1Week 2 Textbook ProblemsWeek 2 Textbook Problems 2S.docx

1
Week 2 Textbook Problems
Week 2 Textbook Problems
2Scroll Down to Check Second Set of Answers
Week II Textbook Problems
FIN/366 – Financial Institutions
Week II Textbook Problems
Ch. 4 Questions and Applications
#1. The Fed Briefly describe the origin of the Federal Reserve
System. Describe the functions of the Fed district banks
The United States experienced several banking panics in the
1800s and early 1900s and a major crisis in 1907. Congress
established a central bank and in 1913, and the Federal Reserve
Act was implemented, which established requirements for the
commercial banks that chose to become members. The
functions of the Fed district banks is to facilitate operations
within the banking system by, replacing old currency, clearing
checks, and to provide loans to depository institutions that need
of funds.
#3. Open Market Operations Explain how the Fed increases the
money supply through open market operations.
According to the text, The Fed’s purchase of government
securities has a different impact than a purchase by another
investor would have because the Fed’s purchase results in
additional bank funds and increases the ability of banks to make
loans and create new deposits. An increase in funds can allow
for a net increase in deposit balances and therefore an increase
in the money supply.

#4. Policy Directive What is the policy directive, and who
carries it out?
If the FOMC determines a change it is reported through a
statement; policy statement; to the Trading Desk that is carried
out by the Feds.
#6.Reserve Requirements How is money supply growth affected
by an increase in the reserve requirement ratio?
According to the text “when the reserve requirement ratio is
reduced, the bank's deposits that can be lent out by depository
institutions increases. When the loaned funds are spent, some
of them will return to the depository institutions in the form of
new deposits. The lower the reserve requirement ratio, the
greater the lending capacity of depository institutions. A
change in bank required reserves can cause a larger change in
the money supply.
#14.The Fed's Impact on Unemployment Explain how the Fed's
monetary policy affects the unemployment level.
Fed's monetary policy Each central bank has its own local
interest rate that it might influence with monetary policy in
order to control its local economy he Fed's monetary policy
affects the unemployment level has a major influence so price
stability (low inflation) and economic growth (low
unemployment).
#15.The Fed's Impact on Home Purchases Explain how the Fed
influences the monthly mortgage payments on homes. How
might the Fed indirectly influence the total demand for homes
by consumers?
The Fed's influence the monthly mortgage payments on homes
because monetary policy affects interest rates. Their strong
influence on the cost of borrowing can affect the amount of
monthly payments on mortgages. Fed indirectly influence the
total demand for homes by consumers because it determines

what households can afford and therefore how much consumers
spend.
#16.The Fed's Impact on Security Prices Explain how the Fed's
monetary policy may indirectly affect the price of equity
securities.
The Fed's monetary policy may indirectly affect the price of
equity securities. The policy affects the prices of equity
securities by affecting economic conditions, which influence the
future cash flows generated by publicly traded businesses.
Ch. 5 Questions and Applications
#3. Passive Monetary Policy Describe a passive monetary
policy.
According to the text passive monetary policy allows the
economy to correct itself rather than rely on the Fed's
intervention. The policy is an attempt to not allow the Feds to
adjust money supply in order to improve economic conditions.
#11 Impact of Money Supply Growth Explain why an increase
in the money supply can affect interest rates in different ways.
Include the potential impact of the money supply on the supply
of and the demand for loanable funds when answering this
question.
If the money demand is smaller it tends to raise market interest
rate. An increase will increase the supply for loanable funds
and it can cause a decrease pressure on interest rates. But it can
also cause an increase expectation for loanable funds and
increase on interest rates.
#14. Interpreting the Fed's Monetary Policy When the Fed
increases the money supply to lower the federal funds rate, will
the cost of capital to U.S. companies be reduced? Explain how
the segmented markets theory regarding the term structure of
interest rates (as explained in Chapter 3) could influence the
degree to which the Fed's monetary policy affects long-term
interest rates.
A change in the federal funds rate could cause a change in

short-term interest rates; but not in long-term interest rates
because the direct impact is only on short-term rates. To the
extent that maturity markets are segmented, the effect will be
isolated on short-term rates.
References
Madura, J. (2015). Financial Markets and Institutions. (11 ed.).
Cengage
Set 2
Week 2 Textbook ProblemsWeek 2 Textbook Problems
Ch. 4
#1. The Fed
There were two attempts to establish a central bank in the
1800’s that failed and in the late 1800’s and early 1900’s many
banks went into panic, which led to another attempt to establish
in 1913. The Federal Reserve Act was passed and had 12
districts across the Unites States. The Fed district facilitate
operations within the banking system by clearing checks old
currency, and providing loans to depository institutions in need
of funds.
#3. Open Market Operations
The Fed can sell holdings of its Treasury securities to various
depository institutions, which can cause a reduction in the
account balance of these institutions.
#4. Policy Directive
A policy directive is a statement issued by the FOMC to the
trading desk of New York Fed that directs monetary policy. A
policy directive is established by the Fed and submitted to the
trading desk. The manager of the trading desk must ensure that
the directive is accomplished.
#6. Reserve Requirements
An increase in the reserve requirement ratio reduces the
proportion of deposited funds, which a financial institution can
lend to businesses or individuals, and it can reduce the rate for
money that can be multiplied.

