Standing in Foreign Policy Argument

The Importance of “Standing” in Argumentation:
Transformational Diplomacy and the U.S. Department of State
M. Karen Walker
m.karen.walke.phd@gmail.com * (703) 625-1298
October 17, 2007

Standing and Foreign Policy Argumentation - 2
The Importance of “Standing” in Argumentation:
Transformational Diplomacy and the U.S. Department of State
Drawing on my experience as a foreign affairs officer, I analyze argumentation within the
U.S. Department of State as officials readied to adopt transformational diplomacy as a
new mode of planning and resourcing diplomacy initiatives. I introduce transformational
diplomacy and assess its influence on the comparative standing of the Department’s
regional and functional bureaus based on analysis of officials’ public statements.
The U.S. Department of State (the Department) houses a matrixed organization of
functional and regional bureaus and offices. Each Bureau and Office manages a unique
mission to advance the Administration’s foreign policy goals.1
In January 2006, Secretary
of State Rice announced a transformational diplomacy initiative that is fundamentally
altering the way the Department of State defines and conducts its mission. Considering
both public and internal argument contexts, transformational diplomacy provides a case
study in the construct of “standing,” a proposed elaboration to rational argument models.
In framing and implementing diplomatic initiatives, arguments are made by
internal organizational elements and officers who have standing, either by vested
institutional authority or through operational norms and common consent. Public
statements by officials, albeit vetted through Departmental and interagency clearance
processes, certainly reflect—and may also constrain or increase—the latitude of available
standpoints. In this case study, I explore the degree to which transformational diplomacy
as an institutional ideal has tightened the array of available standpoints for Departmental
argumentation.
1
For a detailed assessment of the Department’s Bureaus, mission and strategic goals, see the 2006
Performance and Accountability Report, a .pdf report available for free at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/758340.pdf

The essay progresses in three broad strokes. In the first section, I present a scene-
setter on the communication framework internal to the U.S. Department of State. Second,
I cull existing literature to connect argumentation theory and models to the State
Department’s organizational context. Third, I analyze public statements to better
understand the influence of transformational diplomacy on the Department’s
argumentative processes. My primary proposition is that transformational diplomacy has
altered the comparative standing of Regional and Functional Bureaus, to the Regional
Bureaus’ advantage.
Twenty Years of Sea Change and Two Anchors of Stability
Even the most casual observer of American foreign policy can recite the sea-
changes that have rocked the Department in the past two decades. The Department has
retooled and re-organized as it responded to the collapse of Communism and demand for
democracy-building programs in Central and Eastern Europe; unprecedented levels of
civil engagement in managing global issues such as sustainable development; renewed
world attention to civil and ethnic conflicts and peacekeeping in the Balkans and on the
African continent, and now Iraq; and international disaster relief at an unprecedented
scale. The Department mourned its dead and injured from the 1998 terrorist attacks on
U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, a portent of the Global War on Terrorism. The
Department’s most recent functional reorganization occurred in 1999. The Foreign
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 mandated the reorganization, which had
two major components. The former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was

integrated with the Department in April 1999 and the U.S. Information Agency followed
in October 1999.
Throughout these challenges and reorganization, the matrixed relationship of
Regional and Functional Bureaus provided an anchor of stability and aided in internal
communication between Main State and its Embassies and Consulates, collectively
referred to as overseas missions or posts. Regional Bureaus refer to the Department’s
geographic bureaus, e.g., African Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, European and
Eurasian Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, South and Central Asian Affairs, and Western
Hemisphere Affairs. Functional Bureaus, by contrast, manage the Department’s sectoral
policy interests related to economic, environmental, human rights, health,
nonproliferation, and other global issues.
When working well, matrixed relationships provide an efficient and collaborative
environment for foreign and civil service officers to raise issues, air differences, and
reach compromises at the staff level to guide Departmental and interagency action.
Matrixed relationships engage policy offices within Regional Bureaus and Functional
Bureau officers assigned “regional” beats. Foreign service officers frequently fill
positions in functional bureaus, lending additional country and regional expertise to the
decision-making process.
In addition to the matrixed organizational management scheme, a second anchor
of stability is the relative transparency and predictability of decision-maker roles and
responsibilities, based on the position of the foreign affairs officer and his or her
Bureau’s equities. Roles include representing a larger Departmental of interagency
interest in a decision; serving as a liaison between Main State and overseas posts

involved in a given decision; advocating a broad constituency’s or specific stakeholder’s
interest in the outcome of argumentative discourse; and stewarding the Department’s
reputation and resources.
Roles are practiced through repetitive scenarios (e.g., commercial advocacy in
response to a foreign government’s tender) and cyclical requirements (e.g., G-8 and
APEC Summits). Roles are maintained both through social mechanisms, such as the
Department’s bidding process for foreign service officer postings, and by regulatory
mechanisms, such as the Department’s clearance processes managed by the Department’s
executive secretariat, acting independently of decision makers.
Officers assume their roles most frequently in responding to problems or issues
that are low urgency, but with high consequence. Situations that are high urgency and
high consequence (e.g., disaster response) require immediate action by the Department
and its personnel, with less opportunity for prolonged discussion and argumentation.
Tasks that are high urgency but low consequence tend to lead also to response without
prolonged conversation, if only because decision-makers see no requirement to stake a
claim. Disputes can arise also over issues of low urgency and low consequence, but most
often on issues of lesser interest for argumentation study, such as administrative
procedures and protocols.
Transformational Diplomacy Navigates New Waters
Secretary of State Rice announced the Transformational Diplomacy Initiative on
January 18, 2006, in remarks at Georgetown University. The Initiative is born of the
Administration policy “to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and

institutions in every nation and culture with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our
world.”2
As defined by Secretary Rice, the objective of transformational diplomacy is
to work with our many partners around the world, to build and sustain democratic,
well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct
themselves responsibly in the international system. Let me be clear,
transformational diplomacy is rooted in partnership; not in paternalism. In doing
things with people, not for them; we seek to use America’s diplomatic power to
help foreign citizens better their own lives and to build their own nations and to
transform their own future.3
An accompanying Department of State Fact Sheet synopsized transformational
diplomacy into a Departmental five-point agenda. The most immediate action was a
global repositioning and re-allocation of American diplomatic resources including the
transfer of 100 positions from European and Washington bureaus to critical emerging
areas in Africa, South Asia, East Asia and the Middle East.
Operational changes included adoption of a regional focus and localization, in
order to marshal resources and extend the in-country reach of America’s diplomatic
presence; management changes included new skills development and empowering
diplomats to work jointly with other Federal agencies. The initiative justified the creation
of a new position at the Department, Director of Foreign Assistance, to serve
concurrently as Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID). An internal re-alignment of country desks resulted from the Initiative as well,
specifically the movement of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan from the European Affairs Bureau into the newly named Bureau of South and
Central Asian Affairs.
2
Rice, “Transformational Diplomacy.”
3
Ibid.

