1. (NASDAQ: FWONK)
Current Price: $53.79
Target Price: $72.20
Potential Upside: +34%
CALL: BUY
As of:
1 November 2022 Adrian Peikert, Ryan Auyok, Ewan Minjoot, Ryan Karimpanal
2. Key Partners, Agreements & Teams
Revenue Breakdown
The Formula One (F1) Group was acquired by Liberty Media
Corporation in 2017. F1 Group is responsible for the promotion of the
FIA Formula One World Championship and holds the sport’s exclusive
commercial rights. F1 is one of the world’s most popular global sports
with more than half a billion fans and comprises a championship
running from March to November annually. 2022 saw 22 races in 20
countries across 5 continents. F1’s market capitalization: USD$12.38B
Company Overview
Sponsors Teams
Geographical Exposure
Representation of 22 different countries, with 5
Middle Eastern, 4 Asia-Pacific, 9 European, 4
North American and 2 South American races
Agreements
100-year Agreement – F1 has exclusive commercial rights to the
World Championship and is a member of the FIA’s world motor
sports council. This is set to expire at the end of 2110.
Concorde Agreement – A contract set between the FIA, F1
teams and the F1 Group which set out the terms in which teams
compete in races, as well as how revenues/prize money is split.
The current agreement expires in 2026.
F1 earns its revenues from 4 main revenue lines.
1) Race Promotion (32%): Race promoters pay F1 for right to sell tickets
2) Media Rights (35%): Media companies pay F1 for broadcasting rights
3) Sponsorship Fees (16%): Companies pay F1 for advertising rights
4) Other Revenues (17%): Primarily hospitality revenues (Paddock Club)
Lean Operating Structure
F1’s lean operating structure comprising
heavily variable costs allows all revenue
growth to flow directly into EBITDA
Steadily Increasing Revenue Per Race
The increasing global popularity of F1 has allowed
it to negotiate better contracts with media
companies, race promoters, and sponsors,
resulting in F1’s revenue per race increasing
steadily over the past years
F1 is the only global motorsport of this scale
Company Overview
0 2 4 6 8 10
North America
South America
Europe
Asia-Pacific
Middle East
3. The sports media business has significant barriers of entry within submarkets like
Motorsports. Consumer habit is a major factor, with a lot of F1 fans being
engrained with the typical Friday/Saturday/Sunday race weekend watching
behavior. Secondly, exclusive rights to the sport over a 100-year period prevent
any competitors from entering the sub-market.
These long-term barriers to entry and the unique access to customer demand
make F1 a favorable business, within the wider growing (sports) media market.
Moats
Founded in 1953, World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. (WWE) is a scripted professional
wrestling promotion. An over-dependence on big-name stars (unlike F1) has played out
negatively for the firm, which is currently experiencing declining ratings and average
viewership, primarily due to a lack of new performers who are able to capture audience
retention. UFC suffers similarly, with ten of its largest PPV events involving Conor McGregor.
75.2% of WWE’s revenues come from media rights. This showcases how much higher F1’s
media rights revenues can potentially grow once it successfully penetrates the US market.
WWE (NYSE: WWE) / UFC (NYSE:EDR)
There are no firms directly comparable to F1. The business thus has no direct competitors. F1 is able to hold its competitive ground and new players are unable to enter
the market due to F1’s exclusive rights. That being said, there are two publicly listed organisations with somewhat comparable business models.
Growing Sports Media Business
The global value of sports media rights - $52.1 bn in 2021 - has risen by about $7.2bn since
last year, an increase of just under 16 per cent on last year’s COVID-affected total. It is also
about $1.1 bn more than 2019’s total of $50.9bn, underlining the industry's resurgence.
The US is still by far the most-valuable sports media rights market, worth $23.5bn
in 2021 (45% of the market). With 2 brand new races launched in the US in
2022/2023 coupled with Netflix’s Drive to Success exploding in popularity in the
US, F1 is set to significantly increase their penetration in the US and capitalize
on a huge market and opportunity.
