Indian Psychology

1. NYAYA SCHOOL OF
PHILOSOPHY

2. • Gautama was the founder of the Nyaya philosophy.
• Vatsyayana calls it the science of reasoning
(nyayavidya, nyayasastra) or the science of critical
reasoning in harmony with perception and scriptural
testimony.
• Nyaya is primarily concerned with epistemology and
logic, and secondarily with ontology, psychology ethics
and theology.
• It deals with the sources of knowledge, i.e. perception,
inference, comparison and testimony and conditions of
their validity and the nature of the world, soul and God.

3. • Gautama (200B.C.) was the author of the Nyaya-sutra.
The Nyaya deals with sixteen philosophical topics:
• 1. The instruments of valid knowledge (pramana) are
perception, inference, comparison and testimony,
• 2. The objects of valid knowledge (prameya) the self,
body, sense-organs, objects, knowledge, manas,
voluntary actios, faults, transmigration, fruits of actions,
pain and liberation. Self comprises God and finite souls.
Objects are the physical elements and their sensible
qualities.

4. • 3. Doubt (Samsaya) is indefinite
knowledge of an object as either one or
the other in which the mind oscillates
beween two alternatives.
• 4. Motive (prayojana) is the end of
voluntary actons, which is the attainment
of good or the rejection of evil

5. • 5. Drstanta is any fact or state of affairs is
an instance in which a probans is found to
be accompanied by a probandum, and
which is admitted to be valid by a
disputant and an opponent.
• 6. A tenet (siddhanta) is proved by
pramanas and accepted as true.

6. • 7. The members (avayava) of a demonstrative
inference are proposistion, reason,
exemplicfication concerning which there is no
dispute, and which therefore serves as an
instance of a general truth, principle or rule.
• 8. Tarka is the indirect way of demonstrating the
truth of a certain claim by showing that its
negation leads to absurdities. Such a process of
reasoning is called “hypothetical reasoning”.

7. • 9. Nirnaya is true and certain knowledge
arrived at by the application of only the
legitimate and permissible means and
methods of knowledge.
• 10. Vada is an argument or discussion in
which the premises and conclusion as well
as the means and criterion of knowledge
are explicitly stated.

8. • 11. Jalpa is a seeming dispute or
argument in which one or other parties
engage with the aim of not arriving at truth
but merely of winning the argument.
• 12. Vitanda is an argument or a debate in
which each party is merely interested in
refuting and discrediting the other’s
position rather than establishing its own.

9. • 13. Hetvabhassa is something that is offered as
a valid reason but is in fact not so.
• 14. Chala is any device employed by one of the
disputants to dodge a question or objection
raised by the other. The device usually consists
in distorting the meaning of the opponent’s
words, quibbling; and playing on pun and
ambiguity, although the opponent’s meaning has
been clear all along.

10. • 15. Jati is the employment of false and
inappropriate analogies to defend one’s own
position or refute that of others.
• 16. Nigrahasthana is the basis on which an
argument is lost. Thus, in the course of an
argument, one party demands that the other
concede defeat by showing that the latter has
either grossly misunderstood its own position (or
that of the former) or is unaware of the
implications of its own thesis (or that of the
former).

11. • Epistemology
• According to Nyaya, knowledge is not a
essential but only an adventitious property of the
self. Knowledge arises as a result of contact
between the self and the non-self. Nyaya’s
fundamental definition of knowledge is
phenomenological: knowledge is cognition,
apprehension, consciousness, or manifestation
of objects.

12. • It is of the utmost importance to note that for
Nyaya, knowledge is different from the knowing
subject and the object known .
• This view of knowledge as distinct from the
subject as well as the object follows from Nyaya
realism. Nyaya compared knowledge to the light
of the lamp which reveals the lamp as well as
the objects around it. That is, the light is
different from both the lamp and the objects
around it.

13. • Nyaya divides knowledge into two broad
varieties : presentative and representative.
Each of these two varieties is further divided into
two kinds: valid knowledge and invalid
knowledge.
• Valid knowledge is the true and correct
apprehension of an object. In other words valid
knowledge consists of the manifestation of an
object as it really is. This characterization of
valid knowledge is a consequence of the
correspondence theory of truth which Nyaya
upholds.