#14. The Fed’s Impact o Unemployment
The Fed’s monetary policy affects interest rates; cost of
borrowing by households and businesses, and it affects their
level of spending for products and services. The demand for
products and services affects the number of people employed by
businesses, which affects the unemployment level.
#15. The Fed’s Impact on Home Purchases
The Fed influences interest rates that affect the rate paid by
homeowners on mortgages. If the Fed’s reduces interest rates it
reduces the monthly payment on new mortgages, which can
increase the demand for homes by consumers. Increased interest
rates can reduce the demand for homes.
#16. The Fed’s Impact on Security Prices
The Fed’s monetary policy influences the demand for services
and products, which affects the cash flow, generated by publicly
traded businesses, and the value of stock in a business is
influenced by the expectations of its future cash flow.
Ch. 5
#3. Choice on Monetary Policy
A stimulative monetary policy can be used to stimulate the
economy if inflation is not a concern. Restrictive monetary can
be used to slow down economic growth so they can reduce
inflation fears. A stimulative-monetary policy can result in
higher inflation. A restrictive monetary policy is a potential
slowdown in the economy, which can result in higher interest
rate and reduced spending.
#11. Impact of Money Supply Growth
An increase in money supply increases the supply for loanable
funds, which can place downward pressure on interest rates. It
can also cause inflation expectations, which can have an
increased demand for loanable funds, which will have an
upward pressure on interest rates,
#14. Interpreting the Fed’s Monetary Policy
Changes in federal funds rate will cause a change in short-term

interest rates. It will not result in a change in long-term interest
rates because the direct impact is only on short-term rates.
Maturity markets are segmented the effect will be isolated on
short-term rates.
Ch. 18
Effect on Bank Strategies on Bank Ratings premium.
A. All of the regulatory criteria will be affected because when
they issue more stock, it will help the company grow, and by
retaining more earnings, it will be able to expand its operations,
and by reducing loans they have the ability to use the money for
other projects.
B. Yes because when they save money then more money is
available to be distributed to the shareholders at the end of the
year.
C. Yes because the bank managers will have more funds to use
so that they expand the business and work on new projects.
References
Madura, J. (2015). Financial Markets and Institutions. (11 ed.).
Cengage
View eBook
History and Historiography of Philosophy
Jorge J. E. Gracia
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Donald M. Borchert. Vol. 4.
2nd ed. Detroit, MI: Macmillan
Reference USA, 2006. p396-402.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2006 Gale, COPYRIGHT 2007 Gale,
Cengage Learning

Full Text:
Page 396
HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY OF PHILOSOPHY
The term history of philosophy is often used in two different
senses. In one, it refers to past events
(res gestae) and, in another, to accounts of those events
(historiae rerum gestarum). "The history of
ancient Greek philosophy" can be taken to indicate views
entertained by Greek philosophers, but
also the accounts that later historians give ofPage 397 | Top of
Article those views. The positions
Aristotle takes in his Metaphysics are part of the first but not of
the second, whereas those adopted
by Joseph Owens in The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian
Metaphysics (1951) are part of the
second but not the first.
The term historiography of philosophy can also be taken in two
senses. According to one, it refers
to accounts of past events, and so it is interchangeable with
history when this term is used in the
second sense mentioned above. But historiography of
philosophy can also be used to mean the
discipline that studies and establishes the procedures to be
followed in accounts of the views from
past philosophers. Aquinas's statement, "whatever is moved is
moved by another," is part of the
history and historiography of philosophy in the first sense
mentioned. But the claim, "A proper
understanding of Aquinas's view, that whatever is moved is
moved by another, presented in the
Summa theologiae, requires that we look into what he says
about movement elsewhere in his
writings," is part of historiography when this is understood as a
discipline.

