mission command paper adalah bentuk penugasan wajib yang dilaksanakan oleh siswa Engineer Captain Career Course di Ft Leonard Wood, Amerika Serikat yang berisi tentang analisa kepemimpinan dalam pertempuran merujuk kepada doktrin kepemimpinan militer AS yang disebut Mission Command. Dalam tulisan ini penulis membahas tentang analisa pertempuran Mogadishu yang menyebabkan insiden Blackhawk down dan membahas secara khusus aspek kepemimpinan Mayor Jenderal William F. Garrison sebagai Komandan Satgas tersebut

1. MISSION COMMAND ANALYSIS:
MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM F. GARRISON AT THE BATTLE OF MOGADISHU,
Captain Wahyu Wuhono Widhi Nugroho (Indonesian Army)
ECCC 01-18, Team Echo
8 January 2017

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According to Peter Parret in Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and
His Time, "War is... a continuation of political activity by other means."1
In 1992, political
strife between the Somalia National Alliance (SNA) under Muhammad Farrah Aided and
the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) resulted in multiple raids on the
UNOSOM. The United Nations (UN) eventually demanded the United States (US) to
deploy the Task Force Ranger. US Government approved to launch Operation Gothic
Serpent under Major General William F. Garrison, “an experienced special operation
officer.” The TFR mission was to capture Aided and weaken his network.2
Before the Battle of Mogadishu, TFR conducted six raid missions out of seven
assigned.5
Due to inaccurate intelligence; they only accomplished at the fifth raid while
capturing Osman Atto, Aided’s financier. During all six raids, TFR operated at night with
minor enemy resistances and no friendly forces loss, but inflicted numerous civil
casualties. The TFR always employed a combination of aerial assault, fast ground
vehicle attack, and suppressive aerial fire support. The mission priority following a
successful raid or prisoner capture was a quick, immediate retrograde.6
On the seventh raid, inaccurate intelligence regarding Aided’s meeting with his two
lieutenants near the Bakara Market led TFR into the Battle of Mogadishu. For the first
time, MG William F. Garrison decided to launch the raid at midday in the center of
Aided’s stronghold area. The SNA implemented surprise tactics which included shooting
down several helicopters, blocking reinforcements, and surrounding TFR with an armed
mob. During this raid, TFR suffered two Blackhawk losses, 18 casualties, and 84
severely wounded Soldiers. Faced with this challenging situation, MG William F.
Garrison ineffectively exercised the commander roles which include “understand,”

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“visualize,” “describe,” “direct,” and “assess,” which resulted in the TFR’s defeat at the
Battle of Mogadishu, forcing the US Government to retreat from Somalia.
In the operations process, understanding is a cornerstone for the commander to
develop a situation’s context.7
Understanding is process to grasp the operation
environment's nature and significance.8
Developing a complete situational
understanding and framing of the problem relies on analysis of the operational variables
and mission variables.9
Prior to the TFR’s operations, Aided was not popular amongst
the local populace. However, during the Battle of Mogadishu, it was evident that popular
opinion had shifted. In this battle, Somali became wrathful and helped Aided to kill TFR
Soldiers.10
They brought their weapons, burned trash and tires, blocked roads and
surrounded TFR positions.11
Due to this shift, TFR soldiers reported encountering more
fire than they had expected in Mogadishu.12
Aided and his clan had been waiting for the
right moment to conduct a surprise counter-attack.13
MG William F. Garrison failed to understand the social and information of operational
variables, and civil consideration of mission variable. Somalia is a tribal-state under
multiple warlords upon clans. SNA’s communication relied upon runner, which made
TFR’s sophisticated SIGINT ineffective. Additionally, the complex clan system made
human intelligence (HUMINT) collection very difficult in addition to a lack of HUMINT
assets. MG William F. Garrison ignored his untrustworthy intelligence assets which kept
him from fully understanding the enemy situation. Unchecked civil collateral damage
from previous raids bolstered Aided’s support from the local populace. This condition
created new militia forces who augmented the SNA’s forces and incited an angry civilian
population resulting in numerous armed mobs. This factor eventually allowed Aided to

