The Conundrum of The Ubiquitous Solicitor's License Saga: Has the spectre created by the supreme court come to haunt pupils in Klu V Laryea?

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THE CONUNDRUM OF THE UBIQUITOUS SOLICITOR’S LICENSE SAGA:
HAS THE SPECTRE CREATED BY THE SUPREME COURT COME TO HAUNT PUPILS IN KLU V LARYEA?

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THE CONUNDRUM OF THE UBIQUITOUS SOLICITOR’S LICENSE SAGA:
HAS THE SPECTRE CREATED BY THE SUPREME COURT COME TO HAUNT PUPILS IN KLU V LARYEA?
A: INTRODUCTION
The Court of Appeal, Greater Accra
Region, sitting at Accra (Coram: Dennis
Adjei, Avril Lovelace-Johnson (as she
then was), and Kwofie, JJ.A) has delivered
a unanimous decision in a suit intitled
Abraham Okan Klu v Joseph Agyei
Laryea1
regarding the scope of a pupil’s
duties whiles serving pupillage. The
Court consequently declared as a nullity,
proceedings in which a lawyer serving
her pupillage and had not yet obtained a
practicing license had participated. The
Supreme Court had in two earlier decisions
intituled Ex parte Teriwajah and Henry
Nuertey Korboe v Francis Amosah reached
similar conclusions and given judgment
against a lawyer who had participated in
court proceedings while he had not yet
renewed his solicitor’s license. The entire
proceedings the lawyer participated in
were declared a nullity by the apex Court.
This article seeks to explore the effect the
Court of Appeal’s decision in Klu v Laryea
portends for the pupillage system and the
practice of law in Ghana.
B: THE CASE: KLU V. LARYEA
The plaintiff/respondent in the suit issued
a writ at the High Court against the
defendants/appellants as head and elder of
a certain family. The defendants raised an
1 Judgment of Court of Appeal dated 24th October, 2019 in Suit No. H1/130/2019 (unreported). Her
Ladyship Justice Avril Lovelace-Johnson was sworn in as a Justice of the Supreme Court of Ghana on 17th
December, 2019.
objection to the plaintiff’s capacity to sue.
The High Court took evidence on the issue
of the plaintiff’s capacity and the trial judge
ruled that the plaintiff had the requisite
capacity to institute the action.
Subsequently, the defendants’ lawyer filed
an application to interrogate the capacity
of one of the lawyers handling the case
for the plaintiff. The defendants’ lawyer
argued that, one Stella Adu-Duodu, who
had been representing the plaintiff in the
suit was a pupil, and therefore, did not
have a solicitor’s license. As a result, the
defendants’ lawyer argued further, the said
lawyer Stella Adu-Duodu did not have the
requisite capacity to represent the plaintiff
as lawyer. The trial judge ruled that since
the said plaintiff’s lawyer was a pupil and
had not as yet procured a practicing license,
the proceedings she had participated in
were a nullity. The judge directed that the
case should be tried de novo. Both parties
were aggrieved by aspects of the ruling and
appealed against it.
The main issues for determination by
the Court of Appeal were whether or not
the plaintiff’s lawyer, by participating in
proceedings as a pupil without a solicitor’s
license, rendered the said proceedings a
nullityandwhetherornotonlytheportions
of the proceedings she participated in or
the whole proceedings were so nullified.

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THE CONUNDRUM OF THE UBIQUITOUS SOLICITOR’S LICENSE SAGA:
HAS THE SPECTRE CREATED BY THE SUPREME COURT COME TO HAUNT PUPILS IN KLU V LARYEA?
The Court held that since the pupil
participated in the proceedings at a period
prior to obtaining a solicitor’s license on
3rd May, 2017, all the proceedings she
participated in, without exception, were
a nullity. The Court opined that “[s]urely,
her participation in the proceedings had
tainted them”. In effect, all the legal work
and industry the pupil had put into the
conduct of the case for her clients came to
nothing. Whatever money, time and other
resources the pupil’s client had invested in
the proceedings also went down the drain,
in a manner of speaking.