New domestic media rights deals for NFL begin in 2023. The new deals with
Disney, Fox, Comcast, CBS and Amazon will collectively produce an 80%
increase on equivalent deals with one package still yet to be sold. With F1’s
rapidly growing popularity, this foreshadows the positive contract renewal
upside F1 can capture when existing media rights expire in the next 3-7 years.
Industry Overview
Penetrating the US Market is the Key to Success
2020 F1 media rights % share: 41.9% 2021 F1 media rights % share 42.0%:
4. F1 has the highest engagement rate with social
media posts compared to other major sports in 2021
Social Media Growth
Drama-filled 2021 season with controversy in championship
fight resulted in lots of engagement
The 2022 season has also experienced its fair share of drama
which will be taken up in DTS, including overspend of RB
which nearly resulted in the withdrawal of the 2021 WDC title
Penalties from RB overspend will reduce competitiveness of
2023 RB car, resulting in more overall competitive racing
Drama-filled 2021 & 2022 season
Drive-to-Survive reached #1 in 27
countries and is a major driver
enhancing F1’s popularity and
engagement, especially in the US
markets
Successful 2022 Miami Race was
attributed to the show
DTS was recently renewed for
Seasons 5 and 6
DTS will capitalize off the (again)
drama-filled season in 2022, leading
to greater viewership of 2023 season
Drive-to-Survive
Share of total minutes consumed
(2020)
10%
Share of total minutes consumed
(2021)
16%
Engagement
1.5bn
+74%
Video Views
7bn
+50%
Unique Users
113m
+63%
Followers
49.1m
+40%
Thesis I: Rapid increase in interest and engagement, of which the magnitude is not yet priced
in by market, will result in increased viewership of F1, allowing capture of higher revenues [1]
5. F1 global audience hit 1.55bn in 2021, Abu Dhabi
finale reaching 108m viewers worldwide, 20% YoY
2.69 million fans welcomed to events, still below pre-
Covid 4.14 mn, upside opportunity
Three GPs had attendance >300k with USA (400k),
Mexico (371k) and GB (356k) (previous attendances
of 268k, 348k and 351k), highlighting demand
Increased Ratings and Engagement
F1 implemented regulation changes in 2021, and
future changes in 2026
These provide more quality races and make the
sport more competitive, hence creating greater
excitement for viewers and driving demand
F1 added six sprint races in 2026, up from 3 in
2022 when they were debuted, further enabling
more racing action and views
Increased competitiveness
Media rights – Reversion to Market Value
Example: NFL 2023-2034 Rights Deal
Race Promotion & Paddock Club
Demand/Supply and Mainstream Attraction
Mainstream attraction: example Singapore GP
Paddock Club ticket in excess of $10k USD
F1 event over weekend leading to $70k USD
min club tables across Singapore
Sponsorship & Partners
Greater viewership enables higher sponsorship fees,
even assuming constant per rating fee
F1 average total viewers reached almost 1mm in 2021 season
Lots of growing interest and engagement across different media platforms has not translated to actual subscription or viewership yet. The mispriced magnitude of interest in F1 will result in much
greater viewership than consensus expects, which will allow F1 to capture and revert to the “market value” of media rights and race promotion agreements, and increase sponsorship fees.
