MSc Framework Governing Infrastructure Programmes

MSc in Major Programme Management
Empirical framework for the Governing Process of
Infrastructure Governmental Programmes
Submission Date: 01/09/2014
Word Count: 9989
Candidate Number: 287402
Declaration:
This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Science in Major Programme Management. I hereby certify
that the following piece of work is my own and complies with the Own Work
Declaration form and with the University’s Rules and Regulations relating to
plagiarism and collusion.

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ABSTRACT
Empirical framework for the Governing Process of Infrastructure
Governmental Programmes
This dissertation explores the fact that many infrastructure major projects
are procured without the necessary technical detailed studies resulting in
rework, cost overruns and schedule delays. It then introduces a framework for
the governing process of infrastructure major projects within a governmental
programme.
It hypothesis that the framework might reduce uncertainties and problems
that are related to the execution of these projects by adopting an agile
approach that encourages early stakeholder involvement, accountability and
transparency to the planning and execution control phase.
It includes a literature review on major projects’ overruns and on Projects’
Governance that encourages early stakeholders’ involvement, progressively
shaping of the projects during its life cycle, incremental deliverable of benefits
by the physical outputs from the projects within a programme, management in
small batches and other methods that could be related to an Agile approach
Therefore, based on this literature, an analysis of data on four major
projects within the Brazilian 2014 World Cup Programme and based on the
results gathered by a questionnaire applied to the Brazilian Government’s PMO
Analysts, this dissertation examines how the framework can contribute towards
mitigating the risks and uncertainties faced by these type of problems.

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Although the data analysed were on Brazilian Major Projects conducted by
the Brazilian government, this research project assumes the fact that since
these type of problems are presented worldwide, this framework could also be
applied to programmes that face these type of problems.
Abstract word Count: 237

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Firstly, I would like to thank God for providing me the will, opportunity and
capability to complete this course successfully.
Secondly, I would like to thank to my family. Without their encouragement,
patience and support I could hardly complete this MSc.
Thirdly, I would like to thank all my new friends and colleagues for their
experience, comments and discussions, which brought much glamour and
knowledge to the classroom. Thanks also to the Pernambuco State Government
and Recife City Hall for providing the data, the interviewees for answering the
questions, the Saïd Business School for accepting me and the MMPM staff who
were very helpful.
Finally, thanks to my business colleagues for our constant discussion on
Megaproject and Governance, and for my supervisor Dr. Chantal Cantarelli who
guided me through this dissertation process.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................... VII
LIST OF TABLES.......................................................................... IX
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS................................................................ IX
1. INTRODUCTION...................................................................... 1
1.1. Research Question ............................................................ 3
1.2. Background..................................................................... 3
1.3. Structure of the dissertation ................................................ 7
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................... 8
3. RESEARCH METHOD............................................................... 18
3.1. Approach ..................................................................... 18
3.2. Sample Population .......................................................... 19
3.3. Questionnaire Design ....................................................... 22
3.4. Data on five major projects within the world cup programme on the
host city of Recife .................................................................. 24
4. RESEARCH DATA .................................................................. 26
4.1. Questionnaire data ......................................................... 26
4.1.1 Section 1 – Interviewee Identification.............................. 26
4.2.1 Section 2 - Project(s) Characteristic(s)............................. 27
4.3.1 Section 3 - Governing Process ....................................... 30
4.2. Data on four major projects within the world cup programme ...... 39
4.3. Data Analysis................................................................. 43
5. FRAMEWORK....................................................................... 45
6. DISCUSSION ........................................................................ 54

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6.1. Limitations ................................................................... 54
6.2. Theoretical and Practical allegations .................................... 54
7. CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 56
APPENDICES............................................................................. 57
APPENDIX A. Questionnaire ....................................................... 57
APPENDIX B. Data on four major projects within the 2014 World Cup
Programme .......................................................................... 63
REFERENCES ............................................................................ 64

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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Organization Structure of Pernambuco State Government (Governo de
Pernambuco, 2014) ...................................................................... 4
Figure 2. . Organization Structure of the city hall of Recife (Prefeitura da Cidade
do Recife, 2014) ......................................................................... 5
Figure 3. % distribution of respondent per Government ......................... 22
Figure 4. Example of open question related to a previous answer. ............ 23
Figure 5. Typical question for the section three of the questionnaire, governing
process. ................................................................................. 24
Figure 6. Average number of projects monitored per function of the interviewee
........................................................................................... 26
Figure 7. Interviewees Experience in Project Management ..................... 27
Figure 8. Percentage of their main projects that are sub-projects of others
projects ................................................................................. 28
Figure 9. Budget category distribution in million Brazilian Reais............... 28
Figure 10. Average duration of the Projects per budget category ............. 28
Figure 11. Stakeholder identification............................................... 29
Figure 12. Main Stakeholders ........................................................ 29
Figure 13. Stakeholders’ power and influence identification ................... 29
Figure 14. Stakeholders’ conflicting interest identification..................... 29
Figure 15. Project Management method used ..................................... 30
Figure 16. Definition of Project success for the interviewees .................. 31
Figure 17. Existence of Prioritization Criteria..................................... 32
Figure 18. Type of prioritization criteria........................................... 32

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Figure 19. Prior study on cross-project interference. Figure 20. Reasons for not
conducting prior study on cross-project interference............................ 33
Figure 21. Reliable delivery schedule.............................................. 33
Figure 22. Percentage of respondents that knew that Project Amending is a
common practice. ..................................................................... 35
Figure 23. Reasons for project amending. ......................................... 36
Figure 24. Amount of project procurement with the necessary construction
detailed design......................................................................... 36
Figure 25. Reasons for bidding without the necessary detailed design. ....... 37
Figure 26. Reliability of the KPIs .................................................... 38
Figure 27. Adoption of any agile approach for the execution control. ........ 38
Figure 28. Monitoring of Project’s vision and purpose ........................... 39
Figure 29. BRT corridors (Governo do Brasil, 2013)............................... 40
Figure 30. Project amending type................................................... 43
Figure 31. Governance Perspectives ................................................ 46
Figure 32. Prioritization criteria graph ............................................. 51
Figure 33. Construction Sprints...................................................... 52
Figure 34. Governing Framework.................................................... 53

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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Average cost overrun in 258 transportation infrastructure projects, in
constant prices (Flyvbjerg, 2007) ................................................... 12
Table 2. Interviewees and their role in the government structure............. 21
Table 3. Main Transportation Project for the host city of Recife. ............. 40
Table 4. Overruns for the four majors projects within the programme ....... 41
Table 5. Analysis over contracted projects ........................................ 42
Table 6. Analysis over decision to build ............................................ 42
Table 7. Interference Matrix ......................................................... 49
Table 8. Power and Interest Matrix ................................................. 50
Table 9. Data on the four major projects within the 2014 world cup Programme
........................................................................................... 63
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
DBB – Design Bid Build
CS – Construction Sprints
GDP - Gross domestic product
KPI – Key Performance Indicator
MMPM – Master in Major Programme Management
PMO – Project Management Office

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1. Introduction
This research project proposal aims to create an empirical framework for
the governing process of infrastructure governmental programmes.
The framework intends to ameliorate the problems by adopting an agile
approach to the planning and execution control phase by breaking down the
duration of the major project into smaller cycles. Additionally, it aims to
involve the main stakeholders from the beginning of the construction phase in
order to get the required buy-in. During the smaller cycle, the goal is to
introduce a process for continuous planning aimed at reducing the exposure to
risks as yet identified. This process also identifies the deliverables that are less
likely to change due to misconception of the preliminary construction design.
The framework will be created based on the data of obtained from a
questionnaire applied in the government of the state of Pernambuco in Brazil
and it will also analyse data on four major projects within the Pernambuco state
governmental programme related to the World Cup in the host city of Recife.
Brazil is one of the largest countries in the world, both by population and
by geographic area, and has the seventh highest GDP in the world (World Brank
Group, 2014). Recently Brazil has hosted the 2014 Football World Cup and it is
preparing for the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro.
In order to be able to deliver such mega-events, the Brazilian Government
has had to rely on its public procurement process, regulated by the Federal Law
8666/93 (Congresso Nacional Brasil, 1993). The Brazilian Federal Law
establishes rules for bidding and procurement of Public Administration. One of

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the regulations establishes that the contract type should be fixed price and
fixed time with an annual economic adjustment based on a federal economic
index.
This law follows the DBB (Design-Bid-Build) model for construction bids once
it demands a previous design in order to launch the Bidding Process. However,
this bidding model could exacerbate any problems if it permits the bidding
process to happen without the necessary detailed studies and thus unrealistic
estimations.
Although the Federal law 8666/93 demands a previous construction design,
it does not demand a detailed design. So, it is common practice to bid only
with the preliminary design.
The lack of a detailed design can cause, for example, problems during the
execution phase such as design omissions, inconsistency between designs and
underground situation, defects, lack of several studies, bad estimation, poor
planning interface among the projects, wrong project prioritization and poor
execution and control (Hsieh, et al., 2004; Flyvbjerg, 2005).
Therefore, the particularity that in Brazil the bidding process can happen
with a preliminary design, the availability of data and the fact that Brazil has
been investing billions of dollars in preparation for these mega-events makes
Brazil an interesting case for analysis.

