Protecting_the_Agricultural_Infrastructure

Running Head: Protecting the Agricultural Infrastructure
AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY
PROTECTING THE AGRICULTURAL INFRASTRUCTURE
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND HUMANITIES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER’S OF ARTS IN HOMELAND SECURITY
SCHOOL OF ARTS AND HUMANITIES
BY
MATTHEW RICHERT
PUEBLO, COLORADO
JUNE 2015

Protecting the Agricultural Infrastructure 2
Table of Contents
Chapter
1. Introduction …………………………………………………………….2
Purpose and Research Question of the Thesis
2. Research Methodology………………………………………………..7
Reasoning Behind Methodology Chosen
3. Literature Review………………………………………………………8
Presentation of Agro-Terror Dangers and Solutions
Data and Information from Statistics and Case Studies
4. Analysis and Findings………………………………………………..45
What the Facts Say
5. Conclusion…………………………………………………………….53
End Product
6. Bibliography…………………………………………………………..59

Chapter 1
Introduction
September 11, 2001 forever changed America. It was the single most
effective attack against American’s on American soil by any enemy. This attack
on America resulted in the deaths of 2,977 individuals. The closest any other
attack ever came was Pearl Harbor; yet, that attack killed 2,500. While the Pearl
Harbor attack was significant and resulted in a deadly response from the
American military; it did not have as significant an impact on American culture
and policy as the 9/11 attacks did.
The 9/11 attacks resulted in a number of substantial changes across the
federal government in general and nearly every federal agency. These federal
agencies and their hierarchy were completely restructured. This restructuring
was designed to provide a more linear chain of command and a faster response
system when threats and risks are identified. The restructuring of federal
agencies came with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. This
department took ownership over dozens of individual agencies until it alone
employed over 240,000 federal employees. One of the primary responsibilities of
the Department of Homeland Security was designed to be risk analysis.

Risk analysis became a large factor after anthrax began being sent
through the mail by terrorists. Between the 9/11 attacks and the anthrax attacks,
the government began to realize just how vulnerable it truly was. It also realized
that it needed to develop some means of predicting attacks as best as possible.
For that reason, DHS began adapting different forms of risk analysis’ widely used
in business. This form of analysis works by having the government determine
vulnerabilities in the American infrastructure. Once a vulnerability is identified
DHS goes further by determining every way in which that vulnerability could be
exploited, and the possibility of it being exploited in these ways. Once these risks
are verified resources can be distributed to shore up the vulnerabilities so they
cannot be used by enemies of the U.S.
It was through risk analysis that the Department of Homeland Security
learned that the greatest risk to America and its citizens was the use of a CBRNE
weapon. More specifically, a chemical or biological weapon because the creation
of a sophisticated chemical or biological weapon is much easier and much
cheaper. “We learned that the lethality of a sophisticated biological weapon could
rival the lethality of a Hiroshima-sized bomb, and that the development and
delivery of such a bioweapon would require far less money and technical
expertise than a nuclear weapon.” (Graham and Talent 2011, 2). This makes
them a highly viable option for terrorists.
Agriculture is the single largest money making enterprise in America. Not
only does it provide food across the country, but it brings in billions of dollars’

worth of revenue in both domestic and foreign sales. There are roughly 30 million
beef cows in America, and as of 2013 those alone accounted for $5.711 billion in
revenue.”(beefusa.org). That revenue is provided from only the beef portion of
agronomy. Successfully disrupting and damaging the beef industry would
unquestionably damage the U.S. economy so that it would be years in recovery.
If an attack were capable of disrupting not only the beef side of agriculture, but
other portions as well then the economy could potentially become irreparably
damaged due to its current state.
If a terrorist organization were to develop or conduct a sophisticated
enough attack on American agriculture the effects would be far more enduring
and impactful than an explosive attack in a major metropolitan area. An explosive
attack or even an erudite biological attack in an urban setting may cause some
deaths and widespread fear for a period of time. However, the area would
recover, and America would retaliate. If agriculture could be disrupted in some
fashion on a grand scale, as stated, the effects would be far reaching.
It was recognition of that fact that led to both Project BioShield and further
research into biological weapons and how they could be used against America.
From that research arose the fact that America’s agronomy was in many ways
both the most vulnerable target in America as well as the most protected. What
hurts it was the same thing that also protected. Crops, for example, are grown
over thousands of miles and thousands of acres. Livestock are raised across a
number of different states. The fact that agriculture covers such a wide area of

land should have been enough to prevent any attack from taking a significant toll
on both the agriculture in general and the American economy. In recent years
feedlot practices have changed and livestock have become increasingly
clustered together, and while crops still cover wide swaths of land new
technology makes dispersing chemicals and biological agents to kill those crops
easy. The sheer size, once an outbreak occurs, also makes it that much more
difficult to contain.
This information is out there. America’s enemies know it as well anyone in
the federal government working to protect America’s agriculture. Yet, despite
knowing these facts, terrorist groups have yet to launch an attack on America’s
agronomy. So far, it can be inferred that it has not been attacked for the same
reason it has been found to be so difficult to protect. Agriculture in the United
States is spread out over tens of thousands of miles and tens of thousands of
acres. It appears to be far too spread out for a successful attack to every truly
occur.
It has been recognized that this cannot be relied upon forever. With the
increasingly high rate of advancement in technology, and the cheapness it which
it can be obtained, more options and possibilities are opening up to terrorists
than ever before. Because of this, the federal government knows it needs to be
as ready to prevent and respond to an attack when it happens. As such,
agricultural terrorism, while not widespread knowledge in the public, has been
investigated and researched by a number of sources.

Unfortunately, there is a disconnection between these sources. The
disconnection does not entirely reside within the proposed solution, but in how
the solutions can be achieved. Many sources agree that there are few answers to
the threat of agroterrorism, but they disagree on how to implement those
answers in an efficient manner. This thesis will research all current information
on agroterrorism and proposed solutions. Upon completion, the research will be
thoroughly analyzed, and the thesis will seek to connect the intervening space
left by the current research.

Chapter 2
Research Methodology
Determining research methodology depends on the question trying to be
answered and preference. The method could be quantitative, qualitative, or a
combination of both. Along with the question being answered determining the
appropriate methodology also relies on what sources of information are available
on the topic at hand.
Quantitative methods rely on numerical data and statistics to provide for
an answer. A quantitative methodology would be of limited use in relation to this
thesis, but could still have merit. Statistical data on the spread of animal diseases
and plant diseases, or the number of attacks world-wide on agricultural centers
would all lend backup support to the overall analysis. Due to the nature of the
current research question a qualitative methodology will be the primary method
of research. Qualitative methods of research rely on current research, interviews,
and case studies on the topic and topics related to the overall research question.
As such, this thesis will detail a number of both primary and secondary peer
reviewed resources, and will include details from an exclusive interview with FBI
Special Agent Dave Autry who is an FBI expert in the area of agricultural
terrorism in Colorado. These resources all coincide with a qualitative
methodology.

Chapter 3
Literature Review
Agricultural terrorism has a number of definitions; however, an
agroterrorism workshop in 2004 posed the following definition: “Agroterrorism is
the deliberate tampering with and contamination of the food supply with the intent
of adversely affecting the social, economic, physical, and psychological well-
being of society.”(Levin et al 2005, 7). While seeming a fairly general definition; it
is one that encompasses the full range of possibilities in which an agroterrorist
event could occur. Whether livestock and crops are poisoned to kill them off or
carry the disease to citizens; each possibility is included in the definition, and
thus it is the primary definition that will be utilized throughout this thesis.
Agricultural terrorism is an area of terrorism; that while receiving more
note in recent years, has received much less attention that any other form of
terrorism. “Testimony before the Government Affairs Committee of the U.S.
Senate has suggested that agriculture is an area that has received comparatively
little attention with regard to terrorism.”(Levin et al 2005, 7). Due to the relatively
low amount of discussion, public knowledge, and resources in regards to
agricultural terrorism the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) Southwest Center for Agricultural Health, Injury Prevention and
Education established the first ever agricultural terrorism workshop. This