C: ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR LAW
PRACTICE IN GHANA
It is contended that the decision given
by the Court of Appeal as set forth above
portendsableakfutureforthedevelopment
of the legal profession in Ghana. The
admission of aspiring lawyers into Ghana
School of Law has been fodder for the
entire citizenry of Ghana and beyond for
the past couple of years and need not be
recounted here. By the decision in Klu v
Laryea, the tortious journey of becoming
a lawyer in Ghana has been made even
more onerous.
It is submitted, with the greatest of respect,
that the decision of the Court of Appeal
in Klu v Laryea is retrogressive and
backward-looking at best. The reasons for
this assertion are not far-fetched, and they
are as appear hereunder.
• The impracticality of the decision:
By the Court of Appeal’s decision, a person
who qualifies as a lawyer but has not as
yet been issued with a solicitor’s license
cannot appear in court to even hold brief
for another licensed lawyer. The question
is, can such a person prepare deeds and
documents, write letters, hold conferences
with clients, prepare legal opinion and so
on? It appears the answer to this question,
from the Court of Appeal’s decision in
Klu v Laryea, is in the negative. If that is
the case, then what purpose is pupillage
intended to serve in the legal profession?
InEngland,whichprovidestheantecedents
for our requirement of pupillage after one’s
qualification as a lawyer, the period of
pupillage is 12 months; first 6 months is
for the pupil to ‘shadow’ the pupil master/
mistress. At this stage, pupils do not
handle cases on their own but understudy
the pupil master/mistress in the rudiments
of the practice of law. This includes
accompanying the pupil master to court
to observe proceedings, drafting pleadings
and documents in chambers for the pupil
master/mistressundersupervision,among
others. At the end of the first 6 months,
the pupil supervisor will sign a certificate
confirming satisfactory completion and
send it to the Bar Standards Board. The
Bar Standards Board will then issue the
pupil with a Provisional Qualification
Certificate.
Upon acquiring the Provisional
Qualification Certificate, the second
6 months of pupillage kicks in for the
pupil to ‘practice’. At this stage, pupils
undertake to supply legal services and
exercise rights of audience before courts
on their own. At the end of this second
6 months period, the pupil’s supervisor

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must then certify another document for
satisfactory completion and send it to the
Bar Standards Board pupillage records
office. The pupil will then receive a Full
Qualification Certificate.2
It bears noting
then, that even in England, pupils handle
cases in court on their own before they
receive a Full Qualification Certificate.
It, therefore, stands to reason that in Ghana
where the statutory duration for pupillage
is 6 months, pupils must, and should
be made to, draft and move motions,
undertake hearings and participate in full
trials within the duration of the 6 months
of pupillage. That is the only way by which
pupils will gain the necessary experience
to handle their personal case load after
pupillage.3
• The lingering ghost of Exparte
Teriwajah: 45
The decision in Klu v
Laryea has once again brought to the fore
the difficulty occasioned by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Ex parte Teriwajah.
This was a case brought before the
Supreme Court for orders of certiorari
and prohibition. For clarity of facts and
appreciation of the rather rich history of
the case, the full course ran by the case
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pupillage
3 The practice varies even among Commonwealth countries. For example, Canada has a one
year clerkship programme for lawyers before they are admitted to practice; South Africa has a one
year pupillage programme; Kenya has a 6-month pupillage programme as part of the Law School
programme before enrollment. The United States, India and Nigeria have no requirements of pupil-
lage at all.
4 Republic v High Court (Fast Track Division), Accra; Ex parte Teriwajah & Korboe (Reiss &
Co (Ghana) Ltd Interested Party) [2013-2014] 2 SCGLR 1247
5 Legal Profession Act, 1960
6 Legal Profession (Professional Conduct and Etiquette) Rules 1969
through the hierarchy of courts is set forth
below.
