Leslie.Archambeault.Thesis.December.4.2015.Final

The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan:
The Need for a Gender Analysis
A thesis submitted to the Center for Global Affairs at New York University in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Global Affairs
By: Leslie Archambeault
Concentration: Peacebuilding
Thesis Advisor: Anne Marie Goetz
New York, NY
Fall 2015

1 Archambeault
Table of Contents
I. Introduction 2
a. Current Context and Paper Roadmap 2
b. Research Questions 6
c. Methodological Framework 7
II. Underlying Theoretical Assumptions 9
a. Conflict Theory 9
b. Gender 18
c. Human Rights 19
III. Assessment 21
IV. Conclusion and Reflections 55

2 Archambeault
Part I: Introduction
a. Current Context and Paper Roadmap
“History will remember Jordan as a country that opened its
doors to those who sought its help….”1
As the Syrian Civil War quickly barrels toward its fifth year, a political settlement to end the
conflict seems a distant promise. Regardless of whether a political solution emerges in the coming
weeks and months, years of human rights violations and abuses, and blatant disregard for international
humanitarian law by all sides to the conflict,2 has had a deep and complex impact on Syria, its
immediate neighbors, other states in the Arab states region, and indeed the very heart of global security.
Although statistics change daily, it is estimated that over 250,000 people have been killed and
over one million have been injured since fighting began in early 2011.3 Indiscriminate and illegal attacks
on civilian targets and public infrastructure4 as well as related and substantiated security concerns as
armed groups on both sides of the conflict use force to advance their own agendas, have also resulted in
an unprecedented displacement crisis. Estimates claim that over half of all Syrians have suffered forced
displacement, with some having to uproot themselves multiple times as the violence quickly moves
throughout the country, with no regard to civilian impacts or international laws of war.5 Within Syria,
1
“Jordan Says World’s Failure to Deal with Refugee Plight Has Led to Current Crisis,” The Jordan Times,
September 5, 2015, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jordan-says-world%E2%80%99s-failure-deal-
refugee-plight-has-led-current-crisis.
2
See for example, Human Rights Watch, World Report: Syria, 2011-2015; Amnesty International, World Report:
Syria, 2011-2014.
3
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,“About the Crisis,” Syria Crisis: Regional Overview,
accessed November 18, 2015, http://www.unocha.org/syrian-arab-republic/syria-country-profile/about-crisis.
4
See for example, United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the implementation of
Security Council Resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) and 2191 (2014), S/2015/862, November 11, 2015.
5
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,“About the Crisis.”

3 Archambeault
6.5 million people have been displaced because of violence as of October 20156 and the United Nations’
(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that at least one million
more will be displaced by the end of 2015.7
In addition to massive internal displacement, millions are also fleeing the country, including
Palestinian and Iraqi refugees who had been residing in the state. The most recent data available shows
that at least 4.2 million Syrians have sought refuge outside the country as officially registered refugees
within the UN system.8 Important to note however is that the number of unregistered refugees is unclear
and for the most part unknown. Close familial and friendship ties between Syrians and residents of some
of the states sharing borders with Syria makes the potential for large numbers of undocumented refugees
likely.
The refugee crisis is one of many impacts that the Syrian war has had globally and it is that
which this paper seeks to explore more fully. The large influx of refugees from Syria has placed
enormous stress on its neighbors in particular, putting strains on government infrastructure and social
service provision across multiple sectors.9 This paper intends to examine the effects on one such
neighbor, Jordan, specifically examining the gendered impacts of the refugee crisis on Jordanian host
6
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,“Syrian Arab Republic | OCHA,” October 2015,
http://www.unocha.org/syria.
7
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,“About the Crisis.”
8
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response,” UNHCR
Syria Regional Refugee Response,November 17, 2015, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php; Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Syrian Arab Republic | OCHA”; “Regional Refugee & Resilience
Plan 2015-2016: In Response to the Syria Crisis,” Regional Strategic Overview (Syrian Refugee Regional
Response: Inter-Agency, 2015), 9.
9
Sarah Bailey and Veronique Barbelet, “Towards a Resilience-Based Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis: A
Critical Review of Vulnerability Criteria and Frameworks” (Amman, Jordan: United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP),Sub-regional Facility for the Development Response to the Syria Crisis, 2014), 1; Jordan
Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Jordan Response Platform to the Syria Crisis, and United
Nations, “Jordan Response Plan 2015 to the Syria Crisis” (Amman, Jordan, December 1,2014); Jordan Ministry
of Planning and International Cooperation, Jordan Response Platform to the Syria Crisis, and United Nations,
“Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis: 2016-2018,” Unpublished Draft (Amman, Jordan, November 2015).

4 Archambeault
communities. Further elaboration on the research question, methodological framework, and underlying
theory follow this section.
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Jordan) lies geographically south of Syria, sharing a border.
As of November 15, 2015, there are 633,644 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan.10 This number is
expected to reach 700,000 by December 2015.11 In addition to documented Syrian refugees that Jordan
hosts, UNHCR estimates that there are at least 100,000 more undocumented refugees currently living in
Jordan as well.12 This large number of Syrian refugees now comprises approximately 20 percent of the
Jordanian population,13 and indeed one Syrian refugee camp, Zaatari Camp, is larger than most
Jordanian cities.14 In terms of demographic breakdowns of the Syrian refugee population in Jordan,
official reports are dangerously misleading. For instance, the Jordan Response Plan claims that 23.5
percent of registered Syrian refugees are women, 2.1 percent of which are older women above the age of
60.15 Although technically accurate, this number discounts the large number of young women and girls,
aged 0-17, which are not counted as adult women, yet comprise part of this population. Indeed, over half
of the refugees are girls and women statistically speaking.16
10
“UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response:Jordan,” UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response,November
17, 2015, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107.
11
“Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016: In Response to the Syria Crisis,” 9.
12
“Mapping of Host Community-Refugee Tensions in Mafraq and Ramtha, Jordan” (Mercy Corps, May 2013), 1;
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “External Statistical Report on UNHCR Registered
Syrians in Jordan” (UNHCR,November 15, 2015).
13
Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Jordan Response Platform to the Syria Crisis, and
United Nations, “Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis: 2016-2018,” 7.
14
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,“Syrian Arab Republic | OCHA”; Jordan Ministry of
Planning and International Cooperation, Jordan Response Platform to the Syria Crisis, and United Nations,
“Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis: 2016-2018”; “UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response: Jordan”;
“Inside ZaatariRefugee Camp: The Fourth Largest City in Jordan - Telegraph,” accessed December 5,2015,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/jordan/11782770/What-is-life-like-inside-the-largest-
Syrian-refugee-camp-Zaatari-in-Jordan.html.
15
United Nations, “Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis: 2016-2018,” 15.
16
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “External Statistical Report on UNHCR Registered
Syrians in Jordan.”

5 Archambeault
Significantly, the majority of the Syrian refugee population lives among Jordanian host
communities, rather than in refugee camps. The percentage of those Syrian refugees living outside of
camps has ranged from 83 percent to 85 percent over the last two years.17 Hosted in some of the poorest
areas of the country, the large majority of children and women refugees amongst this population means
that as a whole they are extremely vulnerable.18 The needs of vulnerable Syrian refugees living in
economically and resource poor Jordanian host communities has greatly strained Jordan’s public
finances, and has greatly increased subsidy spending, and spending on both social services and
security.19 In some of the host communities, the Syrian refugees actually outnumber residents,
compounding social cohesion concerns, exacerbating tensions and hostilities between host communities
and refugee populations.
Although this paper focuses on host communities, it is important to note that the Syrian refugee
population itself is extremely vulnerable at present with many refugees in dire circumstances. This paper
is intended to highlight that both refugee and host community populations have distinct needs that
should be addressed in order to avoid risks of further conflict, specifically emphasizing the neglected
gendered impacts on host communities.
Part one of this paper sets forth the research questions driving the study. Part two of this paper
restates basic theoretical assumptions that create the backdrop of this research, and expounds on these
theories to create the underlying rationale for the study, as well as linkages between disciplines and
theories to highlight the comprehensive nature of the issues involved. Part three explores the gendered
17
United Nations, “Jordan Response Plan 2015 to the Syria Crisis”; Jordan Ministry of Planning and International
Cooperation, Jordan Response Platform to the Syria Crisis, and United Nations, “Jordan Response Plan to the
Syria Crisis: 2016-2018.”
18
United Nations, “Jordan Response Plan 2015 to the Syria Crisis.”
19
Ibid.

6 Archambeault
impacts of the Syria crisis on host populations in Jordan and looks for potential gaps in data and
knowledge using gender as a lens crosscutting all relevant sectors, as well as how regional and domestic
response programs, such as the Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis and the Inter-Agency
Regional Response Plan for the Syria Crisis have responded or failed to address gender impacts. Part
four of this paper provides recommendations for necessary future study and research based on the
findings produced in this paper, and final reflections and conclusions drawn from the research and
writing process.
b. ResearchQuestions
This paper intends to explore the following research questions:
1. What are the evidenced and potential gendered impacts on Jordanian host communities of the Syrian
refugee crisis?
2. How have gendered impacts, if any, been addressed as part of the response to the Syrian refugee
crisis?
3. What future research is necessary to further explore gendered impacts in order to develop and
implement essential program and policy responses?

