- Equality and DiscriminationCivil LibertiesCivil libertie.docx
Thesispub
1. MODUS VIVENDI, THE NEW UNDUE BURDEN OF THE FEDERAL EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
By: Nicholas A. Yanchar, J.D., LL.Mi
INTRODUCTION
Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate
our own moral code . . . [a]t the heart of liberty is the right
to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and the mystery of human life.1
This is one of the most powerful statements when it comes to human existence.
But this statement did not come from a book or a short story; it came from Supreme
Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in her majority opinion of Planned Parenthood v.
Casey. 2
Depressingly, moral views of the many have been allowed to overrule the
liberties of the few and courts have been unwilling to stand against those wronged by the
sword of injustice.
Gays3
have been the subject of disdain and hate since the late 1880’s, and to date
not much has changed.4
Advocates of anti-gay rhetoric in America have been successful
in restricting and combating against the liberties of human decency that the gay
community deserves.
Currently under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution, sexual orientation is a non-Suspect classification granting it
only Rational Basis review. This is the lowest standard that could be offered under Equal
1
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850-851 (1992).
2
Id.
3
Hereinafter, “gay” or “gays” refers primarily to gay men due to the historical stance against male
homosexuality, but lesbian women are included in this definition where appropriate, or unless otherwise
specified.
4
See also, General Article, Sexual Orientation and the Law: A Selective Bibliography on Homosexuality
and the Law, 1969-1993, 86 Law Libr. J. 1 (1994).
2. 2
Protection violations. This standard is insufficient to rectify intentional and purposeful
discrimination that has been enacted by the government against the gay community.
Injustices against this community have been aggressive and highly intrusive
throughout history. Besides legal restrictions, medical experiments—either voluntary or
involuntary—such as electroshock therapy and brain surgery were conducted on gay
men.5
No matter how hard people have tried to erase gays from the country however,
they have always persevered.
Eventually, the gay community fought back leading America to come to terms
with homosexuality.6
This revolution lead America to current day where homosexuality
is more rooted in society and those who are gay have come out of the closet proclaiming
equality. However, equality is only a pipe dream when the Equal Protection Clause
offers minimal protections from state intrusion.
One-hundred and thirty-three years7
after the first anti-gay law was enacted in
America and forty-three years8
after the revolt by the gay community for equality, the
United States Constitution has still failed to offer protections to this worthy class.
This article has one focus it seeks to advocate: higher protections for
discrimination based on sexual orientation. This author’s argument is adopting a new
standard of review under Equal Protection altogether, deemed the Modus Vivendi Nexus
Standard, in consideration of court reluctance to allow higher protections under a current
standard for the gay community.
5
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylaw 81 (Harvard Univ. Press eds., 1999).
6
Symposium, Stonewall at 25, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 277 (1993).
7
Eskridge, supra note 5, at 2.
8
Symposium, supra note 6, at 2.
3. 3
The Modus Vivendi Nexus Standard requires showing a nexus between an
important governmental objective to the statute or law at issue, and if such nexus is
shown, that the statute or law is narrowly tailored to achieve that goal without violating
one’s right to practicing their sexual orientation.
Throughout this article, there will be two main parts with subparts. The first part
will show the historical discrimination by America, while the second part will address the
legal history and analysis, including the proposal for the new Modus Vivendi Nexus
Standard.
The first part has three sub-parts. Subpart one presents the idea of disgust in
politics and how that played a roll in sodomy laws, gender roles, and pre- and post-World
War I politics and constitutional restraints of expression.
The second subpart presents the transformation of disgust to immorality resulting
in a Kulturkampf, including a comparison of American and Nazi-Germany laws. In
addition, this author will address the evolution of the medical community’s opinion on
homosexuality and how that impacted American law.
The third subpart will analyze the revolt of the homosexual community from 1969
to present. Specifically, this part will address the gay rights movement and how America
took defense against the arguments for equality.
The second main part will consist of two subparts. Subpart one will analyze the
historical context and evolution of the Equal Protection Clause. Within this subpart there
will be an analysis of its classifications, standards of review, importance and
unimportance of fundamental rights in Equal Protection analysis, and deconstruction of
the requirements for the different classifications.
4. 4
The second subpart will introduce the Modus Vivendi Nexus Standard.
Contained therein will be the meaning of the standard, discussion of fundamental rights
in relation to sexual orientation, deconstruction of the proposed Standard, and counter
arguments. Within the counter arguments, there will be proposed arguments discrediting
the new Standard and responses to those attacks. Lastly, an application of the Standard
used in two case examples.
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
It is common knowledge that gays and lesbians are not treated equally with their
heterosexual counterparts. Unlike heterosexuality, the gay community has been subjected
to hateful and demoralizing actions by individuals, local and state governments, and the
federal government.9
As a result gays have lived in fear of being who they are due to the
ramifications and lack of protections from the constitution, which theoretically, was
created to prevent those injustices.10
One possible explanation has been presented how these injustices have been
allowed to occur without redress: the idea of disgust. Many strategies and arguments in
politics have unconsciously used the idea of disgust in anti-gay laws.11
A deeper analysis
produces visualizations like “feces, other bodily fluids, corpses, and animals or insects
that have related properties (slimy, smelly, oozy).”12
Specifically, projective disgust—projection of disgust properties onto a group or
individual—is act of a group or person linking another group or person based on one of
9
This whole article addresses the statements made within this sentence.
10
Alba Conte, Sexual Orientation and Legal Rights, ix (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. eds., Vol. 1 1998).
11
Martha C. Nussbaum, From Disgust to Humanity 8 (Oxford Univ. Press eds, 2010).
12
Id. at 14.
5. 5
the principles outlined above.13
Historical examples include the Nazi opinions of Jews as
slimy or similar to maggots, although we know that is untrue, it worked for Nazi
Germany.14
Thusly, it is not shocking that gays fall into the idea of disgust for mainstream
society.15
In gay-male sex visualizations of “contamination-by-penetration,” that is,
semen to feces is produced.16
Arguably heterosexual sex is no better besides the strong
connection to mortality and reproduction.17
One key difference however between gay
and heterosexual sex is that in gay sex a male receives the bodily fluids (semen) while in
heterosexual sex the woman is the one who receives those fluids.18
These graphic visualizations have a purpose: the idea of disgust has been forced
upon subordinate groups as a way of stigmatizing them as sick and inferior.19
However,
disgust provides no valid reason for compromising equalities that are constitutionally
required.20
Nonetheless, this has not stopped society from condemnation of gays to
second class-citizens. The following history accounts of how disgust was projected in
America’s perception on gays.
I. Immorality to Regulation of Sexual Intimacy.
In 1881, the post-Civil War state of New York passed a bill criminalizing sodomy
but not specifying homosexuals as the intended class.21
As a result of these kinds of laws
enacted between the 1880’s and 1900’s, male subcultures were born in New York City,
13
Id. at 16.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 18.
16
Id. at 18-19.
17
Id. at 19.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 20.
20
Id. at 21.
21
Eskridge, supra note 5, at 2, 19.
6. 6
San Francisco, St. Louis, Philadelphia, Chicago, Boston, New Orleans, and Washington
D.C. By the early 1900’s, Milwaukee, Denver, Louisville, and Portland (Oregon) were
considered as “homosexual capitals.”22
During this period, American doctors considered the cause of this gender-related
detour from mainstream society concluding that this type of gender inversion was a
dangerous sickness.23
These conclusions in conjuncture with media influence resulted in
defensive action in all states.24
These included anti-gay societies, civilians assisting
police in arrests of those engaged in sodomy, gender-role inversion of prostitutes and
theatre, and gay establishments.25
Until 1921, “social disgust and state action” played out at the municipal, state, and
federal levels aiming at suppression of gender roles and sexual variations.26
Specifically,
states responded by enforcing felony sodomy statutes with neutral application to male
and females alike.
A shift from concern of homosexuality to a higher societal concern about same-
sex eroticism occurred due to the Newport investigation in March 1919,
contemporaneous with World War I.27
This investigation concerned sailors who cross-
dressed, were described as effeminate, solicited and performed oral sex with other men,
and were deemed “morally degenerated.”28
By Court Marshall, they were dishonorably
discharged and jailed. In response, Congress and the War Department quietly passed an
ex-post facto Articles of War criminalizing the same acts these sailors were imprisoned
22
Id. at 21.
23
Id. at 22.
24
Id. at 23.
25
Id. at 23-24.
26
Id. at 24.
27
Id. at 36.
28
Id. (citing 1919 Court of Inquiry Transcript, 268-269, which can be found in National Archives, Record
Group 125, Records of Proceedings of Courts of Inquiry etc., No. 10821-1).
