3. iii
ABSTRACT
AUTHOR: Colonel Thomas H. Rendall
TITLE: Warriors or bureaucrats? Why officers who start out to be Sam Damon end up as
Courtney Massengale
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 09 April 2000 PAGES: 45 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
The United States, a large, powerful, industrial nation, has developed an Army of a particular nature
and size and has evolved a military bureaucracy to run it. The bureaucracy affects everyone from the
Commander in Chief to the rawest recruit at the company level. The bureaucracy is the frame-of-
reference of the entire Army culture.
An unintended effect of the bureaucracy is to stifle development of junior and mid-level leaders who
would be the prospects of tomorrow's top Army leaders. Today's senior leaders, who want candor from
subordinates, do not get it. They want to give appropriate military advice to their own superiors in National
Policy situations of the gravest import, but find the process daunting, threatening and sometimes
dangerously ineffective.
The novel Once an Eagle, by Anton Myrer, deals with some of these issues in the context of a dramatic
story that ranges from World War I to the War in Vietnam. The novel has found a wide readership in
certain military circles. This paper uses the basic themes of the novel as a metaphor to expose needed
changes in the U.S. Army leadership environment.
In the novel, Once an Eagle, Sam Damon, the protagonist, advances from Private to Lieutenant
General. Along the way, another officer, Damon’s nemesis, Courtney Massengale, always several ranks
above Damon, confronts him. Massengale is a bureaucrat and a self-promoter, with little regard for
people or their well-being. Thus, a situation builds that is all too familiar to many junior and mid-level
officers today.
The trend among junior and mid-career officers is away from being leaders (warriors) to being strictly
managers (bureaucrats). The average officer wants to be a leader like Sam Damon when he or she
enters the Army, but depending on the leadership environment encountered in his or her early years, he
or she tends to shift to that of a micromanager (bureaucrat) like Courtney Massengale. In fact, the
incentives in the system: acceptance by superiors, early promotion and personal power, push an officer in
this direction.
The shift toward an impersonal, bureaucratic leadership style has had a negative effect on unit
leadership climates and on the Army’s leadership culture. This has negatively impacted morale,
performance, retention, readiness and recruiting. Changing the climate in units will result in a like change
in the Army's leadership culture and ensure the development of the kinds of leaders who can ably defend
the Nation in the 21st Century.
5. v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
WARRIORS OR BUREAUCRATS? WHY OFFICERS WHO START OUT TO BE SAM DAMON END UP
AS COURTNEY MASSENGALE. ................................................................................................................. I
ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................................................. III
PREFACE ...................................................................................................................................................VII
WARRIORS OR BUREAUCRATS? WHY OFFICERS WHO START OUT TO BE SAM DAMON END UP
AS COURTNEY MASSENGALE. ................................................................................................................ 1
WHY A BUREAUCRACY?................................................................................................................... 5
THE PAST. ...................................................................................................................................................7
THE PRESENT...........................................................................................................................................10
THE FUTURE. ............................................................................................................................................11
THE PROBLEMS................................................................................................................................12
PROBLEM 1. LACK OF EFFECTIVE TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION. ........................................12
SOLUTION 1. REINFORCE EFFECTIVE TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION. ......................13
PROBLEM 2. COMMANDERS ARE CONSUMED BY MANAGEMENT DETAILS.....................14
SOLUTION 2A. REDUCE COMMANDERS' MANAGEMENT DETAILS, REPORTS AND
BRIEFINGS. ........................................................................................................................14
SOLUTION 2B. CREATE A NEW POSITION, DEPUTY COMMANDER, IN BRIGADE
AND BATTALION-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS...................................................................15
PROBLEM 3. LEADERSHIP STYLE...................................................................................................15
SOLUTION 3A. RESTORE TRUST: GET RID OF THE OLD STYLE AND EMPLOY
TRANSACTIONAL AND/OR TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP METHODS...........16
PROBLEM 4. LACK OF MENTORING; POOR LEADERSHIP CLIMATE....................................18
SOLUTION 4A: CHECK THE MENTORING PROGRAM AND UNIT CLIMATE...............19
SOLUTION 4B. INSTITUTE PROFESSIONAL MENTORS. ..............................................20
PROBLEM 5. INEFFECTIVE PROFESSIONAL AND LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMS. ...........................................................................................................................................21
SOLUTION 5. DEVELOP AN ARMY CORE IDEOLOGY AND A CENTRALIZED
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR OFFICERS....................................21
6. vi
PROBLEM 6. ACADEMIC ENVIRONMENT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT/INFREQUENT OFFICER
EDUCATION. ...........................................................................................................................................22
SOLUTION 6A. IMPROVE THE ACADEMIC ENVIRONMENT. ........................................23
SOLUTION 6B. GIVEN THE COMPLEXITY OF THE MODERN POLITICO-MILITARY
SYSTEM, DEVELOP A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING EDUCATION TO EDUCATE AND
DEVELOP ALL OFFICERS. ...............................................................................................23
PROBLEM 7. THE EVALUATION PROCESS LACKS OBJECTIVITY AND DEPTH.................24
SOLUTION 7. CHANGE THE EVALUATION PROCESS: GATHER THE TOOLS AND
CREATE A "360 DEGREE LOOK" AT AN OFFICER. ......................................................24
PROBLEM 8. LACK OF INCENTIVE SYSTEMS. .............................................................................25
SOLUTION 8A. IMPROVE POSITIVE INCENTIVES FOR SOLDIERS. ............................26
SOLUTION 8B. GIVE COMMANDERS A DISCIPLINARY TOOL: CREATE A NON-
CAREER KILLING, BUT EFFECTIVE UCMJ OPTION......................................................27
PROBLEM 9. UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE REGIME; DON'T LIKE THE MISSIONS. .........27
SOLUTION 9. USE THE MISSIONS FOR WHAT THEY PROVIDE: REAL-WORLD
BATTLE LABS WITH REAL OPPOSITION. .....................................................................29
PROBLEM 10. LACK OF A "STRATEGIC CULTURE."..................................................................29
SOLUTION 10. DEVELOP A STRATEGIC CULTURE. .....................................................30
CONCLUSION. ................................................................................................................................... 31
ENDNOTES ................................................................................................................................................ 33
BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………………………………………35
7. vii
PREFACE
The United States, a large, powerful, industrial nation, has developed an Army of a particular nature
and size and has evolved a military bureaucracy to run it. The bureaucracy affects everyone from the
Commander in Chief to the rawest recruit at the company level. The bureaucracy is the frame-of-
reference of the entire Army culture.
An unintended effect of the bureaucracy is to stifle development of junior and middle level leaders
who would be the prospects for tomorrow's top Army leaders. Today's senior leaders, who want candor
from subordinates, do not get it. They want to give appropriate military advice to their own superiors in
National Policy situations of the gravest import, but find the process daunting, threatening and sometimes
dangerously ineffective.
The novel Once an Eagle, by Anton Myrer, deals with some of these issues in the context of a dramatic
story that ranges from World War I to the War in Vietnam. The novel has found a wide readership in
certain military circles. This paper uses the basic themes of the novel as a metaphor to expose needed
changes in the U.S. Army leadership environment. The author of this paper also seeks enlightenment
from sources as varied as Professor Samuel Huntington's book, The Soldier and the State to Napoleon,
U.S. Grant and John M. Vermillion's 1987 essay "The Pillars of Generalship."
In the novel, Once an Eagle, Sam Damon, the protagonist, advances from Private to Lieutenant
General. Along the way, another officer, Damon’s nemesis, Courtney Massengale, always several ranks
above Damon, confronts him. Massengale is a bureaucrat and a self-promoter, with little regard for
people or their well-being. Thus, a situation builds that is all too familiar to many mid-level and higher-
level officers today.
The trend among junior and mid-career officers today, has shifted away from being leaders (warriors)
to being strictly managers (bureaucrats). The average officer wants to be a leader like Sam Damon when
he or she enters the Army, but depending on the leadership environment encountered in his or her early
years, he or she tends to shift to become a professional manager, more like Courtney Massengale. In
fact, the incentives in the system: acceptance by superiors, early promotion and personal power, push an
officer in this direction.
This transformation writ large has caused leadership climate problems in units and has led to a
pervasive leadership culture problem in today’s Army. Climate and culture problems reflect themselves in
a drop in unit morale, as reported in numerous surveys and studies. The drop in morale has had a
negative effect on retention among officers and enlisted soldiers. Poor morale indirectly reflects itself in
an inability to meet recruiting objectives, although recruiting usually lags in the presence of a strong
economy. Low morale, high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and recruiting and retention problems have
short and long term impact on the future of the Army.
8. viii
The purpose of this paper is to change the culture of Army leadership. It will examine the causes of
unevenness in Army leadership and propose reforms in order to change the climate at the unit level and
over time change the culture, thus reversing the trends in morale and retention and indirectly the trend in
recruiting.
The author is not a whistleblower. Soldiers no longer assemble on whistles. This is, however, a bugle
call and soldiers do respond to them. It is a call for assembly to fix a nagging problem in the institution.
The problem is fixable.
This paper addresses leadership, mainly at the mid and lower-levels (Sergeant First Class to
Colonel). There are several reasons for this. First, senior leaders are the products of decades of
experience. A paper like this will not change the way many of them think or operate.
1
Second, the author
writes about what he knows and has studied. Although senior leaders are visible, the opinions formed of
them are often the result of coverage in the Media and the shadows cast by whatever Administration they
serve. The picture that emerges is relevant, however, characterization of this officer or that officer as a
"Massengale," would be somewhat unfair.
