Dissertation

LLB Dissertation in Law – Lewis J F Smith
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EDINBURGH LAW SCHOOL
Media Pluralism in the United Kingdom:
Does the Existing Regulatory Framework Adequately Prevent
Undue Political Influence and Support A Diverse Media
Environment?
Lewis James Fraser Smith
9,998 Words

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
To my parents,
For their constant support throughout my time at school and university.
And to my supervisor, Dr Rachael Craufurd Smith,
For inspiring me to write this dissertation on a topic of great interest to me, and for
her efforts in supervising my work.

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CHAPTER I – AN INTRODUCTION 4
⇒ The Importance of Media Pluralism 5
⇒ The Need for Policy in Relation to Plurality 6
⇒ Aims and Objectives of this Dissertation 8
CHAPTER II – A SUMMARY OF THE UK REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 9
⇒ The 20/20 Rule 9
⇒ The Public Interest Test 9
CHAPTER III – PROCEDURAL ISSUES 12
⇒ General Approach and the Periodic Plurality Review 12
⇒ Decision-Making Power 14
CHAPTER IV – MEASURE MEDIA PLURALITY: SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES 20
⇒ Coherent Objectives in Assessing Plurality 20
⇒ Scope 25
⇒ Online Content and Digital Intermediaries 28
⇒ Metrics 34
CHAPTER V – CONCLUSION 41
⇒ Summary and Closing Remarks 41
BIBLIOGRAPHY 43

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CHAPTER I
AN INTRODUCTION
The need to protect media pluralism in the UK has been acknowledged since the
1940s, and has often led to tension between regulating to promote this concept and
maintaining the integrity and freedom of the media.1
In the late 1990s, the
Government was committed to deregulating media ownership in favour of relying
primarily on competition law to address plurality concerns.2
This was justified by the
argument that technological developments were reducing the need for regulation, but
also by the government’s desire to have large UK media firms compete
internationally.3
However, a Joint Committee, chaired by film producer Lord
Puttnam, voiced concern over deregulation of this kind, and insisted competition law
was not designed to adequately protect media plurality.4
This eventually led to the
introduction of the media public interest test in the Enterprise Act 2002.5
In 2014, the
House of Lords Select Committee on Communications (“Select Committee”)
published its review of the framework.6
This dissertation analyses the current UK media plurality framework and
discusses areas for reform. However, there are some initial points to address. This
chapter will explain the concept of “media pluralism”, the reasons for market
intervention in preserving media plurality, and the aims and objectives of this
dissertation. For clarification, “Pluralism” will refer to a value concept that places
multiplicity and diversity in ideas and institutions on a moral pedestal, while
“plurality” refers to the empirical fact of plurality.7
1
R Craufurd Smith and D Tambini, ‘Measuring Media Plurality in the United Kingdom: Policy
Choices and Regulatory Challenges’, Journal of Media Law, 4(1), 35-63 (2012), 35.
2
R Craufurd Smith (2013). ”Bright-Line Versus Responsive Regulation: Some Thoughts From the
United Kingdom”, In: Valcke, Peggy, Sükösd, Miklos & Picard, Robert (eds.), Media Pluralism:
Concepts, Risks and Global Trends, Palgrave, 312.
3
Smith and Tambini, ibid, 41.
4
Joint Committee (House of Lords and Commons) on Draft Communications Bill, Report (2002), HL
169–1/HC 876–1, vol. 1.
5
Enterprise Act 2002, s 58; C Arnott, ‘Media Mergers and the Meaning of Sufficient Plurality: A Tale
of Two Acts’ (2010) 2 Journal of Media Law 245, 256.
6
House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, Media Plurality, 1st
Report of Session 2013-
14, 4 February 2014.
7
K Karpinnen, ‘Rethinking Media Pluralism’ (USA: Fordham University Press, 2013), 3-4.

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Media Pluralism
Karpinnen considered media pluralism to be “the broad belief that the media ought to
reflect different interests, values and cultures in society, and provide public access to
the widest possible range of voices.”8
The concept is multi-dimensional and there is a
wealth of variances of pluralism that could be mentioned, but there are two clear
central aspects.9
The quantitative aspect concerns the structure of the media in terms
of the number of sources or voices, and the qualitative aspect concerns the diversity in
content within the media.10
These could also be referred to as external/structural and
internal/content pluralism respectively, with the former considered a means of
achieving the latter.11
Similarly, a European Commission study gave a broad
definition of pluralism as “the diversity of media supply, use and distribution, in
relation to 1) ownership and control, 2) media types and genres, 3) political
viewpoints, 4) cultural expressions and 5) local and regional interests.”12
This
separates the concept into two dimensions. Firstly, the former two elements are the
“operational” dimensions of media pluralism; concerning the structural making of the
media – the quantitative aspect. Secondly, the “normative” dimensions, the latter
three elements, concern media content goals – the qualitative aspect – to be achieved
through the means of the operational dimensions.13
While there is no explicit definition in UK legislation, the Enterprise Act notes
the need for a “sufficient plurality of persons with control of the media”.14
Furthermore, Ofcom defines the desired outcomes of a plural market as ensuring a
diversity of viewpoints available and consumed across the media.15
This reflects the
notion that a commitment to the quantitative aspect can result in achievement of the
qualitative aspects. However, Ofcom also places importance on preventing undue
8
Ibid, 4.
9
K Lefever, E Wauters, P Valcke, ‘Media Pluralism in the EU – Comparative analysis of
measurements system in Europe and US’, Steunpunt Media, 19 July 2013, 6.
10
Ibid.
11
Smith and Tambini, supra n 1, 36.
12
ICRI et al. (2009). Independent Study on Indicators for Media Pluralism in the Member States –
Towards a Risk-Based Approach, retrieved from
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/media_taskforce/pluralism/study/index_en.htm.
13
Lefever et al, supra n 9, 6-7.
14
Enterprise Act 2002, s 58(2C)(a) (Inserted by the Communications Act 2003, s 375).
15
DCMS, Government Response to the House of Lords Select Committee on Communications Report
into Media Plurality, 6 August 2014, 8.

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political influence by any one media owner or voice,16
demonstrating a commitment
also to political pluralism. It is therefore clear that defining bodies stress the
importance of the quantitative and qualitative aspects of pluralism.
The Need for Policy in Relation to Plurality
This section will summarise the case for market intervention to preserve media
plurality and explain why competition law is inadequate for such purposes.
Market intervention for protecting media plurality is warranted according to
the European Court of Human Rights17
and there are two main justifications for a UK
plurality policy. Firstly, it can ensure media enterprises do not have undue influence
over political opinion, as they control flow of information to the public.18
Media
ownership concentration can result in enterprises owning a substantial section of the
market, which they can use to disseminate their preferred news and political
viewpoints. This affects how individuals make political, social and economic
decisions, and the political process can be undermined if individuals cannot
adequately make informed voting decisions.19
Furthermore, ties to certain politicians
or corporations, can result in media bias amongst owners of substantial parts of the
market.20
This is epitomised in the UK,21
where such relationships may have even
influenced policy.22
These suspicions, at the very least, diminish trust in the
democratic process.23
Therefore, measures to reduce the potential for media influence
in politics are justified and media plurality policy can ensure a healthy democratic
process.
16
Ibid.
17
App No 13936/02, Manole and Others v Moldova, judgment of September 2009, para 100.
18
Smith and Tambini, Supra n 1, 36-7.
19
S Krasa and M Polborn, ‘Political Polarisation and the Electoral Effects of Media Bias’ Journal of
Public Economics 92, (2008), 1092.
20
CE Baker, ‘Viewpoint Diversity and Media Ownership’, Federal Communications Commission Law
Journal, 656-7; J Smith, ‘Monsanto Forced Fox TV to Censor Coverage of Dangerous Milk Drug’
Huffington Post, 13 April 2009; EC Schwartz, Conflicts of Interest: How Media Pluralism Protects
Democracy and Human Rights, 2010, http://gradworks.umi.com/3423027.pdf.
21
J Ball, ‘The Conservatives’ Contact with News International’ The Guardian ‘Datablog’, 27 July
2011; H Mulholland, ‘Cameron Refuses to Deny Discussing BSkyB Bid with News International’ The
Guardian, 20 July 2011;
22
A Grice, ‘Blair Says He Wasn’t Too Close to Murdoch. I Disagree’ The Independent, 28 July 2011;
S Barnett and J Townend, ‘‘And What Good Came of it at Last?’ Press-Politician Relations Post-
Leveson’ The Political Quarterly, Vol. 85, No. 2 (2014), 166 (citing David Cameron’s written
evidence to the Leveson Inquiry and private text messages of Jeremy Hunt also disclosed in the
Inquiry).
23