7. 7
for, specifying that the armed forces could forcibly remove or exclude “all suspected
perverts.”29
Thus, this was the military’s first regulation with legal support screening out
gay male applicants who wanted to enlist.30
During the era of World War I, 31
psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud published his
opinion on sexual orientation presenting a different perspective.32
He believed that
sexual orientation was “a crucial part of a person’s identity, distinct from biological sex
or gender character.”33
He argued that all human beings were innately bisexual, and in
his opinion, declared homosexuality more culturally learned then biological.34
When
discussing possible “conversion therapies,” he argued they were unrealistic by comparing
the idea that you cannot convert a homosexual to heterosexual with any more ease as you
could doing the opposite.35
His theory, along with a society going through a sexual
transformation with gender roles and sexuality, made society uncomfortable causing
reactions.
One example of a reaction happened in an Ohio case where a judge deemed
homosexuals “sexual perverts [who] were ferocious animals who engaged in a degenerate
sexual commerce with little boys or little girls.”36
This decision became the groundwork
for a state like Ohio to create state interests in controlling and punishing the supposed
29
Id. at 36-37.
30
Id. at 37.
31
Actually beginning in 1910, but influential highly in World War I era.
32
Id. at 38. (citing Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on Sexuality (1905) and The Psychogenesis of a Case of
Homosexuality in a Woman (1920)).
33
Id. at 39.
34
Kenji Yoshino, Covering 36 (Random House, eds., 1st
ed. 2006).
35
Id.
36
Barnett v. State, 135 N.E. 647, 649 (Ohio 1922).
8. 8
psychopathic homosexual, drive any expression of it underground, and protect the
public.37
Post World War I had a massive influx of gay subculture and the government
worked harder on publically suppressing it.38
In order for the state to curtail youth from
being attracted to this subculture, it restricted positive role models as a deterrent.39
The government suppressed gay association by police departments being made
aware of popular gay hangouts and organizing teams posing as decoys to attract
solicitations, raiding gay bars, baths, and other spaces.40
Revocation of a liquor license as a method of control by the state, requiring “good
character” and preventing the premises from being a “resort of disreputable persons.”41
If
a violation occurred, their liquor license would be suspended or revoked.42
Books with homosexual themes or conduct were censored and removed from
bookshelves. However, uncensored literary works depicting homophobia and work of
sexologists were not censored.43
In filmography, censorship was effortlessly used on homosexual depictions by a
Supreme Court exemption of movies from First Amendment protections.44
Thus,
Hollywood adopted the Production Code in 1930 preventing any mention of
37
Yoshino, supra note 34, at 7, 45.
38
Eskridge, supra note 5, at 2, 43.
39
Id. at 44.
40
Id. (citing Allan Berube, The History of Gay Bathhouses in Policing Public Sex 187-220 (Dangerous
Bedfellows, eds., 1996)).
41
Id.
at
45.
(citing
Chicago
Code,
1911,
§§ 1525-26, 1536).
42
Id.
43
Id.
at
46.
44
Id.
at
48.
9. 9
homosexuality in movies or on Broadway, but could be replaced by “sissy” and
“tomboy” instead.45
In 1940, America instituted the mandatory draft and the Newport event
resurfaced. Except this time the military instituted a screening process that intrusively
asked new recruits their sexual orientation upon enlisting, men and women46
alike.47
However when they asked women their orientation, it ended up beginning the next big
homophobic investigation by the government since Newport. This time it happened at the
Women’s Army Corps (hereinafter “W.A.C.”) training camp in the spring of 1944.
Triggered by a letter from a mother suggesting that there were a bunch of sex maniacs
and homosexuals at W.A.C., she specifically stated that one alleged “maniac” had
molested her daughter.48
The time between the Newport and WAC investigations reflects
the transition from the focus of “immorality” to the state wanting to regulate specific
intimacy, regardless if it was consensual.49
This next time period started the recognition that social and intellectual
developments strongly influenced law. 50
Those who realized they fell into this
disfavored category internalized the shame and assumed a “mask,” remaining silent about
their individuality and trying to correct the imbalance that supposedly occurred within
them.51
The law supported this pressure by normalizing sex based on heterosexual
45
Id.
at
48-‐49.
See
also
William
N.
Eskridge,
Jr.,
Law
and
the
Construction
of
the
Closet:
American
Regulation
of
Same-‐Sex
Intimacy,
1880-‐1946,
82
Iowa
L.
Rev.
1007
(1997).
46
Originally,
women
were
never
asked
their
sexual
orientation
until
after
July
1944.
See
supra
note
32,
at
7.
47
Eskridge, supra note 5, at 2,
50.
48
Id. at 51. (citing Lieut. Col. Birge and Capt. Ruby Herman, Report to The Acting Inspector General, July
29, 1944 (available at the National Arhives, Record Group 159 [Office of Army Inspector General], File
333.9 [Third WAC Training Center])).
49
Id.
50
Id. at 52.
51
Id.
10. 10
procreation and giving power to those who wanted to control the homosexual.52
If a
person would be strong-willed enough to protest against this, it fell on deaf ears since
they had no legal remedy.53
Being forced underground, the gay culture mutated into a double-life conundrum:
gay behind closed doors, and claiming to be heterosexually “normal” to the world. The
law potentially is the literal cause of this mutation: one could attack gays without
accountability by teaching that they were subhuman.54
In reality, gays had only two
options: lie and commit to a never-ending masquerade of heterosexuality, or tell the truth
and face ruin, jail, or asylum.55
II. Scalia’s Kulturkampf: Immorality to Sickness to Erasure.
“The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.”56
This was the first line in
the dissent of Romer v. Evans57
by Justice Antonin Scalia. A Kulturkampf literally
means “culture battle,” and this author will address this line in more detail below.
However, the relevance at this point in historical evaluation is appropriate, as it is
obvious that Justice Scalia did not believe such a culture war existed in that case—or
ever. Conversely, quite the opposite is proven through the next few years of history
creating the highest point of entanglement between disgust toward gays and an attempt at
their extinction.
World War II transformed the gender roles of America: sending women from the
traditional kitchen-esque female duties to work, while the heterosexual men (or those
52
Id.
53
Id. at 53.
54
Id. at 54.
55
Id. at 56.
56
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57
Id.
11. 11
“masked”) fought overseas. Sadly this was short-lived, as once the war was over
relaxation of gender roles were diminished again forcing gays back underground—aka
“the closet.”58
However, this posed a threat to many Americans comparable to the Red
Scare. 59
As a result, America began forcibly removing gays from the closet: an American
Kulterkampf.
In 1947 Herbert Hoover, former FBI director, announced that the highest increasing
crime was that of sex offending and that such people, comparable to animals, were
allowed to roam freely in America.60
Of course it didn’t take long for the press to inflate
this claim, which not only re-gassed the fires of the child-molestation-homosexual
correlation, but targeted the group responsible: homosexuals.61
Thus, between 1946 and 1961 criminal prosecutions on that premise resulted in
approximately one million gays being incarcerated for simple things such as consensual
adult intercourse, dancing, kissing, or holding hands.62
In 1948 the nation’s capital passed its first sodomy law 63
with sentencing
enhancements deeming all homosexuals as “sexual psychopaths.”64
In 1953, Congress
changed the law to allow police to peer into the private lives.65
Naturally, states
piggybacked enacting similar statutes themselves. This was when the flushing of the
proverbial closet reached full swirl.
Imploring the same tactics as pre-World War I, police again became highly intrusive
into the private lives of gays. Spying on gays often meant spending hours perched above
58
Eskridge, supra note 5, at 2, 59.
59
Referring to the idea of communist invasion after World War II.
60
Eskridge, supra note 5, at 2, 60.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
D.C. Code § 22-3502, 62 Stat. 347 (1948).
64
Eskridge, supra note 5, at 2, 60-61, see also Id. at (b).
65
D.C. Code, supra note 63, at 11.
12. 12
public toilets, peeking into parked cars, and even following them and peering through
their bedroom doors.66
The Kulturkampf rooted in disgust didn’t end here, but continued
and while getting progressively worse.
A. Nazi-Germany and Pre and Post-World War II on anti-homosexual
regulation.67
In 1933, Adolf Hitler declared all homosexuals an enemy of the state as a threat to
German youth, their morals, and reproduction.68
Congress enacted a similar statute 1950
but added national security risks to the list, which was reaffirmed by Eisenhower in
1953.69
In 1935, German sodomy law was expanded to include any sexual contact between
two men, with higher penalties for sex with a minor, but never mentioned woman.70
In
1948, Congress adopted the same type of law with harsher penalties.71
In 1936, German criminal police established special units for detecting homosexuals
and used raids to achieve group arrests; while by 1950 many states had similar squads in
place and gay raids resulting in group arrests.72
In this same year—1936—the Reich
Office for Combatting Homosexuality and Abortion was created as a clearinghouse for
information about homosexuals; comparable to 1937 when the FBI collected similar
information for dissemination to agencies and employers.73
In 1937, the Reich sentenced homosexual offenders to concentration camps and
subjected them to medical experiments and treatments like castration. America’s
66
Eskridge, supra note 5 at 2, 64. See, e.g. People v. Earl, 31 Cal. Rptr. 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) [gay
couple spied on by police peering through glass into motel room].