Soldiers never know the true character of their leaders until times of crisis, when greatness emerges
or it does not. Every officer and NCO fights a daily battle for his or her own soul; whether to speak up or
remain silent, whether to create and innovate or go with what is easy and accepted, whether to support or
jettison a subordinate or whether to stand firm on matters of conscience or give in to pressure. For that
reason, this work is directed toward the officers and non-commissioned officers who must take the points
herein, ponder them, decide their merits and then act. The object, then, is to prevent future Massengales
and multiply the Damons.
9. 1
WARRIORS OR BUREAUCRATS? WHY OFFICERS WHO START OUT TO BE SAM DAMON END UP
AS COURTNEY MASSENGALE.
"That's what you ought to be. An aide to General Pershing." "Me?" He smiled his slow
sad smile. "Tommy I'm a troop commander. I'm not a fancy Dan, full of drawing room
charm and classical references and the right word at the right time and all that." "You
could learn..." "Maybe. I doubt it." "I'll tell you: I think you're either born with it or you're
not.... Like curly hair." Tommy started faintly she'd just remembered Massengale's
opening confession. Was that his divinely bestowed attribute? "You don't think he's
learned, then." "Oh, some of it maybe. But not the charm, not the instinctive move toward
the politic reply." He paused. "Massengale will never make an enemy and he'll never
have a friend."
Conversation between Sam Damon and his wife Tommy
2
As for the best leaders, the people do not notice their existence. The next best, the
people honor and praise. The next, the people fear; and the next, the people hate....
When the best leader's work is done, the people say, "We did it ourselves."
Robert Townsend, UP THE ORGANIZATION
3
The American Commander in Chief (CINC) got out of his vehicle and, followed by members of his
Staff, strode to the training site to view the American Division's training. It was an opportunity to
demonstrate the preparedness of his force to the President of the Host Country. There was little advance
warning of the visit.
The CINC did not like what he saw. He was singularly unimpressed with the training and the critiques
and explanations offered by the Division Commander and Chief of Staff. The CINC publicly chastised the
Division Commander and the assembled staff members.
As the Division Commander and staff stood mute, the CINC turned to leave, but the insistent voice of
a lone Captain (recently minted a temporary Lieutenant Colonel) stopped him. The Lieutenant Colonel
strode forward, explaining the problems of the training thus far and that he, the Lieutenant Colonel, was
responsible for the training and should answer the CINC's questions. The Lieutenant Colonel also stated
that the CINC's Headquarters was part of the problem. The CINC turned to leave again, but the
Lieutenant Colonel grabbed him by the elbow, to restrain him, and continued the address. At the
conclusion of the altercation, the CINC's lips tightened and he departed without another word.
4
Sometime
later on, he sent a note to the Division, asking the Lieutenant Colonel to join his Staff. The Lieutenant
Colonel did join the CINC's staff. He had risen to Colonel and was the Field Army G3 by the end of the
War.
This anecdote did not and could not happen today. The Lieutenant Colonel would have been relieved
instantly, if not by the CINC, then by the Division Commander or Chief of Staff or any officer in between.
However, these men were men of a different character than leaders of today and were embarked on a
real-world mission, and after all, the Lieutenant Colonel had spoken the truth candidly, yet tactfully and
he was right.
10. 2
The setting for this exchange was France. The CINC was General John J. Pershing and the
Lieutenant Colonel was George C. Marshall. Albeit at different levels, they both were preparing elements
of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) to enter World War I.
Some years later, the President of the United States met with his Secretary of the Treasury and
another adviser at the White House to discuss the deteriorating world situation. The advisers presented a
plan for a massive expansion in the size of U.S. Armed Forces and a huge increase in the defense
budget. The President at first was “flippant and cynical”
5
and disapproved their recommendation. After all,
the country was not at war. Such a plan would simply complicate an already dangerous situation and it
was an election year. Mobilization sent warlike signals. Thus, it was politically very sensitive. Mobilization
would disturb the American people and the leaders of other nations, friendly or not.
In desperation, the Secretary of the Treasury asked the President to hear the other man, whose face,
by this time, had flushed brick red. The other man walked to the President’s chair and asked for three
minutes to explain the need for the program. In those three minutes, the course of history changed. Two
days later, the President sent this new program, with an even bigger budget increase, to Congress. It
passed.
The President was Franklin D. Roosevelt and the adviser was General George C. Marshall, the same
Marshall who had addressed General Pershing in France so many years before, when Marshall was a
Captain (temporary Lieutenant Colonel).
Without anecdote one, where a subordinate can state his or her honest opinions on important
matters, without being denigrated, chastised or punished for doing so, there can be no anecdote two.
That is, if Lieutenant Colonel Marshall knows the facts and cannot communicate them to General
Pershing, or even Colonel Pershing, for that matter, then it is a good possibility that 22 years later
General Marshall will fail to communicate the necessary facts and appropriate military advice to President
Roosevelt. He will fail in this respect either because he was conditioned to bear the General's critique
silently, or because his own resolute response would see him relieved from duty, preventing his
promotion.
When Marshall did what he did or General Edward C. (Shy) Meyer articulated the dismal state of the
"Hollow Army"
6
or General John Vessey strongly advocated maintaining ground forces in Korea
7
, they
took and held positions which were unpopular with their superiors. In doing so, they showed the absolute
essence of leadership: honest, independent, courageous thought and action. And these men were right.
The debate over leadership versus management continues today as ever. In recent years, it is
becoming increasingly difficult to separate the two. Effective leaders are usually good managers. The
reverse is not always true. In the recent book MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE
Taylor and Rosenbach differentiate between management and leadership as follows:
(Management is) a set of functions planning, organizing and controlling-that can be
taught and learned. The resources managers work with are people, money, materiel,
information and time. All are applied to accomplish the unit organizational objectives.
11. 3
Thus, the skillful manager employs many tools and techniques acquired through a
combination of education and experience.
Leadership is an influence process. The end result is evaluated in terms of the unit
organizational objective. However, leaders work through people, and effective leaders
are skilled in relating to others. Specific methods are not well defined because influence
is a product of individual personalities and human interactions. There are still questions
as to whether people can be educated or trained to be leaders.... managers do not
necessarily lead, and leaders are not necessarily good managers. However, we find that
successful leadership and good management go hand-in-hand. The best leaders have
also distinguished themselves as superb managers.
8
Extending the logic of the previous paragraphs a bit further, one can say that it is possible for good
leaders who are not necessarily good managers themselves to find and employ good managers. One of
the most notable examples of this is Napoleon, who relied on his highly capable Chief of Staff, Berthier to
develop and carry out the details of the plans and orders that Napoleon so swiftly developed.
9
The novel Once an Eagle, by the late Anton Myrer, has recently surged in popularity in American
military circles. It has become so popular that certain senior military leaders cite it as a sort of pocket
guide that governs their conduct. Accordingly, this paper uses the basic lessons of the book as a
metaphor and a measuring tool to highlight needed changes in the American Army leadership
environment.
Anton Myrer fought in several major battles in the South Pacific during World War II as an enlisted
Marine. Considering his background, it is astonishing that he had such in-depth knowledge of and chose
to write such a vibrant novel about life in the US Army.
Sam Damon, the protagonist of Once an Eagle, as Colonel Sean J. Byrne says in his fine essay
"Looking for Sam Damon," says that Damon is arguably the greatest officer that "never lived."
10
Damon was a country boy who grew up in western Nebraska. An excellent student and athlete, he
exhibited strong leadership traits early. Stories of war he heard from his Uncle Billy and a neighbor,
George Verney influenced him in his early life. He developed an intellectual interest in military service and
studied battles and campaigns regularly as a young man. He attempted to gain entrance to West Point.
After encountering a delay, he enlisted in the Army because he sensed the onset of World War I and
wanted to be in uniform when it came.
During World War I, Damon served in France and received the Medal of Honor and a Battlefield
Commission. Wounded twice, he rose to the temporary rank of Major. Soon after the war, he reverted to
First Lieutenant and slogged his way through the period from 1918 to 1941, known as the "inter-war
years," in a number of troop assignments. While serving in the Philippines during this period, he was
detached and sent to China as an observer with a Communist Guerrilla force fighting the Japanese.
During this experience with poorly provisioned, yet highly motivated guerrillas, he learned a wealth of
lessons about combat leadership when times got tough. He also learned invaluable lessons about the
Japanese culture and learned to read and write the Japanese language.
12. 4
At the beginning of World War II, Damon was a Lieutenant Colonel, commanding a battalion in
California. Following dazzling combat service during World War II, where he rose to the rank of Major
General. He sat out the Korean War, serving as Commanding General of the Infantry Center at Fort
Benning, Georgia. The book closes as the retired Lieutenant General Sam Damon concludes an
evaluation of American operations in the mythical country of Khotaine (read Vietnam).
Colonel Byrne characterizes him as:
Not only a combat leader but also extraordinary operator and planner. He visualized the
ongoing battle and the enemy's reactions to his plans at both the tactical and strategic
levels. He was able to develop branches and sequels in his mind while others were still
trying to comprehend the basic plans.... He was an incredibly forceful personality but did
not lead through intimidation; rather he inspired his subordinates. It was clear that
although he maintained the highest standards, he was close to his soldiers and
subordinate leaders. They knew he was not out for glory; he just wanted to get the job
done as fast and successfully as possible while sustaining the fewest casualties
possible.
11
Damon was also:
Often viewed as a renegade with a number of strikes against him.... he was a Mustang,
an officer up from the ranks.... Damon's concerns for the well being of enlisted soldiers
were often viewed as a carryover from his past and being too close to the soldiers....
Many were jealous of his World War I record and the awards he had received.... He was
outspoken and saw little or no gray area in anything he did or said. In today's
environment, he would have had great difficulty understanding the concept of being
"politically correct."
