1. AIR LAND SEA BULLETIN
Approved for public release; unlimited distribution.
Issue No. 2016-2 Summer 2016Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center

2. ALSB 2016-1 2
ALSA Staff
Director
Col Michael E. Kensick, USAF
Deputy Director
COL David R. Applegate, USA
Bulletin Editor
LTC John Walmsley, USA
Editor
Ms. Patricia Radcliffe, Civilian, USAF
Layout Artist/Illustrator
Ms. Laura Caswell, Civilian, USN
Publications Officer
Maj Darin Lupini, USAF
Purpose: The ALSA Center publishes the ALSB two
times a year. ALSA is a multi-Service Department of
Defense field agency sponsored by the US Army Train-
ing and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Marine Corps
Combat Development Command (MCCDC), Navy War-
fare Development Command (NWDC), and Curtis E.
LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Educa-
tion (LeMay Center). The ALSB is a vehicle to “spread
the word” on recent developments in warfighting con-
cepts, issues, and Service interoperability. The intent
is to provide a cross-Service flow of information among
readers around the globe. This periodical is governed
by Army Regulation 25-30.
Disclaimer: The ALSB is an open forum. The ar-
ticles, letters, and opinions expressed or implied
herein should not be construed as the official posi-
tion of TRADOC, MCCDC, NWDC, the LeMay Center,
or ALSA Center.
Submissions: Get published—ALSA solicits articles
and readers’ comments. Contributions of less than
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Local reproduction of the ALSB is authorized and en-
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A United States (US) Army AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopters escort two CH-47 Chinook heli-
copters carrying US Marines with Task Force Spartan, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), over
Taji, Iraq, as they head to Kara Soar for their mission in support of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE
on 17 March 2016. Operation INHERENT RESOLVE is an international U.S. led coalition military
operation created as part of a comprehensive strategy to degrade and defeat the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant. Photo by Cpl. Andre Dakis, USMC
CONTENTS
Director’s Comments...........................................................3
FEATURE ARTICLES
Consider Adaptive Networks to Foster
Understanding Relationships in Complex
Operational Environments.................................................4
Joint Equities in Aerial Lodgment...................................14
Joint Entry in the Urban Littorals: Freedom of Access
Does Not Equal Freedom of Action................................20
Ignoring the Inevitable:
Urban Close Air Support Problems................................25
Female Service Members Model Gender Integration
among Partner Nations.....................................................30
IN HOUSE
Current ALSA MTTP Publications.................................34
Future Air Land Sea Bulletins..........................................37
ALSA Organization and Joint Working Groups............38
ALSA Mission and Voting JASC Members....................39
Online Access to ALSA Products....................................39

3. ALSB 2016-13
The Air Land Sea Application Center
(ALSA) meets the needs of the warfighter by
providing timely, relevant, and compelling
doctrine.
ALSA welcomes CDR Shannon Moore,
to the multi-Service team and says farewell
to LTC Blake Keil, who will command 2-8
Field Artillery in Fort Wainwright, Alaska
and Lt Col Brian Gross, who will attend
the Eisenhower School for National Secu-
rity and Resource Strategy at Fort Lesley J.
McNair, Virginia. They have been fantastic
teammates and will be missed. ALSA con-
gratulates former staffer LTC Dana Smith
and current staffers Ms. Laura Caswell and
Ms. Patricia Radcliffe who won the 2015
Secretary of the Army Award for Improving
Publications. Ms. Radcliffe won the Army
Editor of the Year Award, also.
This Air Land Sea Bulletin (ALSB) is
an open forum offering a great mix of les-
sons learned, current statuses, and future
considerations for warfighters. It contains
a diversity of articles that provide thought-
provoking viewpoints and showcase the in-
genuity and flexibility of United States (US)
Service men and women.
The first article is, “Consider Adaptive
Networks to Foster Understanding Rela-
tionships in Complex Operational Environ-
ments”, by Mr. Bryan Sopko, Mr. Matt Os-
man, Maj Danica Slater, Mr. David Miles,
Mr. Chris Worrett, and Mr. Randy Munch.
This article discusses the importance of un-
derstanding the operational environment
when making network engagement deci-
sions.
The second article, “Joint Equities in
Aerial Lodgment”, is by Lt Col Dan Magrud-
er, the Director of Operations for the 22nd
Special Tactics Squadron. The article sug-
gests further consideration is needed to
maximize the long-term effects of airpower
projection.
The third article is, “Joint Entry in the
Urban Littorals: Freedom of Access Does
Not Equal Freedom of Action”, by Mr. Scott
Packard, a former infantry officer, who is
currently assisting the Marine Corps Tac-
tics and Operations Group with urban opera-
tions Service doctrine and concept develop-
ment. His article discusses the challenges an
urban environment presents to entry opera-
tions, with or without opposition, and argues
that seabased forces present the best option.
The fourth article is “Ignoring the Inevi-
table: Urban Close Air Support Problems”,
by SMSgt Eric Muller, superintendent of
the 274th Air support Operations Squadron
and former course manager and superinten-
dent for the Joint Terminal Attack Controller
(JTAC) qualification course. He calls for a re-
newed emphasis on JTAC training in urban
settings and increased efforts to fully capture
lessons learned from the past 15 years of con-
flict.
The final article is “Female Service Mem-
bers Model Gender Integration among Partner
Nations”, by MAJ Tiffany Collins of US Special
Operations Command Central. She discusses
the successes enjoyed by US special opera-
tions by integrating women into special op-
erations forces teams and developing female
partner force engagement teams to work with
several Middle Eastern partner-nation allies
that are also expanding roles for women.
I invite you to seize opportunities to rep-
resent your Service and share your ideas, not
only by being published in future ALSBs, but
also by participating in joint working groups.
As we tackle the challenges ahead, your ideas
matter now more than ever. Your unique per-
spective can spark innovation in current and
future tactics, techniques, and procedures.
To help shape the discussion and be part
of the solution, go to www.alsa.mil and pro-
vide inputs through the “Contact Us” link.
Thank you for reading.
MICHAEL E. KENSICK, Colonel, USAF
Director
DIRECTOR’S COMMENTS

4. ALSB 2016-1 4
... network analy-
sis is conducted
to provide the
staff with deeper
understanding of
the structure and
function of the
network, which
is used to engage
and target other
networks.
CONSIDER ADAPTIVE NETWORKS TO FOSTER UNDER-
STANDING RELATIONSHIPS IN COMPLEX
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
By Bryan Sopko; Matt Osman;
Maj Danica Slater, USMCR; Randy
Munch; Chris Worrett; and David
Miles.
INTRODUCTION
Analysis of the operational envi-
ronment (OE) is necessary to support
planning efforts, regardless of the type
of operation being conducted.1
The
staff must collect and analyze large
amounts of information from a variety
of sources to develop a comprehensive
understanding of the OE to provide
the commander situational awareness.
Additionally, the staff must focus on
key factors that are identified as criti-
cal variables which relate directly to
achieving the commander’s desired
end state. Refined analysis of the OE,
with a focus on human networks, sup-
ports identifying critical variables that
relate directly to a network’s ability to
form, function, and sustain itself in the
OE. The staff’s ability to gain a greater
understanding of these critical vari-
ables provides insight that supports
developing engagement plans to affect
selected networks.
The staff must conduct an in-
depth analysis of the selected network
to understand its structure and func-
tions. This provides insights and op-
tions on ways to identify the network’s
critical variables. Analysis of the OE
is a part of intelligence preparation
of the operational environment and is
expanded by the staff during the plan-
ning process. Simultaneously, net-
work analysis is conducted to provide
the staff with deeper understanding
of the structure and function of the
network, which is used to engage and
target other networks. By deliberately
expanding the analysis of the OE as it
relates, specifically, to networks that
the commander may desire to support,
influence or neutralize, a staff may be
able to determine the critical variables
that exist within the OE that facilitate
the network’s formation, growth, and
sustainment. Including these critical
variables as inputs to the targeting
process, the potential exists to produce
lasting effects on selected networks.
NETWORK FORMATION AND
SUSTAINMENT
Networks are a series of direct
and indirect ties from an actor to a
collection of others (nodes) and are
formed when the ties between two or
more nodes develop from some type of
common purpose. A catalyst, receptive
audience, and accommodating envi-
ronment, depicted in figure 1, are three
fundamental conditions that must be
fulfilled for network formation and
sustainment within an OE.2
A catalyst for a network may be
related to a single variable or multiple
variables that represent conditions
within the OE. Depending on the net-
work, there may be a variable within
the OE that is critical for supporting
the initial formation of the network. For
example, a critical variable that might
be identified as a catalyst for Al-Qaeda
is the ideology of the Sunni Muslim
religion.3
Since the inception of Al-Qa-
eda, other networks have formed and
aligned with Al-Qaeda and have done
so with variations on the basic ideol-
ogy. To engage networks effectively,
staffs must dedicate significant analyt-
ical effort to understanding them, in-
cluding the related catalysts and why
the message or narrative resonates
with the audience.
A receptive audience that sup-
ports the formation and sustainment
of a network is directly associated with
the catalyst for that network. Current
and future members of the network
have made, or will make, some type

