The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv

A
VULNERABILITIES AND THEIR
SURROUNDING ETHICAL QUESTIONS:
A CODE OF ETHICS FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR
HackIT 2016, October 7th, Kharkiv, Ukraine
Alfonso De Gregorio, Zeronomicon
#VULNETHICS
@ZERONOMICON
Discuss
#HACKIT2016 #HACKITUA
Agenda
1. The Vulnerability Supply Chain
2. The Surrounding Ethical Questions
3. Code of Ethics: Principles and Standards
4. Concluding Remarks and Debate
SUPPLY CHAIN
THE VULNERABILITIES
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
VULNERABILITIES ARE LIKE POLLUTANTS
INCENTIVES
IT’S WHY WE DO THINGS
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
VULNERABILITY DUMPING
UNRESTRAINED
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
VULNERABILITY DUMPING
UNRESTRAINED
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
INCENTIVE
PERVERSE
– David Rice
“patching allows software manufacturers
to optimize market and legal
protections by "re-negotiating" contract
terms buyers could not
negotiate in the first place”
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
ETHICAL QUESTIONS
THE SURROUNDING
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
THE MORAL LOW GROUND?
WHO HOLDS
THAT EXPLOIT US THE MOST?
WHO ARE THE ONES
IF OUR GOVERNMENTS INTRODUCE TRADE
CONTROLS TO ADMINISTER THE EXPORT OF
INTRUSION SOFTWARE, SHOULD WE DEMAND
SOFTWARE MANUFACTURERS TO INTERNALISE THE
COST OF THE INSECURE SOFTWARE THAT WE
IMPORT INTO OUR LIVES, FOR REASONS OF
SYMMETRY?
SHOULD WE MAKE THEM LIABLE FOR THE DEFECTS
AND FLAWS THAT ALLOW THE INTRUSION IN THE
FIRST PLACE?
WITH INCOMPLETE KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE REAL-
WORLD SECURITY OF SYSTEMS WE ENTRUST OUR
BUSINESS, IS IT ETHICAL TO REFRAIN US FROM
HUNTING VULNERABILITIES OR PREVENT OTHERS
FROM DOING LIKEWISE?
AND, WHAT SHOULD DO A SECURITY RESEARCHER
WITH THE VULNERABILITIES WHEN THEY GET
FOUND?
IS FULL DISCLOSURE AN ACCEPTABLE COURSE OF
ACTION?
DOES FULL DISCLOSURE BECOMES MORE
ACCEPTABLE IF THE AFFECTED VENDOR IGNORES
THE VULNERABILITIES THAT WERE REPORTED
RESPONSIBLY OR FAILS TO PROVIDE A TIMELY
PATCH?
DOES COORDINATED VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE
PROVIDE A MORE ETHICALLY SOUND PATH TO BE
TAKEN?
DOES THE SAME PATH REMAINS MORALLY
PREFERABLE IF ONE OF THE PARTIES, WHO RECEIVES
THE VULNERABILITY INFORMATION FROM THE
COORDINATOR PRIOR TO ITS PUBLIC DISCLOSURE,
DECIDES TO USE IT TO EXPLOIT VULNERABLE
ENTITIES?
ARE BUG BOUNTY PROGRAMS EXPLOITING BOUNTY
HUNTERS?
A Data Point
Target: Microsoft Outlook on the web (OWA)
Exploit: Remote Code Execution
Price: $200,000 USD
Expires on: November 30th, 2016

