1. Famines Under the British Raj: A Manmade Tragedy
1770 – 1946
Yash Balasaria
Department of History
HIEU 4502
April 18, 2015
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2. “It is said that babies were seen dying actually at the breasts of their mothers, young men
hanging themselves and committing suicides, girls selling for a handful of rice or a few
pieces of silver coins, husbands leaving breaths before their beloveds and wives dying
before the very eyes of their husbands after long and wearied battles with starvation. A
gentleman was telling me that once a heap of small babies, say about a hundred or so of
the age of less than two or three months, was collected and set fire to at a single place. I
have myself seen the dead body of a child of less than two months lying on the bank of
the River Hoogly near the Howrah Bridge. Crows were siting around his dead body and
enjoying their feast.”1
Tusharkanti Ghosh
Ghosh, Tushar Kanti. The Bengal Tragedy. Edited by Amrita Bazar Patrika. Laore: Hero Publications,1
1944:10.
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3. To my extended family in Kolkata
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4. Introduction
Historian Andrew Roberts claimed that modern-day India should hold “grateful
recognition for over three centuries of British involvement in India. [This period] led to the
modernization, development, protection, and agrarian advance, linguistic unification, and
ultimately the demarcation of the sub-continent.” This claim by the renown British historian,
however, fails to account for the widespread devastation, in the form of large-scale famines,
caused by the British Raj’s economic and political institutions. From 1770 to 1946, famines
accounted for the death of more than sixty million persons under the British government in India.
Although many historians argue that the British Empire represented a benevolent colonial power,
bearing no responsibility over these deadly famines – I argue otherwise. Natural climate systems
served as the immediate cause of droughts and famines in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. However, the British Raj during its 176 year reign, by means of callous political
institutions and exploitive systems directly engineered ravaging famines that swept the Indian
subcontinent – seen through the case study of the Bengal Famine of 1943.
This thesis paper, organized into five distinct chapters, argues against the assertion made
by historians that famines in the Indian subcontinent simply resulted from natural incidents.
Chapter one sets up by clearly defining the oppositional argument. The following chapter sheds
light upon the state of Indian famines before British involvement in India, the national economy
of India in the twentieth century leading to 1943, and the food situation in India before World
War II. Chapter three discusses crucial background information upon the Bengal Province and
the mechanisms that catalyzed the Bengal Famine of 1943. Lastly, chapter four discusses British
economic and political policies that demarcated the province – particularly the Denial Policy, the
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5. Ryotwari System, and destructive tax policies. The last chapter details British attitude towards
the local population, relief efforts, and overarching consequences of the Bengal Famine of 1943.
Chapter 1: Famine – A Natural Phenomena?
Famines under the British Raj, produced by the combination of imperial arrogance and
natural occurrence, represented some of the worst tragedies in human history – rivaling
genocides and holocausts. The Indian subcontinent, along with other global regions, experienced
unknown (at the time) global factors that induced droughts that decimated local native
populations in imperial history. British India, in particular, experienced harsh consequences as
India represents country of “tropical climate with its cultivated area for the most part unprotected
by artificial irrigation.” India’s tropical nature consequently relies heavily upon rainfall as2
rainfall amounts serve significant in determining annual crop yields and supplies of food. This
dependence, from the eighteenth to twentieth century, was magnified by a system that stirred
mayhem among the ill-prepared British government in India – a system, today known, as the El-
Niño Southern Oscillation System (ENSO).
Imperial scientists in the nineteenth century struggled to understand the case of global
droughts that simultaneously appeared in multiple areas around the globe. ENSO and its
mysterious climate patterns represented “most elusive great whale of tropical meteorology.” The3
El-Niño Southern Oscillation System, clearly hypothesized by Jacob Bjerknes in 1969,
Bhatia, B. M. Famines in India: A Study In Some Aspects of the Economic History of India with Special2
Reference to Food Problem, 1860-1990. Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1963: 3.
Davis, Mike. Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and The Making of The Third World. London:3
Verso, 2001: 213.
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6. represents heating and cooling of air masses in the Pacific through periodic redistribution of solar
energy every “three to seven years.” British India’s agriculture-heavy industry relied heavily4
upon adequate and predictable rainfall patterns as “about 90 per cent of the total rainfall in the
country [India] is obtained from the summer monsoon.” The ENSO system exploited this5
reliance as the climate system causes the monsoon season to shift eastwards towards the central
Pacific Ocean. Hence, ENSO displaces the rainfall, that is so crucial for sustenance throughout
India, out of reach from the populations and areas of need. ENSO continued to wreck havoc
upon the Indian subcontinent at a time when imperial scientists struggled to make sense of the
climate system.
