1. Organizational Analysis of U.S. Department of State
Brendan Scott
PMGT 499—Public Management
February 6, 2017

2. 2
Executive Summary
Problem
One of the significant organizational challenges the U.S. Department of State faces is
the inefficiencies caused by high turnover. There are two main consequences of frequent
turnover between posts:
 Foreign Service Officers are confronted with adjusting to a “new job” every two to three
years. This creates a significant learning curve for each new post that sacrifices time and
expertise.
 Due to the up-or-out system of the Foreign Service, promotions and job offers are
dependent upon short-term and often inferior initiatives that are easier to display on
evaluations and resumes.
Solution
I recommend that the U.S. Department of State proactively seeks to reduce the
inefficiencies resulting from high turnover by doing the following:
 By creating a lessons learned database that is post-specific and easily navigable,
incoming officers will have an always accessible resource of valuable information to
reference in times of need. I recommend that posts specifically solicit input from locally
employed staff to ensure accuracy and applicability.
 Creating a strategic plan for each post that seeks goal-clarity and encourages long-term
initiatives that will benefit the overall mission rather than individual objectives.

3. 3
Introduction
Diplomatic relations between people and countries have existed for as long as people have
separated themselves from other groups of people. The U.S. Department of State has existed as
an organization since 1789, continually evolving to better adapt to the changing demands of a
globalizing world. What has not changed dramatically since its inception is the high turnover
rate between diplomatic missions around the world. With diplomats moving between posts
every few years, this creates issues of continuity and stability, sustainability of initiatives, and
the requisite expertise to properly address the complexities of various cultures. In the first
section of this paper, I describe the organization of the U.S. Department of State, the Foreign
Service in particular. In the second section, I outline the consequences of a high turnover rate
and several implications this has on a mission-level. In the third and fourth sections, I begin to
present alternatives to the current turnover system as well as my recommendations for public
managers in the Foreign Service moving forward. In this analysis, I propose changes to lessons
learned systems and mission-level strategic plans to counteract the adverse effects of high
diplomatic turnover.
Organization
The U.S. Department of State is comprised of three main sub-groups: the Foreign
Service, Civil Service, and locally employed Foreign Service staff at overseas posts. While each
sub-group has a distinct role in the Department of State, all are united by their diplomatic
mission. The U.S. Department of State describes its primary mission and responsibility today as
“fight[ing] terrorism, protect[ing] U.S. interests abroad, and implement[ing] foreign policy
initiatives while building a freer, prosperous and secure world” (U.S. Department of State

4. 4
2017a). To accomplish this mission, the Department has created multiple bureaus and offices in
a top-down structure that are either regional or functional in nature. Regional bureaus consist
of bureaus that focus their efforts on the challenges and objectives of an area such as Africa or
the Near East. Functional bureaus focus their efforts globally but on specific issues such as the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor or the Bureau of Administration (U.S.
Department of State 2017b).
The Foreign Service, one of the fundamental components of the Department of State, is
comprised of approximately 13,000 employees who represent America overseas and work for
American citizens living and traveling around the world. The Foreign Service is divided between
embassies, consulates, and diplomatic missions around the globe, including many within the
United States (U.S. Department of State 2017a). Each location has a Chief of Mission, usually an
Ambassador, that heads the operations within a given geographic location and then delegates
responsibilities to his or her leadership team comprised of Senior Foreign Service members and
Foreign Service Officers.
Issues
The United States Foreign Service is a unique branch of the U.S. Department of State
that has adapted over the years to various constraints and challenges. Among the many
challenges that the Foreign Service has had to struggle with is the ideal duration of a typical
post for its officers. High attrition rate is not a typical problem of the Foreign Service in
general—although the impending retirements of baby boomers will significantly impact this
over the coming years—but embassies and consulates around the globe are affected by high
turnover rates (Parker 2010, 42). Abbasi and Hollman (2000) argue that high labor turnover is a