The High Court case: The brief facts
were that the plaintiff made a claim for a
liquidated sum and other ancillary reliefs
in the suit. Upon service of the writ and
the accompanying statement of claim,
the plaintiffs, Henry Nuertey Korboe and
Hekoma Ghana Limited, engaged the first
applicant herein (who was at the material
time a practising lawyer) to represent them
in the suit. The first applicant applied to
vacate some alleged irregular orders made
by the trial court. This was met with a
noticeofpreliminaryobjectionongrounds
that the first applicant did not disclose his
solicitor’s license number for the year 2013
on the motion paper. And that not having
taken any practising license for 2013, the
first applicant was incompetent to sign a
motion and that same contravened Section
8(1) of Act 32. 6
Avril Lovelace –Johnson, J.A (as she then
was), sitting as an additional High Court
judge, upon hearing the preliminary
objection, held that there was a breach
of Section 8 of Act 32 and Rule 4(4) of
L.I 6137
. Her Ladyship then proceeded

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to strike out the writ of summons on the
grounds that the plaintiff’s lawyer did not
have a valid solicitor’s license at the date he
issued the said writ.
The Supreme Court (application for
certiorari): The applicants (the lawyer and
the plaintiff, his client), therefore, applied for
an order of certiorari, among other reliefs,
to quash the ruling of the trial judge in an
applicationforjudicialreviewtitledRepublic
v High Court (Fast Track Division), Accra;
Ex parte Teriwajah & Korboe (Reiss & Co
(Ghana) Ltd Interested Party). The Supreme
Court upheld the trial judge’s decision and
ruled that since the first applicant did not
have a valid license at the time he purported
to represent the second applicant, the first
applicant was incompetent to represent
the second applicant and the application
to vacate the injunction order had been
properly dismissed by the trial judge. It is
the decision in this case that is known and
called Ex parte Teriwajah.
The Court of Appeal: After the applicants’
failure to obtain an order to quash the trial
judge’s decision at the Supreme Court in Ex
parte Teriwajah as stated in the preceding
paragraphs, the applicants (the lawyer
and his client) launched an appeal against
the trial judge’s decision to the Court of
Appeal. The Court of Appeal, coram: Ofoe,
Torkornoo (as she then was) and Tanko (as
he then was), JJ.A by a unanimous decision8
7 Dated 15th May, 2014
8 Henry Nuertey Korboe v Francis Amosah Civil Appeal No. J4/56/2014
9 Per Ansah, Dotse, Yeboah, Baffoe-Bonnie, JJSC (Atuguba, Akoto-Bamfo and Akamba JJSC.
dissenting) and dated 21st April 2016
, overturned the trial judge’s decision and
delivered a most erudite and thorough
judgment. Their Lordships held, in essence,
that processes filed by a lawyer who has
failed to comply with Section 8(1) of Act 32
ought not be invalidated.
Thesalientpointsthatformedthebasisofthe
Court of Appeal’s decision were that: first, it
would be harsh to visit the consequences of
the lawyer’s failure to take out a practicing
license on the client; second, there is the
need to adopt a purposive approach to the
interpretation of Section 8 of Act 32 instead
of a literal interpretation; third, there is
nothing in Section 8 (1) of Act 32 that
disqualifies lawyers from practicing without
a license and that, Act 32 merely provides
criminal sanctions for non-compliance and
does not invalidate or nullify processes filed
by a lawyer without a license at any given
moment.
The Supreme Court “2”: Feeling aggrieved
by the turn of events at the Court of Appeal,
the unsuccessful party appealed to the
Supreme Court in Henry Nuertey Korboe
v Francis Amosah.9
This, thus marked
the parties’ second appearance before the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, by
a 4-3 majority decision10
reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeal and held,
that a lawyer without a valid solicitor’s
license for any particular year, as required
by Section 8(1) of Act 32, cannot practice as

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a lawyer in any court or prepare any process
as a lawyer within the particular period
of non- compliance, and that any process
originated by such a lawyer is a nullity.
Dotse, JSC concluded his delivery of the
majority decision thus:
“The Court of Appeal judgment of 15th
May 2014 is hereby set aside. I will in its
place order that a lawyer who has not taken
out a Solicitor’s License in any year, unless
granted a waiver by the General Legal
Council for any length of time, cannot
practice as a professional lawyer in any court
of competent jurisdiction in Ghana and or
sign any legal documents.”
Ansah, JSC was even more metaphorical in
hisopinioninconcurrencewiththemajority.