67
This
in
no
way
is
to
minimize
the
horrific
and
grotesque
treatment
of
Jews
in
the
holocaust.
68
Id. at 80.
69
Id., citing Gunter Grau, eds., Hidden Holocaust? Gay and Lesbian Persecution in Germany, 1933-45.
70
Id. at 81.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
13. 13
equivalent was after 1946, by sentencing gays to hospitals or special wards and subjected
them to the same as the Reich, but the more common American experiments were
electrical and pharmacological shock treatments and lobotomies.74
From 1942 to 1944, Wehrmacht High Command issued guidelines regarding
homosexuality in the armed forces, and America did the same during the same period.
However, American post-war guidelines increased the penalties for those caught as
homosexual in the armed forces that were higher penalties then Wehrmacht had.75
The similarities are disturbing, and while America never conducted execution of
homosexuals simply for being labeled such, it did conduct experiments. Terminology
presents one key difference between Nazi Germany and America’s treatment of gays:
Nazi’s goal was genocide, while America’s was a Kulturkampf by attempting erasure.76
B. Scientific influence on anti-homosexual regulation.
In 1948, Alfred Kinsey published his report77
on sexual behavior in the human male,
followed by a similar report78
on sexual behavior in the human female in 1953.79
Regarding his report on the human male, he recognized the social significance of
homosexuality is “considerably emphasized by the fact that both Jewish and Christian
churches have considered this aspect of human sexuality to be abnormal and immoral.”80
He acknowledged that “[s]ocial custom[s] and . . . law are sometimes very severe in
74
Id.
75
Id.
at
82.
76
Id.
77
Alfred Kinsey, et al., Homosexual Outlet in Sexual behavior in the Human Male 610 (1948)
78
Alfred Kinsey, et al., Homosexual Responses and Contacts in Sexual behavior in the Human Female 446
(1953) (I am not addressing this article here as there were no additional information that would support or
attack this paper’s thesis.).
79
William Rubenstein, Lesbian, Gay Men and the Law 1 (New York New Press eds., 1st
ed. 1993).
80
Id.
14. 14
penalizing one who is discovered to have had homosexual relations.”81
Punishments for
being labeled gay in society caused him to analyze the aspect of homosexuality as a cause
and effect hypothesis.
He concluded that homosexuality was something imbedded deep in a person’s
personality. He further acknowledged that humans forget that they are part of the animal
kingdom and this required recognizing that having only two classifications for human
males is an improper categorization. 82
This report played no role in the scientific
community’s opinion however, as the religious and legal influences superseded his
research.
In 1952, the first Diagnostic Statistic and Mental Disorders Manual83
(hereinafter
“DSM”) listed a number of diseases for diagnosis and treatment, and deemed
homosexuality as a “psychopathology.”84
It was here where the legal and medical
community’s almost seemed to merge, allowing “correction” therapies for
homosexuality. Whether voluntary or involuntary, gays were legally powerless to protect
themselves.
Not surprisingly the legal and religious influence on DSM classifications worked its
way into the case law in support for cases involving homosexuality. Such a case was
Boutilier v. Immigration Services,85
a 6-3 decision, which deported a bisexual Canadian
immigrant because homosexuality was deemed a “psychopathic personality.” This
81
Id.
82
Kinsey, supra note 77, at 13.
83
See also, Donald H.J. Hermann, article, Legal Incorporation and Cinematic Reflections of Psychological
Conceptions of Homosexuality,70 UMKC L. Rev. 495 (2002). (further discussion and analysis on the DSM
beyond this article’s scope).
84
Yoshino, supra, note 43 at 7, 38.
85
Boutilier v. U.S., 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
15. 15
decision ignored the dissent’s argument86
using Kinsey’s report conveying that it was
impossible to define a person as a homosexual.87
This classification stayed in the DSM until the second re-printing of the DSM-II88
in
1973 where homosexuality was downgraded from a mental disorder to a sexual variant
only.89
In a position statement written by Robert L. Spitzer, who was involved in
nomenclature and statistics of the DSM, stated that by not removing the variant of
homosexuality as an illness would be “misused by some people outside of our profession
who wish to deny civil rights to homosexuals.”90
However, he warned that changing the
variant will not recognize, medically speaking, that homosexuality would be as normal as
heterosexuality.91
Specifically, he criticized that if we maintained homosexuality as a
disease then we “have to add . . . celibacy, revolutionary behavior, religious fanaticism,
racism, vegetarianism, and male chauvinism.”92
In a follow up Psychiatry Journal written by Spitzer on DSM-II, he recognized it was
“inconsistent for homosexuality to be singled out as a mental disorder merely because of
negative societal attitudes.”93
He acknowledged that a common trait in homosexuals—as
a possible counter-argument for inclusion in the DSM—was “subjective distress or . . .
associated with generalized impairment in social effectiveness of functioning.”94
This
was mitigated by the fact that “homosexuality is not associated with distress . . .
86
Dissenters were Douglas, Brennan, and Fortas.
87
Id. at 125-135.
88
First edition printed in 1968.
89
Robert Spitzer, The Diagnostic Status of Homosexuality in DSM-III: A Reformation of the Issues, Am. J.
Psychiatry 138:2 (1981).
90
Robert L. Spitzer, Homosexuality and Sexual Orientation Disturbance: Proposed Change in DSM-II, 6th
Printing, page 44, 730008 American Psychiatric Assoc. (1973). (can be found at:
http://www.torahdec.org/Downloads/DSM-II_Homosexuality_Revision.pdf).
91
Id. at 3.
92
Id. at 2.
93
Spitzer, supra note 89, at 15.
94
Spitzer, supra note 90, at 15, 2.
16. 16
[although] many claim that if there were no societal discrimination against homosexuality
and no societal expectation of heterosexuality, homosexuals would never be distressed by
their sexual orientation.”95
In the DSM-III, published in 1980, the definition changed again marking
homosexuality as “ego-dystonic,” that is, classifying it as “other sexual disorders”
including “distress about one’s sexual orientation.”96
The criticism against this diagnosis
was (1) no comparable equal to a heterosexual distress disorder; and (2) consequences of
being labeling homosexuality as an illness.
Certainly, heterosexuals are frequently distressed by some
aspects of their sexuality . . . there is not a single case . . .
that describes an individual with a sustained pattern of
heterosexual arousal who was distressed by being
heterosexually aroused and wished to acquire homosexual
arousal in order to initiate or maintain homosexual
relationships . . . the inability of most heterosexuals to
function homosexually puts them at no disadvantage except
in extraordinary situations . . . [o]n the other hand, inability
to function heterosexually has the built-in consequence of
preventing, or at least interfering with, the ability to
procreate—a matter that some judge to be not
inconsequential.97
Although the illness/psychopathic disorder definition was removed from the DSM,
this did not detour many from still classifying it as a problem. In the 1978 case of
Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 98
Certiorari was denied where the University of Missouri denied
recognition to Gay Lib because it would spread homosexuality, holding such denial
unconstitutional. Justice Rehnquist in a dissenting opinion, concurred by Justice
95
Id.
96
Am. Psychiatric Assoc., DSM-III, 296 (3rd ed. republished, 1980).
97
Spitzer, supra, note 89, at 15.
98
Ratchford v. Gay Lib.,434 U.S. 1080 (1978).
17. 17
Blackmun, proposed that Certiorari should have been granted and classified the issue at
hand as:
[T]he question is more akin to whether those suffering from
measles have a constitutional right, in violation of
quarantine regulations, to associate together and with others
who do not presently have measles, in order to urge repeal
of a state law providing that measle[sic] sufferers be
quarantined.99
This misappropriation has been interpreted to mean “[g]ays were not citizens who could
assemble with others to persuade them of their cause. They were lepers who would infect
all they touched.”100
Additionally, the same Immigration and Naturalization Service that excluded
Boutilier101
did not until 1990—17 years after the removal by the DSM—surrender the
power to exclude homosexuals as psychopaths.102
It is incredulous that the legal community was not influenced by the trend of the
medical progression on the opinion of homosexuality. However much the degree of
influence, it bears acknowledging that this time period as a whole created a Kulturkampf
that is still alive and well in today’s society.
III. Gay is Good: Stonewall Riots of 1969 and the beginning of the rebellion and
attempted liberation.
