Rules of Court sample case

2. G.R. No 247661, June 15, 2020
DEEPAK KUMAR, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
• This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that
the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 156711 be
reversed and set aside. The assailed Decision denied petitioner Deepak Kumar's (Kumar)
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Regional Trial Court in declining to entertain Kumar's Notice of
Appeal, as the trial court decision which Kumar sought to appeal had lapsed into finality. The
assailed Resolution denied Kumar's Motion for Reconsideration.
• In an August 18, 2016 Joint Decision,the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City found Kumar
guilty for charges of violating Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (the "Anti-VAWC Law"), specifically, that he
choked his wife, hit her head, pulled her hair, and forced her into sexual activity.
• The court also finds accused Deepak Kumar guilty beyond reasonable doubt
in Criminal Case No. 11-545 for violation of Section 5(g) of Republic Act No.
9262

3. • Despite notice, Kumar was absent during the promulgation of judgment. As no motion, pleading, or
any other submission in reference to this Decision was ever filed before the Regional Trial Court, this
Decision lapsed into finality.
• A year and a half later, on March 14, 2018, D Dimayacyac Law Firm filed before the Regional Trial
Court an Entry of Appearance with Notice of Appeal.
• In a March 27, 2018 Order, the Regional Trial Court, still through Judge Aguinaldo, denied the Notice
of Appeal as the Decision sought to be appealed had become final.
• Following the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Kumar filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals.
• The Court of Appeals dismissed Kumar's Rule 65 Petition as it found no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of Judge Aguinaldo in denying Kumar's Notice of Appeal.
• Following the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration,Kumar filed the present Petition.

4. • ISSUE : Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not finding grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of Regional Trial
Court Judge Philip A. Aguinaldo in refusing to entertain petitioner Deepak Kumar's
Notice of Appeal.
• RULING :
• This Court dispenses with the filing of a Comment by respondent and outright denies
due course to the present Petition. It fails to present any consideration of such
character as those identified in Rule 45, Section 6 of the Rules of Court and as would
warrant the exercise of this Court's power of judicial review.
• Petitioner comes to this Court by way of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Other than appeals brought to this Court concerning
"criminal cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment[,] a Petition for Review on Certiorari is the sole procedural vehicle
through which appeals may be taken to this Court.

5. From Rule 45's provisions will be gleaned basic procedural standards which a petitioner must
satisfy if one's Rule 45 Petition is to be entertained:
(1) that the petition does not only exclusively raise questions of law, but
also that it distinctly sets forth those legal issues;
(2) that it be filed within 15 days of notice of the adverse ruling that
impels it;
(3) that docket and other lawful fees are paid;
(4) that proper service is made;
(5) that all matters that Section 4 specifies are indicated, stated, or
otherwise contained in it;
(6) that it is manifestly meritorious;
(7) that it is not prosecuted manifestly for delay; and
(8) that that the questions raised in it are of such substance as to
warrant consideration.

6. • Failing in these, this Court is at liberty to deny outright or deny due course to a Rule 45 Petition. Any such denial
may be done without the need of any further action, such as the filing of responsive pleadings or submission of
documents, the elevation of records, or the conduct of oral arguments.
• Furthermore, this Court's denial may come in the form of a minute resolution which does not go into the merits of
the case, and instead merely states which among the eight (8) standards it is based. A denial by minute resolution
does not violate the constitutional imperative that judicial decisions "[express]. . . clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which [they are] based.“ This is because any such minute resolution is not a judgment on a case, but is a
declaration that a Rule 45 petition is insufficient in form and substance.
• Hence, it is that petition's manifest inadequacies that prevent it from proceeding any further, not the ultimate
quality of its factual and legal assertions.
• It is basic that appeal is not a matter of right. Parties wishing to appeal must comply with the rules, otherwise they
lose their opportunity to appeal:
• T]he right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who
seeks to avail of the remedy of appeal must comply with the requirements of the rules; otherwise, the
appeal is lost. Rules of procedure are required to be followed, except only when, for the most persuasive
of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve the litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree
of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. (Citation omitted)

7. This Court may decline to review cases when all that are involved are settled rules
for which nothing remains but their application. Also, when there is no manifest or
demonstrable departure from legal provisions and/or jurisprudence. So too, when
the court whose ruling is assailed has not been shown to have so wantonly deviated
from settled procedural norms or otherwise enabled such deviation.
Litigants may very well aggrandize their petitions, but it is precisely this Court's task
to pierce the veil of what they purport to be questions warranting this Court's sublime
consideration. It remains in this Court's exclusive discretion to determine whether a
Rule 45 Petition is attended by the requisite important and special reasons
WHEREFORE, in view of petitioner's failure to show that the discretionary power of
the Court to review meets the requirements of Rule 45, Section 6 of the Rules of
Court, the Petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed November 23, 2018
Decision and May 21, 2019 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
156711 are AFFIRMED.

