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CyberThreat Hunting & Intelligence
Types ofThreat Hunting
2
1. IOC Based Threat Hunting
2. Hypotheses Based Threat Hunting
3. Baseline Based Threat Hunting
4. Anomaly Based Threat Hunting
IOC BasedThreat Hunting
3
• Hunting based on Indicators of Compromise (IOC) collected from Threat
Intelligence
• More like into Compromise Assessment
• Checking whether the IOC is present in the environment
• Checking on Specific ThreatActor or Specific Threat Intel Report
Hypotheses BasedThreat Hunting
4
• Creating a hypotheses for certain TTPs
• e.g : Hypotheses for hunting on endpoint, hypotheses for hunting on
network,
• Leverage Framework such as MITRE ATT&CK Framework for creating
hypotheses on TTPs of Threat Actor
• Defining specific asset for hunting (such as Crown Jewel Asset)
Baseline BasedThreat Hunting
5
• Detect something haven’t seen before based on baseline data in the
environment
• Needs larger set of data available about your infra for creating the baseline
• Sometimes triggers lot of False Positives
• Quite effective to spot changes in your infra
Anomaly BasedThreat Hunting
6
• Siting through the log data available for the threat hunters to spot
irregularities that might be malicious
• Additionally applying patterns on your infra
• Quite useful in Fraud detection
Threat Hunting UseCase
7
Use Case 1 : Process Spawn cmd.exe
8
MITRE Reference : CAR-2013-02-003 https://car.mitre.org/analytics/CAR-2013-02-003/ : Processes
Spawning cmd.exe
• Hypothesis : The Windows Command Prompt (cmd.exe) is a utility that provides command line
interface to Windows operating systems. It provides the ability to run additional programs and also has
several built-in commands such as dir, copy, mkdir, and type, as well as batch scripts (.bat).
• Typically, when a user runs a command prompt, the parent process is explorer.exe or another instance
of the prompt. There may be automated programs, logon scripts, or administrative tools that launch
instances of the command prompt in order to run scripts or other built-in commands. Spawning the
process cmd.exe from certain parents may be more indicative of malice.
• Example Use Case Hunting : if Adobe Reader or Outlook launches a command shell, this may
suggest that a malicious document has been loaded and should be investigated. Thus, by looking for
abnormal parent processes of cmd.exe, it may be possible to detect adversaries.
UseCase 2 : RDPActivities
9
MITRE Reference: CAR-2016-04-005: https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2016-04-005
• Hypothesis:A remote desktop logon, through RDP, may be typical of a system
administrator or IT support, but only from select workstations.
• Monitoring remote desktop logons and comparing to known/approved originating systems
can detect lateral movement of an adversary.
• Example Use Case Hunting :
Looking for Successful RDP Login not from your Country GeoIP login and after office hour
Use Case 3 : StoppingWindows Defensive
Services
10
MITRE Reference: CAR-2016-04-003: https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2016-04-003
• Hypothesis: Spyware and malware remain a serious problem and Microsoft developed
security services, Windows Defender and Windows Firewall, to combat this threat. In the
event Windows Defender or Windows Firewall is turned off, administrators should correct
the issue immediately to prevent the possibility of infection or further infection and
investigate to determine if caused by crash or user manipulation.
• Example Use Case Hunting :
Antivirus services stopped not long after there is a successful logon from internal network via
network services
UseCase 4 :Task
Scheduler
11
MITRE Reference:
CAR-2020-09-001 : Scheduled Task – FileAccess: https://car.mitre.org/analytics/CAR-2020-09-001/
• Hypothesis: In order to gain persistence, privilege escalation, or remote execution, an adversary
may use the Windows Task Scheduler to schedule a command to be run at a specified time, date,
and even host. Task Scheduler stores tasks as files in two locations - C:WindowsTasks (legacy)
or C:WindowsSystem32Tasks. Accordingly, this analytic looks for the creation of task files in
these two locations.
• Example Use Case Hunting :
a. Task Scheduler running from a suspicious folder location (e.g : C:Users.. ; C:Windowstemp)
b. T
ask Scheduler running using suspicious Scripting Utilities (LOLBAS) : cscript.exe,
rundll32.exe, mshta.exe, powershell.exe, regsvr32.exe
Use Case 5 : Credential Dumping via
WindowsTask Manager
12
MITRE Reference:
CAR-2020-09-001 : Credential Dumping via Windows Task Manager :
https://car.mitre.org/analytics/CAR-2019-08-001/
• Hypothesis : The Windows Task Manager may be used to dump the memory space of
lsass.exe to disk for processing with a credential access tool such as Mimikatz. This is
performed by launching Task Manager as a privileged user, selecting lsass.exe, and clicking
“Create dump file”. This saves a dump file to disk with a deterministic name that includes the
name of the process being dumped.