7 Archambeault
c. Methodology
The research undertaken in this study was primarily desk based. The desk review included
compiling and analyzing qualitative and quantitative data from a variety of sources including Jordanian
Government databases, United Nations’ agency reports, reports and studies conducted by local and
international non-governmental organizations, and books written by recognized experts on conflict,
gender, and human rights. In addition, newspaper sources were used when available.
Complementing the desk review, consultations with various actors were conducted in order to
solicit more information when necessary, obtain source leads, or confirm findings. Such consultations
included discussions with programming officers at the UN country office for Jordan, liaisons for the
Jordan Response Platform, humanitarian officers at UN Women’s Jordan country office, and conflict
prevention, peacebuilding, human rights, and access to justice specialists at the UNDP’s Regional Hub
for Arab States, headquartered in Amman. In addition, consultations were undertaken with two regional
experts who work as consultants on peace and security issues in the region, and officers at two Jordan
based civil society organizations, the Jordanian Women’s Union, and Circle of Discussions, a youth led
movement to build discussions on issues of gender in the MENA region. All discussions took place in
person between the months of June and November 2015.
Although this author recognizes that a desk review is not perhaps the best way of exploring the
research questions stated, serious limitations impeded the feasibility of field research, including
interviews and focus groups. In particular, time constraints, language and cultural barriers, growing
insecurity in the Syria sub-region, as well as financial limitations, all played into the determination that
field research, although preferable, was inadvisable for this researcher.

8 Archambeault
In addition, other limitations unfortunately affected the data obtained through this research.
Information sought was often unavailable due to the degree of openness and transparency that the
government exhibited in regard to gender based inquiries, language constraints on official government
websites, and the lack of secondary research directly related to the topic at hand. Also, when data was
available, it was often not as up to date as necessary providing only short time frames from which to see
often slow moving affects. Available data was also not often sex disaggregated and rarely disaggregated
by governorate in order to provide the best comparisons in assessing refugee impacts.
This researcher hopes that this paper will be used as jumping off point for future research and as
a call to action for those agencies and NGOs working on addressing both refugee and host community
needs.

9 Archambeault
Part II: Underlying Theoretical Assumptions
a. Conflict Theory
i. Peace, Violence, and Conflict
There are many conceptualizations of peace, violence, and conflict. Conflict theorists,
academics, humanitarian and development actors, and UN member states have debated the parameters
of what does and does not constitute a conflict time and again without reaching any definitive
conclusion. This paper, however, is based upon conflict theory as stated by one of the forefathers of the
peacebuilding field, Johann Galtung. As such, this paper understands the term conflict to encompass
both organized violence between two or more armed groups,20 as well as structural and cultural
manifestations of violence that serve as direct root factors or at times drivers of conflict.21 Galtung
postulated that direct physical violence, structural violence, and cultural violence are interlinked and
feed off of and reinforce each other.22
Direct violence is the physical violence that is most visible and recognizable, structural and
cultural violence are significant root causes and drivers of physical violence, creating a continuous cycle
of violence. Structural violence is a process of needs deprivation of a group or groups in the society,
leading to marginalization. When advantages or disadvantages to the provision of social services, for
example, are built into the system based upon class, gender, nationality, ethnicity, race, or other
20
Rooted in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) definition of armed conflict, see UCDP (2015)
“Definitions”, Uppsala University: Department of Peace and Conflict Research,
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#Ceasefire_agreements (accessed 10.05.15)
21
Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization (Oslo :London ;
Thousand Oaks,CA: International Peace Research Institute ; Sage Publications, 1996).
22
Ibid.; For a helpful discussion on the violence triangle see also: Understanding the Violence Triangle at
http://kanglaonline.com/2012/07/understanding-violence-triangle-and-structural-violence-by-rajkumar-
bobichand/; and for a graphic view of the violence triangle see Cultural/Structural/Direct Violence,unpublished
handout, Turning the Tide: Nonviolent Promotion For Social Change, available at http://www.turning-the-
tide.org/files/Structural%20Cultural%20Direct%20Violence%20Hand-out.pdf.

10 Archambeault
inclusion or exclusion criteria, some members of the society are deprived of their needs to a
disproportionate extent. 23 This results in relative inequality and potentially exacerbates tensions in
vulnerable communities. Lastly, cultural violence is the legitimization of violence in its direct or
structural form based on cultural norms. Cultural violence is then used to rationalize manifestations of
structural or physical violence.24
Although direct violence is the only manifestation that is visible, all three forms of violence must
be addressed in order to achieve positive peace. Rather than defining peace as simply the absence of
violence, 25 this paper understands peace as something more-the ultimate ideal, or the “presence of
harmony.”26 This ideal may never be fully realized and must be addressed as part of a continual process
of growth and adaption. Indeed, recent linkages made between peace and security, human rights, and
development at an international level reflect the premise that peace is something more than an absence
of conflict or direct violence, and the interdependence between the three disciplines necessitate a more
comprehensive understanding of the concepts of peace and conflict as well as more comprehensive,
integrated, and strategic programming and policy positions.27
ii. Spillover Effects
Another dimension of conflict theory that is emerging as significant globally is with regard to
regional conflict factors, particularly what are referred to as neighborhood effects or spillover effects.
This paper also accepts and relies on this theory, and its significance and relevance to the Arab states
23
Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means,197. Johan Galtung, Human Rights in Another Key,Polity Press,1994
24
Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means.
25
Johan Galtung, A Mini Theory of Peace,2001; Catia C. Confortini, “Galtung, Violence, and Gender: The Case
for a Peace Studies/Feminism Alliance,” 2006.
26
Ibid.
27
UNDP,Changing with the World: UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017, 2014; “The Challenge of Sustaining
Peace,” UN Doc. A/69/968–S/2015/490 (Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations
Peacebuilding Architecture,June 29, 2015).

11 Archambeault
region, and particularly the sub-Syrian region. Conflict theorists and international organizations have
increasingly referred to spillover effects to conflict and how the mistaken conception of wars as
intrastate leads to long-term peacebuilding and development challenges. Direct violence as a result of a
conflict is rarely contained by state borders and the movement of refugee populations, armed groups,
and weapons across borders destabilizes geographic neighborhoods and regions.28 In addition, although
beyond the scope of this paper, outside states may advocate for their own political agendas through the
financial and logistical support of armed groups,29 making nearly all conflicts global in nature.
The spillover effects of conflict have been witnessed many times over the years and have had a
variety of impacts on these neighboring states. For instance, conflict itself can easily spread from one
state to another as exemplified by the current crises in Syria and Iraq. Ideological governance shifts,
including the progression or regression of democratic governments has also occurred in waves across
geographic regions.30 Strong evidence has been compiled that increases in political and civil repression
are often direct reactions by governments that are neighbors of conflict states.31 These measures are
generally taken in an attempt to quell possible conflict contagion scenarios or acts by domestic
opposition groups, however, in practice repressive policies often exacerbate existing tensions between
groups, particularly those who feel marginalized or disenfranchised in the state.
Economic spillover effects may positively or negatively affect socioeconomic trends as increases
or decreases or other disruptions in trade, and changes in labor supply.32 For instance, neighbors of
28
Carol Cohn, ed., Women and Wars (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity Press,2013), 25.
29
Ibid.
30
“Beyond Governance and Conflict: Measuring the Impact of the Neighborhood Effect in the Arab Region,”
Working Paper (Emerging and Conflict-Related Issues Division: Economic and Social Commission for Western
Asia (ESCWA),October 2014), 3.
31
Margarita Puerto Gomez and Asger Christensen, “The Impacts of Refugees on Neighboring Countries: A
Development Challenge,” World Development Report 2011: Background Note, (July 29, 2010).
32
“Beyond Governance and Conflict: Measuring the Impact of the Neighborhood Effect in the Arab Region,” 3.
Additional sources- UNDP

12 Archambeault
states in conflict may lose close trading and financial partners. In addition, the influx of refugees may
cause strains on the economy, both locally and nationally, when their presence causes declining wages
alongside higher unemployment and skyrocketing housing costs. In addition, in states like Jordan, where
commodity subsidies are heavily relied upon, the additional economic strains on the country may affect
the provision of social services, price increases for basic necessities such as food, and increased
competition for already scarce resources like water.33 Large influxes of refugee populations may cause
host countries to reallocate financial and human resources to providing humanitarian assistance, having
an impact on the domestic economy, and creating tension with a host population who may see
themselves as increasingly marginalized in their own country.34
In addition, as stated previously, spillover effects include the transfer of arms, refugee
populations, and armed groups across borders - greatly affecting economic, political, and security
contexts in neighboring states.35 In fact, cross border acts of terror, human trafficking, and arms
trafficking are considered widespread spillover effects of conflicts.36 Non-state actors are relatively
unconstrained by state borders and often find neighboring states to be relative safe havens from which
they can operate. The presence of large refugee populations in neighboring states facilitates the
expansion of non-state armed groups in this manner.37 For example, non-state actors with family and
friendship ties among refugee populations may contribute to the radicalization of segments of refugee
and host communities, may increase insecurity in these populations through the movement of arms and
perceptions related to potential violence, and may plan and implement actual acts of violence aimed at
33
Ibid., 5–6, 11.
34
Ibid., 11. Also cite the Mercy Corps Report in Northern Jordan/UNHCR…find page number.
35
Ibid., 3; Margarita Puerto Gomez and Asger Christensen, “The Impacts of Refugees on Neighboring Countries:
A Development Challenge,” World Development Report 2011: Background , (July 29, 2010).
36
“Beyond Governance and Conflict: Measuring the Impact of the Neighborhood Effect in the Arab Region,” 5–
6.
37
Ibid., 14.