On June 27, 1969, at Stonewall Inn in Greenwich Village located in New York City, a
gay bar was visited by police officers with a warrant to—for all purposes—kick out the
gays from the bar.103
In the beginning, they all complied, applauding and cheering for
99
Id. at 1084.
100
Yoshino, supra note 34, at 7, 45.
101
Boutilier, supra note 85, at 14.
102
Id. at 41.
103
Symposium, Stonewall at 25, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 277 (1993).
18. 18
each other as they were forcibly removed from the bar.104
However, when drag queens
and a lesbian were forced into a paddy wagon, it resulted in a riot. The crowd started
throwing beer cans, bottles, and rocks at the police forcing them to take refuge in the
same bar they just emptied.105
Inside they were subjected to cobblestones and trashcans
filled with burning paper thrown into the Inn, and ultimately the Inn was set on fire.106
Gays around the country were tired of being treated worse than animals and the
country took notice. Stonewall did not only open the preverbal closet door but started a
national coming out of the closet event. “After Stonewall, lesbian and gay college groups
grew like weeds in a vacant lot,”107
and “hundreds of new organizations formed, most
notably GLF (Gay Liberation Front) and its successor GAA (Gay Activists Alliance)”. 108
In the area of literary censorship, new publications emerged, “many of these new
publications were radical, advocating positions such as lesbian separatism (The Furies),
free love (Gay), and gay political militancy (Gay Power). Community-centered
newspapers, such as The Gay Blade in Washington, D.C., and the Bay Area Reporter in
San Francisco, were established in this period identifying political points of contest.”109
Almost as a direct cause-and-effect, Hollywood’s censorship on movies was lifted,
mostly noting their increased awareness of their gay audiences.110
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
William
N.
Eskridge,
article,
Challenging
the
Apartheid
of
the
Closet:
Establishing
Conditions
for
Lesbian
and
Gay
Intimacy,
Nomos,
and
Citizenship,
1961-‐1981,
25
Hofstra
L.
Rev.
817,
880
(1997).
108
Id.
at
875.
109
Id.
at
888.
110
Id.
at
898.
19. 19
Gays started to enter into politics, most notably with the story of Harvey Milk who
moved from New York in 1972 to Castro Street in San Francisco.111
Initially opening a
camera shop, he ran a total of three times for city supervisor, losing the first two attempts
but winning the third in 1977.112
Unfortunately, his public office tenancy was cut short
when he was assassinated in 1978.113
Not surprisingly, anti-homosexual campaigns
surfaced alongside the now more vocal and open gays of society.
One notoriously known anti-gay activist was Anita Bryant who zealously campaigned
against the homosexual agenda for equal rights in Florida. With her “Save Our Children”
campaign, she believed she was correctly rooted for protest through a power that God
gave her in claiming homosexuality a sin and using a role model argument that was
ultimately successful.114
Her successful influence swept across other states115
using the
same belief system to pass similar laws.116
In 1986, the first gay rights case hit the Supreme Court, Bowers v. Hardwick. 117
Michael Bowers was charged with consenting same-sex sodomy—a felony—when police
entered his private bedroom on a call for an alleged robbery. He was charged and
sentenced where on appeal to the Supreme Court they held with a plurality that the
charge and sentence would stand since no fundamental right was violated. The dissent
argued that the decision should not have been issued for four principles: the right to be let
111
PBS
Online,
Harvey
Milk,
Hero
and
Martyr,
http://www.kqed.org/w/hood/castro/resourceguide/harveymilk.html
(last
visited
May
12,
2012).
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Michael England, Note, In Whose Best Interest? Florida’s Statutory Ban on Homosexual Adoption and
the Arguments Set Forth in Support of an Absolute Ban, Represent the Perceived Best Interest of a
Conservative Morality and Not Those of the Children, 9 Whittier J. Child & Fam. Advoc. 279, 287 (2010).
115
Other states that were influenced: Minn., Kan., Okla., Or.
116
Anthony E. Varona, Article, Setting the Record Straight: The Effects of the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 1997 on the First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights of Gay and Lesbian
Schoolteachers, 6 CommLaw Conspectus 25, 31 (1998).
117
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
20. 20
alone, violation of Equal Protection and cruel and unusual punishment, invasion of
privacy under the Fourth Amendment, and that the religious purpose behind the law was
not a valid state purpose.118
The dissent specified that the Court even had an almost
“obsessive focus on homosexual activity” in the case, even though the statute was
broadly written.119
It was not until years later in 2003, in Lawrence v. Texas, 120
did the Bowers decision
get overturned creating a fundamental right to sexual intimacy in the privacy of one’s
home, between two consenting adults. Although the decision does not discuss
homosexuality specifically—discussed in more detail below—this does not mitigate the
fact that homosexuals in America have been subjected to torturous, harassing,
demeaning, offensive, animal-like, second-class citizenship treatment by the government.
As was seen throughout the history presented, it is analogous to a bell that once it is
rung the sound waves cannot be stopped. The federal government and Supreme Court
has yet to rule that those discriminated based on sexual orientation are deserving of any
more Equal Protection of the laws then Rational Basis. However when analyzing the
treatment of the gay community through the history of America, it bears little argument
that at a minimum the lowest standard under Equal Protection of Rational Basis is
stupendously insufficient.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND ARGUMENT
I. The Beginning of Equality: Ratification and Evolution of the 14th
Amendment.
118
Id. at 199-220.
119
Id. at 200.
120
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
21. 21
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution was initially proposed
to the thirty-ninth session of Congress in 1866, immediately after the Civil War.121
Upon
ratification and adoption by both houses, the beginning stages of Equal Protection had
begun. Specifically—as this article is addressing—the following section was adopted:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.122
The intent behind this Amendment could not be any clearer based on the timing of
its enactment: racial equality. Other issues before Congress during this time were ones
concerning the South’s property and considering the rights for the newly freed slaves.123
Thus, it is neither ironic nor surprising that the Constitutional Amendment was passed in
furtherance of the goal of racial equality.
Congressman John Bingham drafted the Fourteenth Amendment.124
He initially
proffered a speech in the House of Representatives in May 1866 proposing this
Constitutional Amendment. He recognized that “[t]he want of the republic to day[sic] is
not a Democratic party, is not a Republican party . . . [but] equality of the States, and the
equal rights of all people under the sanctions of inviolable law.”125
A preliminary
interpretation of his statement suggests acknowledgment that political party affiliation
meant nothing when it came to equal application of laws.
121
USCS Const. Amend. 14, § 5.
122
USCS Const. Amend. 14 Sec. 1, emphasis added.
123
Eric Schnapper, article, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71
Va L Rev 753 (1985).
124
See supra n. 122 at 21.
125
Cong. Globe, 39th
Cong., 1st
Sess. 2542 (1866).
22. 22
Although the Amendment’s purpose was more focused on equal rights for African
Americans, the actual intent was clear: all Americans deserved equal treatment under the
law. Bingham acknowledged that “[n]o state ever has the right, under the forms of law or
otherwise, to deny to any freeman the equal protection of the laws . . . although many of
them have assumed and exercised the power, and that without remedy.”126
Even in 1866,
states were violating the rights of the few in favor of the many. Sexual orientation is such
a group that, as the history presented, has been oppressed and treated unequally since
1881.
The Equal Protection Clause has in many ways come a long way since 1866.
Many legal scholars have now interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to mean that all
persons who are similarly situated to be treated alike.127
But, “[d]uring the first eighty
years after its enactment however, the Supreme Court believed that the Fourteenth
Amendment protected only racial and ethnic minorities.”128
Since then it has been
expanded to include many other classes of individuals, standards of review, and
enormous amounts of case law. The main principle emulating in the expansion was the
belief that “the United States Constitution is a living document, designed for application
to new circumstances upon a principled and historic yet realistic basis.”129
Sadly, we still have a long way to go. Since the Constitution is a document that
changes with the times, it has been slow in protecting discrimination based on sexual
orientation. The time is now to give those within this class equal treatment and basic
rights the founding fathers imagined: the right to live.
126
Id.
127
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
128
Gayle Lynn Pettinga, note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 Ind.
LJ 779 (1987).
129
Conrad v. Denver, 724 P.2d 1309, 1318 (Colo. 1986).
23. 23
A. Equal Protection Evolution: In a nutshell.130
As previously stated, there was only one classification intended under the Equal
Protection Clause: race. Currently, six classifications are given special treatment
applying four different standards of review. Comporting with the concept that the
Constitution is a living, always changing document, it is palpable that this clause can
grow to include new classifications today.
Currently the highest level of review is Strict Scrutiny for those denoted a Suspect
class: race, national origin, and alienage. The quasi-high level of protection is
Intermediate Scrutiny encompassing the quasi-Suspect classes of gender and illegitimacy.
