2015-lachs-panel_6-1-jasani.ppt

Bhupendra Jasani
Department of War
Studies
King’s College London
Commercial Systems for
Military
1
Commercial systems for military
Montreal 16-17March2015: Jasani

2
 In 1978 unexpectedly the US ocean
surveillance satellite, Seasat, carrying a SAR
radar detected on the sea surface the wake of
a submerged submarine illustrating yet
another way to detect submarines;
 First Gulf War in 1990-1991 illustrated the use
of commercial satellites in an armed conflict;
 These were the beginnings of the use of
commercial satellites by the military.
Introduction

3
Where are various space assets?

Some major space faring states with
defence and commercial programmes
4
Country Early-warning
satellites
Communications
satellites
Navigation
satellites
Meteorological
satellites
Observation satellites Indigenous
launch vehicle
D C D C D C D C D C
China          
DPRK  
Europe         
France         
India      
Iran  
Israel  
Japan     
Russia          
USA          

5
Since the beginning
of the space age in
October 1957 with
the launch of the
Russian Sputnik 1
satellite,
considerable
advances have been
made in the
capabilities of earth
orbiting spacecraft
for both military and
commercial uses,
the latter
approaching that of
military
Some comparison between
commercial and military space assets
Observation satellites-spatial resolution

6
Spectral resolution
Range of electromagnetic spectrum over which
observation satellites operate

7
Summary of spectral resolution & band
widths

8
8
Target in visible and multi-
spectral images
1996 image of the
UK Dungeness
nuclear power plant
imaged by a
Russian Cosmos
satellite carrying a
KVR-1000 sensor
with 2m resolution
Landsat-5 image
acquired on 3
November 1997 over
Dungeness Nuclear
power station; bands 6
(thermal) as red, 5 as
green and 4 as blue; the
warm water discharged
into the sea can be
detected while clearly
the reactor buildings
are well insulated.
Source EOSAT

9
Target imaged by a radar
sensor
Dungeness Nuclear Power Plant acquired by ERS-2 radar satellite.

10
Target imaged by high resolution
optical and radar sensors
Helicopter
base in
Berlin
imaged by
Russian
satellite
carrying a
KVR
sensor
with a
resolution
of 2m
Helicopter base in Berlin imaged by ERS-2
radar sensor with 25m resolution

11
A US sports centre imaged by the US
QuickBird satellite at 0.61m resolution
Lastly, temporal resolution
meaning how frequently a
satellite comes back to a
particular point on the earth’s
surface

12
 It can be seen that the quality of the commercial remote sensing satellites is
converging to that of the military systems;
 This trend continued to other application satellites such as the communications,
navigation and meteorological satellites also,
 Because of the availability of information commercially from space assets to all, it
is not surprising that the international community also desires access to and the use
of such satellites;
 The two big powers verify their bi-lateral treaties by the National Technical Means
(NTM) of verification largely made up of space-based assets access to which is very
limited;
 Because the inspected State is generally reluctant to make it too transparent,
verification by satellites under a Multi-lateral Technical Means (MTM) was
conceptualised;
 This was possible because of the availability of commercial high resolution images
and the Principle V of Remote Sensing Principles encourages such activities;
 According to this, “States carrying out remote sensing activities shall promote
international cooperation in these activities. To this end, they shall make available to
other States opportunities for participation therein.”
 Time has come to examine how to proceed from here.
Where to now?

13
13
Some of the existing relevant
legal regimes
There are:
3 Treaties - 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 1972 Liability Convention
and 1976 Registration Convention;
4 Principles - 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles, 1986 Remote
Sensing Principle, 1992 Principles on the use of Nuclear Power
Sources in Outer Space,1996 Declaration on International
Cooperation;
2 Resolutions – adopted by the UNGA on International
Cooperation, 1961 Resolution 1721A and B (XVI) and 2000
Resolution 55/122 concerning the GSO;
Some relevant documents – 2007 Guidelines on Debris
Mitigation and 2009 Safety for nuclear power source.