5. ALSB 2016-15
The potential
for a network
to exist within
an environment
is limitless, but
the ability of
members of the
network to take
action in support
of the catalyst re-
lies solely on the
conditions within
that environ-
ment.
Network Formation and Sustainment Conditions
Catalyst: A variable within the operating environment that motivates or binds a group
of individuals together to take some type of action to fulfil a collective need.
Receptive Audience: A group of individuals that feel they have more to gain by engag-
ing in activities of the network than by not participating.
Accomodating Environment: Conditions within the operating environment that facili-
tate the organization and actions of a network.
of decision to join the network based
on whether their individual needs may
be met by an emerging network versus
what is provided for them from current
conditions within the OE. In essence,
the conditions and catalyst for a net-
work serve to influence and motivate
a portion of the meta-network to func-
tion as a receptive audience.4
A meta-
network is a composition of a group
of networks which are connected and
interrelated by common nodes. The
members of the receptive audience
will, essentially, weigh the opportuni-
ties and risks of joining the network
and then decide to join the network.
For example, in the spring of 2003 an
insurgent network formed in the city of
Fallujah, Iraq. Sunni Muslims and for-
mer Ba’ath Party members identified
themselves as being disenfranchised
and marginalized with the defeat of
the Iraqi regime. Members of this re-
ceptive audience related to the cata-
lyst for the insurgent group that would
be later identified as Al-Qaeda of Iraq
(AQI), and were motivated to join this
network to fulfill their needs.
Over time, the receptive audi-
ence’s perception of AQI changed, due
to a series of AQI atrocities against the
population. In the fall of 2006, Unit-
ed States (US) forces recognized this
change and supported an alternative
catalyst for members of this recep-
tive audience, resulting in the forma-
tion of a series of local defense forces
which were sanctioned and often sup-
ported by tribal elders. These networks
of forces were able to slowly recapture
the Al-Anbar province of Iraq from AQI,
which is commonly referred to as the
“Al-Anbar Awakening”.5
An accommodating environ-
ment exists when conditions within the
OE facilitate the actions of a network.6
The potential for a network to exist
within an environment is limitless, but
the ability of members of the network
to take action in support of the catalyst
relies solely on the conditions within
that environment. There are variables
associated with identifying the level of
accommodation that can be identified,
measured and affected. Eliminating
the conditions related to variables that
support an accommodating environ-
ment is unlikely. The complexity that
exists within an environment, com-
prised of a multitude of inter-related
networks, is a composite of numerous
variables. Vast resources are required
to adequately alter OE conditions that
impact the level of accommodation.
Examination of the recent actions of
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
within Iraq demonstrates the environ-
ment was less accommodating to ISIS
influence when coalition forces were
present.7
As coalition forces departed
Iraq, Iraqi forces did not possess the
same capabilities and; thus, provided
ISIS members with an accommodating
environment for them to take action in
support of their goals.
Removing or altering certain
conditions will require the network to
adapt to ensure survival. The actions
networks take to adapt may pose ad-
ditional risk; and, if understood, could
provide opportunity for further en-
gagement of the network. A compre-
hensive understanding of the OE and
Figure 1. Network Formation and Sustainment Conditions

6. ALSB 2016-1 6
Network Structure and Function Considerations
Structure
Nodes
• Function with network
• Links to other nodes
• Level of influence within the
network
• Pattern of life
Composition
• Nodes: People, Places, Things
• Resources: Money, Equip-
ment, etc.
Links
• Type: Family, Societal, Cul
tural, etc.
• Strength: Strong/Weak
• Internal
Between nodes
• External
Association to other net-
works
Function
Capability
• Adaptability
• regeneration
• Recruitment
• Resource
• Train
• Conduct operations
• Communication
Intent
• Catalyst for formation
• Objectives
• Ideological goals
• Likely COAs/TTPs
Influence
• On other networks
• By other networks
Figure 2. Network Structure and Function Considerations (from Marine Corps Interim Publication 3–40.1, 74)
... consideration
of any network’s
structure and
function is nec-
essary as part
of the planning
process.
a detailed analysis of the networks are
required to identify the conditions that
support the network’s formation and
sustainment. Accomplishing these re-
quires gaining an understanding of the
conditions within the OE that must be
attained through refined analysis of
the mission variables and an in-depth
network analysis. Identifying and un-
derstanding these conditions will pro-
vide key information to support devel-
opment of an engagement plan for any
type of network that a commander may
desire to support, influence, or neu-
tralize.
NETWORK STRUCTURE AND
FUNCTION
Understanding a network re-
quires identifying characteristics that
define the network’s structure and
function. Network structure is the or-
ganization and relationship between
the nodes of a network, whereas the
network’s function is identified as ac-
tivities or purposes of the network or
one of its components. Regardless of
the type of capability being employed
to effect a network, consideration of
any network’s structure and function
is necessary as part of the planning
process.
Network analysis is conducted
using various techniques and can pro-
vide the commander with a variety of
information.8
The information should
be organized in a manner that facili-
tates understanding of how the net-
work is structured and how it func-
tions to support achieving goals as is
demonstrated in figure 2.

7. ALSB 2016-17
Common network analysis tech-
niques (such as network mapping, link
analysis and social network analysis
(SNA)) provide data that help a user
define the network structure and func-
tion. Analysts apply multiple network
analysis techniques that result in
layered products for use by the com-
mander and staff. These products are
not static, but are continuously updat-
ed (as new information is collected and
analyzed) to provide timely and accu-
rate situational understanding in sup-
port of planning and targeting.
Situational understanding is the
product of applying analysis and judg-
ment to relevant information to deter-
mine the relationships among the opera-
tional and mission variables to facilitate
decision-making. Building and main-
taining situational understanding is es-
sential for establishing the situation’s
context, developing effective plans, as-
sessing operations, and making qual-
ity decisions throughout the operations
process.
Army Doctrinal Publication 5-0, The
Operations Process, 17 May 2012, Page 5
The characteristics associated
with the structure and function of a
network are focal points for additional
exploration by US forces in support of
engagement planning and targeting.
Understanding structure and func-
tion of the network enables the abil-
ity to identify key nodes through ap-
plying SNA and a variety of network
analysis techniques. It is important to
understand a network’s functions as
they relate to critical OE variables. For
example, a critical OE variable might
be that an illegal drug network is gen-
erating so much illicit economic activ-
ity it is interfering with a host nation’s
ability to further develop licit economic
activity. A commander providing secu-
rity force assistance to the host nation
might determine the desired end state
will include neutralizing the drug net-
work to enable licit economic growth.
To achieve this, it would be essential
to significantly decrease the function-
ality of the drug network. To maximize
network neutralization, analysts would
need to understand critical network
functions and key nodes related to
those functions. Key nodes are those
that possess certain characteristics by
virtue of their position and intercon-
nectivity with other nodes. These char-
acteristics make key nodes targets for
achieving desired effects when they are
engaged in specific ways.
A common practice in target-
ing networks is to identify the network
nodes that are high in “betweenness
centrality.” Betweenness centrality
is determined when a node serves as
a connection between small clusters
(cliques or cells) or individual nodes
and the larger network.9
In the ex-
ample of the network prior to target-
ing (figure 3), the node Bob, possesses
the highest betweeness centrality. Al-
though SNA techniques are used to
identify this characteristic, SNA is not
applied independently. SNA is used,
optimally, with other network analy-
sis techniques. For this example, the
analyst has determined that targeting
Bob, Andy, and Jim would provide the
commander with the greatest ability to
achieve the desired end-state, which
is to maximize network fragmentation.
These nodes are highest in between-
ness centrality and, in essence, hold
the network together by virtue of their
positions and relationships.
NETWORK AFTER TARGETING
To ensure SNA is conducted on
a current understanding of the net-
work, the SNA analyst should incor-
porate as much data as possible and
consult with analysts from as many in-
telligence disciplines as are available.
Once the commander decides to tar-
get key nodes within the network, as a
part of the continuous implementation
of the collection plan, analysts possess
the ability to update the understand-
ing of the structure and function of the
targeted network by producing updat-
ed network analysis products. In figure
4, Bob, Andy, and Jim were removed
from the network, but more important-
ly, the section of the network that was
Understanding
structure and
function of the
network en-
ables the ability
to identify key
nodes through
applying SNA
and a variety of
network analysis
techniques.

8. ALSB 2016-1 8
The structure and
functions associ-
ated with networks
are codependent
in nature ...
responsible for finance has been sepa-
rated from the rest of the network and
fragmented into smaller cells. Frag-
menting a network may be desirable in
situations where a section of the net-
work is isolated for further targeting
actions and can have an effect on the
functionality of the network. In this ex-
ample, for the network to maintain or
return to a pretargeting capability lev-
el, it will be required to regenerate and
replace the functions provided by the
nodes that were removed. Due to the
complex adaptive nature of networks,
targeting that results in some type of
effect on the structure or function of
a network will not produce significant
long-term effects as long as conditions
within the OE support the sustainment
of that network.
The structure and functions as-
sociated with networks are codepen-
dent in nature, which also should be
understood to maximize planning and
engagement efforts. The structure of a
network exists in its current state to
support the facilitation of network ac-
tions or the function of that network.
Likewise, the desired or necessary func-
tions of a network are supported by the
overall structure of the network. These
network attributes are interrelated and
codependent. Engagement strategies
for networks focus on the structural
aspects of the network since the key
nodes within a network are identifi-
able using available network analysis
techniques. The complex and adaptive
nature of networks, coupled with an
ability to fully understand a network,
Figure 3. Network Prior to Targeting. (The authors developed this diagram using *ORA, a dynamic meta-network assessment and analysis tool
developed by Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems at Carnegie Mellon University. It contains hundreds of social net-
work, dynamic network, and trail metrics; procedures for grouping nodes; identifying local patterns; and comparing and contrasting networks,
groups, and individuals from a dynamic meta-network perspective.)

9. ALSB 2016-19
requires decisions on collection plan-
ning and engagement to be made with
the best information available at the
time. Engagement plans for a network,
regardless of the type of network being
engaged or the desired effect intended
for the network, target key nodes that
produce a first-order effect on the node
(direct impact on the structure), which
is intended to produce a second-order
effect on the network’s structure or
function.
Engaging networks to produce
desired effects on the structure and
function of the network is fundamen-
tal to current targeting methods. The
duration of the effects of operations on
networks depends on a number of vari-
ables, which includes the network’s
ability to adapt. However, this manner
of engagement effort will not eliminate
the existence of a network. The known
structure and function of a network are
often only the visible components that
network analysis helps us to identify.
Threat or illicit networks are motivated
to protect their network from attack
by hiding nodes, links (structure), and
function. These are often referred to as
dark networks.
IDENTIFYING CRITICAL VARI-
ABLES FOR NETWORKS
Critical variables are resources
or conditions that are present within
the OE that have a direct impact on the
commander’s objectives and may af-
fect the formation and sustainment of
networks.10
During the planning pro-
cess, the staff must focus on determin-
ing critical variables associated with
the commander’s operation.11
The rel-
evance of identifying critical variables
in relation to the commander’s mission
directly relates to gaining an under-
standing of conditions that will support
the commander’s desired end state.
However, networks exist within the en-
Figure 4. A Network After Targeting
During the plan-
ning process, the
staff must focus
on determining
critical variables
associated with
the commander’s
operation.