12
His saving grace in this arena was that when he chose the battle to fight, he would back
up his words with action. However, his self-righteous attitude did influence evaluations,
duty assignments and school selections. Similar to General George S. Patton Jr., high-
level staff positions during the interwar years could have been his undoing because of his
lack of "political correctness."
13
Throughout his career, Damon confronted his nemesis, Courtney Massengale, an officer from a city in
the Northeast (and a family of former wealth). Massengale earned his spurs as a staff officer. Throughout
the book, Massengale was always a rank or two above Damon. At one point. Massengale tried to include
Damon in his circle of sycophants. Damon refused this advance, leading Massengale to conclude that
Damon was too close to his men and thus too sentimental to be of any use to him personally.
Yes you're a Regular Army officer, you're not a 30-year NCO mothering your brood,
kissing some and kicking others. You were one once, briefly. But you're not now. Look,
it's all right to be a maverick if you want to be, a bit of an eccentric maybe all great
leaders have had a little of that from Joshua on down. But you shouldn't be known for
one. That's just sentimental and destructive.
Massengale to Damon
14
As fate would dictate, the turbulent relationship between the two men came to a head during World
War II, when Damon commanded his Division under his newly assigned Corps Commander, Massengale.
The styles and personalities of the two men erupted in expected conflict. Damon had to execute a plan in
13. 5
which he had no faith and yet, due to his indomitable will, expertise and on-scene leadership, his Division
emerged victorious in spite of great losses. At one point in the battle, the Japanese almost overran
Damon and his Division after Massengale failed to commit a verbally promised reserve.
Once an Eagle begins with the following quote from Aeschylus:
So in the Libyan fable it is told, once an eagle, stricken with a dart, said, when he saw the
fashion of the shaft, "With our own feathers, not by others hands, are we now smitten.”
15
The meaning of this quote is clear we are often our own worst enemy.
WHY A BUREAUCRACY?
What this really means is that the bureaucratic structure doesn't encourage risk-taking, it
doesn't encourage chaos, which so many organizations have to live with. It doesn't
encourage leaders who shake up the system, who make waves, who will rock the boat.
Most bureaucracies like reasonable, adaptive, malleable, docile people.
Bennis and Townsend, Reinventing Leadership
16
The United States is a large, powerful, industrialized nation. It has developed an Army of a particular
nature and since details of such a large force are difficult to manage, has evolved a military bureaucracy.
This bureaucracy has engulfed many of its leaders. This bureaucracy permeates the Army down to
company level. The effects of the bureaucracy, while unintended, stifle development of junior leaders and
result in senior leaders who want candor from subordinates and do not get it. They want to give
appropriate military advice to superiors, but find the process daunting, even threatening.
The trend among junior and mid-career officers is away from being leaders (warriors) to being
managers (bureaucrats). The average officer wants to be like Sam Damon when he or she enters the
Army, but depending on the leadership environment encountered initially and then, extended over time,
he or she tends to shift to become more like Courtney Massengale. Not surprisingly, in peacetime, like
Massengale, this type of officer can become extremely successful.
Officers who resist the shift are characterized as "mavericks," "Neanderthals," "dinosaurs" and "too
close to the men" (the same as Damon) by those who adopt the bureaucrat's path. When it comes to
fighting [even in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) such as peace operations and
humanitarian assistance], the bureaucrats, as well as the country, still need the warriors. Too often, the
warrior leaders are gone at the time of the next emergency, the troops suffer as a result and the opening
engagement is costly and embarrassing.
The late British Major General John Frederick Charles (J.F.C.) Fuller stated the problem well:
The Archduke Albert puts his finger on it when he says: "There are plenty of small
minded men who, in time of peace, excel in detail, are inexorable in matters of equipment
and drill, and perpetually interfere with the work of their subordinates. They thus acquire
an unmerited reputation, and render the service a burden, but they above all do mischief
in preventing development of individuality, and in retarding the advancement of
independent and capable spirits. When war arises the small minds, worn out by attention
to trifle, are incapable of effort, and fail miserably. So goes the world.
17
14. 6
The author of this paper contends that the shift toward an impersonal, bureaucratic style of leadership
has had a negative impact on morale, performance, retention, readiness and recruiting. In order to
alleviate these effects, the Army's leadership process needs redesigning, beginning at the company level.
This will change the climate in units, and, with support from the top, will ultimately result in a like change
in the Army's leadership culture.
Enemies of good morale and discipline did not cause the shift toward bureaucracy. An external
enemy did not inject it into the Army like a virus. It is not the product of recruiting and retaining low quality
people. The systematic bureaucratization of the Army is the product of the Army's coming of age as an
institution, dealing with changes in society and the world and incremental internal change.
The shift is the sum total of the actions of all soldiers who have lost the ability to be candid and speak
critically with each other, for soldiers have known what has been happening. Every time a soldier,
regardless of rank, decided to let a bad plan, an injustice, a misconception or some other event requiring
comment go unanswered, the line between warrior and bureaucrat shifted a little further. Every time a
soldier, regardless of rank, did something to aggrandize him or herself unjustifiably at the expense of his
or her unit, the line shifted a little further. Every time a soldier, regardless of rank, accepted responsibility
for some activity that really was the responsibility of someone else, the line shifted a little further. Every
time a commander required a subordinate commander to be responsible for tracking another
management detail, simply to cover him or herself, the line shifted a little further. In this light, there is a
collective culpability. However, the process has been gradual. Changing the system and allowing leaders
who now serve to diligently and rapidly apply their talents to reversing the trend can correct it.
To further illustrate the depth of the problem, both Marshall and Pershing were products of a bygone
era. Though they were exceptional men of their times, the times produced exceptional people. Life was
rough for many. America was just recently "off the frontier." Young men joining the Army understood
hardship, probably knew how to hunt and looked forward to service as part of, in many cases, a family
tradition. They also appear to have been unusually good at telling and hearing the truth. The Army's
current senior and mid-level leadership came from a generation similar in many ways to that of Pershing
and Marshall, acquainted with hardship, knowledgeable of history and understanding a tradition of
service.
Today, the Army recruits from a pool of young people for whom (for the most part) history began in
1960 (or later), who rarely have natural skills in the outdoors, who have lived a sedentary lifestyle and
whose parents have no tradition of service. This is not a bad reflection on these young people or their
parents. It is simply a fact; times now are easier than in the past and this trend of greater ease in
succeeding generations will probably continue. However, the Army must recruit people from this and
following generations and matriculate them into effective soldiers and leaders. It will prove to be a tougher
task than it was to bring on previous generations. The situation will exacerbate over time.
The last of the Vietnam generation of officers are departing. Soon the Army’s warrior spirit will have to
be sustained by officers and NCOs who knew combat vets, but whose only personal combat-related
15. 7
experiences occurred in DESERT STORM, Somalia, Grenada, Panama, Haiti or Bosnia. Sustaining the
warrior spirit will prove to be a difficult task.
THE PAST.
Sam Damon, taking notes on Revolutionary War actions in high school history class determined that:
(Gen. Horatio) Gates (was a) pompous, vain stupid man, continually confused trivial with
important. Through either fear or incompetence, incapable of decisive action. Arnold
knew Gates was incompetent. He had had ample opportunity to gauge him in first battle
of Freeman’s farm, September 19th. He probably realized battle would be lost if
Burgoyne were permitted to force action, turn American position on Bemis Heights and
open door to Albany…so Arnold disobeyed orders, dominated action, won battle and
perhaps war. Should he have been court martialed or decorated? Or both? Apparently
he was neither. Can direct disobedience of orders be justified by circumstances? And if
so, when, and for what reasons?"
18
The professional American military developed on its own after the founding of the country. The
founding fathers envisioned no standing military forces and thus made no provision for them. In the
Constitution, they provided for the maintaining of a Navy and for the raising of armies. The Founders
envisioned the Navy would support the commerce of the immature maritime nation. The Founders
intended to raise armies in support of national emergencies. National emergencies would originate from
outside the country. Colonists formed local militias in order to protect citizens from security threats
originating on the frontier.
During several national emergencies such as the war of 1812, the war with Mexico and the Civil War,
the nation raised armies rapidly in response. Interestingly enough, the war with Mexico provided a solid
backdrop for the development of the two distinct leadership styles. Generals Zachary Taylor and Winfield
Scott, the force commanders, differed in many respects. Both were extremely competent, effective and
competitive. Scott was stiff and formal, almost pompous. Taylor, a frontiersman, was more relaxed and
easygoing. Their nicknames "Old Fuss and Feathers" (Scott) and "Old Rough and Ready" (Taylor)
capture the differences effectively. Taylor kept a small staff and issued simple, direct orders, while a host
of subordinates always trailed Scott.
During the Civil War, commanders such as Grant and Sherman evolved a new form of industrial
warfare; making war against the enemy's industrial and agricultural base, using the weapons and other
tools that industry produced. The widespread use of the railroad and telegraph enabled commanders to
marshal and move forces with unprecedented swiftness. Their staffs moved and stockpiled supplies as
never before. Telegraph communications allowed a new level of long distance command and control.
In essence, the Army spent the balance of the period from the end of the Civil War through the
beginning of its participation in World War I (1865-1917 52 years) involved in military operations other
than war (MOOTW). The period of land-based MOOTW between the Civil War and World War I was
interrupted only by the conventional ground operations (American vs. Spanish) conducted in the
Caribbean during the Spanish American War. These were relatively small and of short duration. However,
16. 8
during those years, the radio, the telephone, the airplane, the machine gun, the tank and motorized
transportation, among other inventions, proliferated in the armed forces of the world.
Until the beginning of World War I, commanders exercised command of their units directly or through
a number of "aides de camp," which carried orders and instructions from the generals to subordinate
formations. Staffs at all levels were lean and commanders habitually lived close to their men. This is
especially true in the cases of Grant and Sherman. Grant wore an enlisted man's tunic for most of the
Civil War.