https://www.zeronomi.com/campaigns.html
SHOULD BUG HUNTERS PRETEND TO GET PAID IF
THE OTHER PARTY HAS NOT ASKED THEM TO DO
THEIR WORK?
WHAT GOVERNMENT SECURITY AGENCIES SHOULD
DO WITH VULNERABILITIES?
SHOULD THEY EXPLOIT THEM OR SHOULD THEY LET
EVERYBODY ELSE MITIGATE THEM, IN THE WAY THEY
ALREADY DO?
SHOULD THEY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THOSE
VULNERABILITIES TO BENEFIT A LIMITED NUMBER
OF STAKEHOLDERS, OR SHOULD THEY DISCLOSE
THEM TO ALL AFFECTED CONSTITUENTS?
HAS THE POWER INEQUITY IN THE VULNERABILITY
EQUATION TO BE BALANCED?
WITH ENTITIES AFFECTED BY VULNERABILITIES
SPREAD ALL AROUND THE WORLD, HOW TO INFORM
THE PUBLIC?
WITH VENDORS THREATENING LEGAL ACTION AND
SUPPORTED BY THEIR SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL
RESOURCES, HOW TO PROTECT THE SECURITY
RESEARCHERS?
WITH OUR SOCIETY GROWING MORE DATA
INTENSIVE, HOW TO OVERSEE NOT ONLY MATERIAL
AND TECHNOLOGY BUT ALSO KNOWLEDGE?
HOW DO THE ATTEMPTS TO STRIKE A BALANCE
BETWEEN SCIENTIFIC OPENNESS AND NATIONAL
SECURITY […] REDEFINE SCIENCE-SECURITY
RELATIONS?
HOW DOES SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE BECOME
SUBJECT TO SECURITY GOVERNANCE?
HOW DOES THIS DYNAMIC AFFECT THE LINKS
AMONG SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE, SECURITY
EXPERTISE AND POLITICAL DECISION?
CAN WE REGARD HACKING TO BE AN ETHICAL
PRACTICE AND CONDEMN, AT THE SAME TIME, THE
TRADE OF CAPABILITIES ENABLING THIS PRACTICE
AS IMMORAL?
WHAT TO DO?
THE NON-ZERO SOCIETAL RISKS
NOT IPSO FACTO GOOD OR BAD
NOT IPSO FACTO GOOD OR BAD
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
Depending from which side of the playing field we look at things, the use of the same capability might be considered differently if it goes towards the creation or the detriment of
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
CULTURE OF RESPONSIBILITY
CODE OF ETHICS
SIX PRINCIPLES
EIGHT STANDARDS
THE PRINCIPLES ARE
ASPIRATIONAL GOALS AIMED AT
GUIDING AND INSPIRING THE
CONDUCT OF BUSINESS
THE ETHICAL STANDARDS ARE
ENFORCEABLE RULES FOR THE
DAY-TO-DAY BUSINESS
OPERATIONS.
PRINCIPLE A: 

CLEAN HANDS
R e s p e c t a l l h u m a n r i g h t s
proclaimed by international human
rights treaties, including The
International Bill of Human Rights,
and strive to ensure no complicity in
any human rights abuses.
STANDARD 1: VETTING AND
MONITORING OF CUSTOMERS
Do not engage in any business with
entities known for abusing human
rights and reserves the right to
s u s p e n d o r c e a s e b u s i n e s s
operations with entities found to be
involved at a later time in human
rights abuses.
PRINCIPLE B: 

DO NOT POSE A DANGER TO
HUMAN HEALTH
Champion the health of human beings and
commit to do not enable your Customer entities
with capabilities that may pose a direct danger
to human health.
STANDARD 2: 

INADMISSIBLE CAPABILITIES
Do not engage in any trade of capabilities that
exploit vulnerabilities in medical devices or in
systems to which human life is entrusted, unless
the Vendor of the affected device or system is the
Acquiring Entity or the Acquiring Entity was
authorised by the Vendor to be the recipient of
the vulnerability disclosure process, vulnerability
information, or risk mitigation strategy.
STANDARD 3: 

TRADE SECRETS
You will never trade in stolen trade secrets, and
require your suppliers to certify that they have
independently found the vulnerability and
autonomously developed any related technology,
and that they are not employees of the targeted
software manufacturer, nor have they received
access to the confidential information through a
disclosure by the same.
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
PRINCIPLE C: 

AVOID CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Strive to benefit those with whom you do
business and take care to avoid possible
conflicts of interest that could cause your
Company, its Employees, or Contractors to
pursue goals not in the interest of the
Company business peers.
STANDARD 4: 

OVEREXPLOITATION
You will protect the value of the traded capabilities.
You will specify the maximum number of entities to
which the same capabilities may be sold, within a
given time-frame (unless in case the capabilities are
intended for risk prevention).



Furthermore, you shall strive not to sell a
vulnerability to one party, and the technology to
defend against that vulnerability to another party
which is a likely target of the first.

STANDARD 5: 

UNINTENDED USE
Prohibit yourself, employees and contractors to use
the information or the capabilities, traded in the
fulfilment of the service, for the pursuit of personal
goals. Authorised personnel shall use such
capabilities only to test and validate them, and
more generally only for research and development
purposes.