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1.1. Research Question
The dissertation hypotheses that introducing a framework for the governing
process of infrastructure major projects within a governmental programme
might reduce uncertainties and problems that are related to the execution of
these projects.
It works with the assumption that most of the problems are caused by
technical issues, i.e., the lack of necessary studies and thus unrealistic data.
This is permitted by a breach of the Brazilian 8666/93 Federal law as mentioned
above.
Through a review of the literature, an analysis of the data of four major
projects within the 2014 World Cup Programme and based on the results
gathered by the questionnaire applied, the following research questions were
examined.
(a) Is it possible to ameliorate risk and uncertainties of major infrastructure
projects that were procured without the construction detailed design?
(b) How could a governing framework be applied in order to minimize such
risks and uncertainties?
1.2. Background
The United Nations – Department of Economic and Social Affairs awarded
the Government of Pernambuco for its effort in modernizing its decision making
process (United Nations, 2012 and 2013).
Pernambuco is one of the fastest-growing states in Brazil and managed
to attract huge investments concentrated in the industrial Port Complex of

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Suape (The Economist, 2012). In 2010 Suape was one of the largest centres of
investment in the country attracting several megaprojects, such as the
Atlântico Sul Shipyard, the Petrobras’ Abreu e Lima oil refinery and the
construction of the R$ 7.5 billion Brazilian Reais Transnordestina railroad (The
New Economy, 2012).
The organization structure of the Pernambuco state government is shown
by the figure 1 below:
Figure 1. Organization Structure of Pernambuco State Government (Governo de Pernambuco, 2014)
The state PMO was created and structured in 2009 with the goal of acting
as facilitator for planning, monitoring and controlling the priority projects
selected by the governor.
The number of projects monitored by the PMO varies, but it normally
runs from 50 to more than 110. At the present date, July 2014, according to a
PMO analyst, the total number of Projects monitored is 100. Their approximate
budget is R$4 billion Brazilian Reais.
Governor
State Secretariat
of Planning and
Management
Executive
Secretariat of
Strategic
Management
State PMO
State
Secretariat of
Economic
Development
State
Secretariat of
the Cities
Special
Secretariat
for 2014
World Cup
Others
Secretariats
Governor
Cabinet

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The State PMO is composed of 10 analysts and a Manager, totalling 11
members. The 100 projects are split among the analysts. However, among the
analysts are those specialized in infrastructure projects and programmes.
The Pernambuco PMO methodology was inspired by the ones developed
in Minas Gerais (Governo de Minas Gerais, 2014) and in Rio de Janeiro (Governo
do Rio de Janeiro, 2014).
The capital of Pernambuco state is Recife, one of the largest cities in
Brazil. Recife also has the highest GDP per capita among the capitals of the
northeast region (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2014).
The organizational structure of the City Hall is shown by figure 2 below.
The Cabinet for Special Projects was created to be responsible for the
construction of several commitments made by the Mayor (Prefeitura da Cidade
do Recife, 2014). It has in its portfolio approximately 181 projects. There are
Mayor
Municipal
Secretariat of
Planning and
Management
City Hall PMO
Municipal
Secretariat of
Development and
Urban Planning
Municipal Secretariat
of Sports and World
cup
Others
Secretariats
Mayor's Cabinet
Cabinet for
Special Projects
Figure 2. . Organization Structure of the city hall of Recife (Prefeitura da Cidade do Recife, 2014)

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approximately 20 people working for the Cabinet, including six engineers
responsible for overseeing construction projects.
Around the year 2013 the city hall implemented its PMO following the same
principles developed by the state PMO. At present, the City Hall PMO is
composed of six people and monitors 26 priority projects. The estimated budget
is approximately R$777 million Brazilian Reais.
The Brazilian 2014 World Cup programme started being structured in
January 2010 with the signature of the Responsibility Matrix (Governo do Brasil,
2014b). The Responsibility Matrix is a document that defines the roles of the
Federal, State and City Hall governments in the release of funds and execution
of actions.
Recife was chosen as one of the tournament´s host cities. So, the Matrix
defined the budget for the Programme for the Host City Recife, which was
approximately R$1,5 billion Brazilian Reais. The actual cost of the Programme,
according to the World Cup 2014 Transparency Portal to date was approximately
R$534 million Brazilian Reais (Governo do Brasil, 2014a).
Officially, the state secretariat that was created to manage the programme
was the Special Secretariat for 2014 World Cup. However, the state major
projects within the programme were conducted by the State Secretariat of the
City and managed by the state PMO. The programme consisted of the
implementation of series of related projects divided into seven priority areas,
namely (Governo do Brasil, 2014a):

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1. Tourism Development
2. Football stadium
3. Urban Mobility
4. Harbour
5. Public Safety
6. Telecommunication
7. Temporary structures (Confederations Cup)
1.3. Structure of the dissertation
The dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one presents the
introduction and gives an overall idea of the purpose of the dissertation,
chapter two presents a literature review trying to identify which key points are
necessary to a practical framework for governmental infrastructure
programmes. Chapter three describes the research method, i.e., the approach
used, the sample population where it describes who were the participants and
the percentage of respondents and how the questionnaire was designed. The
fourth chapter analyses the data from the questionnaire and from five major
projects within the World Cup Programme in the host city of Recife and they
give the necessary subsides to propose a framework, presented in chapter five.
Chapter six addresses the limitations of the research and its implication and
chapter seven draws the conclusion.

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2. Literature Review
Governmental programmes are normally conceived to implement changes
that deliver benefits to a specific region and its inhabitants. A programme is
composed of a group of projects with a common objective.
These related projects are the main driver of the desired change. They aim
to deliver incremental benefits during the life cycle of the programme.
However, many of the programme’s benefits are only achieved long after it is
finished because they are hard to measure, especially if they are related to
infrastructure programmes.
Some programme indicators can be measured during the life cycle of the
programme, such as the World Bank Indicator Improved sanitation facilities (%
of population with access) that measures the percentage of the population
using improved sanitation facilities (The World Bank Group, 2014). But other
indicators, such as the United Nations Development Programme HDI (Human
Development Index) (United Nations Development Programme, 2014) only
reflect the change that programme intends to make after some time.
This lag time makes it difficult to evaluate the programmes well because
they are finished and normally it would demand an established governance
framework to monitor and to associate any improvement of these indicators to
the specific project or programme in the time given. In addition, a poor
governance can also worsen the overruns and schedule delays in most of the
major projects within a governmental programme. This normally happens
because it does not offer the necessary tools and processes to assess the

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projects and programme well. Besides, it does not offer a clear punishment to
promoters once it is proved that the programme was launched without the
necessary studies and caused losses to the public treasure (Flyvbjerg, et al.,
2003).
Project governance has been studied by several authors such as Flyvbjerg et
al. (2003), Hobbs & Miller (2002 and 2005), Samset, et al. (2006), Klakegg, et
al. (2009) and Müller (2009 and 2011). It can be defined as a framework
containing a set of processes, procedures and tools for ethical decision-making
based on transparency, accountability and responsiveness that should be used
in order to deliver projects successfully. It aims to ensure that the projects are
implemented in accordance to the objectives of the organization.
The governance processes and tools should outline the relationship of the
stakeholders, describe the flow of information, the roles, the policy, ensure
appropriate review of issues and monitoring to ensure that the value brought
by the projects are being obtained.
Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) in his work has focused on the necessity of creating
institutional arrangements and regulatory regimes to minimize the effect of
over-optimistic forecasts of project viability. Miller & Lessard (2000) also
emphasizes that institutional arrangements are the most important factor of
project performance. That is because there is a lack of accountability and
transparency. For this reason, it is common to see underestimated costs in order
to get projects approved and almost no punishment to the politicians who have

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promoted those projects. In addition, it is hard to penalize the contractors that
have won the bidding process.
Still, according Flyvbjerg et al. (2003), the desired governance should
establishes the necessary institutional appraisal to minimize the risks of having
wrong projects implemented. Those arrangements should focus on measuring
how objectives are being met, penalize, and reward the bad and good
performance. They also suggest the maximization of overall accountability and
performance by introducing transparency and checks and balances on
performance. Moreover, they emphasize that the specification, i.e.,
construction requirement should be formulated consistently to permit any
monitoring and auditing during the execution phase.
Klakegg, et al. (2009) identifies several principles that a governance
framework should possess. Among many of them, it is worth pointing out the
identification and engagement of stakeholders in planning and decision making,
simple methods and practices, learning capacity, risk sharing and rule of
conduct.
In accordance with Flyvberg et al. (2003), Samset, et al. (2006) and Klakegg,
et al. (2009) mention the lack of accountability as being related to problems in
both public and private context. Besides, they expand accountability in
answerability, responsibility and liability.
According to Miller & Hobbs (2005) project governance should be a dynamic
body adapting itself to the complexity, singularity and changes as projects
development unfolds. In addition, they suggest a creation of a progressive