10. ALSB 2016-1 10
vironment (due to the conditions that
are available to them) which include a
catalyst, receptive audience, and ac-
commodating environment. Analysis
of the OE and output from analysis of
the network should be conducted con-
tinuously to identify the specific condi-
tions that exist to sustain the network.
These identifiable conditions are the
critical variables for the network.
A logic tree may be used to help
highlight a way to determine the criti-
cal variables for a network. Using the
outputs from evaluating the OE and
the network under analysis, the first
decision point is to identify the vari-
ables of the OE that comprise the cata-
lyst for the network.
The staff must determine if the
mission variable is a catalyst for a
network from current and future per-
spectives. The purpose of challenging
the staff to answer this question is to
identify any of the variables existing
within the OE associated with a cata-
lyst for the network, regardless of cur-
rent conditions. This effort also consid-
ers variables that potentially reinforce
the catalyst as the network adapts to
operations being conducted. Too often,
the analysis centers focus on current
operations. This “here and now” line of
effort presents potential risk by limit-
ing the focus of effort to a portion of the
conditions and often does not consider
monitoring and shaping the desired fu-
ture OE conditions.
The complex, adaptive nature of
networks and individuals tends toward
survival. Ensuring a relevant catalyst
exists for a network is fundamental for
the network to sustain itself within the
environment. For example, a unit suc-
cessfully identifies a variable within
the OE that is important in establish-
ing a catalyst for a network. Through
various lethal and nonlethal engage-
ments and operations, the commander
is successful in affecting this variable,
resulting in a weakening or undermin-
ing effect on the catalyst. The network
will, instinctively, seek an alternative
or substitute (associated with struc-
ture or function) to reinforce the cata-
lyst to continue existing. These substi-
tutes are now critical variables for the
network that will need to be leveraged
or acquired by the network to contin-
ue its existence. The ability to identify
potential substitutes as parts of the
The complex,
adaptive nature
of networks and
individuals tends
toward survival.
Figure 5. Critical Variable Logic Tree. This version of a logic tree considers the structure, functions, and conditions for network sustainment to
help identify critical variables.

11. ALSB 2016-111
initial analysis provides a potential
opportunity to limit the availability of
these substitutes as parallel efforts of
network engagement.
An example of a network seek-
ing substitutes is the way Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi’s network of jihadists in
Iraq did not affiliate themselves with
al-Qaeda until the fall of 2004. Prior to
this, Zarqawi built his network from a
combination of Iraqis and foreign fight-
ers who were motivated by the actions
of the network. At the time, Osama bin
Laden (al-Qaeda’s founder) sought to
“own” the jihad movement in Iraq. This
was not initially embraced by Zarqawi.
Critical resources were needed by Zar-
qawi to continue his jihad effort, which
had been constrained by coalition ef-
forts. His decision to associate with bin
Laden and al-Qaeda resulted in the
formation of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and
subsequent access to private donors
and recruitment, logistics, and facili-
tation networks.12
Although Zarqawi’s
beliefs differed from bin Laden, the
need to seek substitutes for limited re-
sources was a driving factor in the of-
ficial formation of AQI, which has now
morphed into as the Islamic State in
Iraq (ISIS).
Whether or not the mission vari-
able supports the conditions for a re-
ceptive audience should be applied
from the perspective of identifying
conditions that exist in support of the
current receptive audience and the de-
veloping potential audience members
within the OE. A network’s ability to
grow and regenerate structure, if loss-
es are sustained, relies upon its acces-
sibility to a receptive audience that can
be motivated and influenced to join.
Expansion of the receptive audience
for ISIS is associated with a number
of different conditions within the OE.
One particular condition is the percep-
tion of equality among various groups
in Iraq. Similar to what occurred dur-
ing the 2006 Anbar Awakening, groups
identified with a perceived grievance
within the OE that swayed them to be-
come members of the receptive audi-
ence, which coalition forces were able
to leverage. Now, some of the same
members of the population have been
swayed in the opposite direction, which
has resulted in an expanded receptive
audience for ISIS that has been mo-
tivated to join that network. ISIS has
successfully promoted its catalyst to
this audience by exploiting this per-
ception and currently possesses the
capability to leverage violent means to
further influence members of this au-
dience. Identifying and affecting this
variable has the potential to produce
long-term effects on the ISIS network,
but requires the synchronized applica-
tion of a host of available capabilities.
A network generates members
from the audience through some type
of influence and is supported by the
catalyst for the network. Understand-
ing and relating this to the receptive
audience will help support developing
and implementing the commander’s
engagement strategy for that network.
In addition to focusing an analysis on
identifying the conditions that support
the receptive audience, a staff should
consider the relationship of these
members to other networks. A subset
of mission variables contains the orga-
nizations that exist within the OE. As
part of comprehensive network analy-
sis, these organizations may appear
to be autonomous. By identifying the
critical variables that exist in an OE,
a commander may be able to identify
connections, or bridges, between these
network elements to engage specific
organizations or nodes that can influ-
ence the current receptive audience.
This shaping of the OE should include
specific, measurable activities or indi-
cators to monitor progress toward the
commander’s desired end state.
Analyzing critical variables from
the perspectives of current and poten-
tial conditions supports planning to
engage networks and affect the current
conditions for network sustainment
and provides the staff an opportunity to
consider including actions to facilitate
future conditions for network sustain-
A network’s
ability to grow
and regener-
ate structure ...
relies upon its
accessibility to a
receptive audi-
ence that can be
motivated and in-
fluenced to join.

12. ALSB 2016-1 12
ment. The decision on what must be
accomplished for the critical variables
related to the receptive audience is de-
termined based upon the commander’s
desired end state. Efforts should result
in planning that supports or opposes
the condition depending upon the de-
sired effect to support, influence, or
neutralize the selected network.
Without an accommodating en-
vironment, networks may exist, but
their ability to take actions in support
of achieving their goals will be limited.
The staff must understand planning
operations that are intended to limit
a network’s ability to take action by
identifying the critical variables that
comprise the accommodating environ-
ment for the network. Following the
logic tree in figure 3, the primary con-
cern to address to identify the critical
variables for the accommodating envi-
ronment is whether or not the mission
variable supports the accommodating
environment.
The initial analysis will focus
on the current OE conditions. Staffs
should study to understand conditions
that may emerge within the OE as net-
work engagement operations are con-
ducted.
For the staff, maintaining situ-
ational awareness of the OE is chal-
lenging and time consuming due to
the complexity that exists in any envi-
ronment. The OE constantly changes
and can be affected by many networks
or subnetwork elements. Some criti-
cal variables may require monitoring
and evaluation. For example, the staff
should determine if the current condi-
tion in the OE supports achieving the
commander’s desired end state. It is
common to focus efforts on conditions
that must be shaped to meet a desired
end state, since more effort will be re-
quired to affect those conditions. The
purpose of gaining a comprehensive
understanding of the OE is to ensure
all of the required conditions neces-
sary to attain an end state are identi-
fied and routinely monitored. A condi-
tion in the OE that is beneficial can be
negatively affected by US’ operations or
the actions of other networks. Identify-
ing the potential impacts of operations
on these conditions as part of the plan-
ning process or realizing a condition
of this nature is changing allows the
commander to make necessary adjust-
ments.
The potential exists for the criti-
cal variables to be evaluated for a level
of accommodation that could be in-
cluded as part of a formal assessment
of the engagement plan for the network.
Since eliminating the critical variable
is unlikely, the desired condition may
be to lower the accommodation level
to a degree that the network has diffi-
culty in taking action, which will result
in the need for the network to seek an
alternative. Potential for identifying al-
ternatives for the network to increase
the level of accommodation in the envi-
ronment exists. However, the analysis
must focus on identifying these critical
variables to consider them during the
planning process. The network will ex-
pend resources and accept some risk
to gain or sustain the necessary level
of accommodation.
Expanding analysis to gain an
understanding of the critical variables
for a network (as they relate to the sus-
tainment of the network) will tend to
result in engagement plans that pro-
duce lasting effects on networks. The
immediate need to engage networks
from structure and function perspec-
tives will still be necessary, but incor-
porating analysis on future conditions
for sustaining the network into plan-
ning and targeting efforts will result in
greater long-term effects from opera-
tions.
Like the critical variables iden-
tified to support operational assess-
ments, the critical variables for the
networks can be used in a similar fash-
ion. The staff should explore develop-
ing measures of effectiveness for these
critical variables and identifying indi-
cators that become part of the assess-
ment of operations. Since assessments
are resource intensive, the goal would
The OE constantly
changes and can
be affected by
many networks or
subnetwork ele-
ments.

13. ALSB 2016-113
be to maximize the efforts of the as-
sessment process by finding measures
that can be supported as part of rou-
tine collection efforts.
CONCLUSION
The key to successfully engag-
ing a network revolves around gain-
ing and maintaining a comprehen-
sive understanding of the conditions
within the OE. Also, it requires an
in-depth understanding of variables
that are critical to achieving a desired
end state. Accomplishing this goes be-
yond conducting routine analyses and
maintaining situational awareness. It
requires the staff to identify and relate
operations to the critical variables that
exist in the OE, which must be shaped
to meet the commander’s desired end
state and affected to a degree that miti-
gates a threat network’s ability to sur-
vive.
Although understanding the
structure and function of a network
directly supports current targeting
methodology, these methods alone will
never realize the optimal objectives
when engaging networks. Regardless
of the commander’s desired effect (sup-
port, influence, or neutralize) on any
network (friendly, neutral, or threat),
the primary conditions existing within
the OE that allow a network to form,
grow, and survive must be considered
as part of the planning and targeting
processes. The disadvantages an adap-
tive network possesses can only be
overcome by making network engage-
ment decisions based on an in-depth
understanding of the OE as it relates
to network goals, functions, behavior,
and sustainability.
The authors are current and former
military personnel with expertise in
network engagement methodology.
MAJ (Ret.) Sopko, SGM (Ret.) Osman,
and Maj Slater work as contract sup-
port to the Marine Corps Tactics and
Operations Group. Mr. Miles, LCDR
(Ret.) Worret, and COL (Ret.) Munch
work with the US Army’s Training
and Doctrine Command.
END NOTES
1
The views expressed in this article are the authors alone and
do not represent the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations
Group, the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, or the
US military.
2
Marine Corps Interim Publication (MCIP) 3-40.1, Network
Engagement, September 2014, 47-48.
3
Matthew Alan Hill, Democracy Promotion and Conflict-Based
Reconstruction (Routledge, 2011), 156.
4
Training and Doctrine Command’s Training Brain Operations
Center-Advanced Network Analysis and Targeting Train-
ing Course Material, ”When applying the concepts of social
network analysis (SNA), normally by using SNA software, each
group of two or more connected nodes is considered to be a
network. A meta-network is formed when all related networks
are merged into a single “master” network. Some analysts refer
to this as a “master merge”.
5
Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams and Lieuten-
ant Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler, Al-Anbar Awakening Volume I:
American Perspectives (Marine Corps University, 2009), 9-16.
Accessed on August 11, 2014, http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/
Portals/61/Docs/Al-AnbarAwakeningVolI[1].pdf
6
MCIP 3-40.1, 48.
7
Richard Spencer, “How US and Britain were warned of ISIS ad-
vance in Iraq but turned a deaf ear”, The Telegraph (June 2014),
Accessed August 11, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10918607/How-US-and-Britain-
were-warned-of-Isis-advance-in-Iraq-but-turned-a-deaf-ear.html
8
MCIP 3-40.1, 56.
9
Ibid., 69.
10
Ibid., 41.
11
Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August
2011, III-12-15.
12
Aaron Y. Zelin, “The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for
Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement” (The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy 20, 2014), 2. Accessed on August
11, 2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Docu-
ments/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf
... the primary
conditions exist-
ing within the
OE that allow a
network to form,
grow, and survive
must be consid-
ered as part of
the planning and
targeting pro-
cesses.