In addition, both the history and the historiography of
philosophy need to be distinguished from the
philosophy of the history of philosophy. This last studies the
history of philosophy understood as
past events in order to make claims about its nature and how it
develops in general. In doing so, it
may refer to particular events of that history, but its primary
aim is not to account for them. For
example, philosophers of the history of philosophy might claim
that philosophy develops according
to certain stages, but when they identify the stages through
which ancient philosophy passed in
particular, they do so to illustrate or establish the first kind of
claim.
Because the history of philosophy, the historiography of
philosophy, and the philosophy of the
history of philosophy are closely connected, their tasks are not
often distinguished and
philosophers engaged in the pursuit of one also frequently
pursue the others. For the sake of
clarity, however, this entry will keep them separate,
concentrating only on the issues pertaining to
the historiography of philosophy when this is understood as the
study of the procedures to be
followed in the investigation of the philosophical past and of
the philosophical issues that this kind
of study raises.
Six of these issues have been the focus of most discussions: (1)
What kind of claim are historians
of philosophy entitled to make? (2) What is the relation between
philosophy and the study of its
http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.umuc.edu/ps/pdfViewer?docId

=GALE%7CCX3446800854&userGroupName=umd_umuc&inPS
=true&contentSegment=&sort=&prodId=GVRL&navContext=no
ne&accesslevel=FULLTEXT&c2c=true#content
http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.umuc.edu/ps/advancedSearch.d
o?method=doSearch&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&userG
roupName=umd_umuc&inputFieldNames%5B0%5D=AU&prodI
d=GVRL&inputFieldValues%5B0%5D=%22Jorge+J.+E.+Gracia
%22
http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.umuc.edu/ps/eToc.do?content
ModuleId=GVRL&resultClickType=AboutThisPublication&sear
chType=&docId=GALE%7C5BNS&userGroupName=umd_umuc
&inPS=true&rcDocId=GALE%7CCX3446800854&prodId=GVR
L
http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.umuc.edu/ps/i.do?p=GVRL&u
=umd_umuc&id=GALE%7CCX3446800854&v=2.1&it=r&sid=G
VRL&asid=c6297ca2#
VRL&asid=c6297ca2#
VRL&asid=c6297ca2#
VRL&asid=c6297ca2#
VRL&asid=c6297ca2#
VRL&asid=c6297ca2#
history? (3) What is the value of the study of the history of
philosophy for philosophy? (4) What is
the role of texts in the study of the history of philosophy? (5)

What approach should historians of
philosophy use? And (6) what are the main genres historians of
philosophy employ?
1. CLAIMS
Disagreements concerning the kind of claim that historians of
philosophy are supposed to make
center on three possibilities: descriptive, interpretative, and
evaluative. A descriptive claim consists
of a proposition that accurately (1) presents what particular
philosophers said or thought or (2)
recounts contemporaneous and later views concerning the
positions of the philosophers under
study. These claims take forms such as "X stated that P," "X's
stating that P is the reason that X
gave for holding Q," "M, a contemporary of X, stated that X did
not hold that P," "N, a later historian
of philosophy, disagreed with M as to X's view," and so on.
In interpretative claims, historians of philosophy go beyond
what particular philosophers and their
historians said or thought, in order to establish nonexplicit
relations between the stated or unstated
views of a philosopher or a historian, or between the views of
two or more philosophers or
historians. They also formulate broad generalizations that
purport to characterize the overall
approach used by a philosopher or the philosophers from a
particular period, and to translate the
views of historical figures into the languages and conceptual
frameworks of contemporary
historians in order effectively to communicate their meaning.
Interpretative claims can take various
forms, such as: "X held that Q," "X held that Q because X held
that P," "X held that Q because Y
held that P," "X's view that P led to the abandonment of ∼P by

her contemporaries," and so on.
Evaluative claims make judgments about the value of
philosophical views from the past. These
judgments may concern truth, validity, coherence, adequacy,
completeness, clarity, social
relevance, and so on. Here are some forms that these claims
may take: "X's view, that P, is true,"
"X's argument A is invalid," "X and Y were right in formulating
problem P as they did," "X's view that
P is a backward step in the history of philosophy," "X's position
had an adverse effect on society S,"
and so on.
The question pertaining to descriptive, interpretative, and
evaluative claims that concerns
historiographers in particular is the following: Are historians of
philosophy supposed to make claims
that are descriptive, interpretative, evaluative, or some
combination of these? At one extreme,
positivist historiographers answer that historians should consign
themselves to descriptive claims.
Their job is to describe, and not to interpret or to evaluate, the
philosophical past (Lafrance 1983).
At the otherPage 398 | Top of Article extreme, historicist
historiographers maintain that historians
should merely be concerned with interpretation and evaluation
because description is impossible.
Every historical event is unique and cannot be reproduced either
in reality or thought. Therefore,
the attempt to describe and understand the past as it was in
itself, independently of how it appears
to the present, is bound to fail. The job of historians is to
present the past as it looks to them at
present (Collingwood 1946).