Thesis I: Rapid increase in interest and engagement, of which the magnitude is not yet priced
in by market, will result in increased viewership of F1, allowing capture of higher revenues [2]
2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E
GSe Race PromotionFees / Race $34 $39 $40 $41 $42
GSe Race PromotionFees 785 926 960 994 1,018
UCLAMRace PromotionFees / Ra $34 $38 $40 $42 $44 $46 $49
UCLAMRace PromotionFees 753 907 952 1,048 1,150 1,297 1,417
GSe vs UCLAM Race Promotion Forecasts
6. Race Promotion Agreements 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
Belgian GP - Spa Not renewed
Monaco GP Not renewed
French GP Dropped
Austrian GP Unknown
Mexican GP
Japanese GP
Italian GP
British GP
Azerbaijan GP
Sao Paulo GP
Emilia Romagna GP
Dutch GP
US GP
Spanish GP
Hungarian GP
Singapore GP
Abu Dhabi GP
Saudi Arabian GP
Canadian GP
Miami GP
Australian GP Early renewal from '26 through '35
Bahrain GP Through '36
Chinese GP
Las Vegas GP
Qatar GP 2022 race not held because of WC
Media Rights Agreements 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
UK/Ireland Sky Sports Early renewal from '25 through '29
Sky Sports Germany Early renewal from '25 to '27
Sky Sports Italy New contract
ESPN USA 3-yr extension, new terms
France Canal+
Spain DAZN/Movistar no deal announced yet
F1 is transitioning from a “small player” to one of the
largest sports media businesses
The market misses the increasing bargaining power over
media and RPs that comes with the increased scale
Ability to self-promote and enjoy promoter economics (Las
Vegas GP) further enhances leverage in negotiations
Bargaining Power
Recent Sky Sports Pan-Europe Renewal - UK/Ireland
Renewal makes up ~10% of revenues, contractually locked
in until 2029
Decision to renew Germany (‘25 through ‘27) and Italy
early signals favorable terms
ESPN rumored to be around 80-90m deal, or around 15x
increase in AAV from last US contract
Rights Renewals and RP Agreements
Assumed AAV Increase for Sky Sports Agreements: 1.2x
Sky UK and Ireland: 2022 average audience of 1.7
million, up 60% since 2019
4.3m new viewers to Sky Sports F1 since 2019, of which
1.7m were women
4 of the top 5 most watched races ever on Sky during 2022
Conviction in assumed AAV Step-ups
Sky Italia & Deutschland: 2022 Italian average audience
of 1.5 million (up 20% since 2021 / up 24% in Germany)
Most watched Grand Prix in Italian pay-TV history was
Saudi Arabia with 1.937 million viewers
Half of German new viewers aged under 35
40% of German new viewers overall are women
Assumed 1.2x AAV step-up for pan-
European Sky Agreements (despite
40-60% increase in viewership since
2019)
15x ESPN AAV agreement from
2023, assumed 2.5x AAV in 2026
Comp AAV Increases
33% of the 2023 calendar races expire
within 2 years, while 54% expire
within 3 years and 67% expire within
5 years
High-yielding fly-away races like Abu
Dhabi, Qatar, KSA, Bahrain and
Miami are locked in until at least 2030
Lower yielding European races can
either be renewed at more attractive
terms of replaced with more fly-away
races
Contract Lifecycle
Thesis II: Growing bargaining power with scale and options
7. Stefano Domenicali when asked from UCLAM
analyst at LSE talk about greater # of races in the
future: “I could easily do 33-34 races”
Under current Concorde agreement, the
maximum # of races is 25 (2023 cal is 24 races)
The market is not projecting any increase of races
after 2026 when Concorde agreement expires
The increase in races is possible due to greater
revenues, which are then paid to the teams
Logistics optimization and reduced overall travel
in future make higher # of races easier
Expert Call with F1 President
Case study: capacity utilization of F1 races
Comparison of F1 / Nascar capacity utilization (assumes 3-
day race weekend)
2023 F1 # of Races: 24
% of days raced year-round: 19.7%
Nascar # of Races: 36
Example # of F1 Races: 34 % of days raced year-round: 29.5%
% of days raced year-round: 27.9%
Despite international travel, F1 has significant
opportunity to capture more capacity utilization, trailing
Nascar and NBA/NFL/NHL etc.
Fly-away race promotion fees per race are
typically much higher than non-flyaway races
Advantageous % fly-away race mix
0.0%
20.0%
40.0%
60.0%
80.0%
100.0%
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
Flyaway Races Non-Flyaway Races
More fly-away races also enable penetration of
new markets for more viewership - (South)
Africa, Asia (races like Vietnam), USA:
Penetration of US market with new ESPN agreement and
total of 4 races on the continent
US GP record attendance up 52% since 2018, 35k+
through Austin airport, busiest day ever
Two thirds of fans attending first F1 race, double vs 2019
Miami race 275k pre-registered for tickets, 1.8k placed
$5k deposit. inventory sold in one day
Las Vegas GP sold out within hour of tickets made avail.
