1. Louisiana State University
On Fundamental Principles
of Moral Frameworks
Zakary McDonald
Historical Introduction to Metaphysics
February 2015

2. In this paper, I will show that Harman’s subjective moral theory is less plausible than arguments for an
objective moral theory. I will proceed by first discussing what moral frameworks are and how they can differ from
culture to culture; second, I will explicate a Parfitian account of reasons; third, I will discuss subjectivism, both in
general and Harman’s particular account; fourth, I will delineate two objections to Harman’s account of
subjectivism; fifth, I will discuss objectivism, both in general and Parfit’s account; finally, I will defend Parfit
against the two objections previously discusssed.
I. Moral frameworks
A moral framework is a set of principles that dictate what an individual ought to do. Normally, moral
frameworks are agreed upon by a group of individuals called a culture. Which set of principles a culture chooses
to make up a moral framework can differ from one culture to the next due to nuanced factors (this term will be
discussed at greater length later on). For example, the moral framework of most Christian cultures would include
the principle that a husband ought to have only one wife. If an individual is a part of the Christian culture, then
that person subscribes to the belief that monogamy is morally right.
Moral frameworks can differ from culture to culture, so principles from one culture could possibly
contradict a principle from another culture. For example, a Mormon culture might permit polygamy while a
Christian culture prohibits it. Since different cultures’ principles do often contradict one another, it is the case that
either (1) the rightness or wrongness of a principle is relative to its moral framework within a culture or (2) the
rightness or wrongness of a principle can be adequately judged according to an independent criterion. For
example, the principles that polygamy is wrong and monogamy is right are either (1) true relative to the Christian
culture or (2) true according to an independent criterion of morality.
Darius, the Persian king, came to the conclusion that moral frameworks often differ from culture to
culture after observing contradictory principles about funeral rites from the Greeks and Callatians: for the
Greeks, dead bodies were customarily burned upon a funeral pyre; for the Callatians, dead bodies were eaten
by friends and relatives of the deceased. When he asked members from each culture what it would take for them
to adopt the other culture’s funeral rite, they replied that nothing could persuade them to do so, for the other
culture’s principle about funeral rites is morally wrong.1
II. Reasons
Reasons are important when discussing principles because we only accept principles for which there are
good reasons to accept. Reasons are given by facts, and, according to Parfit, “we respond to these reasons if
our awareness of these facts leads us to do, or try to do, what we have these reasons to do” (32). For example,
the fact that I am hungry gives me reason to go make a sandwich. My awareness of that fact leads me to go
make a sandwich.
Parfit discusses two kinds of reasons: decisive and sufficient. Decisive reasons, he contends, “are
stronger than our reasons to act in any of the other possible ways... and acting in this way is what we have most
reason to do” (32).2
For example, the fact that I am hungry and the fact that eating a sandwich will assuage my
hunger both give me a reason to make a sandwich instead of, say, run on a treadmill at the gym. Sufficient
reasons, however, “are not weaker than, or outweighed by, our reasons to act in any of the other possible ways”
1 Herodotus. The Histories. Trans. Aubrey de Selincourt. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972. 215-220.
2 Parfit, Derek. On What Matters. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