9. [ G.R. No. 247787, March 02, 2021 ]
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
RESPONDENT.
FACTS:
• Under its 1999 compensation plan, the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) Board of
Directors authorized salary increases to eight top officers totaling P17,380,307.64 in 2006.
• The supervising auditor prohibited the amount on June 19, 2007, since the DBP's pay plan lacks
Office of the President approval.The DBP appealed the disallowance to the COA Corporate
Government Sector Cluster A - Financial. COA Cluster Director refused appeal on June 2, 2010.
• The DBP petitioned the COA in anger. Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's April 22,
2010 Memorandum authorized the DBP's pay scheme from 1999.The COA granted the petition
and lifted the disallowance on February 1, 2012.
• The DBP received the COA Decision on February 6, 2012, but did not appeal or petition the
Supreme Court. Mario P. Pagaragan, DBP's Vice President/Officer-In-Charge of Program
Evaluation, sent confidential letters to the COA on March 27, 2012, urging it to reconsider its
February 1, 2012 Decision.
• The letters explained that Omnibus Election Code bans wage increases 45 days before a regular
election. Since President Arroyo approved DBP's compensation plan on April 22, 2010, within 45
days before the May 10, 2010 elections, it is invalid.

10. • The COA considered Pagaragan's letters a move for reconsideration and opened and
revised settled accounts on April 13, 2015. The COA upheld the motion and reversed its
February 1, 2012 Decision.
• The DBP requested review on July 29, 2015, arguing that the February 1, 2012 COA
Decision was final and executable. Pagaragan is not a party and has no solution.
• June 14, 2019, the COA partially approved the motion. Approving officers and passive
beneficiaries are excluded from refunding the disallowance. They depended on Arroyo's
post-facto approval in good faith.
• Thus, this recourse alleging COA significant discretion abuse. The DBP claims that the
COA's February 1, 2012 Decision is final and executable without a move for
reconsideration or appeal within 30 days of notice or on February 6, 2012 until March 7,
2012.
• DBP contented that Pagaragan has no legal standing to request a retrial. The DBP also
alleges due process and case speed violations. The COA didn't let DBP respond to
Pagaragan's letters.
• DBP's reconsideration motion took COA four years to resolve. Finally, former President
Arroyo's April 22, 2010 ratification of the DBP's compensation plan approved senior
officials' wage hikes and did not extend new privileges.
• However, the COA believes Pagaragan is a legitimate party-in-interest.

11. ISSUE :
• Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in reviewing a final and
executory judgment and reopening a settled account beyond the legal period
RULING
• Yes. Pagaragan is not an aggrieved party who may appeal the COA Decision or
Resolution. Under Rule VII, Section 1 of the COA Rules, it is "[t]he party aggrieved by a
decision of the Director or the ASB [who] may appeal to the Commission Proper."
• COA is guilty of unjustified delay in acting on Pagaragan's Letters and resolving DBP's
motion for reconsideration.
• Here, the COA is guilty of unjustified delay. On March 27, 2012, Pagaragan submitted
confidential letters to the COA asking to reconsider its Decision dated February 1, 2012
which lifted the notice of disallowance. However, it took COA more than three years or
until April 13, 2015 to act on the letters and reversed the Decision dated February 1,
2012. The COA did not provide any justification for the delay. On July 29, 2015, the DBP
filed a motion for reconsideration. This time, COA took almost four years or until June 14,
2019 to resolve the motion. Again, the COA did not explain the length of time to decide
the pending incident

12. • In this case, the COA lifted the notice of disallowance on February 1, 2012. The DBP received a copy of the
COA's Decision dated February 1, 2012 on February 6, 2012 and it has 30 days or until March 7, 2012
to move for a reconsideration or file a petition to the Supreme Court.
• Nonetheless, Pagaragan's letters which the COA treated as a motion for reconsideration was filed only
on March 27, 2012 or beyond the 30-day reglementary period. Hence, the COA has no more jurisdiction
to entertain Pagaragan's letters given that the Decision dated February 1, 2012 has become final and
executory absent a timely motion for reconsideration or appeal.
• It is settled that all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest once a judgment
becomes final. No other action can be taken on the Decision except to order its execution.. The rule,
however, is subject to well-known exceptions, however, not one of these exceptions is present in this case.
• Taken together, the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in reviewing a final and executory
judgment and reopening a settled account beyond the legal period. Nothing is more settled that a
definitive final judgment is no longer subject to change or revision, thus:
• FOR THESE REASONS, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Commission on Audit's Decision dated
April 13, 2015 is SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 1, 2012 lifting the notice of disallowance
is REINSTATED.