Both positivist and historicist historiographers accuse each
other of betraying the historical
enterprise. According to the first, the second do so because they
fail to account for the past by
falling into Anachronism, that is, reading the present into the
past. But historicists retort that
positivists betray history because they misunderstand the past
by falling into Antiquarianism, that
is, by failing to grasp the significance of the past for the
present.
In between these two extreme positions, various positions
attempt to find a more sensible middle
ground. Closer to positivism is the view that the history of
philosophy needs to be disinterested, that
is, it should refrain from any kind of value judgment or
interpretation based on value judgments
(Garber 1988). Closer to historicism is the position that the
history of philosophy should not be
conceived as a science at all, but rather, like all philosophy, as
a process of edification. Accordingly,
it is its current uses and meaning that matter, not what actually
happened in the past (Rorty 1984).
Closer to the middle, some historiographers argue that
historians of philosophy need to engage in
description, interpretation, and evaluation: Description, because
their aim is to understand and
account for the past; interpretation, because the understanding
and account of the past requires
interpretation; and evaluation, because a history of philosophy
without evaluation has no use
(Gracia 1992).

2. PHILOSOPHY VS. HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
But what is the relationship between philosophy and the history
of philosophy? Are they compatible
enterprises? And if compatible, how dependent are they on each
other? The attempts to answer
these questions are plagued with puzzles and difficulties
(Powers 1986).
The positions adopted with respect to these questions generally
follow those adopted in the
previous one. On one side are those historians who draw a sharp
distinction between the
descriptive aim of the historian of philosophy and the
interpretative and evaluative aims followed by
the philosopher. According to them, philosophy and the history
of philosophy are incompatible
insofar as the philosopher seeks to establish truth in general,
whereas the historian of philosophy is
merely interested in historical truth, that is, in arriving at
accurate descriptions of the philosophical
past. The historian studies the history of philosophy in its own
terms, not for the philosophical truth
it may yield (Frede 1988).
On the other side are those who closely relate the task of
description with those of interpretation
and evaluation. For some, philosophy necessarily involves the
study of its past, so it must be done
historically (Cohen 1986); for others, studying the philosophical
past requires doing philosophy
(Kenny 1995, 1996); and for others still, the relation goes both
ways (Taylor 1984). The reason, as
given by philosophers with historicist leanings, is that
philosophy is a rearticulation of a view about
ourselves and the world, and this requires both the
understanding of past articulations and a

liberation from them. The study of the philosophical past, then,
necessarily involves philosophical
judgments, and philosophy must study its past to move beyond
it; the history of philosophy must be
done philosophically and philosophy must be done historically.
Indeed, philosophy is a historical
enterprise insofar as the thought or statement of a philosophical
view is a historical event and thus
part of the history of philosophy. So even contemporaneous
philosophical discussions necessarily
involve historical references and the understanding of the past,
even if the history in question is
recent (Popkin 1985).
These positions have been criticized in various ways. Some
critics point out that they rely on an
oversimplification of the issue (Janaway 1988; Alexander
1988), whereas others object that they
fail to draw a distinction between objective and methodological
necessity (Gracia 1992). Objective
necessity holds between a discipline or study on the one hand
and its object of study on the other.
In this sense, the history of philosophy, considered as past
philosophical views, is indeed
necessary not just for the study of the history of philosophy but
also for philosophy insofar as
philosophy studies the world and all human experience of it and
the history of philosophy is part of
that object. Methodological necessity, however, holds between
two studies or disciplines, insofar as
there is a necessary dependence of the methods employed by
them. This distinction opens the
doors to an alternative position to the two mentioned.
According to it, the study of the history of

VRL&asid=c6297ca2#
philosophy is not methodologically necessary for philosophy,
although philosophy is
methodologically necessary for the study of its history. One can
philosophize without a historical
aim or concern; but one cannot investigate the history of
philosophy without aPage 399 | Top of
Article philosophical understanding of the concepts and
arguments it contains. The relation of
necessity between philosophy and its history, then, is not
reciprocal.
3. VALUE
Regardless of the position one takes with respect to the relation
between philosophy and the study
of its history, one may still ask whether the second is useful or
detrimental for the first. Those who
argue that the study of the history of philosophy is incompatible
with philosophy see only negative
influences on it: the study of the history of philosophy stultifies
creativity, prevents discoveries, is
irrelevant to present concerns, and wastes precious time
(Descartes 1970). And for those who hold
that doing the history of philosophy is necessary for doing
philosophy, the question of the value of
the first for the second is obviously irrelevant. However, for
those who maintain that the study of the
history of philosophy is neither incompatible with nor necessary
for doing philosophy, it is pertinent.
Some of these believe that the study of the history of
philosophy is harmful, whereas others argue
that it is beneficial and thus justify it in various ways. At least
eight different justifications are