13 Archambeault
these already vulnerable populations in an effort to radicalize, recruit, or incite terror. Recent arrests of
non-state armed actors in Jordan, including in Zaatari camp, as well incidents in other Syrian neighbor
states, including Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq,38 illustrate the gravity of this threat to host states.
Lastly, demographic changes as a result of large influxes of refugees is also an important
spillover effect and conflict factor that contribute to hostilities and can trigger the outbreak of direct
violence in a neighboring state, as will be explored in detail with regard to Jordan. Changing
demographics of populations can directly impact the balance of power in local contexts, as well as shift
ethnic and cultural compositions of host populations. These demographic changes can influence
ideological alliances in the state, incite opposition group actions, and may also weaken state institutions
more generally, facilitating corruption, and threatening rule of law in an affected neighbor state.39
Significantly to note for the purposes of this assessment, statistical analysis has found that large
influxes of refugees greatly increase the likelihood of direct violence and the eruption of armed conflict
in the host country.40 Yet, the above mentioned spillover effects are by no means comprehensive. These
effects are discussed only as generally recognized trends identified by leading scholars and international
organizations, and in particular in their relevance to the Jordanian context.
iii. The Women, Peace and Security Agenda
This paper also relies on the linkages made between women’s participation and addressing
women’s security in conflict and post-conflict contexts as a key component to preventing conflict and
achieving sustainable peace. These linkages were highlighted and recognized in large part due to the
progression of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda as an area of significance in all UN bodies
38
Ibid., 21; “Mapping of Host Community-Refugee Tensions in Mafraq and Ramtha, Jordan.”
39
“Beyond Governance and Conflict: Measuring the Impact of the Neighborhood Effect in the Arab Region,” 5,
7.
40
Ibid., 13.

14 Archambeault
and agencies. The WPS agenda gained traction, and really gained authority as a concept in 2000 with the
explicit recognition by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1325(2000) of both the distinct and
disparate impacts of conflict on women, as well as the acknowledgment of the contributions women can
and do make in conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. The WPS agenda encompasses the
restatement of women’s international legal rights to issues related to peace and security, as well as
creating concrete linkages between addressing women’s rights and sustainable peace. It is emphasized
largely in Security Council Resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889, 1906, 2106, 2122, and most recently
2242. The agenda, however, should be viewed as a restatement of existing international law, as well as a
contribution to new processes and mechanisms to enforce these laws, and highlights the intrinsic link
between women’s empowerment and participation and sustainable peace.
The WPS agenda is comprehensive, covering the four pillars of prevention, protection,
participation, and recovery. It requires activities aimed at prevention of conflict specifically,41 as well as
preventing specific types of violence against women (VAW), including gender-based violence (GBV).42
The protection pillar of the WPS agenda calls for deterrence efforts, physical protection from specific
41
“General Recommendation No. 30 on Women in Conflict Prevention, Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations,”
UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/30 (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, October 18,
2013), para. 30.
42
Ibid., 29.

15 Archambeault
types of violence, including GBV,43 and protection from: arbitrary arrests and detentions,44 torture,45
restrictions in dress and freedom of movement,46 forced displacement,47 and electoral violence.48
The WPS agenda also calls for ensuring women’s participation in all decision-making bodies and
processes that affect peace and security, encompassing domestic governing and law making bodies,
constitutional processes, transitional justice mechanisms, and peace processes at every stage,49 and
emphasizes recovery processes including security sector reform measures,50 legislative, constitutional,
43
UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) [on women and peace and security],31 October
2000, S/RES/1325 (2000) [UNSCR 1325], OP 10 and OP 12; UN Security Council, Security Council resolution
1820 (2008) [on actsof sexual violence against civilians in armed conflicts],19 June 2008, S/RES/1820 (2008),
[UNSCR 1820], OP 2, 3, 8, 9, 10; Geneva Conventions of 1949, Common Art. 3(1); Geneva Convention (III) art.
14; Geneva Convention (IV) art. 27; Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, art. 10 and 76; Additional
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, art. 4 and 14; UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,10 December 1984, United Nations, Treaty
Series, vol. 1465, p. 85[CAT], art. 2, 16; CEDAW GeneralRecommendation No. 19, paras 1, 6, 7, 9, and 16; UN
General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010),17 July 1998, [Rome
Statute], art. 7, 8; Arms Trade Treaty,art. 7(4); ICCPR, art. 6, 9; ICESCR,art. 12(1)
44
See UN GeneralAssembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,10 December 1948, 217 A (III), art. 6, and
9
45
UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman orDegrading Treatment or
Punishment,10 December 1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85 CAT, art.2, 16, 29; UN General
Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010),17 July 1998, art. 7, 8, 30.
46
CEDAW,7, art. 1; Universal Declaration of Human Rights,10 December 1948, 217 A (III), 6, 13; UN General
Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty
Series, vol. 999, p. 171, art. 4(1), 6.
47
UDHR,6, 15; UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women,18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p. 13, Art. 7, 9
48
ICCPR,6, 25 (a-c); CEDAW,7; UDHR,7, 21; UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2122 (2013)
[on women and peace and security],18 October 2013, S/RES/2122 (2013), [UNSCR 2122], OP 8
49
CEDAW,7, 8; CEDAW GeneralRecommendation No. 30, para 28, 42, 44; United Nations, Beijing
Declaration and Platformof Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women,27 October 1995, para
142(a); ICCPR,25 (a-c); UDHR,art. 21; UNSCR 1325; UNSCR 1820; UN Security Council, Security Council
resolution 1888 (2009) [on acts of sexual violence against civilians in armed conflicts],30 September
2009, S/RES/1888 (2009), [UNSCR 1888]; UNSCR 2122.
50
CEDAW,art. 2(a-c) & (f-g), art. 3, 15, 16(1)(h); CEDAW GeneralRecommendation No. 30, para 71; UDHR,
art. 21; ICCPR,art. 2(2); UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2106 (2013)[on sexual violence in
armed conflict],24 June 2013, S/RES/2106 (2013), [UNSCR 2106], OP 2, 16; UNSCR 1888, OP 6; UDHR,art.
17

16 Archambeault
and governance reform measures,51 and accountability for human rights abuses and violations of
international humanitarian law.52
For the purposes of this paper, the dimensions of the WPS agenda that should be emphasized are
women’s roles in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. For example, resolution 1325 reaffirmed “the
important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building.”53 The
Committee on the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW Committee) likewise stressed the contributions of women to conflict prevention and
peacebuilding in its General recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-
conflict situations. It restated the obligations of states parties to CEDAW to focus on early warning
systems as well as promoting prevention efforts that “tackle the root causes of conflict.” Significantly,
the CEDAW Committee noted the “correlation between the increased prevalence of gender-based
violence and discrimination and the outbreak of conflict.”54 Conversely, this means that efforts to
address, reduce, and eliminate gender-based violence (GBV) is a key strategy of conflict prevention.55
51
CEDAW,art. 2(a-c) & (f-g), art. 3; CEDAW GeneralRecommendation No. 30, para 71; UDHR,art. 21;
UNSCR 1888, OP 6.
52
Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 146, 147; Rome
Statute, art. 7, 8, 68(1), 43(6); UNSCR 1820, OP 4; UNSCR 1888, OP 6, 7; UNSCR 2106, OP 16; See also,
Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of
international human rights and serious violations of humanitarian law, Commission on Human Rights Res.
2005/35, 19 April 2005; and ECOSOC Res. 2005/35, 25 July 2005, Principle 22(b) which provides that the right
to reparation of the victim includes, as a modality of satisfaction, the ‘‘[v]erification of the facts and full and
public disclosure of the truth.’’ Principle 24 further provides that: ‘‘victims and their representatives should be
entitled to seek and obtain information on the causes leading to their victimization and on the causes and
conditions pertaining to the gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of
international humanitarian law and to learn the truth in regard to these violations;” UDHR,art. 8; ICCPR,art.
2(3); CAT, art. 14; Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts page 3 (Protocol I) art. 91;
Rome Statute, art. 75; UNSCR 2122, OP 13.
53
UNSCR 1325 (2000)
54
“CEDAW General Recommendation No. 30 (2013),” para. 29.
55
Ibid.

