MUNUC DISEC Background Guide

DISARMAMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY COMMITTEEMUNUC XXIX
Topic A: Prevention of Extremist Radicalization
Topic B: Securing Movement of Refugees

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DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE MUNUC XXIX
LETTER FROM THE CHAIR
Hello Everyone!
It’s a pleasure to meet you! My name is Srikanth Krishnan, and I’ll be serving as your chair for the Disarmament
and International Security Committee at MUNUC XXIX.
While I find all issues handled by the United Nations to be of international priority, I believe that topics
closely related to current events to be the most engaging and thought provoking. To that end Topics A and B,
Prevention of Radicalization into Violent Extremism and Securing the Movement of Refugees, deal with what
we’ve seen on the news and has captured national attention. As a delegate, much of the world’s response to
these problems are as yet too young to be able to endorse with certainty, and the positions taken by different
countries around the world may stand in stark opposition to each other as well as your own beliefs. As your
chair, I ask that you take the simulation to its fullest and embody your national policy truly, so that we might
all better understand why the world currently deals with the radicalization of militants and dangerous refugee
crises in the way that it does.
I am a sophomore undergraduate student majoring in Economics and Public policy. Here at the college and
in addition to MUNUC, I compete as a member of our traveling Model UN team and am part of our college
conference CHOMUN. Outside the MUN world I help organize TEDxUchicago, work for DC Thinktanks,
play soccer, and am involved with our university Institute of Politics.
I am extremely passionate about backpacking, camping, and all things outdoor. I deeply miss my Labrador
retriever, Pepper, back home in Maryland and watch Archer, Parks and Rec., and Narcos to procrastinate
schoolwork. If you are a Chicago local, feel free to belatedly celebrate the last World Series with me again.
I look forward to meeting you in person at MUNUC, until then research hard and follow the news! If you
have any questions or need any clarification, feel free to reach out to me.
Best,
Srikanth Krishnan
Chair, Disarmament and International Security Committee
disec@munuc.org

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HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE
The Disarmament and Security Committee (DISEC), also known as the First Committee of the General
Assembly, concerns itself primarily with issues dealing with global security and threats to peace. Each member
nation of the UN is allowed a delegation (of no greater than five representatives) in DISEC, and the body
meets for a four to five-week session every year beginning in October.1
This year will mark the 72nd
meeting of
the First Committee and the United Nations.
DISEC has a very wide purview, in that it is charged with dealing with every threat to global peace within
the Charter of the United Nations.2
This charter charges the General Assemblies with dealing with issues that
might concern DISEC, including “the general principles of co-operation and security, including the principles
governing disarmament.”3
The purpose of the General Assembly is to provide a forum for discussion and
debate amongst all member nations of the UN (and, under some circumstances, nonmembers), allowing for
a diversity of opinion that is hard to find in smaller decision making bodies such as the Security Council.
However, DISEC, like all other General Assembly committees, maintains an advisory role rather than one
of direct action. In fact, Article 10 of the United Nations charter limits the power of the General Assembly,
stating that its ultimate power is to “make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the
Security Council or to both.”4
Voting in DISEC is identical to the other General Assembly committees. Substantive decisions on international
peace and security are passed by a two-thirds majority in which every nation gets exactly one vote. Minor
decisions and procedural motions are made by a simple majority of member nations.5
Despite its inability to pass treaties or laws that bind member states, DISEC nonetheless remains an integral
part of the United Nations, as it serves as an invaluable measure of global opinion and a fair forum for
international debate. Resolutions, the main instrument of legislation for DISEC, are considered very carefully
by the rest of the United Nations, and the Security Council depends on DISEC for input on its decisions.
Important action taken in the past as a result of discussions in DISEC include the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.The Disarmament and Security
Council has a mandate to protect the peace and stability of the world through open discussion and discourse,
and has shown that this is an effective tool in the past. The role of DISEC is only set to grow as matters of
international security become increasingly complicated and polarizing.
1 “Disarmament and Security: The First Committee,” General Assembly of the United Nations, accessed November 17, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/
ga/first/.
2 Ibid.
3 United Nations Charter, “Chapter IV: The General Assembly,” United Nations, 1945.
4 Ibid.
5 “Chapter IV: The General Assembly.”

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TOPIC A: PREVENTION OF EXTREMIST RADICALIZATION
Statement of the Problem
The classic narrative of radicalization is that of a very simple equation; in the face of an occupying force,
ethnoreligious persecution, totalitarian regimes, or rapid cultural change, a set of likely impoverished and
uneducated people transform into a violent oppositional force. In turn, this equation prescribes a very
predictable solution of legal rights expansion, education reforms, and economic empowerment. Imagine then,
the surprise of Swedish policymakers when they realized they were exporting terrorism in the form of over
300 Swedes leaving to join the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in 20166
alone from data collected
by their national security service, Säpo. So strange was this finding that Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven
stated that “Sweden has been naïve.” The PM noted that his country, believed both at home and abroad to be
an open democracy lacking neither in economic opportunity nor educational access, seemed implausible as an
incubator of ISIL’s violent ideologies.7
Yet Sweden had exported more radicalized Swedes than even the United
States, whose population is over thirty times that of Sweden’s.
In the context of international affairs, radicalization is defined as the process by which a person becomes an
advocate of radical political or social reform and their way of thinking and engaging with society becomes
drastically different from the normative set of behaviors.8
On the other hand, violent extremism is when a
person decides that methods making use of fear and terror are justified to achieve an ideological or political
agenda. While radicalization does not necessarily lead to violent extremism, the two concepts are often highly
interrelated.9
Radicalization into violent extremism is far from a uniquely Swedish problem. According to
a report from the U.S. Department of homeland defense, fighters leaving for conflicts in the Middle East
number in the hundreds from the U.K., Germany, and Lebanon, then climb to over a thousand from Turkey,
France, Russia, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. In Tunisia, the home of the Arab Spring and the democratic surge
of the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, approximately five thousand fighters left to join the
violence in Syria and Iraq. 10
While this list only covers a number of top contributors of fighters to the conflicts
across the Middle East, they include both Islamic and non-Islamic nations as well as nations that present a
wide spectrum of governmental openness and vastly different economic systems. As Sweden demonstrates,
it is no longer enough to hope that open democracies and secular cultures will be sufficient in disrupting
Radicalization into Violent Extremism (RVE).
6 “300 Swedes have left to fight in Middle East,” The Local, October 5, 2015, http://www.thelocal.
se/20151004/300-swedes-have-left-to-join-extremist.
7 “PM: Sweden has been ‘naïve’ about terror threat,” The Local, November 19, 2015, https://www.thelocal.se/20151119/
swedish-pm-country-naive-about-terror-threat.
8 “Radicalize,” Merriam-Webster, accessed November 16, 2016, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/radicalize.
9 Chris Angus, “Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: Causes and Responses,” NSW Parliamentary Research Service, February 2016.
10 “Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel,” Homeland Security Committee, September 2015.