Departmental officials’ subsequent public statements indicate that
transformational diplomacy has become an encompassing theme for both Regional and
Functional bureaus. Representative regional examples include “Transformational
Diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere” and “Transformational Diplomacy and the New
Africa Agenda.” Functional Bureaus are equally represented in the public domain.
Examples include “Advancing Transformational Diplomacy through Sustainable
Development,” the “economic side of transformational diplomacy,” transformational
diplomacy and humanitarian aid, and “transforming our diplomacy to combat WMD
terrorism.” These statements offer a window on how Regional and Functional Bureaus
framed successes and advocated for resources in the Initiative’s implementation.
Argumentation tactics are described more precisely in a later section. A precursor task is
selecting an evaluative model for policy argumentation appropriate to foreign affairs
organizations such as the U.S. Department of State.
Applying the Critical Discussion Model to the Department’s Context
The critical discussion model is an attractive fit to argumentation internal to the
Department. First, the model is not focused on “consensus.” Second, the process involves
sequencing of stages and strategic maneuvering. Third, the process is regulated by rules.
Fourth, the entitlements and obligations of the parties engaged in argument are dynamic,
changeable at each successive stage.
Van Eemeren and Houtlosser situated the critical discussion model in van
Eemeren and Grootendorst’s pragma-dialectical approach to argument. As van Eemeren
and Houtlosser note, the critical discussion model is oriented toward dispute resolution

rather than achievement of consensus as a philosophical ideal.4
More accurately, the
critical discussion model is “instrumental in the endeavor of critically testing the
acceptability of a standpoint by dealing in a reasonable way with all the doubts and
criticism of a real or imagined antagonist.”5
Consequently, in addition to reasoning
recognized as logically valid, the model takes into account the differences of opinion that
generate the nexus of discourse and accompanying socially and organizationally framed
rules for discussion.6
Descriptively, a difference of opinion provides the point of departure selected by
one who initiates argument, thus limiting the arguments put forward in search of
resolution, the argumentation schemes employed, and the argumentation structure.7
Structurally, the pragma-dialectical approach involves a protagonist and antagonist who
engage in a multi-step action-reaction process.8
Within its dialectical framework, the
critical discussion model provides a procedure for establishing, methodologically,
whether a standpoint is defensible against doubt or criticism.9
As outlined by van Eemeren and Grootendorst, the protagonist offers a standpoint
on a matter of opinion in dispute. The antagonist calls the standpoint into question,
requiring the protagonist to offer further justification or to refute the criticism. The
antagonist again reacts critically, prompting the protagonist to introduce a new argument,
again triggering a similar reaction from the antagonist. The process achieves resolution
when the protagonist either retracts his or her standpoint, or invokes conciliatio.10
4
Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, “Rhetorical Analysis,” 294.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, “A Pragma-dialectical Procedure,” 365.
9
10
See Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, “Rhetorical Analysis,” 392.

Conciliatio is reserved to the protagonist, to appropriate the antagonist’s argument in
support of his or her own standpoint. Conciliatio will be successful when the appropriated
argument is both expedient to the protagonist and optimally adapted to the antagonist’s
point of departure.
The procedural process of the critical discussion model has a ring of inevitability,
as if the process itself were guiding the protagonist and antagonist. Quite the opposite, the
participants engage in the pursuit of rhetorical aims, through a strategy of restricting
“disagreement space” to focus confrontation on subjects or points deemed most favorable
(which could presumably also mean the least objectionable of unfavorable alternatives).11
This strategy, termed “strategic maneuvering,” unfolds through four distinct stages12
:
confrontation, during which the difference of opinion is defined; the opening stage,
during which a standpoint is established; the argumentation stage (standpoint-criticism-
argument-resolution); and the concluding stage, determining the result. Rules and
procedures can be applied usefully in lowering the barriers to resolution inherent in each
stage.13
Applied to the Department’s context, in the confrontation stages, individuals
would seek advantage by being the first to know or report the issue to be resolved. Being
first offers advantages such as establishing Bureau leadership, framing the problem to the
Bureau’s advantage, identifying early intra-Departmental stakeholders, and initiating
communication. In the opening stage, all parties involved would seek to gain or maintain
their seat at the table and legitimate their standpoints with other internal stakeholders. In
the argumentation stage, individuals would gain internal adherents and receive continued
11
Ibid., 298.
12
Ibid.
13
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, “A Pragma-dialectical Procedure,” 366.

recognition of their mission-relevance to the telescoping and coalescing of internal
opinion.
One can reason that transformational diplomacy has its greatest influence in this
argumentation stage by pre-defining the mission relevance of available standpoints. In the
concluding stage, the individuals’ goal will be to influence the official communication
(e.g., guidance and talking points cabled to post; briefing or action memo sent forward to
Department principals), if not to actually hold the pen. Communication channels may be
more or less prescribed. Generally speaking, flexibility exists on authorship of cables and
emails to counterparts at overseas posts, and officers maintain prerogatives to prepare
memos for Department principals in other Bureaus. Strategic maneuvering allows the
protagonist and antagonist the opportunity to “steer discourse rhetorically in the direction
that best serves their interests.”14
Strategic maneuvering is rhetorical to the extent that protagonist and antagonist
make the most of topic selection, meet audience demands (i.e., comply with listeners’ or
readers’ good sense and preferences), and exploit presentational devices at each of the
four stages just listed.15
Moreover, words, expressions, and other signs give the
protagonist and antagonist clues to recognize argumentative moves, and the dynamics of
move and counter-move, that can assist in resolving a difference of opinion.16
To recap, the critical discussion model fits the Department of State context
because it is more concerned with resolution than consensus; it involves sequenced stages
and strategic maneuvering; it’s regulated by rules; and re-fuses itself at each successive
14
15
Ibid., 298.
16
Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, “Development of the Pragma-dialectical Approach,” 399-400.