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Secondly, media plurality policy can ensure a “multiplicity of sources”, which
is argued to best ensure adequate support of a diverse media by positively enhancing
the dissemination of information and ideas.24
This has been countered by evidence
suggesting that increased market concentration could lead to a greater diversity in
content, with large media organisations better equipped to fulfill all interests in
society.25
However, these are not grounds for ending market intervention when there
is sufficient evidence supporting its efficacy.26
It is a well-maintained principle that,
while not compelling any citizens to consume information from a diversity of sources
and opinions, the Government should seek to promote the availability of such a range
of sources for consumption.27
Both Lord Leveson and the Select Committee agreed
with this principle,28
with the latter discussing further why it is not adequate to leave
the concerns of media plurality to the governance of competition law.
Competition law concerns itself with economic interests, making it “separate
but parallel” from plurality policy in the sense that there may be instances that satisfy
plurality concerns but not competition concerns and vice versa.29
It is thus crucial for
media ownership to be governed by a plurality policy that concerns democratic, social
and cultural benefits explicitly, so to ensure the attainment of such benefits.
Aims and Objectives
Market intervention for preventing undue political influence of media owners and
ensuring a diversity of media content is therefore widely accepted. But is the existing
framework adequate for these purposes? This dissertation will analyse and evaluate
the UK’s current regulatory framework with a view to answering this question.
Following a summary of the framework in Chapter II, there will be a critique of its
adequacy. Chapter III will discuss procedural issues, including the need for a periodic
24
Ibid; R Craufurd Smith, ‘Media Ownership and the Public Interest: The Case of Virgin Media,
British Sky Broadcasting and its ITV Shares’, Journal of Media Law, 1 (2009), 21.
25
P Steiner, ‘Program Patterns and the Workability of Competition in Radio Broadcasting’ Quarterly
Journal of Economics LXVI (1952) 194.
26
Smith and Tambini, supra n 1, 39-40; J Waldfogel, ‘Station Ownership and the Provision of
Consumption of Radio News’, FCC Media Ownership Study 5, 6 June 2011; L Hitchens,
Broadcasting, Pluralism and Diversity: A Comparative Study of Policy and Regulation (Hart
Publishing, 2006) 302.
27
DCMS, supra, n 15, 8.
28
The Right Hon. LJ Leveson, The Leveson Inquiry into the Culture Practice and Ethics of the Press:
Executive Summary, 29 November 2012, 29; Select Committee, supra n 6, 8.
29
Select Committee, ibid, 9-10 (quoting Robin Foster and Prof. Martin Cave).

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plurality review and the question of who should hold decision-making powers in the
existing framework. Chapter IV will discuss the framework’s substantive issues,
including the need for coherent objectives in assessing plurality, the extent of scope,
the inclusion of online content and digital intermediaries, and the metrics adequate for
measuring media plurality. Chapter V will conclude with a summary of the findings.

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CHAPTER II
UK REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: A SUMMARY
The 20/20 Rule
Under the Communications Act 2003, there are fixed ownership limits preventing
mergers involving a 20% or greater market share in the newspaper sector and a
Channel 3 service licence.30
It includes the prohibition of newspaper proprietors with
20% market share or greater from also holding more than a 20% interest in a
corporation holding a Channel 3 license.31
These limits are collectively known as “the
20/20 rule”. In additional, there is the “public interest test”.
The Public Interest Test
This is a broad plurality assessment of the UK media for mergers, including cross-
media,32
The Enterprise Act provides that the relevant Secretary of State may
intervene, with notice to the Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”), in a
merger situation where there are public interest considerations relevant to that
merger.33
These considerations, for newspaper mergers, are the need for accurate
presentation of news, free expression of opinion and a sufficient plurality of views
where reasonable and practicable.34
The considerations for broadcasting and cross-
media mergers are the need for a sufficient plurality of persons controlling media
enterprises serving UK audiences, for a wide range of broadcasting of general high
quality and appealing to a wide variety of interests, and for persons in control of
media enterprises to be genuinely committed to the broadcasting standards in s 319 of
the Communications Act 2003.35
30
Communications Act 2003, Sch 14, Pt 1.
31
Ibid, Para 2(1).
32
This resulted in the abolition of the Fair Trading Act 1973 newspaper regulations – E Barendt et al.,
Media Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Pearson Education Ltd, Edinburgh 2014), 283; Public interest
test incorporated into Enterprise Act 2002 by Communications Act 2003, ss 375(1), 411(2)(3).
33
Enterprise Act 2002, s 42(1)(a), (2) (for the purpose of clarity, the CMA was substituted into the
2002 Act by Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 c. 24 Sch 5(2) para 82(2) to replace the
Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission).
34
Enterprise Act 2002, s 58(2A),(2B) (added by the Communications Act 2003, s 375(1)).
35
Ibid, s 58(2C).

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Intervention can only occur where the UK turnover of the enterprise being
taken over exceeds £70m or where the merger results in a 25% or more holding in
media supply across all, or a substantial part of, the UK.36
The Secretary may also
give “special intervention notice” in a “special merger situation”, where one of the
merging parties holds a 25% share of supply “of any description” in broadcasting or
newspapers, or where this share is created or increased by the merger.37
The notice
instigates investigations and reports by the CMA38
and Ofcom39
on the competition
aspects and media public interest aspects respectively.40
Upon receiving the reports,
the Secretary of State, bound by the CMA’s findings on competition issues and with
consideration of Ofcom’s public interest findings, may refer the merger to the chair of
the CMA for further investigation if it is adverse to the public interest.41
The CMA
then investigates further and presents a report to the Secretary of State,42
who chooses
whether or not to make an “adverse public interest finding”.43
If such a finding is
made, the Secretary may do what is reasonable and practicable to prevent any effects
adverse to the public interest.44
The Secretary of State may also give a “European intervention notice” where
the merger involves European Community competition issues, which are dealt with
by the European Commission.45
However, the EC Merger Regulation allows the UK
discretion to review mergers where it concerns legitimate interests,46
including the
public interest consideration of media plurality.
There may be other “exceptional circumstances” in which the Secretary may
intervene in mergers already caught by ownership rules or mergers never caught by
ownership rules,47
such as where a large number of news or educational channels
36
Ibid, s 23(1) & s 23(2)(b), (3).
37
Ibid, s 59(2), (3), (3C), (3D).
38
Ibid, s 44(2).
39
Ibid, s 44A(1)(b), (2).
40
Ibid, ss 44(3)(a) & 44A(3)(a) respectively.
41
Ibid, s 45(2)-(7); Enterprise Act 2002, Explanatory Notes, para 160.
42
Ibid, s 50.
43
Ibid, s 54.
44
Ibid, s 55.
45
Ibid, s 67(1)(a)(ii), (2) & s 68; an example of this in practice is the News Corp/BSkyB case: European
Commission (2010), Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.5932 – News
Corp/BSkyB). OJ (2011) C 37/5.
46
Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), (2004) OJ L24/1, art 21(4).
47
DTI, Enterprise Act 2002: Public Interest Intervention in Media Mergers – Guidance on the
operation of the public interest merger provisions relating to newspaper and other media mergers,
May 2004, para 8.8.

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come under single control.48
Where a party is dissatisfied by the Secretary’s decision,
they can appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), and, following that, the
Court of Appeal or Court of Session in Scotland.49
Chapter III will now discuss the plurality framework’s procedural issues and
where there is scope for improvement.
48
Ibid, para 8.8.
49
Barendt et al., supra n 33, 284.

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CHAPTER III
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
This chapter will consider procedural concerns and opportunities for possible reform
regarding the instrumental approach and the allocation of decision-making power in
the media plurality test.
Instrumental Approach and the Periodic Plurality Review
The first issue for consideration is the instrumental approach, i.e. should the broad
plurality assessment be maintained or are bright-line fixed ownership limits
sufficiently adequate?
The public interest test is “a ‘holistic’ multi-factor analysis of market
conditions” seeking to provide a “sophisticated indicator of media power and
potential influence”.50
Yet in achieving the public interest objectives of the
framework, it is important that there is a balance between the interests of the public
and those of the industry.51
The public interest test has been criticised as time-
consuming,52
costly and affording too much discretion to the decision-maker,53
and
some suggest that there is a need, where possible, to make the regulatory process clear
and understandable for industry members.54
Fixed ownership limits, such as the 20/20
rule, while not so sophisticated, give certainty and expedience to regulation, and
prevent forms of agency capture, which could justify scrapping plurality assessments
in their favour.
However, this would take away from the sophistication and proportionality of
the current process,55
which targets more accurately genuine plurality concerns in
media mergers through multi-factor assessments, thus giving clear justification for
market intervention. In matters of public interest, it is more appropriate to have a
complex regulatory system that is proportionate and justifies intervention, rather than
simple bright-line regulation based on arbitrary limits.
50
51
Ibid, 55.
52
Smith, supra n 25; Arnott, supra n 5.
53
54
Ibid, 55.
55
Ibid, 55.