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shaping of a project through the project development life cycle. Moreover,
according to them, the issues cannot be settle by a predetermined process.
That is because there is a lot of uncertainty as the project development process
unfolds. Therefore, the issues should be identified and resolved through a
flexible process during the development of the project. Also in accordance to
Flyvbjerg et al. (2003), Miller and Hobbs (2005) also highlight the need for
accountability and transparency. They showed that strong political will is
essential for examination and process improvement during the project life
cycle.
Müller (2009), on the other hand, gives a special attention to the process and
methodology to be used in a programme governance framework, where he
defines as being the achievement of a major purpose or benefit. Since this
objective is directly related to the incremental delivery of benefits achieved
by, normally, the physical outputs delivered by the projects, it should include
how the projects are measured and related to each other avoiding superposition
of similar activities among them.
This sum of energy, synergy and output should deliver the programme
objective, which is not easy to measure in the early stages. Therefore, still
according to Müller (2009), the main areas of concern of a programme should
be the management of stakeholders and benefits, as well as the projects’
governance within the programme.
Although much has been written regarding project governance, there are still
a lot of data on project overruns. Overrun in construction projects is a common

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phenomenon that happens all over the world. Many papers have been written
on the causes of cost overrun (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Sinnette, 2004; Flyvbjerg,
2005, 2007, 2008, 2011; Flyvbjerg et al., 2009; Cantarelli, et al., 2010; Son &
Rojas, 2011). An article by Flyvbjerg (2007) shows that for the last 70 years
nine out of 10 infrastructure transportation projects have presented cost
overruns, so accuracy of project cost estimates has become a larger concern.
Table 1 below shows the average of cost overruns in 258 infrastructure projects
compiled by Flyvbjerg (2007).
Type of project
Number of
projects
Average cost
overrun
Standard
deviation
Rail 58 44,7% 38,4
Bridges and tunnels 33 33,8% 62,4
Road 167 20,4% 29,9
Table 1. Average cost overrun in 258 transportation infrastructure projects, in
constant prices (Flyvbjerg, 2007)
According to Son & Rojas (2011) an important cause of cost and schedule
overrun can be found in unrealistic baseline plans because planners usually do
not take into account the complexity of managing major programmes.
For Flyvbjerg (2007) unrealistic estimations could be subject to three main
reasons: technical, psychological, and political-economic. The technical
explanation given by Flyvbjerg is mainly related to honest mistakes, lack of
experience, imperfect techniques and inadequate data. The psychological one
can be explained by what is called the Planning Fallacy and Optimism bias,
these concepts were first developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).

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In the planning fallacy, planners are normally so immersed in the actual
scenario that they make decisions based on the inside view of the problem and
do not consider past experience. Optimism bias, however, is a human condition
that is inherent in most humans where we tend to have an optimistic approach,
trying to minimize the likelihood of negative results when we are faced with
uncertainties. So, we involuntarily create scenarios of success and we
overestimate the likelihood of potential risks and issues and thus underestimate
cost and time (Flyvbjerg, 2011; Sharot, 2011).
The political-economic one is when politicians, planners and promoters
deliberately and strategically overestimate benefits and underestimate costs.
According to Flyvbjerg (2008), those intentional overestimations of benefits and
underestimations of costs by politicians and promoters can also be called
Strategic Misrepresentation, and it is one of the root causes of project
underperformance, and can be traced to political pressure especially if there
are scarce funds, which have to be competed for.
Nevertheless, politicians, according to their political objectives, normally
select Governmental programmes because they have a mandate to follow,
where they intend to implement the changes that they believe are the best for
their voters or people. The established government does not necessarily follow
any prioritization criteria, besides, mainly, the political ones, as we will see
later.
However, since the politicians’ political mandate has a fixed term, decisions
can be made based on political pressure or commitments made by the

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politicians. Cantarelli et al. (2010, 2012) has shown that when these decisions
are made based on political pressure or commitment most of the overruns
happen for those reasons, even before the real construction starts. These
decisions are known as the ‘real decision to build’.
According to Wood & Antonsson (1990) when a construction project receives
its “permission” to go during one of the earliest phases of the project the more
inaccurate would be the engineering design, cost and time estimates. This
happens because during the preliminary phases of the projects there are still a
lot of uncertainty and imprecision and only the first estimates or feasibility
studies should be done.
Nevertheless, promoters and planners are normally more optimistic about
project outcomes in these phases when there are not enough information about
the possible problems that the project will face. Therefore, it would be
common to find errors in design, omissions, construction mistakes and other
factors that are underestimated by planners leading to overruns (Son & Rojas,
2011; Cantarelli, et al., 2012).
It is known, though, that the more detailed your engineering design, the
more accurate is your cost and schedule. Flyvbjerg (2005) in his article for the
Harvard Design Magazine shows us what happens when you start a construction
project subject to political pressure and when it starts the right way. Flyvbjerg
throws some comparison between two “classical” examples of projects, one
very successful in terms of cost and time overruns and the other not so much.

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He compares the “famous” Sidney Opera House, which had one of the highest
cost overruns in history, with the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao.
There is of course plenty of difference between them, but one point that
should be noted is that the Sidney Opera House clearly suffered political
pressure to start as soon as possible without the necessary detailed designs.
Therefore, a very low estimated cost was approved. Whereas for the
Guggenheim Museum Bilbao they only started with the detailed engineering
design and with the cost and time estimations done based on the detailed
designed and approved by the main stakeholders.
To start a construction with the detailed engineering design and the cost
and time estimates based on this design should be the rule. For Wood &
Antonsson (1990) the engineering design should follow its normal phases, which
are many, but it normally goes from a highly imprecise phase to a very detailed
and precise stage where the final refinements, design, specification, cost and
time estimation happens.
Nevertheless, it is a common practice to overlap design and construction
activities. This overlapping introduces risks that the design might change after
the construction starts causing rework, overruns and delays. Hossain & Chua
(2014) suggest the implementation of a framework to help overlapping design
and construction activities by using concepts of upstream evaluation and
downstream sensitivity. Sensitivity activities are construction activities that are
strongly influenced by a change on the final design differing from the
preliminary one. This difference would cause a high degree of rework and thus

16
overrun and delays to a high sensitive activity, whereas this would not happen
to low sensitivity activities. Blacud et al. (2009) also adopted strategies that
insert flexibility to the process to deal with the uncertainty of the overlapped
execution.
In a similar approach, Elvin (2003) found that is more effective to gather
downstream information in small batches as needed than to have it all at once.
In addition, the small batch process results in a mutual adjustment of design
minimizing the possibility of rework and overruns since there are the
involvement of designers, constructors and client.
Some authors such as Owen et al. (2006), Demir et al. (2012), Senthilkumar
et al. (2012), Lavikka et al. (2013) have studied the adoption of agile to
construction projects. This approach brings special benefits to the design phase
of the construction and control due to its flexibility under uncertainty,
interactivity, process for requirement definition, and stakeholder early
engagement.
The agile methodology improves the understanding of the requirement once
it breaks down the project into smaller cycle permitting the team to focus on
each problem at once. These smaller cycles, also known as sprints, increases
the common understanding between stakeholders. Besides, an early
stakeholder involvement tends to create a more united team improving the
trust and commitment.
According to Owen et al. (2006) the so called agile manufacturing is an
answer to the modifications brought by a constant change, and it is based on

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an incremental development with a continuous learning. Also Owen et al.
(2006) refers to the importance of bringing together in any design phase the
contractor and the client in order to have a joint decision-making process,
because most of the construction costs that do or do not result from overruns
or reworks or regular works are determined during a design phase.

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3. Research Method
3.1. Approach
The approach taken by the researcher was to gather primary data from the
people that are indirectly1 and directly dealing with the monitoring of the
execution phase2, as well as being directly involved in the construction phase
of major projects within a governmental programme. The data was gathered
through a personal interview where the researcher conducted a structured
questionnaire to allow quantitative statistical analysis. Although the
questionnaire did not have any open questions where the interviewee could
openly state anything they wanted, the interviewer took note of any relevant
statements made by the interviewees to help the interpretation of the data
gathered by the questionnaire.
The process taken by the researcher consisted of the following activities:
1. Explanation of the research. The researcher emphasized that any
statements or information provided would be used only on a non-
attributable, confidential basis and the data collected during the
study would be used for the purpose of the researcher dissertation.
2. Consent permission. The researcher handed the consent permission
to the interviewees who gave their consent by signing the document.
1
Stakeholders that are only informed on the progress of the projects and have no direct
power over the project.
2
Execution phase considered here is the phase after the tendering process when the
contracts are awarded.