In 1917, then-Major General Pershing led a party of officers to Europe. They determined the numbers
of soldiers needed and developed a battle plan for breaking the stalemate that had developed between
the forces of the Allied Powers and the Central Powers in France. Pershing sent a request back to the
U.S. for over two million men. The country and the Army, Navy and Marines rushed to meet this objective.
Men were drafted, processed, partially trained and sent to Europe where they completed their training in a
matter of a few months and when they entered the fray, they did just as Pershing expected, they broke
the stalemate and spurred the Allies on to victory.
By this time, the size and complexity of the battlefield had increased, staffs had grown in size and
command became less direct. Commanders at higher levels moved further to the rear. Armies (including
the US Army) developed larger staffs and a more indirect method of command and control.
After the war, Sam Damon and his wife Tommy discussed the matter:
He grinned again. "A lot of the Chaumont (Pershing's headquarters in France) crowd
was like that. They sat back there and fiddled with their mosaics and gave the orders
they didn't have to be around when they got carried out." "You've said yourself General
Pershing was a soldier's soldier..." "He is." "Well, he ran things-in Chaumont didn't he?"
"Tommy, every man in power finds himself surrounded by a coterie. That's in the nature
of things. A few are unselfish and devoted, some valiant and ambitious in a broad sort of
way. Most of them are self-serving and ambitious in a narrow sort of way. You can't
blame Pershing. His job was to get on with the business, using what material he had at
hand."
19
Massive demobilization followed victory in Europe. Pershing, by this time a Five Star General,
predicted that the treaty of Versailles that ended the war would not result in removing Germany as a
threat. He thought that the forces that brought about World War I were simply placed in abeyance until
they could emerge again. Pershing and others serving as Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) during the
inter-war years insured that the small, professional army remained trained, but funds were tight and
equipment was in short supply and mostly obsolete.
During the inter-war period, some officers studied the armies of other nations and developed a greater
understanding of the tactics and methods under development in the rest of the world. These officers
integrated the tank and the airplane, which had made their debut in World War I, into the Army. Their
efforts were not entirely popular. At the outbreak of World War II, the premier division in the Army was a
horse cavalry division.
Up to the inter-war years, promotions in the Army were based on the concept of seniority. Exceptions
occurred, as in the case of Pershing who leaped over 900 plus other officers to move from Captain to
17. 9
Brigadier General at the direction of President Theodore Roosevelt. Normally, however, an officer would
move up in rank only when the man in front of him either was or left the service. While serving as a
Brigadier General, on the death of BG Albert J. Mills, the man in front of him on the promotion list,
Pershing actually had to write a letter to the War Department and inform the Adjutant General that he was
thus the senior Brigadier General in the Army and thus merited promotion to Major General. Otherwise,
the promotion would have had to wait or could have been caught up in the Byzantine world of Washington
politics and gone to someone else.
20
The seniority system produced claims that promotions were based on nepotism and should be based
on merit. Merit-activists claimed that nepotism generated sloth in the officer ranks. However, the seniority
system did allow subordinates to disagree with their superiors and not suffer for it. Men sometimes were
actually blunt with each other. It allowed Captain (Temporary Lieutenant Colonel) Marshall to feel the
need, based on his integrity, to enlighten General Pershing. Neither Pershing nor Marshall saw
Marshall's actions as being "out of the box."
A merit-based Officer Evaluation System and a centralized board selection process were instituted
during the latter part of the inter-war years. The author of this paper proposes that this point marked the
start of "political correctness" in the Army and accelerated the slide toward bureaucracy, because every
word between a superior and a subordinate now had the potential to affect a career. In the absence of a
system to maintain communication and independence of thought and action, this left only combat as the
leveler.
World War II and its outcome elevated the United States to the status of Superpower. The rapid rise
of the Soviet Union and the subsequent Cold War followed World War II. The United States and its Allies
fought this war for the next 45 years. Most of that time, the United States and its allies found themselves
over manned and outgunned in Europe. Interestingly, at the latter part of the cold war, theorists
advocated a return to WWII German-style Auftragstaktik, a looser, mission-oriented command and control
formula to allow NATO forces to fight outnumbered, and win against superior Warsaw Pact forces.
Changes in doctrine and tactics, coupled with new and better equipment in the American and certain
NATO armies were nearly completed by the time of collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1989. The new
doctrine, tactics and equipment allowed the US and the coalition assembled against Iraq to prevail quickly
and easily in DESERT STORM.
For the entire period from the American Revolution until the Cold War, the US contended with
important enemies with varied agendas, skills and competencies, often in diverse environments. During
the Cold War, there were dozens of skirmishes: Greece, Korea, Suez, Israeli/Arab, the Cuban Missile
Crisis, Vietnam, the Iran raid, URGENT FURY (Grenada) and JUST CAUSE (Panama), to name a few.
This accounted for the fact that during those years, people trained with a sense of urgency
understanding well the alternatives to readiness and preparedness.
As stated earlier, the industrial form of warfare created the conditions for the rise of military
bureaucracy. For the longest time, however, the bureaucracy and the bureaucratic style of management
18. 10
were more the province of civilian members of the military and the administrative and logistic branches of
the Army, not the combat arms. The bureaucracy grew during World War II and Korea but accelerated to
new levels during the war in Vietnam.
Robert S. McNamara, President John F. Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, brought methods of
statistical analysis into the military arena. To McNamara, numbers were facts and if the right variables
could be determined and quantified, one could predict how long a conflict might last, how to employ
particular forces, how to use force to influence diplomacy and, when necessary, how to win battles and
campaigns. Senior military officers attempted to argue that military experience and the intuition
concomitant to it were needed to do these things, but they lost the arguments to McNamara and his "Whiz
Kids." The counting of beans and the peddling of flesh flourished. It was impossible to beat men armed
with facts with such intangibles as experience and intuition.
The Vietnam War proved the undoing of McNamara's idea. In McNamara's pursuit of his strategy of
"graduated pressure,"
21
the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong did not ascribe to the same idea that all
things could be quantified nor did graduated pressure affect them in the desired way. They had certain
other intangibles on their side such as a strong core ideology, battle hardening, long-term vision and a
seemingly limitless will to accept casualties.
McNamara, greatly disillusioned, left the Department of Defense before the end of the war. However,
though McNamara left, the Armed Services, in varying degrees, retained his methods. The advent of the
computer made the tabulation of statistics even more important, in many ways, simply because they were
easier to tabulate.
THE PRESENT.
When Sam Damon announced he had joined the Army, instead of waiting for an appointment to West
Point the next year, his neighbor George Verney and his Uncle Billy chastised him:
But that was war, boy!” ... “You don’t join the Army in peacetime, to consort with thieves
and ignorant moonshiners and the riff-raff of the cities of the East. … Outlaws and men
without names that’s what the Army’s filled with now, boy.
22
Imagine a world-class company that found itself unable to produce or market its products because it
could not find enough people to work for it. Imagine a sports team that had the best record in the league,
but had to forfeit its final games because players quit or did not join. This is analogous to the situation that
the Army finds itself in today, for it cannot recruit and hold enough quality people for its requirements. The
Army has tried incentives like signing bonuses and other enticements. They have attracted a certain
amount of additional recruits. However, once in the door, many of these new recruits elect not to stay.
Recruiting and retention are local. If soldiers enjoy the climate in their units, regardless of the
mission, if they feel they are doing something worthwhile, they tend to re-enlist. This is borne out in many
units that spend large amounts of time deployed, so long as the climate is right. If soldiers leave the Army
frustrated and dissatisfied, they return to their hometowns and discourage their friends, relatives and
19. 11
eventual children from ever serving. However, the other side of the same coin is that if soldiers enjoy their
service, they will recruit their friends and will be a positive influence on relatives and children.
THE FUTURE.
During a lull in the fighting in World War I, Sam Damon’s commander and future father in law (then)
Colonel Caldwell observed:
We are a race of headlong altruists. We rush to a foreign land in a deluge of embattled
sympathy. We give away clothing, cigarettes, our rations.... We do everything in our
power to proclaim our good intentions, our nobility of purpose, our loftiness of soul... and
all because we think we're too good for the rest of the world." "Is that the reason?" "Yes,
more or less. We can't be bothered with the sordid details, the actualities of human
motivation. We stubbornly, sublimely refuse to see man, as he is, Sam we're so damn
certain about how he ought to be. We know how he ought to be he ought to be
American...
23
Oddly, in the years since the end of the Cold War, the American military has been employed at a
higher rate than in previous periods. It is no longer a sprint. These operations can be long-duration and
instead of being like a marathon with one task executed over a long period of time, they become more of
an “eco-challenge” for the military, with tasks changing while operations are in progress and with different
organizations taking the lead during different phases. With the past as prologue, the future will certainly
be a time in which a high tempo of operations, turbulence and chaos will be the norm, rather than the
exception.
Without the rise of a major peer competitor until the Chinese, predicted to the anywhere between
2009 and 2015, the likelihood of a Medium Theater War (MTW) such as Desert Storm is thought to be
low. There will, however, the more of the same as in the last 10 years: humanitarian assistance
operations, peace operations and non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs).
Ominously, in all that America has done in the last decades to engage other nations, to act on behalf
of oppressed people and to stand against what it recognizes as tyranny and injustice, it has made a
number of implacable enemies and will continue to face more in the future. Meanwhile, these enemies
are acquiring the technology to strike at the American homeland in any number of ways, ranging from
information attacks to the possibility of attacks by weapons of mass destruction. Americans abroad will
continue to be at risk. Although the pressures may arise at home to seek an isolationist stance in relation
to events abroad, in order for the country to enjoy progress and improving standard of living, the country
will continue to engage abroad with all of its instruments of national power (military, diplomatic, economic
and informational).