The lowest level of scrutiny is given Rational Basis and incorporates all other groups not
otherwise protected. However, the Court has crafted out a special single-group
classification that does not fall within any of the above classes: the woman’s right have
an abortion. Different from the rest, abortion is a standard all by itself following an
Undue Burden standard.131
One of the earliest cases specifically dealing with race was Strauder v. W. Va.,132
where an African American defendant brought a claim for violations under the Equal
Protection Clause when the state did not allow black men to serve on juries. The
Supreme Court viewed this as the direct purpose why the Equal Protection Clause was
enacted, stating:
At the time when [the Fourteenth Amendment was]
incorporated into the Constitution, it required little
knowledge of human nature to anticipate that those who
had long been regarded as an inferior and subject race
130
See also, John Marquez Lundin, article, Making Equal Protection Analysis Make Sense, 49 Syracuse L.
Rev. 1191 (1999).
131
Casey, supra note 1, at 1.
132
Strauder v. W. Va., 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
24. 24
would, when suddenly raised to the rank of citizenship, be
looked upon with jealousy and positive dislike, and that
State laws might be enacted or enforced to perpetuate the
distinctions that had before existed. Discriminations against
them had been habitual. It was well known that in some
States laws making such discriminations then existed, and
others might well be expected.133
The Court relied on the proposition that “it is necessary to look to the purpose which we
have said was the pervading spirit of [the Fourteenth Amendment], the evil which [it
was] designed to remedy, and the process of continued addition to the Constitution, until
that purpose was supposed to be accomplished, as far as constitutional law can accom
plish[sic] it.”134
Even in 1880, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Equal
Protection Clause existed to remedy evils which society created against particular groups.
The idea that the Equal Protection Clause was to offer protections against the
“evils” that society produced did not take long to manifest to other areas. In the 1886
case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 135
Chinese laundromat owners were intentionally
discriminated on by California solely because they were Chinese. The Court declared
that they were denied Equal Protection based on a theory of alienage and nationality, and
ultimately became entitled to a Suspect classification.
Within a twenty-year period since the Amendment was adopted, the area of
coverage and protections already began to grow beyond it’s intent. It is perplexing to
believe that the Amendment cannot grow to include other minorities today.
Gender-based classifications were added to the Equal Protection Clause in
1971,136
where the Court recognized that it was an impermissible discriminatory
133
Id. at 306.
134
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
135
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
136
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
25. 25
classification, however only initially granting the class Rational Basis—the lowest
standard. That standard was increased in 1976 in the case of Craig v. Boren137
declaring
that Intermediate Scrutiny was appropriate. In Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion
regarding the criticism of applying another standard, he stated:
[The Equal Protection Clause] does not direct the courts to
apply one standard of review in some cases and a different
standard in other cases. Whatever criticism may be leveled
at a judicial opinion implying that there are at least three
such standards applies with the same force to a double
standard.138
Illegitimacy was added to Intermediate Scrutiny in 1978 in the case of Lalli v.
Lalli, 139
acknowledging that prior cases140
ruled this class for Equal Protection analysis
should only receive Rational Basis. It was not until Lalli that the standard was
heightened and added this class to the quasi-Suspect sister of gender.
Non-Suspect classifications receive the lowest level of protections. Such classes
include: age,141
sexual orientation,142
disability,143
wealth,144
poverty,145
and smoking. 146
Age is not entitled to higher protections since everyone gets old.147
Disability is
not given higher status because the range of disability varies between people and those
disabled have legislative oversight and political support.148
Wealth is not protected
because discrimination due to wealth is for legislatures to control.149
Poverty—similar to
137
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
138
Id. at 211-212.
139
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
140
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495; affm’d by Trimble v. Gordon, 430 US 762 (1977).
141
Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
142
Romer, supra note 56, at 10.
143
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
144
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
145
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
146
N.Y. City C.L.A.S.H. v. N.Y. City, 315 F.Supp2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
147
Murgia, supra note 141, at 25.
148
Cleburne, supra note 143, at 25.
149
Rodriguez, supra note 144, at 25.
26. 26
wealth—is not entitled because just as one does not have a fundamental constitutional
right to be rich, they don’t have an argument when they are indigent.150
Similarly,
smoking is not entitled because it is considered to be a discretionary or voluntary act.151
Thus, based on the discrimination that has been perpetuated against those who
classified themselves as gay or lesbian, it is bellicose to commit them to Rational Basis.
Classes currently grouped with sexual orientation can change based on economy,
medication, spending habits, even healthy lifestyle—while sexual orientation
discrimination attacks one’s right to live their personal life because of the sex of another
person—their partner.
Abortion however went through a transformation as the Supreme Court
considered it. In 1973, the legendary case of Roe v. Wade152
was initially decided
holding it a non-Suspect level class, then on remand determining it a Suspect level class.
It remained a Suspect level class until Casey v. Planned Parenthood153
in 1992
determining that giving abortion Strict Scrutiny was improper and thusly created a new
standard not yet in existence: the Undue Burden standard.
The creation, implementation, and application of this standard under the guise of
Equal Protection created an interesting proposition: when a classification, due to
government intrusion, deserves Equal Protection protections which does not fall into an
already existing category, the Constitution allows a new standard to be made.154
This
proposition is not only necessary—but also obligatory—to apply to sexual orientation
150
McRae, supra note 145, at 25.
151
N.Y. City C.L.A.S.H., supra note 146, at 25.
152
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
153
Casey, supra, note 1, at 1.
154
See Id.
27. 27
discrimination in opposing the sound waves of disgust that it released throughout
American history and still today.
B. The Implementation of Fundamental Rights into Equal Protection?
Another aspect to Equal Protection is the idea that you are only entitled to higher
scrutiny if you have a fundamental right—Suspect class—or a somewhat fundamental
right—quasi-Suspect class—being infringed.
Textually speaking, nowhere in the Fourteenth Amendment does it state
“fundamental rights” in the same line as “Equal Protection.” Those who construe the
Constitution verbatim should recognize the idea of fundamental rights being correlated
with Equal Protection as only being persuasive at best.
Non-textually speaking, the fundamental right argument has become an integral
part of the Equal Protection Clause. In 1970, evaluation of Equal Protection claims fell
between two tests: “Under the so-called ‘traditional test,’ a classification is said to be
permissible under the Equal Protection Clause unless it is ‘without any reasonable basis .
. . [o]n the other hand, if the classification affects a ‘fundamental right,’ then the state
interest in perpetuating the classification must be ‘compelling’ in order to be
sustained.”155
There have been alternative arguments made by the Supreme Court against the
strict black and white Equal Protection Clause analysis. It was argued that concentration
must be focused on the character of the classification, the importance to the members of
that class, and the states interests in support of making that classification.156
This
155
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-520 (1970) (Marshall, J., Brennan, J., dissenting).
156
Id.
28. 28
article’s main goal is implementing this argument: the country’s need for a higher Equal
Protection classification based on sexual orientation.
Through the evolution of the Equal Protection Clause, we now know that quasi-
Suspect classifications present the argument of “somewhat” fundamental rights needing
protection. But that poses the question that unless it an enumerated fundamental right,
who decides what is fundamental? It seems that the groups that fall within this somewhat
fundamental right classification—and Suspect classifications—are subject to the court’s
personal opinions, which has been criticized by members of the Supreme Court.
[T]he Court’s insistence that Equal Protection analysis turns
on the basis of a closed category of ‘fundamental rights’
involved a curious value judgment. It is certainly difficult to
believe that a person whose very survival is at stake would
be comforted by the knowledge that his ‘fundamental’ rights
are preserved intact.157
Regardless of the issue whether “fundamental rights” should be a factor in Equal
Protection discussions, it is noteworthy to state that the right to practice your sexual
orientation is fundamental based on Lawrence. 158
This historic case did quite a few
things—such as overturn Bowers159
—but more importantly Justice Kennedy created a
fundamental right to private sexual intimacy, although applying it as a substantive due
process violation. Never stating a fundamental right to be “gay,” Lawrence160
could be
interpreted to mean a fundamental right to private consensual sexual intimacy no matter
what sex or sexual orientation you are under the guise of the right to express sexuality.
157
Id. at 530 n.14.
158
Lawrence, supra note 120, at 20.
159
Bowers, supra note 117, at 19.
160
Id.
29. 29
The fact that Lawrence161
was not decided on Equal Protection grounds by the
majority is irrelevant. The concept and application is the same whether one believes
fundamental rights are relevant to Equal Protection analysis or not, as the same outcome
occurs: if a fundamental right is present, higher Equal Protection protections are required.