3. (33).2
For example, the fact that I am hungry and the fact that eating a sandwich will assuage my hunger both
give me sufficient reason to either make a peanut butter sandwich or make a turkey sandwich.
Now, we, as individuals, act rationally “if we act in some way because we have beliefs about the relevant
facts whose truth would give us sufficient reason to act in this way” (35).2
That is to say, rationality is the
appropriate response to sufficient and decisive reasons. If I were to get a job because I need to pay rent, I would
be responding appropriately to the fact that I need to pay rent and therefore be acting rationally. On the other
hand, we act irrationally “if we act in some way despite having beliefs whose truth would give us clear and
strongly decisive reasons not to act in this way” (35).2
That is to say, irrationality is the inappropriate response to
decisive and sufficient reasons. If I were to gamble away what few remaining dollars I have left because I need
to pay rent, I would be responding inappropriately to the fact that I need to pay rent and therefore be acting
irrationally.
As we have discussed, which set of principles a culture chooses to make up their moral framework is
dependent on nuanced factors. If the choice of principles is merely a response to nuanced factors, then nuanced
factors are nothing more than facts which give a culture reason to adopt certain principles; moreover, it is the
content of these facts that is most contentious: opposing theories about the content of the facts that influence
moral frameworks are in argument about whether facts about the individuals’ desires or facts about an
independent criterion should influence which principles a culture chooses. Theories that contend facts about the
individuals’ desires should influence which principles a culture chooses are know as subjective theories about
reason-giving facts. Theories that contend facts about an independent criterion should influence which principles
a culture should choose are known as objective theories about reason-giving facts.
III. Subjectivism
For subjective theories about reason-giving facts, the fact that an individual has a desire gives the
individual reason to respond appropriately to the desire. For example, the fact that I want to eat an apple gives
me reason to go to the store and purchase one. Furthermore, it is this present desire that gives me reason to go
to the store and purchase one, not some future desire. The fact that next week I will want an apple does not give
me reason to go to the store and purchase one since I do not presently have any desire for one.
Harman makes similar claims when he says that “we make inner judgments about a person only if we
suppose that he is capable of being motivated by the relevant moral considerations” (4).3
That is to say, we often
assume that others have the same present desires that we do and that they will respond appropriately to the
desire. For example, if I had the desire to turn in a lost wallet to the police station, then I might assume that
others would have the same desire in similar situations and they they would respond appropriately by taking the
wallet to the police station; however, Harman suggests that it is wrong to assume that an individual would have
the same desire in similar situations and it is wrong therefore to say that an individual has a moral obligation to
take the wallet to a police station.
Individuals within a culture do share moral obligations, so Harman must rectify this discrepancy. He does
so by appealing to what he calls moral bargaining: “It is enough if various members of society knowingly reach
an agreement in intentions-- each intending to act in certain ways on the understanding that the others have
similar intentions” (13).3
That is to say, individuals come together (either implicitly or explicitly) to choose and
3 Harman, Gilbert. “Moral Relativism Defended.” The Philosophical Review 84, no. 1 (1975): 3- 22.

4. restrict a set of present desires to be pursued and also the appropriate response to each present desire. Since
individuals could not possibly fulfill all of their present desires, Harman contends that individuals start by
choosing principles that promote their fundamental desire, namely the preservation of life: “You cannot, except in
very special circumstances, rationally form the intention not to try to preserve your life if it should ever be
threatened” (14).3
The claim that individuals start by choosing principles that promote the preservation of life is
supported, he contends, by the prominence of such principles in legislation. For example, American legislators
came together, with voters, and chose to restrict the present desire to drive under the influence of alcohol, a
desire that would not promote the preservation of life, such that the appropriate response to that present desire
is to reject it.
Thus, in what we can call the Subjective Theory of Moral Bargaining (or STMB), Harman contends that
(A) Cultures have moral frameworks that consist of principles.
(B) Principles differ from culture to culture based on reason-giving facts about present desires.
(C) Individuals have particular present desires that might contradict one another
Therefore
(D) Individuals must bargain with one another to choose and restrict a set of present desires to be
pursued and the appropriate response to each present desire, both of which must be a rational present desire
for the individuals to pursue.
Therefore
(E) The criterion of judgment for a moral principle is how well it fulfills the present desires of the
subscribing individuals.
IV. Objections against subjectivism
A. The Agony Argument
In his book, Parfit delineates the following problem with subjective theories about reason-giving facts:
suppose that great destruction awaits a culture, but the individuals of the culture have no present desires to
avoid the great destruction; since the fact that they do not have a desire to avoid destruction gives them reason
to wait idly by, they might be unanimous in accepting a principle that results in their destruction. The point being
that if moral principles are dependent on present desires , then such desires could lead to irrational principles.
However, it could be argued that although the individuals of the culture have not present desire to avoid
destruction, they could have a future desire when they encounter the destruction. This future desire could then
lead to a rational moral principle that addresses the destruction.
Two points need to be made about this counterargument: (1) what the Agony Argument shows is that a
moral framework that bases its principles on the present desires of its individuals could lead to irrational moral
principles and (2) though a future principle might negate the present irrational principle, the fact remains that a
culture’s moral framework could be dependent on irrational desires.
B. The Repugnant Principles Argument
Not only could the moral principles of a culture be irrational, but they could also have instinctively base
and repugnant implications. Suppose culture A accepts a principle that fulfills their present desires by enslaving
culture B. The fact that the only way their present desires can be fulfilled is through the enslavement of culture B
gives them reason to accept a principle of enslavement.