PRINCIPLE D: 

OBEY THE LAW
Comply with all applicable legal requirements
and understands the major laws and
regulations that apply to your business,
including laws related to: trade controls, anti-
bribery, competition, trade secret, money
laundering and insider trading.
STANDARD 6: 

EXPORTING
Comply with trade laws controlling where
the you can send products and services,
strive to meet the criteria required to hold
export licenses, where applicable, and stay
alert to changes to the applicable export
licensing systems.
PRINCIPLE E: 

PRESERVE CONFIDENTIALITY
Protect the confidentiality of the identity of
entities you do business with and the the
confidentiality of the information and
intellectual properties received from, or
provided to, your business peers in the
fulfilment of your Service. At the same time,
recognize that the extent and limits of
confidentiality may be regulated by applicable
laws and regulations.
STANDARD 7: 

MAINTAINING CONFIDENTIALITY
At the extent and limits regulated by
applicable laws and regulations, preserve
the confidentiality of the identity of entities
you do business with. Restrict access to
the information and the intellectual property
received from or provided to your business
partners on a need-to-know basis,
enforcing a principle of least privilege
PRINCIPLE F: DOCTRINE OF
DOUBLE EFFECT AND DUAL USE
Acknowledge that the capabilities you provide may be used within
goods that, just like any and all information security tools, are
inherently dual purpose and potentially dual use, and therefore may
serve also military purposes, police investigations and the like; the
military use of the traded capabilities may have a double effect: the
intended effect and the foreseen but genuinely unintended
consequence. While discouraging against harmful side effects, you
acknowledge the inherent duality of the effects resulting from the
use of those capabilities and you trade them, unless they are in
conflict with other principles set forth in the present Ethics Code.
STANDARD 8: DUALITY
Acknowledge that the capabilities you provide can
be used within goods that are inherently dual
purpose and accept to supply them, as long as it is
foreseeable that those capabilities will be used only
for legitimate purposes in line with international
standards for the respect of human rights, and
unless their trade is in conflict with principles set
out in the present Ethics Code.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
AND DEBATE
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
– Ayn Rand
“Every aspect of Western culture needs a
new code of ethics — a rational ethics — as
a precondition of rebirth.”
Every aspect of the vulnerabilities
supply chain needs a new code of ethics
— a rational ethics — as a precondition
of rebirth.
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
– Earl Warren
“In a civilised life, law floats in a sea of
ethics.”
– Steven Aftergood
“Expanding the scope of ethical deliberation over new
technology may seem like a daunting prospect bound to impede
innovation.”
THANK YOU!
ANY QUESTIONS?
The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv
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The Vulnerability Supply Chain - HackIT Ukraine 2016, Kharkiv