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Contemporary conflicts, particularly those involving non-state actors, are increasingly characterized by
asymmetric warfare, that is, conflicts where there is a large discrepancy in the military capability of the warring
parties. Rather than conventional open combat between standing armies, violence has taken indirect venues
such as political terrorism, cyberwarfare, and guerilla or irregular combat.11
This method of combat has proven
largely advantageous for non-state actors and rebel groups looking to challenge a state’s governing regime;
since 1950 the ‘weaker’ combatant has won a majority of all asymmetric conflict.12
Additionally, modern
communications technology in the form of such things as internet, social media, and handheld smartphones
offer substantial new venues for ideology transmission and membership recruitment for these organizations.
This pattern of combat has two relevant effects for this committee to consider.
First, violent extremist organizations must allocate resources to cultivating individuals who will invest
their lives into the ideology of the organization. To do so requires extensive recruitment attempts as well as
active culturing of recruits to fanaticism, a process known as radicalization. This understanding also implies
opportunity to disrupt radicalization, either by targeting at-risk groups and individuals susceptible to violent
ideologies, or by disrupting the channels through which ideology is spread. Second, the actions of violent
extremist organizations usually cause political and humanitarian crises in their targeted states. Often, states
coordinate their internal responses in various forms of a crisis commission. Such commissions benefit from the
political expediency of a state reacting to a crisis, and are able to quickly set internal policies that are rapidly
entrenched.13
While convenient for immediate response action, policies set in this manner can be prepared
hastily, and without adequate global coordination to remain effective.14
Dialogue regarding this issue should
begin with discussing ways to disrupt the process of radicalization performed by violent extremists and the
cultivation of a more cohesive and prepared global framework for response to extremist activity.
The face of radicalization today is quickly evolving. Consider, as a case study, perhaps the most successful
radicalizer of modern times, known worldwide as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or as Daesh (dā`ish) in the Arabic speaking world. ISIL currently is directly
combatting the Syrian Assad Loyalist, Iraqi, Kurdish, and various Syrian Revolutionary governments for
territory, alongside ostensibly sixty other states in the stated pursuit of establishing a worldwide Caliphate.
Organizations affiliated with ISIL are additionally active in Nigeria, Libya, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.15,16
The
American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated that by the end of the year 2015, approximately 30,000
11 Robert R. Tomes, “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare,” Parameters: U.S. Army War College 34:1 (2004): 16-28.
12 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International Security 26:1 (Summer 2001): 93-128.
13 Ryan Shaffer, “Counter-Terrorism Intelligence, Policy and Theory Since 9/11,” Terrorism and Political Violence 27:2 (2015): 368-375.
14 Ibid.
15 Hamid Shalizi, “Exclusive: In turf war with Afghan Taliban, Islamic State loyalists gain ground,” Reuters, June 29, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-afghanistan-islamic-state-idUSKCN0P91EN20150629.
16 Katie Zavadski, “ISIS Now Has a Network of Military Affiliates in 11 Countries Around the World,” New York Magazine, November 23, 2014, http://
nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/11/isis-now-has-military-allies-in-11-countries.html.

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foreign fighters had been recruited from outside its primary territory in Syria and Iraq. Such numbers suggest
that upwards of half of ISIL’s military capacity is sourced from abroad.17
Much of this success may be attributable to an eager and skillful adoption of increasingly universal internet-
based social media. Experts find that ISIL’s media wing operates a more sophisticated program on websites
such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube than most American private companies.18
Their campaigns, carefully
cross-coordinated and utilizing select hashtags or images out of Raqqa, the capital in North Central Syria,
depict the organization as a religious authority, capable state builder, and successful in its military campaigns.
Not only has this lead to radicalization figures called “unprecedented” by the UN19
but it has also been
believed to be successful in soliciting large support from anonymous donors worldwide.20
It is not simply that ISIL’s use of social media is impactful, but that an entire apparatus dedicated to
radicalization through media is central to ISIL’s success. Three media wings have been founded simply to aid
in this process: the Al-Furqan Foundation for Media Production, the Al-I’tsam Media Foundation, and the
Al-Hayat Media Center. Between these three wings, ISIL produces physical propaganda such as CDs, DVDs,
prints, and web media. Originally distributed via the Deep Web, ISIL produces and distributes the magazines
Dabiq, Dar al-Islam, Konstantinyye, and Rumiyah which have been translated into a number of languages
including English, French, German, Turkish, Russian, and Indonesian, among others.21
ISIL also coordinates
sophisticated electronic media outreach efforts.
An ISIL produced and distributed mobile application, known as The Dawn of Glad Tidings, or more colloquially
Dawn, allows users to submit personal information regarding their social media accounts to ISIL. The
organization in turn mass posts imagery, messages, news, and custom hashtags through Dawn surrogate users.
Furthermore, the application is carefully calibrated to not trip various social media platform anti-spam
algorithms, and has intelligently used mass posting to change search suggestions to instead display whatever
ISIL leadership wants.22
Such massive expansion into recent communications tech has allowed ISIL to turn the
internet into a gargantuan radicalization network. States have as yet lacked major responses to such growth,
17 Amre Sarhan, “CIA: 30,000 foreign fighters have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS,” Iraqi News, September 29, 2015, http://www.iraqinews.com/
iraq-war/cia-30000-foreign-fighters-traveled-syria-iraq-join-isis/.
18 Roula Khalaf and Sam Jones, “Selling terror: how Isis details its brutality: Jihadists issue ‘annual report’ of operations,” Financial Times, June 17,
2014, https://www.ft.com/content/69e70954-f639-11e3-a038-00144feabdc0.
19 Simon Tomlinson, “UN report says ‘unprecedented’ number of jihadists are flocking to join ISIS… partly thanks to the terror group’s love of posting
kitten photos on Twitter,” Daily Mail.com, October 31, 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2815895/UN-report-says-unprecedented-
number-jihadists-flocking-join-ISIS-partly-thanks-terror-group-s-love-posting-kitten-photos-Twitter.html.
20 Christine Spolar, “The slow death of hope for America’s loyal friends in Iraq,” Financial Times, November 29, 2015, https://www.ft.com/
content/19f0eece-9539-11e5-8389-7c9ccf83dceb.
21 “ISIS Declares Islamic Caliphate, Appoints Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi As ‘Caliph’, Declares All Muslims Must Pledge Allegiance To Him,” The Middle East
Media Research Institute, June 30, 2014.
22 J. M. Berger, “How ISIS Games Twitter: The militant group that conquered northern Iraq is deploying a sophisticated social-media strategy,” The
Atlantic, June 16, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-iraq-twitter-social-media-strategy/372856/.

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and private web companies are left largely without support in combatting the expansion of extremist
radicalization that has been hijacking their services.23
As a response to the diverse and widespread tactics used for radicalization, states have attempted to develop
equally innovative reactionary mechanisms. It is important to note that while counterterrorism initiatives aim
to eliminate violent threats, counter-radicalization methods cannot rely on forceful or military-driven solutions.
States must focus on the underlying
causes that allow radicalization to
become globally proliferate and make it
appealing to a general populace.24
Many
existing programs try to accomplish this
through education programs and on-the-
ground intervention schemes. National
governments and regional institutions
have allied themselves with local leaders
and community centers to help raise
awareness. European states have also
begun to implement local community-
policing programs in which people may
report on suspicious activity and such incidents would then be further investigated by a local task force.25
The
European Union as a whole has also incorporated a central database of information regarding radicalized and
terrorist groups into their response mechanism. Their Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) uses this
information to then provide local guidance to communities that request assistance.26
Additionally, a number
of states – including the United States and the United Kingdom – have increase national security measures,
with the commitment to preventing high-risk individuals from entering the nations’ borders.27
Radicalization into violent extremism is a diffuse problem that has disastrous consequences if left unchecked.
This committee’s commitment to international security should not be taken lightly as delegates begin to
wrestle with this topic. It is similarly important to emphasize that the topic of radicalization is complicated a
nuanced, as demonstrated by the aforementioned examples. Organizations that rely on both radicalization and
violent extremism have well-established social networks that allow them channels through which to spread
23 David Goldman, “Twitter goes to war against ISIS,” CNN, February 5, 2016, http://money.cnn.com/2016/02/05/technology/twitter-terrorists-isis/.
24 Rami G. Khouri, “Military responses alone will not defeat ISIL,” Al Jazeera, November 15, 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/11/
military-responses-alone-will-not-defeat-isil.html.
25 “Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach,”
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, February 2014.
26 “Strengthening the EU’s response to radicalization and violent extremism,” European Commission, January 15, 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-14-18_en.htm.
27 Angus, “Radicalisation and Violent Extremism.”

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their ideas and the adequate infrastructure into which new members can be incorporated and indoctrinated.
Therefore, any responses posed by the committee, to address these complexities, needs to be similarly multi-
faceted. The international community currently lacks a coordinated response and effective mechanism to stop
radicalization at its roots. Members of this committee are encouraged to exercise their creativity and draw
upon lessons learned from history to craft new solutions.