common. They can roughly be divided into three groups:
rhetorical, pragmatic, and essentialistic.
Rhetorical justifications in turn fall into two groups. According
to one, the history of philosophy
provides a source of inspiration: past philosophers function as
role models whose lives, devoted to
the pursuit of truth, inspire us to emulate them (Rée 1978).
According to another, the history of
philosophy can be a source of support and respectability, and in
that way be used to validate the
present (Gilson 1955).
Pragmatic justifications can be classified into four types. One
argues that the consideration and
analysis of a rich historical treasure of philosophical views and
arguments can supply present-day
philosophers with a fertile ground in which to train for the
philosophical task (Yolton 1986). Another
proposes that the history of philosophy is a source of solutions
to important philosophical problems
insofar as many great minds from the past have presented
answers to questions still pertinent
today and offer us alternatives to contemporary proposals
(Curley 1986). A third maintains that the
present state of philosophy is one of confusion and "ill health,"
and the study of the past can help
us figure out how and where philosophy went wrong; the study
of the history of philosophy can be
therapeutic for the present (Bennett 1988). The fourth group
combines all three of these
justifications, arguing that philosophy can profit from both the
failures and successes of the past
(Mash 1987).
Essentialistic justifications are cashed out in terms of the nature

of philosophy and the way it
develops. At least four versions of them have been proposed.
One, not explicit among
historiographers of philosophy, although applicable to
philosophy and used in some sciences,
argues that the ontogeny of a discipline recapitulates its
phylogeny. The acquisition of philosophical
knowledge by an individual person goes through stages that
mirror those that the human race as a
whole has experienced in its philosophical understanding. The
study of the history of philosophy,
then, provides a shortcut to the level of understanding that
individual philosophers seek. Another
argues that the dialectical nature of philosophy requires that we
study its past. Regardless of
whether this dialectical nature is taken to apply to the dialogue
thought to be fundamental to the
philosophical enterprise (Veatch 1988) or to a set of stages of
development that repeat themselves
(Hegel 1974), it appears essential that philosophy engage its
past. In the first case, this is because
the variety of the past makes it an ideal interlocutor; and, in the
second, it is because any stage in
VRL&asid=c6297ca2#
the development of philosophy relies on prior stages. A third
justification argues that the
understanding and management of science and technology is
possible only on the basis of
historical experience and the history of philosophy supplies it
(Krüger 1984). A fourth argues that
philosophy is a cultural enterprise that relies on historical

elements such as language, values,
presuppositions, and so on; to understand the philosophical
present, then, we need to go back to
the past, for it is from the past that the present has arisen
(Gracia 2000).
4. TEXTS
The object studied by historians of philosophy consists of the
views of past philosophers, but they
have no way of establishing direct contact with those views
except through texts. Their access to
Kant's philosophy, for example, is only through the texts that
express Kant's views, whether they
were composed by the author himself or by subsequent
historians. The study of the history of
philosophy amounts, then, to the study of texts, and this poses a
set of questions that fall within
what is frequently called hermeneutics. They may be divided
roughly into four categories,
depending on whether they have to do with texts themselves,
their interpretation, their authors, or
their audiences.
With respect to texts, the most pertinent questions concern their
nature and identity. For purposes
of thePage 400 | Top of Article history of philosophy, the texts
that matter most are written. Oral
texts are relevant only insofar as they have survived either in
written reports or have been taped.
Historians who wish to give an account of William of Ockham's
logic, then, begin by looking at
copies of the pertinent texts from Ockham, say the Logica. But
it turns out that the copies of the text
they have are not the autograph Ockham wrote. Rather, they are
reconstructions produced by
editorial processes that took into account various manuscript

versions of Ockham's text, and relied
on the judgment of various editors as to the most historically
accurate reading. This means that
historians need to be aware of the distinction between the
historical text—the one produced by
Ockham—and the text they currently have, which may be called
the contemporary text.
Even when historians have access to a philosopher's autograph,
however, they may still ask
themselves whether the script they have in front of them is the
one intended by the author, for the
philosopher may have written something he did not intend, or
failed to write something he intended.
So in addition to the historical text and the contemporary text,
historians could take into account
what they consider to be the intended text. But there is still
more, for some historiographers argue
that there is another text that is pertinent, namely the text the
author should have written. Ockham
may have written something that did not fit his view, because he
was distracted or even failed to
understand all the implications of his own position. Hence, in
addition to the historical,
contemporary, and intended, there is also what might be called
the ideal text. These different ways
of conceiving texts give rise to wide disagreement among
historiographers concerning the kind of
text that is most pertinent for the study of the history of
philosophy.
Two questions in particular are pertinent concerning the
interpretation of texts: "What is an
interpretation?" and "What is its purpose?" According to a
common conception, an interpretation of
a text is the understanding that an interpreter has of the text;