17 Archambeault
Linking the WPS agenda’s recognition of women’s significance to conflict prevention and
peacebuilding with Galtung’s conceptions of peace and violence and more recent developments
concentrating on spillover effects as root causes to conflict the following becomes clear. In order to
achieve sustainable peace all three forms of violence must be addressed, direct, structural and cultural,
as they lead into and reinforce each other. As women are victims of structural, cultural, and direct
violence throughout the world, addressing all three forms of violence against women is thus necessary to
reduce the risk of future conflict. Furthermore, as women experience conflict distinctly and disparately
because of their gendered structural, cultural, and physical, violence, then only by addressing all three
forms of violence is sustainable peace able to be achieved.
Historically, much attention has gone to protecting or addressing women’s physical security
needs both during and outside of conflict contexts. However, according to Galtung, sustainable peace is
only achievable if all three forms of violence are addressed. Thus, even in conflict contexts
humanitarian, development, and human rights actors must seek to target programming and policies to
address pre-conflict forms of structural, cultural, and physical violence, as well as exacerbated
manifestations of these forms of violence as experienced by women in conflict contexts. Although
Jordan is not currently in conflict under traditional interpretations, the extreme spillover effects
experienced within the country and throughout the region as a result of the Syria Civil War means that
for the purposes of this analysis, the northern governorates of Jordan, those areas hardest hit by influxes
of Syrian refugees, should be considered conflict contexts as well. As such, in order to address the needs
of women in host communities in Jordan, policy and programming must be directed at physical, cultural,
and structural violence experienced by women in these host communities, as well as the exacerbated
effects of these forms of violence resulting from the conflict context.

18 Archambeault
b. Gender
This paper also intends to undertake a gendered analysis. As such it is necessary to briefly define
what is meant by the term gender. Gender should be understood as primarily a social distinction that
exists in societal structures and is reinforced by cultural narratives and direct violence. Gender
determines not only how people perceive themselves but also how they are perceived by others and how
they are perceived as part of society more generally.56 Gender often determines and shapes personal
choices in regards to family life, employment, education, and healthcare. Gender also impacts the very
material and cultural resources to which people have access.57 Significantly, gender is more than just a
set of ideas about what it means to be male or female; it is “a way of categorizing, ordering, and
symbolizing power, of hierarchically structuring relationships among different categories of people, and
different human activities symbolically associated with masculinity and femininity.”58 Much like racism,
colonialism, and class based power systems, gendered power structures rest on distinctions and the
categorization of man and woman, defining rights, responsibilities, levels of authority, access and
options between the two.59 It is a way of ordering the sexes and distributing power and rationalizing why
some, men, have certain access, resources, or opportunities, which others, women, do not. Sex refers to
biological distinctions between male and female, whereas gender is about socialized norms of man and
woman. The differing experiences of men and women have everything to do with gender, social
positioning, and underlying social structures.60
56
Cohn, Women and Wars,3.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid., 4.
60
Ibid., 37.

19 Archambeault
It is also significant to mention the concept of intersectionality as it is at the heart of gender
theory. Gender roles do not exist in a vacuum and must be understood as one factor of many structuring
societal power dynamics, including socio-economic class, race, religion, ethnicity, age, and sexuality.61
As such, and as the WPS agenda reflects, gender then greatly impacts female experiences of conflict- it
is not then female experiences of conflict that should be considered but rather women’s experiences of
conflict, as woman means something distinct and is manifested differently dependent on context.62
c. Human Rights, Norm Creation, and Cultural Relativism
The last underlying theory that this paper accepts and thus needs to address relates to the
universal application of human rights in contexts that argue for cultural relativism, and in particular,
how human rights norms are integrated into contexts that use cultural rationalizations in violations and
abuses.
There are large gaps between international human rights norms and the codification of these
norms in treaties and declarations, and the translation of these norms into local communities where the
subjects of the given norms live and work.63 Human rights are infused with cultural assumptions and
value judgments about the nature of a human being, and one’s relationship with the community and
state, and as such these rights are not often easily received and adopted between settings.64 A long
61
Ibid., 5.
62
For more detailed and varied analyses of gender and conflict the following are excellent sources on the topic:
Cohn, Women and Wars; Valerie M. Hudson, ed., Sex and World Peace (NewYork:Columbia University Press,
2012); ’Funmi Olonisakin, Karen Barnes,and Eka Ikpe, eds., Women, Peace and Security: Translating Policy
into Practice,1. issued in pbk, Contemporary Security Studies (London: Routledge, 2012); Lois Ann Lorentzen
and Jennifer E. Turpin, eds., The Women and War Reader (New York:New York University Press,1998); Laura
Sjoberg and Sandra Via, eds., Gender,War, and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives,Praeger Security International
(Santa Barbara,Calif: Praeger,2010); Laura Sjoberg, Gender, War,and Conflict (Cambridge:Polity Press,2014);
Gender, Peace and Security:Women’s Advocacy and Conflict Resolution (Commonwealth Secretarial, 2012).
63
Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice,
Chicago Series in Law and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,2006), 2–3.
64
Ibid.

20 Archambeault
history of research on rule of law and human rights norms have shown that punishment alone does not
empower the law or shape society to mirror desired norms. Rather, the norms promoted by laws must
become part of everyday lives and societal practices.65 For human rights norms to be effective, they
must go beyond the textual language and become embedded in the culture.66 International and local non-
governmental organizations play an essential part in interpreting international human rights norms for
local contexts, while taking stories with local understanding and appeal and framing them in human
rights based language.67
Although it may be misleading to claim all the values promoted in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) are universal, as a good deal of the world does not abide by every article, it is
more helpful perhaps to view the UDHR as an ideal from which to aspire. Universal application and
acceptance of the UDHR values are clearly aspirational and must then be treated somewhat sensitively
in contexts where local adoption of these principles has been slow or nonexistent. Efforts then should be
focused on drawing light on the gaps in universal achievement, fully comprehending the context in
question, and determining the best way for local NGOs and governments to translate existing local
narratives into a human rights framework. States are ultimately responsible for bringing domestic and
customary laws into conformity with international law obligations.68 However, it must be recognized
that some contexts may take longer to comply than others. Political will in this regard is essential and
focusing on achieving such political commitments and follow through, although slow, may be a good
start to addressing the problem. Practically speaking, attempts to force state compliance have for the
65
Ibid., 3.
66
Rebecca J. Cook,ed., Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives,Pennsylvania Studies
in Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,1994), 39.
67
Merry, Human Rights and GenderViolence,3.
68
Cook, Human Rights of Women,167.

21 Archambeault
most part failed, and new methods in search of universal achievement of human rights norms are
necessary.
What has been clear is that norms change over time. Exposure to different cultures, values,
religion, and experiences has certainly had local level impacts. For the purposes of this paper, it is
necessary to understand that the author views all aspects of society and daily life through a human rights
framework. It is this framework, a framework that relies upon and demands the dignity of the human
being, against which all things are measured. As such, this paper recognizes that despite the universality
of human rights norms, and legal commitments made, local adoption of such norms is essential and
cannot be forced. As such, local civil society organizations are the most likely translators of
international human rights norms into local narratives.
Part III: Gendered Impacts of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Jordanian Host Communities
a. Education:
The influx of Syrian refugees into Jordan has had an extremely significant impact on Jordan’s
education sector, especially public schools. The education sector has been a high priority of the
government of Jordan, and through much investment, Jordan met its Millennium Development Goal
(MDG) targets for both universal primary enrollment and for gender parity.69 In general, girls have
lower dropout rates than boys, especially in secondary school,70 and girls’ schools were considered to be
of higher quality overall than boys.71 Women and girls have slightly higher participation rates in
69
“Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan” (Kingdom of Jordan Ministry of
Planning and International Cooperation and the United Nations, 2013), 56. Ministry of Education, enrollment data
for school year 2014/2015, November 2013;
70
Ibid.; Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Jordan Response Platform to the Syria Crisis,
and United Nations, “Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis: 2016-2018.”
71
“Insights into Gender Dynamics in Marginalised Urban Communities in Jordan” (Jordanian Hashemite Fund
for Human Development, 2009).; USAID/Jordan,Gender Analysis and Assessment,March 2012.