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History of the Problem
Early Religious Extremism
The history of Radicalization to Violent Extremism is fairly closely tied to the history of terrorism itself.
Contemporary discussions and language, especially in the West, suggest a narrow set of actions that are
prescribed as ‘terrorism.’ This said, as the history will demonstrate, terrorism and the radicalization inherently
tied to it exists in different incarnations and different contexts throughout history.mViolent extremists have
likely existed for as long has humanity has experienced ethnoreligious and socioeconomic strife. Earliest
histories point to tactics associated with violent extremism within a religious context.28
The earliest known
organization, the Sicarii, were Jewish Zealots operational during the first century. Named for the small
daggers they concealed on their persons, called ‘sicae’, the Sicarii assassinated Roman Officials and Hebrew
Sympathizers instrumental to the Roman occupation of Judea. This political targeting easily follows from their
ideologies as a resistance organization, and radicalization likely appealed to the suffering resulting from the
occupation of Judea as well as a defense of the Jewish communal ethnicity and religion.29
The Gunpowder Plot of 1605 is another such example of early violent extremism based on religion. As the
Crown of England grew more and more Protestant in its leanings, ordinances against Catholics became
increasingly severe with laws banning priests practicing Catholicism. Despite the threat of violence against
active practice however, Catholicism continued in secret in some areas of England.30
A group of Catholic men
of military backgrounds, one of whose uncle was executed on account of being a Catholic priest,31
conspired
to detonate barrels of gunpowder below the English House of Lords. While the plan was narrowly defeated by
British authorities it is evident that, radicalized by the suppression of their religion and possibly the personal
loss of a father, the plotters turned to violent extremism as a defense of their Catholicism.
Secular Terrorism
With the climaxing of the Enlightenment began the western concepts of modern citizenship and nationalism
that sparked a field of secular terrorism of several new motivations. Terrorism in the contemporary western
definition begins as an official policy of revolutionary leaders in France during the French Revolution of the late
eighteenth century in what is now known as the Reign of Terror. Maximilien Robespierre, spokesman of the
Jacobin Club that drove much of the Revolution’s violence, described terrorism as an “Emanation of Justice”32
and used violence to execute mass numbers of political enemies in a highly public format. The Jacobins hoped
28 David C. Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions,” The American Political Science Review 78:3 (September 1984):
658-677.
29 Daniel C. Peterson and William J. Hamblin, “Who were the Sicarii?,” Meridian Magazine, June 7, 2004, http://ldsmag.com/article-1-4364/.
30 Alan Haynes, Gunpowder Plot: Faith in Rebellion (Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2016).
31 Antonia Fraser, The Gunpowder Plot: Terror and Faith in 1605, (London: Phoenix, 2002).
32 Maximilien Robespierre, “Justification of the Use of Terror,” February 1794.

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that through terrorizing the country, they could root out or silence any opposition to their republican ideals.
To Robespierre, such an action was in the name of freedom, or as “a consequence of the general principle of
democracy.” The consequent radicalization of members of the French elite can be attributed perhaps to a belief
in the justness of their actions, as well as their political leanings which served as a distinct identity they wished
to protect.
An early major populist extremism came in the form of the Narodnaya Volya, or the “People’s Will” in the
late nineteenth Century. With the serfdom of Tsarist Russia abolished, Russian intelligentsia looked for
ways to uplift their country. A series of intellectual dialogues across the nation resolved in a loose consensus
upon a form of democratic socialism, but upon the intelligentsia’s attempts to begin speaking to assemblies,
as many as 1,600 of them were jailed by the Tsar’s secret policemen.33
Enraged, the now populists formed
the Narodnaya Volya and began a campaign of targeted bombings culminating in the assassination of Tsar
Alexander II.34
For the Narodnaya Volya, just as for the French Jacobin Revolutionaries, the ideology that
radicalized their followers was political. Its members were acutely aware of the intense serfdom the Russian
people had been subjected to, and found their populism as a rallying cry for their betterment and dignity.
Assassination targets were given internal absentee trials within the organization using researched arguments
presented by its members.35
Such arguments were also distributed via a party newspaper which documented
the party’s actions. This paper was spread through Russian intelligentsia in places such as schools. In fact, a
large portion of arrested Narodnaya Volya members were discovered to be schoolteachers.36
While the French Jacobins and Russian Narodnaya Volya were operating against the existing native powers
in their homeland, political extremism on the basis of ethnoreligious emancipation from foreign occupation is
also historically prevalent. The Fenian Brotherhood was founded in the United States around 1858 by political
dissidents from British occupied Ireland. Under British rule, Irish nationals suffered reductions in suffrage,
economic collapse, and religious diminishment of the predominant Catholic faith. The Fenians hoped to trade
for the freedom of Ireland by capturing strategic points in British Canada.37
They enjoyed short term success due in part to two factors. First, American politicians were initially apathetic to
their founding due to anger over the lack of British aid for the Union during the American Civil War. As such,
American law enforcement did not persecute Fenian militants and even facilitated their initial development
by removing their militants from formal American draft lists. Second, by capitalizing on the increasingly
affordable mass printing technology available at the time, the Fenians were able to issue propaganda and
sell printed war bonds amongst the hundreds of thousands of Irish immigrants to the United States. In this
33 Derek Offord, The Russian Revolutionary Movement in the 1880s (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Leon, Ó Broin, Fenian Fever: An Anglo-American Dilemna (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971).

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manner, even partially radicalized persons, the Irish immigrant populace, were utilized to further the actions
and ideals of fully radicalized soldiers of the Fenian Brotherhood.38,39
The ability to use advances in media and information distribution, such as mass printing, allowed for the
development of new support groups to extremists among sympathizers who were only somewhat radicalized.
This effect cannot be understated; mobilizing more ‘normal’ individuals through such methods as financial
support, voting and political support, or even social media presence in the case of ISIL allows a massive
expansion of operations for the radical organization in question. Additionally, non-state organizations tend
to deviate from open, conventional armed conflict. Instead, aggression on the part of such organizations
is necessarily expressed through cyber-attacks, terrorist attacks, or small-scale operations, such as suicide,
targeted assassinations, and car bombings, favored by current militants in Syria and Iraq.40,41
Violent non-state
organizations rely on smaller groups of highly dedicated members to achieve their goals. Prominent, new, forms
of contemporary violent extremism fall into several categories: nationalist insurgencies/colonial independence
movements, domestic or “Lone-Wolf” terrorism, leftist insurgencies, and fundamentalist terrorism.
Radical Nationalist Insurgencies Case Study: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Before and during its colonization, the island of Ceylon was home to three major kingdoms. Two of these,
the Kingdom of Kotte and the Kingdom of Kandy, were Buddhist majority states of Sinhalese ethnolinguistic
heritage and controlled most of the island. The final Jaffna Kingdom, concentrated in the island’s north, was of
Tamil ethnolinguistic heritage and predominantly Hindu beliefs. After a tumultuous sixteenth and seventeenth
century, Ceylon was “united” under the British empire as a protectorate in 1815 during the colonial era. The
union under the British Empire as British Ceylon crown colony laid the foundation for the social discord in
Sri Lanka. To further complicate the social strata, the British brought around a million Indian, non-Ceylon
native, Tamilians and settled them as indentured workers in the hill country at the center of the island.42
Modern-day unrest in Sri Lanka has its roots in the development of nationalist sentiment as well as state-
sponsored and independent aggression towards the Tamil Minority. Protestant missionary activity from
America inspired Tamilian community leaders to begin creating separate schools, temples, community
organizations, and cultural literature to strengthen Tamilian culture in Sri Lanka.43
Tamils were able to enjoy
38 Owen McGee, The IRB: The Irish Republican Brotherhood, from the Land League to Sinn Fein, Second edition (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007).
39 Ó Broin, Fenian Fever.
40 “Several killed in Syria car bombings,” BBC News, November 5, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20205432.
41 “Syrian revels emboldened after assassinations,” CBS News, July 19, 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
syrian-rebels-emboldened-after-assassinations/.
42 “The Population of Sri Lanka,” Committee for International Cooperation in National Research Demography,1974.
43 Murugar Gunasingam, Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism: A study of its origins (London: MV Publications LTD, 1999), 108, 201.