The El-Niño Southern Oscillation System’s effects further magnified in the Indian
subcontinent due the region’s preexisting natural properties. “The regional distribution of rainfall
in the subcontinent is uneven and shows wide variations.” For example, in the region6
compromising “the outer slopes of the Himalayas” to the “eastern fringe of the Gangetic Delta”
holds a wide range of annual rainfall that “varies from 70 to 200 inches.” This variability7
consequently sent the British government and Indian agriculturists into frenzies to rapidly adapt
its economic and political structures around unknown seasonal changes. Additionally, “the
unseasonableness of rainfall also proves destructive to crops and produces famine conditions
even in the areas of fairly high rainfall.” The consequent droughts and crop failures, results of8
Davis., 174
Bhatia., 45
Bhatia., 46
Bhatia., 47
Bhatia., 5.8
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7. ENSO climate patterns, continued to puzzle imperial scientists as ENSO represented “the most
important source of global climate variability” after “the cycle of seasons.” Although “the9
immediate cause of famine in the country [India] is almost invariably drought or unseasonal
rains,” the British Raj’s destructive political policies and economic institutions further catalyzed
famines in India.
The ENSO system presented both a challenge and a mean of reflection to scientists of the
British Empire. William Roxburgh, a naturalist for the East India Company, ascribed, “‘the
dreadful effects of which I have been a constant eyewitness’ less to any natural cycle than to the
profound disturbances in land use arising from the East India Company’s conquests.”10
Roxburgh continued by condemning the Company “for aggravating drought through profligate
deforestry and intensifying famine through denial of ryot’s permanent title to their land: a huge
disincentive… to agricultural improvement and irrigation” . Additional imperial scientists,11
notably Edward Balfour in Madras, defended Roxburgh’s condemnation. Balfour argued “that
famine was ‘a straightforward consequence of British colonial rule and revenue policies” in
India. These accounts by British imperial scientists directly threaten “the moral legitimations12
of Empire” (Davis 218). additionally, these British condemnations discredit arguments that
immunize the British Raj from any responsibilities over famines during the Raj’s reign.
Chapter 2: British Progression of India
Davis., 239.9
Davis., 217.10
Davis., 217.11
Davis., 218.12
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8. The Indian subcontinent, similar to every part of the world, suffered from famines from
the very beginnings of its history. However, the subcontinent under “Mogul India was generally
free from famine until the 1770’s.” From the 11th century until the end of the 17th century,13
“fourteen famines occurred in regions very confined areas.” Before British involvement in14
India, “available evident suggests… that a major famine occurred once in every 50 years.”15
However, British involvement in India instantly catalyzed the frequency of famines. “From 1765
when the British East India Company took over the Diwani of Bengal to 1858, the country
experienced twelve famines and four ‘severe scarcities…’ Between 1860 and 1908, famine or
scarcity prevailed… twenty out of the forty-nine years.” Hence, the British political16
establishment in India evidently ceased the relatively famine-free period preceding their rule.
From 1910 until 1940, India under the British Raj experienced eighteen scarcities that
resulted in no loss of life (due to starvation) because of the confined nature of these scarcities.
Despite the prevalence of droughts and crop failures during this time period, prices of food
grains remained low. This period of tranquility, however, does not paint the true portrait of
British India as its ruing elite grew comfortable with the decrease of natural calamities. Two-
thirds of India’s population lived under an “unspeakably low standard of living” – yet domestic
agriculture production did not meet demands of the Indian native population. The twentieth17
century represented a turbulent period involving two major World Wars that challenged the
Davis., 218.13
Digby, William. 'Prosperous' British India. London: Unwin, 1991: 123.14
Loveday, A. The History & Economics of Indian Famines. New Delhi: Usha Publications, 1981:25.15
Bhatia., 308.16
Bhatia., 309.17
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9. British government in India. However, British administrative unpreparedness and ignorance
aggravated a socio-economic situation which had been nearing its pressure point for years.
The national Indian economy, from 1896 until the Bengal Famine of 1943, experienced
complex economic challenges as prices of food grains and commercial crops remained volatile.