5. 5
significant cause of declining productivity and sagging morale. Turnover, they argue, negatively
affects human relations, reduces employee loyalty, erodes morale and stability, and disrupts
work flow.
The low employee turnover statistics for the Foreign Service, however, do not
accurately measure the amount of change in labor each post experiences every year because it
focuses on employees of the Foreign Service in general, not on specific posts. Yet, Foreign
Service generalists and specialists typically spend from one to three years working at a post
before moving on to another location. While there are numerous benefits to such a system,
such as a variety of creative solutions and an infusion of motivated individuals, there are also
numerous adverse effects. One such effect this system creates is a working environment where
officers are adjusting to a “new job” every one to three years.
One of the natural consequences of this system is that officers are unable to gather
location expertise. For example, in a cone such as public diplomacy, there are numerous
commonalities around the globe in the challenges and skills needed to address those
challenges. However, there are also numerous unique challenges facing each post. For example,
the media landscape in Ukraine operates vastly differently than how the media operates in the
United States or how the media operates in China or Columbia. There are nuances and
complexities that vary from post to post and can only be learned through time and first-hand
experience.
Unique cultural and language barriers are additional impediments that require time to
understand and operate effectively within. Typically, the first year of an officer’s three-year
post is similar to a probationary time where the officer learns how to accomplish his or her

6. 6
work effectively. High turnover in each post makes it difficult for officers to embrace complexity
and produce effective initiatives that properly address the challenges to the U.S. mission.
Rather, the tendency is towards overly simplistic responses to challenges that unintentionally
discount better alternatives. While officers are given historical and cultural training prior to
arrival as well as throughout their tours, this does not adequately prepare officers to face the
dynamic political and economic environments they enter.
The problem of high turnover is exasperated by the frequent change in positions and
specialized cones within the Foreign Service. The current trend is toward generalists where, for
example, political officers may be encouraged to work in the economics section, or
management officers may work in the public affairs section. As with any policy, there are
advantages and disadvantages to this organizational policy. A positive effect of this policy is that
it encourages a wide range of thought that can be applied between disciplines. It can help
officers to apply different ways of thinking about challenges in their own expertise that have
perplexed them as well as allow officers to bring in expertise from their discipline’s way of
thinking to their current situation. However, this trend also makes the adjustment period that
much more difficult. An officer not only must adjust to a new location and the unique
challenges of that post, but also of a new section of the Foreign Service that he or she is likely
unfamiliar with.
Another consequence of the high turnover rate between posts is the creation of a
perverse incentive against long-term, sustainable projects. Naturally, the Foreign Service
engages in regular employee evaluations. These evaluations are essential for officers who are
applying for their next post. The evaluation is what determines promotions as well as the type

7. 7
of position an officer may apply for in the future. In a recent press release, the American
Foreign Service Association (AFSA) President, Ambassador Barbara Stephenson, described the
Foreign Service as an “up-or-out system” where officers who fail to move up are forced out of
the system (2017). This type of systemprovides strong incentives to produce demonstrable
successes.
However, due to the uniqueness of the Foreign Service, this also produces an incentive
to focus on short-term projects that may not appropriately address the issues the United States
faces in the long-term. With tours usually lasting no longer than three years, the employee
evaluations incentivize officers to provide concrete examples of projects they have
accomplished within that three-year period instead of the post’s long-term best interest.
Projects that are completed prior to transferring to another post typically lose momentum after
the officer departs and others come in with their own objectives.
Alternatives
Status Quo Alternative
The status quo alternative is an attractive option that calls for no major changes in
organizational structure or policies and maintains the many resulting benefits. Turnover among
posts helps prevent officers from losing loyalty to their home countries, an important attribute
for those seeking the interests of their home country abroad. It is natural for individuals to
begin sympathizing with the people of the country where they reside after making longer-term
connections. While this does not necessarily mean that developing connections with people of
a foreign country will result in treason, it does present a potential conflict of interest that can