12
disproportionate success in British style college education due to a focus on the English language in Tamil
schools.44
After Sri Lankan independence in 1948, however, the majority Sinhalese government began instituting a
number of measures that negatively affected the Tamil minority. First, the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948
denied citizenship to all Indian Origin Sri Lankans, attempting to deport the approximate million Tamils
brought by British imperialism and alienating all minority communities.45
Following this, a series of harsh
policies that banned the English language, colonized Tamil land, repressed Tamil culture, and limited external
intervention was enacted and enforced. 46
When the 1958 race riots occurred, during which up to 1,500
Tamilians were killed and countless others subjected to physical abuse, the Sinhalese majority government
blamed and banned the Tamilian Federal Party.47
After the 1973 Standardization Act, which created an
affirmative action system in education favoring Sinhalese, Tamilian Politicians began calling for a separate
Tamilian State.48
The Liberation Tamil Tigers Eelam (LTTE) paramilitary insurgency was formed as a response to the denial
of this request for a Tamil State in 1976. Radicalization for the defense of Tamilians from repressive Sinhalese
programs and perceived humiliation of Tamil culture motivated the LTTE’s operations. Militant members
engaged in socially intensive behaviors such as abstaining from sex, drugs, alcohol, and tobacco, as well as
carrying cyanide capsules to prevent their interrogation upon capture.49
It effectively united all elements
of society into mobilization, overcoming the traditional gender, caste, and religious divides of the Tamil
community by establishing secular ideologies inclusive of the Tamil Muslim population alongside the majority
Hindus in addition to the inclusion of women as equals.50,51
Next, the LTTE was respected within its de facto controlled areas as a state, not just an insurgency. The
Tamil Eelam state founded by the LTTE provided courts, policing, human rights associations, humanitarian
divisions, health boards, educational provisions, a bank, and an official radio station.52,53
So effective were these
measures that systemic problems such as domestic abuse dropped due to LTTE governance.54
The LTTE was
44 J. E. Jayasuriya, Education in the Third World: Some Reflections (Bombay: Somaiya, 1981).
45 R. Cheran, “Roots of Sri Lankan conflict,” The Real News, November 4, 2016, http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie
w&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=3555.
46 Russel R. Ross and Andrea Matles Savada, ed., “Sri Lanka: a country study,” Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 1988.
47 “Root Causes of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka,” Tamil Guardian, February 19, 2008, http://www.tamilguardian.com/content/
root-causes-ethnic-conflict-sri-lanka.
48 Jayasuriya, Education in the Third World.
49 Stephen E. Atkins, Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Group (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), 252.
50 “Tamil Tiger proposals,” BBC News, November 1, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3232913.stm.
51 Velupillai Pirabaharan, “Women’s International Day Message,” March 8, 1992.
52 Kristian Stokke, “Building the Tamil Eelam State: Emerging State Institutions and Forms of Governance in LTTE-Controlled Areas in Sri Lanka,” Third
World Quarterly 27:6 (2006): 1021-1040.
53 Deirdre McConnell, “The Tamil people’s right to self-determination,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21:1 (2008): 59-76.
54 Rahila Gupta, “Sri Lanka: women in conflict,” Open Democracy, March 7, 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/rahila-gupta/
sri-lanka-women-in-conflict.

13
extremely successful in leveraging sympathetic, partially-radicalized support from abroad, operating a number
of front organizations that collected donations, curated investment portfolios, developed propaganda, and
even negotiated arms deals with North Korea.55
In addition to these elements, what may be the most decisive element of mass radicalization for the LTTE was
Black July. Victims of a particular LTTE ambush of Sinhalese soldiers were to be buried by the government
in the capital en masse rather than given the standard procedure of being returned to their home villages.56
Public outcry incited a riot which began growing through the city of Colombo and spread to a number of
other cities throughout the following week. This event united Tamilians regardless of their origin: Indian
or Ceylonese, Hindu, Muslim, or Buddhist.57
Eyewitness reports cite that during this period, Tamils being
systematically hunted using checkpoints and voter registration, as well as Tamils being targeted for beatings,
rapes, immolation, and dismemberment. Government forces in both military and police branches were observed
by the international community to be either apathetic or even complicit in the violence.58
Black July effectively
turned entire communities into martyrs; it became a recruitment campaign for the LTTE and a rallying cry
for their radicalization. Young Tamilians joined the LTTE and other counter-Sinhalese insurgent groups in the
thousands; the fleeing Tamil diaspora became a massive international financial support structure.59
Domestic ‘Lone Wolf’ Case Study: Oklahoma City Bombing
Around 9:00 am on April 19th
, 1995 a truck bomb with the estimated explosive force of 2,300 kilograms of
TNT60
exploded outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in the heart of Oklahoma City. The blast
killed 168 people, injured upwards of 680 additional victims, and damaged $652 million worth of property.61,62
Media sources and investigators alike conjectured on whether the bombers were the same radical Islamic
terrorists responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing two years before, or possibly Latin American
drug cartel operatives targeting DEA officers within the building.63
However within a matter of hours primary
perpetrators Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols had been apprehended; both bombers were confirmed to
be American born and raised.64
55 Rohan Gunaratne, “Transcript – Rohan Gunaratne,” Lessons Learnt & Reconciliation Commission, October 1, 2010, https://llrclk.wordpress.
com/2010/10/01/rohan-gunaratne/.
56 Edgar O’Ballance, Terrorism in the 1980s (New York: Arms and Armour Press, 1989), 21.
57 Roland Buerk, “Sri Lankan families count cost of war,” BBC News, July 23, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7521197.stm.
58 Edward Aspinall and Robin Jeffrey, Diminishing Conflicts: Learning from the Asia-Pacific, ed. Edward Aspinall, Robin Jeffrey, and Anthony J. Regan
(London: Routledge, 2013), 104.
59 Frances Harrison, “Twenty years on – riots that led to war,” BBC News, July 23, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3090111.stm.
60 Paul F. Mlakar et al., “The Oklahoma City Bombing: Analysis of Blast Damage to the Murrah Building,” Journal of Performance of Constructed
Facilities 12:3 (August 1998): 113-119.
61 Sheryll Shariat, Sue Mallonee, and Shelli Stephens Stidham, “Oklahoma City Bombing Injuries,” Oklahoma State Department of Health, December
1998.
62 Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to al Qaeda (New York: Routledge, 2003), 106.
63 Mark S. Hamm, Apocalypse In Oklahoma: Waco and Ruby Ridge Revenged (New England: Northeastern, 1997).
64 Richard A. Serrano, One of Ours: Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma City Bombing (New York City: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), 139-141.

14
Both the 1992 Ruby Ridge Standoff and second the 1993 Waco Siege were cited as motivations for the bombing.
These incidents involved escalations to violence between American government agencies and private citizens
that resulted in unnecessary civilian death.65
McVeigh felt sympathy for the victims of these two events and a
growing distaste for the American government that culminated in the creation of a bomb. Deeper analysis of
McVeigh’s character and influences may yield better understanding of why he became a lone wolf extremist.
He experienced a troubled childhood, with his parents divorcing during his adolescence and he was targeted
for bullying by classmates throughout his early schooling.66
McVeigh then quickly dropped out of college and
joined the U.S. Infantry.67
Despite honorable discharge with a number of service awards, McVeigh claims that
his hatred of the government first began during his time in the military. He is additionally noted as having
gained access to study material on explosives as well as affiliating with the KKK.68
After military service
McVeigh struggled to hold any semblance of a normal life; he was unable to find a wife, felt that he harmed his
family, left home, and began obsessively gambling. Again, he found control over his life in the form of guns,
visiting eighty gun shows in over forty states where he sold survivalist items and copies of The Turner Diaries,
an internationally-designated hate book espousing White Supremacy.69
An important delineation should be made here regarding McVeigh’s mental health. There is a popular belief
within the Western general public that the perpetrators of such acts of violent extremism experience mental
disability or disorder of some form. Little scholarly data exists to support this conclusion. While incarcerated,
McVeigh was examined by psychiatrist Dr. John Smith who found him sane. He additionally was not found
to be psychopathic; during his examination, he hinted that he deeply regretted the death of the nineteen
children who died in the blast. Further, he noted that he had initially intended to target another government
building, but when he learned it had a private florist shop on the ground floor, he instead chose the Murrah
building for its entirely public staffing to prevent collateral death. Dr. Smith concluded that “[McVeigh] was
a decent person who allowed rage to build up inside him to the point that he had lashed out in one terrible,
violent act.”70
McVeigh’s experiences suggest a possible mixture of conditions that foster lone wolf radicalization. First, he
was never able to make connections in his personal, social, and romantic lives so as to integrate smoothly
into society. Second he was able, through his military experience and cultural upbringing, be exposed to
methods of combat and the technology that contributed to his ability to craft an explosive. Third, McVeigh
felt a connection between his identity and that of the events at Ruby Ridge and Waco such as to consider their
65 Hamm, Apocalypse In Oklahoma.
66 Dale Russakoff and Serge F. Kovaleski, “An Ordinary Boy’s Extraordinary Rage,” The Washington Post, July 2, 1995, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-srv/national/longterm/oklahoma/bg/mcveigh.htm.
67 “Timeline: Oklahoma bombing,” BBC News, May 11, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1319772.stm.
68 Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck, American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh & The Tragedy at Oklahoma City (New York: Harper, 2002).
69 Ibid.
70 “Profile: Timothy McVeigh,” BBC News, May 11, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1321244.stm.