USA as large Upside Potential
Comps of US Media Rights, upside potential for F1
Thesis III: Expanding fly-away geographies and # of races
9. Fiscal Year Ended December 31 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E
Terminal # of Flyaway Races 18
Terminal % of Flyaway Races 62%
Terminal # of Non-Flyaway Races 11
Terminal # of Total Races 29
Smoothed Increase in Races:
Flyaway Races - 2 - 1 1 1 1
Non-Flyaway Races - - - - - 1 -
Total Number of Races 22 24 24 25 26 28 29
Revenue drivers:
Race Promotion Fees:
Flyaway Fees per Race YoY Escalation - 11% - - - - -
Non-flyaway Fees per Race YoY Escalation - - - - - - -
5% Escalator for existing race promotion agreements 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Media Rights AAV Increase Multiples:
Top 5 Contracts Ex. USA 1.20x 1.20x 1.20x 1.20x 1.20x 1.20x
ESPN USA ('23 through '25) 15.00x 2.50x
Other FTA/TRAs
5% Escalator for existing media contracts 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
D2C % of Total Media Rights Revenue 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.0% 5.0%
Advertising and Sponsorship Fees per Race Increase 10% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Other Revenues per Race YoY % Increase: 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Cost drivers
Team Payments excl. Amortization as % of Pre-Team 81% 77% 75% 73% 72% 71% 70%
Other Costs of Formula One Revenue % of Revenue 21% 21% 20% 20% 19% 19% 18%
SG&A as % of Revenue 7% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6%
SBC as % of Revenue 0.6% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
D&A as % of Revenue 14% 13% 11% 10% 9% 8% 8%
DSO 11 Days 11 Days 11 Days 11 Days 11 Days 11 Days 11 Days
DPO 46 Days 46 Days 46 Days 46 Days 46 Days 46 Days 46 Days
Deferred Revenues as % of Revenues 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13%
Capex as % of Revenues 11% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Greater amount of sponsor and fee payments in 2023, moderate increase thereafter
Much higher base in 2022, conservative assumption
LV and Qatar added, expect 150-200mm increase in revenues
Multiple only applied where contract expires
Standard contract escalators
2023 multiple semi-confirmed, 2026 multiple as ~2 * Top 5 Contracts Ex. USA assumption
No multiple assumption, just 5% step-up YoY
Increasing penetration of D2C F1 service over time
Fixed nature of some bonuses / payments in prize pools result in reduction as % of Revenue
Other costs reducing in line with trend
Historic average / scale
In line with historic average
Diminishing balance depreciation/amortization for FIA agreement /
goodwill results in reduced depreciation over time
No change in efficiency
No change in efficiency
No change in efficiency
No major capex spend anticipated
Model Drivers
10. DCF
Unlevered Free Cash Flows 2021 4Q22E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E CAGR (E)
Fiscal Year/Quarter ended 31/12/2021 31/12/2022 31/12/2022 31/12/2023 31/12/2024 31/12/2025 31/12/2026 31/12/2027 31/12/2028
Revenue 2,136 721 2,540 2,999 3,158 3,464 3,877 4,255 4,617 10.5%
% YoY 87% (8%) 19% 18% 5% 10% 12% 10% 9%
EBITDA 478 190 634 804 853 958 1,074 1,182 1,304 12.8%
% of Revenues 22% 26% 25% 27% 27% 28% 28% 28% 28%
EBIT 92 96 277 416 492 596 708 824 938 22.5%
% of Revenues 4% 13% 11% 14% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