8. 8
be difficult to decide between. Frequent transfers between posts helps mitigate these potential
conflicts of interest.
While many officers dream about comfortable posts such as Barbados or London or
Tokyo, there are also many posts that are much less attractive. For every Paris, there is also
Kabul or Djibouti or other areas that are not in high demand. As a way of establishing fairness,
the Foreign Service allows frequent movement where everyone can enjoy the benefits of living
in ideal locations but also share the burden of performing essential duties in hardship posts. It
creates an environment where local living conditions are balanced with career opportunities
and helps to prevent burnout. The Foreign Service seeks officers who wish to make a career out
of diplomacy rather than short-term commitments. Turnover between posts allows for
challenging and attractive opportunities for officers to make a career out of the Foreign Service.
What many officers found attractive about the Foreign Service was the opportunities to
travel around the world while doing worthwhile work. However, there are many important
positions in Washington, D.C. and elsewhere in the United States that also need to be filled. The
high turnover between posts allows for officers to switch between international and domestic
positions. A positive effect of requiring officers to complete a domestic tour is that it allows
officers to better understand the current domestic climate and how foreign policies have a
domestic impact.
While there are frequent rotations between posts, it is important to understand the
context of these turnovers. Rotations are on an individual basis and typically follow one of three
rotation periods throughout the year. This ensures that there is overlap between staff members
to maintain a certain level of continuity and expertise at any given moment. Additionally, civil

9. 9
servants typically stay at a post for longer periods and locally employed staff remain for even
longer periods. Also, having completed one tour at a post does not exclude officers from
returning to the same post for later tours. Although not perfect—creating its own sets of
issues—there are not usually significant levels of “brain drain” at the end of each tour due to a
staggered departure of experienced personnel.
Localized Expertise Alternative
The localized expertise alternative is an option that directly impacts both the lack of
post-specific expertise as well as the perverse incentives for short-term goals. This alternative
calls for longer tours—equivalent to tours of USAID officers—that enable officers to gather
country specific knowledge and develop richer relationships with strategic contacts. To
lengthen the average duration of a tour from two or three years to four or five years would
allow for the Foreign Service to retain much of what makes it attractive while also deepening
the understanding of local nuances.
One of the most beneficial impacts a longer tour would have would be to give time for
deeper relationships of trust to develop. Culbert and McDonough argue, “With trust and
trusting relationships imperfect plans can be made to work; without trust and trusting
relationships even the most perfectly conceived plans can fail” (1986, 171). Trust is not
something immediately established, but must be cultivated over time. With more time to
cultivate trust, a better working relationship can form that enables improved communication
and effectively executed plans.
Diplomats spend significant time learning multiple foreign languages throughout their
careers. An officer may spend months learning and trying to perfect their fluency in Mandarin

10. 10
while at the Foreign Service Institute in Arlington, Virginia and throughout their three-year tour
in China only to begin anew learning Russian for their next tour. This process is repeated
multiple times throughout a diplomat’s career. With so much time and so many resources
spent becoming proficient in a foreign language—especially a difficult foreign language—a
longer tour would make better use of the energy spent developing these skills. By extending the
duration of most tours, there is less demand for foreign language instruction—thus saving
additional training costs.
Foreign language is but one example of how high turnover costs can be reduced. Other
costs associated with turnover can also be reduced, such as time, salary, and other resources
such as on-the-job training. Allen (2008) argued that high turnover rates can become extremely
costly to organizations. One perk of the Foreign Service is that the substantial relocation costs
for officers are covered by the Department of State. Extending the average length of a tour
would reduce the costs associated with more frequent relocation.
Recommendations
I recommend that the Chief of Mission maintains the general structure of the Foreign
Service and institutes two changes to compensate for the adverse effects of high turnover and
perverse incentives to focus on short-term goals. The first change I recommend implementing is
to better empower locally employed staff members. The second change I recommend is to
establish long-term post-specific goals that work towards greater United States foreign policy
strategies.
In contrast to Foreign Service Officers who rotate between posts frequently, locally
employed staff remain in their post for years to provide stability and local expertise. They are