workshop brought together many agricultural leaders from a number of the major
agricultural centers across America, as well as those that work in agricultural
research, so that they could develop and discuss preparations for any terrorist
event targeting agriculture. “The workshop was an effective collaboration
between NIOSH Agricultural Centers, the State Department of Health (Texas), a
school of public health, and the Texas Agricultural Research and Extension
Centers in five urban and rural locations with substantial agricultural
production.”(Levin et al 2005). This workshop was and still remains the only one
of its kind to have been conducted. Having NIOSH conduct this workshop was
essential because it brought the discussion of agricultural terrorism and its
possibilities to a more public venue. At a period where there was little knowledge
on the topic in the public this workshop sough to bring its threat out into the open
and make citizens aware as well as better prepared.
This workshop developed a four phase system that would be utilized at all
times for pre and post terrorist event. Throughout the workshop they emphasized
the importance and need of surveillance and community cooperation. This comes
into play in phase one of the system which focuses on pre-event activities. This
phase consists of spreading the knowledge throughout the community and
knowing what kind of attack may come in each type of geographical location. In
other words, knowing the differences between how a terrorist cell may try to hurt
or spread contagions throughout heads of cattle, or simply setting fire to fields of
corn. The key was to understand what may come about in each area depending

on the type of agriculture in that area. Beyond that it emphasized having
response plans in place for an agroterrorist event and going through them
regularly.
Once an event does occur training in identifying whether or not a terrorist
event has occurred is a necessity. This was one of the main features of the
workshop, and this was entitled the “Response” phase. In order to promote
discussion on how to identify an event, and how to respond in case of an actual
event the workshop presented a number of hypothetical scenarios. “Didactic
presentations were built around case scenarios to enhance participant recall and
liklihood of incorporating information into practice.”(Levin et al 2005, 9). The
workshop broke itself into individual modules, and each module focused on
different forms of terrorist attacks on agriculture; such as presenting parasitic
plants into certain crops, or the transmission of diseases among animals. “The
livestock and poultry module emphasized prevention of disease transmission
through the use of sanitary techniques and the proper handling of animal
carcasses.”(Levin et al 2005, 9). Scenario based training like this was able to get
everyone involved in the workshop to participate learn as they went. The
workshop did not just focus on any one scenario or what it considered to be the
most likely threat. Instead it focused on providing broad training over a number of
different types of events, and how to prevent and respond to those events.
Aside from scenario based training that emphasized identification of an
event the response phase, before rolling into the recovery phased, also ensured

that every participant knew what agencies and groups to contact should an event
occur. Knowing who to contact is as essential as being able to identify if and
when an agricultural attack has occurred. Federal agencies have the ability to
quarantine an area and disperse the necessary resources to assist in recovery
as well as slow or halt the progress of an attack. Once these steps have been
completed and resources have been dispersed the workshop taught that actions
would then procede into the recovery phase. The recovery phase is similar to an
AAR or After Action Review. During this phase all agencies, groups, and
individuals evaluate their response and discuss what could have been done
better. It is during this phase, post-event, that NIOSH recommended would be
the best time to notify the public that a terrorist attack targeting America’s
agriculture occurred.
The final phase of the four phase system proposed by the NIOSH
workshop is called the “Resource” phase. In this phase, discussion is continued
in the same manner of an AAR, but is focused entirely on resources. These
resources include those of the material type as well resources in the form of
personnel participation. Post-event the event can be analyzed and new partners
that have better capabilities can be incorporated into the fold to assist with any
future attacks. The resource phase focuses a great deal on locating the best
possible assets after a live event has been analyzed in depth so that it can be
better prevented in the future.

Foxwell Jr. (2001) argues that, especially since the 9/11 attacks, that the
possibility of an agroterror event is becoming much more likely. He attributes this
to an apparent shift in ideology in terrorist groups targeting America. “The
relatively indirect and indiscriminate nature of an agroterror attack meshes
perfectly with the perceived shift in terrorism goals, which have ostensibly veered
away from attempting to achieve specific political results and instead increasingly
seek the destruction of “enemy” societies. “Joseph W. Foxell, “Current Trends in
Agroterrorism (Antilivestock, Anticrop, and Antisoil Bioagricultural Terrorism) and
Their Potential Impact on Food Security,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24, no.
2 (2001): 107–129.. To further establish his argument he points out historical
precedent. Only once in American history, thus far, has any true form of
agricultural terrorism been successfully accomplished. This success came in a
series of attacks during WWI, and were conducted by Anton Dilger under the
guidance of Imperial Germany. Dilger’s attacks led to the deaths of over 3500
warhorses bound for Europe. Granted, even Foxwell points out, this attack was a
very unremarkable example. Unfortunately, it proves that it can be successfully
accomplished on American soil. This is not the only example of an attack on
agriculture in recent history. Leslie Seebeck points out the attacks attributed to
the Japanese during World War II. During the war the Japanese utilized a
number of pathogens, primarily anthrax and rinderpest in attempts to interrupt
food supplies and such.

In the last 90 years that have been such instances like Dilger’s work.
There have been a number of nation-states that have sought out the ability to
attack their enemies utilizing agricultural pathogens in order to undermine their
food supplies during war. In WWII the French began experimenting with potato
beetles which were then introduced into the German supply lines to get at their
food. Then decades later throughout the Cold War the Soviet Union began
experimenting with ticks to spread a number of diseases. “…experiments with
ticks in order to transmit FMD, bovine pleuropneumonia, avian influenza, and
other infectious diseases capable of infecting both animals and humans.”(Polyak
2004). These are just a few of the major incidents and experiments that took
place throughout the world. Yet, according to Polyak, despite nation-states
experimenting with agricultural warfare it is nothing new. What is new are the
amount of non-state actors now making closer examinations of agricultural
warfare and seeking out the means to cause widespread agricultural damage.
As Graham and Talent point out, a sophisticated biological weapon is
extremely easy to make in comparison to a nuclear or radiological weapon, and it
is also much cheaper as well. Foxwell Jr. argues that because so many “infective
agents”(Foxwell Jr. 2001) occur naturally in the wild that some form of an
agricultural “weapon” would be even easier than a biological weapon geared
towards humans. “Agroterrorism is attractive to enemies of the U.S. because
because agricultural agents are easier to prepare than biological
weapons.”(Foxwell Jr. 2001). In the last few decades with the number of naturally

occurring outbreaks, the fall of the Soviet Union, and even the fall of Saddam
Hussein it has become increasingly easy for terrorist groups to obtain biological
agents and the means to experiment with them.
Foxwell goes on to detail how easily agricultural pathogens and such can be
created. In many cases, they can be created using technology that barely crests
the $10,000 mark, and would have the ability to produce whatever contagion the
producers desired. In one example, Foxwell states that a simple high school
biology lab has the capabilities of producing these contagions in only a matter of
days. Polyak’s opinion is nearly identical to that of Foxwell’s in that he believes
terrorist will be that much more attracted to the use of agricultural weapons
because of how cheaply they can be made. The difference is that Polyak looks at
a bigger picture. While Foxwell is right that many agents can be cultured in
something as simple as a high school lab in only a matter of days, it takes a
factory to make enough pathogens to cause real damage.
Polyak states that a “basic bio-toxin producing facility can be built and
operated for less than $10 million.” (Polyak 2004). To many this may seem like a
large sum of money; however, it is estimated that Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo sect
possess assets somewhere between $200 million and $1 billion from 95 to 96;
while Al Qaeda’s assets are estimated between $30 and $300 million. A fully
functioning and fully operation biotoxin producing facility is a feasible threat.
What makes this threat even more frightening is the possibility of a terrorist
organization hiring an actual bio-scientist to create the agents for them.

