This is a presentation delivered by Mr Aaron Stein, at the RUSI Missile Defence Conference 2014

1. Brandishing the American Sword in the Gulf (based on an article originally
published in The National Interest on 30 March 2014:
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/brandishing‐the‐american‐sword‐
the‐gulf‐10152?page=1)
The Islamic Republic of Iran first began to explore uranium enrichment in 1985. The
program limped along for close to 15 years, before Iranian scientists successfully
introduced uranium hexafluoride into P‐1 centrifuges sometime in 1999. Iran began
enrichment at Natanz in 2007. And now, Iran has some 20,000 P‐1’s under vacuum,
with close to 10,000 actually enriching uranium to 3.5%.
As part of the recently concluded Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), the P5+1 and the
Islamic Republic agreed that “a comprehensive solution would involve a mutually
defined enrichment program with practical limits and transparency measures to
ensure the peaceful nature of the program.” The two sides are now haggling over the
number of centrifuges, as part of a concerted American effort to decrease Iran’s
capacity to enrich uranium, so as to lengthen the time in which Iran could re‐enrich
its current stockpile of low enriched uranium to weapons grade in a so‐called”
breakout” scenario. (Iran would then have to fashion that weapons grade uranium
into a usable weapon.)
The Gulf States – like Israel – have expressed deep reservations about Iran retaining
its enrichment program, but appear to have acquiesced to a formula whereby the
time in which Iran can “break out” is more than a year. The GCC appears to have
accepted that the International Atomic Energy Agency can detect the diversion of
any Iranian fissile material within that time period, and that the United States would
then use military force to destroy the program.
Thus, regardless of whether the current negotiations are successful or not, Iran will
continue to retain elements of its current enrichment infrastructure. The issue for
American policymakers, therefore, isn’t whether Iran will be able to enrich, but
rather how U.S. policy will be affected once Iran’s enrichment program is
legitimized.
American policymakers fear that Iran’s nuclear program will prompt other states in
the region to pursue dual‐use technology that could be used to develop nuclear
weapon. Those fears are misplaced. Turkey and Jordan have both opted for unique
financing models for their nuclear power stations, which all but rules out the
possibility of clandestine nuclear weapons development. The United Arab Emirates
has foresworn enrichment and reprocessing. Egypt has hinted that it may re‐launch
its nuclear program, but there is absolutely no evidence that it has taken steps to
rectify the issues that have prevented its procurement of reactors in the past. Saudi
Arabia has indicated that it might acquire a nuclear weapon, but its nuclear power
plans remain on the drawing board, and there are serious questions about whether
or not the Kingdom has the capacity to indigenously design, develop, and then
deploy nuclear weapons.

2. Barring any radical shift from the current status quo, the United States will continue
to have to provide its regional allies with nuclear assurances. Yet, the dynamics in
the region present a unique challenge to security planners that may be tempted to
replicate American practice in South Korea. In the Korean context, the Obama
Administration has paired the continued deployment of ground troops, with a
“playbook” of scripted military responses designed to demonstrate American
resolve to use whatever means necessary to defend Seoul. The plan hinges on
publicizing U.S. military deployments to the region, including the round the world
flying of B‐2 bombers outfitted with dummy bombs that were dropped on a South
Korean test range.
While the United States does station air and naval assets in the Middle East – most
notably in Bahrain – it is forced to keep the presence of its military assets under
wraps, or otherwise risk inflaming anti‐American sentiment. In the Middle East, the
United States does not, and will not have the luxury of resorting to high‐profile
military exercises and simulated nuclear strike missions to reassure the Arab states.
A different approach is needed.
In the past, the United States has sought to reassure its allies with massive arms
sales, designed to ensure that the Arab states retain a technological military
advantage vis‐à‐vis the more numerous Iranian military. The United States has also
emphasized that the GCC purchase missile defense systems, which are designed to
be interoperable with U.S. missile defense systems based in the region. The missile
defense architecture is intended to defend against Iranian ballistic missiles, while
also reassuring the Gulf Allies of the viability of the U.S. commitment to come to
their defense. This strategy has some notable drawbacks.
The pairing of precision strike cruise missiles with capable missile defenses
incentivizes Iran to build more ballistic missiles, so as to negate the GCC states’
technological military edge. This, in turn, creates the need for missile defenses and
greater precision strike. Thus, the two sides could find themselves locked in a
conventional arms race that only helps further destabilize the region. Absent a
credible nuclear guarantee, the United States may be faced with an escalating
conventional arms build‐up, fueled by concerns that Iran’s small enrichment
program could still be used as the basis for a nuclear weapons program.
The situation necessitates the crafting of a policy using a mixture of conventional
weapons and the nuclear forces in the triad ‐ intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs), submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers – to
simultaneously reassure GCC allies and deter Iran. In the past, the United States
opted to reassure wary allies of its commitment to use nuclear weapons with port
visits made by SSBNS. The political situation in the Middle East, however, would
appear to preclude such an option. The United States would have to dedicate
significant forces to protect its SSBNs, or otherwise risk terrorists trying to target
the sub in a similar manner to that of the USS Cole.

3. Moreover, for many leaders in the Gulf, SSBN visits could be deemed too risky, lest
such overt display of American military hardware spark massive anti‐American
demonstrations, or empower groups that abide by a religious ideology similar to
that of Al Qaeda.
Absent these options, the two sides could opt to increase consultations about
nuclear war planning, in much the same way the United States and Japan cooperated
on the drafting of the 2010 Strategic Posture Review. The United States could also
teach courses in deterrence at the recently established Gulf Academy for Strategic
and Security Studies in the UAE.
More broadly, the crux of the U.S.‐GCC relationship will continue to hinge on the
President’s ability to convince his/her GCC counterpart of the viability of the
American security guarantee. The United States faced a similar quandary during the
Cold War. European allies openly worried about Washington’s commitment to use
nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, lest such action led to a Russian strike on
the U.S. homeland. To assuage these fears, the U.S, beginning in the 1950s, opted to
deploy nuclear weapons in NATO countries and eventually resulted in the inclusion
of the Allies in NATO nuclear war planning.
The United States will not deploy nuclear weapons in the Middle East. The
assurance, therefore, will have to be based on conventional weapons, backed by an
ironclad presidential guarantee of the United States’ willingness to use whatever
means necessary to protect its Gulf allies. This will require the U.S. President to
continue to prioritize its relationship with the GCC’s leadership. The United States,
therefore, has a perverse incentive to retain the regional status quo, even though the
current situation fails to adhere to the promotion of democracy worldwide.
And, more broadly, it casts doubt on the notion that the United States will abandon
the Middle East, as it seeks to dedicate more resources to Asia. Regardless of the
outcome of the current talks with Iran, the U.S. will retain a strong incentive to
engage with its Arab allies on deterrence and nuclear related issues. The time for
debate about a future Iranian enrichment program has now passed. The United
States must now begin to craft a strategy to reassure very skeptical allies. It wont be
easy.