  • 1. VULNERABILITIES AND THEIR SURROUNDING ETHICAL QUESTIONS: A CODE OF ETHICS FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR HackIT 2016, October 7th, Kharkiv, Ukraine Alfonso De Gregorio, Zeronomicon
  • 3. Agenda 1. The Vulnerability Supply Chain 2. The Surrounding Ethical Questions 3. Code of Ethics: Principles and Standards 4. Concluding Remarks and Debate
  • 50. – David Rice “patching allows software manufacturers to optimize market and legal protections by "re-negotiating" contract terms buyers could not negotiate in the first place”
  • 72. THE MORAL LOW GROUND? WHO HOLDS
  • 73. THAT EXPLOIT US THE MOST? WHO ARE THE ONES
  • 74. IF OUR GOVERNMENTS INTRODUCE TRADE CONTROLS TO ADMINISTER THE EXPORT OF INTRUSION SOFTWARE, SHOULD WE DEMAND SOFTWARE MANUFACTURERS TO INTERNALISE THE COST OF THE INSECURE SOFTWARE THAT WE IMPORT INTO OUR LIVES, FOR REASONS OF SYMMETRY?
  • 75. SHOULD WE MAKE THEM LIABLE FOR THE DEFECTS AND FLAWS THAT ALLOW THE INTRUSION IN THE FIRST PLACE?
  • 76. WITH INCOMPLETE KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE REAL- WORLD SECURITY OF SYSTEMS WE ENTRUST OUR BUSINESS, IS IT ETHICAL TO REFRAIN US FROM HUNTING VULNERABILITIES OR PREVENT OTHERS FROM DOING LIKEWISE?
  • 77. AND, WHAT SHOULD DO A SECURITY RESEARCHER WITH THE VULNERABILITIES WHEN THEY GET FOUND?
  • 78. IS FULL DISCLOSURE AN ACCEPTABLE COURSE OF ACTION?
  • 79. DOES FULL DISCLOSURE BECOMES MORE ACCEPTABLE IF THE AFFECTED VENDOR IGNORES THE VULNERABILITIES THAT WERE REPORTED RESPONSIBLY OR FAILS TO PROVIDE A TIMELY PATCH?
  • 80. DOES COORDINATED VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE PROVIDE A MORE ETHICALLY SOUND PATH TO BE TAKEN?
  • 81. DOES THE SAME PATH REMAINS MORALLY PREFERABLE IF ONE OF THE PARTIES, WHO RECEIVES THE VULNERABILITY INFORMATION FROM THE COORDINATOR PRIOR TO ITS PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, DECIDES TO USE IT TO EXPLOIT VULNERABLE ENTITIES?
  • 82. ARE BUG BOUNTY PROGRAMS EXPLOITING BOUNTY HUNTERS?
  • 83. A Data Point Target: Microsoft Outlook on the web (OWA) Exploit: Remote Code Execution Price: $200,000 USD Expires on: November 30th, 2016
 https://www.zeronomi.com/campaigns.html
  • 84. SHOULD BUG HUNTERS PRETEND TO GET PAID IF THE OTHER PARTY HAS NOT ASKED THEM TO DO THEIR WORK?
  • 85. WHAT GOVERNMENT SECURITY AGENCIES SHOULD DO WITH VULNERABILITIES?
  • 86. SHOULD THEY EXPLOIT THEM OR SHOULD THEY LET EVERYBODY ELSE MITIGATE THEM, IN THE WAY THEY ALREADY DO?
  • 87. SHOULD THEY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THOSE VULNERABILITIES TO BENEFIT A LIMITED NUMBER OF STAKEHOLDERS, OR SHOULD THEY DISCLOSE THEM TO ALL AFFECTED CONSTITUENTS?
  • 88. HAS THE POWER INEQUITY IN THE VULNERABILITY EQUATION TO BE BALANCED?
  • 89. WITH ENTITIES AFFECTED BY VULNERABILITIES SPREAD ALL AROUND THE WORLD, HOW TO INFORM THE PUBLIC?
  • 90. WITH VENDORS THREATENING LEGAL ACTION AND SUPPORTED BY THEIR SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL RESOURCES, HOW TO PROTECT THE SECURITY RESEARCHERS?
  • 91. WITH OUR SOCIETY GROWING MORE DATA INTENSIVE, HOW TO OVERSEE NOT ONLY MATERIAL AND TECHNOLOGY BUT ALSO KNOWLEDGE?
  • 92. HOW DO THE ATTEMPTS TO STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN SCIENTIFIC OPENNESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY […] REDEFINE SCIENCE-SECURITY RELATIONS?
  • 93. HOW DOES SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE BECOME SUBJECT TO SECURITY GOVERNANCE?
  • 94. HOW DOES THIS DYNAMIC AFFECT THE LINKS AMONG SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE, SECURITY EXPERTISE AND POLITICAL DECISION?
  • 95. CAN WE REGARD HACKING TO BE AN ETHICAL PRACTICE AND CONDEMN, AT THE SAME TIME, THE TRADE OF CAPABILITIES ENABLING THIS PRACTICE AS IMMORAL?
  • 98. NOT IPSO FACTO GOOD OR BAD
  • 99. NOT IPSO FACTO GOOD OR BAD
  • 102. Depending from which side of the playing field we look at things, the use of the same capability might be considered differently if it goes towards the creation or the detriment of
  • 117. THE PRINCIPLES ARE ASPIRATIONAL GOALS AIMED AT GUIDING AND INSPIRING THE CONDUCT OF BUSINESS
  • 118. THE ETHICAL STANDARDS ARE ENFORCEABLE RULES FOR THE DAY-TO-DAY BUSINESS OPERATIONS.
  • 119. PRINCIPLE A: 
 CLEAN HANDS R e s p e c t a l l h u m a n r i g h t s proclaimed by international human rights treaties, including The International Bill of Human Rights, and strive to ensure no complicity in any human rights abuses.
  • 120. STANDARD 1: VETTING AND MONITORING OF CUSTOMERS Do not engage in any business with entities known for abusing human rights and reserves the right to s u s p e n d o r c e a s e b u s i n e s s operations with entities found to be involved at a later time in human rights abuses.
  • 121. PRINCIPLE B: 
 DO NOT POSE A DANGER TO HUMAN HEALTH Champion the health of human beings and commit to do not enable your Customer entities with capabilities that may pose a direct danger to human health.
  • 122. STANDARD 2: 
 INADMISSIBLE CAPABILITIES Do not engage in any trade of capabilities that exploit vulnerabilities in medical devices or in systems to which human life is entrusted, unless the Vendor of the affected device or system is the Acquiring Entity or the Acquiring Entity was authorised by the Vendor to be the recipient of the vulnerability disclosure process, vulnerability information, or risk mitigation strategy.
  • 123. STANDARD 3: 
 TRADE SECRETS You will never trade in stolen trade secrets, and require your suppliers to certify that they have independently found the vulnerability and autonomously developed any related technology, and that they are not employees of the targeted software manufacturer, nor have they received access to the confidential information through a disclosure by the same.
  • 125. PRINCIPLE C: 
 AVOID CONFLICTS OF INTEREST Strive to benefit those with whom you do business and take care to avoid possible conflicts of interest that could cause your Company, its Employees, or Contractors to pursue goals not in the interest of the Company business peers.
  • 126. STANDARD 4: 
 OVEREXPLOITATION You will protect the value of the traded capabilities. You will specify the maximum number of entities to which the same capabilities may be sold, within a given time-frame (unless in case the capabilities are intended for risk prevention).
 