The prevalence of Britain’s involvement in the twentieth century’s two World Wars further
catalyzed these price volatilities. From the decade of 1896-1905 to the decade of 1935-45, the
annual average production of food grains declined by 5.23% while the output of commercial
crops grew by 77.61% during the same time period. This contrasting price movement depicts18
British economic greed as the British Raj expanded its revenue through increased commercial
crop exports at the expense of domestic food grains dependence. During this same time period,
population grew by 19% while the per capita output decreased by 9%. The inverse direction of
these two measures further cements the British Raj and its exploitation of economic
opportunities at the expense of its Indian subjects.
Although proponents of the British Empire will quickly indicate that Indian
manufacturing industries boomed from 1896 to1945, this growth does not represent the true
portrait. “There was an impressive increase in the output of manufacturing industries and mining
from RS. 150 crores in 1896-1905 to RS. 630 crores in the decade 1936-1945 – an increase of
320 per cent.” However, in this same time period “the output of industry and mining formed 419
per cent of the total net output” only rising to “14 percent” – an increase of 250%. The deficit20
between the two growth values paints an inadequate rate of industrialization – unable to
Bhatia., 312.18
Bhatia., 313.19
Bhatia., 313.20
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10. significantly impact India’s total output (25.07% increase) or Indian national employment
(2.39% increase in the male labor force engaged in agriculture). Hence, this inadequate rate of21
industrialization constricted economic growth among an exponentially growing Indian
population whose dependence upon agriculture ballooned.
As the twentieth century progressed, the Indian national population’s dependence upon
agriculture expanded in parallel with the increase of crop imports. Imports of food grains, a
staple of the Indian economy and Indian life, increased from 1920-1925 to 1935-1940 from 1.6
lakhs of tons to 13.8 lakhs of tons – a 762.5% increase. The British Raj predominantly22
imported food grains from Burma to satisfy the deficiencies in domestic food production and the
Indian native population’s increasing demand. This transition from a net-exporter of food grains
to a net-importer served dangerous as India’s time bomb approached detonation. In the period of
forty years preceding World War II, India’s population grew by 38% while output of food crops
per capita fell by 32.03%. This negative inverse relationship further fueled the dire state of23
India’s improvised population whom lived in extremely low standards of living. “The balance
between actual starvation and bare subsistence [was so delicate] that the slightest tilting of the
sales in the value and supply of food was enough to put it out of reach of money to bring large
classes within the range of famine.” This disruption of balance, the ticking time-bomb, finally24
erupted on April 1942 when Japan seized Burma during World War II – horrifically shocked the
balance between supply and demand.
Bhatia., 313.21
Bhatia., 318.22
Bhatia., 315.23
Bhatia., 315.24
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11. The British government in India possessed the required resources to avoid the severe
disruption in April 1942, yet it took no concrete steps to skirt this newfound issue regarding food
supply. The British Raj’s unpreparedness in the twentieth century, through its inflexible
economic institutions and political policies, directly exposed its Indian native population to
ravaging economic consequences. The lack of administrative preparedness in India specifically
devastated the Bengal Providence, as World War II progressed, in the form of the Bengal Famine
of 1943. Tushar Kanti Ghosh, a prominent Bengali author, wrote, “So far as we are aware, all of
India’s farmers originated primary from calamities of nature. But this one is accounted for by no
climatic failure, rainfall has been plentiful… The sickening catastrophe is man-made.” The25
Bengal Famine of 1943, engineered by British through Marxist-like political and economic
policies, felt the wrath of imperial globalization – a price paid by three million Indians.
Chapter 3: The State of Bengal Leading to 1943
The Province of Bengal, located in eastern India, is “preeminent among Provinces of
India in two respects: it has the largest number of mouths to feed and produces the largest
amount of cereals.” While the population of India increased by 37% between 1901 and 1941 –26
the state of Bengal increased by 42% in 1943 nearing a population of 60 million persons. In
terms of religious distribution, “over 54 per cent of the people of Bengal are Muslims, about 42
per cent Hindus.” The Bengali population of 60 million persons distributes into an urban27
Ghosh., 12.25
Knight, Henry, Sir. Food Administration in India, 1937-47. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954:26
68.
