The document discusses the zero-day market and the dilemmas involved. It presents three scenarios in the iterated zero-day dilemma: submissive, adaptive, and MAD. Cooperation is possible if the seller does not play submissively and can retaliate against defections, such as through full disclosure of vulnerabilities. Cooperation may be sustained as an equilibrium through repetition in the iterated dilemma framework.
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The Bazaar, the Maharaja's Ultimatum, and the Shadow of the Future: Extortion and Cooperation in the Zero-Day Market
1. ...
The Bazaar, the Maharaja’s
Ultimatum, and the
Shadow of the Future:
.
Extortion and Cooperation
in the Zero-day Market
.
Alfonso De Gregorio
.
Founder, BeeWise
..
PHDays V, Moscow, May 26th-27th, 2015
3. ..
Agenda
.
1. The Zero-day Market
A hairy business
2. Relevance
Should I care?
3. The Zero-day Dilemma
Extortion and Cooperation in the Zero-day Market
4. Recommendations to Zero-day traders
How to maximize the payoff?
34. ..
Time-sensitive commodity
.
The Zero-day Market
.
31/112
..
. Valuable only when they are not
widely known
. Value drops to zero, as soon as the
vulnerability is disclosed or a
mitigation is released
. Transactions should complete in
short times
. Discretion required
36. ..
Trust
.
The Zero-day Market
.
33/112
..
. No centralized way to locate its
players
. Finding buyers and sellers is
time-consuming
. Unfamiliar business partners
. Hard to verify intentions
38. ..
Lack of transparency and price fairness
.
The Zero-day Market
.
35/112
..
. Adoption levels of the vulnerable
component
. Presence within a given attack
surface
. Level of authentication required to
exploit it
. Difficulty of independent
rediscovery
. Exploit reliability
42. ..
Reveal
.
The Zero-day Market
.
39/112
..
. Whoever moves first and lose your
asset
. Buyer steals the vulnerability, if the
seller reveals it before the sale
. Seller runs away with the money, if
the buyers pays in advance
43. ..
Demonstrate
.
The Zero-day Market
.
40/112
..
. Whoever controls the computing
environment has an edge
. Does the seller tampers with the
computing environment?
. Does the buyer records the working
of the exploit and steal it?
47. ..
Exclusive rights to the buyer
.
The Zero-day Market
.
44/112
..
. Grant exclusive rights, to receive the
largest payoffs
. What if the seller defects, selling the same
zero-day to multiple parties?
. This time are the buyers to lack a mean to
protect themselves
. Forcing to return the funds?
. Difficulty to identify sellers, to attribute
multiple transactions to the same
supplier, and to enforce contracts helps
the seller willing to betray
49. ..
Proposed solutions
.
The Zero-day Market
.
46/112
. Use punishment (i.e., public disclosure of vulnerabilities) to discourage a
buyer from defecting;
50. ..
Proposed solutions
.
The Zero-day Market
.
46/112
. Use punishment (i.e., public disclosure of vulnerabilities) to discourage a
buyer from defecting;
. Resort to the use of trusted-third parties (e.g., escrow services), as crucial
entities for enabling cooperation of market participants;
51. ..
Proposed solutions
.
The Zero-day Market
.
46/112
. Use punishment (i.e., public disclosure of vulnerabilities) to discourage a
buyer from defecting;
. Resort to the use of trusted-third parties (e.g., escrow services), as crucial
entities for enabling cooperation of market participants;
. Build a reputation system (e.g., reputation score) as an instrument to
establish trust relationships between distrustful players.
54. ..
Motivating questions
.
The Zero-day Market
.
49/112
1. Can the zero-day market achieve cooperation and efficiency even in
absence of trusted-third parties?
55. ..
Motivating questions
.
The Zero-day Market
.
49/112
1. Can the zero-day market achieve cooperation and efficiency even in
absence of trusted-third parties?
2. Can punishment discourage the buyer from defecting?
56. ..
Motivating questions
.
The Zero-day Market
.
49/112
1. Can the zero-day market achieve cooperation and efficiency even in
absence of trusted-third parties?
2. Can punishment discourage the buyer from defecting?
3. Under which conditions a player can extort the opponent?
57. ..
Motivating questions
.
The Zero-day Market
.