according to another, it is a text added
to the text under interpretation. A example of the first sort is
Thomas Aquinas's understanding of
Aristotle's Metaphysics; an example of the second is Aquinas's
Commentary on Aristotle's
"Metaphysics." The purpose of the interpretation may vary in
each case, and this has also been a
subject of disagreement, which most frequently occurs along
two lines: understanding the meaning
of the text or relating the text to something else. The first, in
turn, can be broken down depending
on various ways of conceiving the meaning of a text: in terms of
the author's understanding or
VRL&asid=c6297ca2#
VRL&asid=c6297ca2#
intention, in terms of the understanding of a particular audience,
or independently of either the
author or any audience. The second purpose of interpretations
has been prompted in part by
questions raised about the nature and viability of meaning by
such Analytic philosophers as W. V.
Quine and such Continental philosophers as Jacques Derrida.
These questions have undermined
meaning-based conceptions of interpretation and have led some
historiographers to favor relational
ones instead (Daniel 1993). If the purpose of an interpretation is
relational, then the interpretation
depends on what the text is related to, such as another text,
particular historical events, certain

conceptual frameworks used in the interpretation, and so on.
Those who make interpretations dependent on authors need to
establish the identity of the latter,
but this again is contested, for at least three authors need to be
considered: historical,
pseudohistorical, and contemporary (the terms used to refer to
them vary). The first is the person
who produced the historical text—the person who wrote
Ockham's Logica for instance. The
pseudohistorical author is the person whom later historians
think wrote the text. The
pseudohistorical author of the Logica, for example, goes by the
same proper name as the historical
author, but it could in fact be different. The contemporary
author is the author of the contemporary
text. Recall that the contemporary text is a reconstruction of the
autograph carried out by editors on
the basis of various texts and readings, so it is likely that it is
different from the historical text and,
therefore, it would be incorrect to regard the historical author as
having sole responsibility for it.
The audience also has frequently been thought pertinent for the
interpretation of texts. And here,
again, various understandings of it may be considered. For
some, authors themselves may be
conceived as audiences, whereas others refer to the audiences
intended by authors, the audiences
contemporary with the composition of the historical text under
interpretation, or the audiences
contemporary with interpreters. Naturally, these differences in
audiences alter the character of an
audience-based interpretation. It is one thing to grasp Aristotle's
own understanding of his
Metaphysics and another to comprehend what thirteenth-century

scholastics thought of it.
5. APPROACHES
Different views concerning the interpretation of texts generate
different approaches to them.
Several taxonomies of these have been proposed, but most of
themPage 401 | Top of Article
include some of the following: ideological, sociological,
biographical, scholarly, doxographic,
apologetic, literary, idealistic, eschatological, dilettantish, and
problematic. Ideological approaches
use the history of philosophy for the justification of a chosen
point of view and treat texts
accordingly (Marxist historians). Sociological approaches break
down into several, depending on
whether they emphasize cultural (Gilson 1955), psychological
(Kusch 2000), or generally
contextual factors (Peckhaus 2000) in the study of the history of
philosophy. Biographical
approaches focus on personal histories (Rée 1978). Scholarly
approaches seek to establish
reliable texts, to produce accurate translations, to determine
precise chronologies, and to
reconstruct and expound the views of past authors and their
relations without engaging in value
judgments (Owens 1951). Doxography usually considers facts,
figures, and ideas with a primarily
informative aim (Diogenes 1925). Apologists see their goal as
the defense of a particular author's
point of view (John of St. Thomas 1931). The literary approach
emphasizes form over content,
stressing the need to take the former into consideration for the
understanding of the latter (Danto
1985). Idealists consider the views they find in texts as
imperfect renditions of what they think are
perfect views, so they engage in speculative reconstruction

(Russell 1937). Eschatologists view the
history of philosophy as progressing toward some end, or as
retreating from it (Aristotle 1984).
Dilettantes focus on texts in isolation from historical contexts,
being interested only in what they can
find in them for their own philosophical purposes (Plantinga
1978). And those who adopt a
problems approach look at the history of philosophy as a series
of attempts to solve philosophical
problems (Bennett). A recently proposed variant of the last is
the framework approach. According to
it, a proper historiographical method should make explicit the
conceptual frameworks of problems
and views used to study philosophical texts from the past in that
such frameworks can be used to
understand historical views better both in themselves and in
relation to the views of the interpreters
and their contexts (Gracia 1992).
A topic of occasional discussion in this context is the nature
and value of what is frequently called
the Principle of Charity. According to it, historians must
attempt to develop the most favorable
interpretations of the philosophical views they study. This
applies whether the historians agree or
disagree with them. If they agree, it is argued that this serves to
support their own views, and if they
disagree, that then they are presented with the best case against
their own positions, forcing them
to rethink those views or develop better arguments in their
support.
6. GENRES