• Example Use Case Hunting :
Hunting for File Creation (thinking about Sysmon Event ID 11 for example), with the process
image is taskmgr.exe
Case Study End to EndThreat Hunting
Process
13
Threat Hunters defined the Hypotheses and Start Hunting
1. Hypotheses 1 : User visiting malicious website from Phishing Email
2. Hypotheses 2 : User downloading malicious file after visiting the Malicious Website (Drive
by Download maybe?
3. Hypotheses 3 : Malware Run on the User System after being downloaded
4. Hypotheses 4 : Malware doing persistence mechanism on Infected / Exploited Machine
5. Hypotheses 5 : Malware contacting Command and Control Server
6. Hypotheses 6 : ThreatActor exfiltrate Sensitive document to Command and Control Server
7. Hypotheses 7 : Sensitive Data Leaked on the Internet
Hypotheses 1 : User visiting malicious
website from Phishing Email
14
• Data Source for Hunting
– Passive DNS Log, DNS Server Log, Proxy Log, NGFW Log, Sysmon Log,
Email Log, Mail Security Gateway Log
• Platform for Hunting
– SIEM, Security Analytics Platform
• Analysis and Enrichment Data
– DNSTwist, Phishing Domain List, Threat Intelligence Feeds, VirusTotal,
HybridAnalysis, URL / Domain Sandbox Analysis
Hypotheses 2 : User downloading malicious file after visiting the
MaliciousWebsite (Drive by Download maybe?)
15
• Data Source for Hunting
– Passive DNS Log, DNS Server Log, Proxy Log, NGFW Log, Sysmon Log,
• Platform for Hunting
– SIEM, Security Analytics Platform,
• Analysis and Enrichment Data
– Threat Intelligence Feeds, Alexa top 1M Domain, VirusTotal,
HybridAnalysis, URL / Domain Sandbox Analysis, Blacklisted Domain
Checker
Hypotheses 3 : Malware Run on the User
System after being downloaded
16
• Data Source for Hunting
– Prefetch, Shimcache, Amcache, Process Running, Volatile Data
(Memory), Sysmon,Auditd,
• Platform for Hunting
– SIEM, Security Analytics Platform, EDR
• Analysis and Enrichment Data
– File Hash of Process Executed, Parent-Child Process Analysis(SANS Find
Evil Poster as Reference), Folder Location of Executables, Signed of
Binary Files, VirusTotal, HybridAnalysis,
Hypotheses 4 : Malware doing persistence
mechanism on Infected / Exploited
Machine
17
• Data Source for Hunting
– ASEP (Auto Start Extensibility Points), Registry, Startup Services and
Folder, Task Scheduler, Cron Job,
• Platform for Hunting
– SIEM, Security Analytics Platform, EDR
• Analysis and Enrichment Data
– Signature Check, Autoruns Sysinternals, File Hash Check, Date of
Creation,
Hypotheses 5 : Malware contacting
Command and Control Server
18
• Data Source for Hunting
– Netflow, Firewall Log, NGFW Log, IDS, Proxy Logs, Full Packet Capture,
DNS Log
• Platform for Hunting
– SIEM, Security Analytics Platform, NDR, XDR,
• Analysis and Enrichment Data
– Date of Creation Domain, SSL Cert Attribute Checks, JA3 SSL Fingerprint,
GeoIP Location Data, Threat Intelligence Feeds
Hypotheses 6 :ThreatActor exfiltrate
Sensitive document toCommand and
Control Server
19
• Data Source for Hunting
– Netflow, Firewall Log, NGFW Log, IDS, Proxy Logs, Full Packet Capture,
DNS Log
• Platform for Hunting
– SIEM, Security Analytics Platform, NDR, XDR,
• Analysis and Enrichment Data
– Date of Creation Domain, SSL Cert Attribute Checks, JA3 SSL Fingerprint,
GeoIP Location Data, Threat Intelligence Feeds
Hypotheses 7 : Sensitive Data Leaked on the
Internet
20
• Data Source for Hunting
– OSINT, Dark Web Search, Underground Forum, Threat Intelligence Feeds
• Platform for Hunting
– Threat Intelligence Platform
• Analysis and Enrichment Data
– Pastebin, Github, Honeypot
Threat Intelligence
21
Threat
Intelligence
• Threat intelligence, or cyber threat intelligence, is information an organization
uses to understand the threats that have, will, or are currently targeting the
organization.