According to Polyak there is the possibility of any number of wealthier
terrorist organizations hiring just such an individual. During the Cold War the
government was spending almost 4% of its budget on research and development
into biological agents. As the Soviet Union collapsed the amount of spending on
biological agents dropped by roughly 90%. Since that time many of these
scientists have found themselves unemployed and in “reduced circumstances.”
As such, as many as there are in theses circumstances, there may be some of
them looking for alternate means on employment. While this is not a verified risk
at this time it is still a possibility that increases the overall risk of an agricultural
attack.
According to Foxwell, most agricultural centers are well grouped together
geographically making it that much easier for contagions to spread in a number
of ways. “…cattle feeding in western Kansas; hogs in North Carolina, Nebraska,
and Iowa; and poultry in Virginia, Georgia, Arkansas, Pennsylvania, and
Marylands eastern shore district.”(Foxwell Jr. 2001). Today these locations are
still the same, and the only addition would be the cattle grazing in Texas. The
livestock populations in these are areas are very high and very dense in the
specifica areas in which they are maintained. Referring back to Levin et al and
their workshop, this is why it is essential that all those in the agro-community
know what kinds of potential attacks could occur in their individual geographic
locations. The attacks could vary, and knowing what to expect in a related area is
essential to reacting in a timely fashion. Beyond that, Foxwell conceded’s that

part of the problem that needs to be addressed is the lack of public knowledge.
Information dessimination and communication is the most effective solution to
this threat.
Years after Foxwell’s argument is presented it is echoed in many ways by
Leslie Seebeck out of the Queensland University of Technology. Her initial point
of discussion is to emphasize how easily modern agricultural practices may make
an agro-terror attack. She points out that thousands of livestock reside in tight
confines making them much more susceptible to disease. Different kinds
livestock reside on different types of feedlots, but all of these feedlots have
reputations as being overcrowded as it is. Polyak points out that many cows get
fattened up at feedlots that can hold anywhere from 150,000 to 300,000 cows,
pig farms hold as many as 10,000 pigs, and chicken farms group together as
many as 100,000 birds. Among the tight confines are other issues such as
“stock” being constantly and quickly traded among differing feedlots, and a
massive lack of surveillance in general. “…the breeding of highly resistant strains
of pathogens through the misuse of antibiotics; the use of franchisors in
production; the rapid transfer of stock; and fast ‘just in time’ delivery to the table;
with minimal surveillance along the many often widely dispersed links in that
supply chain…”(Seebeck 2007). It is these factors that go to show just how
vulnerable the agricultural infrastructure really is. These vulnerabilities, namely
the consistent over-overcrowding of feedlots, makes the threat of an agricultural
attack a very high probability. If a disease were intentionally released into any of

these over-crowded lots the disease alone could kill thousands if not hundreds of
thousands; while the government would have to kill hundreds of thousands more
to ensure the disease did not continue to spread.
Seebeck continues her argument with a discussion on the economic tolls
posed to the agricultural infrastructure should an attack successfully disrupt its
processes in a significant way. As discussed earlier, the beef sector of agriculture
alone provides billions of dollars’ worth of revenue to the economy. As Senator
Susan Collins stated “…the fields and pastures of America’s farmland might
seem at first to have nothing in common with the towers of the World Trade
Center or our busy seaports. In fact they are merely different manifestations of
the same high-priority target, the American enconomy.”(Collins 2003). A
successful attack in this sector alone could potentially cause nearly irreparable
damage to the economy.
Seebeck looks beyond the revenue brought in from trade in agriculture
and examines the costs in expenditures to disrupt and halt any attack.
“In the agricultural sector alone, the financial impact of such
attacks would be incurred at three levels: direct costs arising from
containment and prevention measures such as destruction of
livestock or plants; indirect multiplier effects, compensating effected
farmers and related industry; and international costs, through
protective trade embargoes.”(Seebeck 2007.)
The Australian Productivity Commission conducted a quantitative analysis and
study in order to produce an estimate of the likely cost outcome of an attack or
outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth disease in Australia. While the numbers and costs

generated are for another country; they are important because they can still
provide essential estimations into the America economy. Only minor adjustments
need be made to correlate the quantitative data with the American agricultural
economy because both countries are nearly the same size; if Alaska is excluded.
The Australian Commission estimated that the loss in export revenues alone,
should there be a Foot-and-Mouth disease outbreak, would reach as high as $3-
9 billion, and once all costs across all three levels were totaled they estimate the
costs would reach and exceed $8-13 billion. Many of these cost estimations
came from previous experience. More specifically they were estimated from the
costs incurred by Taiwan during the Foot-and-Mouth disease outbreak that
occurred there in 1997. “For example, the 1997 Foot-and-Mouth disease (FMD)
outbreak in Taiwan cost the Taiwanese government $US4 billion spent on
surveillance, cleaning, and disinfection.”(Seebeck 2007). These costs do not
even show what the grand total was once it was calculated at all three levels that
Seebeck discusses.
Then there is also the cost taken on simply because of fear of a
contaminated product. In 1985 a number of phone calls were received where an
individual claimed that Chilean grapes were laced with cyanide poison. Over the
course of a year this claim went completely unverified, and there were no deaths
caused by cyanide laced grapes from Chile. Yet, those phone calls resulted in
over $330 million in lost revenue. In this case there was not even an actual
agricultural attack utilizing Chilean grapes. An individual or organization made a

claim and let the psychological impact of the fear it generated do the rest. Should
even a small attack take place it would be enough to generate enough fear alone
that the agricultural market would be decimated. Fear can result in panic, and
panic can result in many different outcomes. In the case of an agro-terror attack
the likeliest outcome of panic would be the refusal of food production employees
to work. The conclusion of such a reaction would be the halting of the food
production industry for a period of time compounding the growing economic crisis
that would result from the attack, and greatly increasing unemployment rates
straining the economic crisis even further.
In further detail, the levels of cost as discussed by Seebeck do not reside
solely within the range of containing the attack and recovering from it. Much of
the financial crash that could arise from a successful agro-terror attack would
come from the psychological impact as well. According to Turvey et al, just in
2001 one in eight Americans were employed in the food production industry, and
in 2013 agriculture and the food production industry employed almost 17 million
American citizens. An attack on agriculture, depending on the type of agro-
attack, could result in a massive drop in employment. The psychological impact
of an agro-attack meant to spread a pathogen through the food production
industry so that it would harm American citizens would be devastating.
Returning to the FMD outbreak in Taiwan we can see just how deadly
FMD alone can be. Seebeck even points out that, because of the potential
effects of FMD, it can be considered in most cases to be a WMD; especially if

used correctly. According to the U.S. National Library of Medicine and National
Institutes in Health, the FMD outbreak in Taiwan resulted in the loss of
approximately 37.7% of the pigs. At that time, all but two cities were quarantined
and deemed FMD zones. Once the quarantine was in place the outbreak was
under control 180,000 pigs died directly from infection, but another 3.85 million
pigs had to be killed in order to prevent the disease from spreading. Cost
accrued by the Taiwanese government would have been much higher if the FMD
had spread to other livestock breeds. According to the World Organization for
Animal Health, FMD is highly contagious and can be spread to all cloven hoofed
animal breeds. This means that all cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, etc are susceptible
to FMD. In 2001, another outbreak of FMD occurred throughout Europe. The
United Kingdom alone had to slaughter over 4 million animals in order to halt the
spread of the disease, and that is not counting the death toll taken by the disease
itself.
FMD is not the only animal pathogen that poses a threat to livestock
animals in the United States. There are a number of diseases that occur in
nature that could be easily obtained, brought into country, and utilized to cultivate
an outbreak among cattle or any other breed of livestock animals. Rocco
Casagrande from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology makes a point of
discussing exactly how easy it would be to smuggle almost any plant or animal
pathogen into a country. In New Zealand, for example, farmers wanted to
decrease the rabbit population that was destroying their crops. “…the farmer’s

had rabbit calicivirus smuggled into the country through one of the tightest
airport/port biosecurity regimes in the world.”(Casagrande 2000). While this is
only one example of just how easy it is to smuggle an animal pathogen it is an
important factor because the event set a precedent.
What is more concerning is the fact of just how easy it would be to obtain
a plant or animal based pathogen within the United States. As a part of his study
Casagrande contacted a number of laboratories in possession of plant and
animal based pathogens to gather information. It is required that any lab
obtaining pathogens that could cause serious harm must register with the Center
for Disease Control, but to obtain plant and animal based pathogens a lab need
only obtain a permit from the USDA. According to Casagrande’s findings exactly
one third or the laboratories that he contacted stated “they would require no
paperwork to send viable samples of their plant pathogens within the same
state.”(Casagrande 2000). Yet all of the labs would have to obtain another
permit through the USDA in order to ship the samples to other states. Lastly,
Casagrande learned that so long as the correct documentation appeared to be in
order none of the labs would contact any form of law enforcement after a request
to obtain a plant or animal pathogen. Fortunately, diseases like FMD and the
Rinderpest virus are only cultivated and studied at the Plum Island Animal
Disease Center. This means that a terrorist organization would not be able to
obtain cultivated samples of two of the most deadly animal pathogens from a lab
in the United States.