22 Archambeault
secondary and higher education, plus 3 percent respectively, however, women’s labor force participation
rates remain significantly lower than men’s.72
Since the onset of the Syrian Civil War, the number of boys and girls registered as refugees
enrolled in public education institutions has rapidly increased.73 This increase has caused a strain on
education sector resources and infrastructure.74 These impacts are seen most distinctly in the
governorates of Amman, Mafraq, and Irbid75- where the majority of Syrian refugees currently reside.76
By the end of October 2013, 85,493 Syrian refugee children enrolled in the public schools of host
communities.77 Data shows that 70 percent of all eligible refugee children have enrolled in schools
currently. In addition, to the Syrian refugee children, an additional 35,000 Jordanian children moved
from private to public school by the start of the 2014 academic year, likely as a result of the suffering
Jordanian economy.78 However, although the Jordan Response Platform attributes this shift to the
economic impacts of the Syria crisis, data as to private to public school shifts over the last decade was
unavailable and thus contextually, it is unclear as to whether this number is a large spike as well as what
other potential reasons for the shift could indicate.
72
“Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan,” 2013, 56; “Understanding Social
Cohesion and Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities: Assessment Report” (Amman,Jordan: REACH,2014).
73
United Nations, “Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis: 2016-2018”; Jordan Ministry of Planning and
International Cooperation, Jordan Response Platform to the Syria Crisis, and United Nations, “Jordan Response
Plan 2015 to the Syria Crisis.”
74
United Nations, “Jordan Response Plan 2015 to the Syria Crisis”; “Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of
the Syrian Crisis on Jordan,” 2013.
75
76
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response.”
77
“Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan,” 2013, 58.
78
Ibid.

23 Archambeault
Crowding of spaces in school, as well as shortages in qualified teachers are major resource
problems for the state.79 Nearly half of all public schools are now classified as crowded, compared to 36
percent of schools nationally in 2011.80 Overcrowding in schools has long been an issue in Jordan, and
was identified as a threat to quality of education even prior to the crisis. In 2011, a study by the National
Center for Human Resource Development in Jordan reported that 36 percent of all schools in the country
were crowded, emphasizing that urban schools were the most affected.81 In the northern governorates
most affected by the Syrian refugee crisis, 22 percent of schools were already crowded and operating in
excess of capacity prior to the refugee influx. A September 2013 study undertaken by UNICEF and the
Ministry of Education of the Government of Jordan showed that half of the schools in Amman and Irbid
were overcrowded and thus unable to accommodate additional influxes of students. Amman and Irbid
currently host some of the highest numbers of Syrian refugees. Sixty-six percent of schools in Amman,
68 percent of the schools in Irbid, 50 percent of schools in Mafraq, and 62 percent of schools in Zarqa,
all governorates heavily affected by the Syrian refugee crisis, were classified as either crowded or over-
crowded according to the Jordanian Ministry of Education.82
Unfortunately, data on the enrollment of Syrian refugee children is not disaggregated by gender.
However, assuming enrollment rates roughly mirror the demographics of the Syrian refugee community,
(of all Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR 16.9 percent are females between the ages of 5 and 17
79
“Understanding Social Cohesion and Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities: Assessment Report.”
80
“Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan,” 2013; “Understanding Social
Cohesion and Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities: Assessment Report”; Jordan Ministry of Planning and
International Cooperation, Jordan Response Platform to the Syria Crisis, and United Nations, “Jordan Response
Plan 2015 to the Syria Crisis.”
81
“Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan,” 2013, 59; Jordan Ministry of
“Jordan Response Plan 2015 to the Syria Crisis.”
82
“Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan,” 2013, 60, fig. 18; Jordan Ministry of
“Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis: 2016-2018.”

24 Archambeault
and 18 percent are male),83 and that current trends in higher dropout rates for boys remain constant, a
picture begins to form. Pre-crisis, overcrowding was often higher in girls’ schools84 and it is likely that
this problem remains. Much more research is required, however, including the compilation of gender
disaggregated data, updated statistics on dropout rates, and an analysis of how early marriage,
particularly among Syrian refugee communities, affects girls’ education.
The Ministry of Education has attempted to recruit teachers to address human resource capacity
concerns; however, these teachers have proven generally unqualified and underprepared for the
difficulties currently facing schools.85 One study found that temporary teachers were generally less able
to manage their classrooms effectively than those teachers who were permanent appointments.86 In
addition, the Ministry of Education has resorted to utilizing double-shift schedules in a large number of
public schools, 98 to be exact, in an attempt to mitigate the issues of crowding and lack of qualified
teachers.87 The proportion of students attending double-shifted schools has doubled since the onset of
the Syrian crisis.88 This is unfortunately in direct opposition to the Ministry of Education’s stated goals
to reduce the number of such double-shift schools, because of the negative impact on the quality of
education received in such contexts. The majority of schools in the northern governorates have adopted
double-shift schedules. At some schools, classes have been shortened to half an hour, affecting the
83
84
“Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan,” 2013, 2013; “Understanding Social
Cohesion and Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities: Assessment Report.”
85
“Understanding Social Cohesion and Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities: Assessment Report”; Jordan
Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Jordan Response Platform to the Syria Crisis, and United
Nations, “Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis: 2016-2018”; “Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the
Syrian Crisis on Jordan” (Kingdom of Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and the United
Nations, 2014).
86
87
88
“Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan,” 2013, 6–7.

25 Archambeault
amount of time teachers can spend on a given lesson.89 Officials in one highly affected northern
community, Aljoun, reported that teachers are simply unable to give students necessary individualized
attention.
In addition to overcrowding, the influx of Syrian refugee children enrolled in public schools has
also put a strain on school infrastructure. A study by UNICEF and Japanese Emergency NGO (JEN)
reported that only 27 percent of the 474 schools assessed had bathrooms of moderate quality. This is
particularly important for girls as the low quality of bathrooms has been shown to have a negative effect
on girls’ attendance, especially in secondary school.90
Despite efforts to address the needs of refugee children and host community populations alike,
the Ministry has expressed quality concern regarding the current educational context.91 The state is
particularly worried about the effect that the current lower educational quality will have on a generation
of Jordanians. Education sector related tensions, including differential levels of access, as well as
resentment about the current education issues has been raised consistently as an increasing problem
between Syrian refugee populations and Jordanian host communities.92 This increase in tension between
the two populations has unfortunately resulted in manifestations of violence and bullying in schools.93
89
“Understanding Social Cohesion and Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities: Assessment Report,” 11.
90
91
United Nations, “Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis: 2016-2018.”
92
“Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan,” 2014; “Needs Assessment Review of
the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan,” 2013; “Understanding Social Cohesion and Resilience in Jordanian
Host Communities: Assessment Report”; “Mapping of Host Community-Refugee Tensions in Mafraq and
Ramtha, Jordan”; Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Jordan Response Platform to the
Syria Crisis, and United Nations, “Jordan Response Plan 2015 to the Syria Crisis”; Jordan Ministry of Planning
and International Cooperation, Jordan Response Platform to the Syria Crisis, and United Nations, “Jordan
Response Plan to the Syria Crisis: 2016-2018”; Sarah Bailey and Veronique Barbelet, “Towards a Resilience-
Based Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Critical Review of Vulnerability Criteria and Frameworks.”
93
Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and Jordan Response Plan, Comprehensive Vulnerability
Assessment,August 2015.

26 Archambeault
The table below shows the percentage of Jordanian women aged 15 years and older who have
attained a basic level of education or higher, secondary level of education or higher, or are illiterate.94
Due to the limited data available, (it would be particularly useful to have data for the years 2014 and
2015, and governorate disaggregated data for the years 2003-2009), as well as unknown factors affecting
specific contexts of each governorate, it is difficult at first glance to see any particularly significant
trends. However, upon further study some potential trends are evident. Those governorates hosting the
largest percentage of Syrian refugees, Mafraq, Irbid, and Amman, show little to no improvement in
women’s illiteracy rates and achievements in attaining basic level or secondary level education. This is
especially interesting when compared to the numbers for the entire Kingdom of Jordan. In Mafraq, the
percentage of women in the governorate who fall into the illiterate category dropped suddenly after the
onset of the crisis, for reasons unknown, and have since held steady. In Irbid, for the same category, the
percentage of women in the governorate who are categorized as illiterate fluctuated between 10% and
11%. In Amman, the percentage of illiterate women fell, although in extremely small increments.
Interestingly, in comparison with the entire Kingdom, for which many more years of data are available,
one can see that the percentage of illiterate Jordanian women had been falling steadily for nearly seven
years. After 2011, which coincides with the onset of the Syrian crisis and refugee influx, the numbers
related to illiteracy stop falling, and level off.
94
The author has adapted the Government of Jordan’s definitions for the purposes of this paper and defines these
categories as follows: illiterate is a person who cannot read or write a simple description about himself in any
language; basic level of education and above is a person who can read and write in a language and has completed
elementary level education and/or higher; secondary level of education and above is a person who can read and
write in any language and has completed secondary level education and above, including an intermediate diploma,
bachelor’s degree,higher diploma, master’s degree,or a doctorate.