Denying a class of people higher protections that are clearly defined by two
specific traits—sodomy and sex of one’s partner—is invalid discrimination under
Lawrence since it created the right to private sexual intimacy.162
C. Equal Protection Classifications: Deconstructed.
An analysis of the current classifications is required in determining whether a new
classification for sexual orientation is warranted. This is to examine how the Court and
Constitution allowed specific classes of individuals to be given higher protections, but
also to address the arguments why sexual orientation does not fall within any current
standards thusly requiring the adoption of the Modus Vivendi Nexus Standard.
i. Suspect Classifications.
To be considered a Suspect classification a class must pass a litmus test of
qualifiers. Although none alone is dispositive in permitting the classification to attach,
they each still bear equal weight. First, the group must have suffered a history of
purposeful discrimination.163
Second, evidence of discrimination that represents a gross
unfairness that is inconsistent with the principles of Equal Protection.164
This qualifier
has a few sub-considerations a court considers: whether the class is defined by a trait that
bears no relation to perform in society; whether the class is burdened with unique
161
Lawrence, supra note 120, at 20.
162
Id.
163
Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1345 (9th
Cir. 1988).
164
Id. at 1346.
30. 30
disabilities because of prejudice or inaccurate stereotypes; and whether the trait defining
the class is immutable.165
The last consideration is whether the class is a discrete and
insular minority that is politically powerless and underrepresented.166
Many federal courts—but not the U.S. Supreme Court—acknowledge that gays
have been subjected to discrimination.167
However, regardless of the unacknowledgment
by the Supreme Court, it is undeniable that gays—as a class—has been the target of many
hateful and discriminatory attacks since 1881.
When discussing whether the sexuality of an individual attributes to their
performance in society, it is relevant when one is deemed “gay” by society because
sexual orientation discrimination has been long ingrained in American history.168
Likewise, when discussing whether the sexual orientation of an individual is a unique
disability that is prejudicial or inaccurate, views such as that gays proselytize children, or
seek out children to molest, or are mentally ill or sick have been found to be incredibly
inaccurate or false and result in prejudicial treatment.169
However, when discussing the qualifier of gross unfairness, the most critical
factor has found to be whether the trait is immutable—unchangeable. This however is
slightly more complicated in analysis then the other qualifiers. For example, with
illegitimacy based classifications, Court’s felt it was “unjust” to condemn the child born
out of wedlock who was in no way responsible for the situation and more importantly
165
Id.
166
Id. at 1348.
167
E.g., Id. at 1345, reversed by rehearing, 875 F.2d 699;High Tech Gays v. Defense, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th
Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 465 (7th
Cir. 1989) (all holding homosexuals were subject
to a history of discrimination).
168
Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 143, 1549 (Kan. 1991). (revs’d and remanded on basis of qualified
immunity) (citing 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 825-27).
169
Id.
31. 31
unable to change that status.170
Distinguishably, courts have declared that homosexuality
is not immutable because it “is behavioral and hence fundamentally different from traits
such as race, gender, or alienage.”171
However, although homosexuality does involve
conduct that defines the class, the same can be said for gender—masculine or feminine
conduct—and alienage—the actions of seeking residency in America.
However, it seems that for homosexuality to be deemed purely immutable it will
require that the characteristic is not “individual responsibility” but something more
innate.172
,
173
Although this ignores the fact that it is similar to illegitimacy because
society labels the individual as gay and it is difficult to change that status. Regardless, all
attempts thus far arguing for immutability with homosexuality have failed.
Finally, when discussing political powerlessness, there is a divide between courts
whether gays lack political power. Some courts ruled that “[i]t is beyond doubt that the
homosexual community has been able to reach out and gain the attention of politicians of
all sorts,” 174
while other jurisdictions have believed the opposite.
There are several factors which limit effective political
action by homosexuals. Due to the harsh penalties imposed
by society on persons identified as homosexual, many
homosexual persons conceal their sexual orientation.
Silence, however, has its cost. It may allow a given
individual to escape from the discrimination, abuse, and
even violence which is often directed at homosexuals, but it
170
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 352 (1979).
171
High Tech Gays, supra note 167, at 30, 573; E.g.. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th
Cir. 1996);
Watkins, supra note 163, at 29.
172
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
173
However, recent research may suggest genetic. See also, Dean Hamer, et al, A Linkage Between DNA
Markers on the X Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation, 261 Science 321-27 (1993); Hamer &
Copeland, The Science of Desire: The Search for the Gay Gene and the Biology of Behavior, (1994).
Eskridge & Hunter, Sexuality, Gender, and the Law, 99, stating “the National Cancer Institute of the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), claimed to have found on the X chromosome (X28, to be precise)
where a “gay gene” would likely be found.”
174
Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp 1, 8 (U.S.D.C, D.C. 1991); See also, High Tech Gays, supra note 167, at
30 (anti-discrimination laws prove no politically powerlessness).
32. 32
ensures that homosexuals as a group are unheard
politically. Moreover, the prejudice that compels many
homosexuals to refrain from open political activity also
limits access to political power in other ways. By
diminishing contact between the heterosexual majority and
avowed homosexuals, the majority loses any perspective on
concerns in the homosexual community and is deprived of
the resulting sensitivity to those concerns.175
Although in 1985, Justice Brennan acknowledged the political powerlessness of gays.
[H]omosexuals constitute a significant and insular minority
of this country's population [and] [b]ecause of the
immediate and severe opprobrium often manifested against
homosexuals once so identified publicly, members of this
group are particularly powerless to pursue their rights
openly in the political arena.176
Thus, courts struggle in determining whether the use of the judicial system by the
gay community means that they lack political power. On one hand the argument shows
that the gay community has become more vocal in equality but at the same time rarely
having any successful outcomes.
There have been attempts at convincing courts that sexual orientation deserves
Suspect classification protections by litigating all the qualifiers discussed above.
Unfortunately, all attempts resulted in non-Suspect-Rational Basis status. One argument
against awarding this higher classification focused at the failure to identify whether
sexual orientation was conduct-based or status-based.177
,178
Another argument refused to
175
Jantz, supra note 168, at 30.
176
Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brennan, J., Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
177
Ben-Shalom, supra note 167 at 30, 465-466 (declared as suspect class, then on appeal revs’d declaring
non-suspect class).
178
This author argues that practicing sexual orientation is conduct based. However society and courts have
labeled this conduct as “gay” or “queer” causing the conduct to produce a status in society of a lesser being,
thus making the issue of whether homosexuality is conduct or status based irrelevant.
33. 33
declare homosexuality a Suspect class because no other higher court had ever declared it
entitled to be given a higher standard.179
The famous Supreme Court decision of Romer v. Evans, overturning an anti-gay
Colorado Constitutional Amendment, failed to recognize (by omission) the argument that
gays deserved Suspect class status.180
This decision was used as support in another case
using Romer as persuasive precedent for Suspect classification based on omission.
However the court refused to read Romer that liberally since the Supreme Court was
mute on the topic.181
There additionally have been attempts by comparing homosexuality to race,
which also failed. “[I]t would not pass even Rational Basis review for the military to
reject service members because of characteristics—such as race or religion or the lack of
inherited wealth—that have absolutely no bearing on their military service.
Homosexuality, by contrast, is not irrelevant to homosexual conduct.”182
Unfortunately, due to many personal and ideological biases in society, Suspect
classification for homosexuality may be a misnomer for quite some time. Not only do
political perceptions have to change but also evidence of a stronger stance of political
powerlessness. Even more trying is proving being gay is not a choice—thus immutable.
Although society has come a long way in changing their views on homosexuality 183
discrimination based on it it is alive and well. These views are difficult to change and
179
Watkins, supra note 163, at 29, 722.
180
Romer, supra note 56, at 10.
181
Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d. 42, 61 (1st
Cir. 2008).
182
Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1994). See also Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
article, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist
Politics, 47 Buffalo L. Rev. 1 (1999); , Francisco Valdes, article, Intersections of Race, Ethnicity, Class,
Gender & Sexual Orientation: Queer Margins, Queer Ethics: A Call to Account for Race and Ethnicity in
the Law, Theory, and Politics of "Sexual Orientation ", 48 Hastings L.J. 1293 (1997).
183
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 700-701 (2000) (Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
34. 34
until the day that courts are willing to accept new views on homosexuality, Suspect
classification may be far off in the distance.
ii. Quasi-Suspect Classification.
This classification was not intended under the original Equal Protection Clause.
Comparable to the Undue Burden standard, discussed below, the Supreme Court created
this standard because of the proposition that when it comes to Equal Protection
everything isn’t black and white.184
Constitutionally speaking it does not require that things that are different in fact or
opinion to be treated the same.185
It was this principle that the Court utilized in Plyler v.