Nevertheless, diseases such as FMD can still be easily obtained.
Despite the UK and other modern countries being able to fight off FMD outbreaks
over time, the disease still runs rampant in many third world countries. “A
knowledgeable individual could do severe damage to agriculture with a pathogen
obtained from the environment of a foreign country.”(Casagrande 2000). This
makes the disease easily obtainable, and FMD alone is contagious enough that
cattle can catch it just by coming into contact with contaminated objects a single
time. If necessary a terrorist agent need only contaminate its clothing with FMD
and walk through a feedlot. All that would be necessary to cause devastation
would be for one animal to catch the disease. From there that one animal could
start the spread of the disease to every other animal it comes into contact with.
“…wind-borne FMD could spread throughout an entire cattle-raising region from
one centrally located infected farm.”(Casagrande 2000). The ease in which
viruses such as FMD can spread make them a viable option for terrorists to use
when wanting to send a powerful political message or even to cause financial
disaster.
The point of discussing and emphasizing FMD and similarly fatal diseases
is that many of them have caused widespread devastation in countries through
naturally occurring outbreaks. Experts in both America and New Zealand believe
that FMD is the most likely disease to be utilized by a criminal or terrorist
organization because of its availability and ease of use. A targeted attack from a
terrorist organization, that has potentially enhanced the disease, could have a

much wider effect. “But a terrorist instigated outbreak – a targeted attack – would
have wider implications for national security, not least through the need to offset
an enemy’s potential exploitation of national weakness that may result.”(Seebeck
2007). Polyak, on the same path as Seebeck, points out that if FMD is introduced
into a livestock population in any one state that it could potentially spread to 23
other states within only five days. Thus Seebeck argues that it is imperative that
the threat of an attack toward the agricultural infrastructure be recognized with a
great sense of urgency.
Seebeck also points out that past experiences in dealing with biological
terror attacks in other countries, as well as the responses given to naturally
occurring agricultural diseases, gives the American government a strong
foundation in which to build policies that can protect agriculture. Despite a strong
foundation, those previous events have allowed authorities to estimate that an
agro attack just in California would cost between $6 and $13 billion. Federal
authorities also estimate that because of how feedlots and livestock
transportation operates in America authorities estimate, based off events in other
countries, they would have to destroy upwards of 23 million animals in order to
control an outbreak. Once an outbreak occurs the problem, once contained,
comes from distinguishing a naturally occurring outbreak from a terrorist attack.
This would be extremely difficult to do simply because of the technology available
to enemy organizations makes this kind of attack highly possible, yet very difficult
to recognize as anything other than a naturally occurring event. An aerosolized

version of FMD, according to Polyak, can travel on the wind upwards of 170
miles. This creates a massive dispersal area with the potential to infect
thousands of animals simultaneously.
When discussing and proposing solutions on how to protect the American
agronomy Seebeck refers to the problem of designing these protections as a
“wicked problem.” When speaking of a wicked problem Seebeck states, “These
complexities, uncertainties, and nonlinearities present the designer with a ‘wicked
problem.’ Such problems are not conducive to traditional methods of, which seek
to impose ‘tame’ methodologies and assumptions to achieve a clear
unambiguous solution.”Lesley Seebeck, Responding to Systemic Crisis: The
Case of Agroterrorism, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 30, 2007.. It is
because this is considered a wicked problem that prevents even the problem
itself from being identified with a single universal definition. It is also the nature of
a wicked problem to have the solution be just as indefinable as the problem,
because any time a defined solution is proposed it changes how the problem is
looked at thus changing any definition placed on the problem at hand. It is ever
changing and ever adapting, and it can’t be consistently and universally defined.
Thus, because of the nature of wicked problems, Seebeck recommends a
number of concepts pulled from CAS or Complex Adaptive Systems as being
necessary to finding solutions to wicked problems. CAS utilizes a number of
different agents that constantly change and provide feedback. The kind of
feedback provided comes from a numbers of sources that are unique to how

CAS agents conduct analysis. “…CAS theorists look to understanding
relationships, the dynamics of organization, and the emergence of behaviors,
often drawing on tools such as statistical mechanics and agent-based
modeling.”(Seebeck 2007). Through the kind of analysis conducted by CAS
agents it is potentially possible to create more flexible and resilient systems and
solutions. In the case of agricultural terrorism being a wicked problem it is
essential to have an adaptive solution. This is because agriculture covers such a
broad spectrum of products and can be attacked in so many different ways and
forms.
Thus far the primary discussion has been in regards to FMD and how
livestock are at risk. While this is an obvious risk, agriculture encompasses more
than just livestock. America grows many different kinds of crops all across the
nation that bring in billions of dollars’ worth of revenue. “In round number, U.S.
farmers produce about $143 billion worth of crops…”(epa.gov). Also according to
the EPA America’s major staple crops include corn, soybeans, hay, wheat,
cotton, sorghum (grain), and rice. Corn is the largest staple crop of all as America
produces over 30% of the world’s corn and brings in almost $64 billion by itself.
As a whole America produces more crops than nearly any other country in the
world. But like pathogens that target livestock; crops are just as vulnerable
because plant pathogens are just as attainable and potentially even easier to
use. “…plant pathogens are much easier to use than other weapons of mass
destruction, and they would cause more damage to the food supply and the

economy.”Foxell, “Current Trends in Agroterrorism (Antilivestock, Anticrop, and
Antisoil Bioagricultural Terrorism) and Their Potential Impact on Food Security.”.
This is not the only issue at hand. America is so large and populous that it relies
on the food provided by the crop industry. Yet, if an attack occurred successfully
on a large enough scale, according to Paul Rogers, a leading British
agroterrorism expert, a country facing this kind of attack could be faced with
famine that could cost as many lives as a major anthrax attack on a city.
Crops do have one benefit over livestock and that is the fact that they are
grown over much wider areas than animals. According to Foxell Jr. this leaves
the possibility of terrorists adopting America’s policy in distributing anti-crop
agents. In the 1950’s and 60’s the U.S. designed plans to utilize anti-crop agent
and expected that the wind would continue to spread whatever infectious
material they utilized at the time. This expectation led them to plan to distribute
the infectious materials over wide areas instead of covering every plant in a crop
field. Possibilities such a this, in terms of crops, are much more viable than even
prompting an FMD outbreak among livestock.
Crops have a much wider array of agents that can deal them damage. The
primary means of targeting livestock reside within utilizing certain highly
contagious diseases and poisoning animal feed. Crops can be targeted in a
number of ways to include diseases, chemical poisons, and even insects that
feed on certain types of crops. The sheer quantity of different agents that could
harm America’s crop has its own role to play that make it such a viable option to

terrorist and criminal organizations. The large amount of possibilities is
exacerbated by an increase in all forms of international travel; whether that travel
is from an import ship, cruise line, or air travel. International travel of all kinds
having increase drastically in the last couple of decades makes it that much more
difficult to determine if the destruction of crops was natural or an attack.
Attacks on crops present the same problem that attacks on livestock
present, but worse because of the number of different ways crops can be
destroyed naturally. Even if a foreign insect or plant pathogen that has never
been recorded in America suddenly appears it does not automatically constitute
that it was delivered by a terrorist. It is just as likely that someone traveling came
into contact with contaminated objects and accidentally carried the disease over,
or that insects like potato beetles simply stowed away on a ship and spread
throughout the U.S. upon docking. Either way, these possibilities can cast doubt
that an event was caused by a terrorist organization and would make determining
one way or another very difficult.
Unfortunately, to compound the difficulty of determining whether or not an
event is natural or an attack is the fact that America has a “monoculture” crop
system. This means that unlike many other countries that rotate through a variety
of different crops American’s only rotate through one or two different crops. This
greatly increases the crop vulnerability of the U.S. agricultural infrastructure. “The
lack of diversity, wherein single crops are gown over thousands of acres, renders
the entire crop susceptible to a single pathological organism.”(Foxell 2001). Even

aside from the increased vulnerability to single pathogens it opens the doors for
other possibilities. The lack of multiple crops among the crop rotations weakens
the soil and doesn’t replenish as many key nutrients. This weakens the soil to the
point where it makes it easier for blights to spread. Whenever the soil is weak the
crops themselves aren’t as strong because they are not receiving the right
amount nutrients. If the crops are already not as strong as they could be they are
that much easier to contaminate and destroy.
Again, just like with livestock being diseased in an attack, any attack on
crops that contaminates them will generate a great deal of fear. People will clear
the shelves at store of products currently on the shelf out of fear that anything
incoming will be harmful and poisonous. Workers in the food industry as well as
those simply purchasing the food could succumb to the fear and panic, and
refuse to handle and purchase the food out of anxiety that whatever poisoned the
crops will poison them as well.
However, Turvey et al argues along similar lines as the NIOSH workshop.
Turvey et al proposes that the simplest solution to mitigate such widespread
panic is the effective use of all forms of media in order to communicate with the
public. Unfortunately, this falls into the overarching concern of agro-terrorism
being a wicked problem, and its inability to have any simple solutions.
Communication through any form of media presents a number of issues in and of
itself.