14. ALSB 2016-1 14
by Lt Col Dan Magruder, USAF1
Over the last four decades, the
United States (US) military utilized a
joint force to secure airfields in Grena-
da, Panama, Afghanistan, and Iraq in
the face of armed opposition. While the
examples of large-scale, forcible entry
stand-out in history, a more frequent
operation is the establishment of tem-
porary lodgments for the purpose of
follow-on actions.2
This is an under-de-
veloped topic in multi-Service tactics,
techniques, and procedures.3
Notably,
some in the US Air Force view the capa-
bility in terms of untethered operations
(UTOs), which claim rapid mobility to
forward bases can assure allies and
deter would-be enemies.4
While the
UTO concept is an accurate depiction
of shaping and deterrence operations
(phase 0 and 1), it is a framework that
must be further developed for combat
operations. Air-minded Services would
be well served to review the concept of
JOINT EQUITIES IN AERIAL LODGMENT
aerial lodgment because it may pro-
vide inroads to solutions for challenges
posed by anti-access (A2)/area denial
(AD) threats and lesser threat environ-
ments.
The purpose of this article is
to develop the conceptual utility of an
aerial lodgment, address why it is im-
portant, and examine potential follow-
on implications. This article argues
three main points. First, although aer-
ial lodgment is focused on fixed-wing
landing zones, air-minded Services
have shown a limited investment in
ground-centric operations that support
the projection of airpower.5
Second, in
an effort to improve conceptual un-
derstanding of aerial lodgments, this
article offers classifications based on
the threat in the operational environ-
ment, frequency of execution, and risk.
Third, this article argues the concep-
tual application of aerial lodgments in
any environment has the potential to
A C-17 Globemaster III rehearses forced entry operations at the Nevada Test and Training Range in Tonopah, Nevada, 23 May 2012. Photo by
SSgt Ciara Wymbs, USAF
... air-minded Ser-
vices have shown
a limited invest-
ment in ground-
centric operations
that support the
projection of air-
power.

15. ALSB 2016-115
mitigate threats posed by operational
access challenges which could enable
airpower projection.
A main operational gap is pro-
jecting airpower into denied areas us-
ing ground-based forces. For example,
the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Recon-
naissance (ISR), Major General Lin-
da Urrutia-Varhall said the Air Force
knows counterterrorism, but when
it comes to A2/AD, “[n]ot so much.
We found that out when we went up
against the competition in Syria.”6
Op-
eration INHERENT RESOLVE in Iraq
and Syria is exactly the type of opera-
tion that would be well served by an
aerial campaign supported by ground
elements.7
There are at least two ways Air-
men on the ground could better facili-
tate the projection of airpower to achieve
operational campaign objectives in Iraq
and Syria. First, air power is already
projected via dynamic targeting from
strike cells and ISR assets with little-
to-no American boots on the ground.
In this example, airpower is the most
lethal element of national power, but
is coming up short in achieving long-
lasting effects. The main impediment
to progress is the lack of synchroniza-
tion between aerial strikes and friendly
ground maneuver elements at and be-
hind the forward line of troops (FLOT).
Therefore, to capitalize on airpower,
the coalition needs to conduct simulta-
neous, offensive ground advances with
the intent to hold terrain. If there is a
coalition force willing to hold terrain,
the FLOT could change in the coali-
tion’s favor. In critical ways, the politi-
cal situation hinders any decisive mili-
tary outcome.
Second, there is an opportunity
to employ temporary aerial lodgments
behind enemy lines if American policy
evolves to allow its forces to operate
beyond the FLOT. This would yield a
serious positional advantage to coali-
tion forces because they could disrupt
enemy operations by conducting deep-
strike, which could relieve pressure on
the front lines allowing a coalition to
break through and advance.
Ground forces are required to
conduct clearing operations, but most
of the time, draw on support from all
the core airpower missions.8
Interest-
ingly, Air Force Service doctrine sug-
gests the joint force air component
commander should be the supported
commander when “airpower presents
the joint force commander with the
preponderance of counter-surface ef-
fects”.9
While this article used the Iraq-
Syria example to examine the concept
in concrete terms, dissecting aerial
lodgment into component parts will as-
sist in highlighting doctrinal gaps and
elaborate on conceptual utility as it ap-
plies to other scenarios.
While joint concepts for op-
erational access and doctrine exist at
the broadest levels, conceptual clarity
is gained by categorizing operational
threat environment conditions (per-
missive, uncertain, hostile) associated
with an aerial lodgment.10
Joint doc-
trine addresses the broadest concept
of forcible entry in three joint publica-
tions.11
Even if doctrine primarily fo-
cuses on seizing an enemy’s terrain in
the face of armed opposition, this is far
too conceptually and operationally con-
strictive. Broadly, an aerial lodgment is
a secured and held landing zone which
facilitates the entry of follow-on forces
and attains “maneuver space for sub-
sequent operations”.12
These types of
operations can be conducted in any
range of threat environments. However,
the nature of the environment and as-
sociated risk to mission and force dic-
tate the mix of ground forces required
and the manner in which they must be
employed to enable airfield operations.
In most threat environments, the man-
ner of ground force employment is
most likely joint and may resemble the
Army’s wide area security construct.
Ground force employment in permis-
sive environments depends heavily on
Department of State support in gaining
political access to airfield facilities and
airspace.
A main opera-
tional gap is pro-
jecting airpower
into denied areas
using ground-
based forces.

16. ALSB 2016-1 16
Theoretically, it is also useful to
categorize potential aerial lodgments
operations using two criteria: the oper-
ational environment and the likelihood
of execution.13
While an uncertain
environment implies a high threat to
strategic aircraft and friendly ground
forces, they are uncommon and only
executed when serious national securi-
ty interests are at stake. These are the
high-risk operations addressed by joint
forcible entry doctrine.14
However, a
more common option is establishing an
airfield miles from an objective.15
Once
a ground force is inserted at an offset
landing zone, it can move to shape the
environment at the primary objective
by reducing air and ground threats.16
For example, this scheme of maneu-
ver was used to secure Kandahar and
Baghdad International Airports at the
outset of invasions in 2001 and 2003,
respectively.
Far more common are opera-
tions in uncertain environments where
the likelihood of engaging a threat is
possible because the host nation does
not have complete control over the ter-
rain or population.17
For example, as
coalition forces withdrew from Iraq
and Afghanistan, a number of airbases
were transitioned to host nation secu-
rity forces. Later, the same airbases
were used occasionally, but required
forces to clear and hold terrain before
reopening them for airfield operations.
Furthermore, austere airfields can be
assessed and established anywhere
the terrain is suitable. Generally, op-
erations conducted in permissive en-
vironments are routine and conducted
when the host nation exhibits control
and a willingness to assist friendly ef-
forts.18
Because the highest risk mis-
sions are also the most complex, the
joint force should focus on contingen-
cies. The highest risk missions, such
as joint forcible entry and aerial lodg-
ment behind enemy lines, have the
highest potential return on invest-
ment. Therefore, training should focus
on scenarios that develop competency
in these areas. Subsequently, all other
scenarios are less challenging in plan-
ning and execution.
Paratroopers assigned to the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, US Army Alaska, practice a forced-entry
parachute assault on Malemute drop zone at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, 18 March 2015, as part of a larger tactical field exer-
cise. Photo by Justin Connaher
Because the high-
est risk missions
are also the most
complex, the joint
force should focus
on contingencies.

17. ALSB 2016-117
Planning and training should
focus on scenarios that will mitigate
the risks associated with establishing
aerial lodgments across operational
environments. Successfully executing
high-risk operations is “due in no small
part to the habitual relationships and
practices developed during deliberate
joint training …”19
This emphasizes the
fact that tactical forces must plan and
rehearse prior to conducting opera-
tions because the complexity increases
commensurate with threat levels and
lack of interoperability experience. In
the current environment, many factors
combine to raise the prospects of con-
ducting these types of high-risk opera-
tions. For example, the erosion of op-
erational access is driven by political
choices made by allies to limit US ac-
cess to bases, US drawdown of forces,
proliferation of A2/AD threats, and the
tyranny of distance problem. Regard-
less of risk mitigation measures, a bar-
rier to airpower projection remains.
Undervaluing concepts, such
as aerial lodgment, sidesteps an op-
portunity to address one of the main
impediments to airpower projection.
Most notably, aerial lodgment can fa-
cilitate how a joint force projects air-
power into an A2/AD environment.20
The use of temporary airheads is not a
novel concept, but what is new is em-
ploying them in support of a broader
airpower campaign in pursuit of op-
erational objectives. Aerial lodgments
were established time and again dur-
ing World War II’s Pacific campaign;
which in today’s lexicon, would be cat-
egorized as defeating an adversary’s
A2/AD efforts.21
Interestingly, a search
of Air Force Service doctrine yields no
results for operational access, A2/AD,
or joint forcible entry.22
Furthermore,
airbase opening is marginalized to an
annex in the Service publication cov-
ering mobility operations.23
A notable,
albeit limited, exception is the “Rapid
Raptor” concept which employs a C-17
with munitions, fuel, and maintainers
to an austere environment to support
four F-22s. For their part, the Navy of-
fers a unique perspective because car-
rier battle groups are floating airfields,
but they would serve to gain access if
land-based airfields are held. Also, Air
Force doctrine states airpower “adds
flanks” as important as the “horizontal
battle” and some argue it is a maneu-
ver element in its own right.24
However,
the converse is equally true.
Joint land operations conducted
to establish airheads can facilitate fol-
low-on actions that uniquely contrib-
ute to airpower projection. Establishing
aerial lodgments in any threat environ-
ment enables the joint force to project
airpower. Most importantly, follow-on
aerial operations could range from the
launch and recovery of strike assets,
forward staging of ISR platforms, or
mobility missions for finishing forces.
Successful execution of the concept
requires mutually supportive airheads
which can temporarily sustain opera-
tions. Ultimately, extending the opera-
tional reach of strike aircraft will allow
them to hit the enemy and quickly ret-
rograde to safety for refueling and re-
arming. In any case, successful execu-
tion of the concept requires mutually
supportive airheads which can tem-
porarily sustain operations. Further-
more, if US forces plan to use multiple
airfields for varied periods of time, it
complicates the adversary’s response
to the encroachment. Joint doctrine of-
fers a solution to this problem in the
form of entry forces (i.e., conventional
or special operations forces.
Generally, conventional forces
secure large, high-threat areas. How-
ever, for a less overt signature, a SOF
component can infiltrate an area, as-
sess the terrain, and establish an
airhead (if it is suitable). Crucially, if
ground-based air threats exist (i.e., in-
tegrated air defense system) they may
be vulnerable to raids or finding and
fixing, which would enable a strike.
This requires the ground force to have
sufficient weapon types, mobility, and
communications to control the air-
head line including some surrounding
environs. Therefore, the projection of
airpower in an operational campaign
... aerial lodg-
ment can facili-
tate how a joint
force projects
airpower into an
A2/AD environ-
ment.