14. • According to the correspondence theory of truth
a proposition is true if and only if the proposition
corresponds to the appropriate state of affairs.
That is truth is the correspondence between a
proposition and reality.
• Thus the proposition “snow is white” is true if
and only if snow is white. Presentative
knowledge arises when the object of knowledge
is directly present to the knowing subject.

15. • Valid knowledge is called pram.
According to Nyaya, there are four
sources of knowledge: 1. perception, 2.
inference, 3. comparison, and 4.
testimony.
• Invalid knowledge is produced by memory,
doubt, and hypothetical reasoning.

16. • Memory by definition is always the present
recollection of some past cognition.
Consequently, knowledge by memory is not
presentation but representative and is
accordingly classified by Nyaya as invalid
knowledge.
• Nevertheless, memory can serve as a source of
valid knowledge if it can be shown that what is
recalled or remembered was experienced in the
past as a presentative cognition.

17. • Doubt is lack of certainty of cognition.
Error is misrepresentation of what is
cognized: a man steps on a rope in the
dark and thinks that it is a snake. Error
then is misapprehension which is of two
kinds:1. thinking that a thing exists when in
fact it does not, and 2. thinking that a thing
has a certain property when in fact it does
not have it.

18. • Hypothetical reasoning, although important as a
tool of formal reasoning, does not produce any
new knowledge. Thus, given the claim that
wherever there is smoke there is fire,
• one asserts by hypothetical reasoning that
wherever there is no fire there is no smoke. The
reason why Nyaya classifies hypothetical
reasoning as a source of invalid knowledge is
that it can only confirm what is already known
but cannot produce any new knowledge.

19. • Nyaya theory of truth is realistic pragmatism.
Nyaya uphold the realism- the view that the
existence and characteristics of external objects
are independent of the experiencing subject.
correspondence between knowledge and the
object of knowledge is in no way dependent
upon the knower. Thus, “the rose is red” is true
even when no one is perceiving the rose.
According to Nyaya one certifies the claim as
true or false according as action based on the
claim lead to success or failure.

20. • To sum up, Nyaya is realistic with respect
to the nature of truth
• pragmatic with respect to the test or
criterion of truth.
• In short, truth and how we come to know it
are two different issues.
• For this reason, we may describe the
Nyaya theory of knowledge as realistic
pragmatism.

21. • We shall now consider the four pramanas,
sources of valid knowledge recognized by
Nyaya.
• Perception-
• perception, according Nyaya, is the direct and
immediate cognition produced by the interaction
between the object and the sense-organs. The
self, mind, sense-organs, objects and contacts
between them are necessary for perception.

22. • Thus, unless the self is in contact with the
manas and the manas with the sense-
organs, there can be no sense-object
contacts and hence no perception.
• Nyaya divides perception into two
kinds:ordinary (laukika) and extraordinary
(aloukika).

23. • We have ordinary perception whenever
our sense-organs contact the object in the
ordinary way. Thus, my seeing the tree in
the yard with the aid of my eyes is ordinary
perception.
• Extraordinary perception arises whenever
the contacts between sense organs and
objects occur in an unusual manner.

24. • Nyaya further divides ordinary perception into
two kinds:internal (manas) and external (bahya).
Ordinary perception is internal whenever it is
due to contact between the mind (internal sense
organ and its objects). Thus, cognition, desiring,
feeling willing etc., are examples of internal
perception.
• It is obvious that the object of internal perception
can only be a psychic state or process.

25. • Perception is external whenever it is due to
contact between our external sense-organ(s)
and an object.
• The five external sense-organs of sight, smell,
hearing, taste, and touch bring about external
perception.
• Nyaya recognizes three kinds of extraordinary
perception: samanyalaksana, jnanalaksana, and
yogaja.

26. • Samanyalaksana is the perception of
universals, the essences by possession of
which a number of objects are recognized
as being all of a certain kind. Thus, when
someone says that a given animal is a
horse he is classifying that animal under
the class ‘horse’. But what enables him to
so classify the animal?