Miscommunication issues mostly arise through the different forms of
media mediums themselves. These mediums may present the information to the
public which is meant to alleviate risk and panic; however, the way a media
source decides to present the information influences how it is interpreted and
received by the general public. This can make forms of communication through
media ineffective, and work opposite the goal by causing more widespread panic.
This widespread panic, among other things, is what could be achieved by any
terrorist organization utilizing agricultural terrorism. This possibility of widespread
fear that is made worse by America’s own media sources makes it even more
attractive to these groups. “…way for a terrorist group to undercut a nation’s
economy, undermine its political system, cause nationwide panic, and generate
enormous publicity for the organization or individual responsible for the
attack.”(Polyak 2004). Turvey et al points out that in many cases media
communication is slurred by any number of political and self-interests. In fact,
political interests play a large role in media in society today, and can be observed
everywhere from comic books to the evening news. As can be seen in the
statement from Polyak, there are others that agree. This kind of attack would
generate and attract large amounts of publicity and media coverage, but it would
all have differing spins attached to it that would only add to the nationwide panic.
A fairly interesting example on just how mainstream media attempts to
influence the interpretation of political events can be seen through Marvel’s Civil
War. When President Bush was attempting to have the Patriot Act signed into

being Marvel’s Civil War began. It began because the federal government was
attempting to force the heroes to register their actual identities and aliases so
that they could be monitored by the government. Captain America led the faction
against the government while Iron Man led the faction for this new identity
registration. When President Bush successfully had the Patriot Act passed into
law Marvel comics had Captain America assassinated as a statement showing
that their version of America had died; yet, when President Obama was elected
Marvel resurrected Captain America. As comical and also subliminal as this may
seem it was an effective message that reached out to younger generations and
influenced how they interpreted political events happening at the time.
Subliminally, younger voters at the time that followed pop culture media
sources such as Marvel comics correlated events like the Marvel Civil War with
hot button issues like the Patriot Act. This was the goal in the first place by
Disney and Marvel. Disney, at the time, was the second largest media producer
in the world owning many of the most popular brand name companies and
television channels to include Marvel and ESPN. The point behind this example
is to show that whenever a company or large media source wants to get its own
political messages across and influence how certain political events are viewed
they have the ability to. Companies such as these may discuss and present on
the exact same event but spin it to get across their own viewpoint and influence
others. Statistics in the form of President Bush’s ratings at the time show how
effective media can be at influencing its audience. Whenever an attack occurs,

especially on agriculture where identification and notification are key, information
is power. That information can reassure the America people and help contain the
initial panic, but it can’t be trusted to media sources that may put their own spin
on the event in way that’ll counter the point of notifying citizens in the first place.
In another example, on a more regular occasion political views and their
interpretations can be observed nightly depending on which news station is being
watched. Some stations are highly liberal and present information from a liberal
perspective while other stations are highly conservative and present the exact
same information on an event in a conservative point of view. This is the greatest
issue that Turvey et al believes holds back the simplest of solutions from being
the most highly effective.
To back this point a survey was conducted in which civilians were asked
where they believed an agro-terror attack was most likely to come from: “a
foreign state sponsored terrorist organization, a foreign non-state sponsored
terrorist organization, or a domestic terrorist or terrorist organization.”(Turvey et
al). According to the survey results 47.9% of Americans believed that an
agroterror attack would most likely come from a foreign state sponsored terrorist
organization. Only 15.4% of Americans believed that the attack would come from
a domestic terrorist or domestic terrorist organization. Turvey et al points out that
at a committee meeting by the Committee of Governmental Affairs in 2003,
Senator Susan Collins pointed out that a book entitled the Poisoner’s Handbook
was found in the hands of group that is known to support Al Qaeda. While this

book provides highly detailed instructions on how to make poisons harmful to
plants, animals, and people; what is most important is that this underground
pamphlet was written in America, by Americans, and to attack America.
Granted this was in the wake of 9/11 and the beginning of the War on
Terror, but because of the political agenda and how it was presented through the
media American citizens believed that the greatest threat was a foreign state
sponsored organization. In many ways, at the time, that was correct. “Except for
tying this back to the War on Terror the Poisoner’s Handbook was never again
mention in the hearings, suggesting that the committee was not at all concerned
that this handbook was written supposedly by Americans in the United States to
attack the United States.”(Turvey et al). But because of how certain information
was presented and withheld Americans did not fully understand the threat posed
by domestic organizations. The Committee on Government Affairs and other
federal organizations continued to push the political agenda that the threat was
entirely external.
In order to get around the problem of self-interests and political interests
getting in the way of effective communication to the nation in a time of crisis they
must find a medium that allows them to speak without bias. In the face of a major
disaster that is still unfolding it is necessary to reach to the people and get them
to understand exactly what is happening and what is needed without worrying
about misinterpretation. Only in this manner can the simplest solution become
truly effective. This where the National Advisory System comes into play. This

system already has the ability to, once activated, take over any television
channel and radio station to announce its warning. Generally, these warnings are
straight forward with the bare minimum of details necessary; however, the
technology is present today to utilize the system in a different manner.
The National Advisory System may be the necessary medium to use, and
it is already in place. In order to use it as necessary few modifications would be
necessary. Through this medium a single individual can be vetted out and used
to go on air through this medium to talk with the public. In this manner the
government can reduce political and self-interest messages from over shadowing
the real message being delivered. The National Advisory System allows the
government to circumvent almost all other media mediums and thus allows them
to circumvent whatever spins or attached messages those mediums want to add.
When discussing other preventive measures Polyak claims that the overall
continuous costs of prevention would still be far cheaper than even a single
terrorist attack or terrorist instigated outbreak of FMD. He argues that if an
organization instigated an outbreak in California that within little more than three
months it would total approximately $89 billion. “…”$89 billion for one year of
military operations and reconstruction operations in Iraq and Afghanistan roughly
equals the costs of uncontrolled FMD in California for a period of only 14
weeks.”(Polyak 2004). As of 2004 the FDA was requesting an increase in the
counter-terrorism budget to bring it to $181 million, and other budget requests
called for a Food and Agriculture Defense Initiative that would appropriate $381

million. Additionally, that same year Congress approved a $5.6 billion budget for
Project BioShield. As of 2014 the FDA was requesting a budget overhaul of $4.3
billion total where it would appropriate almost $340 million for its Biologics
program, $1.1 billion for its Foods Program, and over $190 million for its Animal
Drugs and Feeds Program.
These new budget acquisitions show that the government and its sub
agencies have begun to take a greater look at agricultural terrorism. However, in
many ways the sub agencies disagree on how this should be done. Some
agencies believe that all that need be necessary is to train more state and local
experts in agricultural terrorism, and training them in how to recognize outbreak
patterns and such. From that point the local experts can call whichever agency
needs to be contacted. However, this leaves to chance the “human condition.” If
that individual is not making proper observations, or is even on vacation. The
government would have to fund the training of large amounts of people in order
to ensure that someone is always on watch in each geographic location. The
best answer to this would be to follow the model presented in the NIOSH
workshop. Train the ranchers and farmers themselves so that they know what to
look for and who to contact.
This is not full proof though. Polyak argues that more spending needs to
be geared towards modern surveillance systems. These systems, once in place,
would provide remote sensing capabilities that have the ability to detect toxins
and pathogens in the air and even in the feed for livestock animals. The

technology is available that has the ability to detect pathogens and toxins that
have been aerosolized. For example, the Pentagon is in possession of just such
a system, and their current tests of that system show that it works successfully.
Unfortunately, those same tests also show how easily a pathogen can be
dispersed over a wide area.
“The effective dissemination of a large quantity of a weaponized
pathogen… would not require nation state technologies. The ease
of a large scale aerosol release was recently demonstrated by the
Department of Defense. To test the biosensors at the Pentagon, a
simulant was released upwind of the Pentagon. The device used to
disperse the simulant was a $49.95 leaf blower purchased at a
local hardware store.”(Graham & Talent 2011).
Obviously the government has the capability of detecting the wide spread release
of pathogens in the air. The key is to have the government disperse these
technologies and require that they be maintained at every major feedlot, farm,
and ranch. Utilizing these technologies greatly reduces the threat of even
aerosolized FMD, because it would be rapidly detected and quarantined.
In many cases, Polyak’s end argument is nearly in sync with that of the
NIOSH workshop. He believes that a multi-staged approach would provide the
necessary solution to protecting the agricultural infrastructure. Polyak’s approach
differs in that he seems to go beyond the community and a few agencies. While
NIOSH believed that the key to successful reaction was founded in the
community; Polyak incorporates all levels of the government in a number of
different ways.