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overwhelm and surprise the TFR. The vengeful civilians in the crowds became an
unexpected combat multiplier for the enemy. During stability operations, MG William F.
Garrison should be shaping the population’s support to maximize TFR’s advantage and
reduce enemy’s resources. However, he neglected to thoroughly analyze the civil
consideration factor which resulted in an inaccurate assessment of enemy movement
and influence.
According to Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0: The Operations
Process, “Commander's visualization is the mental process of developing situational
understanding, determining the desired end state, and envisioning an operational
approach by which the force will achieve that end state.”14
The Commander builds their
visualization under collaboration with higher, subordinate and adjacent commanders,
the staff, and unified action partners.15
MG William F. Garrison planned his execution
with a focus on rapid offensive actions.16
He integrated helicopters as a close combat
attack (CCA) asset and the high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) as
fast ground support. However, helicopters became a liability when they crashed down
which forced TFR to shift their mission from an offensive to rescue.17
Additionally, the
HMMWV proved to be vulnerable in urban conflict, due to soft armor.
MG William F. Garrison never requested armor assets as part its force package from
higher and unified action partners.18
He declined to actively collaborate with his unified
action partners, which could have augmented TFR with additional armor assets,
reinforcement forces, and intelligence assets. Following the suppression of TFR forces,
MG William F. Garrison finally requested armor assets and reinforcement forces from
UNOSOM’s Quick Reaction Forces (QRF). MG William F. Garrison failed to visualize

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how to efficiently employ his troops despite inherent operational constraints, which
ultimately led to a flawed operational approach. This situation drove him to
conceptualize his course of action incorrectly which affected the progression of battle.
His inability to comprehend the operational environment and visualize the operation
process proved to be calamitous.
According to ADRP 5-0, “After commanders visualize an operation, they describe it
to their staffs and subordinates to facilitate shared understanding and purpose.”19
Describe is a process to ensure subordinates understand their visualization well enough
to begin course of action development.20
Commanders describe their visualization
including commander’s intent, the operational approach in planning guidance,
commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR), and essential elements of
friendly information (EEFI).21
During the Battle of Mogadishu, many TFR soldiers
believed that the raid would be swift with minor resistance.22
They reduced combat
loads by carrying less ammo and removing water, armor plates, and night vision
goggles (NVG).23
Pilots were unprepared for possible threats despite intelligence
reports that the SNA had downed a QRF Blackhawk a week earlier.24
This situation
created more casualties, reduced their capability, and became a turning point which
allowed the SNA to seize the initiative.
MG William F. Garrison was unable to describe his operational approach to his
subordinate efficiently. He shared an incorrect situational understanding which resulted
in his subordinate being unaware and unprepared for the enemy threats. MG William F.
Garrison also failed to protect his essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). The
SNA easily monitored TFR’s combat rehearsals, since TFR’s base only 3 miles away

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from Mogadishu. As a result, the enemy comprehended TFR’s tactics and were able to
develop effective countermeasures. Ultimately, the SNA trapped the TFR with their
most deadly course of action (MDCOA).
According to ADRP 5-0, “Direct is a process to drive all aspects of operations by
establishing their commander’s intent, setting achievable objectives, and issuing clear
tasks to subordinate units.”25
This action includes the preparation and approval of plans
and orders, allocation of resources to exploit opportunities and counter threats, the
committing of reserve forces as required, and the assignment of tasks, control
measures, and task organization.26
During Operation Gothic Serpent, TFR employed
helicopters as CCA and airlift which provided speed and surprise at decisive points
unrestricted by nighttime operation.27
However, the Blackhawk helicopter proved more
vulnerable to RPG fire than anticipated.28
Once two of them crashed, the enemy forced
TFR to stretch their forces beyond the limits.29
TFR had lack of reaction force for
rescuing downed crew. TFR’s CSAR helicopter could not reach the second downed
Blackhawk because of its limited assets. The ground forces attempted a rescue but got
lost because of the massive blockades. The command and control (C2) helicopter were
also unable to steer the lost unit, due to heavy fire and smoke.
MG William F. Garrison was incapable of directing his staff to anticipate the enemy’s
MDCOA and to build risk reduction control measures. He failed to plan an operation that
would adequately protect his aerial assets as a tactical-decisive point. Moreover, MG
William F. Garrison neglected to prepare for reserve forces which provide flexibility and
adaptability. He also was unable to provide a robust medical evacuation plan to recover
his available forces. Furthermore, he failed to create a C2 contingency plan, as