5. Because, for a subjective theory of reason-giving facts, the criterion of judgment for a moral principle is
how well it fulfills the present desires of the subscribing individuals, and because this principle of enslavement
does fulfill the individuals of culture A’s present desires, the principle is good for culture A and bad for culture B.
Since evaluative terms like “good” and “bad” are dependent on the conformity of a principle with a culture’s
present desires, culture B can not say that the principle is bad in general, but merely that the principle is bad for
culture B.
Harman accounts for this objection when he says, concerning a man who kills for a living, “it would be a
misuse of language to say of him that he ought not to kill Ortcutt or that it would be wrong of him to do so, since
that would imply our own moral considerations carry some weight with him, which they do not” (5).3
That is to
say, because the man does not have the same desires as us in similar situations, he does not hold the same
principles that we do and, therefore, is not acting irrationally according to his moral framework.
However, this reply does not so much circumvent the objection I presented as it does exemplify the
problem with subjective theories about reason-giving facts. By this I mean that if a theory on reasons can not
give us good reason to condemn acts which we, admittedly, pre-analytically judge as immoral, then such an
account is not worth taking seriously.
V. Objectivism
Objective theories about reason-giving facts contend that the facts are about an independent standard
which gives us reasons to act. While the standard can differ from theory to theory, I will focus on the standard
which I find to be the most plausible, namely the promotion of positive or neutral benefits. On this view, it is the
act which promotes either positive benefits (the benefits outweigh the burdens) or neutral benefits (the benefits
are equal to the burdens). Thus, the fact that an act will promote positive or neutral benefits gives us reason to
perform the action. For example, the fact that eating an apple will promote, in me, positive or neutral benefits
gives me reason to eat the apple; moreover, I do not eat the apple because of a desire-based reason, but
instead because of a reason independent of my desires, namely an objective-based reason.
According to this view, a culture operates no differently. The fact that a principle will promote positive or
neutral benefits gives the culture reason to accept the principle either as a form of act consequentialism or rule
consequentialism. Act consequentialism is a moral theory of objective-based reasons that claims “everyone
ought always to do, or try to do, whatever would best achieve one or more common aims” (246).2
The aim here,
of course, is to promote positive or neutral benefits. Rule consequentialsim, on the other hand, is another moral
theory of objective-based reasons that claims “we ought instead to follow the optimific [promoting the most
positive or neutral benefits] rules even when, by acting in this way, we would be likely or even certain to make
things go worse” (252).2
Thus, a theory of rule consequentialism often holds that while following principles of a
moral framework might lead to less short-term positive or neutral benefits, it leads to more positive or neutral
benefits in the long-term. For example, the fact that honesty will promote, in a culture, positive or neutral benefits
in the long-term gives the culture reason to accept the principle of honesty.
Because the moral principles are dependent on an objective standard, every individual (not just
individuals of a particular culture) can reasonably accept or reject a principle in the same way, regardless of
particular desires. Thus, if it is reasonable to one individual that a principle of honesty should be part of a
culture’s moral framework, it is reasonable for all individuals of any culture to accept the principle of honesty, so