• By identifying the threat actors the organization may be targeted by, defenses and
monitoring solutions can be created to better protect from attacks.
• Threat Hunting is also closely associated withThreat Intelligence, as hunting is the
process of using intelligence to search for evidence of sophisticated threat actors,
who are already in the network
22
Benefit ofThreat
Intelligence
• By identifying relevant threat actors, and consuming intelligence from a number
of sources, aThreat Intelligence function can help the business better understand
risks from cyber-attacks. In short, it helps security teams focus on attackers that
are likely to target the organization, and work to develop defences and other
measures to prevent or limit the impact of attacks.
• ThreatActors have the skills, knowledge, and resources to evade most of security
perimeter and tools owned by the organizations.That is why it is quite important
to keep up to date with their tactics, and develop unique solutions to detect,
response and prevent them to get into our network.
23
Indicator of Compromise
24
IOCs are artifacts that have been
identified as acting maliciously or attributed to
threat actors. Some of the most common ones
include
• IP Addresses : An IP that has been
observed doing a scanning or exploitation
to our network
• Domains : A domain that hosts a
credential harvesting site or hosting
malicious payload
• Email Addresses :An email address that
has been sending phishing emails with a
malicious attachment
• File Names : Malicious file names
dropped by the attacker during the
compromised
• File Hashes : The unique hash of a piece
of malware / malicious tools used by threat
actors
Threat Intelligence
Remember IOC != Threat Intelligence
25
Threat Intelligence andThreat
Hunting
26
• Threat intelligence and threat hunting are two distinct security area that can
be complimentary for each other. For example, threat intelligence can make
up a small portion of the threat hunting process. However, subscribing to a
threat intelligence feed does not automatically satisfy the need to threat hunt
your network. A proper threat hunt can identify threats even when they have
not yet been seen in the wild.
Threat Intelligence andThreat
Hunting
27
EC Council CTIA Threat Intelligence
28
Thank you
29

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Cyber threat-hunting---part-2-25062021-095909pm

  • 1. CyberThreat Hunting & Intelligence
  • 2. Types ofThreat Hunting 2 1. IOC Based Threat Hunting 2. Hypotheses Based Threat Hunting 3. Baseline Based Threat Hunting 4. Anomaly Based Threat Hunting
  • 3. IOC BasedThreat Hunting 3 • Hunting based on Indicators of Compromise (IOC) collected from Threat Intelligence • More like into Compromise Assessment • Checking whether the IOC is present in the environment • Checking on Specific ThreatActor or Specific Threat Intel Report
  • 4. Hypotheses BasedThreat Hunting 4 • Creating a hypotheses for certain TTPs • e.g : Hypotheses for hunting on endpoint, hypotheses for hunting on network, • Leverage Framework such as MITRE ATT&CK Framework for creating hypotheses on TTPs of Threat Actor • Defining specific asset for hunting (such as Crown Jewel Asset)
  • 5. Baseline BasedThreat Hunting 5 • Detect something haven’t seen before based on baseline data in the environment • Needs larger set of data available about your infra for creating the baseline • Sometimes triggers lot of False Positives • Quite effective to spot changes in your infra
  • 6. Anomaly BasedThreat Hunting 6 • Siting through the log data available for the threat hunters to spot irregularities that might be malicious • Additionally applying patterns on your infra • Quite useful in Fraud detection
  • 8. Use Case 1 : Process Spawn cmd.exe 8 MITRE Reference : CAR-2013-02-003 https://car.mitre.org/analytics/CAR-2013-02-003/ : Processes Spawning cmd.exe • Hypothesis : The Windows Command Prompt (cmd.exe) is a utility that provides command line interface to Windows operating systems. It provides the ability to run additional programs and also has several built-in commands such as dir, copy, mkdir, and type, as well as batch scripts (.bat). • Typically, when a user runs a command prompt, the parent process is explorer.exe or another instance of the prompt. There may be automated programs, logon scripts, or administrative tools that launch instances of the command prompt in order to run scripts or other built-in commands. Spawning the process cmd.exe from certain parents may be more indicative of malice. • Example Use Case Hunting : if Adobe Reader or Outlook launches a command shell, this may suggest that a malicious document has been loaded and should be investigated. Thus, by looking for abnormal parent processes of cmd.exe, it may be possible to detect adversaries.