The genres used in the history of philosophy break down into at
least two large categories: textual
commentaries and systematic expositions. The first includes
more or less literal commentaries. The
second breaks down into general or particular histories. General
histories of philosophy aim to
provide accounts of the whole history of philosophy. Particular
histories are concerned with the
philosophy of particular periods, regions, nations, ethne, races,
and authors, or with specific
problems or ideas, and with their comparison. Here are some
examples of particular histories:
history of medieval philosophy, history of Latin American
philosophy, history of French philosophy,
history of Hispanic philosophy, history of Black philosophy,
Hegel's philosophy, Gustav Bergmann's
position on individuation, history of the problem of universals
(in general or in a particular period),
and the history of the idea of substance. Historiographers
disagree on the comparative value of
these genres, but they continue to use them.
See also Aristotle ; Bergmann, Gustav ; Continental Philosophy
; Derrida, Jacques ; Descartes,
René ; Feminism and the History of Philosophy ; History and
Value Judgments; John of St. Thomas
; Kant, Immanuel ; Ockhamism ; Quine, Willard Van Orman ;
Thomas Aquinas, St. ; William of
Ockham ; Women in the History of Philosophy .
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The bibliography lists only sources from the last twenty-five
years, except for some classical and
medieval sources and a few earlier well-known historical
accounts. However, these sources contain
references to earlier historiographical literature.

Alexander, Peter. "History of Philosophy: The Analytical Ideal
II." Aristotelian Society 62 (1988):
S191–S208.
Aristotle. Metaphysics. Bk. A. In The Complete Works of
Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation,
edited by Jonathan Barnes. Vol. 2. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1984.
Ayers, Michael. "Analytical Philosophy and the History of
Philosophy." In Philosophy and Its Past,
edited by Jonathan Reé, Michael Ayers, and Adam Westoby.
Hassocks, U.K.: Harvester Press,
1978.
Bennett, Jonathan. "Response to Garber and Rée." In Doing
Philosophy Historically, edited by
VRL&asid=c6297ca2#
VRL&asid=c6297ca2#
http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.umuc.edu/ps/retrieve.do?tabID
=&userGroupName=umd_umuc&inPS=true&prodId=GVRL&con
tentSet=GALE&docId=GALE%7CCX3446800106

VRL&asid=c6297ca2#
Peter H. Hare. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988.
Cohen, Lesley. "Doing Philosophy Is Doing Its History."

Synthese 67 (1986): 51–55.
Collingwood, R. G. The Idea of History. Oxford, U.K.:
Clarendon Press, 1946.
Curley, Edwin. "Dialogues with the Dead." Synthese 67 (1986):
33–49.
Page 402 | Top of Article
Daniel, Steven. "Paramodern Strategies of Philosophical
Historiography." Epoché 1 (1993): 42–61.
Danto, Arthur. Narration and Knowledge: Including the Integral
Text of Analytical Philosophy of
History. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985.
Descartes, René. Descartes: Philosophical Letters, edited and
translated by Anthony Kenny.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.
Diogenes Laertius. The Lives and Opinions of Eminent
Philosophers. Translated by R. D. Hicks. 2
vols. The Loeb Classical Library. London: W. Heinemann,
1925.
Frede, Michael. "The History of Philosophy as a Discipline."
Journal of Philosophy 85 (11) (1988):
666–672.
Garber, Daniel. "Does History Have a Future? Some Reflections
on Bennett and Doing Philosophy
Historically." In Doing Philosophy Historically, edited by Peter
H. Hare. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus
Books, 1988.

Gilson, Étienne. History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle
Ages. New York: Random House,
1955.
Gracia, Jorge J. E. Philosophy and Its History: Issues in
Philosophical Historiography. Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1992.
Gracia, Jorge J. E. "Sociological Accounts and the History of
Philosophy." In The Sociology of
Philosophical Knowledge, edited by Martin Kusch. Dordrecht,
Netherlands: Kluwer, 2000.
Graham, Gordon. "Can There Be a History of Philosophy?"
History and Theory 21 (1982): 37–52.
Hare, Peter H., ed. Doing Philosophy Historically. Buffalo, NY:
Prometheus Books, 1988.
Hegel, G. W. F. Lectures on the History of Philosophy.
Translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances H.
Simson. 3 vols. London: Routledge, 1974.
Irwin, William, ed. The Death and Resurrection of the Author?
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
2002. Articles by Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Alexander
Nehamas, Peter Lamarque, and
others.
Janaway, Christopher. "History of Philosophy: The Analytical
Ideal I." Aristotelian Society 62 (1988):
S169–S189.
John of St. Thomas. Cursus theologicus. Tractatus de
approbatione et auctoritate doctrinae d.
Thomae. Disp. 2, vol. 1. Paris: Desclée, 1931.

