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Kant’s Third Antinomy
Immanuel Kant is one philosopher who had a gift for the truly challenging and controversial.
It cannot be denied that he was brilliant. It is through this brilliance that the idea of
antinomies arose. The juxtaposition of two affirmations one the thesis and the other the
antithesis, is the foundation of an antinomy. They are contradictory affirmations, and
seemingly the confirmation of one is the rejection of the other. I say seemingly because
through the application of proofs we find ourselves accepting either the truth of both the
thesis and the antithesis, or the falsehood of both the thesis and the antithesis. Kant advances
four antinomies. Of the four, the third antinomy is of particular importance with regards to
this essay. Within the third antinomy the ideas of freedom and of determinism are explored.
The first two antinomies are considered to be mathematical as they concern the finitude of
time and space, basically the mathematical confines of these elements. The third and fourth
antinomies are understood as dynamical, as they concern causation, particularly the initial
cause. It is this initial cause that the third antinomy is grappling with. Kant will provide a
remedy that seems to grant both the thesis and the antithesis truth, a compatibilist approach.
Kant was particularly determined to undermine transcendent metaphysics, and one such
vehicle of the destruction of dogmatic metaphysical pursuits is that of the antinomies. With
each of the four antinomies Kant develops a thesis and an antithesis. Kant’s aim is to provide
reasoning for the refutation of purely rational metaphysics, by showing how a metaphysician
of this kind is fated to walking into cul-de-sacs of contradictions. Through the antinomies
Kant also shows how transcendental idealism (his own brand of idealism) is of paramount
importance for the resolution of these contradictory affirmations. It is worth noting that the
antinomies are purely reason based, so they do not make reference to experience (Wood
2010).
There are questions pure reason leads us into asking. These questions are beyond the
capabilities of man to sufficiently answer, thus we are led to contradictory alternating
conclusions. These are antinomies; there are four antinomies which Kant develops. The first
of which is centred on the possibility that the world is finite in terms of time and in terms of
space (thesis), or the possibility that the world is infinite in terms of space and time. The
second antinomy asks whether the fabrics of matter allow for infinite divisibility (antithesis),
or if whether the matter we are confronted with is composite of simple parts that are
indivisible (thesis). Whether freedom is true (thesis), or if events follow the laws of nature
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(antithesis) is the question for dissection in the third antinomy. In the last antinomy the issue
of contention is whether there is just one first cause for the entire world (thesis) or whether
there is not a first cause for the world (antithesis) (Wood 2010).
The third antinomy (of the four mentioned) is of specific interest. The third antinomy
wrestles with the convoluted subject of freedom and determinism. This is no easy task to
tackle and Kant does it in a manner that leads to a surprising conclusion, considering the
contradictory nature of the thesis and antithesis. The third antinomy is set out to clearly show
how there is no coherent reality where by the thesis and the antithesis are both true.
Thesis: Causality through the laws
of nature is not the only one in
which the representations of the
world can be derived. They can be
understood through free causality.
Antithesis: All that is apparent in the world is
derived from the laws of nature and freedom is not a
reality.
Kant is not referring to freedom as the condition that facilitates alternate possibilities.
Freedom as understood through the lenses of Mr. Kant is the condition of a cause that is not
itself the effect of preceding cause. The cause is itself responsible for its own genesis and the
cause of an effect, all facilitated through self-activity (Priest 2007).
The thesis and the antithesis are not worth anything without the backing of sound proof. The
proof provided for the thesis looks at how accepting a deterministic causal chain, only leads
one to affirming the unacceptable. The argument states that without freedom, the causal chain
would mean that every cause is with a preceding cause and this would follow backwards
infinitely. To accept that there is no first cause to a causal chain is absurd, thus freedom is the
only account that allows for the spontaneous first cause that in itself does not follow natural
law (Rudisill 2012).
The thing about the arguments that provide proof for the thesis and the antithesis is that the
power rests with the proof that is a response to an earlier given proof. In the case of the
possibility of spontaneous (free) action, the proof of the antithesis states that; spontaneous
action requires causation. Causation always precedes the effect; however the idea of
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spontaneous action being the result of preceding causal action contravenes the organization of
causation. Clearly the aim is to cast doubt and ultimately refute the argument of the
spontaneous first cause (Rudisill 2012).
Granted the antinomy seems to concern the first cause, it does. However it does not question
the truth of the existence of a first cause, rather the question is whether the first cause acts
freely when exercising its causal power, or if that is merely according to the natural chain.
Also the point of contention is if this causal power is of an existence that is beyond the
natural world (Wood 2010). Kant stresses how the appeal to causality is not an appeal to
spatiotemporal dependence; basically the first cause is not based upon time. Rather the first
cause is based upon causality, so it is not the beginning of time, but rather the beginning of
the chain of events of the natural world (Grier 2010).
Immanuel Kant remedies the conflict postulated in the third antinomy by making reference to
the concepts of noumena and phenomena. Kant advances a compatibilist account of the
interaction between freedom and determinism. According to Immanuel Kant if one considers
the second analogy that states that the unity of experience depends upon the chain of
causation that natural law accounts for remains intact and thus cannot allow for spontaneous
action. Ultimately experience can only allow for natural order in terms of causation and this
chain must remain intact going backwards (Priest 2007).