Tax Rate 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19%
NOPAT 75 78 224 337 399 483 574 667 760
% YoY (124%) 19% 200% 50% 18% 21% 19% 16% 14%
+ D&A 386 94 357 388 361 361 365 359 366
- CapEx (17) (10) (273) (30) (32) (35) (39) (43) (46)
- Changes in NCW 403 (116) 46 32 28 54 75 69 63
Unlevered Free Cash Flow 847 46 355 727 756 863 976 1,052 1,143 21.5%
% YoY 117% 17% (58%) 105% 4% 14% 13% 8% 9%
Present value of UFCF on Nov 05, 2022 valuation date
Val Date Q4 - Stub Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6
EOP - Date for discounting CFs Nov 5, 2022 31/12/22 31/12/23 31/12/24 31/12/25 31/12/26 31/12/27 31/12/28
UFCF Stub Adjusted 28 727 756 863 976 1,052 1,143
Discount Factor 1.01 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.41 1.54 1.67
PV 28 661 632 664 690 685 684
Terminal value - growth in prepetuity approach Terminal value - EBITDA multiple approach
Long term growth rate 3.5% Terminal year EBITDA 1,304
2028 FCF x (1+g) 1,183 EBITDA multiple 18.5x
Terminal Value in 2028 22,751 Terminal Value in 2028 24,124
Present Value of TV 13,620 Present Value of TV 14,442
Present value of stage 1 cash flows 4,043 Present value of stage 1 cash flo 4,043
Total Enterprise Value (TEV) 17,663 Total Enterprise Value (TEV) 18,485
Terminal value as % of TEV 77.1%
Stage 1 cash flows as % of TEV 22.9%
Implied TV exit EBITDA multiple 17.4x
Net debt Shares outstanding
Gross debt and equivalents Shares
Debt @ FMV 3,453 WASO - Basic 233
Senior Loan facility 2,902 WASO - Diluted 246
Cash Convertible Notes due 2023 43 Restricted stock / RSUs -
Cash Convertible Notes due 2027 446 Options / warrants -
Other 65 Convertible debt -
Add: deferred financing costs (3) Convertible preferred stock -
Nonoperating assets Net diluted shares outstanding 246
Cash 2,119
Equity investments (public), net of tax 403
Liberty Braves Group Intergroup Interest (6,792,903 shares @ 217
AT&T Stake (6,100,000 shares eqv. @ 18.5 USD) 113
LMAC (11,500,000 shares @ 10 USD) 115
Padtec Holding S.A. (3,900,000 shares @ 0.72 USD) 3
Equity investments (private), net of tax 100
Valuation Perpetuity EBITDA
Enterprise Value 17,663 18,485
Net debt 831 831
Equity value 16,832 17,654
Shares outstanding 246 246
Equity value per share 68 72
Potential upside (downside): 27% 33%
Price Target (Bear): 55.8
Price Target (Base): 70.1
Price Target (Bull): 90.7
11. Probability
Impact
Risks Description Mitigation
Increasing
commercialization of
sport could alienate fans
Fans may be increasingly
discontent with focus on
growth of sport and over-
dramatization in DTS.
Though fans might dislike
dramatization of events, it has no
core impact on viewer experience of
races, and hence has little probability
of actually causing any harm.
ESG Risk
Motorsports, though
increasingly hybrid, could be
affected by growing ESG push
due to bad environmental
effects and use of fossil fuels.
F1 has pledged to be carbon neutral
by 2030 and has initiated
development of a carbon neutral fuel
for race cars. This can actually drive
innovation.
Recessionary
environment and drop in
consumer discretionary
Recessionary environment
could result in consumer
cutting on discretionary,
including media.
F1’s target audience typically is on
the more luxurious side, hence F1
consumers are unlikely to cut back
on spending for their favorite sport.