27 Archambeault
Table 1 Women's (15 years or older) Education Levels and Illiteracy Rates in Jordan by Governorate95
A similar pattern emerges for those who have achieved basic levels of education and higher or
secondary levels of education and higher. The percentage of women in Jordan who have achieved either
basic or secondary levels and higher rose fairly steadily from 2003 through 2010, with a slight
regression in 2006 for unknown reasons that should be explored. Between 2010 and 2011 and 2011 and
2012 these percentages continued to increase, however the increase was much smaller than in previous
years, indicating perhaps a slowing of progress in this area. Between 2012 and 2013, the percentage for
95
Chart compiled by the author using data from Jordan’s Department of Statistics.

28 Archambeault
those who have achieved a basic level of education or higher stayed exactly the same, in effect halting
the progress seen previously and the percentage for those who have achieved a secondary level of
education or higher actually decreased incrementally.
Beyond access and quality concerns, education sector impacts are also extremely important in
terms of their influence on cultural norms, specifically gender norms. One perception study showed that
many Jordanian parents in host communities see Syrian refugees as having markedly differing values
and traditions, particularly in regard to religion, education, and gender.96 These parents discussed their
views that Syrian students are prone to skipping school and generally less interested in education.97 In
addition, parents participating in this study emphasized that their children are experiencing
psychological effects after interacting with Syrian children. This is believed to be due to discussions and
accounts of trauma and violence experienced by the refugee children prior to arriving in Jordan.98
Schools are one place where Jordanian and Syrian youths can meet and share stories, information, and
ideas. In addition, there was evidenced a large perception that differences and values have led to
increased instances of confrontation and violence in schools, and concerns were raised that such
violence would bleed out into other community and familial dimensions.99
Another study has highlighted the importance of education, especially textbooks, in establishing
and reinforcing gender norms. The study explored the role of the school curriculum in the “socialization
of cultural and ideological messages about women and economic life.”100 The findings showed that the
Jordanian curriculum was largely consistent in reinforcing entrenched gender norms, particularly
96
97
Ibid.
98
Ibid.
99
Ibid., 12.
100
Mayyada Abu Jaber,“Breaking through Glass Doors: A Gender Analysis of Womenomics in the Jordanian
National Curriculum” (Center for Universal Education at Brookings, December 2014), 2.

29 Archambeault
regarding women’s roles as mothers and wives, rather than as workforce participants. For instance, the
curriculum as a whole stressed the desirability of stay-at-home futures for women, represented women
in menial and subordinate positions, and emphasized the idea that women who worked outside the home
would be unable to meet their familial responsibilities.101
Indeed research into gender dynamics in two communities in the northern governorates showed
that both men and women saw education as important for girls only to raise their marriage prospects.102
Significantly, both men and women perceived women who went on to higher education in a negative
light.103 Women respondents claimed as fact that women at universities were prostituting themselves for
tuition, grades, and preferential treatment.104 The majority of male respondents strongly disapproved of
the mixing of genders at university and claimed that they would not allow their sisters or daughters to
go.105 This research shows that although higher education enrollment is generally up in Jordan, and a
large number of women have enrolled in universities across the country, the communities in the northern
governorates are not perhaps as progressive as national data indicates on these particular gender norms.
As it is these governorates where the majority of Syrian refugees are currently residing, it is essential to
monitor and study these trends and perceptions of gender roles in these governorates in particular.
Although more research is required to determine how the changing education sector realities
affect both the teaching and socialization of gender norms, it is clear that education plays a large part in
this process in Jordan.
b. Health
101
Ibid., 2,5,7.
102
“Insights into Gender Dynamics in Marginalised Urban Communities in Jordan,” 18.
103
“Insights into Gender Dynamics in Marginalised Urban Communities in Jordan.”
104
Ibid., 18–19.
105
Ibid., 10.

30 Archambeault
Another sector experiencing strains due to the influx of Syrian refugees is health. Syrian refugee
demands for health services have put severe pressure on Jordan’s public health system as it attempts to
cope and respond to both those needs that existed prior to the refugee crisis, as well as the dramatic
population increase in the northern governorates. Data from the Ministry of Health evidences this
dramatic increase in demand. For example, the frequency of outpatient visits to primary healthcare
centers by Syrian refugees increased from 68 in early 2012, to nearly 16,000 by March of 2013.106
Syrian refugees visiting hospitals during this same period between January 2012 and March of 2013
showed an increase from 300 to 10,330.107 In the northern governorates, where the Syrian refugees
account for nearly half of the population, Jordanian host community residents attempting to access
healthcare, face longer waits and report generally decreased standards of care.108 Quality of care is
suffering, risking all the progress and gains that Jordan has achieved over the last decade. Of concern are
the decreasing ratios of health specialists and hospital beds to the population, which have dropped
considerably.109 Deficiencies and availability in medication, equipment, and physicians have been
reported.110 In the northern governorates, cardiac and vascular drugs, oral rehydration, and diuretics
have been reported as particularly deficiencies of concern.
106
“Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan,” 2013, 69. Government of Jordan,
Department of Statistics, accessed November 2015; Ministry of Health, Statistics, accessed September,2015.
107
“Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan,” 2013; Jordan Ministry of Planning
Response Plan 2015 to the Syria Crisis”; Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Jordan
Response Platform to the Syria Crisis, and United Nations, “Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis: 2016-
2018.”
108
109
Response Plan to the Syria Crisis: 2016-2018.”
110
Response Plan 2015 to the Syria Crisis.”

31 Archambeault
The equipment necessary for vaginal birth delivery was found to be available at less than 50
percent of health facilities in Mafraq, the governorate hosting the largest number of Syrian refugees.111
In addition, the Ministry of Health reported a “pervasive shortage of specialized health workers,”
including gynecologists, in the northern governorates.112
Prior to the Syrian refugee crisis Jordan had made progress in lowering infant and child mortality
rates, as well as maternal mortality rates. In 2000-2001, Jordan’s maternal mortality ratio was
36/100,000 live births, and in 2010, the ratio was 19/100,000.113 Significantly, Jordan has one of the
lowest infant and maternal mortality rates in the Arab states region overall. However, despite progress
made in maternal and infant mortality, maternal and child health in Jordan are still significant areas of
concern. In particular, micronutrient deficiencies remain common. Iron deficiency anemia continues to
be a severe public health problem for children under five and women of reproductive age both within
refugee and host community households. For instance, one third of Jordanian children under five are
anemic.114
In addition, Jordan has made important strides in preventive healthcare. It’s Public Health Act of
2008 granted free access, to both citizens and permanent residents alike, to all preventive services. This
included immunizations and vaccines, as well as treatment for communicable diseases with large public
health implications.115 As a result of this investment, there was a large drop in the incidence of vaccine-
preventable diseases overall. For example, tuberculosis rates dropped from 7.3/100,000 in 1993 to
111
“Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan,” 2013.
112
Ibid.
113
and United Nations, “Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis: 2016-2018”; “Access to Health Care and Tensions
in Jordanian Communities Hosting Syrian Refugees:Thematic Assessment Report” (REACH,June 2014).
114
115
Ibid.; “Understanding Social Cohesion and Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities: Assessment Report”;

32 Archambeault
2.5/100,000 in 2012.116 However, despite this progress just a few years ago, currently only one third of
Jordanian mothers have been protected against neonatal tetanus.117 Other routine vaccination coverage is
reportedly extremely low among high risk populations, including women, children, persons with
disabilities, refugee populations, and those residing in the most impoverished areas of the country.118
Women and children living in impoverished areas are thus much less likely to have received any of the
most basic vaccinations available. This is a particular cause for concern as the changing demographics in
these governorates, notably the influx of a Syrian refugee population with low vaccination rates, leaves
women and children in these areas extremely vulnerable to the contraction of mostly preventable
diseases. For example, tuberculosis prevalence is three times greater among Syrians, 116 cases of
measles had been diagnosed as of 2014, and a recent outbreak of polio, which had been previously
eradicated in Jordan, has increased concerns of health officials that a greater influx of funding will be
necessary to fight against regression in this area.119
Beyond quality of service issues, access to healthcare is also growing increasingly problematic,
due primarily to funding. Nearly one quarter of all Jordanians lack access to universal health insurance
coverage and the majority of those doing without reside in the most impoverished governorates in
northern Jordan.120 These are the same governorates seeing the largest influxes of refugees currently. In
116
117
118
“Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan,” 2013; “Access to Health Care and
Tensions in Jordanian Communities Hosting Syrian Refugees: Thematic Assessment Report.”
119
“Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan,” 2014; “Understanding Social
Cohesion and Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities: Assessment Report,” 13; Jordan Ministry of Planning
120
Response Plan 2015 to the Syria Crisis.”

