A Blockchain Based Truthful Incentive Mechanism for Distributed P2P Applications

1. “A BLOCKCHAIN BASED TRUTHFUL INCENTIVE
MECHANISM FOR DISTRIBUTED P2P
APPLICATIONS”

2. A
BLOCK-CHAIN BASED
TRUTHFUL INCENTIVE MECHANISM
FOR
DISTRIBUTED P2P APPLICATIONS

3. WHAT IS BLOCKCHAIN
Stores all its transactions onto a public database called as Blockchain.
Features:
• Decentralization
• Transparency
• Immutability
• P2P Network
• Secure Transaction

4. Fundamentally How Block Chain
is Formed

6. BLOCKCHAIN P2P SYSTEM

7. TRANSACTIONS OF BITCOIN
USING
BLOCKCHAIN
TX=(TY, PKB, V, SIGSKA
(TY, PKB, V))

8. THREAT MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS

9. TRANSACTION MODEL USING BLOCK CHAIN

10. Points to pay attentions :
who pays whom
how to pay the bill
how much the payer should pay
how to guarantee that the transaction is secure
BLOCKCHAIN BASED TRUTHFUL
INCENTIVE MECHANISM

11. A. WHO PAYS WHO?
.
In this study, we choose to award only those nodes that contribute to a successful delivery,
which means that an intermediate node cannot get a reward if the receiver does not
receive the message correctly

12. HOW TO PAY THE BILL

13. HOW MUCH SHOULD THE PAYERS PAY?
pi = α/2^ n−1 , if i ∈ P,
= β, if i = E,
= 0, otherwise.

14. Types of Cheating
Behavior
1. Not sending signed Acknowledgement to previous
node.
2. Does not Provide Validation Info.
4. Does not receive but falsely claims to receive
ata.
5. It is an intermediate node colludes with its
neighbors.
3. Provides Vague Validation Info.

15. DATA-TRANSMISSION GAME
a. Players – N+1 Player, 1 => Receiver
b. Strategies – Honest/ Selfish
c. Utilities

16. If Pi send acknowledgement to any other node but not to
previous node then Pi-1 validation can’t be done as Pi-1 keeps
acknowledgement secret by encryption and Pi can’t get the
payment.
If Pi can’t give validation info then Pi can’t get payment Pi-1->Pi.
If Pi falsely claims to receive data, it can’t provide Ri and then
transaction Payment A->P1 can’t be verified and E(Pi) wont get
payment… and if data is important to E then cheating will
damage its benefit.
SECURITY ANALYSIS WITHOUT COLLUSION
ATTACKS

17. SECURITY ANALYSIS WITH COLLUSION ATTACKS
2. Incentive mechanism is Intermediate-node-collusion
resistant
Case 1: Intermediate Nodes Colludes with neighbors to
extend the path.
Case 2: An intermediate node colludes with neighbor to
shorten path.
1. Incentive mechanism is receiver-collusion-resistant if
where q -> probability that two arbitrary nodes encounter
each other.
3. Incentive mechanism is Intermediate node collusion
resistant.

18. UTILITY EVALUATION
1. Overheads that includes system configuration.
Table given below represents CPU processing times.
2. Utility Evaluation
 Utility of a positive cooperative node.
 Utility of the receiver.

19. CONCLUSION
1. Incentive Mechanism that can work in dynamic and
distributed P2P environment.
2. Intermediate nodes that helps in successful delivery can
obtain reward from Blockchain transactions.
3. Commutative encryption used for securely verifying
transactions.
4. Pricing strategy proposed for security of incentive
mechanism which includes detection of selfish users, users
who breaks the chain of transaction.
5. Static game model used to demonstrate security strength of
incentive mechanism.

20. FUTURE RESEARCH SCOPES
1. Consider issues of a sender colluding with its receiver.
2. Introducing reputation based incentive scheme.
3. Considering contradiction of incentive and privacy in
our scheme.
4. Bring certain extensions like zero-knowledge proof and
blind signature to Blockchain.

21. Thank You…
Name
Aakashjit Bhattacharya
Banashree Chatterjee
Bilash Halder
Chinmoy Das

22. REFERENCES
“A Blockchain Based Truthful Incentive
Mechanism for Distributed P2P Applications”
by Yunhua He, Hong Li
https://steemit.com/blog/@khassan/cryptocurr
encies-and-blockchain-are-becoming-a-hot-
trend-in-the-job-market