stage. Nonetheless, the critical discussion model fails to meet the Department’s context in
several significant ways, explicated below.
First, the model presumes a single protagonist and antagonist. While internal
decision-making may eventually take the form of two opposing camps, the initial work
involves multiple parties and standpoints in competition for internal adherents. A visual
heuristic for Departmental argumentation can be described as a ziggurat pyramid.
Starting from its broadest base, the pyramid mirrors the typical progression of an
argument opening with all equities, followed by a period of internal advocacy, sorting,
and winnowing, leading to an internal coalescing of regional and functional issues, which
are subsequently successfully negotiated by a smaller group of affected parties, resulting
in an approved and codified decision or action step. Argumentation has failed when
organizational elements (e.g., two offices within a Bureau or two Bureaus within the
Department) put forward a split decision memo for Principals’ concurrence.
Second, roles and responsibilities subjugate personal opinion. On any given issue,
individuals will exhibit a range of involvement, from personally disassociated but
engaged because their Bureau mission requires their presence, to personally involved and
fully committed to achieving a given outcome. Third, in the earliest, confrontation stage
initial standpoints may concern whose constituency’s interest(s) is best served, whereas
the critical discussion model appears to presume a pre-formed, extant audience.

The Interactionist Approach, Authority-based Argumentation and Field Theory Conform
to the Department’s Context
To increase the degree of correspondence of the pragma-dialectical approach and
its critical discussion model, the literature offers several complementary constructs, with
particular attention to authority-based argumentation and field theory. In the exercise of
elaborating the critical discussion model, organizational communication imperatives
commend an interactionist perspective.17
This perspective, attributed to David H. Smith’s
negotiation strategies, investigates argument as a means to defend a decision, a point in
common with the critical discussion model.
The interactionist approach matches the wider perspective of circumstance and
consequence and longer temporal view adopted by foreign affairs officers in considering
a problem set. A supporting point is that in Cox’s advocacy of public policy argument as
a normative field, the individuals involved in argument “objectify” reasons for a course
of action and invoke “the public” in interpreting the consequence of their decision.18
Within the Department, widely accepted norms of argumentation and internal debate put
a premium on cordiality and professional conduct. Objectification of the decision process
and consequences, as well as development of a common operating picture, aid in
maintenance of these norms.
Cox’s interactionist perspective accommodates the study of subjective rules,
commonplaces, and images, thus combining a study of process and language employed
routinely within the foreign affairs policy community. Writing in a similar vein, Anton
and Peterson address the analysis of subject positions and rhetorical strategies:
17
Cox, “Investigating Policy Argument as a Field, “ 133.
18
Ibid., 131.

Structured and existential subject positions, used for either epistemic qualification
or epistemic privilege, can be asserted by speakers about themselves (self-
asserted) or can be attributed to speakers by someone else (other-attributed). That
is, speakers can claim the existence and relevance of their own subject position or
others can claim the existence and relevance of it.19
The twinning of qualification and privilege speak directly to my conception of “standing”
in a foreign affairs policy community and organizational context. The notion that
qualifications and privileges are cooperatively determined through discourse aligns also
with the critical discussion model’s rhetorical leanings and Cox’s interactionist
perspective mentioned above.
Other authors contributing to the literature on argumentation have suggested
specific strategies or tactics. Scholarship related to rhetorical choice and tactical decisions
adds depth to the critical discussion model, which provides an overview framework for
interaction but is more opaque on the matter of rhetorical invention. Rountree, for
example, has described a number of strategies useful in prospective argument, that is, the
avoidance of commitments that could lead to self-contradiction or otherwise constrain
one’s future actions. Rountree mentions specifically silence, the trial balloon, the use of
surrogates, the use of transient (unwritten) forms of communication, and the use of a
permanent form of communication with a limited audience.20
Rountree’s tactics are immediately available and employed within the
Department; an officer with strong standing can afford to wait for argument claims and
their respective champions to coalesce, with the knowledge that the “final word” remains
reserved. Trial balloons, often introduced by surrogates (such as a constituency group
19
Anton and Peterson, “Who Said What,” 411.
20
Rountree, “Prospective Argument,” 209-210.

member external to the Department or an interagency official sympathetic to one’s
standpoint), are a low-risk form of engagement.
Officers value unwritten communication to learn colleagues’ opening positions;
informal correspondence such as emails can help form coalitions. More formal formats,
such as information, briefing and decision memoranda, serve as a forcing function for
stasis, separating areas of consensus and dispute, and aid in the negotiation process. On
sensitive matters, designations such as “official use only” and “sensitive but unclassified”
can help resolve internal disputes in which compromise by one or more parties may be
unwelcome by external constituencies.
Leff has proposed the strategic use of prolepsis, the rhetorical figure of
anticipating and clearing away objections.21
Given that many decision contexts are
cyclical and/or repetitive in nature, individuals engaged in a particular matrixed network
of regional and functional bureau issues will frequently meet on familiar ground. Bureau
positions and supporting arguments are well-rehearsed. Leff’s notion of anticipating
others’ standpoints therefore offers high validity, especially when taking into account the
Department’s affinity for precedent.
Because argumentation tends toward known scenarios, templates may be
developed to identify the fixed and dynamic factors governing argumentation processes
and consensus on who has standing. Examples of fields of encounter for which templates
could be produced include annual budget preparations, G-8 summit preparation, a
bilateral dialogue, a standard commercial advocacy case, and a typical investment
dispute. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations on global issues such as environment and
health add to the palette.
21