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Another option is to set thresholds, which if triggered and the merger was
found inconsistent with the public interest, would place a burden on the merging
enterprises to rebut the finding with countervailing factors.56
This is the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) approach, and Arnott similarly argues
merging firms should have the burden of demonstrating plurality will not be
resultantly affected.57
But this would be advantageous for larger firms who will have
more resources to present a stronger case,58
thus leading to an unfair system for
smaller firms that may be merging exactly because of a lack of resources. For these
reasons, broad plurality assessment under the public interest test is the most
appropriate mechanism.
The framework’s costly and time-consuming nature can be resolved through
the introduction of a periodic plurality review, undertaken by Ofcom every 4-5 years,
as endorsed by the Select Committee.59
The Dutch Media Authority publishes an
annual report on its media landscape and media concentration, with pluralism issues
examined on an incidental basis,60
but has suggested a similar approach to the
periodic plurality review.61
This would allow for merger reviews to be streamlined by
offering reports to which Ofcom may refer for plurality assessments. A well-
articulated plurality report would also allow an element of consistency and
understanding, with media enterprises knowing the UK’s state of media plurality to
understand whether a merger would be intervened. This report would also capture
plurality concerns that arise otherwise than through mergers or acquisitions, such as
organic growth of an enterprise.62
An example of this is people changing how they
consume news, such as by moving from newspapers to tablet, which can affect
plurality.63
It has been argued that technological innovation necessitates a framework
that regularly monitors for the purposes of addressing organic growth.64
This would
allow the framework to capture all risks to plurality, and not simply those arising from
56
Ibid, 56-7.
57
Arnott, supra n 5, 247.
58
59
Select Committee, supra n 6, paras 153, 196.
60
Lefever et al, supra n 9, 43; Commissariaat Voor De Media (CvdM), About the Media Monitor,
http://www.mediamonitor.nl/content.jsp?objectid=11620.
61
Commissariaat Voor De Media, Mediamonitor: The Dutch Media in 2010, February 2011,
www.mediamonitor.nl/dsresource?objectid=11689&type=org, 90.
62
Smith and Tambini, supra n 1, 58-9; Ofcom, Ofcom’s report on measuring media plurality, June
2012, para 5.59-5.65; R Foster, ‘News Plurality in a Digital World’, Reuters Institue, July 2012, 13.
63
Ofcom, 6 June 2012, in House of Lords Select Committee Report, para 153.
64
R Craufurd Smith, ‘Is the Media Plurality Test Fit for Purpose?’ (2011).

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mergers, and further better takes account of technological developments. The
framework would be more adequate if it included a periodic plurality review.
There is still the issue of agency capture, and ensuring that the right person has
decision-making power. Therefore, we will now consider the question of allocating
decision-making power in the public interest test.
Decision-Making Power
The matter of who should yield decision-making power in the framework has become
a prominent consideration in the debate for reform.65
A number of proposals and
recommendations have been made as to who should be the decision-maker, including
the Secretary of State, an independent regulator (e.g., Ofcom), various hybrid options
and a plurality commission.66
The focus here will remain on whether the Secretary or
Ofcom should make the decisions, as this discussion generates the strongest debate.
i. Secretary of State
In the current public interest test, the Secretary must make numerous decisions:
whether or not to make an intervention notice, triggering a report on plurality issues
from Ofcom; following the Ofcom report, whether or not to refer the matter to the
CMA; whether or not to make a finding that the merger is against the public interest;
and, upon advice from the CMA, whether or not to impose any remedies and, if so,
what remedies.67
In the event of a periodic review process, the only decision relevant
to this issue is that which would be made at the end of a plurality assessment,68
for
example, ordering divestiture.
Criticisms of the Secretary’s allocation of decision-making power can be
summarised poignantly by the News Corp/Sky bid,69
when then Business Secretary
65
Barnett and Townend, supra n 23; Smith and Tambini, supra n 1; Ofcom, ‘Measuring media
plurality, Supplementary advice to the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport and the Leveson
Inquiry,’ 5 Oct 2012;
66
Select Committee, supra n 6, 50-53.
67
Ofcom, ‘Measuring media plurality, Supplementary advice to the Secretary of State for Culture,
Media and Sport and the Leveson Inquiry,’ 5 Oct 2012, 16.
68
Ibid, 17.
69
This was the acquisition of shares in Sky by News Corp to make them soul shareholder of the
broadcaster.

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Vince Cable MP responsible for decision-making.70
Cable made clear in the Leveson
Inquiry that his decision was based on political considerations, as he believed Rupert
Murdoch’s political influence through News Corp had become disproportionate.71
Cable, a Liberal Democrat in the Coalition Government, was replaced after being
recorded by the Daily Telegraph saying he had “declared war on Mr. Murdoch”.72
This suggests that elected politicians are too vulnerable to political tensions and bias
that may result in poor judgment and wrongful decision-making regarding public-
interest concerns. Cable could be criticised for having demonstrated bias, since News
Corp newspapers conventionally maintained views consistent with conservatism and
the Conservative Party.
However, Jeremy Hunt, Cable’s replacement, conjures similar criticisms but
for different reasons. It was suggested that Hunt was influenced by his relationship
with News Corp’s James Murdoch, to whom Hunt sent text messages indicating his
strong support for the merger under his review.73
There was further evidence adding
to these suspicions, such as Hunt’s political aide’s friendship with News UK74
chief
lobbyist Frederic Michel,75
PM Cameron’s relationship with News International chief
executive Rebekah Brookes,76
and other stories of close connections between News
Corp and political parties.77
The framework therefore had the potential to become
“politically toxic and vulnerable to prejudice”.78
This demonstrates how the
Secretary’s judgment can be clouded by relationships with prominent media figures
70
Jeremy Hunt MP, then Culture Secretary, would later replace him – S Kimberley, ‘Jeremy Hunt
assumes Vince Cable’s media responsibilities’, MediaWeek, 22 December 2010:
http://www.mediaweek.co.uk/article/1047475/jeremy-hunt-assumes-vince-cables-media-
responsibilities.
71
Barnett and Townend, supra n 23, 165 (quoting Vince Cable’s written evidence to the Leveson
Inquiry).
72
P Wintour, ‘Humiliated Vince Cable stripped of Sky role after ‘war with Murdoch’ gaffe’, The
Guardian, 21 December 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/dec/21/vince-cable-war-
murdoch-gaffe.
73
Barnett and Townend, supra n 23, 166.
74
News Corp’s UK subsidiary company is fully titled News Corp UK & Ireland Limited, formerly
known as News International and NI Group.
75
Daniel Bentley, ‘Jeremy Hunt aide Adam Smith quits over News Corp link’, The Independent, 25
April 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-hunt-aide-adam-smith-quits-over-
news-corp-link-7678401.html; ‘Jeremy Hunt to make statement to Parliament as aide resigns over
BSkyB row’, The Telegraph, 25 April 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/leveson-
inquiry/9225369/Jeremy-Hunt-to-make-statement-to-Parliament-as-aide-resigns-over-BSkyB-
row.html.
76
77
Ball, supra n 22; Grice, supra n 23..
78

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and their own political biases, and gives justification for allocating decision-making
power elsewhere.
Furthermore, Cable disclosed to the Leveson Inquiry of instances that News
Corp representatives had inappropriately approached his colleagues during the merger
review, which invoked fear that an adverse decision against News Corp would result
in their newspapers persecuting the Liberal Democrats.79
This demonstrates the
inappropriateness of politicians holding decision-making power, as powerful media
companies can use their position as influential on public opinion as a scare tactic to
ensure decisions are conducive to their aims. While Ofcom remain neutral on the
matter, they noted that the current system might result in politicisation of the
process.80
Even if these suspicions are considered unsubstantiated, they diminish trust in
the system to adequately deal with the public-interest concerns regarding media
mergers and it is clear that decision-making power should be allocated to another
body. Hunt welcomed this debate and the potential for “someone … out of the
political fray” to be allocated responsibility.81
However, Cable maintains his belief
that these public interest decisions are too important and must stay with an elected
official.82
It could be that the media’s prominent role in a democratic society is such that
the significance of these public interest decisions justifies their resolution being
decided by secretaries of state.83
Leveson concurred, arguing that the Secretary should
be required to publish fully reasons for not adopting Ofcom’s recommendations for
any given merger and that Ministers should “be capable of putting any irrelevant
considerations to one side.”84
However, this is essentially the existing regulatory
framework,85
and, as has been demonstrated, prior events suggest the incapability of
79
Ibid, 166.
80
Ofcom, supra n 68, 17.
81
J Hunt, Boldness be my friend (2011),
http://www.culture.gov.uk/news/ministers_speeches/8428.aspx.
82
P Wintour, ‘Vince Cable and Jeremy Hunt split over handling of future media takeovers’ The
Guardian, 1 June 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/jun/01/cable-hunt-media-takeover-
clash.
83
D Reader, ‘Ofcom: A Credible Solution to Bias in Media Public Interest Mergers?’, Competition
Policy Blog, https://competitionpolicy.wordpress.com/2014/02/16/ofcom-a-credible-solution-to-bias-
in-media-public-interest-mergers/; Chris Dawes, ‘Media Plurality in the UK: Where Do We Go From
Here’, LSE Media Policy Project Blog, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2014/08/18/media-
plurality-in-the-uk-where-do-we-go-from-here/.
84
Leveson, supra n 29, Executive Summary, para 143.
85
Select Committee, supra n 6, quoting Robin Foster