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3. The interviewer applied the questionnaire, took notes on statements
that would help in interpreting the data and sent the answered
questionnaire in PDF format to the interviewees.
3.2. Sample Population
The participants in the research, the interviewees, work for the state and
City Hall government as secretary executive, functional managers, PMO
managers, PMO analysts and civil engineers. The selected interviewees work
either monitoring the execution phase as Manager or Project Analyst, or PMO
Analyst or as a team member of the infrastructure construction projects3. They
oversee most of the infrastructure projects within both governments and they
would be the logical choice. The reason for both governments was to have a
more representative number of respondents once the methodology used by the
City Hall to monitor programmes came from the State Government. Before
selecting the interviewees, the researcher, in accordance with the secretary
executive and PMO manager for both governments, studied the function of each
interviewee and selected only the ones that were involved with infrastructure
projects. This was important to have more consistent data only on
infrastructure projects related or not to a Programme because it was noted that
some PMO analysts and managers supervise projects that are within or without
a programme.
Table 2 below summarizes the interviewees, the amount chosen and their
roles in the government structure.
3
From now on, the term “Project” will be used to relate to any project, major project and
programme.

20
Government
Function
Role
TotalAmount
ofpossible
interviewees
Amount
Selected
Amount
Interviewed
%ofinterviews
done
City Hall Executive
Secretary of
Secretariat of
Planning and
Management
Responsible for
overseeing more
than 700 projects
1 1 1 100%
City Hall Manager of the
Cabinet for
Special Projects
Responsible for
overseeing more
than 170 projects
1 1 1 100%
City Hall General Manager
of Secretariat of
Planning and
Management
Responsible for
overseeing more
than 700 projects
1 1 1 100%
City Hall PMO Manager Responsible for
overseeing more
than 20 projects
1 1 1 100%
City Hall PMO Analysts Responsible for
overseeing more
than 20 projects
5 3 3 100%
City Hall Project Analyst Responsible for
overseeing more
than 700 projects
11 5 2 40%
City Hall Engineers Responsible for
overseeing directly
40 construction
projects
5 5 4 80%
State Executive
Secretary of the
Secretariat of
the Cities
Responsible for
overseeing more
than 35 projects,
including the
projects related to
the World Cup 2014
1 1 1 100%
State Engineers Responsible for
overseeing directly
40 construction
projects
2 1 1 50%
State Project Analyst Responsible for
overseeing more
than 700 projects
10 4 1 25%

21
State PMO Manager Responsible for
overseeing more
than 100 projects
1 1 1 100%
State PMO Analysts Responsible for
overseeing more
than 100 projects
11 7 5 71%
Table 2. Interviewees and their role in the government structure
The total percentage of respondents was 71% of the total population chosen,
see figure 3 below. The distribution showed by the table above demonstrates
that PMO Analysts were the major respondents, making up 36% of the total
respondents. This is important because they are the ones analysing,
communicating, integrating the projects within or without a programme and
experiencing the problems encountered with the projects.
However, it is also important to mention that Civil Engineers were the second
largest group with 23% of the total respondents that correspond to
approximately 83% of the respondents of the group Engineers. The Engineers
are the ones who are directly supervising the construction on the construction
sites. Their feedback on the risks, issues and main problems is vital to the
analysis of the data and creation of the framework.

22
3.3. Questionnaire Design
The main objective of the questionnaire, see Appendix A for the entire
questionnaire, was to evaluate whether the interviewees were aware of the
existence of a formal process that was accountable and transparent. The
questionnaire was divided into three sections with a total amount of 57
multiple-choice type of questions. There were 17 open questions that were
mainly related to a multiple-choice question answered before, totally 74 total
questions.
The researcher conducted the questionnaire asking each question to the
interviewee, making sure that they would answer all questions. There were
some questions that were related to a previous answer, such as, “if no, why?”.
Figure 4 below shows an example of an open question (question #30) related to
a previous answer (question #29).
17
14
31
13
9
22
76%
64%
71%
58%
60%
62%
64%
66%
68%
70%
72%
74%
76%
78%
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
City Hall State Total
PercentageofRespondent
NumberofPeople
% of Respondent per Government
Amount Selected Amount Interviewed % of Respondent
Figure 3. % distribution of respondent per Government

23
Figure 4. Example of open question related to a previous answer.
The first section of the questionnaire, named Interviewee Identification,
aimed to identify the interviewees’ experience (months of work involved in
Projects), where they work (for which government), their function, and what
type of project they normally supervise and how many projects they have
supervised.
The objective of the second section, named Project(s) Characteristic(s),
was to understand the context of the Projects being managed or monitored by
the interviewees. The questions were related to characteristics of the project,
such as the average duration of the project, the budget, if their main project
was a sub-project related to a programme or megaproject, if the stakeholders
are formally identified and if the objectives of their main project are known by
most of the stakeholders.
Section three of the questionnaire was designed to try to understand whether
there was a formally established governing framework. The name of the section
was Governing Process and it was divided into three sub-sections. The first one
was concerned with the strategy used to prioritize, to manage the projects and
to check the level of involvement of the stakeholders. Figure 5 below show an
example of question presented in this section.

24
Figure 5. Typical question for the section three of the questionnaire, governing process.
The second sub-section was designed to try to understand the processes used
to assess mainly risk and scope, since any changes made with these processes
can affect other management processes. The third sub-section was designed to
evaluate the methodology used to assess the performance of the projects.
3.4. Data on five major projects within the world cup programme on
the host city of Recife
All the data was provided by the state Secretariat of the Cities responsible
for the bidding process for most of the projects within the 2014 World Cup
Programme for Recife.
Some information was gathered from the World Cup 2014 Transparency
Portal (Governo do Brasil, 2014a). In addition to having the data provided by
the state secretariat and from the Transparency Portal, the researcher
identified who among the possible interviewees would have more information
on the data. After the identification, a questionnaire, section 3.3 above, was
conducted with the interviewee and the researcher asked the interviewee to

25
relate each possible answer to the four major projects within the 2014 World
Cup Programme.
The purpose of this analysis was to complement the results obtained by the
questionnaires matching the answers to real examples that happened in a major
governmental programme, corroborating the results obtained by the
questionnaire.

26
4. Research Data
4.1. Questionnaire data
4.1.1 Section 1 – Interviewee Identification
The first section of the questionnaire had the objective of identifying the
interviewees, the type of projects they normally supervise and their experience
in time and amount of project supervised.
Figure 6. Average number of projects monitored per function of the interviewee
Data for the figure 6 above excludes the secretary executive and a manager
that only supervise the status of the project, i.e., they are not directly involved
in the monitoring of the projects and they are related to the projects only
through a higher functional hierarchy. The managers that were kept in the
figure above, although functional managers, act as a sponsor. This is despite
the fact that there was no clear evidence that they have a direct sponsor for
their projects.
Engineer Manager PMO Analyst
Project
Analyst
Average Number of Projects 4 84 10 96
Standard Deviation 2 77 8 52
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
TítulodoEixo
Average Number of Projects (+/- Standard Deviation)

27
From what we can see shown in Figure 7 below, most of the interviewees
have less than five years of work experience in the field of Project Management.
However, the Engineers that work directly on the construction site have more
than 10 years of experience. It is interesting to observe that although most of
the interviewees have little experience in Project Management, they are
monitoring a high number of the Projects. Perhaps that is due to the
characteristics of their function where they are constantly involved in meeting
with the several different stakeholders of the projects, while the Engineers are
normally in the field.
Figure 7. Interviewees Experience in Project Management
4.2.1 Section 2 - Project(s) Characteristic(s)
In the second section of the questionnaire the research tries to understand
the characteristics of the projects that are being monitored by the
interviewees. Most of the Projects, 55%, are sub-projects of a greater project,
as we can see in figure 8.
PMO Analyst Manager Engineer
Project
Analyst
Executive
Secretary
Average Months 33 51 149 32 96
Standard Deviation 10 27 101 18 34
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
MONTHS
Experience in Average months (+/- Standard Deviation)

28
That means that they are involved in the execution and control of
programmes and major projects. This is corroborated by figure 9 and 10 that
shows the size of budget and duration respectively of their main project.
The data also shows that the main stakeholders are identified in the projects;
see figure 11. However, there is not any method for mapping their
100-500 million 50-100 million 10-50 million Up to 10 million
Average 33 21 21 15
Standard Deviation 6 8 14 3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
MONTHS
Duration per size of the Main Projects being supervised (+/- Standard
Deviation)
Figure 10. Average duration of the Projects per budget category
major
project
4%
None
32%
Not sure
4%
Program
55%
Project
5%
% of projects supervised that
belongs to:
100-500
million
18%
10-50
million
23%
50-100
million
32%
Up to 10
million
27%
Size of the Main Projects being
supervised
Figure 8. Percentage of their main projects that
are sub-projects of others projects
Figure 9. Budget category distribution in
million Brazilian Reais

