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2015
Terrorism
Research
Center
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As
originally
published
Counterterrorism:
Bridging
Operations
and
Theory—
A
Terrorism
Research
Center
Book
“This
volume
has
been
under
development
for
10
years
and
included
contributions
from
the
world's
foremost
terrorism
experts.”
-­‐
TRC
Robert
J.
Bunker,
John
P.
Sullivan,
Brian
Michael
Jenkins,
Matt
Devost,
and
James
T.
Kirkhope,
Editors
Bloomington:
iUniverse,
2015
Aviation
Security
A
Pilot’s
Eye
View
Kevin
R.
McCarthy
In order to understand modern Aviation Security (AVSEC) in the United States, it is
helpful to review some key historical events, policies, and shortcomings that enabled the
unprecedented 9/11 attacks on four U.S. flights. From the 1960s through the 1980s, the
principal threat to U.S. aviation was not even called terrorism. The FAA, or Federal
Aviation Administration—originally an Agency, was created in 1958 and by 1961 was
confronted with hijackings. President Kennedy declared hijacking or interference with
flight crew a crime in September 1961, and Attorney General Robert Kennedy swore in
the FAA’s first “peace officers”, deputy marshals in 1962. The earliest hijackers were
Cubans who decided that they wanted to go home or create some sort of publicity event
to highlight their cause. They hijacked commercial airliners, typically armed only with
canisters of flammable liquids and a public platform to espouse their views. The
preferred destination was often Havana, Cuba and the airlines handled these events as
almost routine operations. The FAA was the sole U.S. Government (USG) agency
responsible for oversight of all airline operations including security. The FAA
promulgated a protocol that dictated how airline crews would handle a hijacking
situation. The policy handed down to the airlines was called the “Common Strategy.” In
short, the strategy was to give the hijacker whatever transport they demanded. Protocols
directed the crew to not actively confront the hijackers even if they had the capability to
do so; acquiescence was determined to be the most expeditious and safest course of
action. Law enforcement response to hijacking events was based on an international
agreement, —the Hague Hijacking Convention, October 1971—which branded the crime
“Air Piracy” and mandated that perpetrators, after arriving at their destination of choice,
would be prosecuted or extradited by the host government back to the country of origin
of the flight. Few, if any hijackers, were every returned to the United States to face
prosecution. Most were welcomed home as “heroes of the cause” or, at minimum,
granted asylum by the host country.
The hijacking of Air France Flight 139 on June 28, 1976 should have been a
global wakeup call. Following on the heels of the Munich Massacre in 1972, Israel

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recognized the gravity of the situation and acted quickly and aggressively in response to a
new global threat in which hijackers (now labeled “terrorists”) were willing to kill (and
die) for their cause. Flight 139 involved terrorists from the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), with aid from the German Revolutionary Cells, hijacking
a flight from Athens to Paris with the intent of making a public statement through hostage
taking and violence. Seven days later on July 4, 1976, coincidentally the bicentennial
celebration of U.S. independence, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) took bold action. The
action, popularly known as the Raid on Entebbe, redefined the future of AVSEC for
Israel. The IDF flew over 2,500 miles across the airspace of several hostile countries into
central Africa and staged a spectacular rescue mission. Unfortunately, there was loss of
life: three hostages and the IDF operation commander, Lt.Col. Yonatan Netanyahu were
killed. The mission was subsequently renamed “Operation Jonathan” by the
commander’s older brother, Benjamin Netanyahu, later Prime Minister of Israel. The
United States and other western countries failed to adopt Israel’s analysis of the threat
and bold response.
The next big wakeup call, similarly ignored by the USG, occurred on June 14,
1985. Shi’ite terrorists from Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad, seeking the release of
prisoners held in Israel, commandeered TWA Flight 847 from Athens to Rome. When
the hijackers’ initial demands were not met during the first 3 days aboard the aircraft,
U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem was tortured and brutally murdered in a clear sign of the
hijackers’ commitment to using violence to achieve their objectives. The hostage crisis
moved onto the ground in Beirut, continuing for 17 days during which time Israel
released some prisoners before the Iranian-sponsored terrorists freed the remaining
hostages from their compound. The ingenuity, interpersonal, and language skills, and
courage of a TWA flight attendant, Uli Derickson, are credited with saving many lives by
defusing tense situations. The Common Strategy’s shortcomings are obvious in
retrospect. The hijackers succeeded in commandeering the aircraft, forced the pilots to
fly to a hostile destination, killed a passenger, and escaped.