11. 11
essential to promoting the interests of the United States abroad—without which the
Department of State would fail in fulfilling its mission. As such, much can be done to empower
local staff to enable them to better advise and implement impactful U.S. foreign policy
initiatives. Local staff have intimate knowledge of local history and culture, as well as a better
sense for which embassy initiatives are likely to succeed and which are likely to fail.
Leadership at U.S. missions around the world understand and recognize the invaluable
contributions local staff provide and the bridges they build. However, utilizing their expertise
and insights depends in large part upon how willing incoming officers are to listen and heed
their advice. How likely an officer is to seek the advice of his or her local staff can be affected by
cultural misunderstandings and personality types. To better utilize locally employed staff, I
recommend creating a database that collects and disseminates lessons learned from both local
staff as well as Foreign Service Officers—a database similar to what the U.S. military uses.
Weber (2003) explained that a common problem of lessons learned systems in U.S. government
agencies is that the systems typically fail to be where they are needed at the time they are
needed. Through her empirical analysis, Weber demonstrated the usefulness of a “just-in-time”
information delivery approach that is embedded within a decision support systemsignificantly
and measurably improves performance.
A similar lessons learned system applied to each post will greatly reduce the negative
effects of high turnover by giving newly arrived officers a reference for lessons from previous
officers as well as local staff. This organized and easily navigable database would reduce the
adjustment period of officers and allow more effective work sooner as well as throughout each
tour as the need for valuable information arises. As Weber noted, simply having the lessons

12. 12
learned database available is insufficient in bettering the decision-making process of officers.
The monitored distribution approach Weber advocates “requires indexing lessons to the
decisions, tasks, and processes known to the DSS,” or decision support system (Weber 2003,
294).
The Foreign Service understands the importance of effective goal setting and has
understood this for many decades. However, this understanding has not always translated into
reality. Locke and Latham (2002) found in their 35-year research project that the mechanisms
that make goal setting effective are specificity and reasonable difficulty. However, Chun and
Rainey (2005) pointed out that the public sector in particular is prone to setting ambiguous
goals that are not conducive to effectiveness. Many theories have been proposed to explain
why this is so, the most salient being the political nature of goal setting in public
administrations (Perry and Porter 1982). For example, more specificity in goal setting and
better metrics to evaluate policies opens public administrators to political attacks.
The unique nature of the Foreign Service demands that foreign policy goals and
objectives be more ambiguous because it encompasses foreign relations with a wide array of
world governments in a variety of contexts. However, I recommend that more specific goals be
set and measured at the post level, allowing for the best level of specificity. Clearly established
and understood post-specific goals that are mission comprehensive, directive, evaluative, and
prioritized create an environment that encourage not only immediate but also sustainable,
long-term results (Chun and Rainey 2005). A deficiency of the current system is the perverse
incentive created by high turnover that encourages officers to focus on project completion

13. 13
within a three-year period. The creation of more specific post goals and objectives that reward
long-term thinking will attack the flaws of the current system.
Successful organizations create and update strategic plans to give them greater purpose
and direction. High-quality strategic planning at the level of each mission that focuses on goal
clarification can improve organizational performance (Chun and Rainey 2005). However,
strategic planning as developed for the private sector cannot be blindly applied to the public
sector nor do all public organizations face the same constraints and challenges (Radin 2000).
Bryson and Roering (1987) compare private-sector strategic analysis in the context of public-
sector planning and analyze how applicable and successful different conditions and
contingencies are in the public sector. By developing a high-quality strategic plan in each post,
the Foreign Service can be better equipped to overcome the challenges created by frequent
turnover.
Conclusion
The Foreign Service, a key component of the U.S. Department of State, functions as the
diplomatic arm of the United States overseas. Through this corps of highly-qualified diplomats,
the United States government advances its interests and works towards building and sustaining
a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world. The up-or-out system of the Foreign Service
and the high turnover rate between posts provides strong perverse incentives for officers to
demonstrate effective short-term initiatives. To mitigate these perverse incentives, I
recommend the creation of an effective lessons learned database that provides valuable
information when needed and that is easily navigable. I also recommend post-specific strategic
plans that avoid ambiguity but seek clarity. It is imperative that the post’s strategic plan include