Woodhead, John, Sir, comp. Report. Calcutta: Famine Inquiry Commission, 1945: 4.27
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12. population and rural countryside population. One-tenths of the Bengali population, around 6
million persons, are dispersed among urban Bengali cities. The remaining nine-tenths of the
Bengali population inhabit the Bengali countrysides in 84,000 villages – known as “some of the
most densely populated areas in the world.” The large Eastern-Indian province spreads across28
77,442 square miles. Bengal’s agricultural distribution of land consists of two divisions:
cultivated area (29 million acres) and normal crop area (35 million acres). Rice accounted for29
under 26 million acres as it serves as the staple crop and staple food of the Bengali population.30
Jute, the most important nonfood crop, occupied 2 to 2.5 million acres while other food crops
accounted for 4 million acres. Although the Province of Bengal represents one of the largest31
Indian states in terms of population and area, the Bengali state’s economic situation remained
satisfactory preceding World War II.
The economic situation, describing food supply and distribution, present in Bengal was
more satisfactory than in some provinces of India” despite the state’s enormous territory and
population. Between 1928 and 1937, the annual average of production of rice met sufficient32
weekly requirements by exceeding the year’s 52 weeks by generating 54 weeks worth of supply
(Bhatia 318). During the years when Indian agriculturists did not meet weekly requirements,
tensions continued to remain present, “but no abnormal rise in prices.” Additionally, the33
Woodhead., 4.28
Woodhead., 4.29
Woodhead., 5.30
Woodhead., 6.31
Bhatia., 318.32
Bhatia., 318.33
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13. Providence of Bengal imported minuscule quantities of rice from foreign territories – 1.6 lakh
tons (1926) and 1 lakh tons (1936).” Hence, Bengal represented a providence that held a34
comfortable position in regards to the supply of food for its Bengali population. However, this
pleasant portrait is misleading as a large proportion of the population of Bengali under the
poverty line struggling to meet day-to-day necessities as Bengali food production did not grow in
proportion to the increase of Bengal’s population.
The Famine Inquiry Commission published its report on Bengal in 1945 that shed light
upon the deceiving healthy appearance of Bengal’s economic stability. The report stated that five
acres represented the minimum area required to keep the average Bengali family in “reasonable
comfort.” However, the size of holdings must increase to seven acres “if the land is capable of35
growing nothing but aman (winter crop) paddy.” The report paints a true portrait of Bengal’s36
population’s economic position as it displays that 8.5 million of 10.5 million persons (eligible for
this survey) held less than five acres of land. Hence, this proportion represents 81% of the
population which includes agricultural wage laborers (2 million), Bargadars (crop sharing tenants
– 1 million), and 5.5 million persons “wholly or mainly dependent for their livelihood upon the
cultivation of land.” As a result, these delicate proportions left little room for disruptions to the37
balance between production and consumption in Bengal.
The delicate balance between production and consumption in Bengal places its
dependency upon the three annual crops of rice grown in the Bengali state. Aman (Winter) is
Bhatia., 318.34
Woodhead., 8.35
Woodhead., 6.36
Bhatia. 318.37
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14. harvested in December for the next year as the consumer holds a carry-over of earlier yields of
rice. This winter crop constituted the principle source of Bengali food supply as it accounted for
“78 percent of the total population.” Boro (Spring), harvested in February and March, barely38
produces two weeks of supply for the entire population of Bengal. Lastly, Aus (Autumn),
harvested in September, “produced at the time 10 weeks of supply of rice in the Province.” The39
average annual output of rice in Bengal varied significantly year to year. Between 1928 and
1942, the lowest yield measured at 7.4 million tons (1941) while the highest yield registered at
11.4 million tons (1937). These crops served as the engine for Bengal’s food supply. Hence, the40
failure of these rice crops, especially the failure of the Aman crop, held the power to disrupt the
social stability of the fragile Bengali population.
The subsistence economy present in Bengal, that fueled crop growth, spelled disaster as it
created a vicious cycle of reliance upon surplus stocks. The Bengali agriculturists served as
crucial engines to the economy as these farmers cultivated the crop, but also retained the fruits of
their labor for self-consumption. Before World War II, one-half of Bengal’s annual total output of
rice crops were retained while the remaining one-half of rice found itself in the market. However,
the market surplus present is “highly elastic quantity.” This is because the Bengali subsistence41
farmer retains more by selling a lower quantity – ultimately to tackle his fixed financial
obligations such as seed costs, rent, food consumption, and moneylenders’ charges. Hence, the
subsistence economy’s market surplus dropped once market prices rise. However, in any given
Knight., 69.38
Knight., 69.39
Bhatia, 319.40
Bhatia, 320.41
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15. year, wealthier families stored excess crops for possible deficits in the upcoming fiscal year.