29
characteristics. It seems that they are only acknowledged because they are the
parties directly involved, see figure 12. In addition, there is almost no
stakeholder management method where, for instance, their power and their
conflicting interests are assessed, see figures 13 and 14 respectively.
No
73%
Yes
27%
Does your organisation
normally identify stakeholders'
conflicting interests?
No
77%
Yes
23%
Does your organisation normally
identify stakeholders' power and
influence?
Figure 14. Stakeholders’ conflicting
interest identification
Figure 13. Stakeholders’ power and influence
identification
No
18%
Yes
82%
Does your organization
normally identify the
stakeholders of the Projects?
Demanding
Secretariats
30%
Regulatory
Bodies
15%
Community
15%
Constructo
r
27%
Management
Subcontractor
13%
Who are your main Stakeholders?
Figure 12. Main StakeholdersFigure 11. Stakeholder identification

30
Figure 15 below shows that the main method used to control the projects is
time. Although there is not a specific question completing the figure 15 asking
why, the researcher hypothesises that Time Management was the most
answered due to political obligations taken by the politicians. That does not
mean that they do not use other method such as scope and cost management,
because by law they are required to control scope, cost and time when they
make amendments to the projects.
Figure 15. Project Management method used
4.3.1 Section 3 - Governing Process
Section three of the questionnaire is mainly related to the strategy used for
prioritizing the projects, the issues regarding the technical problems and the
process for monitoring.
20,5%
2,6% 2,6%
20,5%
7,7%
46,1%
0,0%
5,0%
10,0%
15,0%
20,0%
25,0%
30,0%
35,0%
40,0%
45,0%
50,0%
Cost
Management
Quality
Management
Risk
Management
Scope
Management
Stakeholder
Management
Time
Management
Project Management Method

31
An important observation that needs to be pointed out is the fact that most
of the interviewees think that a project’s successes is defined as “Products
delivered within the quality, budget and time contracted”, see figure 16 below.
That means that they are mainly worried about the Project Management
Processes and not really with the other dimensions of Project Success, such as
the ones related to the benefits brought by the Project’s objectives or to the
stakeholders’ satisfaction (Cooke-Davies, 2002).
Figure 16. Definition of Project success for the interviewees
Figures 17 and 18 below show a strong political influence in prioritizing
criteria. Figure 17 shows that 95% of the respondents affirmed that there are
some prioritization criteria in order to select the programmes or projects.
Although the Political criteria corresponds to 59%, some of the interviewees do
believe that the government is ensuing its Governmental Promise by structuring
and following its strategic objectives. One important thing to consider is that
the interviewees are very sure about the difference between Strategic
27%
55%
18%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Benefits or value brought
by products delivered
Products delivered within
the quality, budget and
time contracted.
Stakeholder's satisfaction
In your opinion, which option best defines success in a project?

32
Objective and Political criteria, because the answers came from an open
question and no interviewees mention both of them in the same answer.
Figure 19 below shows that there is almost no cross-project interference,
and for the interviewees lack of planning, figure 20, was the main reason.
However, communication among stakeholders was cited by several respondents
in an open question. A statement made by one of the interviewees says:
“The contracts are awarded in a decentralised way, so there is not a
global vision of the projects among the stakeholders.”
In addition, for another respondent politics is the main issue, as it can be seen
below, by answering the why question regarding the prioritization criteria.
“Political time – they have to execute in that period. Because
sometimes they only have the project funding for that period. So they
have to start the fastest possible way, even though problems and
interference among projects may arise during the execution phase.”
No
5%
Yes
95%
Prioritization Criteria
Figure 18. Type of prioritization criteriaFigure 17. Existence of Prioritization
Criteria
Political
59%
Strategic
Objectives
27%
others
14%
Which Criteria?

33
However, but for most of the respondents, figure 19 and 20, the main reason
for not conducting prior studies on cross-project interference was lack of
planning. So, by not conducting a prior study on cross-project interference the
group of stakeholders involved in the specific project may not know in advance
whether this project or parts of it impacts another project or is impacted by.
Then no additional cautions are taken which could cause reworks and overruns
to the programme.
Figure 19. Prior study on cross-project interference. Figure 20. Reasons for not conducting
prior study on cross-project
interference
Figure 21. Reliable delivery schedule
No
77%
Yes
23%
Is there, normally, a prior study on
cross-project interference?
Lack of
Planning
70%
Politics
12%
Don't
know
18%
Reaons for not conducting
prior study on cros-project
interference
No
86%
Yes
14%
At the beginning of a contract,
is there, usually, a reliable
delivery schedule?

34
One interesting result shows that 86% of the respondents answered that there
was no reliable delivery schedule, see figure 21 above. In some of their
spontaneous comments, see below, they mentioned that they could not trust
any formal documents because they knew that they would change on day one.
“I know it is going to change! It is still missing a lot of scope
requirements”
One of the interviewees brought up that although a specific contract was
awarded to a constructor, they could not start the project until they had to
hire another company to redo the entire construction design. Not to mention
that they could not include this extra cost as part of the actual cost for the
construction. This manoeuvre had to be done because the changes brought by
the new technical drawings would considerably change the design resulting in
a substantial cost increase. To the researcher’s surprise, the interviewee stated
that this case was not a common practice but it happened quite often.
In relation to the technical issues, most of the respondents related that to a
project requirement as in poor construction design or lack of detail design or
insufficient data. This shows why they are so confident that project amending
is a common practice, see figure 22.

35
Figure 22. Percentage of respondents that knew that Project
Amending is a common practice.
Figures 23 and 24 below show that the main reason for this certainty of
project amending is due to insufficient technical data, such as requirement
refinement and long history of procurement process without the necessary
construction detailed design, although Politics comes close. When the
researcher asked the average number of times projects were amended, the
average answer was four. Considering that the overall project duration was 22
months that gives approximately one project amendment every six months.
No
14%
Yes
86%
Is it common to know beforehand whether a
project will have amendments?

36
Figure 23. Reasons for project amending.
Figure 24. Amount of project procurement with the necessary construction detailed design.
When the respondents were asked for the reasons for bidding without the
necessary detailed design, lack of planning was the chosen answer with politics
37%
5% 5%
53%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
It has been made that
way in order to be
deployed quickly, due
to political pressure
Yes
The cost was poorly
estimated
Yes
The scope was poorly
elaborated
Yes
There isn't any
Project detailed
design
Yes
PERCENTAGEOFRESPONDENT Is it common to know beforehand whether a project will have
amendments?
Why?
45%
32%
23%
0% 0%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
0% 0-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-100%
%OFPROJECTS
how many of your projects have been bidden with all the Project
detailed designs needed?

37
coming in second, see figure 25 below. Nevertheless, Lack of Planning could be
a possible and logical result for political pressure. This is corroborated by figure
23 that shows that political pressure was an important driver.
Figure 25. Reasons for bidding without the necessary detailed design.
Regarding the monitoring process, which should be transparent and
accountable, most of the respondents do not believe in the existent KPIs. That
happens mainly because they just do not trust them. They think they are
neither well defined, nor reliable. For that reason, they judge them mainly
imprecise. Figure 26 below shows this relation.
5%
59%
5% 9%
23%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Bureaucracy Lack of planning Lack of
prioritization
Other Political
pressure
Percentageofrespondent
Why do you think you projects have been bid without the necessary
detailed design?

38
Figure 26. Reliability of the KPIs
The last section of the questionnaire asked whether the interviewees applied
any agile approach or if there was any method for that, see figure 27 below.
None of the respondents uses any agile approach. However, the researcher had
to explain to some of the interviewees what consists an agile approach and its
difference to waterfall.
Figure 27. Adoption of any agile approach for the execution control.
7% 7%
50%
36%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Other
No
They are hard to be
collected
No
They are imprecise
No
They don't reflect the
actual situation
No
PERCENTAGEOFRESPONDENT
Are the KPIs Reliable? Why not?
No
100%
Is there any agile approach where the planning
and execution control is based on partial
delivery, where the project is built over time?

39
In addition, it is not clear to the researcher whether there is any method for
monitoring the Project’s objective for a given time since 50% of the
interviewees answered yes. Again, the researcher had to explain what he meant
by the question, because the purpose was to establish whether the objectives
are measured, not the performance of the projects. See figure 28 below.
Figure 28. Monitoring of Project’s vision and purpose
4.2. Data on four major projects within the world cup programme
The data on the four selected projects are shown in the Appendix B. These
data were obtained by the State Secretariat of Cities and by Governo do Brasil
(2014a) where they have a web portal called Transparency Portal. This portal
shows the projects conducted by each state and its host city. In this portal,
there are some data on each one of the seven priority areas.
For the host city of Recife, there were four main transportation
infrastructure projects. Three of them were related to the implementation of
No
50%
Yes
50%
Are the project's Vision and purposes
monitored and measured?