27. • According to Nyaya the person could not have
classified the animal as a horse unless he had
grasped the essential characteristics by virtue of
which a given animal is a horse.
• In other words, in addition to perceiving this or
that individual horse, one perceives the
universal horse in the same way as one
perceives a particular horse. The universal
horse inheres in each particular horse.

28. • The second kind of extraordinary perception,
jnanalaksana is perception through complex
association. We sometimes here people say
that they not only smell the fragrance of the rose
but also see the fragrance of the rose; that the
ice not only feels cold but looks cold, and so on.
• This way of talking sounds at first bizarre and
nonsensical. But on careful analysis one finds
that such expressions, far from being absurd
and nonsensical, reveal a complicated
association of perceptions.

29. • Suppose that a person has always in the
past experienced a certain flower as
having a certain color and certain
fragrance. Owing to such invariable
associating of color and smell, the
person’s present visual perception of the
flower triggers in his mind the memory of
the fragrance of the flower. This results in
his saying that e sees not only the color of
the flower but also its fragrance.

30. • The third kind of extraordinary perception
namely, yogaja is not perception through
the instrumentality of sense-organs. It is
radically different kind of perception-the
intuitive and immediate apprehension of all
existence, past, present and future and of
all objects, the infinitesimal as well as the
infinite.

31. • According to Nyaya,only those who have
attained spiritual perfection are capable of
such spontaneous and intuitive perception.

32. INFERENCE
• Nyaya distinguishes between perception and inference as
instruments of knowledge
• Perception gives immediate knowledge (aparoksha)
• Inference gives mediate knowledge (paroksha)
• Inference may be described as the process of reasoning which
enables us to pass from claims of present perceptions or non-
perceptions to claims of the existence or non-existence of things not
perceived at the time.
• That which is perceived is a mark that a certain thing, not perceived
now exists.
• Example: Inference of fire from smoke.
• There is an invariable relation between smoke and fire.
• This is known as (pervasion) –vyapti serves as a basis of inference.

33. • Nyaya Syllogism – Nyaya argument
• Hypothesis (pratijna)- that hill is fire-possessing
• Reason (hetu) Because that hill is smoke-possessing
• Example (drstanta) – like the torch (smoky and fiery) -sapaksha
unlike the river -vipaksha
• We may distinguish between the validity and the soundness of an
inference.
• Valid inference –if basis of inference is true: conclusion is true
• Inference itself cannot tell us whether the basis true or false
• This can be known by inspecting the world.

34. • In conclusion it may be said that Nyaya, like other Indian schools of
philosophy, ditsinguishes between inference for oneself (svartha)
and inference for others (parartha).
• In inference for oneself, there is no need for a formal statement of
the inference.
• When it has to be demonstrated to others one has to offer a fully
formal statement of the inference.
• The fully formal statement of the inference take the form of a chain
of steps which begins with patijna, goes through the intermediate
steps of hetu, udaharana, and upanaya and terminate in nigamana
(conclusion).

35. COMPARISON (UPAMANA)
• Comparison is the third source of Valid knowledge. Nyaya defines
comparison as the knowledge of the relation between a word and its
denotation (what the word refers to). The basis of comparison is
resemblance or similarity.
• For comparison to serve as a source of knowledge one should
already have a knowledge of the denotation of the terms constituting
the description of the object.

36. TESTIMONY (SABDA)
• Testimony is the fourth and the last of the sources of knowledge
recognized by Nyaya.
• Testimony is defined by Nyaya as valid verbal knowledge
• Testimony consists of the statements of trustworthy person and our
understanding of them by understanding the meanings of their
constituent terms
• Nyaya divides testimony into two kinds: 1. that which pertains to
perceivable objects (drstartha) 2. that which pertains to
imperceivable objects.
• The difference between the two lies in the kinds of objects the
testimony is about.
• Another classification of Nyaya of testimony 1. human (loukika) and
divine (vaidika)

37. • The loukika consists of statements of trustworthy human beings,
irrespective of the perceivability of he objects.
• The vaidika consists of scriptural (Vedic) statements, whose ultimate
source is God.
• Human testimony is fallible, no matter how trustworthy the person
may be; because humans are not omniscient.
• Divine testimony is infallible because God is omniscient.
• In both classifications testimony, irrespective of the nature of its
source and the nature of its objects, must be reliable if it is to be a
source of valid knowledge.