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Ministers to put irrelevant considerations aside. Furthermore, this notion that the
importance of public interest decisions is such that only elected representatives should
make them could be countered by the example of the Judiciary’s role in privacy and
defamation cases, involving public interest decisions regularly. Therefore,
reallocating decision-making power away from the Secretary would be justified and
acceptable.
ii. Ofcom
Many argue that a specialist, independent body “insulated from political influence”,86
such as Ofcom, is most suitable for the role. This would maintain the framework’s
integrity; with judicial review still a possibility to safeguard against potential for
wrongful decision-making.87
The Select Committee, proposed this approach, which
would afford Ofcom the power to intervene in media mergers, triggering the CMA’s
competition assessment and Ofcom’s plurality assessment. Where there is conflict
between assessments, the Ofcom Board would balance the considerations of each to
come to a final decision.88
However, Reader suggests this may lead to Ofcom having a conflict of interest
in being responsible for the plurality assessment and balancing the two assessments
where they conflict.89
To resolve this, the Select Committee proposed that Ofcom
Board members responsible for decision-making should not be involved in the
plurality assessment and should always be aware of potential for judicial review.90
This could prevent Ofcom from holding any bias in the balancing act. Furthermore,
the Ofcom Board would be less susceptible to undue media influence, due to being in
greater numbers, making it harder for direct lobbying.91
They would also avoid
pressure from interested parties, with their position not being subject to any election.92
Reader’s strongest point is that Ofcom is susceptible to bias because of its
associations with the media industry, with six of nine current Ofcom Board members
being past industry workers.93
It is difficult to perceive the level of risk this would
86
Barendt et al., supra n 33.
87
88
Select Committee, supra n 6, 59-63.
89
Reader, supra n 84.
90
Select Committee, supra n 6, 62.
91
Reader, supra n 84.
92
Ibid.
93
Ibid.

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realistically create, but a suitable remedy would be to reduce the number of industry
workers to create a more proportionate split. Furthermore, when balancing two
assessments, Ofcom’s rationale for the decision should be published and set at a high
standard for the sake of transparency and proportionality.
Allocating responsibility to Ofcom would also simplify the procedural route of
merger interventions. It was argued that the Sky/ITV case highlighted the complexity
of the process, with a number of bodies making inputs, including Ofcom, the
Competition Commission (“CC”), the Secretary, the CAT, and the Court of Appeal.94
Therefore, making Ofcom responsible for decision-making is most appropriate
because there would be a smaller risk of bias and political pressures. Furthermore,
judicial review would still be maintained as a possibility so to ensure decisions are
always made to the highest of standards.
iii. Decision-making in periodic plurality reviews
The Select Committee’s proposal varies slightly regarding the periodic plurality
review. The Committee proposes Ofcom would have the power to order divestiture,
yet the final report would require approval of the Secretary of State, who could revise
it and suggest amendments to Ofcom before making a final decision.95
This would set
the bar high for instances in which Ofcom ordered enterprises to divest and would
ensure political accountability for the findings of the report.96
Craufurd-Smith
explains the “unprecedented leverage” this would allow government over the media,
and enterprises would lobby and seek to ensure their media services avoided
controversy in the plurality review.97
Therefore, the system to remain coherent and
Ofcom should also be decision-maker for these reviews, as periodic reviews offer no
difference in circumstances to justify otherwise.
94
95
Select Committee, supra n 6, para 219.
96
Ibid, para 220.
97
R Craufurd Smith, ‘Lords’ Media Plurality Report is Potential Road Map’, 5 February 2014, Media
Policy Project Blog, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2014/02/05/rachael-craufurd-smith-
lords-media-plurality-report-is-potential-road-map/.

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CHAPTER IV
MEASURING MEDIA PLURALITY:
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
This chapter will consider the substantive issues arising within the current framework
and plurality assessment. Firstly, it will address legislative inconsistencies regarding
the public interest test and analyse approaches for assessing “sufficient plurality”.
Secondly, it will consider the scope of plurality assessments, including content genres
that should be captured and the inclusion of retail and wholesale providers. Thirdly, it
will separately consider the matter of online content and digital intermediaries, owing
to its significance in the convergence era. Finally, it will consider what metrics are
most appropriate for measuring media plurality. Before continuing, the matter of
guidance for media public interest tests should be addressed. This agrees with the
format of the DTI guidance,98
which is preferred to legislation to allow it to adapt to
changes arising in the media, particularly in the context of digital media.
Coherent Objectives in Assessing Plurality
i. Legislative Inconsistencies
The first issue regards the objectives of the public interest test under the Enterprise
Act when considering a merger. These vary depending on the media sector. In the
event of a print merger, the focus is on its impact on accuracy, freedom of expression
and content diversity.99
Yet mergers involving broadcasting companies focus on
content and source diversity, as well as high quality content and an upholding of
content standards as required under the Communications Act 2003.100
The question is, why the different criteria? The decision to not include the
concern of undue concentration of sources in the print sector seems arbitrary and is
argued to be symptomatic of an incoherent approach to merger reviews.101
A focus on
content diversity indeed addresses the need to ensure a sufficient range of viewpoints
and opinions are available.102
However, this does not address the need to limit the
98
DTI, supra n 48.
99
Enterprise Act 2002, s 58(2A), (2B).
100
Ibid, s 58(2C).
101
Smith, supra n 65.
102
Ibid.

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undue accumulation of influence by media owners, which requires more than a focus
on content diversity, including in the print media.103
The legislation should be amended to create a more consistent and coherent
approach that ensures all concerns are addressed in all kinds of media mergers.
Otherwise, the framework fails to adequately protect media plurality by allowing
threats against it to go unnoticed. This will bring more integrity to the framework as
the provisions currently have “the potential to operate in a random and partial manner,
undermining public confidence in their application.”104
Amendments should ensure
all concerns underpinning ownership regulation are clearly articulated and should
include: the need for a sufficient plurality of persons controlling media enterprises
serving those audiences; the need for a sufficient plurality of views and opinions
serving those audiences; and a commitment to accuracy, particularly in news content,
and freedom of expression.105
Ofcom already separately regulates compliance with
the Ofcom Code under the Communications Act 2003 in the audiovisual context, and
thus it seems unnecessary for its further mention in the public interest test.106
This
would allow for greater focus in the plurality test, and overall these amendments
would clarify the basis for market intervention in all relevant mergers.
ii. Assessing “Sufficient Plurality”
There are also contradictions regarding interpretation of “sufficient plurality”, as
demonstrated in Sky/ITV, with the debate reaching the Court of Appeal.107
This led to
a difference in approach amongst the various bodies. I will now discuss these
differences and establish the most appropriate interpretation of sufficient plurality in
the public interest test.
Sky/ITV concerned the 2006 purchase of 17.9% shareholding in the
broadcaster ITV by British Sky Broadcasting (“Sky”), making Sky the leading
shareholder of ITV.108
This merger was thus just short of the necessary interest to be
caught by the 20/20 rule.109
The aforementioned objectives of the framework are to
103
Ibid.
104
105
Ibid.
106
Ibid.
107
British Sky Broadcasting Group plc, Virgin Media Inc v Competition Commission, The Secretary of
State for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2010] EWCA Civ 2, [2010] 2 All ER 90.
108
Ofcom, Report for the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 44A of the Enterprise Act 2002 of
British Sky Broadcasting plc’s acquisition of 17.9% shareholding in ITV plc, 27 April 2007.
109
Communications Act 2003, Sch 14, Pt I, Para 2(1).

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prevent undue political influence of media enterprises and support a diverse media
environment. Yet, when the case was referred to the CC, they prioritized the need for
diversity of content.110
The CC therefore considered only internal plurality and
allowed the merger, at the expense external plurality, because it did not enhance
BSkyB’s control over ITV’s editorial decisions to an extent that it affected their
provision of news.111
The Court of Appeal confirmed this “internal plurality” test.112
It was argued that the test provided direct evidence of the practical implications of
how editorial decision-making is influenced.113
This was claimed an adequate
plurality assessment, and intervention was not necessary.
Eventually Sky was ordered to divest and reduce the stake to 7.5% on
competition grounds, but Sky thus remains the leading shareholder of ITV.114
This
has worrying implications for plurality because if the News Corp/Sky merger had
succeeded, making News Corp sole owner of Sky, News Corp thus would have
become ITV’s leading shareholder.115
This undue influence over the news agenda is
precisely what the plurality framework aims to prevent, as made clear by Lord
Puttnam in Parliament.116
There are two reasons why the internal plurality test is
unsatisfactory.
Firstly, it is nonsensical to suggest that the largest shareholder in an enterprise
consisting of fragmented shareholdings would not have sufficient editorial
influence.117
Furthermore, evidence suggests that shareholder activism is
predominantly carried out through private intervention rather than through
shareholder proposals and meetings,118
which competition theory also recognises.119
This makes the approach all the more ironic, given that it seems to be based on a
110
Competition Commission, Report on the Acquisition by British Sky Broadcasting Group plc of
17.9% of the Shares in ITV plc, 14 December 2007, para 5.10.
111
Ibid, paras 5.15 and 5.73-5.74.
112
BSkyB v Competition Commission, supra n 108, 109.
113
Arnott, supra n 5, 251; BSkyB v Competition Commission, supra n 108, 91.
114
Arnott, ibid, 248; Smith and Tambini, supra n 1, 43,
115
Arnott, ibid, 248.
116
Lord Puttnam, Hansard HL vol 650 col 911 (2 July 2003).
117
Ofcom, Summary of Evidence to CC at hearings on 26 June 2007 and 18 July 2007, [21]-[22]:
www.competition-commission.org.uk/inquiries/ref2007/itv/pdf/hearing_summary_ofcom.pdf
118
M Becht, J Franks, C Mayer and S Rossi, “Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a
Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund”, Finance Working Paper Series 138/2006, London
Business School, December 2006, 5-7.
119
D P O’Brien and S C Salop, “Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and
Corporate Control” (2000) 67 Antitrust Law Journal 559.