33 Archambeault
addition, although initially granted free access to healthcare, Syrian refugees have had to pay the same
as uninsured Jordanians since November 2014, as funding constraints forced the Ministry of Health to
change its initial policy.121
Over half of the households in those governorates hardest hit by the refugee crisis fall under the
classification of having severe or high health vulnerability.122 Although data on host community
vulnerability is largely surprisingly unavailable, research on Syrian refugee households evidences the
increasing concerns over healthcare quality and access for both refugee and host populations. For
example, in terms of maternal healthcare, half of refugee families with pregnant women reported that
they had no access to ante-natal healthcare.123 Similarly, almost 60 percent of families with lactating
women reported no access to post-natal healthcare.124
A recent perception study undertaken by REACH found that Jordanians largely believe that the
influx of Syrian refugees is the primary reason for the recent decline in quality of healthcare services in
the state.125 When asked if they felt that they had adequate access to healthcare services in their
community, 57 percent of Syrian refugee respondents, compared to only 49 percent of Jordanian host
community respondents replied in the affirmative.126 Sixty percent of Jordanian respondents and 39
percent of Syrians responded that overcrowding in healthcare centers were the primary reason behind
121
122
123
Ibid.
124
Ibid.; “Access to Health Care and Tensions in Jordanian Communities Hosting Syrian Refugees:Thematic
Assessment Report”; “Mapping of Host Community-Refugee Tensions in Mafraq and Ramtha, Jordan.”
125
“Understanding Social Cohesion and Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities: Assessment Report,” 14, fig.
5.
126
Ibid., 14.

34 Archambeault
increased tensions.127 Interestingly, 26 percent of Jordanian respondents and 21 percent of Syrian
refugee respondents answered that uneven access to services between Jordanians and Syrians was
causing tension in the community.128
Increasing obstacles to accessing healthcare, including long distances and transportation costs
between healthcare centers, long waiting lists, and long lines to receive care have contributed to a
decline in access, and perceptions of inequality among Jordanians and Syrian refugee populations.129 As
a result, those host community populations that are among the most impoverished in the country have
been forced to resort to range of coping strategies, including the selling of personal belongings, and
relying on self-care.130
Additional obstacles for women in host communities stem from the extremely pervasive
patriarchal societal structures, particularly in the northern governorates. A study exploring gender
dynamics that focused on two marginalized communities, Sahab and Irbid, both currently experiencing
large influxes of Syrian refugees, found that women in these communities have to negotiate permission
for trips outside of the home, including visits for essential services like healthcare.131 Additionally, focus
groups of male members of the community expressed a great deal of concern over allowing their wives
or sisters to travel long distances by themselves, access services or care in predominantly male sectors
(as is most of the public domain, including health centers), or be exposed to situations wherein they
might be exposed to either harassment or conversation with other men, or bonding opportunities with
other women.132 As women are generally not permitted to access healthcare services on their own, they
127
“Access to Health Care and Tensions in Jordanian Communities Hosting Syrian Refugees:Thematic
Assessment Report,” 9.
128
Ibid., 10.
129
Ibid., 15.
130
Ibid., 5; World Health Organization, “Countries: Jordan,” n.d., http://www.who.int/countries/jor/en/.
131
“Insights into Gender Dynamics in Marginalised Urban Communities in Jordan,” 4.
132

35 Archambeault
greatly rely on male family members who are both willing and able to take them to seek care. As a
result, women’s healthcare needs in these communities are likely not often prioritized.
c. Livelihoods
Poverty in the state is primarily concentrated in those northern governorates hosting the largest
numbers of refugees.133 As a result of the influx of Syrian refugees, the total number of poor households
has increased as well. However, significantly, the level of poverty has intensified or worsened.134 Most
recent government statistics show that the largest numbers of poor households are in the host
communities of Amman, Irbid, Zarqa, and Mafraq.135 Mafraq and Irbid have also been found to be the
most vulnerable to shocks, and 31 percent and 27 percent of their households, respectively, are
characterized as vulnerable to shocks by the government.136 This means that approximately one third of
their populations are vulnerable or fragile when faced with cost of living shocks.
In addition, the Government of Jordan utilizes a Quality of Life Index to measure the standard of
living in order to see which households live in deprivation. This index further confirms that the
governorates of Mafraq, Zarqa, and Irbid had the highest levels of deprivation prior to the Syrian crisis,
and continue to have the highest levels of deprivation.137 Vulnerability of these governorates prior to the
crisis was the result of income levels, but also, more importantly, a relative deprivation in quality and
access to decent housing and social services, including healthcare and education.138 Lastly, the majority
of poor households in Jordan are in urban areas of the country, 80.35 percent compared to 19.65 percent
133
134
135
136
137
138
Ibid., 37–38.

36 Archambeault
in rural areas.139 As the majority of Syrian refugees are living in these urban areas, this fact is
significant. The influx of Syrian refugees into these impoverished host communities certainly constitutes
a shock to already vulnerable and often reeling households. Furthermore, the least resilient to shocks and
stresses related livelihoods are female-headed households, and although actual data on the proportion of
such households remains unclear initial research indicates that it is likely low.140
Impoverished households in the state have limited productivity capacities, high fertility rates, and
have achieved relatively low levels of education.141 For instance, the average family size for
impoverished households is 7.4, with 4.1 being children, compared to the national average of 5.4, with
2.9 being children.142 Significantly, women in these governorates report little awareness or use of
modern birth control methods.143 According to the government, income for these impoverished
households varies, with half of their income coming from employment, another quarter from aid and
cash transfers, and the last quarter coming from rental or selling of home produced goods.144 Nearly all
of this income goes to food, housing, transportation, clothing, healthcare, and education. The working
poor comprises over half of the working population of Zarqa, and 62 percent and 75 percent of the
working populations of Irbid and Mafraq, respectively.145 The working poor remain such primarily
because of low wages, a situation that is exacerbated by large family sizes.146 The influx of Syrian
139
140
141
142
Government of Jordan, Department of Statistics, accessed November 2015.
143
144
Response Plan to the Syria Crisis: 2016-2018”; Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis, “Comprehensive
Vulnerability Assessment,” 2015.
145
146
Ibid., 39.

37 Archambeault
refugees into these governorates has increased competition for informal relief services as well as
employment services for unskilled labor.147 However, the working poor are excluded from national cash
assistance programs and often see intergenerational poverty within families.148
Poverty levels and reduced economic resources greatly increase women’s vulnerability to access
education, healthcare, and other services that require money. In addition, financial pressures frequently
lead to increases in household insecurity. Tensions and frustrations related to financial concerns in these
governorates in particular, often lead to increased instances of verbal, physical, and economic violence
targeted at women and children.149 Yet despite this recognition by the government, as seen in the
Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation’s collaborative research and analysis in the recent
Jordan Response Platform and Comprehensive Vulnerability Assessment, no comprehensive research
has been undertaken in this regard.
Another impact of note is in regard to food security. Food security is defined as “when all people
at all times have both physical and economic access to sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a
productive and healthy life.”150 Significantly, female headed households in Jordan are twice as likely to
be food insecure as male headed households.151 Food security thus requires both sufficient availability of
food supplies and access. Jordan’s economy was greatly affected by the global economic crisis of 2008
and 2009 and as a result, food prices had already been rising. Two thirds of Jordan’s continuously
growing inflation rate between 2010 and 2012 was due to rising food prices.152 In the last decade alone,
147
“Mapping of Host Community-Refugee Tensions in Mafraq and Ramtha, Jordan”; “Understanding Social
Cohesion and Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities: Assessment Report.”
148
“Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan,” 2013, 39; Jordan Response Platform
for the Syria Crisis, “Comprehensive Vulnerability Assessment.”
149
150
Ibid., 47.
151
152
Dr. Basem M. Lozi, “The Effect of Refugees on Host Country Economy: Evidence from Jordan,”
Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business 5,no. 3 (July 2013): 118.

38 Archambeault
food prices have risen 21 percent. Prior to the Syria crisis, Jordan’s government controlled prices for
basic foods in an effort to address the issue of food insecurity of its people. However, after the crisis
began, subsidy costs greatly increased and the government could no longer afford to continue to control
food prices.153 Compounded with increases in demand and rising costs of related essentials, like water
and fuel, food prices have continued to rise.
The government had thus named food security as a top priority in the years leading up to the
Syrian crisis, and continues to keep careful watch over it currently.154 However, despite this prioritizing,
the Syrian refugee crisis has already affected the food security of vulnerable households in host
communities. For instance, there has been a recorded upward pressure on the prices of locally-produced
food supplies.155 As poorer households will no longer be able to afford foods like chicken, sheep, dairy
products, fruits and vegetables, and eggs, nutrition indicators will likely continue to fall, and some
households may resort to negative coping mechanisms in order to buy such items. For these vulnerable
households, limited income is continuously cited as the most restraining limitation to food access.156
However, rising prices caused by increased demand also exacerbates the problem. Government research
has further found that food security in the country is also linked to education levels, especially illiteracy
and large family sizes.157
Micronutrient deficiencies and poor dietary diversity among women and children in particular,
has been noted158 and highlights the need for increased education in good nutritional practices as well as
153
Dr. Basem M. Lozi, “The Effect of Refugees on Host Country Economy: Evidence from Jordan.”
154
155
Ibid., 6.
156
157
Ibid.; Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis, “Comprehensive Vulnerability Assessment.”
158