The first stage includes building up a well-equipped response system.
Where Polyak and NIOSH meet is that they both agree that an essential part of
the solution is to train locals. The training would eventually lead to developing
state and local agro-terrorism experts, but would begin with a number of
intensive scenario based exercises all across the country. These exercises would
build a local base that would greatly decrease the reactionary gap should an
attack actually occur. Locals would know what they are looking for, how they
need to respond, and which authorities they need to contact immediately.
The latter four stages of Polyak’s process are where they begin to differ
greatly from the NIOSH process. Steps two and three for Polyak’s process go
hand in hand. Step two focuses on long term analytical means like incorporating
current means of biosurveillance, and putting geographic information systems to
greater utilization. Step three pertains to the development and stockpiling of
resources in order to aid in any response and recovery events. “It would involve
maintaining a vaccine stockpile to guard against known biological agents, as well
as increasing the ability of the anti-agroterrorism and defense communities to
monitor the world for the emergence of new diseases.”(Polyak). These is an
essential step because technology is advancing at an ever increasing pace.
Technology that was far too expensive for non-state actors a decade or more
ago is now readily available and even more advanced. Being able to monitor the
world for the emergence of new diseases would give the American infrastructure
as whole a much greater degree of security. By having the capability of tracking

new diseases federal agencies would be able to determine the lethality of the
new diseases and determine whether or not the diseases could be used against
the U.S. as a pathogen.
The final two stages deal with security issues. Stage four specifically deals
with the security and integrity of current knowledge and science. By this,
agencies would monitor disgruntled employees, unemployed scientists, and other
individuals that have participated in major biological weapons and vaccine
programs from around the world. Whichever agency took over the responsibilities
of stage four would focus a great deal on countries such as “Iraq, Russia, and
South Africa.”(Polyak). The point of stage three providing this kind of security
over the integrity of biological weapons knowledge would be to prevent both
intentional and accidental leaks of this knowledge. It would prevent or seek to
prevent knowledge of modern biological pathogens and weapons from slipping
into the hands of terrorist organizations.
Stage five takes care of the opposite side of the same coin as stage four.
Stage five, according to Polyak, would provide for the physical security aspect.
This is where agencies that focus on airport and port security come into play. The
security would not stop at simple port security, whether by sea or air. It would
extend to these same agencies training state and local law enforcement in
biological and agricultural terrorism. “This last layer would entail appropriate
training of experts within the law enforcement community so that they understand
and recognize threats of agroterrorism.”(Polyak). Knowledge itself is the solution.

Train locals and law enforcement in this stage so that they know what to expect
and what to look for, and agroterror situations will be handled with a much
greater degree of speed.
While knowledge may very well be the solution it is also part of the
problem. The availability of information due to the World Wide Web greatly
increases the pool of where an agroterror attack could come from. Already
Senator Susan Collins mentioned The Poisoner’s Handbook which was possibly
written by an American to attack America. This underground book is widely
available and easily located. This is evident in the fact that it was found in the
hands of Al Qaeda supporters in the Middle East. Not only that but a simple
Google search with today’s modern internet capabilities can turn up thousands of
guides on how to obtain biological agents, grow your own cultures, weaponize
pathogens and explosives.
Technology does as much to hinder as it does to help. All the information
in the world that a terrorist needs to plan and conduct an attack can be found on
the internet. “Worse, the directions for finding or culturing these pathogens have
been – and are still being – publishing on the Internet, potentially allowing even
the tiniest, most obscure group to mount an economically devastating
agroterrorist assault…”(Foxell 2001). Beyond finding every kind of instruction on
how to collect the necessary items required to conduct a type of attack any
would-be terrorist can find all the information they need to find an appropriate
target as well. The research conducted for this thesis alone brought to light a

number of facts that an individual or organization would find useful to conduct an
attack. The ease in which this information can be obtained means that any
individual or group has access to it. Any individual, including American citizens,
that has a desire to cause harm can do so.
Despite increasing widespread knowledge of agroterrorism and training
authorities at every level to recognize the threat it poses there are still issues that
it presents with aside from those currently discussed. Already mentioned is the
issue of the difficultly in determining whether or not an outbreak was naturally
occurring or instigated by a terrorist organization. FMD alone, when in
aerosolized form, can travel in the air upwards of 170 miles from its point of
release and can still infect a number of animals even at those outer limits. This
creates a large issue because so many feedlots for cows, pigs, and many other
cloven hoofed animals reside in very central locations. The argument use to be
that the agriculture was so spread out that no significant harm could ever come
that part of the infrastructure. At one time this may have been true, but changes
in agricultural operations in just over the last decade have made that argument
obsolete.
Less than a handful of states operate the vast majority of livestock
facilities; whether those facilities are ranches or feedlots. Within those facilities
are kept thousands of animals, and sometimes these numbers reach into the
hundreds of thousands. Having such concentrated locations of livestock would
make determining the nature of the outbreak that much more difficult as well.

Even if the pathogen is weaponized and enhanced in any way once it is released
into the air nature does take over, and depending on the enhancement it could
simple appear as a new super strain that has occurred naturally.
The difficulty in determining whether an outbreak occurred naturally or
was instigated is one of the very factors that make this kind of attack that much
more appealing to all enemies of the United States. An agricultural attack gives
America’s enemies; whether a state or sub-state actor, a barrier of protection in
many ways. The number one barrier being the ability of the U.S. to even
determine if an outbreak was natural or an attack. The second barrier being that
the attack was not geared towards humans and took no human lives. Even if the
United States determined that an outbreak resulted from an agricultural attack,
and were then able to identify exactly who conducted the attack, forms of
retribution are limited.
When citizens, specifically those in the civilian sector, think of terrorism
they imagine the destruction of September 11 and the screams from the Boston
Marathon bombing. The ideas of both state sponsored and sub-state attacks
killing Americans, especially with the use of biological and chemical agents,
spreads a great deal of fear and anger and would result in unrelenting reprisals.
“For example, the United States threatened ‘overwhelming’ and ‘devastating’
retaliation against Iraq if it used chemical or biological weapons in the Gulf
War.”(Casagrande). While this single threat was made during the Gulf War;
America has maintained the same stance for any attack on Americans. Thus, the

war in Iraq and Afghanistan after September 11. For the most part, the world
agrees with America’s feelings of retribution where civilian lives are concerned as
they would feel the same in similar circumstances. It is this fact that has de-railed
much of the progress that could have been completed on the anti-agroterrorist
front. It is the same fact that has created a barrier of protection for those looking
to conduct an agro-terror type of attack.
Most agro-terror attacks are not meant to harm people in any physical
fashion. The main target is the economy through targeted attacks on agriculture.
Unfortunately, these kinds of attacks do not engender the same anger that
attacks on actual people do. Because of this the world community does not
condone the same kinds of reprisal that is permitted for the taking of innocent
lives. Even if the federal government can determine that an outbreak was
instigated, and they can determine who conducted the attack; that specific
nation-state or terrorist organization need not fear unrelenting military reprisals.
“A state sponsor could undertake a campaign to weaken its adversary
economically, yet not have to fear the destruction of its own regime as a result of
being caught in the act of agricultural sabotage.”(Casagrande). This is yet one
more aspect of what makes agricultural terrorism so appealing. The layers of
protection offered to those looking to hurt the U.S. makes the risk/threat level of
such an attack increase dramatically. All while the risks to those conducting the
attack remain relatively low.

