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The Key Management Facility of
the Root Zone DNSSEC Key
Signing Key (KSK)
DEF CON 25 – CRYPTO & PRIVACY VILLAGE
30 July 2017
Punky Duero
| 2
What is ICANN?
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) coordinates the top-level of the Internet’s system of
unique identifiers via global, multistakeholder, bottom-up
consensus policy process, which is implemented via the
IANA Functions
• Protocol Parameters
• Number Resources
• Domain Name
Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA) Functions
| 3| 3
Video Clip: The Blacklist Redemption S01-E04
| 4
Agenda
Root Zone
DNSSEC
KSK Rollover
Key
Management
Facility
The Key
Ceremony
1 2 3
| 5| 5
Root Zone DNSSEC KSK Rollover
| 6
The Root Zone DNSSEC Key
Signing Key “KSK” is the top
most cryptographic key in the
DNSSEC hierarchy
KSK
ZSK
ZSK
KSK
ZSK
KSK
Root Zone DNSSEC KSK
DNSSEC = “DNS Security
Extensions”
DNSSEC is a protocol that is
currently being deployed to
secure the Domain Name
System (DNS)
| 7
Root Zone DNSSEC KSK Rollover
KSK-2010 KSK-2017
New Key called KSK-2017
RSA-2048RSA-2048
Old Key called KSK-2017
(Operational)
| 8
. IN DNSKEY 257 3 8
AwEAAaz/tAm8yTn4Mfeh5eyI96WSVexTBAvkMgJzkKTOiW1vkIbzxeF3
+/4RgWOq7HrxRixHlFlExOLAJr5emLvN7SWXgnLh4+B5xQlNVz8Og8kv
ArMtNROxVQuCaSnIDdD5LKyWbRd2n9WGe2R8PzgCmr3EgVLrjyBxWezF
0jLHwVN8efS3rCj/EWgvIWgb9tarpVUDK/b58Da+sqqls3eNbuv7pr+e
oZG+SrDK6nWeL3c6H5Apxz7LjVc1uTIdsIXxuOLYA4/ilBmSVIzuDWfd
RUfhHdY6+cn8HFRm+2hM8AnXGXws9555KrUB5qihylGa8subX2Nn6UwN
R1AkUTV74bU=
Root Zone DNSSEC KSK – KSK-2017
| 9
How To Update Your System
If your software supports
automated updates of DNSSEC
trust anchors (RFC 5011):
 The KSK will be updated
automatically at the
appropriate time
 You do not need to take
additional action
o Devices that are offline
during the rollover will
have to be updated
manually if they are
brought online after the
rollover is finished
If your software does not
support automated updates
of DNSSEC trust anchors
(RFC 5011) or is not
configured to use it:
 The software’s trust anchor file
must be manually updated
 The new root zone KSK is now
available here after March 2017:
Root Anchors
data.iana.org/root-anchors
| 10
When Does the Rollover Take Place?
The KSK rollover is a process, not a single event
The following dates are key milestones in the process when end users may
experience interruption in Internet services:
| 11
Check to See If Your Systems Are Ready
ICANN is offering a test bed for operators or any
interested parties to confirm that their systems handle
the automated update process correctly.
Check to make sure
your systems are ready by visiting:
go.icann.org/KSKtest
| 12| 12
Where is the Root Zone
DNSSEC KSK?
| 13
Hardware Security Module (HSM)
FIPS 140-2 Level 4
Certified
• Private Key for KSK-2010
• Private Key for KSK-2017
Photo: www.dj.cx
| 14
Smart Cards
Smart Cards
Photo: www.dj.cx
| 15
Trusted Community Representative (TCR)
Photo by Kim Davies
Crypto Officer (CO)
Each smart card is assigned to different
community members, known as Trusted
Community Representatives
| 16
Safe # 2 – Credential Safe
Smart Cards
Can only be opened by a designated staff,
Credential Safe Controller
Photo: www.dj.cx
Photo: Olaf Kolkman
| 17
Safe #1 – Hardware Safe
Hardware Security
Module (HSM)
Laptop
Can only be opened by a designated staff,
Hardware Safe Controller
Photo: www.dj.cx
| 18
Safe Room
Photo: Kim Davies
Photo: www.dj.cx
Photo: www.dj.cx
| 19
Ceremony Room
Mantrap
Photo: www.dj.cx
| 20| 20
What is a Key Ceremony?