  • 9. UseCase 2 : RDPActivities 9 MITRE Reference: CAR-2016-04-005: https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2016-04-005 • Hypothesis:A remote desktop logon, through RDP, may be typical of a system administrator or IT support, but only from select workstations. • Monitoring remote desktop logons and comparing to known/approved originating systems can detect lateral movement of an adversary. • Example Use Case Hunting : Looking for Successful RDP Login not from your Country GeoIP login and after office hour
  • 10. Use Case 3 : StoppingWindows Defensive Services 10 MITRE Reference: CAR-2016-04-003: https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2016-04-003 • Hypothesis: Spyware and malware remain a serious problem and Microsoft developed security services, Windows Defender and Windows Firewall, to combat this threat. In the event Windows Defender or Windows Firewall is turned off, administrators should correct the issue immediately to prevent the possibility of infection or further infection and investigate to determine if caused by crash or user manipulation. • Example Use Case Hunting : Antivirus services stopped not long after there is a successful logon from internal network via network services
  • 11. UseCase 4 :Task Scheduler 11 MITRE Reference: CAR-2020-09-001 : Scheduled Task – FileAccess: https://car.mitre.org/analytics/CAR-2020-09-001/ • Hypothesis: In order to gain persistence, privilege escalation, or remote execution, an adversary may use the Windows Task Scheduler to schedule a command to be run at a specified time, date, and even host. Task Scheduler stores tasks as files in two locations - C:WindowsTasks (legacy) or C:WindowsSystem32Tasks. Accordingly, this analytic looks for the creation of task files in these two locations. • Example Use Case Hunting : a. Task Scheduler running from a suspicious folder location (e.g : C:Users.. ; C:Windowstemp) b. T ask Scheduler running using suspicious Scripting Utilities (LOLBAS) : cscript.exe, rundll32.exe, mshta.exe, powershell.exe, regsvr32.exe
  • 12. Use Case 5 : Credential Dumping via WindowsTask Manager 12 MITRE Reference: CAR-2020-09-001 : Credential Dumping via Windows Task Manager : https://car.mitre.org/analytics/CAR-2019-08-001/ • Hypothesis : The Windows Task Manager may be used to dump the memory space of lsass.exe to disk for processing with a credential access tool such as Mimikatz. This is performed by launching Task Manager as a privileged user, selecting lsass.exe, and clicking “Create dump file”. This saves a dump file to disk with a deterministic name that includes the name of the process being dumped. • Example Use Case Hunting : Hunting for File Creation (thinking about Sysmon Event ID 11 for example), with the process image is taskmgr.exe
  • 13. Case Study End to EndThreat Hunting Process 13 Threat Hunters defined the Hypotheses and Start Hunting 1. Hypotheses 1 : User visiting malicious website from Phishing Email 2. Hypotheses 2 : User downloading malicious file after visiting the Malicious Website (Drive by Download maybe? 3. Hypotheses 3 : Malware Run on the User System after being downloaded 4. Hypotheses 4 : Malware doing persistence mechanism on Infected / Exploited Machine 5. Hypotheses 5 : Malware contacting Command and Control Server 6. Hypotheses 6 : ThreatActor exfiltrate Sensitive document to Command and Control Server 7. Hypotheses 7 : Sensitive Data Leaked on the Internet
  • 14. Hypotheses 1 : User visiting malicious website from Phishing Email 14 • Data Source for Hunting – Passive DNS Log, DNS Server Log, Proxy Log, NGFW Log, Sysmon Log, Email Log, Mail Security Gateway Log • Platform for Hunting – SIEM, Security Analytics Platform • Analysis and Enrichment Data – DNSTwist, Phishing Domain List, Threat Intelligence Feeds, VirusTotal, HybridAnalysis, URL / Domain Sandbox Analysis
  • 15. Hypotheses 2 : User downloading malicious file after visiting the MaliciousWebsite (Drive by Download maybe?) 15 • Data Source for Hunting – Passive DNS Log, DNS Server Log, Proxy Log, NGFW Log, Sysmon Log, • Platform for Hunting – SIEM, Security Analytics Platform, • Analysis and Enrichment Data – Threat Intelligence Feeds, Alexa top 1M Domain, VirusTotal, HybridAnalysis, URL / Domain Sandbox Analysis, Blacklisted Domain Checker