He stated that “[p]ractising without a valid
license is not only criminalized; any process
borne out therefrom is equally tainted; it is
the fruit of the forbidden tree; it ought not to
be touched, put in the mouth or swallowed,
it is poison and must be spewed out of the
mouth”. The majority further berated the
Court of Appeal for refusing to follow the
Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Ex
parte Teriwajah regarding the application
for certiorari (as set out in the earlier
paragraphs).
Theleadingdissentingopinionwasdelivered
by the President of the Court, Atuguba, JSC.
He stated as follows: “I would conclude,
therefore, that the failure of a lawyer to take
out a solicitor’s license should lead to an
adjournment of proceedings to enable the
10 See notes 8 and 9 supra
client instruct another lawyer, if necessary,
but not the invalidation of the processes filed
fortheclient.Thisappliesalsotothequestion
of an unregistered chambers.” Before His
Lordship arrived at the said conclusion, he
took pains to review a plethora of decided
cases and one cannot help but observe that
the dissenting opinion is preferable; it has
depth and character. It also accords with the
general aim and purpose of Act 32, that is,
the protection of clients.
It bears stating that Avril Lovelace –
Johnson, J.A (as she then was), who sat as
an additional High Court Judge in the High
CourtproceedingsinExparteTeriwajahwas
on the Court of Appeal panel that delivered
the decision in Klu v Laryea. Indeed,
Her Ladyship it was who delivered the
unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal.
It is, therefore, disconcerting that the Court
of Appeal failed to make even a perfunctory
reference to the Court of Appeal and
Supreme Court decisions11
that were given
consequent upon Her Ladyship’s High Court
ruling in Henry Nuertey Korboe v Francis
Amosah. The only decision the Court of
Appeal referred to in Klu v Laryea was Ex
parte Teriwajah (the certiorari proceedings
at the Supreme Court). The decision in Klu
v Laryea was, therefore, given per incuriam.
It is highly probable that if the Court of
Appeal had adverted its attention to the
persuasive reasoning in the Court of Appeal
and Supreme Court decisions in Henry
Nuertey Karboe v Francis Amosa, the Court
of Appeal may, in all likelihood, have arrived

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at a different, more convincing, purposive
and forward-looking decision than it did.
• The implications of the decision in
Klu v Laryea on pupillage in Ghana:
The writer contends that the Court of
Appeal should have adopted a purposive
approach to the interpretation of Act 32 in
deciding Klu v Laryea instead of the stiff,
literal and moribund approach the Court
of Appeal adopted. That is the only sure
way an obsolete legislation as Act 32 could
have been applied to serve the needs of the
citizens of this country in the 21st Century.
It is unfortunate that the Court of Appeal
in Klu v Laryea did not consider any public
policy reasons for pupillage in our legal
system before reaching its decision. There
is no gainsaying that, there is the need
for lawyers who are issued with solicitors
licenses to be persons who have ‘worked
the law’ in practice. Merely carrying books
and following so-called seniors aimlessly
about the courts and/or acting as glorified
messengers to “take dates” will not stand
a pupil in good stead to forge ahead in
the practice upon receiving the solicitor’s
license. In that wise, one may argue, law
clerks in chambers would be even more
beneficial to practitioners than pupils.
Secondly, by the erudite decision in the
Court of Appeal and Supreme Court’s
dissenting opinion in Henry Nuertey
Korboe v Francis Amosah, it would have
been more propitious for the court to rule
11 www.glc.gov.gh/pupillage
to ensure that the sins of the lawyer who
is in default for failing to take a solicitor’s
license are not visited on the head of the
poor client. In the instant case, can one
even legitimately argue that the lawyer
undergoing pupillage had been “in default
for failing to take solicitors license”? As the
process stands now, a pupil cannot obtain a
license before the pupillage period expires.