Two more fully developed theories of argumentation, authority-based
argumentation and field theory, can help fill in the gaps that remain in applying the
critical discussion model to the Department’s context. Authority-based argumentation
incorporates considerations of ethos, rhetorical roles, legitimacy, and ideology.22
Roles
and legitimacy are useful constructs for analyzing intra-Departmental argumentation and
debate. Ethos, in the form of personal reputation, also factors into the analysis. In prior
years, the ideological dimension may have provided little differentiation given that the
parties engaged in argument have a common and overarching requirement to fulfill the
Department’s mission. It is conceivable that transformational diplomacy, as a
manifestation of democracy-building ideology, has sharpened distinctions among intra-
Departmental missions.
Forms of authority, listed as command, expertise, and dignity,23
proximate closely
the Department’s values in establishing and maintaining standing. Authority based on a
command accrues to those who hold a title or office within the Department’s hierarchy.
This form of authority is traditionally understood as line authority, reinforced by the
Department’s tasking and clearance processes.
Authority based on expertise accrues to individuals in regional and functional
bureaus throughout the Department and at overseas posts. For foreign service officers,
expertise is attributed to one’s “cone,” for example economics or political affairs, as well
as one’s length of service and roster of overseas postings. For civil service officers,
expertise is attributed to institutional memory and length of service for a given Bureau, as
well as one’s track record of success. Authority based on dignity is more difficult to
22
Fisher, “Good Reasons: Fields and Genre,” 116.
23
Goodwin, “Forms of Authority,” 267.

convey other than by exemplars of individuals who through their service and personal
sacrifice have earned the widespread respect of their colleagues.
The distinction between or among the forms of authority is important to the
analysis, because individuals arguing from different bases of authority often talk past
each other. Second, forms of authority attribute command authority to regional bureaus
and expertise authority to functional bureaus, a distinction that transformational
diplomacy is likely to concretize over time. Goodwin asserts that an observer can
distinguish the three forms of authority by the reaction that a failure to comply would
normally evoke.24
One suspects, however, that additional inference rules are at work.
Often it is the individual whose authority resides in his or her dignity that can broker a
compromise, often through the construction of arguments that reflect Manolescu’s notion
of presentational force.
Jovičić extended authority-based argument theory through the additional
component of the audience, which has relevance for the Department’s practice of initial
positioning based on consequences to internal and external constituencies. Jovičić starts
from the premise that each argument activity has its social and reasoned aspects.25
Argumentation activity is social, because an individual engaged in argument uses
relevant characteristics of the audience group to make his or her standpoint more
attractive. Argumentation is a reasoned activity, as commonly understood, including the
advancement of theses and reasons and the logical relations between the two.
As conceived by Jovičić, the audience possesses both a common interest in the
argument’s aims and accepted values, and knowledge of programs and activities of those
24
Ibid., 273.
25
Jovičić, “Authority-based Argumentative Strategies,” 3.

directly engaged in argument.26
Jovičić avoids the temptation to put those arguing in a
fishbowl, which would relegate the audience to the role of interested spectator. Rather,
the audience has the potential to challenge those directly engaged in argument, as they in
turn attempt to promote audience members who are helpful surrogates while pacifying
the rest.
Specific to strengthening one’s analytical approach, Jovičić offers guidance: “In
evaluating an argumentative activity, we need to know to which audience the activity is
aimed. The relevant characteristics of the audience and their (sic) importance for the
evaluation have also to be analyzed.”27
Accordingly, analysis and evaluation of
argumentative activity are relative to the audience, though I would not go so far as
Jovičić in assigning the audience a singularly deterministic role. The argumentation
activity internal to the Department takes into account multiple audiences, whose
individual and collective stature remain in flux according to each other, the issue at hand,
and each audience’s short- and long-term relational goals with the Department.
Field theory provides another source of analysis of standing in argumentation
within the Department. As outlined by Willard, fields exist in and through the ongoing
and defining activities of their actors.28
Offered as a symbolic interactionist alternative to
Toulmin’s structuralist take on argument form, Willard described fields as traditions of
practices, rejuvenated through inferences about recurring themes and generalizations
about the unifying threads of a group’s activities.29
From this basis Jacobs’ more recent
iteration of fields offers a more robust and meaningful path for understanding the
26
Ibid., 4.
27
Ibid., 3.
28
Willard, “Field Theory,” 22.
29
Ibid.

function of standing in argumentative discourse: “Argument fields are composed of a
constellation of interpretive categories, fundamental beliefs and values, norms of
conduct, and sources of authority which provide an institutional framework within which
to conduct argument.”30
Definitions aside, Willard’s partitioning of fields, namely the relational,
encounter, and issue fields,31
can serve well in the analysis of standing and internal
argumentation. Relational fields exist among colleagues, for example the horizontal
matrix of officers with overlapping geographic and policy interests. Fields of encounter,
or definition of situation, aptly describe the cyclical and/or repetitive scenarios which
generate debate, in which transparency and positive expectancy violations can resolve the
argument. Issue fields, by which Willard means schools of thought and movements,
cannot be discounted. Although relational fields and fields of encounter have been the
source of traditional internal Departmental alliances for problem-solving and decision-
making, one could hypothesize that transformational diplomacy, as an overarching and
ideologically charged construct, could lead to greater prominence of issue fields in
explaining current argumentative processes.
Assessing the Impact of Transformational Diplomacy through Public Statements
The foregoing discussion of the literature offered additional approaches to
argumentation, most notably the interactionist and prospective approaches, and the use of
prolepsis. Argument from authority—with the extension of the audience—and field
theory enrich synergistically the critical discussion model’s application to internal
30
Jacobs, “When Worlds Collide,” 749.
31
Willard, “Field Theory,” 40.