For the soldier, this means years of long-duration, non-linear operations in the face of unclear,
asymmetric threats. For leaders it will require greater skill, dedication, motivation and better leadership
than ever.
The future demands curtailing the bureaucratic style, placing the management details in the right
hands and getting leaders back to the personal style of leadership. This personal style of leadership,
20. 12
improved climate in units and reformed Army culture will allow long-duration operations with greater
independence of thought and action, greater span of control, economy of force and greater success.
THE PROBLEMS.
PROBLEM 1. LACK OF EFFECTIVE TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION.
This problem is the most pressing since without effective two-way communication, leaders only
transmit, they do not exchange with their subordinates. This erodes trust and thus initiative. It also
reduces the leader's ability to get the truth, to know what is going on. One does not acquire the ability to
suggest things to superiors, let alone propose changes in the strongest terms, just before or during
combat. Subordinate and superior must develop the skill through training and experience. One of the
most important exercises of moral courage is to be able to say things that may be unpopular as a
subordinate and to hear them as a superior. It takes moral courage on both parts, especially when in
public.
Warren Bennis says:
Effective leaders reward dissent, as well as encourage it. They understand that whatever
momentary discomfort they experience as a result of being told from time to time that
they are wrong is more than offset the by fact that reflective backtalk increases a leader's
ability to make good decisions.... Perhaps the ultimate irony is that the follower who
is willing to speak out shows precisely the kind of initiative that leadership is made
of.
24
The ability to voice well-reasoned dissent, even when it was unpopular, was what defined Marshall in
the two anecdotes at the opening of this piece. When an NCO, Sam Damon had this to say about two-
way communication in combat orders:
"But Sarge, …just supposing all hell's broke loose, as you say and the officer forgets the
command, or he goes loose in the lid?” Damon let his eyes rove slowly around the room.
Very solidly and distinctly he said: “Why, then obviously the thing to do is tell that officer
he’s a ... fool and that you want to go back and do it all over again.”
25
General Matthew B. Ridgway also discussed the matter:
To me such incidents most frequently found in war are those where the career of a leader
is at stake, and where his actions or decisions will determine the saving or slaughter of
many of his men. History is full of these cases. The lure of glory, the fear of being thought
afraid, of losing personal power and prestige, the mistaken idea that blind obedience to
orders has no alternative all have been followed by tragic losses of lives with little or no
gain.... General George C. Marshall, one of the noblest men who has worn an American
uniform since Washington, once said of decisions of this kind: "It is hard to get men to
do this, for this is when you lay your career, perhaps your commission on the
line."
26
Unfortunately, the Massengales view dissent as disloyalty, even disobedience. There is no discussion
of alternatives, even before the decision. It can lead to major error, even disaster. Lieutenant General
Massengale and Major General Damon had several such discussions.
21. 13
"What's the trouble Samuel?" He (Massengale) asked in a soft voice. "Are you afraid?"
There was absolute silence in the tent. And in the far scan of his eye Feltner saw Brand
make a quick, impulsive movement, instantly checked; otherwise no one moved. Feltner
could hear the blood washing against his ears; the two figures seemed to quiver in the
dull ochre light under the canvas. Damon's face darkened slowly and steadily until it
looked like old bronze. "General," he said very quietly. "That's a rotten thing to say. It is
untrue, and it is insulting." His eyes, which had never left Massengale's, were cold with
contempt. "If you feel I cannot carry out the orders you are perfectly free to give the
division to anyone you please." He paused and his glance flickered over to Ryetower
with a kind of baleful amusement, went back to the Corps Commander. "If you order
this movement I will execute it to the best of my ability. But I'll tell you one
thing you won't find anybody in the Southwest Pacific Theater of War who can
carry out orders he doesn't approve of as well as I can. I think you know that, too."
A few seconds longer they stood in the center of the tent, their eyes locked on each
other. Then without preamble Massengale turned away with a brief, airy gesture. "I
imagine that is so," he said... when he glanced at Damon again Feltner was amazed to
see that he was smiling. "I dare say you were right about that. Touché... Nevertheless,
PYLON on goes off as ordered." "All right General. If that's how you want it. But if I
should be hit in the flank and find myself in trouble I'm calling in elements of the 49th
Division, as last agreed." "Oh, let's not borrow trouble, Samuel..." "I merely want that
understood, Sir." Massengale gazed at him a long moment, musing, tapping his lower lip
with the geisha fan. "Right. But I can tell you right now you won't need it."
27
Lieutenant General Massengale's response is an attack at Major General Damon's character. "What's
the trouble, Samuel? Are you afraid?" Damon? Afraid? He just voiced his opposition to a dangerously
flawed plan. It took courage to do that. His fear was for his men and the losses they would take in the ill-
conceived attack.
Notice how Damon returned the comments. There was no disrespect. He got Massengale to admit
that though Damon disagreed, he'd be the best at carrying out a bad plan. Damon also got Massengale to
verbally promise the reserve. Massengale subsequently denied Damon the reserve at a critical point and
the Japanese mauled Damon's Division.
SOLUTION 1. REINFORCE EFFECTIVE TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION.
Building effective two-way communication may require the utmost in commitment from the Army's
Senior Leadership. In order to reinforce two-way communication, superiors must begin the process. At
the lower levels, soldiers, NCOs and officers feel that if they voice their opinions constructively, they are
labeled as mavericks. This often leads to penalties on performance evaluations, unanticipated career
tracks and early departure from the service.
Leaders must learn to listen and understand that by capturing the thoughts and ideas of subordinates,
they get a truer picture of what is really going on and they ensure the maximum creative input to their own
ideas. Ultimately, even if they disapprove the input, they get maximum cooperation from the men and
women they lead since the men and women take ownership of the ideas and execute them better, even
without supervision. The habits of communication on the parts of both superior and subordinate must be
developed during training and other exchanges in peacetime, before deploying on operations.
Bottom line: soldiers perform better when they know the reasons why they must do things and have
had the opportunity to participate in their own destiny.
22. 14
"When you ask men to die, to endure great hardship, they have the right to know the
purpose that demands that sacrifice," Lin said softly. "They have the right to be treated
like men with all honor due them all honor due their inextinguishable souls."
Exchange between Lin Tso Han, the Communist Guerrilla leader and Major Damon in
China.
28
Ways to improve communication will be discussed in subsequent sections.
PROBLEM 2. COMMANDERS ARE CONSUMED BY MANAGEMENT DETAILS.
"You yourself said it was the system."... "I'm not defending everything in the system," he
said. "I certainly hope not." "There's plenty wrong with it. Plenty. If I'm ordered to abide
by some regulation I'll do it; but if I'm given any latitude I'm going to go my own way. I go
by what I think is right."
Sam Damon
29
An organization does well only those things a commander checks or causes to be
checked.
GENERAL Bruce C. Clarke
30
What gets measured gets done.
Tom Peters, THRIVING ON CHAOS
31
Disposing of this problem in the right way will provide the time, freedom and motivation for leaders to
solve the other problems. Few commanders today would admit to having even a modest amount of spare
time. The current system of management has commanders so deep in organizational logistic and
personnel details that they have little time remaining for the process of command. These logistic and
personnel details are generally related to the area of control and as a result, are actually in the purview of
the Chief of Staff, Executive Officer or Assistant Commander for Support (for those organizations that
have an Assistant Commander). Leaders must claim their time back and devote the time to developing
their subordinates and commanding their units.
SOLUTION 2A. REDUCE COMMANDERS' MANAGEMENT DETAILS, REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS.
In order to free up time and concentrate on what is important, Tom Peters, author of the book Thriving
on Chaos suggests:
Demand that any report to be sent you be reduced to three pages or less. Starting today,
seriously consider not sending any memo to anyone for any reason, use the phone, and
use personal contact. Also, prune the number of reports that you receive by 50 to 80
percent in the next six to 12 months. Furthermore, send back, without comment and
repeatedly if necessary, all "information copies" of memoranda you receive.
I once, in fact, did a study of several hundred memos in multiple levels in multiple
functions in the same organization and over 90 percent of the several hundred were of
the "cover your tail" variety, simply designed to clear the writer of any hint of blame
should anything ever go awry later on. Finally, send back without comment and
repeatedly, any decision document, which just shouldn't be addressed at your level.
32
23. 15
This is true, but is only the first step. Many of the details covered in these memos and the
innumerable PowerPoint briefings that go hand in hand with them need to be tracked-but not by
commanders. Remember, General Bruce C. Clarke did say "or causes to be checked." Some reduction in
workload would have to occur at Department of the Army level since many reports and associated
briefings are Department of the Army driven. Some reports and briefings could be shifted to other
personnel within organizations. The important thing is that everyone must examine the reports and
briefings and memos and eliminate or reduce them or cause them to be tracked by the right person.
SOLUTION 2B. CREATE A NEW POSITION, DEPUTY COMMANDER, IN BRIGADE AND
BATTALION-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS.
At present, only separate brigades and regiments have a deputy commanding officer. However, it is
now common that battalion and brigade-level organizations deploy separately in support of operations in
places such as Bosnia. In doing so, they are confronted with the requirements to run split base
operations, interact with multiple coalition forces and indigenous factions and to handle requirements
normally belonging to higher-level organizations, such as forming Joint Task Forces (JTFs) or Service
Components of a JTF.
In garrison, the deputy commanding officer would serve as the "deputy commanding officer for
support" and would be responsible for the details that had been removed from the commander's plate. In
such organizations, the executive officer or chief of staff would continue to run the staffs.