Meanwhile, a pupil is under a mandatory
imperative to learn the rudiments of the
practice of law during pupillage. Now, by
the decision in Klu v Laryea, there can be no
practical, hands-on courtroom advocacy or
even office solicitors’ work for a pupil. Was
that the intention of the law maker in Act
32? The answer, obviously, ought to be in
the negative. Otherwise, what would be the
aim and purpose of newly-enrolled lawyers
undergoing pupillage, one is wont to ask
• The role of the General Legal
Council: In the light of the retrogressive
and subversive decision in Klu v Laryea,
it is little wonder that the General Legal
Council’s own guidelines on pupillage
issued in February, 2020 is at variance
with the said decision. By the Council’s
guidelines, a pupil is expected to imbibe
core skills and competency in conduct and
etiquette (advocacy). These include witness
handling during trials; preparation for oral
advocacy on motions; narrative advocacy
during trials or other hearings; preparation
for appeals; and competence in exercising
rights of audience.12
A pupil can only be

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certified to have successfully completed
pupillage by demonstrating these
competencies. And these competencies
can only be demonstrated when the pupil
exercises right of audience before courts
and undertake substantive drafting work
in chambers. The practical difficulty of a
pupil master/mistress certifying to the
General Legal Council the successful
completion of pupillage by a pupil who had
no opportunity to display their proficiency
in the law - either in court or in chambers
- cannot be lost on even the most casual
observer.
• Where art thou, Ghana Bar
Association?: The Ghana Bar Association’s
Code on what constitutes misconduct
by a lawyer makes interesting reading.
Regulation 10 of the Association’s Code of
Ethics provides that “[a] lawyer commits
misconduct if he practices without being
a member of professional chambers or the
pupil of such a chamber.”13
Therefore, the
Bar Association recognizes that a pupil
attached to a law firm or chambers can
practiceasalawyer.Thedifferencebetween
a lawyer and a pupil is that, the latter is yet
to complete pupillage and obtain a license
while the former has a license (whether
renewed or not). The similarity between
them is that, both pupil and lawyer have
the right of audience in courts.
12 Adopted at the Ghana Bar Association Annual Conference held in Koforidua from 10th to 14th
September, 2018
13 See note 9 supra. It is interesting to observe that when the case came on for hearing before the Court
of Appeal, some members of the Bar Association filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the lawyer’s case
which, no doubt, assisted the Court in arriving at its highly commendable decision.
In that regard, the Ghana Bar Association’s
silence regarding the decision in Klu v
Laryea has been anything but deafening.
As a registered association of lawyers
in Ghana that collects annual dues and
solicitor’s license fees from its entire
membership, one would have expected
the Bar Association to take a leading role
to overturn this rather unhappy decision.
The writer has had the privilege of serving
on the Juniors and Pupils Committee of
the Bar Association and notes that, the
welfare of juniors and pupils is of utmost
importance to the Bar Association. The Bar
Association’s pussyfooting, or disinterest
in the matter, appears to have been
influenced by their earlier stance in the
Supreme Court decision of Henry Nuertey
Korboe v Francis Amosa14
where the Bar
Association chose to file an amicus curiae
brief that made arguments antithetical to
the lawyer’s (Teriwajah, Esq) case. Can the
same Bar Association make a folte face
and join camp with embattled pupils? Yes,
it can and it would be the richer for it.
After the Supreme Court decision in
Henry Nuertey Korboe v Francis Amosa,
as members of the Bar Association, we all
stood by and resorted to grumbling among
ourselves about the perverse nature of the
majority decision. We failed to take any
action against it. Little did we know that
Henry Nuertey Korboe v Francis Amosa

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was the festering sore on the dog’s head that
was going to lead to its eventual demise.
It even became fashionable for lawyers
seeking refuge from burdensome cases to
raise obnoxious objections to opposing
Counsel’s failure to state their solicitor’s
license numbers on all processes filed. Some
of the objections were beyond ridiculous;
objections based on Counsel’s failure to
state their current chambers registration
number. It took the Court of Appeal’s most
timely decisions in cases such as Antie
Cecelia & 10 Others v All State Construction
Company Ltd; Alex Opoku-Agyemang & 31
Others v All State Construction Company
Ltd (Consolidated) and Nii Lante Mills v
Mildred Ama Woode15
to stem the tide of
such unhealthy developments in the practice
of law.