argumentation processes. These processes are characterized by multiple participants,
standpoints and constituencies, governed by representational roles more than personal
opinion, with heightened concern for maintaining social and professional relations and
preserving standing through precedent.
As a surrogate for direct access to internal deliberations, I assess public
statements of Departmental officials referencing transformational diplomacy. The
descriptive analysis provides a set of heuristics that can inform more detailed questions
such as whether transformational diplomacy has increased the standing of Regional
Bureaus and tightened the array of available standpoints. As previously mentioned, van
Eemeren and Grootendorst’s pragma-dialectical model concerns matters of opinion in
dispute. In the public context of officials’ statements on transformational diplomacy, the
matter of dispute concerns the allocation of resources, congressional appropriations in the
form of development assistant, economic support funds, and funding for Departmental
operations and management accounts.
Combining a key word search of the State Department web site, Lexis-Nexis
Academic and NewsEdge, covering January 2006 through September 28, 2007, I
surfaced 38 public statements, transcripts and interviews of State Department and USAID
officials. Fourteen of the set were from officials representing Regional Bureaus or their
country missions; 17 were from the officials representing Functional Bureaus or their
issue interests; two represented the perspective of Departmental management, concerning
recruitment and training; three were from Secretary Rice; and two were from
Ambassador Randall Tobias, former Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and
Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development. The set for analysis

excludes the Secretary’s January 2006 address at Georgetown University that launched
the initiative.
Public Statements Illustrate Multiple Ways to Describe Transformational Diplomacy
A first-order observation is the lack of conformity in officials’ descriptions of
transformational diplomacy. The most encompassing description of transformational
diplomacy can be found in Secretary Rice’s September 28, 2007 statement to the Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, promoting transformational
diplomacy as tantamount to the Department’s national security mission.
This prioritization correlates with the Department’s FY 2007 budget fact sheet,
released February 6, 2006, which places transformational diplomacy as goal number one,
before the Global War on Terror, Afghanistan, HIV/AIDs, and border security. As a
counter-point, transformational diplomacy is a long-term proposition that when necessary
gives way to more urgent needs, as indicated in March 2007 congressional testimony by
Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs James C. Swan on the sub-regional impact
of the Darfur crisis. Transformational diplomacy is almost an afterthought:
The United States’ priorities in Chad and CAR include limiting the regional
impact of the Darfur conflict, fostering stability, protecting civilians, refugees,
internally displaced persons, and humanitarian workers, and furthering
transformational diplomacy by promoting political reform and good governance.
Public statements reveal a number of correlate terms for transformational
diplomacy. One such term is empowerment. As Secretary Rice told new foreign service
officers in February 2007:

Transformational diplomacy is more than just being told what to do. It’s thinking
and leading and acting and charting the right course on your own …
Transformation in diplomacy, as in business and other fields, rests on the
empowered individual who works for the greater freedom and greater initiative
and thus greater responsibility …”
Transformational diplomacy is also about efficiency. In this same speech, Secretary Rice
describes a work environment for foreign service officers “with fewer hurdles to clear,
fewer boxes to check, and who aided by the power of technology can accomplish what
was once required of many people.” Under Secretary for Global Affairs Paula
Dobriansky likewise highlighted the efficiency benefits of transformational diplomacy in
a June 2007 USINFO article promoting the Supporting Entrepreneurs for Environment
and Development program.
Linking partnerships and efficiency, Dobriansky noted that “by leveraging
resources and innovation from both government nongovernmental groups we can
accomplish a lot, more quickly.” Transformational diplomacy also is a process. As Glyn
Davies, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, testified
in September 2007: transformational diplomacy is a “strategic framework for U.S.
foreign assistance” that provides a “roadmap by which foreign assistance resources will
be allocated and implemented.”
Transformational diplomacy is a moral imperative. Secretary Rice, speaking at
the Interaction Annual Forum in 2007, referred to transformational diplomacy as a “new
national consensus” in which moral and security rationales for development have gained
traction. As described by Under Secretary Dobriansky, transformation diplomacy is “the
right thing to do,” to “[advance] democratic governance, economic development, and the
alleviation of disease and poverty.”

More directly, Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas A.
Shannon, speaking in May 2006 to delegates of the Washington Conference of the
Council of Americas, said that “transformational diplomacy is really about transforming
institutions and partnerships and realizing new purposes, but doing so on the basis of
enduring values.” In keeping with the moral imperative, transformational diplomacy is
“based on a proactive rather than reactive approach to international problems,” as Cindy
Courville, U.S. Envoy to the African Union, noted in her interview May 2007 interview
with USINFO.
Transformational diplomacy claims success stories, such as the pursuit of peace
and democratic change in Guinea, as relayed by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs Linda Thomas-Greenfield in her March 2007 congressional testimony.
Employing Secretary Rice’s words on transformational diplomacy, Thomas-Greenfield
described how the U.S. Government is using “America’s diplomatic power to help others
better their own lives and to build their own nations and to transform their own futures.”
Moving from the African continent to the Western Hemisphere, Assistant Secretary
Shannon testified in September 2007 that while challenges remain, “under President
Uribe’s leadership, Colombia is a success story for transformational diplomacy. For the
first time in over a generation, Colombians can envisage the possibility of real peace, and
the Columbian government is poised to make it a reality.”
Secretary Rice herself touted the success of transformational diplomacy, citing the
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief as a “key example of effective foreign
assistance and transformational diplomacy in action.” Health programs constitute a
double success for transformational diplomacy, when paired with the May 2007 remarks

of USIAD Assistant Administrator Dr. Kent R. Hill, who opined that “the polio
[eradication] effort is a great success that underlies the fundamental purpose of U.S.
Foreign Assistance reform and fosters transformational diplomacy.”
Transformational diplomacy has backward reach in its successes, as Under
Secretary Dobriansky claimed that $1.4 billion in U.S. human rights and democracy
programming, reported in the Annual Supporting Human Rights and Democracy Report,
“illustrates how our transformational diplomacy has helped citizens in some 95 countries
turn their growing demands for human rights and democracy into action.” The attribution
is somewhat disingenuous, in that the report, announced April 2006, covers successes
from FY 2005 funding—a planning cycle two years prior to Secretary Rice’s Georgetown
address.
Transformation Diplomacy “Instrumental” in Achieving Functional Bureau Missions
Regional and Functional Bureaus differ in the how transformational diplomacy is
contextualized in officials’ public statements. Generally, Functional Bureaus reference
transformational diplomacy as instrumental to achieving their program mission; the
mission remains the end goal against which success is evaluated. A standard approach is
to describe how a mission will be accomplished through transformational diplomacy, as
indicated in this excerpt from the Executive Summary of the International Religious
Freedom Report, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor:
“Through transformational diplomacy, the United States seeks to promote freedom of
religion and conscience throughout the world as a fundamental human right and as a
source of stability for all countries.”