  • 16. Hypotheses 3 : Malware Run on the User System after being downloaded 16 • Data Source for Hunting – Prefetch, Shimcache, Amcache, Process Running, Volatile Data (Memory), Sysmon,Auditd, • Platform for Hunting – SIEM, Security Analytics Platform, EDR • Analysis and Enrichment Data – File Hash of Process Executed, Parent-Child Process Analysis(SANS Find Evil Poster as Reference), Folder Location of Executables, Signed of Binary Files, VirusTotal, HybridAnalysis,
  • 17. Hypotheses 4 : Malware doing persistence mechanism on Infected / Exploited Machine 17 • Data Source for Hunting – ASEP (Auto Start Extensibility Points), Registry, Startup Services and Folder, Task Scheduler, Cron Job, • Platform for Hunting – SIEM, Security Analytics Platform, EDR • Analysis and Enrichment Data – Signature Check, Autoruns Sysinternals, File Hash Check, Date of Creation,
  • 18. Hypotheses 5 : Malware contacting Command and Control Server 18 • Data Source for Hunting – Netflow, Firewall Log, NGFW Log, IDS, Proxy Logs, Full Packet Capture, DNS Log • Platform for Hunting – SIEM, Security Analytics Platform, NDR, XDR, • Analysis and Enrichment Data – Date of Creation Domain, SSL Cert Attribute Checks, JA3 SSL Fingerprint, GeoIP Location Data, Threat Intelligence Feeds
  • 19. Hypotheses 6 :ThreatActor exfiltrate Sensitive document toCommand and Control Server 19 • Data Source for Hunting – Netflow, Firewall Log, NGFW Log, IDS, Proxy Logs, Full Packet Capture, DNS Log • Platform for Hunting – SIEM, Security Analytics Platform, NDR, XDR, • Analysis and Enrichment Data – Date of Creation Domain, SSL Cert Attribute Checks, JA3 SSL Fingerprint, GeoIP Location Data, Threat Intelligence Feeds
  • 20. Hypotheses 7 : Sensitive Data Leaked on the Internet 20 • Data Source for Hunting – OSINT, Dark Web Search, Underground Forum, Threat Intelligence Feeds • Platform for Hunting – Threat Intelligence Platform • Analysis and Enrichment Data – Pastebin, Github, Honeypot
  • 22. Threat Intelligence • Threat intelligence, or cyber threat intelligence, is information an organization uses to understand the threats that have, will, or are currently targeting the organization. • By identifying the threat actors the organization may be targeted by, defenses and monitoring solutions can be created to better protect from attacks. • Threat Hunting is also closely associated withThreat Intelligence, as hunting is the process of using intelligence to search for evidence of sophisticated threat actors, who are already in the network 22
  • 23. Benefit ofThreat Intelligence • By identifying relevant threat actors, and consuming intelligence from a number of sources, aThreat Intelligence function can help the business better understand risks from cyber-attacks. In short, it helps security teams focus on attackers that are likely to target the organization, and work to develop defences and other measures to prevent or limit the impact of attacks. • ThreatActors have the skills, knowledge, and resources to evade most of security perimeter and tools owned by the organizations.That is why it is quite important to keep up to date with their tactics, and develop unique solutions to detect, response and prevent them to get into our network. 23
  • 24. Indicator of Compromise 24 IOCs are artifacts that have been identified as acting maliciously or attributed to threat actors. Some of the most common ones include • IP Addresses : An IP that has been observed doing a scanning or exploitation to our network • Domains : A domain that hosts a credential harvesting site or hosting malicious payload • Email Addresses :An email address that has been sending phishing emails with a malicious attachment • File Names : Malicious file names dropped by the attacker during the compromised • File Hashes : The unique hash of a piece of malware / malicious tools used by threat actors
  • 25. Threat Intelligence Remember IOC != Threat Intelligence 25
  • 26. Threat Intelligence andThreat Hunting 26 • Threat intelligence and threat hunting are two distinct security area that can be complimentary for each other. For example, threat intelligence can make up a small portion of the threat hunting process. However, subscribing to a threat intelligence feed does not automatically satisfy the need to threat hunt your network. A proper threat hunt can identify threats even when they have not yet been seen in the wild.
  • 27. Threat Intelligence andThreat Hunting 27 EC Council CTIA Threat Intelligence
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