39 Archambeault
targeted programming for those most vulnerable to food insecurity. In extremely patriarchal societies,
like the northern governorates of Jordan, women are often the last to eat and the first to go hungry in
times of food insecurity. In addition, as women are predominantly cast in the role of caretakers, they
may face increased pressure to provide quality and nutritious meals to their families, with decreasing
money to spend, and little recourse for assistance. Ensuring that women are not forced into negative
coping strategies, including but not limited to selling their belongings, or survival sex, as is common in
other instances of high food insecurity and limited economic prospects, should be prioritized by
Jordanian government. Similarly, the Jordanian government should target programming related to food
security for vulnerable women as studies have proven that such a focus greatly improves dietary
diversity and nutrition outcomes.
Increased competition for work, both real and perceived, is also a resounding concern among
host community populations. Although not true in every sector, this is especially true in informal
employment situations, the majority of which are usually performed by working poor members of
vulnerable host communities.159 According to the Ministry of Labour, Syrian refugees account for just
3.3 percent of all work permits issued by the end of 2014.160 However, this statistic does not take into
account the whole picture. Syrian refugees are not allowed to work in Jordan without first obtaining a
work permit from the Ministry of Labour.161 However, work permits are only available for jobs that are
classified as open to foreigners, and before obtaining the work permit the Syrian refugee must first find
an employer willing to offer him or her a contract and wait patiently for the bureaucratic process to
complete.162 This process is both lengthy and at times confusing to Syrian refugees unfamiliar with the
159
Ibid.; Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis, “Vulnerability Assessment Framework: Baseline Report,”
May 2015; Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis, “Comprehensive Vulnerability Assessment.”
160
161
“Understanding Social Cohesion and Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities: Assessment Report.”
162
Dr. Basem M. Lozi, “The Effect of Refugees on Host Country Economy: Evidence from Jordan,” 119–120.

40 Archambeault
laws and as such most Syrian refugees have not even attempted to obtain a work permit.163 Due to this
fact many assessments claim the unlikeliness of Syrian refugees taking jobs that would have otherwise
gone to Jordanians. However, these assessments tend to overlook the existence of the informal
employment sector. These temporary, seasonal, and mostly unskilled jobs have seen an increase in
competition as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis. One town in northern Jordan, Balqa, has reported
evidence that large numbers of Syrian refugees have replaced Jordanian residents of host communities in
seasonal agricultural work.164 As vulnerable households in host communities lose access to these types
of informal employment opportunities many are being pushed below the poverty line, and others already
below the poverty line are faced with increasingly impossible choices and tradeoffs to remain afloat.165
One study conducted by REACH, reported that respondents strongly perceived that Jordanian employers
were hiring Syria refugees because they would accept lower standards of working conditions, lower
benefits, and much lower wages.166 Interestingly, Syrians reported feeling exploited by such
employment situations, whereas host community members felt discriminated against.167 These
perceptions are exacerbating tensions between host communities and refugee populations in these
governorates.168 In the same REACH study, 87 percent of Jordanian host community respondents
disagreed or strongly disagreed that there was adequate access to livelihoods in their community. Syrian
163
Ibid.; “Understanding Social Cohesion and Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities: Assessment Report,”
18.
164
165
Ibid.; Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis, “Comprehensive Vulnerability Assessment”; International
Labour Organisation (ILO),“Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labor Market,” April 2015.
166
167
and United Nations, “Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis: 2016-2018.”
168
“Mapping of Host Community-Refugee Tensions in Mafraq and Ramtha, Jordan”; “Understanding Social
Cohesion and Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities: Assessment Report”; “Needs Assessment Review of the
Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan,” 2013; Dr. Basem M. Lozi, “The Effect of Refugees on Host Country
Economy: Evidence from Jordan.”

41 Archambeault
refugee respondents felt similarly with 82 percent disagreeing or strongly disagreeing to the same
statement.169
Another recent study reported that over half of all male Syrian refugees aged 15 and older were
working, and of those, 99 percent were working informally in sectors usually comprised of Jordanian
employees.170 It was further found that these informally employed Syrian refugees are paid less, work
longer hours, and work in poorer conditions than those of Jordanians occupied in similar jobs.171 Local
surveys and assessments organized by the Government of Jordan have found that Syrian refugees are in
fact pushing out Jordanian laborers in specific localities.172 Significantly, reports further estimate that
over time this phenomenon will increase significantly, as Syrians make connections and relationships
with the thousands of small informal businesses that greatly characterize Jordan’s economy.173 Although
slightly dated, these 2013 statistics show the problem clearly. In 2013, it was estimated that 86,307
Jordanian households in the four most affected governorates are poor; more than half of this number
were further classified as working poor.174 In these same four governorates, at least 108,000 refugees
were anticipated to economically active, either currently working or actively seeking out employment.175
169
“Understanding Social Cohesion and Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities: Assessment Report,” 18, fig.
10.
170
United Nations, “Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis: 2016-2018”; Jordan Response Platform for the Syria
Crisis, “Vulnerability Assessment Framework:Baseline Report”; Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis,
“Comprehensive Vulnerability Assessment”; “Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on
Jordan,” 2014.
171
172
173
Ibid.
174
Ibid., 40–41; Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis, “Comprehensive Vulnerability Assessment”;
International Labour Organisation (ILO), “Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labor Market.”
175

42 Archambeault
Jordanian women often comprise part of this informal sector through the production of
homebased goods. Although evidence is limited, it has been suggested that these women are also losing
income generating opportunities due to Syrian refugees, as 6 percent of female Syrian refugees over the
age of 15 are reported as economically active. For example, there has been some evidence of home
based economic activities by Syrian women, including cooking and baking, sewing, and even and the
running of informal hairdressing salons.176 The loss of this income has contributed to further
marginalization and exclusion of women in decision-making in their respective households, particularly
in regards to decisions regarding family finances.177 In addition, children and the elderly in these
households will also likely be affected by lower levels of income, according to focus group discussions
on the subject.178 Perceptions among Jordanian women in host communities revolved around the belief
that Syrian women were being given these opportunities because they were more competitive, more
skilled, and generally settled for lower wages.179
In addition to job competition, the Syria crisis has had much broader economic impacts and has
had direct effects on such industries as tourism, trade, and agriculture, also increasing employment
opportunities in Jordanian host communities.180 Pre-crisis high unemployment rates have been
exacerbated by food insecurity and raising costs of food, water, and fuel, as well as strains on social
service provision more generally. In the first quarter of 2015, the unemployment rate was 11 percent and
176
Ibid., 34.
177
Ibid., 3–4; “Understanding Social Cohesion and Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities: Assessment
Report”; Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Jordan Response Platform to the Syria
Crisis, and United Nations, “Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis: 2016-2018.”
178
179
Ibid.; Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis, “Comprehensive Vulnerability Assessment”; International
Labour Organisation (ILO),“Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labor Market.”
180
“Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan,” 2013, 3; Jordan Response Platform
for the Syria Crisis, “Comprehensive Vulnerability Assessment.”

43 Archambeault
22 percent for men and women respectively.181 The unemployment rate for youth was substantially
higher at 35.8 percent for the 15-19 age group, and 30.4 percent for those in the 20-24 age group.182
Lastly, the most significant evidenced impact of increased Syrian refugees in the labor market
has been the downward pressure placed on wages in the informal economy. The informality of the
employment contract as well as deficiencies in enforcement of labor laws gives employers the
opportunity to exploit employees and pay below the national minimum wage.183 As Syrian refugees are
working for less and less this has had a resounding impact for Jordanians employed in informal
sectors.184 Extremely low wages with no oversight or protection gives rise to dangerous working
conditions, labor exploitation, particularly for already vulnerable populations with little economic or
social power, and child labor. As previously stated, more than half of the poor are working poor, and
half of the income of the households of the working poor comes from wages, this lowering of wages will
likely have serious implications for already vulnerable and impoverished host community households.
For example, some reports have indicated that an increase in negative coping mechanisms to these
financial insecurities has been an increase in informal shelters or settlements, multiple households and
181
United Nations, “Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis: 2016-2018”; “Understanding Social Cohesion and
Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities: Assessment Report”; Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis,
“Vulnerability Assessment Framework: Baseline Report.”
182
United Nations, “Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis: 2016-2018”; International Labour Organisation (ILO),
“Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labor Market.”
183
“Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan,” 2013, 35; Jordan Ministry of
“Jordan Response Plan to the Syria Crisis: 2016-2018”; “Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian
Crisis on Jordan,” 2014.
184
“Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan,” 2013, 35; International Labour
Organisation (ILO), “Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Jordanian Labor Market.”

Leslie.Archambeault.Thesis.December.4.2015.Final

Leslie.Archambeault.Thesis.December.4.2015.Final

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (7)

Viewers also liked

Viewers also liked (20)

Similar to Leslie.Archambeault.Thesis.December.4.2015.Final

Similar to Leslie.Archambeault.Thesis.December.4.2015.Final (20)

Leslie.Archambeault.Thesis.December.4.2015.Final