| 21
Team Ceremony Key Ceremony
Not like this Ceremony
Tea Ceremony
| 22
Key Ceremony
Photo by Kim Davies
| 23
Key Signing Ceremony
Trusted Community Representatives
Enable the HSMs
Ceremony Administrator
Performs the Ceremony using scripts
Internal Witness
Attests the ceremony, signs affidavit
Hardware Safe Controller
Opens Safe #1
Credential Safe Controller
Opens Safe #2
System Administrator
Technical Support and Evidence Collection
Third-Party Auditors
Observe and Attest
Root Zone Management Partner
Bring Key Signing Request
Minimum Participants
| 24| 24
Where is the Key
Management Facility?
| 25
Key Management Facility (KMF)
US West KMF
El Segundo,
California
US East KMF
Culpeper,
Virginia
| 26
Trusted Community Representatives (TCRs)
Recovery Key Shareholders (RKSH)
Photo: Kim Davies
| 27
Trusted Community Representatives (TCRs)
Recovery Key Shareholders (RKSH)
Crypto Officer (CO)
KMF EAST
Crypto Officer (CO)
WEST
21
TCRs!
| 28
SOC 3 Certification
| 29
Photos
Photo by Olaf Kolkman
Photo: Kim Davies
Photo: Kim Davies
Photo: www.dj.cx
Photo: www.dj.cx
Photo: www.dj.cx
Photo: www.dj.cx
| 30
Thank You
linkedin/company/icann
@punkyduero
youtube.com/icannnews
Punky Duero
Email: punky.duero@icann.org
www.icann.org
ICANN provided KSK Rollover
Information and Tools:
https://www.icann.org/kskroll
https://github.com/iana-org/get-trust-anchor
https://go.icann.org/KSKtest
Root Zone DNSSEC Trust Anchor:
https://data.iana.org/root-anchors
Call for TCRs:
https://www.iana.org/help/tcr-application

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DefCon 25 - The Key Management Facility of the Root Zone DNSSEC KSK

  • 1. The Key Management Facility of the Root Zone DNSSEC Key Signing Key (KSK) DEF CON 25 – CRYPTO & PRIVACY VILLAGE 30 July 2017 Punky Duero
  • 2. | 2 What is ICANN? Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) coordinates the top-level of the Internet’s system of unique identifiers via global, multistakeholder, bottom-up consensus policy process, which is implemented via the IANA Functions • Protocol Parameters • Number Resources • Domain Name Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Functions
  • 3. | 3| 3 Video Clip: The Blacklist Redemption S01-E04
  • 4. | 4 Agenda Root Zone DNSSEC KSK Rollover Key Management Facility The Key Ceremony 1 2 3
  • 5. | 5| 5 Root Zone DNSSEC KSK Rollover
  • 6. | 6 The Root Zone DNSSEC Key Signing Key “KSK” is the top most cryptographic key in the DNSSEC hierarchy KSK ZSK ZSK KSK ZSK KSK Root Zone DNSSEC KSK DNSSEC = “DNS Security Extensions” DNSSEC is a protocol that is currently being deployed to secure the Domain Name System (DNS)
  • 7. | 7 Root Zone DNSSEC KSK Rollover KSK-2010 KSK-2017 New Key called KSK-2017 RSA-2048RSA-2048 Old Key called KSK-2017 (Operational)
  • 8. | 8 . IN DNSKEY 257 3 8 AwEAAaz/tAm8yTn4Mfeh5eyI96WSVexTBAvkMgJzkKTOiW1vkIbzxeF3 +/4RgWOq7HrxRixHlFlExOLAJr5emLvN7SWXgnLh4+B5xQlNVz8Og8kv ArMtNROxVQuCaSnIDdD5LKyWbRd2n9WGe2R8PzgCmr3EgVLrjyBxWezF 0jLHwVN8efS3rCj/EWgvIWgb9tarpVUDK/b58Da+sqqls3eNbuv7pr+e oZG+SrDK6nWeL3c6H5Apxz7LjVc1uTIdsIXxuOLYA4/ilBmSVIzuDWfd RUfhHdY6+cn8HFRm+2hM8AnXGXws9555KrUB5qihylGa8subX2Nn6UwN R1AkUTV74bU= Root Zone DNSSEC KSK – KSK-2017
  • 9. | 9 How To Update Your System If your software supports automated updates of DNSSEC trust anchors (RFC 5011):  The KSK will be updated automatically at the appropriate time  You do not need to take additional action o Devices that are offline during the rollover will have to be updated manually if they are brought online after the rollover is finished If your software does not support automated updates of DNSSEC trust anchors (RFC 5011) or is not configured to use it:  The software’s trust anchor file must be manually updated  The new root zone KSK is now available here after March 2017: Root Anchors data.iana.org/root-anchors
  • 10. | 10 When Does the Rollover Take Place? The KSK rollover is a process, not a single event The following dates are key milestones in the process when end users may experience interruption in Internet services:
  • 11. | 11 Check to See If Your Systems Are Ready ICANN is offering a test bed for operators or any interested parties to confirm that their systems handle the automated update process correctly. Check to make sure your systems are ready by visiting: go.icann.org/KSKtest
  • 12. | 12| 12 Where is the Root Zone DNSSEC KSK?