38. METAPHYSICS
• Nyaya metaphysics is concerned with delineating the various kinds
of objects of knowledge (prameyas, knowables) constituting the
reality.
• According to Nyaya the knowables are 1.self, 2. the body, 3. the
senses, 4. the objects of the senses, 5. the mind (manas), 6.
knowledge, 7. activity, 8. mental imperfections such as attachments
and aversions, 9. rebirth, 10. pleasure and pain, 11. suffering, 12.
absolute freedom from suffering, 13. substance, 14, quality, 15.
motion, 16. universals (samanya), 17. particularity (vaisesa), 18.
inherence (samavaya) and non-existence (avhava).
• The list is comprehensive. It includes all those objects of the
knowledge of which is essential to the attainment of freedom and
liberation from all forms of bondage and suffering.

39. • In the above list of knowables, some are physical and others are not
physical.
• Nyaya like Vaisesika recognizes five different physical substances,
namely, earth, water, fire, air and ether.
• The ultimate constituents of the first four substances are the eternal,
unchanging, infinitsmal atoms of earth, water, fire and air
respectively.
• On the other hand ether is an infinite and non-atomic substance

40. SELF AND LIBERATION
• Like Vaisesika, Nyay holds that the self is an individual substance,
eternal and all-pervading. Cognition, feeling, willing, knowledge etc.
belong to the self as unique subject.
• According to Nyaya, it would be a mistake to attribute such non-
physical properties as knowing, feeling, and willing to a physical
substance, since physical substance is by definition one which can
only have physical properties.
• As physical properties can only be attributed to physical substances,
so also non-physical properties can only be attributed to non-
physical substances. The self is not to be identified with either the
body, the senses, or the objects of the senses, for none of these can
account for imagination, feeling, ideation etc.
• Self cannot be identified with mind (manas) because mind is atomic
and imperceivable and hence can only have imperceivable

41. • But not such perceivable qualities as pleasure and pain.
• According to Nyaya, the self cannot be identified with pure
consciousness either,
• Pure consciousness understood as consciousness belonging to no
subject, is a fiction: all consciousness is necessarily consciousness
of some self or other.
• The self, then, is the substance to which belongs consciousness.
• Consciousness is not the self but only an attribute of the self, which
is the ‘I’ the knower and the enjoyer.
• According to Nyaya, consciousness is an attribute of the self, it is
not an essential but oly an accidental attribute.
• The self in its original state has no consciousness and hence no
cognition and knowledge.

42. • It is through its association with the sense-organs that the self
comnes to have consciousness.
• In other words, consciousnes consciousness arises as a property of
the self owing to the latter’s entanglement with the body.
• For this reason Nyaya regards consciousness as a purely
adventitious attribute of the self.
• To the question knows that the self exists, Nyaya answers by saying
that the self is known through direct internal perception.
• Some Nyay philosophers, however, maintain that the self as such
can never be an object of perception, whether internal r external, but
can only be inferred from cognitio, feeling,and willing.

43. • In other words, on the basis of the various modes of consciousness
one infers the existence of the self
• The goal of Nyaya, like that of the other Indian schools of
philosophy, is the salvation of the self.
• What is salvation?
• Salvation is the state of total liberation from all forms of suffering and
bondage arising out of the self’s association with the body.
• Because of its association with the body, the self acquires
consciousness and therewith cognition, knowledge, and attachment
to the non-self.
• Attachment is the source of pain and suffering.
• As long as the self is attached, itgoes trough the cycles of birth and
death.
• Nyaya, like all other Indian schools, subscribes t the universal law of
karma, which determines the lot of the self in accordance wit its past
karma.