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indicated by C2 forces inability to guide his ground forces in unfamiliar urban terrain.
MG William F. Garrison’s failure to appropriately “direct” resulted in TFR incurring
unnecessary casualties.
According to ADRP 5-0, “Commanders continuously assess the situation to
comprehend current conditions better and determine how the operation is
progressing.”30
Assessing is a continuous cycle throughout the operation process
including plan, prepare, and execute. The Battle of Mogadishu was TFR’s first midday
raid mission to capture Aided’s lieutenants. Based on his intelligence report, MG William
F. Garrison believed Aided’s presence in a meeting with his two lieutenants in the
vicinity of Bakara Market. Launching a midday raid on the enemy’s stronghold created
four significant disadvantage for TFR. First, TFR lost the favorable night operation
advantage. Second, Aided’s militia would be more aggressive under “khat” drug effect.
Khat is a stimulant derived from a shrub that is native to East Africa region which made
its user felt more energetic and vigilant.31
Third, public activity and civilians would
become a burden for the assault forces. Fourth, conducted the operation with
predictable tactics in an enemy’s favorable condition. All of these points enabled the
enemy to implement their MDCOA.
The inherent vulnerability of HMMWV and helicopters also had worsened that
disadvantage. MG William F. Garrison believed the most suitable tactics would be to
strike with surprise and speed.32
He decided to use superior fire support from CCA to
mitigate his lack of armor assets. However, the CCA assault in Mogadishu during
midday resulted in additional civilian casualties and collateral damage. This situation
attributed to the local populace’s hatred toward TFR’s efforts and resulted in more

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civilians augmenting Aided’s armed mobs. In the offensive missions, MG William F.
Garrison should capitalize on an enemy’s weakness while avoiding the enemy’s
strength.33
However, his decision eventually brought TFR into a deadly ambush and
massive blockade during the chaotic battle. His fallacy in assessing the situation
steered the TFR into Aided’s brutal trap.
Under the tactical perspective, MG William F. Garrison achieved mission success.
TFR conducted the assault in the enemy’s main strongpoint under the unfavorable
condition but seized 24 prisoners including two of Aided’s lieutenant.34
According to
Mark Bowden in Blackhawk Down – A Story Of Modern War, “It was a complex, difficult,
and dangerous assignment, and despite terrible setbacks and losses, and against
overwhelming odds, the mission was accomplished.”35
Despite TFR’s tactical accomplishment, the Battle of Mogadishu was a strategic
failure.36
The Battle of Mogadishu proved to be a costly achievement, with 18 Soldiers
killed and 84 severely wounded. The images of Somalian’s mob dragging the dead
body of US Soldier reduced US political interest in Somalia. The loss of political interest
was tantamount to the withdrawal of US forces as war is the execution of political will
through physical coercion. The redeployment of US forces ultimately led to the SNA’s
declaration of strategic victory and proclaimed Aided’s as the President of Somalia.37
This set of events repeated a similar situation that resulted in the withdrawal from the
Vietnam War.
The Battle of Mogadishu presented several lessons for the future commanders.
Understanding the operational environment, including operation variables and mission
variables, is fundamental in exercising the commander’s role. In the stability operation,

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the understanding of civil consideration, social and political factor is more significant to
shape the populace support. Building an accurate visualization requires active
collaboration with the higher echelon, staff, subordinate, adjacent commanders, and
unified action partners. The commander must describe the operational approach and
ensure subordinate prepared for evolving conditions. One pivotal role of the commander
in operation process is the direction for the staff to develop a robust plan to achieve end
state while emphasizing on risk mitigation. Correct assessment of past, present, and
future condition will allow the commander to exercise effective decision making which
facilitating mission success. In conclusion, MG William F. Garrison had failed to
understand the operation environment, unable to build visualization with the unified
action partners, incapable of describing an effective operational approach, been
unsuccessful in directing his staff to develop a robust plan, and assessed the situation
contexts wrongly. His fallacy in exercising “understand,” “visualize,” “describe,” “direct,”
and “assess,” as part of the commander’s role inflicted a significant TFR’s casualties,
the forcing of US forces withdrawal from Somalia, and the enemy’s strategic victory.