  • 13. | 13 Hardware Security Module (HSM) FIPS 140-2 Level 4 Certified • Private Key for KSK-2010 • Private Key for KSK-2017 Photo: www.dj.cx
  • 14. | 14 Smart Cards Smart Cards Photo: www.dj.cx
  • 15. | 15 Trusted Community Representative (TCR) Photo by Kim Davies Crypto Officer (CO) Each smart card is assigned to different community members, known as Trusted Community Representatives
  • 16. | 16 Safe # 2 – Credential Safe Smart Cards Can only be opened by a designated staff, Credential Safe Controller Photo: www.dj.cx Photo: Olaf Kolkman
  • 17. | 17 Safe #1 – Hardware Safe Hardware Security Module (HSM) Laptop Can only be opened by a designated staff, Hardware Safe Controller Photo: www.dj.cx
  • 18. | 18 Safe Room Photo: Kim Davies Photo: www.dj.cx Photo: www.dj.cx
  • 20. | 20| 20 What is a Key Ceremony?
  • 21. | 21 Team Ceremony Key Ceremony Not like this Ceremony Tea Ceremony
  • 22. | 22 Key Ceremony Photo by Kim Davies
  • 23. | 23 Key Signing Ceremony Trusted Community Representatives Enable the HSMs Ceremony Administrator Performs the Ceremony using scripts Internal Witness Attests the ceremony, signs affidavit Hardware Safe Controller Opens Safe #1 Credential Safe Controller Opens Safe #2 System Administrator Technical Support and Evidence Collection Third-Party Auditors Observe and Attest Root Zone Management Partner Bring Key Signing Request Minimum Participants
  • 24. | 24| 24 Where is the Key Management Facility?
  • 25. | 25 Key Management Facility (KMF) US West KMF El Segundo, California US East KMF Culpeper, Virginia
  • 26. | 26 Trusted Community Representatives (TCRs) Recovery Key Shareholders (RKSH) Photo: Kim Davies
  • 27. | 27 Trusted Community Representatives (TCRs) Recovery Key Shareholders (RKSH) Crypto Officer (CO) KMF EAST Crypto Officer (CO) WEST 21 TCRs!
  • 28. | 28 SOC 3 Certification
  • 29. | 29 Photos Photo by Olaf Kolkman Photo: Kim Davies Photo: Kim Davies Photo: www.dj.cx Photo: www.dj.cx Photo: www.dj.cx Photo: www.dj.cx
  • 30. | 30 Thank You linkedin/company/icann @punkyduero youtube.com/icannnews Punky Duero Email: punky.duero@icann.org www.icann.org ICANN provided KSK Rollover Information and Tools: https://www.icann.org/kskroll https://github.com/iana-org/get-trust-anchor https://go.icann.org/KSKtest Root Zone DNSSEC Trust Anchor: https://data.iana.org/root-anchors Call for TCRs: https://www.iana.org/help/tcr-application

Editor's Notes

  1. KSK Rollover – Reminder and what’s going on KMF – Tour, Show and tell Key Ceremony – How is it related?
  2. Dan