49/112
1. Can the zero-day market achieve cooperation and efficiency even in
absence of trusted-third parties?
2. Can punishment discourage the buyer from defecting?
3. Under which conditions a player can extort the opponent?
4. Can cooperation be sustained also in fully anonymous settings?
58. ..
Motivating questions
.
The Zero-day Market
.
49/112
1. Can the zero-day market achieve cooperation and efficiency even in
absence of trusted-third parties?
2. Can punishment discourage the buyer from defecting?
3. Under which conditions a player can extort the opponent?
4. Can cooperation be sustained also in fully anonymous settings?
5. What about semi-anonymous settings?
63. ..
Inability to self-correct
.
Relevance
.
54/112
..
. So ware manufacturers will not
forgo market shares
. So ware users will not forgo
features
. Attackers will not forgo attacking
tens of millions of vulnerable
systems
68. ..
Should I care?
.
Relevance
.
56/112
1. More interconnected
2. More interdependent
3. Greater dynamic range of possible failure
4. Vulnerability information is key to both offensive and defensive purposes
69. ..
Should I care?
.
Relevance
.
56/112
1. More interconnected
2. More interdependent
3. Greater dynamic range of possible failure
4. Vulnerability information is key to both offensive and defensive purposes
5. Prominent role in modern-day intelligence, national security, and law
enforcement operations
73. ..
Where the results find application?
.
Relevance
.
60/112
..
. Over-the-counter zero-day trading
74. ..
Where the results find application?
.
Relevance
.
60/112
..
. Over-the-counter zero-day trading
. Boutique exploit providers offering
zero-day vulnerabilities for a
subscription fee
75. ..
Where the results find application?
.
Relevance
.
60/112
..
. Over-the-counter zero-day trading
. Boutique exploit providers offering
zero-day vulnerabilities for a
subscription fee
. Service models for vulnerability
research
80. ..
Ultimatum Game
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
65/112
..
. A game in economic experiments
. Proposer: receives a sum of money
and propose how to divide the sum
between himself and another
player
. Responder: chooses to either
accept or reject the proposal
. If he accepts, the money is split
according to the proposal
. If he rejects, neither player receives
any money
81. ..
Prisoner’s Dilemma
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
66/112
..
. Two purely “rational” individuals might
not cooperate, even if it appears that it is
in their best interest to do so
. Two prisoners that commited a crime
. If they both do not confess, they get a low
punishment
. If they both confess, they get a more
severe punishment
. If one confesses and the other does not,
then the one that confesses gets a very low
punishment and the other gets a very
severe punishment
82. ..
IPD
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
67/112
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) is a repeated game, where the PD is the
stage game. Agents play the PD game an indefinite number of times.
84. ..
Submissive scenario
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
69/112
..
. Traders are playing the standard PD
. R > P implies that mutual
cooperation is superior to mutual
defection
. T > R and P > S imply that defection
is the dominant strategy for both
agents
. Or, defection is better than
cooperation for one player, no
matter how that player’s opponent
may play
85. ..
Adaptive scenario
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
70/112
..
. Neither the buyer nor the seller have a
dominant strategy, if we assume Z > S and
the U < R
. If the betryed seller has the ability to close
alternative deals for the same exploit (i.e.,
1-Day FUD, 1-Day private exploits), then
defection would not be a dominant
strategy anymore
. The market nature plays a role
. Today not a monopsony and weakly
regulated. Tomorrow rules and
regulations may emerge in this area (e.g.,
Wassenaar Arrangement) and may impact
the market liquidity
86. ..
MAD scenario
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
71/112
..
. A variant of the standard PD, where the
seller has the ability to negate the buyer
the temptation to defect
. Just make sure T approaches P
. Hence, defection is not a dominant
strategy for the buyer
. If factors such as market liquidity,
export/trade regulations, mean-time to
close a deal prevent the Adaptive
retaliation approach from being
undertaken, then the seller should
consider disclosing publicly the exploit or
the vulnerability.
87. ..
MAD scenario
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
72/112
..
. This would not make herself worse off
. The seller would reduce the buyer
incentives to defect in the first place
88. ..
FD & Brinkmanship
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
73/112
..
. To this end, it is important for the
0-Day sellers to have an efficient
mean for doing full-disclosure
89. ..
