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Nate Ward
Précis 4
9/27/14
Keimpe Algra discusses the connections among myth, philosophical cosmology,
and the development of scientific thought. Greek philosophical cosmology often built
upon or reacted against the prevailing religious and mythological beliefs of ancient
Greece (p. 45).1 Comparing such vague pre-philosophical cosmogonies to the “more or
less clear” cosmological outlines of the Milesians is therefore useful (p. 47). I will focus
upon the key concepts Algra extracts from each thinker in his attempt to create a timeline
of their development.
Algra deduces two things regarding Thales. First, it is “safest to assume” that
Thales claimed water is the origin of everything and not that everything is literally [forms
of] water (p. 50-51). According to Algra, Milesian thought was at least partially
“physicalized” because it removed the anthropomorphic tendencies of earlier theistic
worldviews (p. 53). Regarding Anaximander, Algra focuses upon two important
innovations: “the (implicit) introduction of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and the
application of mathematical arguments to a cosmological question” (p. 55-56). Further,
Algra claims that Anaximander’s notions of “warring opposites” paying “penalty and
retribution” are essentially descriptors of orderly and reversible “physical processes” (p.
57). Anaximenes claims that the cosmos both is and originates from, air (p. 58). Algra
credits Anaximenes with the “brilliant intuition” that the qualitative can be explained in
1 Algra, Keimpe. "The Beginnings of Cosmology." The Cambridge Companion to Early
Greek Philosophy. By A. A. Long. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999. 45-65. Print.

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terms of quantitative factors, such as condensation and rarefaction (p. 58-59). Regarding
Xenophanes, Algra highlights that the prior Milesians’ introduction of more
“physicalized” forms of divinity was perhaps instrumental in Xenophanes’ conception of
a singular “pantheistic” god (p. 60). In addition, Algra points out that Xenophanes was
the first to utilize empirical evidence, in the form of fossils, to support a cosmological
claim (p. 60).
Algra argues that it would be anachronistic to impose our definition of philosophy
upon “what in different ages people were prepared to regard as philosophy” (p. 61). Algra
discusses why neither the “Baconian” nor the “Popperian” conceptions of science
sufficiently categorize the Milesians’ theories. In the Baconian sense, Milesian theories
are not scientific because they lack “detailed systematic observation,” yet it is hard to
imagine, says Algra, “how they could have coped with such questions along Baconian
lines” (p. 61). In the Popperian sense, Milesian theories are not scientific because they are
not able to withstand peer criticism and the “rough and general” nature of the
observational data used in their hypotheses rules out the possibility of their being falsified
(p. 62). However, it remains plausible that the Milesians utilized rudimentary
observational data, in the form of analogies based upon “familiar or observable” natural
processes, to form rough explanatory models (p. 62). Admittedly, this is hardly
systematic, but “it contributed to the development of a more rational worldview”, thus it
would be appropriate to “regard them at least as proto-scientists” (p. 63).