15
victims to be martyrs. These conditions may explain why McVeigh felt an impetus to radicalize against what
he perceived was a great evil in the American government.
Radical Left Wing Extremism Case Study: Naxalite-Maoists
The Naxalites take their name from the West Bengal village of Naxalbari in India, where their uprising had
its origins. This movement sprung from dissatisfaction with landlord ownership of property.71
Therefore, the
theories of Chinese Communist Revolutionary leader Mao Zedong became the popular literature and rallying
cry of the Naxalite movement.72
Ever since, Naxalite armed cadres have engaged in guerilla warfare with
state police forces, have created legal political parties vying in Indian parliament elections, and have extorted
taxation across their de facto control zone in the Red Corridor. While estimates of Naxalite size vary, all
sources agree that the organization has grown rapidly and the highest estimates put their numbers at 10,000
to 40,000 regular members alongside 50,000 to 100,000 militia irregular members.73
The socioeconomic context and successful government response are what make the Naxalites a beneficial case
study. Heavy Naxalite presence and operations define an area known as the ‘Red Corridor’ of India, starting
in Nepal and running along the eastern side of the peninsular subcontinent until the northern fringes of
Tamil Nadu, the south easternmost state. Economically, these districts encompassed are some of the country’s
poorest, with low wealth as well has high levels of economic inequality.74
Industrially, these districts are almost
purely primary sector economies, with agriculture being supplemented only by mining and timber harvest.
Primary sector economies are usually unable to support large population expansions, such as the one India
is experiencing, or provide the modernizing influences associated with urbanized society.75
Socially, these
districts remain close to traditional caste separations leading to heavy stratification of society.76
Additionally,
they all exhibit high populations of India’s impoverished remnant tribal groups such as Santhal and Gond
peoples.77
These factors may explain why the Naxalites are able to easily radicalize and levy local people in the
Red Corridor against the Indian Government.
There exists an interesting caveat to the Red Corridor known as the Odisha Gap. While the Red Corridor
covers lengthwise nearly the entire longitude of India, the State of Odisha’s coastline stands out as having
significantly lower Naxalite activity and support and as such is not considered part of the Corridor. Odisha’s
coastal region is characterized by higher literacy rates as well as greater economic diversification than that
71 A. K. Diwanji, “Who are the Naxalites?,” rediff.com, October 2, 2003, http://ia.rediff.com/news/2003/oct/02spec.htm.
72 “History of Naxalism,” Hindustan Times, December 15, 2005, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/history-of-naxalism/story-
4f1rZukARGYn3qHOqDMEbM.html.
73 William Magioncalda, “A Modern Insurgency: India’s Evolving Naxalite Problem,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 8, 2010.
74 Debal K. SinghaRoy, Peasant’s Movements in Post-Colonial India: Dynamics of Mobilization and Identity (London: SAGE Publications, 2004).
75 Dietmar Rothermund, An Economic History of India (London: Routledge, 1993).
76 Human Rights Watch, Broken People: Caste Violence Against India’s ‘Untouchables’ (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999).
77 Oliver Springate-Baginski and Piers Blaikie, ed., Forests, People and Power: The Political Ecology of Reform of South Asia (Sterling, VA: Earthscan,
2007).

16
of the Red Corridor.78
The Odisha Gap suggests that the economic opportunity and education in a more
prosperous economic zone may stave off the radicalizing elements present within left wing extremism.
The successful response of Indian authorities to the uptick of Naxalite killings and recruitment in the late
2000s may offer a set of possible solutions to addressing radical groups via socioeconomic means. In 2009, the
union government announced the implementation of the “Integrated Action Plan” or IAP. The IAP employed
a two-pronged plan: a modernization and expansion of police infrastructure as well as an expansive series of
development. On the policing side, the IAP expanded the coverage of police offices, increased staff size and
training, developed police intelligence networks, improved coordination protocols, and even obtained police
helicopters. On the economic side, 70,706 developmental projects were arranged to help building schools,
community centers, public sanitation facilities, road infrastructure, healthcare facilities, and irrigation.79,80
The
follow-up program, the Additional Central Assistance (ACA), created community councils to represent either
local poor or tribal authorities that worked with the government to provide vocational trainings to rural poor
youth, offer preschool education, expand mobile services, begin Credit societies, and fight slum development
through improving housing.81,82
The two-pronged approach effectively brought governance to sectors of East
India that had seen very little of it in the past and has, thus far, been largely successful. Death rates have
decreased in the hundreds every year since IAP deployment, and in 2015, measured at about a quarter of what
they were before the IAP in 2009.83
78 Sanjoy Chakravorty and Somik V. Lall, Made in India: The Political Geography and Political Economy of Industrialization (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007).
79 Magioncalda, “A Modern Insurgency.”
80 “Integrated Action Plan for Naxal-hit districts a success: Chidambaram,” The Hindu, May 9, 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/
integrated-action-plan-for-naxalhit-districts-a-success-chidambaram/article3400381.ece.
81 “Guidelines: Additional Central Assistance to States for Slum Development,” Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation of the Government
of India.
82 “Development Schemes in Naxal Affected Districts,” Press Information Bureau of the Government of India, March 4, 2011, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/
PrintRelease.aspx?relid=116427.
83 Muhammad Zamir, “India faces internal challenge from Maoist-Naxalites,” The Financial Express, September 16, 2013, http://print.
thefinancialexpress-bd.com/old/index.php?ref=MjBfMDlfMTZfMTNfMV85Ml8xODM1NDA=.

17
Past Actions
Relevant Past actions include attempts by the UN to provide a global framework for disrupting radicalization
as well as expansion of research on the psychology and pathways radicalization hinges upon.
Global framework for specifically targeting the radicalization process is lacking both in its global participation
and clear policy agenda. Much of the pertinent and specifically international discussion has centered around
UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon’s “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism”84
in which the Office of
the Secretary offered explanation of contexts as well as policy suggestions for combatting radicalization across
the globe. The policies proposed are a diverse attack on radicalizing organizations including “better service
delivery, accountability for gross violations, enhancing community policing, empowering youth, addressing
existing human rights violations, protecting and empowering women, mainstreaming gender perspectives,
fostering an entrepreneurial culture amongst youth.”85
Despite the comprehensiveness of this 22-page report,
the following General Assembly resolution86
simply stated:
1. Welcomes the initiative by the Secretary-General, and takes note of his Plan of Action to Prevent
Violent Extremism; 2. Decides to give further consideration to the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent
Extremism beginning in the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy review in June 2016 as well as in
other relevant forums.
Without formal adoptions in national policies, or General Assembly resolutions securing international programs
to enact the Secretary General’s proposals, the international conversation has stagnated.
Additionally, Naz Modirzadeh, founding Director of the Harvard Law School Program on International Law
and Armed Conflict, has noted six critical flaws with the Secretary General’s proposal. First, that Violent
Extremism is globally undefined. Second, there is a dearth of scholastic research on radicalization which
makes it difficult to identify causal links to radicalization. Third, that the proposals made for states to reduce
radicalized extremism prescribe too broad and too unspecified of solutions to be practically achievable. Fourth,
the proposal suggests that existing resources be remobilized away from existing international efforts rather than
the levying of new resources, harming those humanitarian and security programs which are already in place.
Fifth, the Secretary General’s proposals do not ground themselves in, or interact with, existing international
law. Sixth, the proposal suggests the merging of Counter Violent Extremist programs with others which would
84 “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General Assembly, December 24, 2015.
85 Naz Modirzadeh, “If It’s Broke, Don’t Make it Worse: A Critique of the U.N. Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism,” Lawfare,
January 23, 2016, https://www.lawfareblog.com/if-its-broke-dont-make-it-worse-critique-un-secretary-generals-plan-action-prevent-violent-
extremism.
86 “Draft resolution submitted by the President of the General Assembly: Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism,” United
Nations General Assembly, February 9, 2016.