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competition law approach.120
This demonstrates the inadequacy of the internal
plurality test alone in assessing sufficient media plurality.
Secondly, Arnott emphasises that this test is not in the legislation and that it
contradicts the “fragitlity” approach, supported by a “purposive interpretation” of the
legislation.121
The CAT emphasised in Sky/ITV that once structural media plurality is
lost, it is difficult to restore, thus justifying its stringent protection.122
They found that
the CC was not entitled to use the internal plurality test,123
but the Court of Appeal
overturned this decision.124
There are two provisions in the Enterprise Act relevant to
this dispute. Firstly, that “the number of [media] enterprises … shall be assumed to be
more immediately before they cease to be distinct than it is afterwards”, and secondly,
that two or more media enterprises “shall be treated … as all under the control of only
one person”.125
The Court of Appeal argued these “deeming provisions”126
prevented
regulators from taking an “evidence-based” approach.127
However, Arnott contends
that these provisions provide a stringent framework, justified through reference to the
parliamentary materials and debates, such as the Lord Puttnam’s Joint Committee
Report. These are relevant because they reflect extensive discussion of the
legislation’s purpose and suggest what Parliament meant by “sufficient plurality”.128
For example, Lord McIntosh of Haringey, who introduced the above provisions
supported by Government, emphasised the “underlying principle … that it would be
dangerous for any person to control too much of the media because of his or her
ability to influence opinions and set the political agenda.”129
Therefore, the deeming
provisions are consistent with Parliament’s desire to provide strong protection in the
interest of preventing media enterprises having too much control.130
120
121
Ibid, 252-3, 265.
122
Cases 1095/4/8/08 and 1096/4/8/08, British Sky Broadcasting Group plc, Virgin Media Inc v (1) The
Competition Commission, (2) The Secretary of State for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
and Virgin Media Inc v (1) The Competition Commission, (2) The Secretary of State for Business
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2008] CAT 25, para 262.
123
British Sky Broadcasting Group plc v Competition Commission [2008] CAT 25, 266.
124
Ibid, 266.
125
Enterprise Act 2002, s 58A(4), (5) respectively.
126
127
Competition Commission, supra n 111, 5.16-5.26; BSkyB v Competition Commission, supra n 124,
239.
128
129
Hansard HL, vol 650 col 913 (2 July 2003), referred to in the CC Final Report to the Sec of State at
5.9.
130
Arnott, supra n 5, 264-6.

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The fragility approach does not mean an “automatic assumption” of
insufficient plurality.131
As the Enterprise Act Explanatory Notes state, s 58A(5)
ensures that the substance of who controls the relevant media enterprises will be
considered in the plurality assessment.132
It is therefore clear that an adequate
assessment of sufficient plurality entails consideration of both internal and external
plurality. This highlighted by Ofcom in News Corp/Sky, where they followed the
fragility approach though also brought internal plurality into consideration.133
They
provisionally found that Sky’s editorial independence would be insufficient,
regardless of broadcasting impartiality rules.134
Therefore, the internal plurality test
contradicts the aims of the legislation to ensure a diverse media environment and
protect against the undue accumulation of power by media enterprises, and both
internal and external plurality should be examined in assessing sufficient plurality.
Having examined the inconsistencies in the public interest test’s objectives,
and the need to consider both internal and external plurality in media mergers, the
following section will consider the scope of an assessment to measure media plurality
in the UK.
Scope
There are a number of issues to consider within the matter of scope, which have been
discussed by the Select Committee, Ofcom and the Government’s Department for
Culture, Media and Sport (the “DCMS”). This section will address the main issues
but, owing to space, will not consider further. These are limit to certain content
genres, the inclusion of non-UK based media as well as local and regional media, and
the inclusion of both retail and wholesale providers within the assessment.
The first consideration regards the genres relevant for plurality assessment.
Currently, Ofcom limits the scope of relevant genres to news and current affairs,135
the genre considered most closely connected to public opinion formation and most
important to society.136
While this is not disputed, many nevertheless disagree with
131
BSkyB v Competition Commission, supra n 124, 229.
132
DTI, supra n 48, 7.14, commented on by the CAT, ibid, 254.
133
Ofcom, Report on public interest test on the proposed acquisition of British Sky Broadcasting
Group plc by News Corporation, 31 December 2010, paras 1.20 and 5.11.
134
Ibid, para 1.39.
135
DCMS, supra n 15, 21.
136
Competition Commission, supra n 111, 5.32.

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exclusion of other genres.137
For example, the International Broadcasting Trust argue
that other genres, such as drama and light-entertainment have the ability to influence
the agenda and can further engage with audiences beyond those watching news and
current affairs.138
This suggests that other genres may be relevant to plurality
assessments.
It is argued that capturing other genres is too ambitious in practice, as
emphasised by Ed Vaizey MP139
who could not perceive a “manageable system that
incorporated that wide a scope”.140
This suggests that there would be insufficient
resources to capture other content genres within the framework. However, every
assessment would not require the inclusion of every genre. This would not be
practical, but for measuring media plurality in merger reviews, it would be
appropriate if the scope extended beyond news and current affairs only to cover other
genres relevant to the plurality concern. This would make the framework far more
manageable.
Ofcom also argues that limiting the scope is appropriate because the “news
and current affairs” genre is already used for television and online measurement
systems and furthermore that participants in consumer research are familiar with the
news category, making assessments easier.141
However, it is not sufficient to argue
against policy reform because it is inconvenient or difficult as a result of challenges
that can be overcome, especially when it concerns the public interest.
Arnott argues that the restricting the plurality test to a news audience is not in
the legislation, and therefore is “inconsistent with its broad protection of diverse
voices”.142
The Enterprise Act states that deciding the relevant audience is at the
discretion of the decision-maker where they consider it appropriate in the
circumstances.143
Arnott, referring to Sky/ITV, complained that this provision was not
adequately executed. He argued that where the merging enterprises serve multiple
audiences, it is unlikely that an assessment of plurality in relation to “every different
audience” could focus only on news and current affairs.144
In that case, the CC relied
137
138
IBT, Submission to the House of Lords Select Committee on Communications: Media Plurality
Inquiry, 25 April 2013, 4.
139
Minister for Culture, Communications and Creative Industries.
140
141
Ofcom advice to Select Committee, supra n 6, 12.
142
143
Enterprise Act 2002, s 58A(7).
144

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on an Ofcom survey ranking news first among all content genres, and used this to
justify restricting the test, rather than considering what genres were relevant to the
merger.145
Furthermore, in that survey, only 42% thought there was a relationship
between political engagement and news helping people feel part of the democratic
process.146
Thus suggesting that news is perhaps not even as relevant as one might
think. It is clear that other genres can be relevant to plurality assessments, and the
framework should include all genres relevant to the merger so to ensure its impact on
media plurality is adequately accounted for.
The second consideration is non-UK based media, and local and regional
media. The Select Committee followed the “strong consensus that UK media markets
should be the focus of UK media plurality policy”.147
However, the Select Committee
furthered that scope should nevertheless extend to those “outside UK jurisdiction to
the extent that they are consumed by UK audiences” if relevant to the plurality
assessment.148
This is appropriate to ensure an accurate assessment of UK plurality by
encompassing all enterprises consumed by UK audiences. The Select Committee also
argues for the inclusion of both local and regional media as well as national media.
They rightly warn that decision-makers should be wary of the financial sustainability
of local and regional media, as consolidation might be in the interests of a democratic
society where the enterprises in question are failing financially.149
Both the
Government and the Select Committee made clear that the BBC should always be
included in any plurality assessment, given their media prominence, but should never
be affected by measures taken on plurality, arguing that regulation of the BBC should
stay with the BBC Trust.150
These conclusions should all be operated in practice as
they ensure a broad and accurate assessment of plurality.
In plurality reviews, Ofcom has previously opted to take both “retailers” and
“wholesalers” of news content into account, as demonstrated in the News Corp/Sky.151
The decision to do so was important because of Sky’s provision of news to Five and
ITN’s provision of news to ITV and Channel 4.152
Both the Select Committee and the
145
Ibid, 268; Ofcom, New News, Future News: The Challenges for Television News after Digital
Switchover, 26 June 2007.
146
Ofcom, ibid, Annex, A1.207.
147
148
149
Ibid, 16-17.
150
Ibid, 18; DCMS, supra n 15, 22.
151
Ofcom, supra n 134.
152