Another milestone attack was Pan Am Flight 103, December 21, 1988. All 243
passengers and 16 crew on-board and 11 people on the ground died after a bomb placed
in the cargo hold by Libyan state-sponsored terrorists detonated over Lockerbie,
Scotland. This was a terror attack designed to intimidate the public and influence political
agendas and policies of the United States and her allies, enabling a victory for terrorists
who took advantage of the lack of explosive detection or bag matching procedures. The
USG did close this gap by implementing new hold baggage and passenger screening
procedures, but failed to consider future “opportunities” for exploitation by those intent
on causing havoc and destruction. Maintaining profits for the airlines, limiting disruption
to the flying (and paying) public, underestimation of the motivation and capability of
adversaries, and limited political will to change the status quo produced a culture and
posture of fighting yesterday’s attacks, not tomorrow’s threats.
Despite these events, which clearly demonstrated that aviation threats had become
increasingly more sophisticated, throughout the 1990’s the U.S. airline industry and the
FAA continued to adhere to the Common Strategy of passive cooperation with hijackers.
Too often we are reluctant to “connect the dots” and recognize that adversaries adapt and
new threats require new responses; as eloquently stated by Abraham Lincoln in an
address to Congress, December 1862, “the dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate for the

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stormy present…” As air piracy morphed into Global Terrorism, the USG largely ignored
emerging threats and the airline industry, consumed with financial bottom-lines, failed to
advocate for changes in procedures that would incur costs and reduce their profit margin.
One innovative action was taken during the 1990’s. A nucleus of dedicated airline pilots
from across the industry came together to engage the FAA Security Office and the airline
industry in an ongoing dialogue to increase awareness of aviation threats and begin
building a new aviation security culture. During this time, the FAA also deployed a
small cadre of very well qualified Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS) who were sent
aboard international flights in response to specific threats or routes deemed high-risk for
terrorist attacks. The FAMS understood the threats and vulnerabilities, but their limited
deployment only allowed them to protect a couple of flights at any given time, almost
exclusively to/from international destinations.
On September 11, 2001, terrorists once again took advantage of the shortcomings
of the Common Strategy, infiltrating domestic flights with low probability of FAMS
protection armed only with box cutters (not prohibited items), commandeering the planes,
and killing the pilots trained to submit to hijackers’ demands. Despite the demonstrated
progression of radical Islamic terrorist tactics over the previous decade from the remote
detonation of bombs to human suicide bombers, the USG was shocked that this new
breed of hijackers had no intention of successfully landing the aircraft and surviving the
ordeal. Their sole objective was to kill as many innocent civilians as possible and
undermine America’s sense of security and well being at home. Unfortunately, they did
succeed in sowing fear in the hearts of the traveling public, at least initially; however, as
Winston Churchill rightly remarked, “America always does the right thing, after trying
everything else.”
9/11 changed the lives of all Americans; ‘homeland security’ became both a
newly minted phrase and a way of life for all. The Common Strategy had failed again.
The aircrews on the 9/11 planes had the ability to resist, some more forcefully then
others; they could have fought back. In compliance with the Common Strategy, they—
and many of their countrymen—were murdered. For the aviation industry the Common
Strategy was now not only obsolete, but also in part responsible for the deaths of nearly
3,000 Americans on U.S. soil. The new more aggressive protection and response posture
adopted after 9/11 was dubbed “Aviation Security” (AVSEC). The traveling public at
first willingly complied with the new world of AVSEC including long waits for enhanced
passenger/baggage screening in airports, no accompanying loved-ones to departure gates,
well-armed military and law enforcement officers on patrol in airports and other
transportation venues, etc. They quickly became intimately familiar with the public
persona of AVSEC, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) established by Congress on November 25, 2002, transferred
the nascent TSA from the Department of Transportation to DHS and TSA became the
nation’s first agency dedicated to securing all modes of transportation used by the U.S.
public and corporations worldwide, including air travel, trains, ferries, ship traffic,
commercial trucks, and buses. Previously, airline passenger, baggage, and cargo
screening was accomplished by airlines and private contractors.
In the hysterical frenzy post 9/11, many TSA policies and procedures were
frantically put into action. Some were so intrusive and counter-productive they came
close to realizing the terrorists’ objective of destroying the U.S. economy by taking the

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United States out of the airline industry. Ever so slowly, AVSEC has evolved and many
public servants stepped up, bringing years of experience form various government law
enforcement and intelligence agencies to fashion AVSEC into a functional enterprise. Is
it perfect? Definitely not. Is it better then it was ten years ago? Absolutely. Is it
accomplishing the defined mission to protect commercial air travel? To date, since 9/11
no successful attack has been perpetrated on a U.S. airliner.