At battalion level, the deputy commanding officer would be a senior major or a lieutenant colonel and
could be selected by a separate board or perhaps be an officer drawn from the alternate command list. At
brigade level, he or she would need to be a colonel or lieutenant colonel, selected by a board or picked
from an alternate list.
This officer could come from a different branch from that of the unit. For instance, an Armor battalion
could have an Infantry deputy commander and vice-versa. The Special Forces unit could have an aviator
and vice-versa. In this way, the unit would be capable of expanding its scope of operations into other
areas due to the expertise of the deputy commander.
In battalion and brigade level organizations in divisions, this officer would be rated by the unit
commander and senior rated by the assistant division commander for support. The unit deputy
commanders would conduct a separate quarterly briefing for the assistant division commander to ensure
information flow and mentoring.
PROBLEM 3. LEADERSHIP STYLE.
The manager administers; the leader innovates
The manager is a copy; the leader is an original.
The manager maintains; the leader develops.
The manager focuses on systems and structure; the leader focuses on people.
The manager relies on control; the leader inspires trust.
The manager has a short-term view; leader has a long-term view.
The manager asks why and how; the leader asks what and why.
24. 16
The manager has his or her eye on the bottom line; the leader has his or her eye on the
horizon.
Bennis and Townsend, REINVENTING LEADERSHIP
33
Paring back the micromanagement, creating a new leadership tier in brigades and battalions (not
another layer of bureaucracy) and assigning the right tasks to the right people will reinvigorate
commanders and give them the time to coach and mentor, develop a vision and develop their subordinate
leaders and units.
Bennis and Townsend describe the "old system" of leadership:
The anachronism is the person who in effect says to his organization, "I order all of you
insignificant little people to come to work excited, energetic, and creative and to
accomplish impossible tasks, so that I may become rich and famous and have a
luxurious life traveling around the world and building a home on the Riviera and playing
golf with other important people like myself. By the way, I want you to park in the outer
lot and slog through the snow past the empty parking space with my name on it, and I
also want you to pay for your coffee while l get mine free, served on fine china." That was
the old model, and it worked. Some great companies were built, and they prospered with
that kind of leader. But now we're a long way past that.
34
There are several military analogs to this and are left to the imagination.
With an increase in the amount of a leader's time, the time must be put to good use, such as training
and mentoring subordinates. This is the only way to achieve commonality of purpose and understanding
of the commanders' intent. Personal contact results in an exchange, generally more beneficial to the
subordinate, but not always. J.F.C. Fuller explained it this way:
The exception I witnessed myself, a divisional commander in the picket line with his men
and everyone confident and smiling. He was doing nothing outside showing himself, yet
his presence acted like a charm it maintained confidence. He was a man who knew the
value of moral cement.
35
Eventually personal contact results in a more valid performance evaluation.
SOLUTION 3A. RESTORE TRUST: GET RID OF THE OLD STYLE AND EMPLOY TRANSACTIONAL
AND/OR TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP METHODS.
Taylor and Rosenbach observe:
There is no effective leadership without trust. Leaders are dependent upon trust as a
bond between them and their followers. Leaders must demonstrate their trust in followers
through delegation and empowerment. The leader enables followers to be worthy of that
trust by making sure that adequate training is provided and that goals are clearly
communicated. At the same time, followers depend upon the leader to be trustworthy
honest, consistent, equitable, and humane. Of all the modern organizations, none is so
dependent on the bonds of trust as the military.
36
Sergeant Sam Damon learned the lesson in World War I:
Damon smiled somberly in the dark, listening to the laughter. He was a symbol, then: a
talisman. Of course, that had its good points if they believed that as his platoon, they
were invincible, or destined to win, or just plain lucky, they would be better soldiers.
25. 17
Successful armies were built on esprit, on conviction in the face of those clouds of great
uncertainty in which Clausewitz said three-quarters of all military endeavor was hidden.
37
The common perception today among mid and junior-level officers and NCOs is that superiors do not
trust their subordinates, and so superiors micromanage mundane details. They restrict the freedom of
their subordinates in order to avoid incidents. This has a dramatic effect on missions when, as in Haiti or
Bosnia, American soldiers, arguably the most gregarious in the world and the best outfitted for the
environment of peacekeeping, are forced to stay on their bases, aware that force protection has become
the mission. Thus, they cannot employ the character traits common to most Americans in the business of
meeting people, developing consensus and moving a fragmented nation towards the desired end state. In
addition, while they stay on these bases, their leaders forbid them to, so much as, drink a beer and in
many cases, they are not allowed to handle live ammunition. Yet, leaders expect these soldiers to "jump
the fence," and engage in combat at a moment's notice.
The lack of trust downward occurs because of a lack of "tolerance for error." Lack of trust upwards
results in "risk aversion." Alcohol problems, brushes with the law and media encounters fall into this
category. So, unfortunately do mistakes during training or operations. To be sure, certain conduct must
be discouraged. However, people can learn from mistakes. Leaders can use mistakes as learning tools.
Today many leaders use mistakes as ways to differentiate between subordinates for the purpose of
evaluation. Several officers reported that their OER counseling simply consisted of a recounting of each
mistake they had made during the period. This is “Gotcha!” counseling!
Dr. Warren Bennis, who studied 90 leaders of world-class organizations (none of them military
organizations) for a period for six years found that they all had mastered the art of learning through
mistakes and allowing their subordinates to do so as well:
These leaders never took a setback as a failure. They just took it and held it is
something from which they could learn. So I'm not saying these individuals hailed failure
and that they ignored downside risks. But like Karl Wallenda, they viewed walking the
rope, keeping their goal and vision in mind as the key thing and any setback or miscue or
glitch was something from which they could learn. In fact, one leader said to me, "For me,
a mistake is simply another way of doing things." Imagine that, "A mistake is simply
another way of doing things." Another one said, "If I have an art form of leadership
and I don't think I do, it would be making as many mistakes as I can as quickly as
possible, learning from them and getting on with it."
38
Warren Bennis, The Leadership Challenge: Skills for Taking Charge.
During World War I, Sergeant Damon had to deal with the problem as well:
"Asleep on outpost duty, Asleep on -- You know what you could get, don't you." (Said
Damon) "I -- guess so, Sarge." "You guess so…. they're just dying to make an example
of somebody like you back there. They'll burn you at the stake." ... "What am I going to do
with you?" ... "Sarge," he mumbled, "It won't happen again..." "No. I it won't. It sure as hell
won't." ... But when Damon looked at him again the Sergeant's face might have been
carved from flint. In a very quiet voice he said: "All right, I'm going to give you one more
chance, Raebyrne. I'm going to let you off."..."I'm going to keep this between you and me
and God Almighty." ... "But if I ever catch you on watch with one eye closed again,
Raebyrne ...I'm going to personally run your sorry ass all the way up to Black Jack
26. 18
Pershing and see to it they give you the Bastille for the remainder of your unnatural life.
Now have you got that?"
39
Damon, in the anecdote above, actually granted a subordinate a reprieve for one of the most grievous
errors, falling asleep on guard duty and there were German patrols in the area. That Damon gave
Raebyrne another chance cemented Damon's relationship with Raebyrne, but also with every other unit
Damon led in World War I. His subordinates trusted him. They believed in him and would not let him down
again. Leaders must learn to underwrite honest mistakes. They have to fly "top cover" for deserving
subordinates.
Subordinates show that they do not trust their leaders by voting with their feet. When they leave, they
turn off uncounted others they meet.
Two types of leadership that hold promise for change from the old system are transactional and
transformational leadership.
In transactional leadership, leaders offer incentives for appropriate behavior and disincentives for
inappropriate behavior. What these incentives and disincentives are is a puzzle for commanders because
there is little a commander has with which to reward or punish (see below, discussion of feedback
systems). Personal contact may be the most valuable and cheapest incentive. However, it appears
commanders today avoid contact because eventually they must render an honest evaluation of their
subordinates and they feel that the subordinate must measure up on his or her own or because they
themselves never had personal contact with their superiors.
In transformational leadership, the commander develops a challenging vision, which may involve a
course correction or a new, demanding mission, and gets the subordinates to commit to that vision. Thus,
they become more of a team and better at their jobs. Sergeant Sam Damon was a transformational
leader, although he had not heard the term:
Linked together they swayed and labored along, their heads sunk in their shoulders,
striding in unison although there was no cadence. And Damon, trudging wearily beside
them, felt the same hot rush of affection he'd known that night going up to the line above
Brigny, under the flare but now it was fused with a fierce, possessive pride: they knew
the platoon was more than the mere sum of their numbers They had imbued
themselves with this knowledge and made it theirs. They were great, they were
magnificent; he was proud to be their leader.
40
Transactional and transformational leadership can be employed at the same time and are not
mutually exclusive.
PROBLEM 4. LACK OF MENTORING; POOR LEADERSHIP CLIMATE.
The more management, or command, became methodized, the more de-humanized
each grew; the worker, or the soldier, becoming a cog in a vast soulless machine was de-
spiritualized, the glamour of work, or of war, fading from before his eyes, until working, or
fighting, became drudgery.
41
The (CSIS) Study found an increase in micromanagement and a "zero defects" attitude
that is fed by the availability of the Internet and e-mail. "An awful lot of modern technology
27. 19
is aiding and abetting oversupervision and micromanagement," says project director
Joseph Collins, a former Army Colonel. Many service members say that impersonal
"command by e-mail" is becoming the norm.
42
Many commanders today run what appears to be a "turtle race," when it comes to mentoring and
evaluating officers. Regardless of how they themselves were treated, they devote little time to developing
their officers and, instead, simply watch the results and pick their favorites. In the meantime, junior
officers receive little or no personal contact. Many commanders appear to command their units from the
office, relying on email to pass out instructions and remain informed. The unfortunate thing is that the
computer, which could make some aspects of command simpler and less time-consuming, has become a
major consumer of time.