Low
Threat
High
Threat
Moderate
Threat
Risks & Mitigating Factors
13. Appendix: Cost Breakdown
Fiscal Year Ended December 31 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 1Q22 2Q22 3Q22E 4Q22E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E
Total Formula One Group Revenues 1,784 1,827 2,022 1,145 2,136 360 744 715 721 2,540 2,999 3,158 3,464 3,877 4,255 4,617
Cost of Formula One Group Revenues:
Team Payments excl. Amortization 919 913 1,012 711 1,068 100 368 370 319 1,157 1,358 1,440 1,575 1,780 1,972 2,141
% of Pre-Team Payments EBITDA 69% 70% 69% 94% 69% 45% 71% 69% 63% 65% 63% 63% 62% 62% 63% 62%
% of Pre-Team Payments EBIT 104% 108% 98% 219% 92% 75% 85% 82% 77% 81% 77% 75% 73% 72% 71% 70%
% of Total Formula One Revenue 52% 50% 50% 62% 50% 28% 49% 52% 44% 46% 45% 46% 45% 46% 46% 46%
Other Costs of Formula One Revenue 302 360 381 263 421 95 166 124 165 550 626 644 689 752 804 849
% of Total Formula One Revenue 17% 20% 19% 23% 20% 26% 22% 17% 23% 22% 21% 20% 20% 19% 19% 18%
Operating Expenses:
SG&A 125 154 147 115 152 43 56 51 40 190 180 189 208 233 255 277
% of Total Formula One Revenue 7% 8% 7% 10% 7% 12% 8% 7% 6% 7% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6%
SBC 24 16 19 13 17 0 1 1 7 9 30 32 35 39 43 46
% of Total Formula One Revenue 1% 1% 1% 1% 0.80% - 0% 0% 1% 0.4% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Pre-Team Payments EBITDA 1,333 1,297 1,475 754 1,546 222 521 539 509 1,791 2,162 2,293 2,533 2,854 3,154 3,445
% of Total Formula One Revenue 75% 71% 73% 66% 72% 62% 70% 75% 71% 71% 72% 73% 73% 74% 74% 75%
D&A 451 452 446 429 386 88 88 87 94 357 388 361 361 365 359 366
% of Total Formula One Revenue 25% 25% 22% 37% 18% 24% 12% 12% 13% 14% 13% 11% 10% 9% 8% 8%
Pre-Team Payments EBIT 882 845 1,029 325 1,160 134 433 452 415 1,434 1,775 1,932 2,172 2,489 2,795 3,079
% of Total Formula One Revenue 49% 46% 51% 28% 54% 37% 58% 63% 58% 56% 59% 61% 63% 64% 66% 67%
14. Appendix: 3FS
Fiscal Year Ended December 31 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 1Q22 2Q22 3Q22E 4Q22E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E CAGR (E)
Races:
Flyaway Races 13 12 12 4 10 2 4 - 6 12 14 14 15 16 17 18 7.0%
Non-Flyaway Races 7 9 9 13 12 - 3 7 - 10 10 10 10 10 11 11 1.6%
Total Number of Races 20 21 21 17 22 2 7 7 6 22 24 24 25 26 28 29 4.7%
Total Formula One Group Revenues:
Race Promotion Revenues: 608 538 608 132 651 120 230 193 210 753 907 952 1,048 1,150 1,297 1,417
% of Total Revenues 34% 29% 30% 11% 30% 33% 31% 27% 29% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 31%
Media Rights Revenues: 607 684 759 636 854 102 280 284 240 906 1,070 1,142 1,264 1,481 1,562 1,695
% of Total Revenues 34% 37% 38% 56% 40% 28% 38% 40% 33% 36% 36% 36% 37% 38% 37% 37%
Sponsorship Revenues: 268 265 297 196 345 65 118 147 94 424 509 535 585 638 722 785
% of Total Revenues 15% 14% 15% 17% 16% 18% 16% 21% 13% 17% 17% 17% 17% 16% 17% 17%
Other Revenues: 301 340 358 181 286 73 116 91 177 457 513 529 567 608 674 719
% of Total Revenues 17% 19% 18% 16% 13% 20% 16% 13% 25% 18% 17% 17% 16% 16% 16% 16%
Total Formula One Group Revenues 1,784 1,827 2,022 1,145 2,136 360 744 715 721 2,540 2,999 3,158 3,464 3,877 4,255 4,617 10.5%
% YoY - 2% 11% (43%) 87% 101% 48% 7% (8%) 18.9% 18.1% 5% 10% 12% 10% 9%
Cost of Revenues:
Team Payments excl. Amortization 919 913 1,012 711 1,068 100 368 370 319 1,157 1,358 1,440 1,575 1,780 1,972 2,141
% of Total Formula One Revenue 52% 50% 50% 62% 50% 28% 49% 52% 44% 46% 45% 46% 45% 46% 46% 46%
Other Costs of Revenue 302 360 381 263 421 95 166 124 165 550 626 644 689 752 804 849