One new AVSEC action has been to substantially increase the role and
responsibility of the FAMS, proactively deploying them and without specific threat
requirements. These teams are now deployed everyday on numerous U.S. airline flights
both domestic and international. These highly trained and qualified professionals spend
their time as passengers guarding our airliners in flight. The FAMS have an auxiliary
force born from that small nucleus of pre-9/11 airline pilots who were crying in the
wilderness for industry and government to take AVSEC seriously. The legislation that
founded DHS also established another little-known AVSEC responder, the Federal Flight
Deck Officer (FFDO). U.S. airline pilots can volunteer, in addition to their duties as
pilots, to become sworn, armed officers under the authority of the FAMS—and the last
line of defense for the traveling public. In the words of a Washington columnist, “Sky
King has now also become Wyatt Earp”. The pilot/FFDO undergoes extensive evaluation
and training before becoming an officer of DHS. They have sworn a true and faithful oath
to the government and Constitution of the United States of America to defend their flight
and our nation from all enemies foreign and domestic. As volunteers, they receive no
compensation, returning multiple times a year at their own expense to training bases in
order to hone skills in fighting, shooting, and related areas. When reporting for their
flights, they look and act like all the other pilots, rushing from one plane to the next,
grabbing a Starbucks in passing. In fact, many thousands of pilots are involved in the
program and are flying armed every day. These FFDO are fully authorized and prepared
to exercise the use of deadly force to never again allow a terrorist to seize control of an
airliner. Don’t bother asking them, by statute and oath they are bound not to disclose the
identities of any FFDO.
During the 1970s, with the Vietnam War and later the seemingly never ending
Cold War, only seasoned professionals were focused on AVSEC and adversaries were
considered known entities with clear goals. Now we are faced with a more amorphous
threat emanating from those radical Islamists and others who want to destroy our Western
way of life and everything associated with it. AVSEC is now the domain of multiple
professionals dedicated to preventing attacks and building resiliency. The underlying
philosophy of the new AVSEC response posture is, “We must be right 100% of the time,
but the terrorists only have be right once”. At least some attempted attacks by shoe,
shampoo, and underwear bombers were thwarted by a more vigilant public and retrained
cabin and flight crews. That said, AVSEC operations continue to be plagued by
complacency about emerging threats, high costs, and the growing intolerance of the
public to travel delays. Modern aviation and homeland security is a critical and intricate
system of systems; it involves people, places, and things with significant coordination.
An airliner full of people is an irresistible target for our adversaries; the slightest hint of
an incident and the nattering nabobs of the 24/7 news broadcasts spin themselves and the
public into frenzy. Our adversaries want to bring down our economy and media-driven
hysteria only helps their cause.

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Future effectiveness will require TSA and the airline industry to continue to adapt
and implement operations focused on confounding future threats and not fighting
yesterday’s war. Technology will continue to evolve and TSA officers will be given
better data and tools with the intent to make the whole experience more effective and less
invasive. Today, there is an innovative initiative called Checkpoint of the Future, that
will allow passengers to simply walk through a tunnel with all their belongings and
emerge from the far end all screened and checked in for their flight. It is not science
fiction. It is a vision that is being developed and tested today. Airliner systems (aircraft
and other infrastructure) are also being redesigned and enhanced to build resiliency and
protection into hardware, software, and operations. Almost every flight today has at least
one armed and highly qualified officer aboard in either the cabin, cockpit, or both. And
just like most of the operational details of air transport, the enhanced security system runs
smoothly behind the scenes.
We, the traveling public, are as much a part of AVSEC now as the crews and
officers who manage the security apparatus. When something doesn’t feel right, doesn’t
look right; tell someone and keep telling him or her until they listen and do something.
Further Reading
Tomer Benito, Rain For The Wicked. North Charleston: BookSurge LLC, 2007.
Jeffrey Price and Jeffrey Forest, Practical Aviation Security: Predicting and Preventing
Future Threats. Second Edition. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2013.
Paul Wilkinson and Brian Jenkins, Aviation Terrorism and Security. New York:
Routledge, 1999.
Kevin R. McCarthy is a Delta Air Lines Captain (retired) and founder, MoonRaker
Associates and MoonRaker Aviation Services Inc., two firms delivering global
transportation and logistics expert advise, cutting edge technology enhancements, and
hands-on operations guidance. He has over 33 years experience flying commercial and
military aircraft worldwide. A B777 captain and acknowledged aviation security expert,
in response to 9/11 he was appointed founding Director, Intelligence and Emerging
Threats, Air Line Pilots Association. At the request of the Pentagon, he led a team of
experts to develop operational procedures to reopen Baghdad International Airport to
civilian aircraft. He has served as an advisor to The White House, U.S. House of
Representatives, and senior officials in DHS on matters related to commercial aviation
operations and the protection of airliners. He is active on several private sector advisory
boards and resides in Park City, Utah.
kmccarthy@moonrakerllc.com
www.moonrakerllc.com
www.moonraker-av.com
http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_ss_i_1_11?url=search-alias=aps&field-
keywords=counterterrorism+bridging+operations+and+theory&sprefix=counterterr,aps,1020