Doe. 186
There the Court acknowledged “we would not be faithful to our obligations
under the Fourteenth Amendment if we applied to deferential a standard [Rational Basis]
to every classification.”187
It was discussed that Intermediate Scrutiny permitted the
Court to evaluate the rationality of legislative judgment based in constitutional principles,
and in utilization, gave the Court the ability to discern and over time lift state created
absolutes above the level of pragmatic political judgments of a specific time and place.188
The holding in Plyler referred to other cases adopting Intermediate Scrutiny for
quasi-Suspect classifications. One case was Craig v. Boren that created a higher age of
majority for males to buy liquor then their female equals, holding that sex-based
classifications were subject to quasi-Suspect status.189
Using precedent that used
Rational Basis for such a classification, the Court increased protections for gender
184
Tigner v. Tex., 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
185
Id.
186
Plyler, supra note 127, at 22, 216.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 218 n.16.
189
Boren, supra note 137, at 25.
35. 35
without much explanation. However, the Court did note the historical problems with sex
stereotyping in Equal Protection issues, “archaic and overbroad generalizations . . . could
not justify use of a gender line in determining eligibility for government entitlements.”190
An argument can be made that sexual orientation is similar in regard to the
principle adopted in imploring an increased classification based on gender. Just as
gender was increased in adopting “archaic and overbroad” generalizations, such can be
the same said for homosexuality.
The other case that increased a class to quasi-Suspect status is Lalli v. Lalli, 191
with illegitimacy. There the Court stated that Strict Scrutiny was the proper level of
review but the Court used Intermediate Scrutiny language in determining the
constitutionality of the statute. Although the statute was held to withstand constitutional
muster it nonetheless pushed this classification to a higher standard of quasi-Suspect
status.
It is perplexing that sexual orientation has never at a minimum been granted
quasi-Suspect classification. The arguments have been made and the lower courts have
adopted those higher protections initially. However, on appeal, the higher federal courts
consistently disagreed and removed those higher protections.
Before Lawrence192
decriminalized the idea of sodomy, many cases ruled that
sexual orientation was not worthy of receiving a higher standard of protection because of
the criminal acts committed by that group.193
Of course now having a fundamental right
to engage in sexual relations between consenting adults without government intrusion,
190
Id. at 198.
191
Lalli, supra note 139, at 25.
192
Lawrence, supra note 120, at 20.
193
See Ben-Shalom, supra note 167, at 30.
36. 36
that is no longer a valid argument. However, imaginative and innovative anti-gay
arguments still preclude the class from gaining any additional protection.
In Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, the Southern District of Ohio determined
that “sexual orientation is a quasi-Suspect[sic] classification.”194
In holding, the court
even stated, “we conclude that homo-, hetero-, and bisexual orientation is a characteristic
beyond the control of the individual.”195
It was that exact reason why on appeal to the 6th
Circuit, the decision was reversed.
Assuming arguendo the truth of the scientific theory that
sexual orientation is a "characteristic beyond the control of
the individual" as found by the trial court . . . the reality
remains that no law can successfully be drafted that is
calculated to burden or penalize, or to benefit or protect, an
unidentifiable group or class of individuals whose identity
is defined by subjective and unapparent characteristics such
as innate desires, drives, and thoughts. Those persons
having a homosexual "orientation" simply do not, as such,
comprise an identifiable class.196
In High Tech Gays197
, the argument for a higher standard was made as well. But
the court’s reasoning was based upon similar principles portrayed in Equality Found.
with further explanations in denying granting those protections.
While we do agree that homosexuals have suffered a
history of discrimination, we do not believe that they meet
the other criteria. Homosexuality is not an immutable
characteristic; it is behavioral and hence is fundamentally
different from traits such as race, gender, or alienage,
which define already existing suspect and quasi-suspect
classes. The behavior or conduct of such already
recognized classes is[sic] irrelevant to their identification.
Moreover, legislatures have addressed and continue to
address the discrimination suffered by homosexuals on
account of their sexual orientation through the passage of
194
Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 436 (U.S.D.C., S.D.OH 1994).
195
Id. at 437.
196
Id. on appeal, 54 F.3d 261, 267 (6th
Cir. 1995).
197
High Tech Gays, supra note 167, at 30.
37. 37
anti-discrimination legislation. Thus, homosexuals are not
without political power; they have the ability to and do
"attract the attention of the lawmakers," as evidenced by
such legislation.198
It seems that the argument against quasi-Suspect status is the same as Suspect
status: immutability. Focus on this particular qualifier overshadows the two
considerations of gross unfairness relating to inaccurate or prejudicial stereotypes and
trait bears no relation to performance in society. Further evaluation of these two
qualifiers would dictate that many of the stereotypes relating to homosexuality could be
factually challenged, including the whether being gay effects performance in society.
As can be seen from the arguments and decisions, courts have been reluctant to
add sexual orientation with the other classes already receiving higher protections. This
does not mean that sexual orientation discrimination does not deserve higher protection—
as arguendo, High Tech Gays acknowledges—but one proper classification and standard
does not yet exist to effectuate sufficient protections, until the Modus Vivendi Nexus
Standard.
iii. The “Undue Burden” Standard.
The creation and application of the Undue Burden standard highly supports the
proposition that court’s can and will create new standards when the right case and
argument is presented. This standard stands alone from its Equal Protection sister
standards, and specifically addresses women right to choose to have an abortion.
In 1973, Roe v. Wade199
made headlines as the Supreme Court decision that
granted abortion Strict Scrutiny protection. Originally, abortion was Rational Basis but
198
Id. at 573-574.
199
Roe, supra note 152, at 26. (see decision for more information).
38. 38
then increased to Strict Scrutiny by the Supreme Court based on personal privacy.
“[O]nly personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.’”200
The Court noted
this right to privacy, found either in the Fourteenth or Ninth Amendment, and was broad
enough to include the woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy.201
Then in 1992, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 202
the Supreme Court removed
Strict Scrutiny as the proper standard to apply in abortion cases and created the Undue
Burden standard. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court and many of the
same arguments can be argued in support for higher protections for discrimination based
on sexual orientation.
Constitutional protections supporting the woman’s right to choose came from the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, that “no State shall deprive any person of
life, liberty[,] or property, without due process of the law.”203
“It is a promise of the
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.
We have vindicated this principle before.”204
This is comparable to sexual orientation. For those that believe being gay is a
choice—as this article implores it is not—must concede that the woman’s right to
terminate a pregnancy is just as much as a choice. For those who argue being gay is not a
choice, the argument is still valid as providing evidence supporting an argument for
depravation of life under the Fifth Amendment in discriminating based on sexual
orientation.
200
Id. at 152.
201
Id. at 153.
202
Casey, supra note 1, at 1.
203
Id. at 846.
204
Id. at 847.
39. 39
Next in addressing the comparison to the morality and spiritual arguments
between sexual orientation and Equal Protection in relation to abortion, similar issues
were presented for abortion and are equally applicable to sexual orientation.
Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we
suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound
moral and spiritual implications of terminating a
pregnancy, even in its earliest stage. Some of us as
individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic
principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision.
Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate
our own moral code.205
It is well known that many see abortion as an evil undertaking while others
support the woman’s right to choose. Similarly, it is well known that many confer sexual
orientation to be a sin and morally wrong while others disagree. Additionally, many have
personal moral objections to abortion—but nonetheless abortion is still allowed.
Conversely, it is known that personal moral objections to homosexuality are present in
society but nonetheless homosexuality is still allowed.
Furthermore, Justice O’Connor’s view is that a state cannot compel one position
over another when there are two competing positions. Specifically, a state cannot offend
a personal liberty of a person.
[C]hoices central to personal dignity and autonomy are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were
they formed under compulsion of the State.206
Undistinguishable is the analogous nature of the above statement with sexual
orientation. Those who identify as gay would argue it is a central component of their
205
Id. at 850.
206
Id. at 851.
40. 40
dignity and life. It defines an entire group, and to this point, the government has either
attempted to or conjured ways to prohibit the gay community from having similar
personal freedoms as were described for abortion. But yet the arguments made for the
woman’s right to choose passed constitutional scrutiny by the Supreme Court while the
same application to sexual orientation does not even get out of Rational Basis.
It is important to know that the Undue Burden standard is the following: “the right
of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it with undue
influence from the State.”207
Obviously the right to have an abortion is not absolute, that
is, the state can regulate abortion after viability.208
Thus, this author’s argument for the
Standard aligns with this type of standard created in the Roe and Casey progeny.
It is also important to recognize how Casey209
interpreted the standards from
Roe.210
“While [Roe] has engendered disapproval, it has not been unworkable.”211
It is
obvious that the proposed standard is subject to scrutiny, disapproval, or even disgust—
but that alone does not make this standard unadoptable or any less applicable currently.