14
 Arms control, disarmament and confidence-building measures
are some of the important elements of security;
 Unlike the early bi-lateral treaties between the USA and the
former USSR that depended on earth-orbiting satellites for their
verification under the National Technical Means (NTM) of
verification provision, most multi-lateral treaties do not have such
a mechanism;
 In such cases, often on-site inspection measures are provided;
 However, these usually are very limited because the inspected
State is generally reluctant to make itself too transparent;
 Hence the verification by satellites under a Multi-lateral
Technical Means (MTM) was conceptualised since, with the
availability of high resolution images commercially, this was
possible and Principle V of Remote Sensing Principles allows
such activities.
Outer space “in the interest of maintaining
international peace and security”

15
Outer space Treaty
Entered into force 10 October 1967
 The Outer Space Treaty stipulates that activities in outer space “…shall be carried
out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries..” (Art. I)
 Furthermore, it is stated that “States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on
activities…in the interest of maintaining international peace and security…”(Art. III);
 Many applications of such satellites as remote sensing and navigation would
suggest the opposite;
 Pin pointing a target by remote sensing satellite and delivery of a missile with very
high accuracy by navigation satellites to it would be regarded as very threatening
use;
 Moreover, “The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties
to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes.” (Art. IV), while such a provision
does not appear as far as artificial earth satellites are concerned;
 The Treaty does not have any verification provisions although orbiting weapons of
mass destruction are prohibited;
 A more important issue may be the development of commercial sub-orbital flights
that may have direct ascent ASAT implications;
 Again State’s commitments in Articles I, III, V, VI. VII, VIII and IX are repeated in
Paragraphs 1, 4, 9, 5, 8, 7 and 6 respectively in 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles
emphasising the importance of the OST.

16
International Liability Convention
In Force since September 1972
 A State bears international responsibility for all space objects launched from its
territory so that it is fully liable for damages that result from that space object;
 If two states work together to launch a space object, then both those states are
jointly liable for the damage that object may cause;
 The term “space object” includes “component parts of a space object as well as its
launch vehicle and parts thereof” (Article I), then can debris from space objects be
regarded as “parts of a space object”?
 If so, then there have been either close encounters or actual collisions with space
debris causing potential damage to space objects of other parties as shown in the
following two tables;
 However, how is one to determine the ownership of a debris that may be too small
to be tracked and identified that may cause damage to another state’s property?
 More recent examples are potential damage that may be caused by debris from the
Chinese 2007 ASAT test or by those caused from the destruction of a US satellite
soon after the Chinese ASAT test;
 This is particularly so when tracking of objects is carried out unilaterally by only a
few.

17
Summary of some collisions and
close encounters
Hit by debris Close encounter
Hit by or close encounter with
other objects

18
Summary of some collisions and
close encounters
Close encounter
Hit by debris Hit by or close encounter with
other objects

19
Registration Convention
Entered into force 1976
 The convention requires states to furnish to the United Nations with
details about the objects and their orbits; and these obligations are
mandatory;
 For example, name of launching State, an appropriate designator of the
space object or its registration number, date and territory or location of
launch, basic orbital parameters (nodal period, inclination, apogee and
perigee) and general function of the space object;
 By and large, provision IV.1.(e) has not been fulfilled, since large number
of satellites launched serve military purposes and hardly any of them have
been described to the UN Secretary-General as having military uses;
 Timely information is particularly important when a satellite is carrying a
nuclear power source/reactor as often the satellite is registered much later
after its launch (see 1992 Principles relevant to Nuclear Power Sources in
space);
 As a first step it is essential to strengthen the compliance with the
Convention.

Space debris
 It can be seen from the tables that the first ever accidental in-
orbit collision between two satellites occurred on 10 February 2009
at 776km altitude;
 A US privately own communication satellite, Iridium 33, and a
Russian Strela-2M military communications satellite, Cosmos 2251
collided;
 While in this case the objects are known and therefore resulting
debris could be identify but in a case when debris has spread over
a period of time the owner of a particular piece may be known to
only a few unless the objects are monitored and catalogued
multilaterally;
 Over the half century of space activities, some 6,000 satellites
have been placed in orbit of which about 800 are still operating;
 More than 12,000 object are tracked by the US Space
Surveillance Network, 5-10cm in LEO and 0.3m-1m in GEO;
20