18. ALSB 2016-1 18
hinges directly on the ground force’s
ability to secure and run an airfield.
Turning the current paradigm on its
head, ground combatants (establishing
an airhead via surprise and violence of
action) may facilitate the projection of
airpower in follow-on operations.
To be sure, implications sug-
gested by this article might cause
circumspection because it requires
modifying current paradigms about
the relationship between air and land
power. To many, airpower is typically
viewed as a supporting force to decisive
tactical actions on the ground. Howev-
er, turning the current paradigm on its
head, ground-based Airmen could be a
tool used to project airpower. Indeed,
Special Tactics Airmen are already
task-organized and employ personnel
and platforms to mobilize across great
distances, with minimal logistical sup-
port, and operate in dispersed ways.
The use of aerial lodgments
in pursuit of operational and strate-
gic campaign objectives is a frontier
worthy of future study. Indeed, an
air-ground maneuver concept can be
designed to place airpower assets in
positions to hold key adversary vulner-
abilities at risk. Joint players should
continue a high level of participation
in joint forcible entry and operational
access exercises to build institutional
experience. Practicing complex aerial
lodgments will enable the US military
to revise operational access concepts
that lead to joint force success. That
is a goal any Soldier, Marine, Sailor, or
Airman should find agreeable.
An unidentified US Air Force combat controller from 22nd Special Tactics Squadron communicates with a 357th Fighter Squadron A–10C
Thunderbolt II pilot taxiing to a parking spot after landing on Bicycle Lake Army Airfield at the National Training Center Range, Fort Irwin, Cali-
fornia, 22 September 2015. The pilots participated in austere landing training during Green Flag-West 15–10. Combat controllers survey and
establish airfields in austere or hostile areas while providing air traffic control to land aircraft during combat and humanitarian missions. Photo
by SrA Betty R. Chevalier, USAF
The use of aerial
lodgments in pur-
suit of operational
and strategic cam-
paign objectives is
a frontier worthy
of future study.

19. ALSB 2016-119
Lt Col Dan Magruder is the Direc-
tor of Operations, 22nd Special Tac-
tics Squadron, Joint Base Lewis Mc-
Chord, Washington. He has served in
a variety of Special Operations de-
ployed and staff positions and holds
a PhD in Political Science from the
University of Chicago.
END NOTES
1
The views expressed in this article do not represent the
Air Force or Special Operations Command. All errors are the
author’s alone.
2
Joint Publication 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry, 27 Nov 2012, I-1.
A “lodgment is a designated area in a hostile or potentially
hostile operational area that, when seized and held, makes the
continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides
maneuver space for subsequent operations (a lodgment may be
an airhead, a beachhead, or a combination thereof).”
3
One exception is the Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Airfield Opening (https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.
jsp?pindex=66&pubId=610#). Another in the tactical realm is
Major Ruston Traynham’s, “Forward Operating Location Opera-
tions: A Checklist for the Weapons Officer,” United States Air
Force Weapons School, 66 Weapons Squadron, Class 14A, 29
June 2014.
4
Charles Brown, Brad Spacy, and Charles Glover. “Untethered
Operations: Rapid Mobility and Forward Basing Are Keys to Air-
power’s Success in the Anti-Access/Area-Denial Environment,”
Air and Space Power Journal, May-June 2015, 17–26.
5
Fixed-wing landing zones expand the tactical options for
follow-on operations because they can support forward arming
and refueling points; transload areas; and depending on the
runway type, many types of aircraft (i.e., A-10s, F-22s, F-35s,
C-130s, C-17s, CV-22s, and helicopters). This is reflected in Army
concern about less training support to the global response force
mission. http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/09/24/
fort-bragg-air-force-insists-training-not-degraded.html. Before
2015, see General Carl Steiner and Lieutenant Colonel Dan
Schroeder’s article, “The Army and Joint Forcible Entry”, Army,
November 2009, 19–20.
6
Eleni Ekmektsioglou , http://www.c4isrnet.com/story/
military-tech/isr/2015/09/15/air-force-anti-access-anti-deni-
al/72317652/
7
In fact, as of 3 February 2016, the vast majority of kinetic ef-
fects in Operation INHERENT RESOLVE are due to the applica-
tion of coalition airpower. See http://www.defense.gov/News/
Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve.
8
Air and space superiority; intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance (ISR); mobility; strike; and command and control.
9
Air Force Doctrine, Volume III, Command, 5 June 2013: “In cas-
es where airpower presents the joint force commander with the
preponderance of counter-surface effects, it may be appropri-
ate for the joint force air component commander (JFACC) to be
the supported commander for affecting enemy surface forces,
with friendly surface force commanders acting in a supporting
role. This is often the case when the JFACC’s forces perform the
theater-wide air interdiction and strategic attack functions.”
10
General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Joint Operational Access Concept, version 1.0, 17 January
2012 and Joint Concept for Entry Operations, 7 April 2014.
11
See Joint Publication 3-17, Air Mobility Operations; Joint Pub-
lication 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations; Joint Publication
3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations.
12
Joint Publication 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry, 27 Nov 2012, I-1.
13
Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms, 8 Nov 2010 defines an airhead
as a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile opera-
tional area that, when seized and held, ensures the continuous
air landing of troops and material and provides the maneuver
space necessary for projected operations.
14
Joint Publication 3-35, Deployment and Re-Deployment Op-
erations, 31 Jan 2013, page I-2. A hostile environment is an area
“in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and
capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations that a
unit intends to conduct.”
15
Austere airfields are also known as dirt landing strips and,
typically, are offset from an objective.
16
This is possible due to organic capabilities of the ground ma-
neuver element and/or augmentation from aerial ISR and fires
assets. In this manner, situation dependent, the ground element
can reduce risk to a follow-on force composed of mechanized
infantry or air assault forces.
17
Joint Publication 3-35, I-2. [An] uncertain environment is an
area “in which [host nation] HN forces, whether opposed to or
receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not
have totally effective control of the territory and population in
the intended operational area.”
18
Ibid., I-1. A permissive environment is an area “in which host
nation military and law enforcement agencies have control, the
intent, and the capability to assist operations that a unit intends
to conduct.”
19
Steiner and Schroeder, “The Army and Joint Forcible Entry”,
Army, November 2009, 19–20.
20
In fact, enabling joint forces to close within striking distance
without undue risk is the third imperative of operational access
as outlined in the concept document. See Joint Operational
Access Concept, 17.
21
For example, the Pacific, island-hopping campaign in 1942,
Operation WATCHTOWER, emplaced Marines on the island of
Guadalcanal to seize an airhead and set conditions to project
airpower.
22
See https://doctrine.af.mil/, accessed 6 Oct 2015.
23
See https://doctrine.af.mil/DTM/dtmairmobilityops.htm,
accessed 9 Oct 2015. However, the document recognizes that
airfield seizure by Army, Marines or SOF precedes any sustained
operations by an Air Force Contingency Response Wing or other
joint elements.
24
Givens, Robert. Turning the Vertical Flank: Airpower as a
Maneuver Force in the Theater Campaign (US Air War College,
2013). His argument begins a definition of maneuver warfare
that brings to bear such concepts as surprise, shock, and com-
pellence.

20. ALSB 2016-1 20
JOINT ENTRY IN THE URBAN LITTORALS: FREEDOM
OF ACCESS DOES NOT EQUAL FREEDOM OF ACTION
by Scott Packard
The many challenges to freedom
of access and action resultant from the
proliferation of anti-access and area
denial capabilities rightly receive con-
siderable attention in the joint com-
munity. Assuming the joint force is
successful in gaining and maintaining
sufficient access to an operational area
to project forces into it, the ever-in-
creasing lethality, range, and precision
of systems, down to the lowest level,
will push intermediate staging bases
farther from the objective. This impacts
joint entry operations, forcible or oth-
erwise, independent of the operational
environment. What has received con-
siderably less scrutiny, however, are
the challenges the urban environment
alone presents to entry, even in the ab-
sence of opposition. The Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) manu-
al, Joint Concept for Entry Operations
(JCEO), dances lightly over the chal-
lenges imposed by the urban environ-
ment, briefly mentioning “geographic
and infrastructure impediments”, an
understatement on par with the notion
that German forces entered Stalingrad
absent formal invitation during World
War II.1
In fact, given the challenges
the joint force will face to enter the
congested, contested, and connected
urban environment, seabased forces
are best suited for entry operations.
As United States’ (US) defense
posture continues to change, entry op-
erations will be necessary to support
broader strategic goals. The JCEO lists
five purposes for entry operations: 1)
to defeat threats to the access and use
of the global commons, 2) to find, con-
trol, defeat, disable, and/or dispose
of specific weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD) threats, 3) to establish a
lodgment, 4) to assist populations and
groups, and 5) to conduct other limit-
ed duration missions.2
The first three
imply a degree of opposition, whether
anti-access or area denial, and require
forcible entry, but the last two will not
automatically enjoy freedom of action
A US Navy landing craft air cushion comes ashore on a beach at Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California as part of an amphibious
landing during Exercise DAWN BLITZ, 5 September 2015. Photo by LCpl David Staten, USMC
... the ever-in-
creasing lethality,
range, and preci-
sion of systems,
down to the lowest
level, will push in-
termediate staging
bases farther from
the objective.