 Furthermore, you shall strive not to sell a vulnerability to one party, and the technology to defend against that vulnerability to another party which is a likely target of the first.

  • 127. STANDARD 5: 
 UNINTENDED USE Prohibit yourself, employees and contractors to use the information or the capabilities, traded in the fulfilment of the service, for the pursuit of personal goals. Authorised personnel shall use such capabilities only to test and validate them, and more generally only for research and development purposes.

  • 128. PRINCIPLE D: 
 OBEY THE LAW Comply with all applicable legal requirements and understands the major laws and regulations that apply to your business, including laws related to: trade controls, anti- bribery, competition, trade secret, money laundering and insider trading.
  • 129. STANDARD 6: 
 EXPORTING Comply with trade laws controlling where the you can send products and services, strive to meet the criteria required to hold export licenses, where applicable, and stay alert to changes to the applicable export licensing systems.
  • 130. PRINCIPLE E: 
 PRESERVE CONFIDENTIALITY Protect the confidentiality of the identity of entities you do business with and the the confidentiality of the information and intellectual properties received from, or provided to, your business peers in the fulfilment of your Service. At the same time, recognize that the extent and limits of confidentiality may be regulated by applicable laws and regulations.
  • 131. STANDARD 7: 
 MAINTAINING CONFIDENTIALITY At the extent and limits regulated by applicable laws and regulations, preserve the confidentiality of the identity of entities you do business with. Restrict access to the information and the intellectual property received from or provided to your business partners on a need-to-know basis, enforcing a principle of least privilege
  • 132. PRINCIPLE F: DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT AND DUAL USE Acknowledge that the capabilities you provide may be used within goods that, just like any and all information security tools, are inherently dual purpose and potentially dual use, and therefore may serve also military purposes, police investigations and the like; the military use of the traded capabilities may have a double effect: the intended effect and the foreseen but genuinely unintended consequence. While discouraging against harmful side effects, you acknowledge the inherent duality of the effects resulting from the use of those capabilities and you trade them, unless they are in conflict with other principles set forth in the present Ethics Code.
  • 133. STANDARD 8: DUALITY Acknowledge that the capabilities you provide can be used within goods that are inherently dual purpose and accept to supply them, as long as it is foreseeable that those capabilities will be used only for legitimate purposes in line with international standards for the respect of human rights, and unless their trade is in conflict with principles set out in the present Ethics Code.
  • 136. – Ayn Rand “Every aspect of Western culture needs a new code of ethics — a rational ethics — as a precondition of rebirth.”
  • 137. Every aspect of the vulnerabilities supply chain needs a new code of ethics — a rational ethics — as a precondition of rebirth.
  • 139. – Earl Warren “In a civilised life, law floats in a sea of ethics.”
  • 140. – Steven Aftergood “Expanding the scope of ethical deliberation over new technology may seem like a daunting prospect bound to impede innovation.”