18
disadvantage both. Lastly, seventh, if the Secretary general’s proposal is fully accepted and every state redrafts
its counter extremism programs, they may themselves inspire extremist backlash.87
These problems will have
to be taken into consideration when considering the Secretary General’s proposals and in crafting future
solutions.
Other global initiatives to consider are the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee, as well as the
Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). The Counter-Terrorism Committee, founded after
the September 11 attacks in the United States, exists as a subsidiary body to the Security Council and is
entrusted with carrying out the resolutions 1373 and 1624. These include such provisions as criminalizing state
and individual assistance of extremist activities, financial freezing of extremist assets, information sharing about
possible attacks, and improved border screening.88
The CTITF was given its mandate by the General Assembly
in 2006 to carry out the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. It operates as a collective of 38 international
entities – including Interpol, The Office of the Secretary General, and the Al-Qaida/Taliban Monitoring
Team , among others – vested in the combatting of violent extremism.89,90
While the organizations of CTITF
and the Counter-Terrorism Committee may have the ability to leverage large resources amongst themselves,
their activities are currently focused on actions specifically against existing, known, radical organizations, and
lack distinct programs against the radicalization process itself.
Research into the pathways that bring either an individual or a group into radicalized behavior has not been
conclusive, perhaps due to the lack of international support for the work or the difficulty of collecting data on
the subject. Nonetheless, theories have been drawn up on what forms radicalizations takes, the prevailing of
which categorizes these forms as individual level factors, group level factors, and mass radicalization.91
Individual forms of radicalization include personal grievance, group grievance, slippery slope, love, risk
and status seeking, and unfreezing. Personal grievance specifies feelings of revenge for acts perceived to be
committed against an individual. Possible examples include conspirators of the aforementioned Gunpowder
Plot, brothers Robert and Thomas Wintour, whose uncle was publicly hung, then drawn and quartered by the
English Government. Another could be the Chechen ‘Shahidikas’, or ‘Black Widows’, female suicide bombers
whose husbands were killed by the Russian Government.92
Group grievance operates the same, except that
the individual acts on behalf of a group or cause, such as the LTTE against the Sri Lankan Government.
87 Modirzadeh, “If It’s Broke, Don’t Make it Worse.”
88 “The United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee,” Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, accessed November 17,
2016, https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/.
89 “Entities,” United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, accessed November 17, 2016, https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/
en/structure.
90 “UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, accessed November 17, 2016, https://www.
un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy.
91 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
92 Andrew Osborn, “Moscow’s bombing: who are the Black Widows,” The Telegraph, March 29, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
europe/russia/7534464/Moscow-bombing-who-are-the-Black-Widows.html.

19
Slippery slope refers to when individuals are become increasingly involved with political cause to the point of
obsession, such as Timothy McVeigh’s involvement with far-right politics before he committed the Oklahoma
City bombing. Love as a pathway refers to when people radicalize due to their emotional connection to other
radicalized persons, as may have happened with the families present at Ruby Ridge and the Waco Siege. Risk
and Status seeking refers to the tendency of individuals, particularly young and underserved men, to commit
risky actions for social capital within a group.93
Finally, unfreezing would be the increased openness to radical
ideas of individuals who experience loss of social connection to friends, family, or society at large. Timothy
McVeigh may once again be an example of this form, and similar forms of radicalization has been noted in the
development of prison gang culture.94
Group level factors include group polarization, group competition, and group isolation. Instances of group
polarization can occur when a group engages in persistent discussion and interaction with itself, increasingly
favoring a certain, extreme viewpoint. The Russian Narodnaya Volya, or People’s Will, through their academic
discussion roots, may be such an example. Group competition refers to the escalation of policy within a radical
group when it operates in competition with other radical groups. An example may be the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). While the group initially did not employ suicide bombings as a tactic,
when competing radical organization Hamas gained political power and influence through suicide bombings,
the PFLP shifted towards staging suicide bombings as well.95
Group isolation refers to the increase in control
that radical elements of a group gain when the group becomes isolated from society at large.96
With the group
experiencing social contact only with itself, radical beliefs have less resistance against their spreading.
Mass radicalization methods include martyrdom, hatred, and jujitsu politics. Martyrdom is the institutionalized
belief in the value of death within some radical elements, especially predominant in fundamentalist radicals.
The death-based ideology of the Nizari Assassins may be considered such a form of martyrdom. Hatred is
specific reliance of a radicalizing group upon anger against another group, particularly in cases where the
others are demonized or considered unhuman. The KKK, in all of its iterations, very clearly utilizes such
a radicalizing element in its rhetoric against Black Americans, Jewish Americans, immigrants, and other
American minorities. Finally, jujitsu politics, named for its similarity to the martial art technique of leveraging
an opponent against itself, refers to the strategy of specifically provoking a government or dominant group
into a crackdown using a highly public attack. The resulting crackdown creates in sociopolitical backlash,
radicalizing members of what was the minority’s moderate section. This tactic has been successfully employed
93 McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction.
94 John Fighel, “The Radicalization Process in Prisons,” International Institute for Counterterrorism, December 25, 2007.
95 Sean Yom and Basel Saleh, “Palestinian Suicide Bombers: A Statistical Analysis,” Economists for Peace and Security, November 2004.
96 Lorenzo Vidino, “Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe,” United States Institute of Peace, November 2010.

20
by several Fundamentalist and Leftist radical organizations, including the Naxalites and most famously by
Al-Qaida through its September 11 attack.97,98
Research has also suggested that there exist some misconceptions popularly held by contemporary policymakers.
First, there is little evidence for causality between poverty and radicalization. The Naval Postgraduate School
has found that many terrorists have hailed from their country’s middle class, and often hold university level
degrees.99
This is further supported by an article published by The Economist that compiled research from
a number of institutions to assess correlations between public support for radical attacks and economic or
educational level, along with comparisons of radical suicide bombers demographics against that of their native
male populations.100
Additionally, mental health issues have not been shown to have significant interplay
with the radicalization process. University of Chicago Scholar Robert Pape finds that, even amongst suicide
bombers, the investigations into radicalized individuals have not found a correlation between psychological
disorders such as sociopathy or schizophrenia and propensity to radicalize toward violence.101
97 Craig Rosebraugh, The Logic of Political Violence: Lessons in Reform and Revolution (Minneapolis: Arissa Media Group, LLC, 2004).
98 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
99 Anne Marie Baylouny, “Emotions, Poverty, or Politics? Misconceptions about Islamist Movements,” Connections 3:1 (March 2004): 41-47.
100 “Exploding misconceptions: Alleviating poverty may not reduce terrorism but could make it less effective,” The Economist, December 16, 2010,
http://www.economist.com/node/17730424.
101 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2006).

21
Possible Solutions
While coordinated, large-scale efforts against radicalization currently only exist in the United States and
Denmark, cues may still be taken from their actions as the committee seeks to develop its own policy
recommendations. The Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (PET), Denmark’s Security and Intelligence Service, has
developed a triage and assessment system for dealing with radicalization. It begins first and most generally with
an ‘Outreach’ section, then a ‘Capacity Building’ section, then finally the ‘Exit’ section. The Danish model has
been effective in its diminishment of radicalization influences.102
The Outreach section addresses societal structures and institutes that may encourage radicalization, but are
not themselves an immediate security threat. This section of the plan is not overseen by the PET, but is instead
handled by the Danish Ministry of Social Affairs. First, the Ministry locates areas at risk of radicalization, then
works with local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community centers, community
leaders, and parents to disseminate anti-radicalization information and programs aimed at halting the
radicalization of young people.103
The Capacity Building section is run by the PET and consists of PET field
workers cultivating specific partnerships with community leaders such as sports coaches or religious figures
to create a network. These field workers are additionally given extensive training in mediation, identification
procedures, and preventative policy work to help shape local communities as well as identify problematic trends
which may result in radicalization.104
Finally, the Exit section very closely works with individuals believed to
have been at some point radicalized. In the case of Denmark, this largely refers to individuals who have left
combat zones in the Middle East and returned home. PET workers monitor and work with these individuals
to ensure their psycho-social reintegration to Danish society while preventing a future outbreak and possible
violence from these affected individuals.105
Next, the American Model has developed over the course of its responses to radicalized extremist attacks first
during the September 11 attacks in 2001 and continuing into 2016 with the Pulse Night Club shooting and
the San Bernardino shooting. The current iteration of American response to radicalization has been built upon
a groundwork of targeted dismantling of radical organizations and lethal action against radical leaders, while
offering little policy towards disruption of the radicalization process.106
However, there are indications that
more emphasis will be placed on targeting the source of radicalization with U.S. President Barack Obama
meeting with American Silicon Valley social media and internet leaders such as Facebook, Twitter, Apple,
102 “The Preventative Security Department,” Danish Security and Intelligence Service, accessed November 17, 2016, https://www.pet.dk/English/
The%20Preventive%20Security%20Department.aspx.
103 Naser Khader, “The Danish Model for Prevention of Radicalization and Extremism,” Hudson Institute, August 14, 2014, http://www.hudson.org/
research/10555-the-danish-model-for-prevention-of-radicalization-and-extremism.
104 “The Preventative Security Department.”
105 Khader, “The Danish Model for Prevention of Radicalization and Extremism.”
106 “Fact Sheet: The President’s May 23 Speech on Counterterrorism,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary, May 23, 2013, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-president-s-may-23-speech-counterterrorism.