This “instrumental to” strategy was adopted throughout the Department’s
hierarchy. For example, Robert Joseph, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, has promoted the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
as “an important step to implement transformational diplomacy,” through the formation
of “new flexible partnerships, as well as stronger bilateral and regional ties” to “ensure
strategies for combating nuclear terrorism are tailored to conditions prevailing with our
partner nations.” In this formulation, transformational diplomacy is the means, and
nuclear nonproliferation remains the ends.
Thomas Lehrman, Director of the Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Terrorism, links syllogistically transformational diplomacy with maritime security.
Speaking at a January 2007 Maritime and Port Security Conference, Lehrman asserted
that 1) transformational diplomacy equals partnerships, and 2) the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism likewise provides industry with an opportunity to partner with
foreign governments committed to detection and prevention of nuclear and radiological
threats. Therefore, the Global Initiative is transformational diplomacy because of its
reliance on partnerships. Lehrman first employed this formula in November 2006, in an
address at the U.S. Military Academy. After quoting Secretary Rice’s Georgetown
University remarks, Lehrman adds the following commentary:
Only a flexible network of partnerships that adapts to the changing nature of
threat will provide us with the security we seek. A flexible and global network
will deter potential attackers, enable us to detect plots and provide early warning
to our partners, provide a platform for cooperative emergency response to defeat
imminent attacks, and enable an effective and timely response following the
attack.
Transformational diplomacy has instrumental value, whereas the Office’s mission
(described in text after “will deter”) remains the goal.

Functional Bureaus May Also Emphasize Joint Pursuit of the Same Goals
A related strategy adopted by Functional Bureaus is based on joint pursuit of a
shared goal. For example, David Gross, U.S. Coordinator for International
Communications and Information Policy, has reasoned that because transformational
diplomacy involves the use of American diplomacy “to help create a balance of power in
the world that favors freedom,” and because “ICTs are a critically important tool for
transforming our world,” then “international communications and information policy are
very much a vital and … essential component” of transformation diplomacy.
This correlation allows Gross to provide a sampling of economic, social and
political benefits attributable simultaneously to information and communication
technology and transformational diplomacy. The tactic allows the speaker to hedge his or
her bets; if transformational diplomacy is replaced by the next Administration, the
benefits of a coordinated international communication and information policy remain
untarnished.
Josette Sheeran, Under Secretary for Economic, Business and Agricultural
Affairs, offers a more eloquent and adroit example in her September 2006 remarks on
“Doing Business in the World 2007: A New Emphasis for the U.S. Government.” The
quote below blends transformational and economic diplomacy goals. Depending on one’s
emphasis of interpretation, the quote practically inverts the relationship, with
international economic policy representing transformational diplomacy in a stable form:
The Secretary brought me into this position to focus on the economic side of
transformational diplomacy. This is a critical component in building a safer, more
stable world. Unstable, economically insecure countries can harbor terrorists and
rarely nurture democracy. When a country becomes an economic reformer, it
empowers the people by making it easier to start a business, attracts investment,
and enables nations to be more competitive and successful in the global economy.

Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs Anthony Wayne previewed this
message in his February 2006 remarks, “Economic Diplomacy: Priorities and Concerns”:
Secretary Rice has emphasized the importance of transformational diplomacy—
using the full range of U.S. diplomatic tools to shape change that is good for all
countries, including the United States. Economic diplomacy is a crucial part of
this effort. A powerful and vital way to support political freedom and social
opportunities is by generating economic opportunities that help people build
better futures for themselves.
Chapeau Strategy Provides an Exemplar for Functional Bureaus
In diplomatic parlance, a “chapeau” statement is introductory text to a multi-
lateral statement or declaration, setting forth the signatories’ common purpose,
interpretation, and scope, in language that allows individual parties to pursue varied
implementation strategies. Two individuals representing Functional Bureaus, who would
be familiar with this approach from multi-lateral negotiations in arms control and
international environmental accords respectively, illustrate the strategy as applied to
transformational diplomacy.
Francis C. Record, Acting Assistant Secretary for International Security and
Nonproliferation, used the chapeau in his May 2006 congressional testimony, beginning
with the following claim:
Our recent reorganization has strengthened our ability to implement Secretary
Rice’s vision of transformational diplomacy. There are four specific programs and
initiatives in this area—the Export Control and Related Border Security Program,
the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative,
and the Nuclear Trafficking Response Group.
Following this opening statement, Record provides an overview of each of the four
programs, emphasizing transformational diplomacy’s core concepts of capacity building
and broad participation. This introduction establishes receptivity toward more specific

claims, that “a transformational approach to preventing nuclear smuggling should seek
not only to provide assistance to foreign partners but to develop a global interoperable
architecture with them”; that “transformational diplomacy also demands that we
empower our diplomats to work more closely with their interagency partners”; that
“transformational diplomacy emphasizes the importance of regionalizing and localizing
our effort”; and that “transformational diplomacy also offers us an opportunity to build
new kinds of partnerships that transcend the State Department’s customary relationships
with governments and international organizations.”
Jonathan Margolis, Special Representative for Sustainable Development, applied
the chapeau to environmental diplomacy in November 2006 remarks at Florida
International University, beginning with the following statement:
Sustainable development—the joint pursuit of economic growth, social
development, and environmental protection—is a key mechanism for
implementing Secretary Rice’s call for transformational diplomacy. Indeed, the
U.S. Government’s efforts on sustainable development are an integral component
of the Secretary’s new foreign assistance framework and also a vital contribution
to the United States’ broader national security objectives.
Margolis bullets the program areas of transformational diplomacy, namely peace and
security, governing justly and democratically, investing in people, economic growth, and
humanitarian assistance, and then links sustainable development to these program areas.
Margolis concludes his remarks with an example of regional stability and
transformational diplomacy, describing a water initiative to ease sharing of water
resources in a South African river basin traversing Angola, Namibia and Botswana.