FD & Brinkmanship
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
73/112
..
. To this end, it is important for the
0-Day sellers to have an efficient
mean for doing full-disclosure
. Not for the sake of bragging rights
anymore, but for modern-day
brinkmanship
90. ..
FD & Brinkmanship
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
73/112
..
. To this end, it is important for the
0-Day sellers to have an efficient
mean for doing full-disclosure
. Not for the sake of bragging rights
anymore, but for modern-day
brinkmanship
. As faster the disclosure of the
vulnerability, as shorter the
window of opportunity to the
exploiter and the smaller the
Residual payoff (V)
91. ..
Fair share of troubles
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
74/112
..
. Since July 2002 the Full-Disclosure
list experienced a “fair share of
legal troubles along the way.”
. Posting on a mailing list may
transalte in an OPSEC failure, if the
anonymity of the submitter is not
protected
92. ..
WhistleDay or ZeroLeaks
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
75/112
. A 0-Day disclosure platform
. Researchers could use it for full-disclosure
. Players in the Zero-day market could use to retaliate against buyers who
defect
. Insiders would turn to it to expose the secretive trade in intrusion and
surveillance technologies
. Dub it WhistleDay or ZeroLeaks, if you like
93. ..
Cooperation is possible
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
76/112
. As long as the seller doesn’t play in the Submissive scenario, the buyer is
not better off defecting
94. ..
Cooperation is possible
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
76/112
. As long as the seller doesn’t play in the Submissive scenario, the buyer is
not better off defecting
. In the one-shot sequential 0-Day Dilemma cooperation is possible
95. ..
Cooperation is possible
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
76/112
. As long as the seller doesn’t play in the Submissive scenario, the buyer is
not better off defecting
. In the one-shot sequential 0-Day Dilemma cooperation is possible
. If this is not the case, the rational outcome is the action profile of mutual
defection
96. ..
Cooperation is possible
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
76/112
. As long as the seller doesn’t play in the Submissive scenario, the buyer is
not better off defecting
. In the one-shot sequential 0-Day Dilemma cooperation is possible
. If this is not the case, the rational outcome is the action profile of mutual
defection
. “We have to distrust each other. It’s our only defense against betrayal.” —
Tennessee Williams
97. ..
Cooperation is possible
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
76/112
. As long as the seller doesn’t play in the Submissive scenario, the buyer is
not better off defecting
. In the one-shot sequential 0-Day Dilemma cooperation is possible
. If this is not the case, the rational outcome is the action profile of mutual
defection
. “We have to distrust each other. It’s our only defense against betrayal.” —
Tennessee Williams
. “The dilemma then is that mutual cooperation yields a better outcome than
mutual defection but it is not the rational outcome because the choice to
cooperate, at the individual level, is not rational from a self-interested point
of view.”
98. ..
Cooperation as an Equilibrium
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
77/112
If no form of punishment can be
undertaken by the seller, can the
cooperative outcome still be sustained
as an equilibrium?
99. ..
Iterated 0-Day Dilemma
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
78/112
. The Iterated 0-Day Dilemma (I0DD) is a repeated game, where the 0-Day
Dilemma is the stage game. Agents play the 0-Day Dilemma game an
indefinite number of times
100. ..
Iterated 0-Day Dilemma
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
78/112
. . The Iterated 0-Day Dilemma (I0DD) is a repeated game, where the 0-Day
Dilemma is the stage game. Agents play the 0-Day Dilemma game an
indefinite number of times
Remark: Whenever the Submissive scenario applies, the I0DD reduces to
the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
101. ..
Three settings
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
79/112
. ..
. Onymous: The traders know the
identity of the party they are
dealing with
102. ..
Three settings
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
79/112
..
. Onymous: The traders know the
identity of the party they are
dealing with
. Anonymous: Trades takes place
among strangers
103. ..
Three settings
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
79/112
..
. Onymous: The traders know the
identity of the party they are
dealing with
. Anonymous: Trades takes place
among strangers
. Semi-anonymous: Either the buyer
or the seller is anonymous
104. ..
Cooperation is possible in onymous economies
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
80/112
..