21
 Could the use of remotely sensed data from space to fix prices of agricultural product
against developing states be termed “..for the benefit and in the interest of all countries.”?
(Principle II)
 MTM concept was proposed earlier on the basis of “States carrying out remote sensing
activities shall promote international cooperation in these activities.” (Principle V) but this
has not happened yet;
 An International Data Centre (IDC) is proposed here in the hope that Principle VI would be
fulfilled according to which “In order to maximize the availability of benefits from remote
sensing activities, States are encouraged…to provide establishment and operation of data
collecting and storage stations and processing and interpretation facilities.”
 “The sensed State shall also have access to the available analysed information concerning
the territory under its jurisdiction in the possession of any State participating in remote
sensing activities…” (Principle XII) even though the Sensed State generally is unaware of
being sensed;
 “States operating remote sensing satellites shall bear international responsibility
…irrespective of whether such activities are carried out by governmental or non-
governmental entities…” (Principle XIV) and yet, it was reported, that a terrorist organization
used the maps and satellite images available on the Google Earth over and in the region of
Mumbai, India to coordinate and carry out its terrorist activity with devastating effect;
 This can only happen as much of the outer space legal regime is weak.
1986 Remote Sensing Principles
Some comments

Usefulness of Codes of Conduct for
Outer Space Activities
It is now generally recognised that space capabilities, including
relevant ground facilities, are vital to national and international
security and to maintaining global peace;
A vital element for this is adequate notification of outer space
activities such as pre-notification of launches, possible potential
break-ups in orbits or premature re-entry of space objects causing
potential harm to the earth’s atmosphere and on the ground;
Thus, States should have serious commitment to the outer space
law such as adherence to the Registration Conventions rather than
develop new codes of conduct in outer space activities;
 Above all the codes of conduct do not have verification provisions
and they are not legally binding;
 It is essential to know how outer space is being used if the relevant
treaties and Code of Conducts are to be effective;
 This would require monitoring activities in outer space by
international community under an MTM.
22

What can be done?
Improve space traffic control:
A working group convened by the four leading non-governmental organizations
dealing with space issues, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
the U.N. Office on Outer Space Affairs, the Confederation of European Aerospace
Societies and International Academy of Astronautics, have suggested more
extensive efforts to improve space traffic control procedures;
 Here it is suggested that as a first step, an International Data Centre (IDC) could
be established , for example, in Vienna, where data provided by participating
countries on space objects in orbits would be collated and compiled; the data could
be, for example, the telemetry emitted by satellites, their shapes, sizes, and orbits,
the launching country, and the designation of satellites;
 Such an action would be in line with the Principle VI of the Remote Sensing
Principles;
 The second step would be that the IDC could establish some equipment
necessary to track objects in space to verify the Registration Convention and also
data that might be available from various states on orbital debris;
 The latter would be to check measures that may be used on orbital debris
mitigation.
23

Orbital debris mitigation
Orbital debris mitigation:
 The Inter-Agency Debris Coordinating Committee (IADC)
consisting of space agencies from China, France, Germany,
India, Italy, Japan, Russia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and
the United States, and the European Space Agency, has
drawn up a set of guidelines;
 However, these are not legally binding;
 It might be suggested here that the COPUOS adopts a
possible verifiable “Convention on Limiting and Eliminating
Debris in Orbits (CLEDO)”;
 The verification of such a convention could be carried out
by the above proposed IDC.
24

25
Some simple methods for verification of
compliance with existing and new outer
space related measures
 Largely it is possible to learn about the missions of various satellites by examining
their orbital characteristics and by scanning numerous technical and military
journals;
While monitoring communications flow would add considerably to the knowledge
on the nature of the spacecraft, it may be easier to monitor the telemetry sent from
the satellite to its command and control centres;
 The principal sources of unclassified information about this are groups of amateur
organizations (e.g. UK Kettering School);
 Moreover, some information on radio frequencies used by satellites is available
from the International Telecommunications Union;
 Thus, for example, IDC should start by collecting such information and equip itself
with simple antenna, signal receivers that could be tuned from 550 kHz to 31 MHz
and that would have digital frequency readout and a tunable very high frequency
receiver with, for example, 55-260 MHz frequency range and an FM demodulator;
 A spectrum display unit, a time code generator and a reader, a tape recorder, a
strip chart recorder, a frequency discriminator, a desk computer and a tracking
system.

26
Some simple methods for verification of
compliance with existing and new outer
space related measures
continued
 A number of tracking facilities would be necessary so as to be able to
generate orbital elements for objects being monitored independent of NASA.
 Baker-Nunn cameras could be used that have apertures of about 50 cm
which follow a satellite as it crosses the sky with position accuracy of about
0.001°.
 Assuming a camera had a 50 cm aperture and recording light wavelength of
5.5 x 10~7 m, an object of about 30cm could be resolved from a distance of 300
km, a telescope with an aperture of 10 cm could resolve an object of about 1.5
m;
 The cost of setting up an independent monitoring organization is modest,
some tens of thousands of dollars which would include the cost of setting up
the equipment and testing the whole system.;
 Each station could be manned by not more than a dozen people;
 The abovementioned is only a guide to the type needed and is only the
minimum;
 The question now is what kind of independent organization need to be
considered.