6. long as the objective standard is met. Thus, in what we can call the Objective Benefit Theory of Cultural Morals
(or OBTCM),
(A) Cultures have moral frameworks that consist of principles.
(B) Moral principles are dependent on reason-giving facts about positive or neutral benefits.
Therefore
(C) The reason-giving facts about positive or neutral benefits are the same for every individual.
Therefore
(D)The criterion of judgment for a moral principle is whether or not it promotes positive or neutral
benefits.
VI. Objections against objectivism
A. The Agony Argument
Since the problem that the Agony Argument presents comes from a lack of present desires and thereby
leads to an irrational principle, the Agony Argument presents no problem for an objective theory about reason-
giving facts. If the individuals were to choose between a principle which results in their destruction and a
principle which results in their survival based on OBTCM, where the former promotes negative benefits, or
burdens, and the latter promotes positive or neutral benefits, then the rational principle to choose would be the
principle which results in their survival. Therefore, since OBTCM led the culture to accept a rational principle
which avoids destruction, and can only do so, it overcomes the Agony Argument.
B. The Repugnant Principles Argument
It is often argued that an independent standard based on the promotion of the most positive or neutral
benefits might lead to burdens on a minority being overlooked for the sake of the benefits of a majority. For
example, suppose that a black man must be wrongly convicted by a judge for a crime he did not commit,
otherwise the racist culture in which he lives will riot. Certainly wrongly convicting the man would produce the
most positive or neutral benefits for the town, so the town is reasonably obligated to convict the man according
to OBTCM. Such a conclusion is unacceptable.
To avoid this conclusion, we should shift the focus from the total sum of positive or negative benefits
promoted instead to a look at the facts relevant to the situation which give us reason to accept a principle. Since
the townspeople are acting in contradiction to the fact that the man is innocent, we might say that they are acting
irrationally, that is contradictory to what they have most reason to do. Furthermore, if we posit as a fact that all
men are created equal and, therefore, that there is no reason for individuals to discriminate based on race, then
we could argue that the townspeople’s racism is irrational.
VII. Closing remarks
If Harman is right, then several harrowing implications arise, worst of which are the facts that we could
neither prevent disastrous irrational principles nor condemn the instinctively base and repugnant customs of
some cultures as morally inferior or praise instinctively good, new customs as an improvement over the older
ones. But, as I believe I have shown, a moral theory that bases its principles on desires is fated to disagreement
and dissatisfaction about those very desires. For that reason, a moral theory that bases its principles on an
independent criterion is much more plausible.

7. Annotated bibliography
Harman, Gilbert. “Moral Relativism Defended.” The Philosophical Review 84, no. 1 (1975): 3-22.
In this article, Harman discusses inner judgments, their logical form, and moral bargaining. Inner judgments, he
contends, are when we assume that other individuals have the same desires and, therefore, moral frameworks
that we do. Because we assume this, we judge any action that contradicts a principle within our moral framework
as immoral. Moral bargaining, for Harman, is when individuals come together to choose (either implicitly or
explicitly) principles for a moral framework that will fulfill, as much as possible, the individuals’ present desires.
Harman, Gilbert. “Moral Relativism Explained.” Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.
In his paper, Harman explains the tenets of moral relativism: there can not be universal moral truths because
different cultures disagree about what is moral and what is not. Just as a language changes gradually over time
and adapts to its language-users, so does morality gradually change in cultures by adopting and abandoning
various principles.
Herodotus. The Histories. Trans. Aubrey de Selincourt. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972. 215-220.
In this last section of the chapter, Herodotus is describing the reign of King Darius of the Persian Achaemenid
Empire. Most importantly is his account of Darius’ observation of contradictory moral principles. These
contradictory principles led Darius to the conclusion that different cultures have different moral codes, and,
therefore, whatever is, is right.
Bailey, Garrick, and James Peoples. Humanity: An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology. Cengage Learning,
2014. 96-98.
This section of the book is about Ruth Benedict’s theory of configurationalism. Benedict argued that cultures
gradually acquire, from external influences, patterns of thought and behaviors that begin to distinguish and
dissociate them from one another. The cultures effectively become immiscible elements of a society.
Parfit, Derek. On What Matters. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Essentially, I am concerned with Parfit’s conception of reasons, facts, rationality, irrationality, and theories of
consequentialism. Parfit contends that reasons are given by facts, and we act rationally when we respond
appropriately to the reason-giving facts. Parfit also, develops his own account of act consequentialism and rule
consequentialism, but I am more concerned with his general accounts of the two theories.
Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy. New York: McGraw Hill, 2003. 16-26.

8. Rachels discusses the implications of moral relativism. The implications of moral relativism, he contends, are
that (1) we could no longer say that the customs of other societies are morally inferior to our own, (2) we could
not criticize or improve our own society’s customs, and (3) the idea of moral progress is called into doubt.