Nevertheless, it is not uncommon these days
to come across some court processes bearing
even lawyers’ TIN numbers, ostensibly in
compliance with Ex parte Teriwaja and
Korboe v Amosa. Have we not stretched the
decisions in those cases far enough? We have
allowed the well-researched and painstaking
decisions of the Court of Appeal and the
dissenting crew at the Supreme Court in
Henry Nuertey Korboe v Francis Amosa
to come to naught. Now, the onslaught has
moved from lawyers to pupils. Who is next;
14 Civil Motion No. H3/175/2014 dated 26th November, 2014 (CA, Kumasi Division) and Civil Motion No.
H3/321/2017 dated 4th April, 2017 (CA, Accra Division) per Tanko Amadu, JA (as he then was) sitting as a single
judge). His Lordship referred to the Antie Cecelia case and added thus: “In that case, I held that the requirement
for endorsement of solicitor’s license numbers on court processes is not a statutory requirement. I said further that
it is founded on an administrative directive by Her Ladyship the Chief Justice in a circular dated 27th June, 2012
copied to Judges, Magistrates, Administrative officers and Registrars of the Judicial Service. Being administrative
and not having the status of a practice direction, it cannot have the force of procedural law as in my view the
Honourable Lady Chief Justice did not embark on supplementing the statutory requirement under Section 8(1) of
Act 32.”
students at the Ghana School Law or at the
Faculties of Law? Or perhaps, legal interns?
The answer is anyone’s guess.
D:CALLTOACTION,COMMENDATION
& CONCLUSION
As matters stand now, pupils would be
of no value to chambers and law firms if
they cannot appear in court or prepare
legal documents because they do not have
solicitor’s license. Most law firms may
not be interested in expending money on
allowances for pupils who are of no value to
the firms.
It is a known fact that several generations of
lawyers in Ghana freely practiced as lawyers
right after being called to the Bar and they
gained a lot of practical experience that
stood them in good stead towards their
development as practitioners of law. If the
essence of pupillage is to go to court and
stare at other lawyers doing their own thing,
then why bother, one may ask. Would it
not suffice for the fresh lawyer called to the
Bar to just go to any court they fancy and
sit through proceedings of their choice for
a period of 6 months and then apply and
obtain a solicitor’s license? The question is,
who benefits from the idleness of the fresh

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lawyer out of Ghana Law School? Your
guess is as good as mine.
It is suggested, as a matter of urgency, the
need for the Bar Association to consult
with the General Legal Council to issue
‘directives’ to alleviate the imminent
hardships the decision in Klu v Laryea is
bound to inflict on pupils, pupil masters/
mistresses, lawyers, firms and legal
departments of institutions. A poignant
starting point could be a reference to the
Council’s published guidelines already
referred to in the preceding paragraphs.
If the above fails, then as a matter of last
resort, the Bar Association should rally
its members to embark on a boycott of
the courts till a resolution is found, that
is, newly-enrolled lawyers serving their
pupillage will be permitted to exercise
their right of audience before courts as
provided by law, the Bar Associations Code
of Conduct and the General Legal Council’s
Guidelines on Pupillage.
At any rate, if it is the revenue that accrues
from the solicitor’s license that seems to be
of paramount importance to the collectors
of those fees, then the license should be paid
for and issued to successful lawyers been
called to the bar along with their certificates
on the day of their enrollment or so soon
thereafter. This will be in consonance with
Section 8(2) of Act 32 which provides
that “[a] person shall not be issued with a
solicitor’s license unless that person has
been previously enrolled as a lawyer under
section 3”.
Lawyer Stella Adu-Duodu, whose desire
to practice the law she had been taught
in law school precipitated the decision in
Klu v. Laryea needs commendation for
developing the confidence and ability to get
her feet wet, as it were, in the deep waters
of law practice at such an early stage of
her entry into our beloved profession. By
all accounts, Lawyer Stella Adu-Duodu
enrolled as a pupil into a duly registered law
chamber under a qualified pupil master. She
did nothing wrong for pursuing the career
for which she might have toiled for years in
law school. The same commendation goes
to her pupil master who had the confidence
in her ability to hold her own in court,
and at the High Court for that matter. The
young members of our profession need
encouragement rather than been hounded
out of practice and scarred for life on such
grounds as handling a case brief in court on
behalf of a pupil master during pupillage
without a license.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
The writer is the Founder & Managing
Counsel of FSB Law Consult, Accra.
Contact: francisca@fsblawgh.com
Tel: 0302818433 / 0208195042