% of Total Formula One Revenue 17% 20% 19% 23% 20% 26% 22% 17% 23% 22% 21% 20% 20% 19% 19% 18%
Gross Profit 563 554 629 171 647 165 210 221 237 833 1,014 1,074 1,200 1,345 1,480 1,627 11.8%
% Gross Margin 32% 30% 31% 15% 30% 46% 28% 31% 33% 33% 34% 34% 35% 35% 35% 35%
Operating Expenses:
SG&A 125 154 147 115 152 43 56 51 40 190 180 189 208 233 255 277
% of Total Formula One Revenue 7% 8% 7% 10% 7% 12% 8% 7% 6% 7% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6%
SBC 24 16 19 13 17 - 1 1 7 9 30 32 35 39 43 46
% of Total Formula One Revenue 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% - 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
EBITDA 414 384 463 43 478 122 153 169 190 634 804 853 958 1,074 1,182 1,304 12.8%
% of Total Formula One Revenue 23% 21% 23% 4% 22% 34% 21% 24% 26% 25% 27% 27% 28% 28% 28% 28%
D&A 451 452 446 429 386 88 88 87 94 357 388 361 361 365 359 366
% of Total Formula One Revenue 25% 25% 22% 37% 18% 24% 12% 12% 13% 14% 13% 11% 10% 9% 8% 8%
EBIT (37) (68) 17 (386) 92 34 65 82 96 277 416 492 596 708 824 938 22.5%
% of Total Formula One Revenue (2%) (4%) 1% (34%) 4% 9% 9% 11% 13% 11% 14% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
Balance Sheet (Cash + NWC Items):
Cash & Cash Equivalents 282 160 587 1,684 2,074 2,265 1,944 2,119
Accounts Receivables 84 110 69 121 66 148 89 103 103 103 90 94 104 116 127 138
DSO 17 Days 22 Days 12 Days 39 Days 11 Days 38 Days 11 Days 13 Days 13 Days - 11 Days 11 Days 11 Days 11 Days 11 Days 11 Days
Other Current Assets 479 310 748 459 229 209 229 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196
Intergroup Payables 30 25 32 57 17 (5) 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Accounts Payables 258 233 264 150 308 225 271 267 262 262 252 264 287 321 352 379
DPO 77 Days 67 Days 69 Days 56 Days 76 Days 105 Days 46 Days 49 Days 49 Days - 46 Days 46 Days 46 Days 46 Days 46 Days 46 Days
Deferred Revenues 8 93 113 259 253 526 426 471 361 361 390 410 450 504 553 600
% of Revenues 0% 5% 6% 23% 12% 146% 57% 66% 50% - 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13%
Other current liabilities 9 9 17 17 23 37 25 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
Operating NWC 258 60 391 97 (306) (426) (406) (468) (352) (352) (385) (413) (467) (542) (611) (674)
CFS
Capex (10) (14) (44) (21) (17) (10) (241) (12) (10) (273) (30) (32) (35) (39) (43) (46)
% of Revenues 1% 1% 2% 2% 1% 3% 32% 2% 1% 11% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
15. Appendix: Model Case Sensitivities
Model Drivers - F1 Liberty Media
$ and shares in millions, except per share data
Fiscal Year Ended December 31 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E Comments
Terminal # of Total Races (Bear) 25 Assuming no increase to current Concorde agreement
Terminal # of Total Races (Base) 29 Base
Terminal # of Total Races (Bull) 33 Assumes much higher utilization possible through greater revenues
Revenue drivers:
Flyaway Fees per Race YoY Escalation (Bear) - 7% - - - - -
Flyaway Fees per Race YoY Escalation (Base) - 11% - - - - -
Flyaway Fees per Race YoY Escalation (Bull) - 15% - - - - -
5% Escalator for existing race promotion agreements (Bear) 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
5% Escalator for existing race promotion agreements (Base) 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
5% Escalator for existing race promotion agreements (Bull) 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7%
Media Rights AAV Increase Multiples:
Top 5 Contracts Ex. USA 1.10x 1.20x 1.20x 1.20x 1.20x 1.20x Multiple only applied where contract expires