44. • The self get enmeshed in the karmic chain and its suffering it
perpetuated thrugh the rounds ofbirth and death.
• The goal of Nyaya is the liberation of the self from suffering-the
cessation of the karmic chain.
• In its state of liberation, the self is wholly disentangled from the body
and is consequently free from pain as well as pleasure, sorrow as
well as joy.
• According to Goutama such a state is a state of absolute fredom-
freedom from birth and death. And hence freedom from pain and
pleasure for all time.
• How to attain liberation and freedom?

45. • One attains liberation upon the cessation of all activity as result of
the kowledge that the self is distinct from all other things such as the
body, the mind, the senses, and their ojects.
• Such kowledge is the result of a discipline comprised of three
phases
• 1. reading and listening to (sravana) the scriptual (Vedic) intimations
of the existence and nature of the self, 2 intellectal comprehension
of the trut of these inimatons through analysis in the light of reason
and experience (manana) and 3. existential realization
(nidodhyasana) through Yogic meditation of the intellectually
apprehended truth.
• According to Nyaya, the first two phases alone are inadequate for
liberation. Liberation cannot come from secondhand knowledge, no
matter how authoritative its sources and how ipeccable the process
of reasoning behind it.
• True

46. • liberation is the reslt of knowledge certified by one’s own
experience.
• However, it is important to note that according to Nyay liberating
knowledge, wile in the last analysis personal and direct, shuld be
consonant with reason and experience.
• Liberation is not something one can look forward to after death.
• On the contrary, it is to be attained during one’s lifetime, here and
now.
• He who attains liberation is known as jivanmukta (one who is free
while still in bodily existence).
• On death, such a person attains moksa, total freedom from all
fetters of existence .
• By bringing the armic chain to an end he has overcome both birth
and death and consequently is eyond pain and pleasure.

47. GOD
• In Nyaya-sutras, Gautama, the founder of the Nyaya system,
recognizes God, but he does not deal with the problem of the
existence of God in any detail.
• Lateral Nyaya philosophers constructed a number of proofs for the
existence of God and theorized as to his nature and relation to man
and the world.
• Vaisesika system in the original formulation of Kanada was atheistic,
subsequent Vaisesika philosophers were theistic and consequently
incorporated God into their system.
• Since Nyaya accepts the Vaisesika metaphysics, there emerged in
course of time an amalgamation of the two schools, known as the
Nyaya-vaisesika.
• The proofs for the existence of God are mostly the work of the
Nyaya Vaisesika school.

48. Cosmo-Teleological Argument
• Every composite object of the world, being by definition made up of
parts, is an effect of some cause or other. Ex a mountain is a
composite object and is constituted of the ultimate atoms of earth.
• According to Nyaya atoms are material causes of the objects.
• Material causes alone cannot bring about the various objects of the
world without the guidance of some intelligence.
• Material causes are to be guided by a final cause endowed with
knowledge, purpose and power.
• According to Nyaya, such a final cause is none other than God.

49. Argument from the Unseen Power (adrsta)
• Nyaya recognizes the universal law of karma. According to which
every event, be it thought , word or action, is causally efficacious in
bringing about other events, which in turn act as causes for yet other
events, and so on.
• According to Nyaya, the law of karma, though by itself it can be
considered the sum total of the moral merit and demerit of a man,
lacks any consciousness and hene cannot itself apportion joy or
sorrow to man.
• It therefore requires for its operation the guidance of a supremely
intelligent and moral being.
• Such a being is indeed God.

50. Argument from Atomism. Such an agency is God, the prime
mover.
• According to Nyaya, the ultimate atoms constituting the physical
world originally lack motion and cannot begin to form the finite
objects unless set into motion by an agency. Such an agency is
God, the prime mover.
• In conclusion it may be said that according to Nyaya school, God is
not creator in the sense that he creates the world out of nothing.
Like God, all ultimate substances, both physical and non-physical,
are eternal and hence can neither be created nor be destroyed. God
is thus merely the designer of the universe.
• It is clear that the God of Nyaya, being limited by the law of karma
as well as the many eternal substances, cannot be omnipotent