22
Microsoft, LinkedIn, Dropbox, and YouTube.107
While there has not yet been a sweeping executive reform
to result from this partnership, the White House’s shift in focus may result in improvements in encryption
cooperation between private social media firms and counter-terrorism forces, alongside the development of
improved resources in social media to flag and halt radicalizing messages. The American State Department has
also announced its intentions to work with allied nations to perform similar actions.108
As initially discussed
with the example of ISIL, the usage of social media as a radicalizing tool cannot be ignored, and policies
similar to American cooperation with social media should be considered.
Both the Danish and American Models may hold a successive path forward, but both are an offensive against
radicalizing forces by directly disrupting the process. It is likely necessary to also incorporate defensive policies
that address the contextual landscape of radicalization. Here, the aforementioned CTITF Plan of Action to
Prevent Violent Extremism pushed by the Office of the Secretary General can again be referenced. The Plan of
Action first calls for the need of all National Governments to produce their own Plans of Action for Preventing
Violent Extremism, alongside Regional Plans of Action created in cooperation between states.109
Then, the Secretary-General specifically calls for multidisciplinary approaches to be present, alongside
sustainable practices that will carry into the future. Furthermore, the Plan of Actions calls for seven specific
policy recommendation areas that member states should look to address: Dialogue and Conflict Prevention;
Strengthening Good Governance, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law; Engaging Communities; Empowering
Youth;GenderEqualityandEmpoweringWomen;Education,SkillDevelopment,andEmploymentFacilitation;
and Strategic Communications, the Internet, and social media.110
While the Plan of Action identifies these
core areas for discussion, and justifies their relevance to fight against radicalization, it lacks specificity and
does not point to concrete, legislative actions. This committee, then, will have to assess the success of existing
policy both at home and abroad to make informed contributions in a solution that will, ideally, be effective in
actualizing and addressing the areas of concern highlighted by the Secretary-General’s plan.
107 Danny Yadron, “Agenda for White House summit with Silicon Valley,” The Guardian, January 7, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2016/jan/07/white-house-summit-silicon-valley-tech-summit-agenda-terrorism.
108 Greg Miller and Karen DeYoung, “Obama Administration plans shake-up in propaganda war against ISIS,” The Washington Post, January 8, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-plans-shake-up-in-propaganda-war-against-the-islamic-
state/2016/01/08/d482255c-b585-11e5-a842-0feb51d1d124_story.html.
109 “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.”
110 Ibid.

23
Bloc Positions
Africa
The African Continent is the region perhaps most affected by radicalized elements outside of the Middle East.
Notable radical elements include the Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko
Haram, Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Shabab, and the Christian Fundamentalist Lord’s Resistance Army.111
Despite
this, counter-radicalization efforts in Africa face political realities of the region. Both national governments
and the African Union’s internal discussions have addressed the need for continued focus on development, and
the lack of available resources to dedicate to counter-terrorism. Recently, the African Union has recognized
radical elements and laid out legal parameters against them in such measures as the Assembly of the Union on
the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism [Assembly/AU/dec.311(XV)] and has appointed the AU Special
Representative for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation.
Since the AU’s 2002 Plan of Action, the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT)
in Algiers has provided the scholastic leadership for AU counter-radicalism policy.112
Unfortunately, lack of
resources and an increasing division in African politics along sectarian lines has caused state response to radical
groups to stagnant and possibly even counterproductive. For example, the Institute for Security Studies has
found that excessive force on behalf of the Kenyan Security Forces had driven young Muslims into Al-Shabab,
and that simultaneously, Kenyan government statements have denied any connection between domestic
policy and the growth of radical elements at home.113
To move forward, Africa nations will likely have to
prioritize the development of sustainable counter-radical resources that do not pull away from national focus
on development, while being more sensitive to the contexts causing radicalization. The region may seek to draw
on international support and a coordination of national and international resources.
Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
The MENA Region is the foremost victim of radical extremist violence and the primary supplier of radicalized
militants. Much of Radicalism’s success in the region is consequent of collapsing state control, with primary
terrorist activity in states such as Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, all of which
have roots in civil disturbance during the recent Arab Spring. In states where no such civil disturbance has
occurred, radical violence and recruitment risk are significantly lower, such as in Oman, Saudi Arabia, the
111 “Kidnapped Nigerian Girls: Key Terrorist Groups in Africa,” ABC News, accessed November 17, 2017, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/fullpage/
african-terrorist-groups-infographic-23610960.
112 “The African Union Counter Terrorism Framework,” African Union Peace and Security, last modified November 23, 2015, accessed November 17,
2016, http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/64-counter-terrorism-ct.
113 “Is Kenya’s response to terrorism making it worse?,” Institute for Security Studies, October 15, 2014, https://www.issafrica.org/about-us/
press-releases/is-kenyas-response-to-terrorism-making-it-worse.

24
United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Morocco.114
Regional framework and legislation for counter-radicalization
is grossly outdated, and unreflective of the current political landscape of the region. The standing regional
papers governing cooperation on counter terrorism are the League of Arab States’ Arab Convention on
the Suppression of Terrorism (1998), and the Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
on Combating International Terrorism (1999). Cooperation for future legislation seems unlikely, especially
as Saudi Arabia and Iran, both accused of state-sponsored terrorism, jockey for regional hegemony.115,116
Furthermore, Amnesty International has cited these conventions as problematic in their possibility for abuse
of human rights.117
MENA States will need to prioritize counter-radical programs that can halt the movement
of radicalism between states engaged in civil strife and the rest of the region.
114 “Middle East and North Africa,” in “Political Risk Outlook 2016,” Verisk Maplecroft, January 22, 2016.
115 Edward Clifford, “Financing Terrorism: Saudi Arabia and Its Foreign Affairs,” Brown Political Review, December 6, 2014, http://www.
brownpoliticalreview.org/2014/12/financing-terrorism-saudi-arabia-and-its-foreign-affairs/.
116 “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” U.S. Department of State, accessed November 17, 2016, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm.
117 “The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism: a serious threat to human rights,” Amnesty International UK, January 31, 2002, https://
www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/arab-convention-suppression-terrorism-serious-threat-human-rights-0.