So long as a terrorist organization maintains the economy as its target,
and not the American people, when they conduct an agricultural attack the risk to
them will continue to remain low. As stated, this only refers to most forms of
agricultural terrorism. There are numerous chains throughout the food production
industry, and these chains employ thousands upon thousands of people all
across the country. Both livestock and crops travel to multiple locations as well
when moving through the agricultural industry. “…on average, food supplies must
travel more than 1300 miles from the farm where they are grown to the ‘typical’
urban resident’s dinner table.”(Foxell 2001). This distance is normal when
discussing crops, but is actually increased when discussing livestock. Livestock
can move to multiple locations in a matter of a couple weeks as it progresses
through multiple feedlots, to a slaughter house, to stores and eventually to
consumer’s dinner plates.
There being so many links in the chain that makes up the food production
industry means that there are many vulnerabilities to the food itself. The widest
range of threats to agriculture belong to terrorists looking to hurt the economy by
targeting agriculture by contaminating crops and livestock. However, the
vulnerabilities found throughout the food production industry allows terrorists the
opportunity to target both citizens and the economy together.
Many businesses, whether a slaughter house or a grocery store, do not
conduct thorough background investigations on they’re employees. In many
cases, so long as the basics check out anyone can be hired. This allows any

organization that has the capability to create a false identity to slip multiple
workers into different areas of the chain. These individuals could then begin
systematically poisoning foods as they head to the market or even once they
arrive on the shelves. Many grocery marts only have minimal surveillance
capabilities, and any individual acting as a customer could also walk in and subtly
poison certain foods. Due to the sheer size of the food production industry itself
the contamination could even occur before it ever reaches the market. While
these are simple examples they no less illustrate how vulnerable the food supply
itself is.
By directing attacking America’s agricultural food supply and
contaminating it so that it poisons those that eat it accomplishes two main goals
sought by many terrorist groups. They would hurt the American people and deal
damage to the economy. The positive aspect to this kind of agricultural attack is
that without enough personnel assisting in the attack it would be very difficult to
harm a large number of people. The pathogen used would have to have the
ability to stay potent inside of the food, and be highly contagious so that once it
infects enough people it could continue to spread. Without those two factors the
attack would have to rely more so on the fear and panic it could cause. This case
of fear and panic is no different than any other case caused by other forms of
agricultural terrorism with one exception. For the most part, it would be much
easier to quarantine and halt the spread once people begin showing symptoms
of the poison. Once the outbreak is contained the government can reassure its

citizens and ease the burden posed by the fear and panic. This would be
accomplished much faster than an instigated outbreak geared towards livestock.
There are a number of different ways in which the agricultural
infrastructure could be attacked on American soil. New technology, new feedlot
practices, and thousands of links in the chain of the food production industry all
provide numerous vulnerabilities that can be exploited by enemies of the United
States. There are few highly specific options geared towards solving this threat,
but it can be greatly reduced.

Chapter 4
Analysis and Findings
There have been many proposals put forth to try and solve the dilemma of
how to protest against agricultural terrorism. Going back to Seebeck’s argument,
this is why agro-terrorism poses a “wicked problem.” Any solution that is defined
or attempts to define what it is fixing changes the nature of the problem.
Throughout the research conducted for this thesis a few patterns emerged. Of
the solutions proposed many were fairly generic solutions. Almost all of the
suggested solutions agreed to one extent or another, but they offered nothing
original. The fact that every solution offered was so generic has its pros and its
cons, but appears to have more cons.
On the fortunate aspect the solutions need only be standard because it
means that the limitations of what can be done by both the government and the
enemies of the U.S. are known. This is especially important because when
limitations are known it allows for accurate scenario based training and resource
allocation plans to be designed. It also means that authorities can be better
trained, and have a better idea overall of what to look for and what to expect.
Nothing can be more advantageous than knowing enough of the limitations that
almost all possibilities can be played out, accounted for, and planned for.

Unfortunately, there are a couple of very large cons involved in this that
counter the pros completely. First and foremost is the fact that nature itself would
have its own part to play in any form of attack on agriculture. Nature makes any
terrorist event targeting the agricultural infrastructure highly unpredictable. As
advanced as current weather forecasting abilities have become it would be
impossible to determine the exact course of an outbreak or other kind of attack
once it has been released. Once nature has a hold of whatever pathogen was
released, whether airborne or otherwise, it becomes unpredictable. Secondly, the
advancement of technology today and the ease in which both plant and animal
diseases can be collected means that those who would utilize such attacks do
not have very many limitations. Both of those facts outweigh the pros; thus,
bringing the issue back to Seebeck’s wicked problem definition for agricultural
terrorism.
Yet, based off of what is understood of wicked problems it that broad-all-
encompassing solutions; while not efficient may be the best solution available.
“Consequence planning and management must incorporate as wide a range of
threats as possible”(Kosal & Anderson). The key to making a broad solution
successful would be to make it as highly adaptive as possible. Seebeck believes
that elements of CAS have the best likelihood of providing sufficient means of
determining how to best combat a given scenario. CAS relies on ever changing
information and agents to provide data. “Complex adaptive systems are open
and dynamic; they continually adapt to new developments.”(Cambridge U). It

adapts as it goes and only utilizes that which can provide details and resources
for a given situation.
The ability of CAS to adapt as the environment changes is the kind of
adaptability that any solution will need. Research has shown that many agree
where funding and resources should be focused. The majority of funding and
resources should be geared towards preventive measures in order to stop an
attack before it ever occurs. The arguments provided are valid ones that the
government should be prepared to halt any event even if the preparations never
get tested. In other words, authorities cannot let themselves become complacent
as happened on September 11, 2001. A certain level of training, readiness, and
effort must be maintained at all times.
More specifically, preventive measures need to increase all across the
nation. Funding needs to be made to implement the placement of biosensors not
just in sea ports and airports, but all across America’s agricultural centers as
well. Many experts in the field of agroterrorism argue that surveillance in general,
to include biosensors among other types of surveillance and security, needs to
be increased and implemented. These implementations would stretch across the
nation covering every port, border crossing, and every major agricultural center
across the United States. It is a vast area to cover, but without proper coverage
there are holes for terrorists to slip through. As pointed out previously, there is
precedent to show that with even strict protective measures individuals are still
capable of smuggling plant and animal diseases through ports. This was the

case with certain areas of Europe where farmers sought to rid themselves of
rabbits damaging their crops.
More than that, many pathogens to include some of the most dangerous ones
such as foot-and-mouth disease can be carried along on clothing. X-ray machines and
pat searches will not find pathogens like these because there is nothing to find.
Individuals themselves and the clothes they wear would be the anti-agriculture weapon.
The only means of detecting something like this would be new forms of biosensors that
have the ability to detect faint traces of differing pathogens.
If preventive measures fail and an attack does occur successfully within
America’s borders then the government needs to have proper responsive
procedures in place. This is the next area that many researchers and experts
agree should receive funding and resources from an allocation based off what is
given for preventive measures. Being capable of effecting an efficient and
productive response is what gives a plan or system the ability to be adaptive.
There are hundreds of different ways in which an enemy of the U.S. can attempt
to cause harm to the agricultural infrastructure. In return the government must
have an equivalent range of responses depending on the type of attack that
takes place.
More so in the response phase of an event is where CAS elements would
become most evident. Yet, before a response is made after an attack the correct
measures must be put into place beforehand. A key element that lends to both
preventive and responsive capabilities is training. Training should not be limited

to just the federal lever. Instead that training should incorporate individuals and
groups from all levels to include farm hands and ranchers. In this everyone is
made aware of the threat which is essential because in order to respond quickly
the threat needs to be identified first. Aside from increasing biosensors and
overall surveillance across the nation the front line of any agroterrorist event is
going to be the farm and ranch workers, veterinarians, and feed lot employees.
The workers on the front line in the agricultural industry are going to be the
first ones to notice or realize when crops or livestock begin to die, but if they don’t
know how to react or what steps to take then they are useless. By training them
in the signs and symptoms of the most likely incidents they may come into
contact with arms them with the knowledge necessary to act. The National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health took it upon themselves to initiate
the first step in training others. They conducted the first ever agricultural terrorism
training workshop and incorporated a number of individuals and groups from
within the agricultural community.
Many experts have continued to agree that training at the state and local
levels would offer a significant responsive advantage. After the front line workers
who would be the first ones to recognize the threat would be local and state law
enforcement. Local law enforcement agencies would be the first authorities on
scene. Without proper training on how to respond properly to an agro-terror event
they could potentially make the threat worse before it gets better. State and local
authorities will be the first major authorities on site working to contain any

collateral damage and prevent the spread of any pathogens that may have been
released. Providing training is the way to ensure proper procedures are
established so that local agencies can launch effective quarantines.
Having a quarantine in place in the first major step in halting, or at least
slowing, the spread of any contaminate or pathogen that was used against
agriculture. An effective quarantine would immediately prevent the traffic of any
livestock or crops out of or into the infected area. Once movement has been
halted records will be examined to determine where livestock or crops had been
moved to or from in the weeks prior to the identification of the event. All areas
that have sent or received products from the known infected area must be
quarantined as well, and then on down the line as livestock and crops continue to
move from one location to the next within a given time period. Both local and
state law enforcement have the resources and capabilities to accomplish this
task, but only if they know what they are dealing with.
Another aspect of responding to an agro-terror attack is having the ability
to provide medicines when needed. Not all agricultural attacks focus solely on
attacking animals. One other possibility is for terrorists to attempt to poison the
food supply directly using human pathogens. This is one of the few cases where
agricultural terrorists would have the end goal to harm actual people. One
responsive preparation that the government has had in place and continued
since 2004 is Project BioShield. This initiative encompasses a couple of
responsive measures to including providing funding for training at the state and