40
a Bus-Rapid-Transport (BRT) corridor that would take the visitors from Recife
and/or its surrounding to the World Cup Stadium and the last one is related to
the construction of a metro terminal near the stadium. Figure 29 shows the
routes for the BRT projects.
Figure 29. BRT corridors (Governo do Brasil, 2013)
The four projects are presented by the table 3 below. On the table 4 is
presented the overruns based on the contracted value.
Project Name Object of the contract
BRT: Corridor
"CAXANGÁ" (East/West)
Construction works and engineering services to implement the
Public Transport East-West Corridor, located in the
Metropolitan Region of Recife.
BRT: Corridor "World
Cup City extension"
(East/West)
Construction works and engineering services for the
implementation of the BRT extension for the World Cup city,
located in the Metropolitan Region of Recife.
BRT: North/South -
section
Igarassu/Tacaruna/Recife
center
Construction works and engineering services to implement the
Public Transport North-South Corridor, located in the
Metropolitan Region of Recife.
Metro: Terminal "Cosme
e Damião"
Construction works and engineering services for the
implementation of the integrated Terminal "Cosme e Damião",
located in the Metropolitan Region of Recife.
Table 3. Main Transportation Project for the host city of Recife.

41
Project Name Contracted Value Actual value % cost overrun
BRT: Corridor
"CAXANGÁ" (East/West)
R$ 145.380.016,61 R$ 162.565.217,01 11,82%
BRT: Corridor "World
Cup City extension"
(East/West)
R$ 131.014.036,10 R$ 169.232.319,27 29,17%
BRT: North/South -
section
Igarassu/Tacaruna/Reci
fe center
R$ 151.113.293,56 R$ 216.344.448,18 43,17%
Metro: Terminal
"Cosme e Damião"
R$ 27.707.308,15 R$ 26.271.832,70
-5,18%
Table 4. Overruns for the four majors projects within the programme
It is important to observe that although the metro officially had a negative
overrun, the truth is quite the opposite. The original contract value for the
Metro Project was approximately R$18.2 million Brazilian Reais. However, the
state government due to poor performance of the builder terminated the first
contract. They had to launch a new bidding process and a new contract was
awarded to another company to finish the first contract. The cost of the new
contract was approximately R$9.5 million. So, if we consider the original value
of the contract, i.e., R$18.2 million and the actual cost of R$26.3 million
Brazilian Reais we would have a cost overrun of approximately 145%.
The next table shows a comparison of cost overrun between the average of
actual cost and contracted cost, and the average of actual cost and estimated
cost on decision to build.

42
Analysis over Contracted projects
Cost Time Amendments
Number
of
Projects
Total
Contracted Value
Total
Actual value
Average
Cost
Overrun
Standard
Deviation
Average
delay
(in
months)
Standard
Deviation
Average
Standard
Deviation
4 R$ 455.214.654,42 R$ 574.413.817,16 19,75% 20,99% 22 3 10 2
Table 5. Analysis over contracted projects
Analysis over Decision to Build (2010)
Cost Time
Number
of
Projects
Total
Estimated Cost
Total
Actual value
Average
Cost
Overrun
Standard
Deviation
Average
delay (in
months)
Standard
Deviation
4 R$ 317.000.000,00 R$ 574.413.817,16 54,11% 15,57% 16 6
Table 6. Analysis over decision to build
Although the researcher showed both tables, 5 and 6, for this dissertation
the researcher will consider table 5 for the analysis. That is because the
researcher has assumed for this dissertation that most of the technical problems
are due to the lack of technical data on the time of the contract.
As we can see in table 5 the average number of contract amending was 10.
That is a quite a large number considering the average results obtained by the
questionnaire, i.e., 4 amendments. According to the data, the main
amendment type was regarding scope, i.e., changes made in the scope or in
the requirements once the construction detailed designed was ready. That is
because the contracts were mostly contracted with only the preliminary design.
Figure 30 below shows the distribution of amendments per type.

43
Figure 30. Project amending type
4.3. Data Analysis
The questionnaire data has shown that politics is a strong driver that can
directly influence the technical issues. Nevertheless, the data from the analysis
of the four major projects within the World Cup Programme and especially
figures 23, 24 and 25 from the questionnaire data show that most of the
problems regarding cost and schedule overruns are directly related to technical
issues.
For the researcher this could happen because the politicians have a political
term and during their time as political leaders, they tend to launch programmes
even without the ideal conditions of budgeting, planning and control. This
assumption was made based on the results showed by the data and by the
spontaneous statements made by the respondents, such as the one below made
by one interviewee when he/she answered the question presented by figure 17
and 18.
Others
5%
Time
24%
Scope
change
71%
Project amending type

44
“There is a clear lacking of structured planning for the projects... We
launched everything at once, although not the best choice obviously…
There was a political need for that.”
For the researcher, this is very similar to what Flyvbjerg, et al. (2009) calls
“delusion” when managers spin scenarios of success and ignore the possibility
of making mistakes and miscalculations. Another spontaneous declaration
made by one of the interviewees, below, states that those mistakes happen at
the expense of the people (treasure funds) because some politicians tend to do
as much as possible during the term to deliver some benefits to the population.
This happens because there is still a lot to be done to ameliorate the peoples’
lack of adequate infrastructure.
“The population lacks many things, especially basic needs … there is
still a lot to do here to provide some dignity… they need to do as
much as they can, although it is not the best way.”
The data has shown that most of the problems encountered after the
contract is awarded are due to the lack of a detailed scope requirement, i.e.,
detailed construction design. However, one cannot ignore that behind the
technical problems there could be a political delusion as the most primary
driver.

45
5. Framework
The framework presented by this section consists of a set of processes that
aims to mitigate the risks and uncertainties faced by the projects after the
bidding process. It assumes that by adopting an agile approach to the planning
and execution control phase it will reduce the issues associated with the
technical data due to the lack of a detailed design.
The governing framework created in this section represents the core
processes used by the programmes’ major projects. These processes were
idealized based on the data analysis gathered from the questionnaire and by
the four major projects within the 2014 World Cup programme that showed that
the flaws were mainly caused by a lack of detailed construction design and
political prioritization.
For this reason, the empirical framework was idealized to diminish these
problems once they were procured without the necessary technical detailed
design. It does then use some agile approaches to handle the uncertainties.
Thus, it separates the projects within the programme, it identifies, categorizes
and involves the main stakeholders, it prioritizes the projects, it conducts cross-
project interference and it introduces the concept of “Construction Sprints”.
This governing framework is a part of a programme governance, which in
turn is part of public government governance. Figure 31 below illustrates a
framework containing several perspectives of governance, as well as their
relationship. It goes from a Public Governance where all the political promises

46
are put in place and broken down into Strategic Objectives, which are mostly
turned into projects or programmes.
The Public governance is not covered by this dissertation, but it is the macro
perspective that provides the formal arrangements in order to permit the public
government to state its decisions and carry out its actions. It also establishes
the constitutional values that should be granted and protected (Klakegg, et al.,
2009).
The Post-mortem Governance, which is also not covered by this dissertation,
should be concerned with the measurement of the value and benefits brought
by the programme implementation that cannot be assess during the duration of
the programme. These benefits are, normally, those ones that should be the
main concern of a governmental programme, for instance, the decline of child
mortality by implementation of sanitation.
The Programme governance is defined as the achievement of a major
purpose or benefit. It is obtained by the incremental benefits that are delivered
Postmortem
Benefit
measurement
CS 1 CS 2 CS ”n”
“Pn”
“P1”
Front-endPreliminaryPlanning
andProgrammePrioritization
Figure 31. Governance Perspectives

47
by the sum of the projects’ output. For that reason, the Programme Governance
should be concerned with the governing process of its projects (Müller, 2009).
The governing framework introduces to the infrastructure programme the
concept of Construction Sprints (CS) that are smaller project cycles of up to 45
days. This agile approach has as its main objective the introduction of a process
for continuous planning by adopting transparency, openness and accountability
aiming to reduce the exposure to risks not yet identified and to deliver the
physical outputs with the least possible amount of rework and delays minimizing
the overruns.
These cycles encourage an early stakeholders’ involvement where the
government stakeholders from the specific major project would constantly
meet with the contractors, PMO and others identified stakeholders over the
supervision of the Programme Steering Committee.
The stakeholders would then discuss project progress over the performance
specifications4, issues, risks and cross-project interference. Then the results
would be reported to the identified group of stakeholders, thus creating an
environment for cooperation, trust and transparency.
By adopting an early discussion of the issues commented on above, they
would introduce a planning and control method through the life cycle of the
project where they would have, for instance, a more reliable deliverable
schedule for each major project and thus for the governmental programme.
4
Technical specifications as well as projects objectives.