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Notes
1. Peter Peret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Time,
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007), 393.
2. Clayton K.S. Chun, Gothic Serpent - Black Hawk Down – Mogadishu 1993,
(New York: Osprey Publishing, 2012), 17.
3. Ibid, 16.
4. Ibid, 27.
5. Ibid, 28.
6. Ibid, 74.
7. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0: The Operations Process,
(Washington DC: Department of the Army Headquarter, 2012), 1-3.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Mark Bowden, Blackhawk Down – A Story Of Modern War, (New York:
Penguin Books, 2000), 230.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid, 169.
13. Ibid, 230.
14. ADRP 5-0: The Operations Process, (Washington DC: Department of the
Army Headquarter, 2012), 1-4.
15. Ibid.
16. Clayton K.S. Chun, Gothic Serpent - Black Hawk Down – Mogadishu 1993,
(New York: Osprey Publishing, 2012), 74.
17. Ibid, 73.
18. Mark Bowden, Blackhawk Down – A Story Of Modern War, (New York:
Penguin Books, 2000), 340.
19. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0: The Operations Process,
(Washington DC: Department of the Army Headquarter, 2012), 1-5.

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20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Clayton K.S. Chun, Gothic Serpent - Black Hawk Down – Mogadishu 1993,
(New York: Osprey Publishing, 2012), 74.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0: The Operations Process,
(Washington DC: Department of the Army Headquarter, 2012), 1-6.
26. Ibid.
27. Clayton K.S. Chun, Gothic Serpent - Black Hawk Down – Mogadishu 1993,
(New York: Osprey Publishing, 2012), 73.
28. Mark Bowden, Blackhawk Down – A Story Of Modern War, (New York:
Penguin Books, 2000), 338.
29. Ibid.
30. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0: The Operations Process,
(Washington DC: Department of the Army Headquarter, 2012), 1-6.
31. Philipa Hay, “The Consumption of Khat and Other Drugs in Somali
Combatants: A Cross-Sectional Study,” US National Library of Medicine National
Institutes of Health, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2121109/ (accessed
January 5, 2018).
32. Mark Bowden, Blackhawk Down – A Story Of Modern War, (New York:
Penguin Books, 2000), 349.
33. Norman M Wade, The Operations and Training Smart Book, 2nd ed, (Texas:
Lightning Press, 1999), 6-81.
34. Benjamin Runkle, “The Lost Lessons of Black Hawk Down,” Texas National
Security Network-University of Texas, https://www.warontherocks.com/2013/10/the-lost-
lessons-of-black-hawk-down (accessed December 30, 2017).
35. Mark Bowden, Blackhawk Down – A Story Of Modern War, (New York:
Penguin Books, 2000), 333.

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36. Clayton K.S. Chun, Gothic Serpent - Black Hawk Down – Mogadishu 1993,
(New York: Osprey Publishing, 2012), 76.
37. Clayton K.S. Chun, Gothic Serpent - Black Hawk Down – Mogadishu 1993,
(New York: Osprey Publishing, 2012), 72.

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Chun, Clayton K.S. Gothic Serpent - Black Hawk Down – Mogadishu 1993. New York:
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Cross-Sectional Study.” US National Library of Medicine National Institutes of
Health. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2121109/ (accessed
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Peret, Peter. Clausewitz and the state: The Man, His Theories, and His Time. New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007.
Runkle, Benjamin. “The Lost Lessons of Black Hawk Down.” Texas National Security
Network-University of Texas. https://www.warontherocks.com/2013/10/the-lost-
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