local levers as well as providing funds and contracts for vaccines and other
medicines. The primary aspect of Project BioShield is to protect America from a
biological attack no matter what contagion is used. The federal government has
spent well over the original $5 billion called for by BioShield to address the threat
of biological agents being used against American citizens.
Since 2004 the BioShield Initiative has contracted numerous
pharmaceutical companies and universities to develop vaccines and cures for
every possible pathogen that could be used against humans. Since that time
America has accumulated a massive stockpile of medicines that can be used in
the case of a pathological outbreak targeting humans, and these include
pathogens that could be hidden in the food supply. Regrettably, the BioShield
Initiative only address a biological attack that is geared toward harming people.
At this time there has been no major enterprises to create the same kind
of stockpile that could protect a great deal of America’s agricultural infrastructure.
Agencies such as the FDA and USDA have worked together to research cures
and vaccines for livestock animals to prevent any foreign disease outbreaks
within America’s borders. They have yet to accumulate any significant stockpile
the way BioShield has. Without similar developments to protect livestock, and
developments to grow resistant crops they are a far more vulnerable target than
people are. Without the means to inoculate animals against certain highly
contagious foreign disease livestock are vulnerable to decimation. An outbreak of
FMD alone, even if the number of confirmed cases ranged in the hundreds of

thousands, authorities would have to slaughter millions of the species in order to
ensure that the FMD was contained. While FMD is thought to be the most likely
disease utilized by an extremist organization there are other diseases just as
lethal that target different breeds of farm animals that do not fall into the
“livestock” category. To protect against these maladies it is indispensable that
organizations like the FDA and USDA continue to research inoculations that can
safeguard America’s livestock.

Chapter 5
Conclusion
During the 1990’s a number of experts voiced their opinions that America
was vulnerable to an attack on its agricultural infrastructure. This view became
somewhat more popular after it came to light that individuals like Osama bin
Laden had a great deal of expertise in the area of agriculture. “We have also
learned from the CIA that Osama bin Laden himself has considerable knowledge
of agriculture. He controlled sunflower and corn markets in the Sudan in the mid-
1990’s and may have used his farms to train terrorist operatives.”(Turvey et al.).
When this knowledge was discovered the government took a slightly more
productive view towards a possible attack against America’s agriculture.
However, nothing actually came from that more productive view. The issue of an
attack on agriculture at the time was widely dismissed despite knowledge proving
that it was a possibility.
September 11, 2001 changed all of America, and made the country as a
whole realize just how vulnerable the country really was. No longer was
American soil untouchable by its enemies. Despite warnings on the
vulnerabilities present at the time the government largely ignored the possibility
of a terrorist attack on American soil. When the twin towers fell the federal
government they finally took the threat of attacks on American soil seriously;
unfortunately for many it was too late.

Immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks the government began re-
structuring its intelligence and law enforcement agencies. During this period
President Bush signed into the being the Department of Homeland Security. One
of the primary tasks appointed to DHS is to conduct risk assessments and locate
vulnerabilities in America’s infrastructure. Once those vulnerabilities are located
they must determine all the different ways an enemy could exploit those
vulnerabilities to determine the risk level of each one. Those with the highest risk
levels are allocated funds and resources to shore them up against exploitation.
The risk analysis’ conducted by DHS confirmed what many had been
saying for many years already; that America’s agricultural infrastructure was
highly vulnerable to attack. Despite having confirmation the government still did
not place a sense of urgency on the threat of agricultural terrorism. “Testimony
before the Government Affairs Committee of the U.S. Senate has suggested that
agriculture is an area that has received comparatively little attention with regard
to terrorism.”(Levin et al. 2005, 7). Throughout the first years of DHS they
focused primarily on terrorist issues related to the loss of human life. Despite
taking control over the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) it was
evident by the sluggish reaction of FEMA that DHS’ focus was elsewhere. This
brought to light that DHS needed to balance its responsibilities in determining
and handling threats to the United States. In more recent years the government
has begun to pay closer attention to the threat of agricultural terrorism.

As the threat was more widely recognized and more experts began to
conduct research into the potential threat it became evident that agriculture was
an easy and wide open target being provided to enemies of the United States.
Once, the sheer amount of land being utilized would have been enough to
protect the agriculture. In recent years practices in raising livestock and
advancements in technology have worked to increase the likelihood of an attack,
and that attack being highly successful.
A vast majority of livestock and other farm animals are raised in tightly
confined feedlots that can hold livestock in the hundreds of thousands. More than
even livestock being raised in these tightly confined feedlots is the fact that the
majority of these feedlots are kept extremely close together. “…over 70% of U.S.
beef cattle is currently produced within the locus of a 200-mile circle.”(Foxell
2001). This produces an increased threat level because tests have estimated
that aerosolized foot-and-mouth disease can be spread upwards of 170 miles on
the wind and still remain effective. Considering the highly contagious nature of
FMD, the ease of dispersal, and the massive quantity of beef cattle in one area
means that the beef market could be destroyed in a single effective attack. Other
feedlots and farms that raise other breeds also keep many of the animals in tight
confines among thousands. These feedlots and farms have more spacing
between them than the majority of cattle feedlots do, but they are still confined to
a handful of states. FMD is not only a threat to cattle as it can infect any cloven

hoofed breed of animal. Other contagious disease geared towards animals have
similar fatality rates as FMD and can be just as effectively disseminated.
Crops are one area of agriculture that is still spread over large quantities
of land. Yet, America has low crop diversity, and despite being so widely
dispersed the lack of diversity poses risks in and of itself. The lack of diversity
means weak soil that produces weaker crops thus leaving them more susceptible
to disease. It also makes it easier to contaminate the soil itself. Once
contaminated, depending on the pathogen or chemical used, the wind could
potentially continue to spread it and infect more and more crops.
The fact is that to this day, despite numerous recommendations for
solution, American agriculture is still at risk because too a large extent those
recommendations have not fully been acted upon. Many of the recommendations
pose issues of their own as well. Many argue the financial costs of implementing
many of the solutions are too high or that currently the government does not
possess the necessary resources. What should be remembered is that a
successful agricultural attack could easily be two or three times more expensive
if not more to contain depending on the nature of the attack. Anything the
government attempts to implement to prevent an attack from occurring will be far
less expensive.
One of the easiest executions that can be carried out is to train local and
state experts in all agricultural centers across the country. Have the federal
provide training materials and resources to state governments, and empower

them to take on the training themselves. Impress upon them the nature of the
threat, provide them with training materials and access to the necessary
knowledge, and disperse the costs of training to every state by having them take
on the training themselves. In this way every state can be required to provide
training to a range of agencies, organizations, and individuals but the states take
on the costs of the training thus easing the burden of the financial cost.
Next, the federal government needs to implement an initiative similar to
Project BioShield that is geared towards protecting America’s agricultural
infrastructure. In this way costs can be deferred over a number of years so that
there is no immediate financial burden taken on by a struggling economy, but it
would mean the beginning of true consistent research going into animal vaccines
and cures to prevent diseases like FMD. This initiative could also find ways to
strengthen crops making them less susceptible to foreign crop diseases.
The greatest financial burden taken on at a single time would be to
increase overall surveillance. In order to properly protect against any form of
agricultural terrorism funding must be appropriated for increased surveillance.
Testing at the Pentagon proves that advanced biosensors are possible that can
detect pathogens in the area and local area. These types of biosensors need to
be placed in strategic locations all across the country to include every sea port,
airport, and major agricultural center. These sensors can provide warning as
soon as a major animal or crop pathogen is released into the air eliminating the

need to rely on having someone identify that animals or crops have been infected
first.
America’s agriculture is the single biggest and most vulnerable target in
the country. It appears a soft target because most agricultural attacks do not
endanger human lives, but the target remains the same as it was when the twin
towers fell. The target is still the U.S. economy, and even a small attack on
agriculture could cost the country billions trying to repair the damage and quell
the fear. Preventive and responsive measures must be taken at an increased
pace before it is too late.

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