14. 14
long-term goals with shorter-term objectives to reach those goals. A systemthat rewards long-
term, sustainable goals will enhance the overall effectiveness of U.S. foreign policies and better
advance U.S. interests.

15. 15
REFERENCES
Abbasi, Sami M., and Kenneth W. Hollman. 2000. “Turnover: The Real Bottom Line.” Public
Personnel Management 29, no.3 (Fall): 333-42. Accessed February 6, 2017.
http://www.dx.doi.org/10.1177/009102600002900303
Allen, David G. 2008. Retaining talent—A guide to analyzing and managing employee turnover.
Alexandria, VA: Society for Human Resource Management. Accessed February 5, 2017.
https://ch319.pbsmartmobile.com/public/sites/1399/2699/assets/bbf81e8b8f354289dc
9cc241237dfd94.pdf
Bryson, John M., and WilliamD. Roering. 1987. “Applying Private-Sector Strategic Planning in
the Public Sector.” Journal of the American Planning Association 53, no.1 (March): 9-22.
Accessed February 6, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01944368708976631
Chun, Young Han, and Hal G. Rainey. 2005. “Goal Ambiguity and Organizational Performance in
U.S. Federal Agencies.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Policy 15, no.4
(October): 529-57. Accessed on February 5, 2017.
https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mui030
Culbert, Samuel A., and John J. McDonough. 1986. “The Politics of Trust and Organization
Empowerment.” Public Administration Quarterly 10, no.2 (Summer): 171-88. Accessed
February 6, 2017. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40861307
Jung, Chan Su. 2012. “Why Are Goals Important in the Public Sector? Exploring the Benefits of
Goal Clarity for Reducing Turnover Intention.” Journal of Public Administration Research
and Policy 24, no.1 (January): 209-34. Accessed February 5, 2017.
https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mus058
Locke, Edwin A., and Gary P. Latham. 2002. “Building a practically useful theory of goal setting
and task motivation: A 35-year odyssey.” American Psychologist 57, no.9 (September):
705-17. Accessed February 7, 2017. http://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/0003-
066X.57.9.705
Parker, Pamela E. 2010. Staying Put. State Magazine, September.
Perry, James L., and Lyman W. Porter. 1982. “Factors affecting the context for motivation in
public organizations.” The Academy of Management Review 7, no.1 (January): 89-98.
Accessed February 7, 2017. http://www.dx.doi.org/10.5465/AMR.1982.4285475
Radin, Beryl A. 2000. “The Government Performance and Results Act and the tradition of
federal management reform: Square pegs in round holes?” Journal of Public

16. 16
Administration Research and Theory 10, no.1 (January): 111-35. Accessed February 8,
2017. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024260
Statement on Senior Personnel Changes at the Department of State. 2017. Accessed February
4, 2017. http://www.afsa.org/statement-senior-personnel-changes-department-state
U.S. Department of State. 2017a. “Mission.” What We Do—Mission. Accessed February 2, 2017.
https://careers.state.gov/learn/what-we-do/mission
U.S. Department of State. 2017b. “Organization.” What We Do—Organization. Accessed
February 2, 2017. https://careers.state.gov/learn/what-we-do/mission
Weber, Rosina O. 2003. “Intelligent delivery of military lessons learned.” Decision Support
Systems 34, no.3 (February): 287-304. Accessed February 8, 2017.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-9236(02)00122-7