Top 5 Contracts Ex. USA 1.20x 1.20x 1.20x 1.20x 1.20x 1.20x Multiple only applied where contract expires
Top 5 Contracts Ex. USA 1.40x 1.20x 1.20x 1.20x 1.20x 1.20x Multiple only applied where contract expires
ESPN USA ('23 through '25) (Bear) 14.00x
ESPN USA ('23 through '25) (Base) 15.00x 2023 multiple semi-confirmed, 2026 multiple as ~2 * Top 5 Contracts Ex. USA assumption
ESPN USA ('23 through '25) (Bull) 16.00x
Other FTA/TRAs No multiple assumption, just 5% step-up YoY
5% Escalator for existing media contracts (Bear) 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0%
5% Escalator for existing media contracts (Base) 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
5% Escalator for existing media contracts (Bull) 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0%
D2C % of Total Media Rights Revenue (Bear) 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0%
D2C % of Total Media Rights Revenue (Base) 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.0% 5.0% Increasing penetration of D2C F1 service over time
D2C % of Total Media Rights Revenue (Bull) 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0%
Advertising and Sponsorship Fees per Race Increase (Bear) 8% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5%
Advertising and Sponsorship Fees per Race Increase (Base) 10% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% Greater amount of sponsor and fee payments in 2023, moderate increase thereafter
Advertising and Sponsorship Fees per Race Increase (Bull) 13% 6% 6% 5% 5% 5%
Other Revenues per Race YoY % Increase (Bear) 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Other Revenues per Race YoY % Increase (Base) 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% Much higher base in 2022, conservative assumption
Other Revenues per Race YoY % Increase (Bull) 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
16. Appendix: Capacity Utilization Case Study
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 25 27 29 31 1 3 5 7 9 11 21 23 25 27 28 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 30 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 30
Bahrain Bahrain KSA Australia China Baku Miami Imola Monaco Spain Canada Austria
Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 25 27 29 31 1 3 5 7 9 11 21 23 25 27 29 31 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 30 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 30 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 30
Cont. Silverstone HungaryBelgium Dutch GP Monza Singapore Japan Qatar USA Mexico Brazil Las Vegas Abu Dhabi
Off-season
Pre-season testing
Race weekend
2/10/22 9/4/23
2023 # of races: 24 Example calc: 34 races 34 NBA: Oct 2nd to Apr 9th 82 games played per team 30 games max championship
% of days raced on-season: 28.24% % of days raced on-season 40.00% % of days played on-season: 43.39%
% of weekends raced on-seas 32.94% % of weekends raced on-se 46.67% % minimum days played year-roun 22.44%
% maximum days played year-roun 30.64%
Including summer break: Including summer break:
% of days raced on-season: 25.99% % of days raced on-season 36.82%
% of weekends raced on-seas 30.32% % of weekends raced on-se 42.96%
Including off-season: Including off-season:
% of days raced year-round: 19.70% % of days raced year-round 27.91%
% of weekends raced on-seas 22.98% % of weekends raced year- 32.56%
2023 F1 # of Races: 24
% of days raced year-round: 19.7%
Nascar # of Races: 36
Example # of F1 Races: 34 % of days raced year-round: 29.5%
% of days raced year-round: 27.9%