27
A new method that could monitor existing and
new outer space related measures
 Continuous monitoring could best be carried out from
GSO;
 Can satellite and missile launches be monitored by
weather satellites from the GSO?
 Data produced from US and Russian defense satellites
in the GSO is classified;
 While several sensors deployed onboard such satellites
are not available for civil spacecraft, electro-optical
sensors sensitive in the IR region of the electromagnetic
spectrum are orbited on commercial weather satellites;
 It is proposed that current polar orbiting weather
satellites and those in the GSO should be able to detect the
plum from the launchers or missiles.

28
A new method that could monitor existing
and new outer space related measures
continued
Spectrum of radiation from the plume of US Titan IIIB missileand a tactical ballistic
missile with liquid propellant in boost phase (in red) calculated using NATO InfraRed Air
TArget Model (NIRATAM) is shown here when the missile has reached an altitude of
10 km.
Source for the red curve: Kurt Beier and Erwin Lindermeir, 2007.
.

29
A new method that could monitor existing
and new outer space related measures
continued
Comparison of spectra from solid and
liquid propellants when the rocket has
reached 20km altitude.
Source: Forden, 2006.
Thus, if this method is
proved workable, then this
would give a means of
verifying not only the
Registration Convention
but also such codes of
conduct as the Hague
Code of Conduct (HCOC)
and other measures also;
The next issue is that of
an institutional frame work

30
An independent monitoring
organisation
 Examples of these are: (1) SALT type of Standing Consultative Commission
(SSC); (2) International Cospas-Sarsat Programme; and (3) European Union Satellite
Centre;
 (1) The sensitivity of data dissemination could be reduced particularly if an SCC
were to be established;
• This could well be done, for example, in a regional or a multi-lateral frame work;
• The main objective of a multi-lateral SCC would be not only to promote the
implementation of the provisions of any multi-lateral arms control agreements that
may have been reached, but also to implement outer space related measures
 (2) Under the Cospass-Sarsat programme, several satellites pick up distress
signals that are transmitted at frequencies 121.5 and 406 MHz that saved some 2,700
lives between January 1994 and December 2013;
 (3) In 1993 the WEU Satellite Centre was established in Torrejon near Madrid,
Spain; its mission was to develop satellite image processing methods, train image
analysts in satellite image interpretation and monitor the environment;
 Thus, the models for an independent multi-lateral or an international verification
agency exists.

Some conclusions
It is now generally recognised that space
capabilities, including relevant ground facilities, are
vital to national and international security and to
maintaining global peace;
A vital element for this is adequate notification of
outer space activities such as pre-notification of
launches, possible potential break-ups in orbits or
premature re-entry of space objects causing potential
harm to the earth’s atmosphere and on the ground;
A serious commitment to the outer space law such
as adherence to the Registration Conventions and
Remote Sensing Principles is essential.
31

Some conclusions
continued
 It is proposed that a Multi-lateral Technical Means (MTM) of verification should now be
recognised in current outer space related measures;
It has also been proposed that an International Data Centre (IDC) is established in
support of the MTM-with the level of technical capabilities of most space faring nations,
an MTM is now possible;
MTM and IDC should be recognised in any future measures such as the Global Space
Governance;
 There are some already existing multi-lateral organisations existing (for example, the
EU Satellite Centre) that could be used as a guide to the establishment of an MTM and
an IDC;
It is worth examining the types of sensors on board civil meteorological satellites and
see whether they can be used for early warning and detection of launches of spacecraft
and missile applications;
An important element in all of this is adequate notification of outer space activities
such as pre-notification of launches, possible potential break-ups in orbits or premature
re-entry of space objects causing potential harm to the earth’s atmosphere and on the
ground;
A serious commitment to the outer space law such as adherence to the Registration
Conventions and Remote Sensing Principles is essential.
32

2015-lachs-panel_6-1-jasani.ppt

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to 2015-lachs-panel_6-1-jasani.ppt

Similar to 2015-lachs-panel_6-1-jasani.ppt (20)

More from RockFellerSinghRusse

More from RockFellerSinghRusse (12)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

2015-lachs-panel_6-1-jasani.ppt

Editor's Notes