Kant understands freedom of two kinds, the first of which is the freedom of the first cause of
all sets of causal chains. This cause is one that is the origin of causality in its entirety, a
causal event a kin to God. The second understanding of freedom is of a more modest and
contracted sense. See in regards to the second understanding the first cause is the first of a
causal chain that is singular and is a part of a set of all causal chains. Basically, this causality
is limited to finite individuals, like man. As man can act freely in deciding to shoot a man in
the head, with this action leading to a series of events, however this is not necessarily an
action that follows natural order and an alternative could have just as sufficiently suited the
conditions of action (B478).
The significance of this consideration is that if one moves away from looking at freedom on a
grand scale, they are open to the possibility of looking at freedom as conditions allowing for
the possibility of spontaneous action occurring not at the beginning of time but rather a
possibility within the passage of time. The proof provided for the thesis of the third antinomy
does not account for the freedom of the persons.
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It is important to grasp that uncaused events are not preposterous, as they appeal to logic that
is perfectly sound. Understandably to accept events that have no cause seems a contravention
of philosophical logic. However the affirmation that all events necessarily require causation
shows a lack of understanding of what event truly means. Event does not denote conditioned
occurrence, because simply put, not all events are caused. Merely because an event takes
place, it does not follow that an event took place preceding the event of interest. With this
consideration the thought of uncaused events is attractive and the will of persons being free is
a lot more plausible. Determinism is not however refuted by the argument for the possibility
of spontaneity, since one is dealing with ideas beyond finite intelligence it is only fair to
account for the reality that is the limitation of human understanding. Thus natural order
determinism is compatible with the understanding of free will as a possibility in this reality
(Priest 2007).
Kant postulates absolute and relative beginnings, thus an absolute beginning is a cause that is
without a foregoing cause, that is a cause that is uncaused by anything outside of itself.
Relative beginning refers to the cause that has events that precede it. Note however how I
said events that precede it, not causes that precede it. This is because Kant suggests that
human action that is considered free would be composite of both kinds of beginnings,
absolute and relative. Therefore free human action is a cause that is not itself caused, but is
within a reality whereby there are events that occur prior to the event, but do not cause it
(B476).
Kant’s ultimate suggestion to resolve the third antinomy is in the form of compatibilism.
Kant postulates that humans are both free and determined. Kant makes use of his
transcendental idealism to truly make sense of this claim. According to Kant man is
constituted by two aspects, phenomenal and noumenal. The noumenal (the way we are
outside of our perception of ourselves) is free. The phenomenal aspect of us is the determined
side as we perceive ourselves as following the order of natural law. Compatibilism advances
that both free causality and determined causality can be true within the same reality. Looking
at the nature of our phenomenal existence it is clear that natural law is the order of the way as
the world appears to us as people. Kant then postulates the second aspect of human existence
(noumenon), as significant for the understanding human action freedom. By freedom Kant is
really referring to two modes or versions of it, practical freedom and transcendental freedom.
Transcendental freedom is the freedom that I have mentioned as related to the idea of the first
cause, or rather the uncaused cause. Transcendental freedom is one that is completely
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metaphysical. Practical freedom on the other end is freedom that man generally attributes to
himself when he considers himself as acting freely and this is the freedom particularly
concerning morality. Essentially the idea is that this type of freedom is indicative of the will
of man. Particularly with the postulation of how one can act according to an alternative action
that is not determined by any factors outside the agents own agency. Transcendental freedom
is a necessary component of practical freedom. It necessarily follows that if I posses the
freedom to exercise free will, it be possible for that action to induce a chain of subsequent
events that are the result of my spontaneous and uncaused action.
The problem for Kant arises when the distinction between phenomena and noumena is
applied to account for the possibility of a freedom that aligns with the deterministic laws of
nature. It is evident that practical freedom is one that faces influences from the laws of nature
and however Kant still advances that these influences are not influential enough to stunt
freedom. If that is the case though how can he account for natural causes being unable to lead
to effects, as practical freedom implies that this is in fact a possibility (Priest 2007).
Kant argues that practical freedom is plausible. Kant argues that if all that is, is through
natural law, then it would appear that practical freedom is but an illusion as it is determined.
However Kant says that this would be too haste a conclusion, as according to him the
affirmation of natural law does not refute the truth of practical freedom. Kant advances the
acceptance of practical freedom as the freedom that exists when one considers that even
though something does not happen there is a realistic instance whereby it just as easily could
have occurred. Here, Kant offers ‘ought to have’ as a way of highlighting that an alternate
event can take place even though it does not, this is a strong basis for the affirmation of
freedom as compatible, in a sense, with natural law (Priest 2007).
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Reference List
Grier, Michelle. (2006). The Logic of Illusion and the Antinomies, in G. Bird (ed.) (2006).
192-206. Blackwell A Companion to Kant: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Kant, I. (1998) (A/B) The Critique of Pure Reason, ed. And translated by P. Guyer and A.
Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Priest, Stephen. (2007). Kant’s Concept of Freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason.
Rudisill, Philip, M. (2012). The Third Antinomy from the Transcendental Dialectic of Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason.
Wood, Allen. W. (2010). The Antinomies of Pure Reason, in P. Guyer (ed.) (2010). 245-265.