Aumann, Robert (1959). “Acceptable points
in general cooperative n-person games”. In
Luce, R. D.; Tucker, A. W. Contributions to
the Theory 23 of Games IV. Annals of
Mathematics Study 40. Princeton NJ:
Princeton University Press. pp. 287–324.
MR 0104521.
106. ..
Sentient Player
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
82/112
..
. Power granted to a sentient player
. A player with a theory of mind
. Who realize that her behavior can
influence her opponents’ strategies
109. ..
Evolutionary players
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
85/112
..
A player is said to be evolutionary is she
posses no theory of mind and instead
simply seeks to adjust her strategy to
maximize her own score in response to
whatever the adversary is doing
110. ..
Extortion strategies
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
86/112
. Grant a disproportionate number of high payoffs to the extortionist
. It is the victim’s best interest to cooperate with the extortionist, because she
is able to increase her score by doing so
. In so doing, she ends up increasing the extortionist’s score even more than
her own
. She will never catch up to the extortionist, and she will accede to her
extortionist because it pays her to do so
112. ..
Extortionist strategy: Example
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
88/112
..
. Let R = 3, T = 5, P = 1, S = 0
. Let the desired payoff relation be
Sx − P = 3(Sy − P)
. If we both cooperated last time, then I
cooperate with probability 11/13
. If I cheated you last time (you cooperated
and I defected), then I cooperate with
probability 7/26
. If you cheated me last time (I cooperated
and you defected), then I cooperate with
probability 1/2
. If we both defected last time, I defect
. On average over the long run, my score
minus one will be thrice your score minus
one
114. ..
IPD == Ultimatum Game
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
90/112
..
If both players are sentient, but only one is
aware of ZD-Strategies, then the IPD
reduces to the Ultimatum Game
115. ..
IPD == Ultimatum Game
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
91/112
..
. Let’s suppose both players are sentient
. Let’s suppose the buyer only knows about
ZD-strategies
. The buyer tries to extort the seller
. The seller eventually notice
. The seller decide to sabotage the scores of
both
. This is an Ultimatum Game. The buyer
proposes an unfair ultimatum. And the
seller respond.
116. ..
Generous ZD-Strategies
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
92/112
..
. If both players are sentient and witting of
ZD-Strategies, then they can agree on
playing a Generous ZD-Strategy
117. ..
Generous ZD-Strategies
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
92/112
..
. If both players are sentient and witting of
ZD-Strategies, then they can agree on
playing a Generous ZD-Strategy
. In fact any tentative to extort the opponent
would result in a low payoff for both
118. ..
Generous ZD-Strategies
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
92/112
..
. If both players are sentient and witting of
ZD-Strategies, then they can agree on
playing a Generous ZD-Strategy
. In fact any tentative to extort the opponent
would result in a low payoff for both
. It is rational to agree on a fair cooperation
strategy
119. ..
Generous ZD-Strategies
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
92/112
..
. If both players are sentient and witting of
ZD-Strategies, then they can agree on
playing a Generous ZD-Strategy
. In fact any tentative to extort the opponent
would result in a low payoff for both
. It is rational to agree on a fair cooperation
strategy
. They agree to unilaterally set the other’s
score to an agreed value (presumably the
maximum possible)
120. ..
Generous ZD-Strategies
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
92/112
..
. If both players are sentient and witting of
ZD-Strategies, then they can agree on
playing a Generous ZD-Strategy
. In fact any tentative to extort the opponent
would result in a low payoff for both
. It is rational to agree on a fair cooperation
strategy
. They agree to unilaterally set the other’s
score to an agreed value (presumably the
maximum possible)
. Neither player can then improve her score
by violating the strategy
121. ..
Generous ZD-Strategies
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
92/112
..
. If both players are sentient and witting of
ZD-Strategies, then they can agree on
playing a Generous ZD-Strategy
. In fact any tentative to extort the opponent
would result in a low payoff for both
. It is rational to agree on a fair cooperation
strategy
. They agree to unilaterally set the other’s
score to an agreed value (presumably the
maximum possible)
. Neither player can then improve her score
by violating the strategy
. Each is punished for any purely malicious
violation
123. ..
Generous ZD-strategy: Example
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
94/112
..
