The document summarizes a task force meeting to develop an international certification scheme for rough diamonds. It outlines proposed common elements for exporting and importing countries, including prior notifications, tamper-proof packaging, certificates with unique identifiers and transaction details. It identifies potential vulnerabilities like free trade zones and mixed shipments that need addressing. The task force will analyze questionnaire responses to refine the proposed standards and minimum requirements. The objective is to finalize the certification scheme at an upcoming Kimberley Process meeting.

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Kimberley Process Task Force Meeting. London, 10/11 April 2001
I: Introduction
The Task Force considered replies received to date on the questionnaire on national import and
export procedures. Based on that material and the subsequent discussion, and on comments made
at previous meetings of the Kimberley Process on the possible content of an international
certification scheme for rough diamonds, the Task Force agreed on the points set out below.
In line with the mandate given at Windhoek to the Task Force, this paper is designed to shape
and guide discussion at the Kimberley Process plenary in Brussels from 25 to 27 April 2001.
II: Common Elements of Proposals for an International Certification Scheme for Rough
Diamonds
Based on proposals and comments made, some draft elements are set out below:
a) For States Exporting Rough Diamonds
• prior notification to importing country of shipments of rough diamonds
• use only tamper-proof sealed parcels
• all exports to be accompanied by a forgery-proof Certificate containing at a minimum
certain specific information on the parcel contents (see below)
• record and retain over a minimum period all relevant data on exports
• publish relevant data on a regular basis
b) For States Importing Rough Diamonds
• confirmation to exporting country of receipt of shipment of rough diamonds
• accept only tamper-proof sealed parcels accompanied by a forgery-proof Certificate
containing at a minimum certain specific information on the contents (see below)
• record and retain over a minimum period all relevant data on imports
• publish relevant data on a regular basis
c) For the Certificate
• a unique, sequential export number
• a second, randomly-generated and perforated number which does not duplicate the export
number
• details of carat weight and value of parcel
• lists on reverse side quality characteristics of rough diamonds
• authorized and signed by duly appointed government officials
• includes detachable import confirmation certificate with the same perforated number, to
be returned by the importing country to the exporter
d) Other Common Procedures
• appropriate verification procedures
• administrative co-operation and mutual assistance between competent authorities of
exporting and importing states
III: Key Questions to Structure Data Analysis and Further Discussion in Brussels

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Participants in Brussels will also want to reflect in advance on the following points, all of which
should serve as a basis for further discussion:
a) What are the potential vulnerabilities in an international scheme as described in Section II
above (for example in the use of free trade zones, such as customs bonded warehouses and
"Freeports"; the mixing of rough diamond consignments from different countries of origin;
the lack of relevant expertise within Customs authorities etc) and how should we deal with
them?
b) What does the data analysis tell us about such potential vulnerabilities, and about what is
already being done to implement proposed minimum standards?
c) What recommendations can we make for refining / adjusting proposed minimum common
standards, bearing in mind that the initial thoughts set out above remain the subject of
continuing debate?
e) Are there recommendations or suggestions for additional information beyond that set
out in the questionnaire, which would require collection and analysis?
IV: Objective for Kimberley Process Meeting in Brussels
As set out in the road map agreed at Windhoek, the objective is to use the outcome of the
analysis of the questionnaires to refine proposals for minimum acceptable standards for an
international certification scheme for rough diamonds. This will require inter aha prompt
responses to the questionnaire from those countries involved in the rough diamond trade which
have yet to reply. In order to meet this objective, the Task Force recommends that the agenda for
Brussels should focus on the specific suggestions and key issues set out in Sections П and Ш
above. This in due course may further refine the objective for the plenary in Moscow in June
2001.
V: Role for Other International Organizations
The Kimberley Process will seek, where necessary, advice and assistance from competent
international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, the World Customs
Organization, Interpol and the International Standards Organization.