The Push-Pull of Countries and People, Downplaying Sectoral (Functional) Goals
Randall Tobias, recognized as the Administration’s primary advocate for
transformational diplomacy, provided the most deliberate description of transformational
diplomacy as an ends, and made a definitive juxtaposition of regional and functional
aims. Speaking to those assembled for the Interaction Annual Forum in April 2007,
Tobias urged a tailoring of development assistance to the unique needs of each recipient
country as a means to reach the transformational diplomacy goal. He remarked further
that “When we split up our resources into too many sectors in one country, progress will
be slow and indeed often imperceptible.” From this basis, a functional goal such as
poverty reduction is no longer only a functional bureau priority, but a shared objective of
Regional and Functional Bureaus:
The attraction of the idea to include poverty in the transformational diplomacy
goal was, in part, that it didn’t belong to one organization or sector; it belonged to
the united interests of our movement. Parochial interests that are not grounded in
data or country progress do not serve our cause and they do not serve our goal to
have the President’s foreign assistance budget request fully funded.
Moreover, the Regional Bureaus appear to have an edge in relaying
transformational diplomacy to people. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi
Frazer, in her April 2006 remarks at Howard University, invoked the charge “to use
America’s diplomatic power to help foreign citizens better their own lives and to build
their own nations and to transform their own futures.” Frazer elicited this mandate
directly from the Secretary’s Georgetown address, and the language therefore is available
to any official speaking on the subject.
Whereas “partnerships” achieves resonance in statements issued by both Regional
and Functional Bureaus, helping people is part of the regional bureaus’ robust repertoire.

A potential explanation is that the regional bureaus provide the forum or platform
through which public diplomacy programs are implemented. J. Scott Carpenter, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, affirmed this explanation in his June 2006
remarks on “Transformational Diplomacy in Action”; the Department launched the
referenced Middle East Partnership Initiative in the Fall of 2004:
[Secretary Rice] has asked us to put our best efforts into promoting freedom and
opportunity for the people of the Middle East, which means putting our best
efforts into supporting the region’s community of reformers. … So we are taking
action in tangible ways to work not only bilaterally with governments in the
region on reform, but also directly with citizens and civil society through the State
Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative.
Regional Bureaus Appropriate Functional Bureau Issues
Tobias’s remarks illustrate one way in which Regional Bureaus can appropriate
policy priorities upon which Functional Bureaus are recognized to have greater
legitimacy and standing. An example of rhetorical appropriation of functional or sectoral
issues can be found in Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs James C.
Swan’s remarks to the Fourth International Conference on Ethiopian Development
Studies:
In keeping with Secretary Rice’s concept of transformational diplomacy, United
States government policy in the region focuses on partnership, while promoting
regional stability and security, strengthening democratic processes and
institutions, fostering economic growth, expanding the scope and quality of basic
services, and responding to the humanitarian needs of vulnerable populations.
Of this list, regional stability and security is traditionally reserved to the Regional
Bureaus, involving most directly bilateral and regional diplomacy and negotiations on
political arrangements within, between and among countries. Likewise, expanding the
scope and quality of basic services and responding to humanitarian needs speaks to

development assistance and humanitarian aid programs managed through US overseas
missions (both USIAD and State Department), working within a bilateral or regional
framework. Strengthening democratic processes and institutions, however, is the purview
of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor; fostering economic growth, the
purview of the Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs.
Similarly, Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific
Affairs, in his March 2006 congressional testimony, made the following statement: “Part
and parcel of transformational diplomacy is the effort to address such global issues as
terrorism, disease, international crime, human and narcotics trafficking, de-mining,
Internet freedom, and environmental degradation.” This list represents in near entirety the
portfolio of the Department’s Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs; the
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, organizationally wired to the
Under Secretary for Political Affairs and a sister of the Department’s Regional Bureaus,
manages issues of international crime and narcotics trafficking.
The calculus holds at the country level as well, as illustrated by Mark Ward,
USAID Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East. In
congressional testimony on transformational diplomacy activities in Lebanon, Ward
recites the familiar litany of economic growth, investing in people, and governing justly
and democratically.
In the rhetorical appropriation of Functional Bureau issues, the Regional Bureaus
establish for themselves a wide discursive space. Assistant Secretary Frazer, for example,
placed transformational diplomacy in a much broader foreign policy context than
development assistance alone. Moreover, transformational diplomacy provides an agenda

“to remake U.S. foreign policy to more effectively pursue American national interests in
a world that has moved beyond Cold War divisions.” The initiative allows the step from
conflict resolution and peacekeeping to “the consolidation of democracies.” Thomas A.
Shannon offered a similar view toward his own region, speaking to delegates of the May
2006 Washington Conference of the Council of the Americas:
From our point of view, the Americas have really been doing a kind of
transformational diplomacy for several decades in terms of moving toward a
democratic hemisphere and toward a hemisphere that trades freely and that is
working toward economic integration both sub-regionally, regionally, and also
more broadly in the Americas.
Rearticulating Findings in the Pragma-Dialectical Approach
The analysis illustrates that both Regional and Functional Bureaus refer to
transformational diplomacy in establishing standpoints related to resources and program
implementation; both Regional and Functional Bureaus make use of prospective
argument to avoid commitments that constrain future action. Regional Bureaus have
greater latitude in available standpoints, and are better able to employ prolepsis, the
anticipation and rhetorical removal of an opponent’s objections. In addition, Regional
Bureaus appear better positioned to exercise privilege in invoking “the public” (in this
context beneficiaries of programs funded by Development Assistant and Economic
Support Funding) to support standpoints on resource requests.
Also to the Regional Bureaus’ advantage, conciliato, in which the protagonist
incorporates the antagonist’s standpoint in support of his or her own, appears to be
hardwired in the quest for resources to implement transformational diplomacy. Regional
Bureaus have appropriated (literally and figuratively) Functional Bureau policy priorities.