. Let R = 3, T = 5, P = 1, S = 0
. Let the desired payoff relation be
Sx − R = 2(Sy − R)
. If we both cooperated last time, then I
cooperate
. If I cheated you last time (you cooperated
and I defected), then I cooperate with
probability 8/10
. If you cheated me last time (I cooperated
and you defected), then I cooperate with
probability 3/10
. If we both defected last time, I cooperate
with probability 2/10
. On average over the long run, my score
minus three will be twice your score minus
three
124. ..
Under the assumption...
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
95/112
..
. Ascribe past actions to the same
market participants
. Choose strategies according to the
outcome of past interactions
126. ..
Anonymous Black Market
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
96/112
..
. Is cooperation possible in
anonymous zero-day markets?
. Do you believe it is?
127. ..
Anonymous Black Market
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
96/112
..
. Is cooperation possible in
anonymous zero-day markets?
. Do you believe it is?
. If yes, which institutions for
monitoring and enforcement
promote cooperation in this
setting?
129. ..
Anonymous Economies: Camera and Casari 1
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
98/112
..
. Cooperation is high and increases
with experience
130. ..
Anonymous Economies: Camera and Casari 1
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
98/112
..
. Cooperation is high and increases
with experience
. Low degree of cooperation when
subject see aggregate outcomes
without observing identities (e.g.,
as might result from discussing
trading experiences in anonymous
fora)
131. ..
Anonymous Economies: Camera and Casari 1
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
98/112
..
. Cooperation is high and increases
with experience
. Low degree of cooperation when
subject see aggregate outcomes
without observing identities (e.g.,
as might result from discussing
trading experiences in anonymous
fora)
. Costly personal punishment
significantly promotes cooperation
132. ..
Anonymous Economies: Camera and Casari 2
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
99/112
..
. Subject were given the possibility
to observe actions and outcomes in
their game and to inflict, at a cost, a
loss in the earnings of the defecting
opponent
133. ..
Anonymous Economies: Camera and Casari 2
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
99/112
..
. Subject were given the possibility
to observe actions and outcomes in
their game and to inflict, at a cost, a
loss in the earnings of the defecting
opponent
. Camera and Casari added a second
stage in the one-shot game
134. ..
Anonymous Economies: Camera and Casari 2
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
99/112
..
. Subject were given the possibility
to observe actions and outcomes in
their game and to inflict, at a cost, a
loss in the earnings of the defecting
opponent
. Camera and Casari added a second
stage in the one-shot game
. The retaliation stage resembles in
full the Adaptive and MAD
scenarios in the 0-Day Dilemma
135. ..
Anonymous Economies: Camera and Casari 3
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
100/112
..
. The player who obseverd the
opponent defect sometimes
employed personal punishment
(i.e., in-match retaliation), while
staying in cooperative mode in the
following periods
136. ..
Anonymous Economies: Camera and Casari 3
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
100/112
..
. The player who obseverd the
opponent defect sometimes
employed personal punishment
(i.e., in-match retaliation), while
staying in cooperative mode in the
following periods
. Players show preference for
in-match retaliation over the
(equilibrium) informal retaliation
137. ..
Anonymous Economies: Camera and Casari 3
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
100/112
..
. The player who obseverd the
opponent defect sometimes
employed personal punishment
(i.e., in-match retaliation), while
staying in cooperative mode in the
following periods
. Players show preference for
in-match retaliation over the
(equilibrium) informal retaliation
. Efficiency: defectors who had been
punished by a cooperator were
more likely to cooperate in the
following periods (34.5% vs 24.1%)
138. ..
Punishment as a Public Good
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
101/112
..
. It significantly increases
cooperation
139. ..
Punishment as a Public Good
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
101/112
..
. It significantly increases
cooperation
. The subject that benefit the most
are cooperator who punish little or
not at all
140. ..
Semi-anonymous Zero-day markets
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
102/112
..
. If only one party is anonymous, the
onymous counterpart has not ability to
know if she already had any deals with the
same participant
141. ..
Semi-anonymous Zero-day markets
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
102/112
..
. If only one party is anonymous, the
onymous counterpart has not ability to
know if she already had any deals with the
same participant
. The latter can’t benefit from being sentient
and is forced to choose her strategies as an
evolutionary player would do
142. ..
Semi-anonymous Zero-day markets
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
102/112
..