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Government response concur with this decision.153
This allows for an accurate
assessment of the supply side of the news market,154
giving a better indication of what
media enterprises hold the greatest influence in the market.
The inclusion of online content and digital intermediaries within the scope of
plurality assessments is also a consideration. This discussion is lengthy and requires
detail; therefore the following section is devoted to its analysis.
Online Content and Digital Intermediaries
i. Online Content
In the digital age, it is now crucial that plurality assessments include online content.
There is a distinction to make in terms of online news providers: firstly, services
provided by existing news providers in “traditional” media as an extension of their
service; and secondly, stand-alone news websites operated by new providers.155
Examples of the former would be the websites of The Guardian, The Daily Mail and
the BBC, while an example of the latter is the Huffington Post.
Studies by various bodies, including Ofcom and Reuters Institute, have
demonstrated the significant increase in popularity of online news content.156
This
gives justification for its inclusion in plurality assessments. Robin Foster, advocating
inclusion of online content, justified his argument with reference to the fact that
research had shown that, while the over-45s were still preferential to traditional
media, the under-45s tended to rely far greater on digital media. This, he said, “shows
[online content] has to be included in any assessment.”157
This is supported by
Ofcom’s research, which indicated that the increasing popularity of online sources
was most prominent among the younger demographics.158
This is a firm indication of
the future prominence of the Internet as a source of news.
153
Select Committee, supra n 6, 22; DCMS, supra n 15.
154
D Morisi, ‘Measuring media pluralism in the convergence era: The case of News Corp’s proposed
acquisition of BSkyB’ LSE Department of Media and Communications, 22.
155
156
Ofcom, supra n 63; Foster, supra n 63, 16, citing Newman, Reuters Institute Digital News Report
(2012); Oliver & Ohlbaum, Annual Media Survey (2011), as reported in www.paidcontent.org.
157
158
Ofcom, News Consumption in the UK Research Report, July 2014:
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/other/tv-research/news-2014/.

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Some argue online media is “not yet” a satisfactory substitute to traditional
media,159
suggesting the inclusion of online content in plurality assessments is not
necessary. While the Internet has become the “first port of call” people looking for
information, online media is still not in a position of authority or importance to
effectively challenge traditional media’s ability to set the agenda and hold the
powerful to account.160
Traditional media remain the public watchdog in a democratic
society. This is illustrated by comparing the Daily Telegraph’s release of data
regarding the expenses scandal to Wikileaks’ 2010 release of confidential US military
and diplomatic documents.161
While the former influenced policy change on MP
expenses and resulted in a number of MP resignations and successful criminal
prosecutions, the latter “has yet to exert a comparable impact.”162
This clearly highlights the different impact of traditional media and is supported by
the fact that the only online services capable of reaching 20% of online audiences are
those of traditional media.163
However, this is likely to change,164
as indicated by
online-only news providers, such as the Huffington Post, who provide much of their
own material.165
This is further highlighted by the decision to move exclusively online
by The Independent; a newspaper that has become the UK’s fastest-growing thanks to
its digital growth.166
Online content cannot yet have the same political influence as
traditional media, but this is on course change, as suggested by the aforementioned
evidece. It is therefore adequate to include online news content in plurality
assessments.
Lord Puttnam pointed out an inherent obstacle in incorporating online media
into media plurality policy; that the entire system was designed with only traditional
media in mind.167
The Communications Act does not recognise online-only
enterprises as “media enterprises”,168
leading Lord Puttnam to emphasise the need for
159
R Collins and M Cave, ‘Media pluralism and the overlapping instruments needed to achieve it’,
Telecommunications Policy 37 (2013) 311-320, 317.
160
Ibid.
161
Ibid.
162
Ibid, 317.
163
Ofcom, Measurement framework for media plurality, Consultation, 11 March 2015, citing Ofcom,
News Consumption in the UK Research Report, July 2014.
164
Collins and Cave, supra n 160, 317.
165
Foster, supra n 63.
166
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/press/the-independent-becomes-the-first-national-
newspaper-to-embrace-a-global-digital-only-future-a6869736.html
167
Lord Puttnam’s advice to Select Committee, supra n 6, 18.
168
Ibid.

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law reform to ensure that governing legislation is updated.169
The law should now
acknowledge digital media, to ensure that the legislative framework protecting media
pluralism remains contemporary and relevant.
ii. Digital Intermediaries
Digital intermediaries offer ways in which news providers can further distribute their
content online, and are the following: content aggregators, e.g. Yahoo and MSN;
search engines, e.g. Google and Bing; social networks, e.g. Facebook and Twitter;
and digital stores linked to specific consumer devices, e.g. Apple’s iTunes.170
Evidence from the Reuters Institute indicates the use of digital intermediaries for
accessing content has increased significantly,171
but they are not included in plurality
assessments.172
The Select Committee discussed the inclusion of digital
intermediaries in the framework, but acknowledged that many of these digital
intermediaries were not explicitly media platforms, news organisations, or publishers,
etc.,173
creating a difficulty in justifying their inclusion within the scope of regulation.
They are not neutral “pipes” or full media companies.174
The Government’s response
to the Select Committee made no reference to the issue,175
possibly suggesting their
reluctance to address its complexities. This issue does not concern aggregators, as
they provide compiled packages of news content and sometimes originate their own
content, similar to traditional media. This would justify their inclusion in the
framework like traditional media.176
Therefore the rest of this discussion will not
concern news aggregators.
Foster argues in his report on digital intermediaries and plurality that they may
not yet need to be in a plurality framework but Ofcom should be open to the
possibility.177
He describes these intermediaries as “gatekeepers”, controlling the flow
of information, which they select, sort and distribute.178
This benefits plurality in
helping people find the content relevant to them, but also restricts what people can
169
Ibid.
170
Foster, supra n 63, 23.
171
Newman (ed.), Reuters Institute Digital News Report.
172
Ofcom supra n 134; Smith and Tambini, supra n 1, 44.
173
174
175
DCMA, supra n 15, 22-23.
176
177
Ibid, 11.
178
Ibid, 6.

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access.179
There are numerous interrelated aspects of the conduct of digital
intermediaries that could justify their inclusion in plurality assessments.180
Some of
these will now be considered, to demonstrate the potential need for their inclusion in
plurality reviews.
The first aspect is the extent to which intermediaries “are becoming
bottlenecks for the distribution of news”, where intermediaries became so popular for
users’ consumption of news that it could negatively impact news content range and
diversity.181
Certain intermediaries may grow to hold too much power over
information flows. For example, Apple’s use of harsh “take it or leave it” terms for
distribution of content through its digital store could merit plurality concerns, as they
are potentially restrictive on content access.182
While evidence of the importance of
these digital intermediaries is mixed, their increasing popularity could mean measures
should be taken to ensure “reasonably open access to influential intermediaries” in the
future.183
The second aspect is the extent to which digital intermediaries make
“editorial-like” judgments.184
While considered to act as “neutral platforms”,
intermediaries make some decisions, similar to those of traditional media. These
include selecting and sorting content and applying guidelines on the acceptability of
content.185
For example, Google ensures the relevance of search results for users
through computer algorithms, and promotes its own services by incorporating them
into the results (e.g. YouTube and Google Maps).186
Volokh argues this is not neutral
activity and is similar to editorial judgments, and that, essentially, search results are
based on what the engineers of the search engine company think are most relevant to
the user’s need.187
While these judgments are not as significant as editorial judgments
in traditional media news, digital intermediaries are clearly not “neutral pipes”.188
Tambini also argues that, regardless of whether or not intermediaries manipulate
public opinion through control of information flows, the power and resources to do so
179
Ibid, 28.
180
Ibid, 29.
181
Ibid.
182
Ibid, 31.
183
Ibid, 29-33.
184
Ibid, 29.
185
Ibid, 33.
186
Ibid, 34.
187
Eugene Volokh, ‘First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Results’, commissioned by
Google, 20 April 2012;
188

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is enough to justify their inclusion in the framework.189
This therefore provides solid
grounds for the inclusion of digital intermediaries in the framework, as they gain
more popularity over time and their judgments on content become even more
significant.
The third aspect is their influence on news economics.190
While digital
intermediaries have had a positive impact in helping suppliers find new markets, they
have also contributed to the Internet’s detrimental impact on advertising and the
profitability of news suppliers.191
One main criticism relevant to this is the
disaggregation of news content, caused by digital intermediaries allowing users to
selectively choose news while avoiding paying for full packages by providers.192
This
could reduce the quality of content supplied by media enterprises online, which could
threaten plurality interests, thus justifying their inclusion in the framework.
The final aspect is the extent to which digital intermediaries may “have the
capacity and incentive to influence the political agenda”.193
Large enterprises like
Google and Apple, which benefit the UK economy, could increasingly expect a “seat
at the table” in policy discussions impacting them. However, no evidence currently
suggests that such corporations have this motivation to influence the political agenda,
possibly because most are US-based and have little interest in UK politics.
Nevertheless, Tambini argues that, as history has shown us, powerful enterprises are
known to use all resources available to act in the interests of the company and its
owners.194
This could be the case for digital intermediaries in the future, especially if
they increase their vested interests in the UK, for example by purchasing a media
enterprise.195
They could take note from newspaper proprietors and attempt to lobby
government and attain close relationships with elected officials to preserve their
corporate interests.196
While digital intermediaries might have little leverage because
of their lack of original content and their obligations to satisfy users, they could do
other things.197
For example, Facebook has demonstrated how social media can
189
D Tambini, ‘Plurality Dialogue: what have we learned, and where next?’, LSE Media Policy Project
(2015).
190
Foster, supra n 63, 29, 38.
191
Ibid, 29, 39-40.
192
Ibid, 39.
193
Ibid, 29.
194
Tambini, supra n 190.
195
196
Ibid.
197
Ibid, 40-1.