48
This process would also identify the construction activities that are less
likely to change due to misconception of the preliminary construction design.
It would also enable the approval of overlapping activities between
construction activities and design, it would control the major project
performance, it would do and/or approve the necessary detailed design for the
next CS and it would get the necessary buy-in from the main stakeholders.
So, in accordance with the framework the first main process is the
programme prioritization that is composed of three main criteria:
(1) Cross-Project interference. Which in turn is divided into other criteria
that are weighted5 as shown by table 7 below. After an analysis of each
type of interference, the corresponding letter is applied to each
intersection in the Matrix and then they are weighted resulting on the
Prioritization value. The type of interferences are:
D – Direct, which has a direct impact over the scope. The project or
some part of the project has a clear and unequivocal direct relation to
the other project that will interfere on its execution, i.e., it needs some
part of the other project to be ready in order to proceed with the
project execution.
I – Indirect, which has an indirect impact over the scope. The project
may or may not be direct related to the other projects, i.e., it is unsure
their interference on each other.
5
All the weighted values presented by this dissertation are figurative numbers.

49
N – None, where there is no relation between the compared projects.
After obtaining each value, they are then converted to centesimal
where their sum should be 100. Then they can be used as the
Prioritization value for this criterion.
Group 1 Group 2 Group "n"
Project1.1
Project1.2
Project1.n
Project2.1
Project2.2
Project2.n
Projectn.1
Projectn.2
Projectn.n
Sum
PrioritizationValue
Group
1
Project 1.1 v D D D N N N N N 12 26,1
Project 1.2 N V N D D N N N N 8 17,4
Project 1.n N N v N N I N N N 2 4,3
Group
2
Project 2.1 N I N v D I N N N 8 17,4
Project 2.2 N D I N V I N N N 8 17,4
Project 2.n N N N I I v N N N 4 8,7
Group
"n"
Project n.1 N N N N N N v N N 0 -
Project n.2 N N N N N N N v N 0 -
Project n.n N N N N N N N D V 4 8,7
Table 7. Interference Matrix
(2) Stakeholder Power and Interest. It is a weighted number for the Power
and Interest that each main stakeholder may have on each project within
the programme. After the stakeholders’ identification, they are then
assessed regarding their power and interest. Then the values are weighted
resulting the Prioritization Value. See table 8 below.
Programme
Grouping
Projects

50
(3) Political Strategic Relevance. It is included because it should reflect the
government strategic objective. Although it should be related to the
strategic objective, it is an open assessment where decimal values are
applied to each project.
Group 1 Group 2 Group "n"
Project1.1
Project1.2
Project1.n
Project2.1
Project2.2
Project2.n
Projectn.1
Projectn.2
Projectn.n
Stakeholder
Stakeholder 1 HH HM HH HH HM HM HH HL HH
Stakeholder 2 LH HL LL HM MM HH ML HH LL
Stakeholder n LL MM LL HH LH HL LH ML LH
Sum 12 20 10 28 15 25 16 21 12
Prioritization
Value
7,5 12,6 6,3 17,6 9,4 15,7 10,1 13,2 7,5
Table 8. Power and Interest Matrix
Each prioritization criterion value must be weighed generating a weighted
number for each project within the programme. Then these weighted values
are plotted in a graph that would characterise the Prioritization Criteria for the
Programme. The graph represented by picture 32 below shows, for example,
that the Project 2.1 has the highest priority according to the weighted criteria.
Observe that the further away from the centre, the higher is the project
priority.
However, the factor 'Natural Order of Execution' should be a key value for
decision-making regardless of the result obtained by the weighted values.
Because, normally, they are prerequisites for other projects’ execution. When
Projects
Power Interest Value
HH High High 10
HM High Medium 8
HL High Low 7
MH Medium High 6
MM Medium Medium 5
ML Medium Low 4
LH Low High 2
LM Low Medium 1
LL Low Low 0
Legend

51
there is no impediment for the ‘Natural Order of Execution’, prioritization
should be made by weighing the factors. The assigned weights should be agreed
and approved by the main stakeholders and make it public through its official
communication channels.
Figure 32. Prioritization criteria graph
The second main process brought by the framework is the Construction
Sprints that are schematized by the figure 33 below. As can be seen, it is a
continuous process where the lessons learned from a previous CS can be utilized
for the next CS.
Project 1.1
Project 1.2
Project 1.n
Project 2.1
Project 2.2Project 2.n
Project n.1
Project n.2
Project n.n
Prioritization Criteria

52
2/6 - 16/6
.
12/5
Monitoramento
Semanal
Monitoramento
Semanal
19/5
m
m
26/5
m
m
16/6
m
m
2/6
m
m
9/6
m
m
Plano de Ataque
5/5 - 16/6
CS1
45 days
Up to 15 days before
the end of the cycle
14/7 - 28/7
Planejamento Plano de Ataque 02
23/6
Monitoramento
Semanal
Monitoramento
Semanal
30/6
m
m
7/7
m
m
28/7
m
m
14/7
m
m
21/7
m
m
25/8 - 8/9
.
18/8
m
m
11/8
m
m
8/9
m
m
4/8
Monitoramento
Semanal
Monitoramento
Semanal
1/9
m
m
25/8
m
m
CS2 Planning
Section
CS “n” Planning
Section
CS “n+1” Planning
Section
Periodically Control
Meetings
Plano de Ataque
28/7 - 8/9
Plano de Ataque
16/6 - 28/7
CS2 CS “n”
45 days 45 days
5/5 - 16/6
.
CS 1 Planning
Section
28/7 - 8/9
.
Meetings
Meetings
29/12
.
End of Project
16/6 - 28/7
.
Figure 33. Construction Sprints
For each CS planning section the following arrangements should be
considered:
 Risk assessment from previous CS, actual CS and next CS
 Detailed design activities, i.e., which detailed design activities
should be done for actual CS and next CS
 Approval of previous detailed design activities
 Identification of construction activities that are less likely to change
due to modifications done at the detailed design
 Identification of a deliverable schedule for the actual CS plus
estimation for next CS due to activities dependencies
 Assessment of the impact of the possible rework caused by the
overlapping activities
 Performance assessment based on defined, publicized and approved
KPIs

53
After the specific planning section for the CS, periodically control meetings
are held in order to assess the CS. The main objective of the control meeting
is to monitor the progress of the actions implemented and to take the corrective
actions in case of plan deviation. For that, the control meeting should assess
open risks, new known risks, unknown risks and performance. For instance,
construction activities completed, deliverables handed in, physical progress,
actual costs, scope change, quality issues and so on.
It is important to note that each specific CS might not fit another CS from
other major projects within a programme. Each CS is unique once it is composed
of its own group of stakeholders, of overlapping activities, of risks and issues,
of deliverables and methods. That is because there are particularities within
each CS, and each one acts like a sub-project within the major project. So the
governing framework is the synergy among projects (P1, P2, P3, Pn) plus the
sum of benefits provided by each CS, and plus the benefits provided by other
projects within the programme as represented by Figure 34 below.
Figure 34. Governing Framework
“Pn”
Governing
“P2”
CS
1
CS 2 CS ”n”
“P1”
“P3”
Front-endPreliminaryPlanningand
ProgrammePrioritization
Deliverables

54
6. Discussion
6.1. Limitations
The research involved in this dissertation was limited because it involved a
small number of respondents and only few major projects within the 2014 World
Cup Programme in Brazil. Although the respondents were overseeing more than
700 projects, the actual amount of respondents was low.
In addition, the researcher did not have the opportunity to gather more data
from the World Cup programme within the other host cities that could have
improved the analysis of the overruns and their possible association to the
procurement process, thus contributing more to the Governing framework
developed in the chapter 5.
Another criterion for the limitation was the geographic one. Only data from
Pernambuco was gathered, although all Brazilian states have to follow Federal
Law 8.666/93 for their procurement process.
Finally, it is important to point out that the questionnaire could have been
better designed. It was noted that some questions should had been clearer
because the researcher had to explain many times what was meant. In addition,
it also should have had open questions unrelated to a previous one, where the
interviewees could have expressed better their answers.
6.2. Theoretical and Practical allegations
The researcher believes that the framework conceived by this dissertation
answers the two research questions proposed by this research project. It has

55
shown that it is possible to ameliorate the problems faced by the lack of
construction detailed design. It does that by adopting a set of processes
conceived for this end as showed by chapter 5. The researcher also believes
that the Agile approach used helps in understanding better the major projects
within the programme and mitigates its issues and uncertainties. The literature
has shown that Agile is already being applied to the Construction industry and
a governance based on this approach could be helpful, although there is not
much hard evidence on the literature.
However, for the researcher there is a breach in this type of process that
should be treated by the public governance. The questionnaire data and the
literature has evidenced that infrastructure projects that are conducted based
on preliminary design resulted in overruns due to the uncertainties that are
brought by the changes of the detailed design.
The researcher also acknowledges that it would be better to treat the root
causes of the issues, uncertainties and overruns from these major projects as
suggested by Flyvbjerg et al. (2003), Flyvbjerg (2007), Miller and Hobbs (2005)
and by Miller & Lesser (2000) instead of applying a framework to mitigate the
problems caused by the real factors. However, to apply the changes suggested
by these authors is a Herculean effort that needs a very strong political will or
a huge popular demand.