The paradox here is that most commanders need every organization in their unit to be a good one. If
they go to war, they go as a team, with three or four subordinate companies, battalions, platoons, or
brigades. If they pick, spend time with and only promote their favorites, then the other officers and units
suffer and lag behind. Those officers and units must fend for themselves and succeed in spite of, rather
than because of, their commanders. When such commanders pick their favorites from among
subordinates for being malleable or "safe," the enlisted men and women recognize this. Other officers do
too. For the new officer, the decision is between the following two alternatives, "join the club and succeed,
or stay independent and fend for yourself."
Professor Samuel Huntington writes that the job of the officer is to be expert in the "management of
violence."
43
It is difficult to imagine malleable people managing violence not to mention leading violent
people effectively in combat or the confusing environment of MOOTW.
SOLUTION 4A: CHECK THE MENTORING PROGRAM AND UNIT CLIMATE.
What gets measured gets done. As part of a 360-degree look at a unit commander, provide a certain
percentage of subordinate officers a chance to rate their mentoring. This would be done as part of a
random mentoring survey and would not need to encompass 100 percent of the officers. The mentoring
survey would be done at least twice per year. It would be sent to an officer by an independent
organization at least three levels above the unit commander (so as to be above the senior rater) with
feedback provided to the unit commander's rater and senior rater and the unit commander himself. Since
the unit commander would not know which officers were going to receive the survey, the unit commander
could not work in advance to bias the survey, except by mentoring all of his or her officers.
The survey would be submitted to officers after they received their officer evaluation reports. Once it
becomes clear that a particular commander is not spending time with, mentoring or counseling his or her
personnel, then an additional picture would emerge that the rater and senior rater would be required to
consider in their evaluations and address with the unit commander. Senior raters at the two-star level will
develop a better understanding of their subordinate leaders through this process. They will have reduced
the amount of time they spend in administrative details due to the reduced managerial workloads
described above. They too will have more time to mentor their subordinate leaders. Battalion and brigade
28. 20
commanders would receive surveys too and be able to comment on the mentoring from their rater and
senior rater.
To check the overall leadership climate in the unit, a different survey is required, this one being sent
to a certain percentage of all ranks. Data from these surveys, as well as that from the mentoring surveys
would be placed in the officer's "leadership file," (author's name for a new addition to the boarded file)
which would become a part of the file boards would review. Board members would compare input from
soldiers and subordinate leaders to the OERs and other items in an officer’s file. Board members would
be better able to discern how many of the OERs in an officer's file were simply "boilerplate" constructed
by commanders who didn't really know their people or who were attempting to "stack the deck." Both the
rater and senior rater would see this data as well.
Checking the mentoring process is the only way to ensure it will improve.
SOLUTION 4B. INSTITUTE PROFESSIONAL MENTORS.
Because in the Army's system, it is "up or out," there is a tendency to believe that officers must
continue to advance in rank to be effective. This results in short tours in units, high turbulence and a lack
of mentoring of and by the officer. To reduce this trend, the Army should institute a system of
professional mentors. This would involve officers at Captain, Major and Lieutenant Colonel at minimum
who would determine that they did not wish to advance. Rather, they would determine that they had
found their niche and wanted to serve the rest of their career at that level. They would apply for a position
as a perpetual officer in the current grade and a board would review the request. Their files would not be
submitted to promotion boards, but their files would be regularly examined to determine whether or not to
retain them. Except for positions requiring a centralized selection process, the commander of the unit
above their own would assign them. Increases in pay would come at a separate, slightly accelerated rate
from that of those who continued the "up or out" path, to provide a method of modest financial
inducement.
These officers would perform duty in units and staff sections and would be eligible for a minimum of
one command at whatever level they elected to adopt. However, they would be able to hold that
command position one time by selection, only again if a crisis or an additional requirement such as
command of an ad hoc task force arose. In addition, officers retired from active duty should be allowed to
serve in reserve component units, still drawing their retirement pay plus reserve component pay.
Another idea that would benefit the mentoring process would be to allow officers electing this program
to serve up to two grades down in rank in order to participate in some form of special duty. This would
benefit certain types of low density/high demand units such as special operations, military intelligence and
aviation units. This should be pursued in both Active and Reserve Component Forces.
The professional mentorship program would infuse experience and a new level of mentoring in
all active and reserve component units. These officers would not be subject to the pressures felt by those
who must move "up or out." They would serve as a reference point for those who passed through the
units on their way to other promotions and assignments. They would also provide a benchmark voice for
29. 21
unit commanders. These professional mentors would PCS. However, their movement would be
somewhat slower than those officers on the regular track would.
PROBLEM 5. INEFFECTIVE PROFESSIONAL AND LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS.
Leadership development programs are often haphazard and ineffective. The Army recently took the
major step of codifying its values: loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity and personal
courage. The next step, according to James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras is to develop a core ideology
in which the organization's values are articulated through the organization's core purpose. Though many
leaders today quote the fact that the core purpose of the Army is to "fight and win America's wars," this
leaves the case of operations other than war without an ideological base. Some work needs to be done in
order to incorporate MOOTW into a purpose statement. Perhaps, "Fight and win the nation's wars and
accomplish other missions at the direction of the National Command Authority." This is a subject meriting
widest discussion and is beyond the scope of this paper.
SOLUTION 5. DEVELOP AN ARMY CORE IDEOLOGY AND A CENTRALIZED PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR OFFICERS.
A visionary organization is: an ongoing institution rooted in a set of timeless core values,
that exists for a purpose beyond just making money, that stands the test of time by virtue
of the ability to continually renew itself from within.
BUILT TO LAST, by James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras
44
To compete in a world of chaos, the Army must become a visionary organization. One component of
the visionary organization is the core ideology. The core ideology is sum of the core values plus the core
purpose. The core ideology must then be learned and ascribed to by everyone in the organization. Collins
and Porras say that sometimes organizations have no written core ideology, but in truly visionary
organizations, every member knows what it is. The Army must formulate a core ideology. This process
need not be a lengthy intellectual exercise. For example, if one were to contemplate a developing a core
ideology for the U. S. Marine Corps, "Semper Fidelis" might be a good place to start.
Professional development training of officers is one important way to move people back along the
path to leadership and to a wider understanding and practice of the Army Values and eventually the Army
core ideology. To focus professional development on inculcation of Army Values and improve mentoring,
the Army should adopt a centralized professional development program. Using outside (outside the
Army), professional developmental expertise (Hollywood/Silicon Valley), the Army would develop, a series
of 12 interactive, multimedia, multidimensional professional development "kits." This would amount to one
kit for each of 12 months, with successive kits being produced each month for inclusion in a menu. These
kits would be usable from battalion to corps level. Commanders at all levels would conduct one
professional development session from the kit menu per month.
An example of such a professional development session kit at battalion level would consist of a
videotape plus a multi-media, multidimensional, interactive, computerized simulation and briefing system,
30. 22
which would allow the essence of a virtual "staff ride" to be done in the unit headquarters or any
designated area. The videotape need not be specially developed for the professional development
session. Some years ago at the Command and General Staff College, for instance, the class was
required to watch the movie "Glory" (“Gettysburg,” the Turner rendition of the book The Killer Angels
would also be a good one). Such films would be ideal as a vehicle to teach and even more valuable if
used in conjunction with a staff ride to the actual battlefield or similar terrain.
Leaders would watch the video in its entirety. The multimedia package would consist of a series of
vignettes drawn from the movie, complete with maps and video clips. Officers would be assigned to
portray characters in the scenario. Each officer would develop his or her character, produce a short
briefing and paper and cover the relevant aspects of issues according to instructions in the package.
Since the multimedia kit would be interactive, solutions to situations could actually be oriented on the
aspects of the type of unit the officers actually served in and portrayed in a multimedia environment to
allow the officers to witness the effects of their plans and actions. For example, for logistic units, in
addition to a section on Army Values, there would be a section on logistical operations. Eventually, with
the addition of films due out, such as "Blackhawk Down," these kits could encompass the present and
should move into the future, to entail operations the Army expects to encounter.
These training packages would be oriented on teaching how to think, not what to think and would
allow leaders to tailor the package and coach and mentor their officers to prepare for and cope with
paradox, chaos and ethical dilemmas. This program would also provide commanders with a written and
oral product submitted by each officer and would allow a more realistic picture of each officer to emerge.
This would begin to level the playing field, allowing commanders to see previously unobserved strengths
and weaknesses of certain officers and would go a long way toward developing a more objective picture
of each officer, thus lessening the tendency and perception of favoritism on the part of commanders.
At Quarterly Training Briefs the senior rater would check this program. Units could re-enact a portion
of the OPD and the commander could detail certain presentations by selected officers.
With enough of these to choose from, commanders could pick from the list in order to choose topics
that would assist in preparing for upcoming events such as deployments or training exercises. This
program, over the course of 12 months, would ensure uniform development of values, purpose and
ideology across the balance of the Army, but would reduce the production requirements on all
commanders and leave them free to squeeze out the maximum benefit for their units. Commanders
would have their choice of which OPD to choose each month and where to place their focus.
PROBLEM 6. ACADEMIC ENVIRONMENT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT/INFREQUENT OFFICER
EDUCATION.
Part of every profession involves education. The Army has a formal system of education, but to
supplement this formal system it needs an informal system as well. In the formal training of officers, an
officer attends the basic branch course soon after entry into the Army, the Advanced Course within five or
six years and with luck, Command and General Staff College within ten years of the Advanced Course.
31. 23
Attendance at the War College takes place ten years later. Given the rate of change, much can happen in
eight to ten years.
SOLUTION 6A. IMPROVE THE ACADEMIC ENVIRONMENT.