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“gavanise wide single-issue support” with its organ donor campaign, and search
engines could manipulate information flows in search results, even if the latter seems
crude and unlikely.198
However, this is still likely insignificant compared to influential
front-page newspaper headlines,199
therefore digital intermediaries would need to be
more involved in originating content before they attained significant leverage and
posed a risk to plurality warranting their inclusion in the framework.
Therefore, there is a case for the inclusion of digital intermediaries in the
framework and in 2015, Ofcom advocated such inclusion of those which originated
news content or influenced its selection, which could be exerted through curation of
content, selection of titles, or adjusting the prominence of titles.200
However, such
capturing must not hinder or stifle innovation,201
with the digital sector constantly
growing and developing through new ideas.
There are two possible ways of incorporating digital intermediaries into the
framework. The definition of “media enterprises” could be widened to include digital
intermediaries, or Ofcom could be required to consider a new category of “digital
intermediaries”, which would require legislative reform.202
The latter option is
preferable, where they would not be considered “media enterprises” but would still be
considered for their impact on plurality and potential risks presented to diversity.203
This would be more suitable to accommodate for what Foster called the “hybrid
nature” of digital intermediaries,204
and would take account of their differences from
media enterprises, including in how they impact plurality.
There are also matters of jurisdiction and remedies. Firstly, there is the
question of whether regulation of intermediaries would be better at EU or UK level. It
is not within the scope of this dissertation for an in depth discussion on the
appropriateness of each, though it is noted that the plurality concerns arising as a
result of digital intermediaries may be better addressed at EU-level given their “cross-
border nature”,205
which could present regulatory difficulties. Secondly, regarding
remedies, the contemporary and unique nature of digital intermediaries means it is
198
Ibid, 40-1.
199
Ibid, 41.
200
201
202
Ibid, 48-9.
203
Ibid, 48-9
204
Ibid, 29.
205
Ibid, 49.

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difficult to establish adequate measures for dealing with plurality concerns. However,
there are some ideas, such as an independent board to regulate the algorithms and
activities of digital intermediaries206
or access commitments for digital intermediaries
to abide by, ensuring they carried news content deemed to be in the public interest.207
As Robin Mansell summarised, finding a workable consensus within the legal
plurality framework for digital intermediaries to protect democratic interests will not
happen over night.208
There will be a great deal of work and time required to come to
a strong consensus as to what are the most suitable remedies for digital
intermediaries, but until then, this matter will remain ambiguous.
Evidently, plurality reviews should be open to the inclusion of online content
and digital intermediaries where relevant to a plurality assessment. The metrics that
should be used when measuring plurality in the context of digital intermediaries will
be discussed in the following section of this chapter, where the options of metrics are
explored in detail.
Metrics
In a plurality review, the decision-maker must decide whether there is sufficient
plurality in the UK to ensure diversity and a range of voices and opinions are
available and prevent undue political influence of such enterprises. While having a
multiplicity of independent sources can promote viewpoint diversity, this only
provides limited protection against undue political influence. Two things must be
considered to ensure such adequate protection: the number of outlets and their
individual impact.209
The importance of these considerations is epitomised in the
context of cross-media mergers, such as in News Corp/Sky involving both print and
broadcasting services, because of the different impacts certain media sectors have on
the public.210
However, there is no one single metric, which allows for consistent,
accurate plurality assessments across media platforms.211
This section will explore the
206
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2014/11/07/digital-intermediaries-and-the-public-interest-
standard-in-algorithm-governance/
207
Foster, supra n 63, 49-50.
208
Tambini supra n 190.
209
210
Ibid, 46.
211

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various forms of measurement available and will conclude with what appears to be
the best way to assess plurality in the current framework.
In News Corp/Sky, Ofcom considered a number of measurements in assessing
whether there was sufficient plurality. These were audience share and reach, news
consumption per consumer and their “share of reference” approach,212
the latter of
which will be discussed in due course. Audience reach was the extent of exposure to a
particular source across all users and audience share showed what proportion of the
total audience selects the relevant services, genres or programmes.213
News
consumption measured the number of people accessing news media and the time
spent consuming it.214
The problem with these indicators is that the relevant
monitoring bodies do not have mutual consensus on a consistent measurement
approach.215
For example, while radio statistics are based on a self-reported diary,216
measurement of television audiences is based on remote monitoring of large sample
audiences.217
Furthermore, newspaper statistics do not account for time spent reading
news items alone,218
and there is no standard metric at all for share of online news.219
For these reasons there must be a developed, consistent approach to measurements
across sectors,220
otherwise these metrics cannot adequately assess media plurality.
Nevertheless, even if this is resolved, they will still not be adequate because of
a failure to account for the different levels of influence certain media sectors have on
their audiences.221
Morisi explained this as a reliance on “equal impact
assumption”.222
Research has discounted the equal impact assumption and made clear
that some media sectors are more influential than others.223
For example, five minutes
of watching television is likely to have greater impact than five minutes of reading a
212
Ibid, 56.
213
214
Morisi, supra 155, 27; Ofcom, Measuring Framework for Media Plurality, Consultation, 11 March
2015, 11.
215
216
www.rajar.co.uk.
217
www.barb.co.uk.
218
Ofcom, supra n 134, para 1.23, appendix 1.
219
D Morisi, Response to Ofcom Consultation on Measuring Media Plurality, 5 January 2012,
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/916359/responses/davide-morisi.pdf.
220
221
Ibid.
222
Morisi, supra n 155, 27.
223
P M Napoli, et al., ‘Media ownership and diversity assessment’, in R E Rice (ed.), Media
ownership: research and regulation (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press 2008), 316.

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newspaper.224
Therefore these metrics, while useful, are not sufficient on their own
for plurality assessment without an account of each media sector’s impact.
Ofcom also includes its share of reference approach in their plurality review
for News Corp/Sky. This was primary research about consumers and consisted of a
survey of 2,018 adults, who were asked to choose, from a list of sources, which ones
they used regularly and which one was their “main source of news”.225
The surveying
included options to choose from international and regional media, and online
media.226
Each provider’s number of references was calculated as a proportion of the
total number of references made to determine their overall “influence”, and then reach
was calculated the same way for those who referenced accessing that provider on a
weekly basis.227
Share of reference is an audience-based perspective, which is an improvement
in assessing plurality because of its focus on exposure pluralism.228
Morisi explains
that there are three dimensions to a plurality framework: source pluralism (diversity
of ownership); content pluralism (diversity of viewpoints and format); and exposure
pluralism.229
Source and content pluralism were both concepts discussed in this
paper’s introduction, but exposure pluralism warrants further discussion. This concept
comes from McQuail’s notion of content “as received”, as opposed to “as sent”,230
which is argued to account for “what audience actually selects”.231
For this reason,
such an approach is deemed crucial for the purposes of “diversity assessment
research”.232
Focusing on what consumers actually say they consumed has a number
of benefits. Firstly, it allows for effective cross-platform analysis of media mergers,233
which will prove crucial in this era of digital convergence. Secondly, it means that
there can be a focus on certain genres, such as news and other similarly identified
genres.234
And thirdly, it does not rely on equal impact assumption, like the other
forms of metric used, mentioned above, and further discounted the need for artificial
224
Ofcom, supra n 134, paras 5.29-5.30.
225
Ibid, 96.
226
227
Ofcom, supra n 134, Annex 1.
228
229
Ibid, 7.
230
Ibid, 10; D McQuail, Media Performance, London: Sage Publications (1992).
231
McQuail, ibid, 157.
232
P M Napoli, ‘Rethinking Program Diversity Assessment: An Audience-Centered Approach’, The
Journal of Media Economics, 10(4), 59-74 (1997), 64.
233
234
Ibid.