56
7. Conclusion
Cost overruns and schedule delays have already been deeply studied as
shown by the literature review. Although there are data on technical reasons,
the root causes for these overruns could be lock-in, bad decision-making
process, lack of proper planning, optimism bias or strategic misrepresentation.
Therefore, for this research, it is assumed that once the procurement process
was done wrongly because of any of the root causes, there will be many
problems caused by the inconsistency between the preliminary design and
detailed design as evidenced by the data analysis and by the literature review.
Although there is no physical evidence of the result of the implementation
of this framework, the researcher recommends the use of this empirical
framework to ameliorate the risks and issues arising from the contracts awarded
without the technical detailed designs.
Besides, the framework introduces accountability, openness and
transparency, which seems to be essential in improving governance of public
programmes.

57
Appendices
APPENDIX A. Questionnaire
Questions
Interviewee Identification
1 - For which government do you work? City hall State Federal
2 - What is your function? PMO analyst
Executive
Secretary
Manager Engineer Project Manager
3 - How long have you worked in Projects?
4 - What type of projects do you usually supervise? Health Education Mobility World Cup
Dams/Hydroelec
tric plants
Others
Project(s) Characteristics
5 - How many projects are you supervising or
monitoring or managing at the moment?
6 - Does your main project belong to any governmental
programme or major project or megaproject?
Project Program major project Megaproject Not sure No
7 - Are they aligned to any strategic objective? Yes No
8 - If so, what is it?
9 - What is the funding source for your main project? Town/City State Federal
10 - How large is your main project? (in Brazilian
Reais)
Up to 10
million
10-50 million 50-100 million 100-500 million Over 500 million
11 - What is the Object of the Contract of your main
Project?
Possible Answers
BID/BIRD

58
12 - What is your main project objective?
13 - Does your organisation normally identify the
stakeholders of the projects?
Yes No
14 - Are the projects objective known by the most of
the stakeholders or just by the main ones?
Main ones Most of them
15 - Normally who are the main stakeholders?
16 - What is the average duration of the projects you
are working on at the moment?
Governing
Strategy
17 - Is your main project part of another project, i.e.,
is it part of a bigger project or program?
Project Program Major project Megaproject Not sure
18 - Are there any project prioritization criteria? Yes No Not sure
19 - If yes, what are those criteria?
20 - Are the criteria well known and defined? Yes No
21 - Is there any prioritization in contracting or
execution of the projects?
Yes No Not sure
22 - If so, what are these criteria based on? Politics
Strategic
relevance
Popular
pressure
Natural order of
execution, that
is, it needs to be
completed in
order to start a
different one
Economic
Reason
Other
23 - How would you assess the process of approval,
choice and acquisition of projects?
Complex and
well defined
Simple and well
defined
Unstructured
Structured, but
lacks
management
Not sure
24 - Is there, normally, a prior study on cross-project
interference? That is, is it normally known whether the
contracted project may interfere with other projects?
Yes No
25 - If yes, do you also consider as a prioritization
criteria and how is this information used?
26 - If no, why?

59
27 - Is there any legal instrument requiring the
government to bid with all approved detailed designs?
Yes No Not sure
28 - Does your organisation normally identify
stakeholders' power and influence?
yes no
29 - Does your organisation normally identify
stakeholders' conflicting interests?
Yes No
30 - If no, why?
31 - Do the main stakeholders take part on the project
management and decisions made throughout the
Project life cycle?
Yes No Not sure
32 - If no, why?
33 - Are the main stakeholder normally Communicated
on the decisions made throughout the Project life
cycle?
Yes No Not sure
34 - if yes, how often? Weekly Bi-weekly Monthly
Every three
months
Every six
months
Other
35 - If yes, How is this communication made? Reports E-mail
Meeting
presentations
Informally Whatsapp
Other social
network
Other
36 - In your opinion, which option best defines success
in a project?
Products
delivered
Products
delivered within
the quality
contracted
Products
delivered within
the budget
contracted
Products
delivered within
the time
contracted
Products
delivered within
the quality,
budget and time
contracted.
Stakeholder's
satisfaction
Benefits or
value brought
by products
delivered
Other
Scope, Time and Risk
37 - In your projects, what is the main issue regarding
the scope?
The scope is
unknown
Project lacks
requirements
definition
The Project
designs are not
fully available
for its
execution
Lacks Project
detailed design
Lacks Project
architectural
design
Other
38 - Who does normally elaborates the project(s)
design(s)?
Government
technician
Third-party
business
(contracted)
Functional
manager
Product Supplier Other

60
39 - Are the products usually approved by someone? Yes No
40 - If so, by whom?
Government
technician
Functional
manager
Executive
secretary
State or City Hall
Secretary
Governor/Mayor
41 - Who does normally estimates the project budget?
Government
technician
Third-party
business
(contracted)
Functional
manager
Product Supplier Other
42 - How is done/based the budget estimation?
based on the
elaboration
of
preliminary
designs
based on the
elaboration of
the detailed
designs
based on
market survey
Based on
expertise
elaboration
Based on
supplier
elaboration
Based on
third-party
business
(contracted)
other
43 - Is there any method for a continual planning along
the projects, where you suggest or pact on new
deliveries or services needed?
Yes No
44 - Is it common to know beforehand whether a
project will have amendments?
Yes No
45 - If so, why?
There isn't
any Project
detailed
design
The scope was
poorly elaborated
The cost was
poorly
estimated
It has been made
that way in order
to be deployed
quickly, due to
political pressure
It has been
made that way
in order to be
deployed
quickly, due to
popular pressure
Other
46 - Considering that there will be Project
amendments, is the new scope monitored before its
formalization?
Yes No
47 - Is there any change process informing how the
new scope will be monitored?
Yes No
48 - Has any of your current projects suffered
amendments?
Yes No
49 - If so, what type? Time Scope Cost All
50 - How many amendments do they have, on average?

61
51 - Among the projects you supervise, how many of
them have been bidden with all the Project detailed
designs needed?
0% 0-25% 25-50% 50-75% 100%
52 - Normally why?
Lack of
planning
Political pressure Disorganization Bureaucracy
Lack of
prioritization
Popular
pressure
Other
53 - At the beginning of a contract, are the main risks
and issues known?
Yes No
54 - At the beginning of a contract, is there usually a
reliable delivery schedule?
Yes No
55 - Is there usually a clear understanding of this
Project's purpose?
Yes No Not sure
Methodology
56 - Which of the following methods does your
organisation use to mange projects?
Scope
management
processes
Integration
management
processes
Time
management
processes
Cost
management
processes
Risk
management
processes
Quality
management
processes
Stakeholders
management
processes
Other
57 - Are there well defined KPIs? Yes No Not sure
58 - Do you judge them reliable? Yes No Not sure
59 - If not so, why?
They don't
reflect the
actual
situation
They are
imprecise
They are hard
to be
understood
They are hard to
be collected
Other
60 - Are these indicators based on an existing
technique?
Yes No Not sure
61 - If so, which?
62 - Was there any study or method to create these
indicators?
Yes No Not sure
63 - If so, which?

62
64 - Are Status Reports created regularly? Yes No
65 - if so, how often? Weekly Bi-weekly Monthly
Every three
months
Every six
months
Other
66 - Who normally creates the status report? PMO Project Manager Contractor
Company hired
to manage the
Project
Not sure
67 - Is there any risk assessment? Yes No not sure
68 - If so, how is it done?
69 - Are there well defined processes for changes in
scope, time and cost?
Yes No Not sure
70 - Is there any agile approach where the execution is
based on partial delivery, where the project is built
over time?
Yes No Not sure
71 - If so, how is it done?
72 - Are the project's Vision and purposes monitored
and measured?
Yes No Not sure
73 - If so, how often? Weekly Bi-weekly Monthly
Every three
months
Every six
months
Other
74 - How are they Monitored? Reports E-mail
Meeting
presentations
Verbally Whatsapp
Other social
network
Other

63
APPENDIX B. Data on four major projects within the 2014 World Cup Programme
Table 9. Data on the four major projects within the 2014 world cup Programme

64
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