VRL&asid=c6297ca2#
VRL&asid=c6297ca2#
Kenny, Anthony. "History of Philosophy: Historical and
Rational Reconstruction." In Methods of
Philosophy and the History of Philosophy: Proceedings of the
Entretiens of Institute International de
Philosophie. Helsinki, August 27–30, 1995. Acta Philosophica
Fennica 61, edited by Simo Knuuttila
and Ilkka Niiniluoto. Helsinki: Philosophical Society of
Finland, 1996.
Kristeller, Paul Oskar. "Philosophy and Its Historiography."
Journal of Philosophy 82 (11) (1985):
618–625.
Krüger, Lorenz. "Why Do We Study the History of
Philosophy?" In Philosophy in History: Essays on
the Historiography of Philosophy, edited by Richard Rorty, J. B.
Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner.
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Kusch, Martin. Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of
Philosophical Knowledge. London:
Routledge, 1995.
Kusch, Martin. "The Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge: A
Case Study and a Defense." In The
Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge, edited by Martin Kusch.
Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer,

2000.
Lafrance, Yvon. Méthode et exégèse en histoire de la
philosophie. Montreal, Quebec: Les Éditions
Bellarmin, 1983.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. "The Relationship of Philosophy to Its
Past." In Philosophy in History: Essays
on the Historiography of Philosophy, edited by Richard Rorty,
J. B. Schneewind, and Quentin
Skinner. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Mandelbaum, Maurice H. "The History of Philosophy: Some
Methodological Issues." In Philosophy,
History, and the Sciences: Selected Critical Essays. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press,
1984.
Mash, Roy. "How Important for Philosophers is the History of
Philosophy?" History and Theory 26
(3) (1987): 287–299.
Morgan, Michael. "The Goals and Methods of the History of
Philosophy." Review of Metaphysics 40
(1987): 717–732.
Owens, Joseph. The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian
Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek
Background of Mediaeval Thought. Toronto: Pontifical Institute
of Mediaeval Studies, 1951.
Piaia, Gregorio. "Brucker versus Rorty? On the 'Models' of the
Historiography of Philosophy."
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 (1) (2001): 69–
81.

Peckhaus, Volker. "The Contextualism of Philosophy." In The
Sociology of Philosophical
Knowledge, edited by Martin Kusch. Dordrecht, Netherlands:
Kluwer, 2000.
Peperzak, Adriaan T. "On the Unity of Systematic Philosophy
and History of Philosophy." In History
and Anti-History in Philosophy, edited by T. Z. Lavine and V.
Tejera. Dordrecht, Netherlands:
Kluwer, 1989.
Plantinga, Alvin. "The Boethian Compromise." American
Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978): 129–
138.
VRL&asid=c6297ca2#
Popkin, Richard H. "Philosophy and the History of Philosophy."
Journal of Philosophy 82 (11)
(1985): 625–632.
Powers, Lawrence H. "On Philosophy and Its History."
Philosophical Studies 50 (1) (1986): 1–38.
Rée, Jonathan. "Philosophy and the History of Philosophy." In
Philosophy and Its Past, edited by
Jonathan Reé, Michael Ayers, and Adam Westoby. Hassocks,
U.K.: Harvester Press, 1978.
Rorty, Richard. "The Historiography of Philosophy: Four
Genres." In Philosophy in History: Essays
on the Historiography of Philosophy, edited by Richard Rorty,
J. B. Schneewind, and Quentin

Skinner. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Russell, Bertrand. "Preface to the First Edition." In The
Philosophy of Leibniz. 2nd ed. London:
George Allen and Unwin, 1937.
Taylor, Charles. "Philosophy and Its History." In Philosophy in
History: Essays on the Historiography
of Philosophy, edited by Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and
Quentin Skinner. Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Veatch, Henry B. "Response to Commentators." In Doing
Philosophy Historically, edited by Peter
H. Hare. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988.
Yolton, John W. "Is There a History of Philosophy? Some
Difficulties and Suggestions." Synthese
67 (1) (1986): 3–21.
Jorge J. E. Gracia (2005)
Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Gracia, Jorge J. E. "History and Historiography of Philosophy."
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited
by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed., vol. 4, Macmillan Reference
USA, 2006, pp. 396-402. Gale
Virtual Reference Library,
http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/CX3446800854/GVRL?
u=umd_umuc&sid=GVRL&xid=c6297ca2. Accessed 8 May
2019.
Gale Document Number: GALE|CX3446800854

1Week 2 Textbook ProblemsWeek 2 Textbook Problems 2S.docx

1Week 2 Textbook ProblemsWeek 2 Textbook Problems 2S.docx

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to 1Week 2 Textbook ProblemsWeek 2 Textbook Problems 2S.docx

Similar to 1Week 2 Textbook ProblemsWeek 2 Textbook Problems 2S.docx (20)

More from RAJU852744

More from RAJU852744 (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

1Week 2 Textbook ProblemsWeek 2 Textbook Problems 2S.docx