21. ALSB 2016-121
and the urban environment itself will
be an obstacle to entry.3
Until recently, the joint staff,
Services, and most military thinkers
largely turned their attention away
from the urban environment, though
military action felt urban to those on
the ground in Iraq and parts of Afghan-
istan.4
This lack of high-level attention
to the urban environment was not the
case prior to those operations. In the
mid-to-late 1990s, General Charles
Krulak, the 31st Commandant of the
Marine Corps, energized the Marine
Corps’ thinking, experimentation, and
training for urban operations. His
“Three Block War Concept”, the con-
current conduct of high intensity close
combat, peacekeeping tasks, and hu-
manitarian aid all within the space of
three contiguous city blocks, outlined
the complexity Marines would face op-
erating on urban terrain and remains
relevant today.5
With extensive experi-
mentation and exercises, the Marine
Corps developed and refined tactics,
techniques and procedures for urban
operations. However, other campaigns
soon proved more urgent, demanding
Service focus, and attention given to
the urban environs waned and doctrine
development languished. Although the
lessons learned in the preceding years
were not completely forgotten and
served the Marines well in Fallujah,
other skills were more pressing.
After 14 years of counterinsur-
gency and stability operations, focus
and attention to the urban challenge
is renewing, not only for the Marine
Corps, but across the other Services
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation alliance, with the trends of ur-
banization and littoralization noted in
the 1970s progressing ahead of pre-
dictions. Recent studies reported that
50 percent of the world population is
in cities and growing; and that three-
quarters of all large cities are located
along coasts.6
It seems very likely that
US forces and multinational and in-
terorganizational partners are going
to operate in the urban littorals. Pre-
vious military thought held that cities
were obstacles best bypassed. Military
thinkers are beginning to understand
that cities may be the key terrain and
reasons for a military mission.
Marines with 2nd Assault Amphibious Battalion, 2nd Marine Division, make landfall in assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs) during amphibious
training operations at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, 16 July 2015. The white smoke is used to conceal ground forces as they leave the AAVs,
before moving inland. Photo by Cpl Sullivan Laramie, USMC
Recent studies
reported that 50
percent of the
world population
is in cities and
growing; and that
three-quarters
of all large cities
are located along
coasts.

22. ALSB 2016-1 22
Why do these trends make ur-
ban operations more likely? As bank
robbers are drawn to banks because
that is where the money is found so,
too, will the military be drawn into cit-
ies because that is where the people are
found. Also, the world has taken notice
that the urban environment effectively
mitigates many of the dramatic advan-
tages that US and coalition forces oth-
erwise enjoy.
Still, entry operations into a city
do not have to be actively opposed by
an enemy to face opposition, active or
otherwise. For example, a city already
facing crisis will be ill equipped to pro-
vide the logistics support a large mili-
tary force might require, and efforts to
procure it from the city will only cause
further problems. Even without an ac-
tive threat, the urban environment will
challenge entry operations and make
seabasing options more attractive to
joint planners.7
While there are a number of
concepts for access and entry, cur-
rently joint doctrine only exists for
forcible entry, not the larger, more in-
clusive entry operations.8
Regardless,
amphibious forces are ideally suited to
support joint entry operations. Of the
forcible entry options (amphibious, air-
borne, or air assault), seabased forces
will be the most useful in a city, pro-
viding the most flexibility, tactical agil-
ity, sustainability, and protection. In
the absence of an intermediate staging
base (ISB) within range of the operat-
ing area, air assault is impossible and
airborne entry difficult. While inter-
continental airborne entry is possible,
sustainment is problematic, and egress
demands external support. For an am-
phibious force, the seabase serves as
an ISB for surface and air insertion,
with an available seaport adding op-
tions to joint logistics over the shore.
While amphibious based air assault
comes with many unique operating
conditions for Army or Marine Corps
forces, it may be the main means of
moving ashore until landing sites and
beach exits are found or made.9
When
forward land bases are not available,
seabasing provides forward staging for
entry or follow-on forces, sustainment,
fires, intelligence and reconnaissance,
command and control, and force pro-
tection. The recent fielding of new, ver-
satile, maritime platforms, such as the
expeditionary transfer dock (formerly
mobile launch platform) and expedi-
tionary mobile base (formerly afloat
forward staging base), has only in-
creased the utility of seabasing. While
the Army serves as the principal US
land force because of its forward pres-
ence, the expeditionary Marine Corps,
with the Navy, is likely to be frequently
employed in cities around the globe.
CONTESTED
The competition for control in
cities, particularly in the peri-urban
areas where population growth out-
strips the state or city government’s
ability to keep up with growing infra-
structure needs, will involve US forces
engaging with a variety of individuals,
groups, and human networks.10
In the
absence of effective government, armed
nonstate actors often exercise coercive,
persuasive, and administrative influ-
ence over the populace. Local power
brokers fill security, legal, water, food,
and education vacuums where the city
management cannot or will not.11
Tran-
siting or operating within their territo-
ry may require negotiations with infor-
mal leaders outside normal diplomatic
channels. In most operations, there
will be insufficient time to establish
trust relationships. The lowest thresh-
old, understanding the dynamics and
subtleties of the relationships between
various individuals, groups, and net-
works sufficient to effectively negotiate
the maze of influencers, will demand
sensing before a conflict. The forward
presence of amphibious forces pro-
vides more opportunities for collection
than other entry options. Seabased
forces can loiter before a crisis to learn
as much as possible through cyber op-
erations and traditional intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance.
... the urban envi-
ronment effective-
ly mitigates many
of the dramatic
advantages that
US and coalition
forces otherwise
enjoy.

23. ALSB 2016-123
CONGESTED
Entry operations in the litto-
rals face increased crowds and clutter,
constricted sea approaches, congested
land approaches, crowded airspace,
industrial hazards, coastal inundation,
and overlapping network footprints.
Agglomeration (one city expanding
into the next) and in-fill (the addition
of structures to empty spaces within a
city) limit surface options, landing or
drop zones, and staging areas. Traffic
congestion may shut down main sup-
ply routes during peak times. Air op-
tions face similar congestion, with com-
mercial aviation and increasing use of
unmanned aircraft systems in the city
presenting a risk to aviation operations
and a potential weapon, if hacked. In
the ungoverned spaces, increasingly
concentrated demographics in the cit-
ies and expansion of the peri-urban
zones filling the available contiguous
space will make penetration difficult
for an amphibious surface landing or
airborne insert. Many urban slums sit
astride the coastal zone, partially on
land and partially over or on the water.
Mobility in these areas will be the do-
main of a maritime force, comfortable
on land, river, sea, and air.
CONNECTED
The concepts of urbanization
and littoralization were noted as early
as the 1970s. What is new, however,
is the massive increase in electronic
connectivity creating a networked pop-
ulace with new abilities to access in-
formation and be a source of informa-
Amphibious assault vehicles assigned to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit conduct an amphibious landing rehearsal from the amphibious
transport dock USS Denver (LPD-9) as part of a combined US and Korean exercise near Pohang, Korea on 5 November 2008. Photo by Cpl
Jason Spinella, USMC
Mobility in these
areas will be
the domain of a
maritime force,
comfortable on
land, river, sea,
and air.

24. ALSB 2016-1 24
tion. A fourth block, the information
block, can be added to Krulak’s “Three
Block War” concept, that addresses
the expansion of connectivity and so-
cial media, increasing the scrutiny of
US operations, providing opportunity
and risk.12
On this block, any gap be-
tween what is said and what is done
is broadcast locally, and to the world,
only adding to the difficulty of military
operations on urban terrain. Govern-
ments are more and more attuned to
the importance of legitimacy with lo-
cal and global audiences. Every person
with a cell phone embedded camera or
networked drone becomes a potential
information operations or collection
asset. Forces lying offshore, poised
for employment and outside the view
of civilians and range of commercial
drones, gain “information sanctuary”
and are more difficult to exploit for ei-
ther propaganda or intelligence. Op-
erational security and messaging are
more easily controlled with a seabased
force.
The joint force will find itself
operating in cities, whether mitigat-
ing human suffering or facing an en-
trenched enemy. Seabased operations
address many aspects of the conges-
tion, competing interests, and strategic
communications challenges US forces
will face. With available entry forces,
sustainability, and force protection,
a joint force operating “from the sea”
avoids the vulnerabilities of a land-
based force. Less exposed to scrutiny,
those forces insert and withdraw with
greater stealth and optimize operation-
al security. In the future urban oper-
ating environment, the joint force will
meet the challenge of entry with sea-
basing.
Maj (Ret.) Packard served as a Ma-
rine infantry officer and currently
assists the Marine Corps Tactics and
Operations Group with urban opera-
tions Service doctrine and concept
development. He has operational ex-
perience in Asia, Africa, Central and
South America, and the Middle East.
END NOTES
1
CJSC, Joint Operational Access Concept, Version 1.0, 17 Jan
2012, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/
joac_2012.pdf.
2
Ibid., 1-2.
3
The Department of Defense (DOD) definition of forcible entry
(seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed
opposition) is too limited, focusing solely on seizing a lodg-
ment. CJCS’s Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) offers
a better one that comprises a variety of operations, inclusive
of lodgment, against opposition. The distinction is important
since, depending on the mission, forces might not seize a lodg-
ment, but maneuver directly against the objective. JP 1–02, The
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms, 8 November 2013 (as amended through 15 March 2012),
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary. Joint Operational
Access Concept, Version 1.0, 17 Jan 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/
doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/joac_2012.pdf
4
David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains (Oxford Press, 2013),
viii-ix.
5
Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the
Three Block War”, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 83:1, January
1999, 18-23.
6
Supreme Allied Command, Transformation, Climate and
Geographical Implications for Future Urban Operations, dated 5
Jan 2015, 6-12.
7
Seabasing is the deployment, assembly, command, projection,
reconstitution, and reemployment of joint power from the sea
without reliance on land bases within the operational area, JP
1–02.
8
Joint Publication 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations, 27 Nov
2012 (currently under revision).
9
Building a truly joint rapid aggregation capability means lower-
ing the barriers to force interoperability; specifically, the joint
force benefits from having Army air assault units capable of
operating from Navy ships.
10
Peri-urban refers to the immediate area surrounding a city, in
this context it refers to the areas also known as slums, favelas,
shanty towns.
11
This is largely based on Dr. David Kilcullen’s “Competitive
Control Theory”. For a more detailed explanation, see chapter 4
of David Kilcullen’s Out of the Mountains.
12
Lieutenant General James N. Mattis, USMC, and Lieutenant
Colonel Frank Hoffman, USMCR (Ret.) “Future Warfare: The Rise
of Hybrid Wars,” USNI Proceedings, November 2005, 18-19.
In the future
urban operating
environment, the
joint force will
meet the chal-
lenge of entry with
seabasing.