Time’s change, views change, and the Constitution changes with it. The majority
in Casey acknowledges this by the evolution of segregation and education. “Society's
understanding of the facts upon which a constitutional ruling was sought in 1954
[separate but not equal212
] was thus fundamentally different from the basis claimed for
the decision in 1896 [separate but equal213
].”214
The factual underpinnings of the 1896
207
Id. at 846.
208
See also, Janeen F. Berkowitz, article, Supreme Court Law: Stenberg v. Carhart: Woman Retain their
Right to Choose, 91 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 337 (2001).
209
Casey, supra note 1, at 1.
210
Roe, supra note 152, at 26.
211
Casey, supra note 1, at 1, 860.
212
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
213
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
214
Casey, supra note 1, at 1, 863.
41. 41
decision were so at odds to the Court in 1954 that “the decision to reexamine . . . was on
this ground alone not only justified but required.”215
Similarly, the attitude of the country has significantly changed since the late
1800’s. There has been more fighting by the gay community for equality. One can say
the opinion of courts, and Supreme Court, has significantly changed acknowledging the
plight of the homosexual community through decisions such as Romer 216
and
Lawrence.217
The most important, constitutionally sound, and historically accurate legal
argument made in the Casey decision in support of adopting the Undue Burden standard
this author believes applies to this article’s main premise is:
[w]here, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court
decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of
intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those
rare, comparable cases, its decision has a dimension that
the resolution of the normal case does not carry. It is the
dimension present whenever the Court's interpretation of
the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national
controversy to end their national division by accepting a
common mandate rooted in the Constitution [emphasis
added].218
It is uncontested that rights surrounding homosexuality are presently in national
controversy and have been for quite some time. Nationwide divisions have been created
resulting from the fight of equality and right to live one’s life. As Justice O’Connor
argued, it is not the place of the Court to pick sides but to interpret the Constitution and to
apply its principles to present day opinions—just like they did with education and
segregation.
215
Id.
216
Romer, supra note 56, at 10.
217
Lawrence, supra note 120, at 20.
218
Casey, supra note 1, at 1, 866-867.
42. 42
Thus, Equal Protection must afford protections in one’s sexual orientation, as it is
either a personal choice—like abortion—or not a personal choice—like race or
illegitimacy. Since sexual orientation has not been afforded protections anywhere else in
the Equal Protection Clause and courts are unwilling to provide higher protections greater
than Rational Basis, then there must be a separately crafted standard similar to Undue
Burden—The Modus Vivendi Nexus Standard.
Too many courts have been at odds with one another—including the Supreme
Court—with the idea of sexual orientation and Equal Protection. This author seeks the
adoption of the Modus Vivendi Nexus Standard for sexual orientation moving the
national controversy monumentally forward in furthering full equality as the Constitution
demands.
II. Modus Vivendi Nexus Standard: The New Undue Burden.
Equal Protection to this day has yet to encompass proper protections for those
who are discriminated based on sexual orientation. While no higher standard has been
adopted, legal scholars and courts have been at odds with one another fighting for both
sides of the cause. The Modus Vivendi Nexus Standard presents a middle ground. This
Standard states that neither the state nor government can intrude on, or discriminate on
the basis of, one’s sexual orientation, unless there is a direct nexus to important
governmental interests in identifying one’s sexual orientation and those interests are
narrowly tailored to that nexus.
A. Modus Vivendi.
43. 43
This Latin phrase has been used in the legal world before but in different context.
The English translation is “[a] method of living.”219
While in the legal world, it was
more often used to refer “to a central principle in a field of law.”220
Thus, it is this
purpose why this author proposes that the Standard be labeled and called Modus Vivendi
Nexus Standard, as it specifically guards against state and government intrusion into
one’s “method of living.”
There has been significant discrimination against those of the gay community as
the history portion of this article has pointed out. Admittedly, there have been great
strides in the area of gay rights law since 1881. Under the current Equal Protection
Clause, sexual orientation only gets protection when there is no Rational Basis in the
interests being sought. However this offers minimal protections since it is a rare case that
a state or federal statute would not be held to have a Rational Basis in a valid state
interest.
By adopting this Standard it will mean protecting those discriminated based on
sexual orientation because of their “method of living.” The right for anyone in America
to live his or her life without state or federal interference was intended with the original
adoption of the Equal Protection Clause, just specifically targeting African Americans at
that time.
There have been many declarations by the country over the course of time
recognizing the importance of self-preservation (racial, ethnicity, women’s liberation,
religion, abortion, etc.). It is now the time that America realizes that after one hundred,
219
Russ Versteeg, Essential Latin for Lawyers, 144 (1990).
220
Id.
44. 44
thirty-one years of documented homophobic and anti-gay treatment is enough: it is time
to let all American’s live their life.
B. Fundamental Rights and Sexual Orientation.
As previously discussed, there have been debates whether courts have properly
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to include fundamental rights in Equal Protection
analysis. This author urges recognition that under either argument, the right of practicing
one’s sexual orientation is a classification worthy of higher protections.
Lawrence221
argued for such a proposition indirectly. Although Lawrence222
specifically dealt with criminalization of sodomy that ultimately produced the
fundamental right of sexual intimacy between two consenting adults, the inferences from
the Court’s reasoning requires a deeper analysis. Not only did Lawrence prevent
government intrusion into the bedroom, but also removed government regulation on a
defining characteristic of homosexuality.223
A possible interpretation of this decision is
that a creation of a fundamental right to practice your sexual orientation was
inadvertently created.
However for those who do not read Lawrence224
as liberally, the argument is still
valid. It would offend common sense to argue that America has not been aggressively
discriminative towards the gay community. It cannot be ignored that the Equal
Protection Clause never stated anything about a fundamental right in correlation to being
221
Lawrence, supra note 120, at 20.
222
Id.
223
This author takes note that sex between two females may or may not involve sodomy. However, the
argument is not diluted because the act of two women having sex is defining conduct similar to gay male
sex, leading to the status of being “gay.”
224
Id.
45. 45
granted equal protections. Therefore, it comes to a simple issue: whether fundamental
rights are important in awarding Equal Protection protections.
If so, then a fundamental right exists under Lawrence225
as was discussed. If not,
then the argument for the Standard does not fail since sufficient evidence is presented
supporting the need for additional protections higher than Rational Basis.
As was argued in Casey226
by Justice O’Connor and many other cases, 227
the right
to personal autonomy and concept of existence is held at the highest regard under the
Constitution. Thus, sexual orientation is a classification falling under this same theory.
Minimally, sexual orientation deserves higher protections then it currently receives—
Rational Basis—irrespective of the belief that a fundamental right is required to be
granted higher protections.
C. Modus Vivendi Nexus Standard: Deconstructed.
The entire Standard is: neither the state nor government can intrude on, or
discriminate on the basis of, a person’s sexual orientation, unless there is a direct nexus to
important governmental interests in identifying one’s sexual orientation and those
objectives are narrowly tailored to that nexus.
Analyzing the components of the proposed Standard is necessary to show how
this Standard achieves the objective of higher rights for sexual orientation discrimination.
By doing so, the Standard will be placed between Intermediate Scrutiny and Strict
Scrutiny, with the burden of proof on the state.
225
Id.
226
Casey, supra note 1, at 1.
227
See Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535 (1942) [discussing right to procreate]; Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S.
479 (1965) [discussing right to martial intimacy]; Lawrence, supra, note 116, at 21 [discussing right to
private sexual intimacy]; Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) [discussing right to marry]; Jacobson v.
Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905) [discussing right to refuse medical treatment]; Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) [discussing right to refuse life-saving medical treatment].
46. 46
The Modus Vivendi Standard was created with the understanding that there has
been an acknowledged history of purposeful discrimination that cannot be denied by any
party. There has been a gross unfairness against the homosexual community that bears
no relation to production in society. These statements are supported strongly by the
history portion of this article.
The biggest criticisms, addressed in section C of this article are politically
powerlessness and immutability. With these in mind, the author believes that this
Standard properly takes these into account for a lower standard than Strict Scrutiny;
however, enough evidence has been presented to argue for a higher standard than
Intermediate Scrutiny, or at a minimum, higher than Rational Basis.
i. Nexus and Important Governmental Objective.
A nexus has been used by the Court in analyzing a number of issues that have
been presented on constitutional violations. For example, federal taxpayer standing has
used a nexus in showing “a logical link between that status and the type of legislative
enactment attacked.”228
In the area of Equal Protection, it has been discussed in the area
of fundamental rights with a non-enumerated liberty, saying
[t]he task in every case should be to determine the extent to
which constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on
interests not mentioned in the Constitution. As the nexus
between the specific constitutional guarantee and the
nonconstitutional[sic] interest draws closer, the
nonconstitutional[sic] interest becomes more fundamental
and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest
is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted
accordingly.229
228
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
229
Rodriguez, supra note 144, at 25, 102-103 (Marshall, J., Douglas, J., dissenting).