25
East Asia and Oceania
The response of this region has primarily been through the conventions of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC). The APEC Counter-Terrorism Task Force (APEC CTTF) was founded in 2003 to
handle implementation and capacity building for counterterrorism efforts. Its relative success resulted in an
expansion of force and purview in 2013. The highly commercial status of APEC, coupled with the geography
of the Pacific region has led to focus on travel-based disruption of radicalization, with extensive measures to
improve airport and seaport screening security, and regional radical identification mechanisms. In order to
protect the lucrative and trade through the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea, APEC has developed
Trade Recovery Programs to stave terrorist activity away from disrupting commercial and financial structures.118
While financial protection is not immediately pertinent to the process of radicalization, it should be recognized
that radical groups could access accounts and funds illicitly and repurpose these for their own activities.
This is similar perhaps to what ISIL has done with banks in its zone of de facto control.119
The commercial
focus of counter terrorism should not diminish the threat of radicalization occurring in the region. Turkic
and Uyghur separatist radicals, such as the Grey Wolves and the Turkistan Islamic Party involved with the
Xinjiang conflict, have committed bombings and attacks in both China and Thailand.120,121
The Association
of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN) have also experienced a rise of Islamic radical sentiment, with terrorist
attacks and organizations across both the Filipino and Indonesian archipelagos. Indonesia and Malaysia should
also consider ways to curb exporting of terrorism, as there have been estimates of nearly a thousand Malay and
Indonesian persons leaving for conflict zones in the Middle East.122
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NATO Global Partners, and India
While not all responses to radicalized organizations for NATO states have been coordinated through NATO
itself, their origins and policies have remained similar. Article 5 of the Treaty, invoking collective defense, was
activated for the only time in history in response to the September 11 attacks in the US. Consequently, NATO
states in North America and Western Europe have some of the most extensive counter-terrorism infrastructure
in place.123
Despite this, not all have looked specifically at the process of radicalization, with efforts being more
invested in military intervention in radical zones abroad. American, Canadian, and British armed forces have
118 “Counter-Terrorism Working Group,” Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, accessed November 17, 2016, http://www.apec.org/Home/Groups/SOM-
Steering-Committee-on-Economic-and-Technical-Cooperation/Working-Groups/Counter-Terrorism.aspx.
119 Michael Kaplan, “ISIS Bank Robber? Islamic State Funds Military Endeavors with $1B In Looting From Syria, Iraq Vaults,” International Business Times,
December 11, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-bank-robbery-islamic-state-funds-military-endeavors-1b-looting-syria-iraq-vaults-2222460.
120 Philip Sherwell, “Bangkok bombing: Was it the Grey Wolves of Turkey?,” The Telegraph, August 29, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/asia/thailand/11832701/Bangkok-bombing-Was-it-the-Grey-Wolves-of-Turkey.html.
121 “China separatists blamed for Kunming knife rampage,” BBC News, March 2, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26404566.
122 S. Pushpanathan, “ASEAN Efforts to Combat Terrorism,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, August 20, 2003, http://asean.
org/?static_post=asean-efforts-to-combat-terrorism-by-spushpanathan.
123 “Countering terrorism,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last modified September 5, 2016, accessed November 16, 2016, http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm.

26
been extensively deployed across the Middle East for the express purpose of eliminating radicalizing leaders.
Additionally, the European Union has adopted the 2002 council framework decision defining the definitions
and legality necessary to pursue counter-radical policy.124
Despite global leadership in the combatting terrorism, culture in the West holds that government actions
should uphold human rights to expression and privacy even in instances where their restriction could possibly
be useful in locating radicalizing individuals or ending radicalizing elements. This cultural division can be
demonstrated by the stigma associated with the historic lois scélérates or ‘villainous laws’ of France which
criminalized radicalizing press, and recent outcry over the American Patriot Act surveillance for lone wolf
radicalized individuals or the National Security Agency’s collection of mobile phone record via the PRISM
program.125,126
These states, along with those that are NATO Global Partners, will likely seek to maintain a
respect of private rights in any UN prescribed recommendations.
India, while neither a member of NATO nor a NATO Global Partner, retains deep similarities to the West
on counter-radical policy, perhaps due to its similar democratic institutions. India passed the Prevention of
Terrorism Ordinance (POTA) in 2001 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act in 2002. These bills defined
terrorism in India and granted expanded investigative rights to prevent radicalization. Similar to the Patriot
Act, POTA came into serious controversy amongst the Indian populace.127
India also holds a unique position
in that it is deeply concerned both with Islamic Fundamentalism due to a series of attacks by Kashmiri Islamic
radicals Lashkar-e-Taiba and others, as well as leftist insurgency from the aforementioned Naxalites. The
nation is now considering ‘softer’ responses to radicalization, similar to the Denmark Model.128
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
CommonwealthofIndependentStatescoordinationoncounter-radicalizationbeganwithacommonframework
through the 1999 Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the CIS in Combating Terrorism
which established necessary legal developments for specifying and criminalizing radical extremism.129
Most
CIS nations look to Russia for strategic leadership, despite geographic and demographic differences. Russia has
recognized Islamic Radicalism as a key security threat following the discovery of a Jihadist Caucasus Emirate
124 “Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism,” Official Journal of the European Communities, June 22, 2002.
125 Lydia Saad, “Americans Generally Comfortable with Patriot Act,” Gallup, March 2, 2004, http://www.gallup.com/poll/10858/americans-generally-
comfortable-patriot-act.aspx.
126 George Gao, “What Americans think about NSA surveillance, national security and privacy,” PewResearch Center, May 29, 2015, http://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/29/what-americans-think-about-nsa-surveillance-national-security-and-privacy/.
127 Jayanth K. Krishnan, “India’s “Patriot Act”: POTA and the Impact on CIVIL Liberties in the World’s Largest Democracy,” Maurer School of Law:
Indiana University, 2004.
128 Shweta Desai, “India Turns to a Soft Approach to Prevent Radicalisation,” Centre for Land Warfare Studies, September 28, 2015, http://www.claws.
in/1443/india-turns-to-a-soft-approach-to-prevent-radicalisation-shweta-desai.html.
129 “17. Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism, 1999,” Convention of
the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, June 4, 1999.

27
operating in Chechnya and Dagestan.130
To this end, Russian legislation has recently expanded anti-radical
legal codes to include forcing data storage for telecommunications companies.131
To the rest of CIS states,
primary concerns include the easy access that radicalized organizations have over transnational borders, and
the susceptibility of CIS state Muslims to growing pressure from ISIL propaganda.132
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)
Latin America and the Caribbean diverges from much of the rest of the world in terms of counter-radicalization
infrastructure due to the prevailing dominance of a primarily leftist form of radicalization. Continued
insurgencies by radical leftist organizations, founded largely in the 1960s, such as Peru’s Shining Path, the
National Liberation Army of Colombia, and the Paraguayan People’s Army remain active today.133
Given
that the causes of radicalization for leftist radicals are more distinctly economic, CELAC member states will
push for policies that fight the large economic imbalances that foster radicalization. Further, Peru’s capture
of Shining Path Leader Abimael Guzman in 1992, alongside a campaign of other successful organizational
decapitations through the capture of Leftist leaders, has demonstrated to CELAC states the need and efficacy
of targeting the leaders of radical organizations.134
Legal frameworks for counter-terrorism for these countries
have been established under the Organization of American States through treaties such as the Inter-American
Convention Against Terrorism (2002) and the Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Take
the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance (1971).135
130 Darion Rhodes, “Salafist-Takfiri Jihadism: the Ideology of the Caucasus Emirate,” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, September 3, 2014,
http://www.ict.org.il/Article/132/Salafist-Takfiri%20Jihadism%20the%20Ideology%20of%20the%20Caucasus%20Emirate.
131 Nataliya Vasilyeva, “Russia adopts controversial counter-terrorism amendments,” The Washington Times, June 24, 2016, http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/24/russia-adopts-controversial-counter-terrorism-amen/.
132 Sébastien Peyrouse, “Drug Trafficking in Central Asia: A Poorly Considered Fight?,” George Washington University, September 2012.
133 Michael Jensen, “Terrorism in Latin America: Infographic,” War on the Rocks, July 15, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/
terrorism-in-latin-america-infographic/.
134 Ibid.
135 “Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism,” Organization of American States, June 3, 2002.

28
Glossary
asymmetric warfare: any armed conflict in which the military capabilities of one combatant far outweigh
that of the other. As a result, the weaker power tends to rely on alternative combat methods such as guerilla
warfare rather than fight the stronger opponent in traditional, open combat.
crisis commission: a group or branch of a body formed and assigned to handle a specific domestic or
international crisis. These groups may coordinate efforts between relevant actors and are often able to act much
more quickly than a national government.
Deep Web: the part of the World Wide Web that is not discoverable by standard search engines. It operates
through encrypted networks and password-protected or dynamic pages.
fanaticism: a belief or behavior that one espouses or supports with unusually obsessive enthusiasm.
insurgency: a rebellion against authority to achieve a certain political end
non-state actor: an individual or organization that is influential politically but is not necessary allied to the
government of any particular country
primary sector economy: an economy that is mostly or entirely dependent on the production and sale of
natural resources. Parts of the primary sector include agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining, among others.
radicalization: when a person’s thinking and behavior become significantly different from how most members
of their society and community view social issues and participate politically
terrorism: the use of violence and manipulation of fear to achieve political goals
violent extremism: the engagement in ideologically motivated or “justified” violence to achieve a certain
social or political agenda.

29
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