25. ALSB 2016-125
IGNORING THE INEVITABLE: URBAN CLOSE AIR
SUPPORT PROBLEMS
By SMSgt Eric D. Muller, USAF
During the last fifteen years,
the United States (US) and its coalition
partners discovered, first hand, the dif-
ficulties involved in fighting in urban
areas. By 2050, the United Nations
estimates, 70-percent of the world’s
population will live in or around urban
areas.1
This means, the future fight
probably will be in urban settings.
The success of the Department
of Defense’s ability to wage war in fu-
ture engagements hinges on the US’
ability to operate successfully in an
urban environment. This will require a
renewed focus on urban scenarios and
the associated challenges of conduct-
ing a full range of military operations
in an urban conflict. Because of this
projected population change, the main
focus of the joint terminal attack con-
troller (JTAC) community should shift
to honing its skills in a near-peer fight
in an urban environment. All the while,
the community should maintain an
aggressive emphasis on capturing the
lessons learned from the past 15 years
of urban warfare and hardships expe-
rienced in Afghanistan and Iraq.
BACKGROUND
CAS training prior to Opera-
tions ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)
and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was insuf-
ficient to prepare JTACs for what they
would encounter in urban combat. The
preponderance of JTAC training was
focused on fixed location CAS scenar-
ios using only one set of aircraft; with
little fires integration; and attacking
large, stationary targets that provid-
ed a limited training benefit. With the
JTAC static, the scenario did little to
emphasize the challenges of control-
ling multiple assets while on the move
in an urban environment. The lack of
urban CAS training scenarios forced
Smoke rises from bomb strikes from an F/A–18C Hornet fighter-attack aircraft on an insurgent target during a combat operation in Now Zad,
Helmand Province, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 3 April 2009. Photo by LCpl Brian Jones, USMC
By 2050, the
United Na-
tions estimates,
70-percent of the
world’s popula-
tion will live in
or around urban
areas.

26. ALSB 2016-1 26
many JTACs to learn the fundamentals
of urban CAS through trial-and-error,
during combat. As OEF and OIF wore
on, these skills were refined and honed
to a high degree of execution. Unfor-
tunately, as the Iraq and Afghanistan
veterans gained rank, retired, and
moved on, their experiences remained
undocumented for the next genera-
tion of JTACs. In short, urban combat
veterans are leaving the Service with
their lessons unrecorded. Their valu-
able experiences and hard-earned les-
sons and skillsets, developed to suc-
cessfully operate in the dynamic and
challenging urban environment, are
being forgotten at the tactical level. To
compound matters, no formal or infor-
mal process is available to capture this
critical skillset from senior controllers
before it is no longer accessible.
Most JTAC instructors and
commanders will take the initiative
and ensure urban scenarios are being
utilized, but many of the combat les-
sons from urban scenarios continue
to be lost. The urban fight was learned
through trial and error; yet, our source
for training JTACs has not evolved to
meet the new urban training require-
ments.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Urban CAS is challenging. The
goal is to capture as many of the is-
sues as possible, including previously
developed tactics, techniques, and pro-
cedures (TTP) along with potential so-
lutions to common problems. The fires
community needs to train in various
combat environments (such as jungle;
mountain; or, most importantly, ur-
ban) and with CAS scenarios in a joint
theater. There are multiple TTP that
could resolve many of the issues faced
in urban combat. These will prevent
the military from having to relearn the
urban CAS lessons it has on hand.
Every operations conducting
JTAC should be equipped with a chest
mounted tablet that has digital imag-
ery, and fitted with Precision Strike
Suite for Special Operations Forces
(PSS-SOF) for dismounted operations.
The combination of PSS-SOF and high-
fidelity imagery will allow US JTACs to
access precise imagery, with accurate
coordinates and elevation, to facilitate
better targeting. The ability to access
imagery at a moment’s notice means
the JTAC can react better to changes to
ingress and egress routes, blocking po-
sitions, target locations, and other op-
erational considerations that support a
dynamic fight. Typically, The Army has
lacked these dismounted capabilities
and relied heavily on JTAC equipment.
The PSS-SOF tool gives supporting air-
craft the exact location of an operation
and makes a bomb on coordinate at-
tack possible. This capability allows
for easier correlation and improves
joint firepower with little prior coordi-
nation. The aircraft can, simply, drop
on an extremely accurate military grid
Joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) Air Force MSgt Chris Thomp-
son communicates via a remotely operated video enhanced receiver
(ROVER) 21 September 2015 in Southwest Asia. The ROVER, a
small laptop with an external antenna, allows the JTAC to see from
the eyes of a pilot, ensuring minimal collateral damage. Photo by SSgt
Angelique Perez, USAF
... urban combat
veterans are leav-
ing the Service
with their lessons
unrecorded.

27. ALSB 2016-127
reference system (MGRS) coordinate
rather than search and acquire the tar-
get and friendly forces that extend the
kill chain. Time-sensitive targeting and
the ability to expend ordnance at a mo-
ment’s notice are essential in fixing and
destroying enemies before they move
and create more targets and increase
the chances of collateral damage.
Graphic production was es-
sential in the urban fight. It was used
to take multiple images and number
buildings listed on each image. This
was given to US Army leadership and
supporting aircraft for battle tracking.
It allowed the JTAC and Army forces to
reference buildings and target locations
without using a MGRS grid method.
However, graphic production was very
time consuming. Imagery that would
recognize buildings and numerically
identify them would be a significant im-
provement, contrasted with the current
practice of dragging and dropping hun-
dreds of numbers over buildings listed
on imagery, and sending that informa-
tion to supporting assets and partnered
Soldiers. This method of battle track-
ing by utilizing graphics, as opposed to
grids, is of significant benefit (i.e., easy
to use and efficient). Although, should
aircraft show up unexpectedly, all the
graphics used by ground forces and
JTACS must also have grids listed on
them as references for imagery and for
generating coordinates.
The joint fires community re-
quires an initiative to begin integrat-
ing assets that focus on cross-Service
training between JTACs and Army
rotary wing (RW) assets. The direc-
tive should ensure proper integration
training prior to the next major ur-
ban engagement. The first time most
JTACs worked with Army aviation was
in combat, which is less than ideal.
Army aviation personnel were unfamil-
iar with JTAC terminology and capa-
bilities. This was mostly due to the lack
of controls inherent in the current Air
Force Instruction 13-112, Volume 1
Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC)
Training Program. The instruction ties
the commander’s hands by allowing a
limited number of controls from un-
manned aerial vehicles (UAVs), RW as-
sets, bombers, and simulators. There
is little incentive to work with these
platforms because JTACs are unable to
maintain their required currency us-
ing them. Prior to OEF and OIF, and in
most cases, JTACs never worked with
bombers, Army RW assets, or any oth-
er Service platforms, and there was an
extreme learning curve for them and
aircrews.
TTP
Dynamic CAS scenarios (CAS
conducted while moving in a convoy,
on foot, or in reactive types of mission
sets) should be established in training
prior to combat operations. On-the-
fly operations, with little planning and
high stress, are essential in produc-
ing the type of JTAC the Army needs.
There are very few training operations
that simulate urban CAS challenges
(e.g., improvised explosive device (IED)
threats; airspace issues; electronic
warfare asset threats; and moving con-
voys using vehicle, ground-based jam-
mers with counter IEDs). Several units
with veterans who learned on the fly in
Iraq and Afghanistan have simulated
these types of missions, but there is no
driving force behind this. The ground-
based vehicle jammers were espe-
cially difficult to operate around and
complicated the CAS and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance co-
ordination. A communication fix was
switching to a very high frequency-
frequency modulation (FM) frequency.
This enabled two-way communication
while vehicle jammers were engaged.
However, the consequence was dimin-
ished frequency range. Using an FM
frequency was beneficial (depending
on the asset). But when working with
the assigned ultra-high frequency-
amplitude modulation JTAC tactical
air direction network, the only option
was to pass information to aircraft in
the blind. Then, prior to reaching the
target, disengaging the jammers and
getting target or area updates from
There are very
few training oper-
ations that simu-
late urban CAS
challenges ...

28. ALSB 2016-1 28
the aircraft. The JTAC can transmit
when jammers are engaged and the
aircrew can hear the transmission.
However, the JTAC is unable to hear
the aircraft’s transmission. When on
the target objective, JTAC line-of-sight
communications with supporting air-
craft was paramount. This mostly en-
tailed roof-top operations to maximize
two-way communications and video
downlink (VDL), also known as Rover
feed. Another issue was a lack of line-
of-sight communications with the air-
craft when surrounded by buildings.
Many JTACs resorted to adding a 20-
Watt amplifier to their 5-Watt radio in
an effort to improve communications
between supporting aircraft, which
helped punch through urban barriers.
There are other uncaptured ur-
ban CAS related TTP. Other TTP were
preplanned CAS stacks and game plans
at check in, such as: “If en route to the
target, our convoy is hit. Expect this
sequence of events using these weap-
ons and tactics”. There needs to be a
strengthening of cross talk among the
units’ liaison officers (LNOs), who are
the battlespace owners. LNOs are the
conduits to the security check points,
partner force check points, quick reac-
tion forces, UAVs, and current opera-
tions, etc.
Another urban CAS TTP that
merits further discussion is: during
aircraft check in, JTACs should pass
the ground force commander’s call-
sign and frequency in the event of in-
jury or an inability to communicate.
This is especially important because
there is, typically, only one JTAC per
unit, which is a single point of failure.
It would allow the aircrew to push an
internal frequency to the platoon, com-
pany, or team and partnered Army
forces to communicate directly with
the aircrew in emergency situations.
Using imagery in an urban envi-
ronment is a necessity. The 50-year-old
technology, using 30 maps for a single
area, is outdated and not a practical so-
lution for the new, digital aged technol-
ogy. Maps still have a role in the joint
fight, for strategic-level planning (they
provide a large view of the battlefield).
But at the tactical level, they provide
little data required by ground com-
manders and JTACs. Using a tablet or
external hard drive enables the ground
force commander and JTAC to access
hundreds of maps and high-fidelity
imagery at their fingertips. The solu-
tion seems fairly simple, but current
policies and red tape restrict the use
of standalone systems, which means a
lack of digital imagery or tablet avail-
ability to facilitate peace and wartime
training. A headquarters directed ini-
tiative and overarching waiver should
mandate acquiring an imagery data-
base and personal tablets for stand-
alone systems for JTAC operations. In
short, the fires community needs to
begin training like it fights and provide
JTACs the essential imagery required
for targeting and fires planning to pre-
pare for the next urban engagement.
Another issue with urban CAS
is urban cultural lighting issues from
street lights and buildings. These com-
plicated night operations when using
night vision devices (NVDs) and infra-
red (IR) pointers due to the high amount
of ambient light. Typically, cultural
lights degraded NVDs’ effectiveness for
air and ground crews. Cultural lighting
mitigated the night operations advan-
tages of US forces by allowing enemy
personnel to view US movements and
track areas during night operations.
Using the variable divergence sniper
laser illuminator module (VSLIM) IR
pointer, with higher power outputs
than regular NVDs, would benefit the
aircrew and ground forces. The L-3 VS-
LIM is much more powerful than any-
thing Army personnel use and easily
distinguishes the JTAC location versus
other IR devices.
The use of vehicle-mounted
weapons, tracers, and smoke to point
out targets or friendly locations was
very beneficial in an urban environ-
ment. Combine that with dismounted
PSS-SOF capability, proper graphics of
the target area, and VDL, and the JTAC
There needs to be
a strengthening of
cross talk among
the units’ liaison
officers (LNOs),
who are the bat-
tlespace owners.