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weighting.235
Artificial weighting is used in Germany and is controversial because it
fails to take account of individuals and how they process and perceive the news they
view.236
The share of reference approach is therefore an improvement in plurality
assessments because it allows better ideas to be attained as to how the certain media
impact on the public.
Ofcom published an adapted approach to measuring media plurality in its
2012 report,237
which it implemented in its report on the Guardian Media
Group/Global Radio merger in 2012.238
The new approach consisted of a number of
measurements falling into three categories, availability, consumption, and impact.239
Availability “captures the number of providers at the point of consumption”,240
while
consumption measured the number of consumers using a service, including frequency
and time spent accessing it.241
The consumption metrics are intended to form the
foundation of a plurality assessment, and include using share of references for
measuring influence, reach and multi-sourcing as proxies for diversity of viewpoints
consumed.242
Frequency and time spent accessing a source have been argued to be
potentially helpful metrics, but this would be considered even more so if the duration
of each visit, or “attentiveness”, were considered.243
Consideration of multi-sourcing
is a helpful addition to these metrics in a digital era where the Internet allows for
multi-sourcing with great ease,244
which is thus likely to have an impact on the
consumption of viewpoints.
Combining these different approaches provides “a more robust basis for
intervention” regarding media plurality, as it will give greater understanding of media
influence by exploring all kinds of exposure.245
In particular, giving attention to the
duration of each visit to a source will add substance to the research, because the
regularity of access to a source may be irrelevant if, for example, each visit is for a
short period of time. It could be argued that the short length of time accessing the
235
Ibid.
236
Ibid, 47.
237
Ofcom, supra n 63.
238
Ofcom, Report on public interest test on the acquisition of Guardian Media Group’s radio stations
(Real and Smooth) by Global Radio, 11 October 2012.
239
Ibid.
240
Ibid.
241
Smith, supra n 2, 316.
242
Ofcom, Measuring Media Plurality, 19 June 2012, 21.
243
Smith and Tambini, supra n 1, 52-3.
244
Morisi, supra n 155, 31: Foster, supra n 63, 20.
245

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source per visit could be less influential than accessing that source less frequently but
for longer periods of time per visit.246
Therefore, this would allow primary research to
cover all bases and allow for a more accurate assessment of plurality. Exposure may
not directly correlate to influence, but it is still a plausible indicator because
“exposure to a particular source affords that source at least the potential to influence
those who access it”.247
In considering Ofcom’s “impact” category, Ofcom noted the “complexity in
how people’s opinions are formed”.248
These proxies included importance of news
sources, impartiality, and reliability and quality. Firstly, importance of sources is
measured by what sources people consider to matter most from a personal and
societal perspective. Secondly, impartiality is measured by the extent of regulation in
each media sector and public perceptions of how sources react to this regulation.
Finally, reliability and quality is indicated by the extent of expenditure on content and
public perceptions of how different sources rate.249
Ofcom emphasised that a range of
these proxies should be used together, but noted they were imperfect because they
“can only measure people’s conscious articulation and not actual effects”.250
Consumers may not fully understand how they have been affected by news, for
example, they may over-emphasise the sources with which they agree and down-play
those with which they do not.251
It further may be “difficult to disentangle” numerous
factors that might have influenced consumers.252
Moreover, there is difficulty in
taking account of the agenda-setting effect of certain media that is more prominent
than that of other media.253
For example, newspapers are argued to be most influential
on the political agenda, and in determining which stories are then broadcast on
television news.254
Therefore, it is clear that self-reported data on media influence
poses its own difficulties and ambiguities regarding its reliability, which are inherent
in the method.
Regardless, Ofcom’s focus on availability, consumption and impact is still its
most adequate approach to date. As Rachael Craufurd Smith emphasises, media
246
Ibid, 53.
247
Ibid, 52.
248
249
Ibid, 22.
250
Ibid, 22.
251
252
253
254
Napoli, et al., supra n 224, 316.

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plurality is “complex and multifaceted” in nature, yet Ofcom’s plurality assessment is
clear and coherent in spite of this.255
There is no perfect way for measuring media
plurality, and this approach offers a multi-factor assessment that considers a broad
range of aspects to establish a well-grounded view of how individuals consume media
and how it influences them. This is more suitable than any arbitrary weighting
mechanism.
Earlier in this chapter, the need was demonstrated to include digital
intermediaries in plurality reviews. Therefore, there will now be a brief consideration
of how they should be included in the assessment. This is a work-in-progress, but
Foster made some suggestions as to what “indicators of consumption and impact”
could be examined by Ofcom. These were: the share of news consumed via
intermediaries generally and via any single intermediary; the extent to which users
can change between intermediaries or access news by other means; the levels of
satisfaction and trust attributed to intermediaries’ services; the extent to which they
provide access to a sufficiently wide range of news; and the extent to which they
enable easy access to both impartial news and news in the public interest generally.256
Ofcom agrees with the use of surveys to understand the extent to which digital
intermediaries are used.257
This allows for in depth considerations as to whether
plurality concerns arise in the context of digital intermediaries and is a good starting
point with which to learn more about the influence of digital intermediaries on
plurality.
Ofcom’s audience-based perspective is the correct approach and should be
expanded upon, to allow for the most accurate plurality assessment possible. This
accurate plurality assessment is crucial for two reasons. Firstly, it ensures the
detection of any risks to the prevention of undue political influence and a diverse
media environment in the UK. Secondly, it provides solid justification for
intervention where necessary to remedy the risks to plurality.
255
256
257
Ofcom, supra 164, 17.

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Removal of the 20/20 Rule
A matter to also consider is whether the 20/20 rule would still be necessary if the
media plurality test was deemed to have resolved the issues highlighted in this
dissertation, and was thus adequate in addressing UK plurality concerns. It has been
argued that the rule has the benefit of providing reassurance to the public that media
plurality is being protected.258
Over time, the transparency and coherence of the
public interest test may become enough to provide that reassurance itself. However,
this dissertation argues that it would be more appropriate to maintain the 20/20 rule,
especially considering the continued prominence Channel 3 services.259
258
Smith, supra n 2.
259
Ofcom, supra n 134.

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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This dissertation has established the adequacy of the plurality framework in
preventing undue political influence and supporting a diverse media environment.
Chapter III emphasised the need to resolve procedural issues before the
framework could be considered adequate. While the media public interest test is
preferable to arbitrary fixed ownership limits, its sophistication results in lengthy,
costly processes and a lack of coherence. This can be resolved by the introduction of a
periodic plurality review to provide streamlining for processes and greater
transparency. It is not adequate for the Secretary of State to make decisions in public
interest merger reviews, and this power should be reallocated to Ofcom to remove the
risks of political influence and wrongful decision-making.
Chapter IV emphasised that there are numerous flaws in the substantive
approach, but there are encouraging steps forward in Ofcom’s plurality assessments.
The legislation underpinning the public interest test should be amended to better
outline all objectives in merger reviews, thus clarifying the basis for market
intervention. Assessing plurality sufficiency should entail the consideration of both
internal and external plurality, reflecting the “fragility” approach, as suggested by a
purposive interpretation of the legislation. This provides strong protection of the
interests to have a diverse media environment and prevent undue political influence of
the media.
The scope of plurality assessments should be as wide as is necessary to
address all plurality concerns. The scope of content genres captured by an assessment
should be widened when necessary, otherwise enterprises impacting on plurality
could be missed and the assessment resultantly inaccurate. Ofcom has been right to
widen the scope of plurality assessments to include non-UK based media affecting
consumption in the UK, as well as the BBC, and the inclusion of both wholesale and
retail news providers further makes the plurality assessment adequate in capturing the
relevant enterprises impacting on plurality.
With online content becoming more popular in the digital age, their inclusion
in plurality assessments is a welcome adjustment by Ofcom, and their proposals to
also include digital intermediaries in the framework are well justified and should be
followed through. Digital intermediaries may not currently pose significant risks to

40 of 46
plurality but it is evident that they are capable of impacting plurality in various ways,
and thus their future inclusion is justified.
Finally, Ofcom has made substantial improvements in its metrics for
measuring media plurality. Its audience-based perspective, focusing on exposure
pluralism, has the benefit of showing what consumers actually said they consumed,
which may help to address issues regarding the impact of certain types of media over
others. Ofcom could potentially take this approach further by expanding on elements
of exposure, but its development of an “impact” category of metrics equally offers
useful proxies to help determine media influences in plurality assessments. While
there are inherent issues in using these proxies for measuring plurality, their operation
in combination with all other metrics can provide a clear, coherent assessment of the
complex and mutli-factored concept of media plurality.
To conclude, it is clear that the existing regulatory framework still has issues
to be resolved. While, the Government’s lack of comment leading up to and following
the 2015 election might suggest that changes are unlikely to happen any time soon,260
it is important that they are pressed so to ensure that the aims of the plurality
framework are fulfilled.
260
“GE2015: Party positions on media plurality and local news”, LSE Blogs:
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2015/05/07/ge2015-party-positions-on-media-plurality-and-
local-news/.

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