Additionally, it is crucial to note that wealthier farmers who held crops in storage did not
immediately release these stored crops for speculative purposes. In contrast, the vast majority of
subsistence farmers, low-income farmers, survived from year to year on the current year yields.
“It would be a fatal mistake to rely on ‘surplus stock’ accumulated from previous years, for, so
far as the market is concerned, those simply don’t exist.” The Bengali subsistence economy42
inherently created a cycle of eventual market dependence that edged it closer to disruption as
import and export dynamics began to shift.
The population of Bengal fulfilled its food supply and demands through rice crop grown
within the Bengali province. However, Bengal also supplemented its internal subsistence
economy through “local crop movements from adjoining provinces and a comparatively small
quantity of rice and wheat imported for the industrial centers” such as Calcutta. This43
methodology of food administration served crucial, yet delicate as a single shock in its system
could potentially devastate Bengal’s population of 60 million. The Bengali consumers of rice
found themselves in three distinct categories. The first represented producers, similar to wealthy
farmers, who held land large enough to become self-sufficient. The second group, similar to
average subsistence farmers, supported themselves for one-half of the year while depending on
the market for the other half of the year. Lastly, the third group consisted of the “nonagricultural
population such as urban laborers and agriculture laborers” whom depended on the market for all
of their needs year round. This system of consumers, in addition to the subsistence farming44
Bhatia., 322.42
Knight., 69.43
Knight., 69.44
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16. economy, cultivates a market which interconnects each individual and creates extensive market
dependencies. “A cessation of them [local crop movements] could cause serious dislocation [as]
the method of its [local crop movements] marketing and distribution affected the bulk of the
population.” The Bengali subsistence farming economy, coupled with consumer complexities,45
and increasing dependency upon net-imports continued to push the State of Bengal closer to the
Famine of 1943.
As World War II progressed, the state of Bengal began to anticipate War-inflicted
economic and political consequences, such as invasion and volatile food prices – especially due
to its proximity to British enemies such as Japan. In 1942, the Famine Inquiry Commission
gathered a vivid account describing the tension in the Bengali atmosphere, “There was a feeling
of tenseness and expectancy in Calcutta… Houses were vacant… In general, the impression was
that nobody knew whether by the next cold weather Calcutta would be in the possession of the
Japanese.” The danger of Japanese invasion forced political authorities to impose strategic46
military decisions in 1942, through the Denial Policy, to secure rice and paddy surplus along
with large passenger boats. These actions symbolized a defensive British government’s strategy
to safeguard its Indian transportation and economic assets. However, the Denial Policy indirectly
further deepened (explained later on) prevalent issues regarding the British organization of
transportation, communication, and British economic institutions.
The effects of World War II, the British administrative unpreparedness, along
consequences as a result of British war policy directly began the deterioration of Bengal. The
Knight., 69.45
Woodhead., 25.46
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17. Famine Inquiry Commission deduced a theoretical rice “budget” of Bengal that clearly outlines
crucial economic factors whose failures catalyzed this deterioration of Bengal:
47
This budget of rice serves crucial as “a failure of one factor on the credit side might not be
serious… yet the failure of two or more factors may cause trouble.” In 1943, Japanese48
occupation of Burma catalyzed the unimaginable to occur as three of the budget’s factors failed.
The failure of the aman crop, foreign imports, and Indian exports were inevitable as British
imperial ignorance in India soared during the years preceding 1943 – displayed through British
economic and political inflexibility. The British governing elite failed to implement defensive
measures to protect its economically vulnerable Indian population on the onset of the Bengal
Famine of 1943.
Chapter 4: The Demarcation of Bengal Through British Callousness
Knight., 69.47
Knight., 69.48
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18. Bibliographies
Bhatia, B. M. Famines in India: A Study In Some Aspects of the Economic History of India with
Special Reference to Food Problem, 1860-1990. Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1963.
Davis, Mike. Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and The Making of The Third World.
London: Verso, 2001.
Digby, William. 'Prosperous' British India. London: Unwin, 1991
Ghosh, Tushar Kanti. The Bengal Tragedy. Edited by Amrita Bazar Patrika. Laore: Hero
Publications, 1944.
Knight, Henry, Sir. Food Administration in India, 1937-47. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1954.
Loveday, A. The History & Economics of Indian Famines. New Delhi: Usha Publications, 1981.
Woodhead, John, Sir, comp. Report. Calcutta: Famine Inquiry Commission, 1945.
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