14. [ G.R. No. 240056, October 12, 2020 ]
DATU MALINGIN (LEMUEL TALINGTING Y SIMBORIO),
TRIBAL CHIEFTAIN, HIGAONONSUGBUANON TRIBE,
PETITIONER, VS. PO3 ARVIN R. SANDAGAN, PO3 ESTELITO
R. AVELINO, PO2 NOEL P. GUIMBAOLIBOT, HON.
PROSECUTOR III JUNERY M. BAGUNAS AND HON. JUDGE
CARLOS O. ARGUELLES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 10, ABUYOG, LEYTE, RESPONDENTS.

15. FACTS :
Through the criminal Informations issued by respondent Prosecutor, petitioner was accused of having carnal
knowledge of a 14-year-old minor, AAA,2 on six occasions by force, threat, intimidation and by taking advantage
of superior strength. This was filed and raffled with the RTC presided by Judge Carlos O. Arguelles He averred
that he was a member of the Higaonon-Sugbuanon Tribe, an indigenous group.
According to him, pursuant to Sections 655 and 66,6 Republic Act No. (RA) 8371, the criminal cases filed
against him should be resolved first through the customary law and practices of the indigenous group he
belonged to and thereafter, the issues must be referred to the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP).He ratiocinated that the invocation of petitioner of the provisions of RA 8371 was misplaced.
Proceedings before the Court Undeterred, petitioner filed the present petition contending that mandamus is the
only available remedy in order to ensure that the victims of violations of cultural rights are given reparation.
Respondent Judge contended that the petition was filed out of time. He posited that petitioner did not file a
motion for reconsideration on the denial of the Motion to Quash which is a sine qua non condition in the filing of
a petition for certiorari; and that the direct resort to the Court is unjustified and, thus, violative of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts.
• ISSUE
May the Court issue a writ of mandamus to compel respondent Judge and Prosecutor to desist from proceeding
with the rape case against petitioner and declare respondent Police Officers guilty of Arbitrary Detention?
• RULING
The Petition for Mandamus lacks merit.

16. Non-observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
The doctrine of the hierarchy of courts guides litigants on the proper forum of their appeals as
well as the venue for the issuance of extraordinary writs. As to the latter, even if the RTC, the
CA, and the Court have concurrent original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, litigants must, as a rule, file their
petitions, with the court below and failure to do so will be sufficient for the dismissal of
the case.
Invocation of the provisions of RA 8371 is insufficient to evade criminal prosecution.
• At any rate, even if the Court sets aside the failure of petitioner to abide by the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts, the Petition for Mandamus. will still fail as it is not a proper recourse to
compel respondents to defer from pursuing the criminal cases against him.
• Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus is an appropriate
remedy when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person: (1) unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station; or (2) unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled. Added to this, it must be shown that there is "no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law" that may be availed of by
the aggrieved person. Notably, the foregoing requirements were not established in the
case.

17. First, petitioner failed to show that he has a clear legal right
which respondents had violated.
• To stress, petitioner relied on Sections 65 and 66 (on the
jurisdiction of the NCIP), RA 8371 in arguing that respondents have
no jurisdiction to prosecute him for his supposed criminal liability.
However, his postulation is untenable because RA 8371 finds
application in disputes relating to claims and rights of ICCs/IPs.
This is not the case here.
• Let it be underscored that petitioner's indictment for Rape has
nothing to do with his purported membership in an ICC, but by
reason of his alleged acts that is covered by the RPC. At the same
time, RA 8371 does not serve as a bar for criminal prosecution
because crime is an offense against the society. Thus, penal laws
apply to individuals without regard to his or her membership in an
ICC.

18. Second, petitioner did not prove any ministerial duty on the part of
respondents which they neglected to perform.
• In prosecuting a criminal case, the State, through the public prosecutor,
exercises its police power and punishes those who are found guilty,
through the determination by the court of law. Undeniably, criminal
prosecution and the court's adjudication pertain to discretionary duties, not
ministerial functions, because they require respondents Judge, Prosecutor
and even respondents Police Officers to act in accordance with their own
judgments and consciences uncontrolled by anyone. Overall, when the
law requires and grants a public officer the right to decide on how he
or she shall perform one's duty, then he or she is vested with
discretionary functions, as in the case of respondents.
• Verily, in the absence of a clear legal right on the part of petitioner and the
corresponding ministerial duties required by law on respondents that they
neglected to perform, then a writ of mandamus cannot be issued.
• the Petition for Mandamus is DISMISSED.