. If only one party is anonymous, the
onymous counterpart has not ability to
know if she already had any deals with the
same participant
. The latter can’t benefit from being sentient
and is forced to choose her strategies as an
evolutionary player would do
. If the anonymous party knows about the
ZD-strategies, she can choose to extort the
opponent
143. ..
Semi-anonymous Zero-day markets
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
102/112
..
. If only one party is anonymous, the
onymous counterpart has not ability to
know if she already had any deals with the
same participant
. The latter can’t benefit from being sentient
and is forced to choose her strategies as an
evolutionary player would do
. If the anonymous party knows about the
ZD-strategies, she can choose to extort the
opponent
. Hence, while cooperation can emerge in
fully-anonymous markets, extortion can
profilate in the semi-anonymous
economies
144. ..
To sum up
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
103/112
. Zero-day markets can achieve cooperation even in absence of trusted-third
parties
145. ..
To sum up
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
103/112
. Zero-day markets can achieve cooperation even in absence of trusted-third
parties
. Cooperation can be sustained even when traders are anonymous
146. ..
To sum up
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
103/112
. Zero-day markets can achieve cooperation even in absence of trusted-third
parties
. Cooperation can be sustained even when traders are anonymous
. Punishment is an effective instrument to discourage traders from defecting
147. ..
To sum up
.
The Zero-day Dilemma
.
103/112
. Zero-day markets can achieve cooperation even in absence of trusted-third
parties
. Cooperation can be sustained even when traders are anonymous
. Punishment is an effective instrument to discourage traders from defecting
. It is possible to get extorted, if the adversary knows about ZD-Strategies
and we simply seek to adjust our strategy to maximize our own profit
150. ..
Recommendations
.
Recommendations
.
105/112
1. Do not deal with anonymous traders, if you cannot ensure your own
anonymity
2. Discourage defection by practicing brinkmanship or casting the shadow of
the future in every decision of your counterpart
151. ..
Recommendations
.
Recommendations
.
105/112
1. Do not deal with anonymous traders, if you cannot ensure your own
anonymity
2. Discourage defection by practicing brinkmanship or casting the shadow of
the future in every decision of your counterpart
3. Respond: Consider punishing defection to promote cooperation
152. ..
Recommendations
.
Recommendations
.
105/112
1. Do not deal with anonymous traders, if you cannot ensure your own
anonymity
2. Discourage defection by practicing brinkmanship or casting the shadow of
the future in every decision of your counterpart
3. Respond: Consider punishing defection to promote cooperation
4. Let the seller supply the vulnerability first, if interested in a one-time deal
153. ..
Recommendations
.
Recommendations
.
105/112
1. Do not deal with anonymous traders, if you cannot ensure your own
anonymity
2. Discourage defection by practicing brinkmanship or casting the shadow of
the future in every decision of your counterpart
3. Respond: Consider punishing defection to promote cooperation
4. Let the seller supply the vulnerability first, if interested in a one-time deal
5. Learn about Zero Determinant strategies, if playing in an onymous market
154. ..
Recommendations
.
Recommendations
.
105/112
1. Do not deal with anonymous traders, if you cannot ensure your own
anonymity
2. Discourage defection by practicing brinkmanship or casting the shadow of
the future in every decision of your counterpart
3. Respond: Consider punishing defection to promote cooperation
4. Let the seller supply the vulnerability first, if interested in a one-time deal
5. Learn about Zero Determinant strategies, if playing in an onymous market
6. Grim trigger: forever defect, if you see defection while playing in an
anonymous market and have no ability to punish the opponent
163. ..
BeeWise
.
Backup
.
114/112
..
. BeeWise is the first prediction market for
forecasting security events and trends
. More specifically, it is a security-event
futures exchange where participants trade
contracts whose payoffs are tied to future
events in information security, such as the
discovery of a given so ware vulnerability,
a security incident, or the diffusion of new
malware
164. ..
BeeWise
.
Backup
.
114/112
..
. With a large enough number of people
betting on the outcome of selected events,
the prices of the contracts will be an
approximate measure of the probability of
the underlying events at any time. The
ability to use market prices as
forward-looking indicators of security
properties will help in establishing
information symmetry between buyers
and sellers (ie., build a quality signal), and
help security stakeholders to make better
and more informed decisions, by telling
mediocre security products from good
ones