29. ALSB 2016-129
was fully capable for urban missions
(in the context of limited rules of en-
gagement). Often, JTACs were directed
to make a limited response to enemy
attacks using shows of force from high-
er headquarters. When shows of force
proved ineffective, the next step was
escalation of force to aircraft gun runs.
Using 20-millimeter guns against an
entrenched, fortified enemy resulted in
little to no progress. Sometimes, the en-
emy would break contact and survive.
The commanders, JTACs, and aircrews
were handcuffed by policy. Due to the
last 15 years, both US and North At-
lantic Treaty Organization JTACs have
become too risk adverse, and current
TTP are counterproductive in urban
combat. The current practice of esca-
lation of force is counterproductive by
maintaining a zero casualty mentality.
In summary, the nature of war-
fare is changing from the open ranges
and spaces envisioned during the Cold
War with a US and former Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics fight of East-
ern Europe to that of an urban centric,
close-in campaign as seen in Syria and
Ukraine. As such, urban CAS consider-
ations and training need to be repriori-
tized by the JTAC community to reflect
this potential, future operating environ-
ment. There should be a more mission
focused mentality and a prioritization
of tasks, beginning with an emphasis
on combat skills training (which should
be our number one priority), without
adding requirements that restrict a
commander’s ability to train. The key
is to acquire necessary equipment and
a training focus to better prepare our
joint forces for urban combat.
Primary methods the commu-
nity can use to better prepare for this
eventuality are to:
1. Swiftly implement more simulator
controls that use urban CAS sce-
narios.
2. Reduce emphasis on live-range re-
quirements.
3. Increase emphasis in an urban-
style conflict using joint fires.
It is essential to implement a va-
riety of scenarios based on the difficul-
ty of the scenario rather than restrict
the type of aircraft that can be used.
Realistically, the type of aircraft work-
ing in a CAS mission is almost irrele-
vant to the JTAC because the targeting
process, CAS procedures, and consid-
erations remain the same regardless
of the type of aircraft used. Addition-
ally, the memorandum of agreement
formalizing the Joint Close Air Support
Executive Steering Committee’s 2005
action plan put zero emphasis on ur-
ban CAS training or requirements for
JTACs and the MOA signatories.2
All JTACs should be fitted with
a chest mounted or a hand-held tablet
that can store imagery, run PSS-SOF
data, and receive VDL feeds and begin
to train like we fight. Due to the nature
of urban CAS, digital communications
will become a vital means by which
JTACs will accomplish their mission.
The focus should be on the qual-
ity of controls versus the type of assets
being used. This allows commanders
the flexibility to dictate effective ur-
ban training versus hunting down CAS
training focused on nonurban range
operations.
SMSgt Muller is the superintendent
of the 274th Air Support Operations
Squadron and previously served as
course manager and superinten-
dent for the Joint Terminal Attack
Controller qualification course. He
has participated in multiple deploy-
ments to Afghanistan and Iraq.
END NOTES
1
Associated Press, UN Predicts Urban Populations will Double
by 2050. Dec 2013 (accessed 22 Dec). http://www.huffington-
post.com/2013/12/10/un-predicts-near-doubling_n_4415290.
html.
2
Memorandum of Agreement between the US Army, Deputy
Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 and the US Air Force, Deputy Chief of
Staff, Air and Space Operations and the United States Special
Operations Command, Director, Operations Support Group for
Joint Fires Observer, November 15,2005, http://sill-www.army.
mil/ftc/documents/JFO%20MOA-Signed%2014%20Nov%2005.
pdf
... JTACs have
become too risk
adverse, and
current TTP are
counterproduc-
tive in urban
combat.

30. ALSB 2016-1 30
FEMALE SERVICE MEMBERS MODEL GENDER
INTEGRATION AMONG PARTNER NATIONS
By MAJ Tiffany Collins, USA
Women’s equality in the work-
force has long been a topic of debate in
the United States (US). Since the 1960s,
societies in western culture have par-
ticipated in the evolution of today’s lib-
erated woman and have seen the female
population chart career paths similar,
or equal, to those of their male counter-
parts.
Narrow the scope of that topic
to focus on the Department of Defense
(DOD) and a woman’s role during com-
bat operations summarizes the Women
in Service Review. The review states,
essentially, women have seen com-
bat throughout the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan; serving, fighting, and in
some cases sacrificing their lives along-
side their brothers in arms. Based on
those facts, former Defense Secretary
Leon Panetta lifted the official ban on
women in combat on January 1, 2013.
For the first time in US military
history women will be able to contrib-
ute to the DOD mission without limi-
tations. Even though each of the mili-
tary Services continue to develop the
individual processes necessary for the
materialization of this monumental de-
cision, Secretary of Defense Ash Cart-
er announced in December 2015 that
all military occupations and positions
would be accessible to women, without
exception. This began January 2016. To
this, GEN Joseph Votel, Commander,
United States Special Operations Com-
mand (USSOCOM) immediately went
on the record to support an all gender-
integrated force. “As USSOCOM moves
forward with integration, the command
will absolutely not lower, raise, or cre-
ate multiple sets of standards for spe-
cial operations. If candidates meet
time-tested and scientifically validated
standards and, if they have proven that
they have the physical, intellectual,
professional, and character attributes
that are so critical to special operations,
they will be welcomed into the special
operations forces,” Votel stated. 1
US Marine Corps Cpl Leslie Souza, right, assigned to the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, reviews a target during live-fire training with an
unidentified member of the Kuwait Ministry of the Interior Personal Protection Unit, Female Division during a training event from 31 January to
11 February 2016 in Kuwait City, Kuwait. Photo by Capt Lindsay Pirek, USMC
Secretary of De-
fense Ash Carter
announced in
December 2015
that all military
occupations and
positions would
be accessible to
women, without
exception.

31. ALSB 2016-131
This is not much of a surprise
to anyone following special operations
forces’ (SOF’s) history of integrating
women. For over 25 years, SOF have
incorporated women within their air-
crews and through capabilities such
as civil affairs and military information
support operations. Since 2011, cultur-
al support teams (CST) distinguished
themselves as a reputable force under
the SOF umbrella by building rapport
and trust among the civilian populace,
mostly through their interaction with
women and children. In the process,
they improved counterinsurgency ob-
jectives.
CST evolved during the Global
War on Terrorism when SOF leaders
realized their inability to engage the fe-
male population in Iraq and Afghani-
stan was a hindrance to their opera-
tions. They recognized that dismissing
the female population would allow the
enemy to exploit a major security gap.
This new-found capability (i.e., employ-
ing female Service members) allowed
SOF to access over 60 percent of the
population with whom they originally
did not have the ability to connect due
to cultural sensitivities.
While the US has had overt dis-
cussions about women’s roles and how
to better harness the skills of female
Service members, partner-nation allies
are having similar discussions among
themselves. Published in December
2011, the US National Action Plan on
Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) un-
der the United Nations Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1325, was established
“to empower half the world’s popula-
tion as equal partners in preventing
conflict and building peace in coun-
tries threatened and affected by war,
violence, and insecurity.” 2
In 2014, US SOF counterparts
opened a dialogue with Special Opera-
tions Command Central (SOCCENT),
the Theater Special Operations Com-
mand charged with conducting SOF
Two unidentified US Marines, left, with the Female Partner Force Engagement Team, demonstrate martial arts techniques during a subject
matter expert exchange with the Qatari Internal Security Forces Female Personal Protection Unit in Qatar on 18 August 2015. Photo by Cpl
Anna Albrecht, USMC
For over 25
years, SOF have
incorporated
women within
their aircrews
and through ca-
pabilities such as
civil affairs and
military infor-
mation support
operations.

32. ALSB 2016-1 32
operations in the US Central Com-
mand area of responsibility. The initial
request for an all-female engagement
came from the host nation of Qatar.
Qatar leaders wanted a subject matter
expert exchange on tactical matters,
such as weapons handling, hand-to-
hand combat, protective security detail
procedures, and integration with male
counterparts. As a result of that re-
quest, US Army Staff Sergeant Melinda
Relethford, 20th Special Forces Group
(Airborne) began developing a program
of instruction (POI) and building a team
of highly qualified female Service mem-
bers to support the requirement. Simi-
lar to recognizing the need for female
assets in Iraq and Afghanistan, Rele-
thford said “the development of CSTs,
female engagement teams (FETs), and
the like, have been a result of the real-
ization for their necessity.” In her ex-
perience, “these programs are usually
temporary and dissolve once the per-
ceived need dissipates.”3
Once SOCCENT fulfilled this
initial requirement, the requests kept
coming and the need launched an in-
novative concept, the female partner
force engagement team. Cultural sup-
port teams bridged cultural and gender
specific gaps during the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan. This ideology is being
used to continue forging SOF relations
with partner nation forces in the Middle
East. Relethford said, “if … elite part-
ner nation forces have a contingent of
females that request equal quality SOF
exchanges in the same manner as the
men, then we should provide the same
level of exchange, and the same caliber
of Soldier, Sailor, Airmen, or Marine to
participate in that exchange.” In her
opinion, “we do not currently have that
capacity, or dedicated capability within
the SOF community.”4
Even with the forecasted change
for an all-gender inclusion among US
SOF, the fact remains that a substan-
Unidentified US Service members, center, with the Female Partner Force Engagement Team demonstrate how to apply field expedient tourni-
quets during a subject matter expert exchange with the Qatari Internal Security Forces Female Personal Protection Unit in Qatar on 16 August
2015. Photo by MAJ Tiffany Collins, USA
Cultural support
teams bridged
cultural and gen-
der specific gaps
during the wars in
Iraq and Afghani-
stan.