Army schools do not provide the same level of academic rigor, as do other schools in the Joint Arena.
In the words of Martin Van Creveld:
Nor are career conscious-officers motivated to serious study in an institution where there
is no competition and from which everybody who enters is certain to graduate. Thus the
best that most war colleges can offer is a year off which may or may not be useful."
45
Consider increasing the rigor at CGSC and AWC by adding tests that gauge creativity, response to
paradox and leadership ability. These tests could take the form of a series of exercises in which
leadership positions were rotated regularly with evaluations provided by a designated observer/controller.
In addition, make the position of instructor at the War College, or CGSC a "peach" assignment.
Consider deferring battalion command, brigade command and General Officer selectees to instruct.
All professionals require education. In many other professions, annual education is required for the
purpose of remaining current in the profession. In all American Military Services attendance at schools is
sporadic and by selection. This means that some do not attend.
SOLUTION 6B. GIVEN THE COMPLEXITY OF THE MODERN POLITICO-MILITARY SYSTEM,
DEVELOP A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING EDUCATION TO EDUCATE AND DEVELOP ALL OFFICERS.
The system of continuing education would include distributed learning opportunities for all officers,
mandatory every two years. The learning environment would be achieved through video teleconferencing,
multimedia interactive computer exchange or attendance at a hard classroom facility or alternate location.
Educational periods should last at least 40 classroom hours.
During such instruction, attendees would receive updates on doctrine, ongoing operations (so that
"Lessons Learned" are not simply "Lessons Listed"), impending operations, political-military trends in the
environment and other subjects as required. Students would also conduct at least one exercise in which
a written and oral product would be presented. Both products would again evaluate the student from the
perspective of initiative, creativity and thought process involved. Input from this continuing education
would be forwarded to the individual's “academic file” (proposed). The idea here is to assess the
intellectual makeup of the officer in terms of aptitude and suitability for certain positions.
Make the "academic file" (proposed); the educational information gathered on individuals from unit
professional development sessions, continuing education, published articles and service school
attendance. This file would add a third tier of evaluation. Use it in conjunction with the performance file,
leadership file (proposed for addition in a previous section) and awards and decorations to determine
assignments, promotions and command selection. Also, consider inclusion of a psychological evaluation
in this process.
32. 24
PROBLEM 7. THE EVALUATION PROCESS LACKS OBJECTIVITY AND DEPTH.
Army regulations require certain actions of the rater and senior rater in the evaluation process, but
since it is not checked, it is not done right. Officers at the Army War College reported receiving OERs in
the mail three months after leaving command. Some officers have not received theirs yet, eight months
after the course began. These officers also report that there were many opportunities for the rater and
senior rater to have presented the report earlier. Since some reports did not arrive until three months
after giving up command or later, it must be assumed that it took that much time to produce them.
Lieutenants, Captains and Majors relate similar stories. Where are the counters of beans and peddlers of
flesh in this arena, one that could surely be tracked using statistics even a "Whiz Kid" would understand?
SOLUTION 7. CHANGE THE EVALUATION PROCESS: GATHER THE TOOLS AND CREATE A "360
DEGREE LOOK" AT AN OFFICER.
This lack of contact in the evaluation process makes the evaluation system invalid. Since the OER is
the most important tool (the only tool) used in board selection, the Army has returned to a form of unit and
branch nepotism. Before the nepotism was Army-wide, but since the Army was smaller, most people at
higher levels knew each other and the seniority system protected their discourse to an extent. Now it is
unit or branch specific and is propagated by unscrupulous or busy commanders who don't spend time
with their subordinate leaders, and as a result, structure their OERs based on favoritism or comfort level
with an officer. This produces successful officers (fast movers) who are simply carbon copies of their
bosses. As one Warrant Officer in a Brigade-level organization recently observed, "All these new
commanders seem like political appointees." Thus, the OER, originally thought to be the solution to merit
based selection, must be reduced in relative effect in regards to selection for promotion and command.
To do this, additional sources of evaluation must be developed. The number of OERs during
leadership tours should be increased from the minimum of two to a minimum of four, in other words, one
every six months if no changes occur involving the rater, rated officer or senior rater. In addition, officers
deploying on missions for two months should receive a change of rater report and will receive a rating
from the chain of command they work for in theater or at the alternate location. This will allow the
evaluation of the officer outside the garrison environment. Consider requiring OERs on all deployed
officers so that their performance on the mission is evaluated in and of itself. Sometimes the best in
garrison are not the best when deployed. Consider sending officers, even commanders, away for short
tours of 2-3 months in one of the emerging operations areas so that they can get first hand experience,
especially if their units will serve in such a mission. Generate additional OERs on purpose, to expand the
file, get a better look at performance and potential, and discourage nepotism.
In addition to the leadership and education files, described above, the number of OERs during leadership
tours should be increased from the minimum of two to a minimum of four, in other words, one every six
months if no changes occur involving the rater, rated officer or senior rater. In addition, officers deploying
on missions for two months should receive a change of rater report and will receive a rating from the
chain of command they work for in theater or at the alternate location.
33. 25
Consider the file of accumulated OERs to be only one lens of a three-lens, 360 degree-look at an
officer. With the addition of the "leadership" and "educational" files (described above), a board gets a
deeper look into the character of an officer. In addition, more OERs, covering shorter periods, would be
available for review. A more complete picture of an officer emerges.
Soon a broader picture of officers will develop in their files and commanders, knowing that they will do
more OERs, will be more inclined to follow the regulation and consider the performance of the officer over
the specific period of time and consider the difficulty or importance of the job the officer was doing.
Additionally, senior raters would gather new information resulting from professional development
session-generated data, subordinate officer mentoring surveys collected and the surveys of command
climate run every year.
Deputy commanders completing OERs on certain officers (Rater for some and Senior Rater for
others) can reduce commanders' OER workload, even in light of the increased number of OERs. To
reduce the number of files going before a command board, the Army should require an individual to apply
for command.
46
This would reduce the number of files coming before a board by an estimated 30-50%.
Not all Lieutenant Colonels or Colonels want to command. Given an increased number of OERS and
inclusion of educational and leadership files, reducing the number of files that come before a Command
Board allows Board members to concentrate on each file, leading to better selections. Promotion boards
would continue to consider all eligible officers, the way they do today.
Finally, the mandatory 1/3 - 2/3 rule (up to 49%) in the top block makes little sense in light of the fact
that commanders are not developing their subordinates. Many officers (considering the system as "rated)
officers) believe that the 1/3 - 2/3 requirement discourages contact between officers and their senior
raters. Sort of "why invest the time when you know you'll have to crush him or her?"
The announced purpose of the new OER was to restore honesty to the system and give boards an
easier job. Since the new report results in less contact, what did it really accomplish other than to improve
counting the beans and peddling the flesh at the expense of leading? First, signing all the required papers
in the affirmative when the required counseling has not been performed is not honest. Second, why
should boards have an easier job? If commanders had more time, due to a reduction in the bureaucratic
demands on their time, spending a few more days on a board to review additional objective rating
information would ensure they picked the best people instead of just the ones served up like the "Blue
Plate Special" by the previous chain of command.
Perhaps if the peddlers of flesh could develop a clever system to get raters and senior raters to
mentor and counsel their subordinates appropriately, then the "Blue Plate Special" would become a thing
of the past. Interestingly, Major Generals no longer receive senior rater reports.
34. 26
PROBLEM 8. LACK OF INCENTIVE SYSTEMS.
Feedback, both positive and negative is important at all levels. Improving the leadership and
mentoring systems as described above will create a certain amount of feedback. In addition, ridding the
evaluation system of favoritism and counterbalancing favoritism through introduction of other evaluative
input will provide a more level playing field. Given a level playing field, personal contact with commanders
becomes an incentive for subordinates. However, there are still matters of discipline and commendation
that must be attended to.
SOLUTION 8A. IMPROVE POSITIVE INCENTIVES FOR SOLDIERS.
As a general form of positive incentive for recruiting and retention, the following is proposed: rework
the pay raise system so that it is graduated, giving a higher percentage of pay increase to enlisted men
and women. Every management book cited in the Bibliography to this paper takes the position that, in
order to keep good people in the business world, companies must pay them well. The Army is no
exception. Officers (leaders) will take pride in proportionately improving the lot of their subordinates.
Second, the Army is now competing for people (as it always has been) with businesses.
Corporations offer reasonable wages, health care and a chance to invest in an excellent 401(k),
sometimes based on company stock. The Army has difficulty competing with this (it has no stock of its
own). The Army has difficulty innovating on its own since anything that the Army would pioneer would
have to be approved by the other services and by selected committees and/or Branches of Government.
Certainly one way to ease concerns over retirement would be to increase the amount of money
uniformed personnel could save in an IRA to $4000 a year and begin some sort of DOD-wide mutual fund
that could be set up as a 401(k) so a certain percentage of wages could be committed to it.
Soldiers would be like employees in some of the great companies in United States, realizing that they
would be providing a valuable service, service in the military, for a reasonable wage. Judicious
investment in safe, interest-bearing investments would ultimately, when coupled with their anticipated
retirement pay, give them great peace of mind about the future, as well as attract others to the service in
the present.
Third, the bugs in the Army active-duty and retirement health care systems must be worked out. As it
stands now, the perception of a poor health care system is a disincentive to enlisting or remaining in the
Army. Fixing the problem would offer an incentive for both recruiting and retention and the effort to fix the
problem would be a trust-builder.
Fourth, devise a system of pay incentives for innovation and work saving. Make them applicable for
more than just the logistics arena. When such a system is instituted, commanders would have a
meaningful way to commend excellent performance without resorting to medals. Some old soldiers
complain about cheapening the award system and some young soldiers complain about receiving their
sixth Army Achievement Medal.