Stated from the perspective of field theory, issue fields are in ascendance as a source for
generating standpoints and interaction in the argumentation stage of encounter; within the
framework of transformational diplomacy, Regional and Functional Bureaus have equal
claim to the territory.
The Functional Bureaus’ perspective of transformational diplomacy as an
instrument to achieve long-standing missions may preserve their standing in future
appropriations and policy development cycles. Without prejudice or endorsement toward
any given presidential candidate, a change of administration will take place, and the new
administration will seek to place its own imprimatur on the Department and the conduct
of American diplomacy. Bureaus adopting transformational diplomacy as a means rather
than an ends will have greater latitude in aligning their mission interests with the
incoming officials’ particular frame of reference and world view.
I also sought to confirm the propositional claims that Functional Bureaus will
invoke authority-based argumentation tactics based on ethos and legitimacy, expressed as
expertise, whereas regional bureaus will invoke authority-based argumentation tactics
based in ethos and ideology, expressed as command or line authority. Second, I expected
to develop an evidence base for the claim that transformational diplomacy, as a school of
thought, has shifted the source of argument resolution away from informational matrixed
relationships and situational definitions to a defined group of ideological commitments.
Unfortunately, public statements alone provide a refracted view on these claims,
requiring additional research to generate conclusive insight.
A more significant question to be addressed at a future time, sufficient to look
back with broader perspective on transformational diplomacy’s long-term consequences,

is whether <security> may reclaim its resonance in American foreign policy. In the last
half of the 20th
century, Americans understood the purpose and craft of diplomacy
through <security> and its contextual pairings. Certain pairings have achieved cyclical
resonance in response to domestic and worldwide events: national security during the
Cold War; domestic security during tumult of the 1960s; economic security and energy
security, which became paramount in response to the 1970s’ price controls and Arab oil
embargos, as well as the 1980s’ attention to U.S. competitiveness; sustainable security of
the 1990s, entailing measures to advance simultaneously economic, environmental and
energy security; global security of the post-Cold War era, particularly with regard to
nonproliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; the reinterpretation of
global security posed by threats to the global commons, such as climate change and
pandemics; and the most recent reincarnation in homeland and border security.
These connectors to <security> speak directly to the portfolio of issues within the
purview of Functional Bureaus. More recently, foreign affairs journals and fora have
taken up the issue of state security, in the more precise formulation of weak and failing
states, irredentism and ungoverned spaces. This formulation of <security> plays to the
strengths of the Regional Bureaus, with their institutional knowledge of geopolitical
regions and track record on capacity building through government-to-government and
public diplomacy programs. Should transformational diplomacy prove to be a vestige of
the current Administration, the reinvigoration of <security> in American diplomacy
could return the Regional and Functional Bureaus to their pre-January 2006 set points.

Bibliography
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Bibliography of Documents with Reference to Transformational Diplomacy
Boucher, Richard A, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs. “A
Regional Overview of South Asia.” Testimony before the House Committee on
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World Affairs, Washington, DC, June 15, 2006.
Courville, Cindy, U.S. Envoy to the African Union. Interview with USINFO staff writer
Jim Fisher-Thompson, May 14, 2007.
Davies, Glyn, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
“U.S. Assistance in East Asia and the Pacific: An Overview.” Testimony before
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and
the Global Environment, September 20, 2007.
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to the Women’s Network for a Sustainable Future, Third Businesswomen’s
Sustainability Leadership Summit, October 23, 2006.
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Federoff, Nina V., Science and Technology Advisor to the Secretary of State. Remarks
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2006 Grafstein Lecture in Communications, February 7, 2006.
Hill, Christopher R., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs.
Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee
on Asia and the Pacific, March 8, 2006.
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Strategic and International Studies press event at the Kaiser Family Foundation,
May 1, 2007.
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News,” by Vago Muradian, Washington, DC, October 9, 2006.
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American Diplomatic Presence.” Testimony to the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, August 1, 2007.
“International Religious Freedom Report 2007, Executive Summary.”

Joseph, Robert G., Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.
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from www.state.gov/t/us/rm/69124.htm.
Lehrman, Thomas, Director, Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism.
“Transformational Diplomacy to Protect the Maritime Supply Chain.” Remarks to
the Marinelog-sponsored Maritime and Port Security Conference and Expo,
January 23, 2007.
———. “Building Transformational Partnerships to Combat WMD Terrorism.” Remarks
at the U.S. Military Academy, November 7, 2006.
Margolis, Jonathan, Special Representative for Sustainable Development. “Advancing
Transformational Diplomacy through Sustainable Development.” Remarks to
Florida International University, Miami, FL, November 16, 2006.
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Nonproliferation. “Foreign Cooperation in U.S. Efforts to Prevent Nuclear
Smuggling.” Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security,
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———. Remarks at the InterAction 2007 Annual Forum, September 28, 2007.
———. “Transformational Diplomacy.” Remarks to new foreign service officers,
February 23, 2007.

———. “Action Today, a Foundation for Tomorrow: The President’s Emergency Plan
for AIDS Relief.” February 8, 2006.
Shannon Thomas A., Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs. “Vision,
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House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
March 1, 2007.
———. “Transformational Diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere.” Remarks at the 36th
Annual Washington Conference of the Council of Americas, Washington, DC,
May 3, 2006.
Sheeran, Josette, Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural
Affairs. “Doing Business in the World 2007: A New Emphasis for the U.S.
Government,” September 8, 2006.
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International Conference on Ethiopian
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Tobias, Randall L., Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance & USAID Administrator. “A
Strategic Approach to Addressing Poverty & Global Challenges: We are in this
Together.” Address to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 5,
2007.
———. Address to the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops Regarding Poverty,
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“Transformational Diplomacy in the Afghan Desert: Afghan Provincial Reconstruction
Team and Day in the Life of a State PRT Office.” Careers@State, May-June
2007.
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Economic and Reconstruction Efforts via Teleconference.” March 8, 2007.
Volker, Kurt, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs.
“Transatlantic Security: Addressing Global Challenges Together.” Remarks at
the University of San Francisco Center for Public Service and the Common Good,
March 28, 2006.
Ward, Mark S., Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East.
“Political Situation in Lebanon.” Testimony before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, April 18,
2007.
Wayne, Anthony, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs. “U.S.
Economic Diplomacy: Priorities and Concerns.” Remarks at the Bank of San
Francisco, February 17, 2006.

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