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Lee piketty-0520-snu
1. Revisiting ‘Capital in the
Twenty-First Century’ and Korea
Special Lecture
Department of Economics
Seoul National University
May 20, 2019
Kang-Kook Lee
College of Economics
Ritsumeikan University
2. Piketty’s ‘Capital in the Twenty-First Century’
• Collecting data of top income and wealth using income tax
and estate tax for more than 200 years of developed
countries-> World Inequality Database
• Analysis: examining inequality in income and wealth, by
calculating the capital/income ratio and understanding their
changes in terms of internal dynamics of capital accumulation
• Finding: inequality was high in the 19th century but fell down
in the 20th century, and has been increasing after the 1980s
• Prospects of the 21st century: with lower growth rate,
capital/income and inequality are likely to rise up
• Proposals: very high top income tax and global capital tax for
democracy to regulate capitalism
5. Theoretical Framework of Piketty
• 1st Fundamental law: capital’s share α = r x β
• 2nd Fundamental law: capital/income ratio β = W/Y = s/g,
at steady state, from Harrod-Domar model
• r > g inequality: historical finding, then wealth inequality
tends to rise, from the inequality model with shocks
• Movements of W/Y, r, and g will determine capital’s share, and
evolution of wealth inequality
• Mainly based on neoclassical production function and growth
model with some extensions
• Presenting rich historical data, however too simple theory
without extensive analysis, which should be developed more
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13. Measurement of Capital and Housing Issue
• Piketty’s capital includes all forms of net wealth including real
estate, and it may be useful to some extent
• However, evaluation of real estate in market prices may not
be proper: affected by the real estate market bubble (Bonnet
et al. 2014), not related to internal dynamics of accumulation
• The increase in the capital’s share together with the increase
in W/Y could be associated with the real estate sector
• If we exclude the real estate sector, Piketty’s argument in the
recent period is wrong (Rognlie, 2014; 2015)
• Large heterogeneity from decomposition of Piketty’s data,
how to understand the price changes of the real estate sector?
23. Too High Elasticity of Substitution and r
• Why the increase of W/Y and the capital’s share together (not
significant fall or return)? Large elasticity of substitution!
• Piketty’s data using net Y suggest a very high elasticity of
substitution, unrealistic compared with others (Rognlie, 2014)
• Piketty mentions technological change in the book, while he
argues that multidimensional character of capital with
changes in relative prices is more important in the recent
paper and interview (Piketty and Zucman, 2013; Piketty,
2015)
• Again, significantly due to the housing sector with high
housing capital income related with high imputed rent
• But still high elasticity even without housing and debate of
empirical measurement of the elasticity is ongoing
(Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014)
29. Debates on r > g
• Emphasis of r > g inequality in internal dynamics may be too
strong in the book without extensive discussion presented
• Using wealth concentration model with the Pareto coefficient
with random shocks but reality is more complex (Jones, 2015)
• Many argue that r >> g is necessary, and politics and
institutions are important (Mankiw, 2015; Acemoglu, 2015)
• r > g is not relevant to rising labor income inequality, which is
important for the US (Furman, 2014)
• Prediction of higher inequality with lower g and rising r > g is
inconsistent with neoclassical production function
• Piketty himself toned down the role of r > g in the recent
paper (Piketty, 2015), which has limitation in examining
inequality in the 20th and 21st century
30. Regression of Wealth Inequality on r-g
- Using 10-yr average data for 1871 to 2010, for 4 countries data available
- Insignificant relationship, same results for panel fixed effects model
_cons .3256029 .0550159 5.92 0.000 .2132455 .4379604
rg .9757194 1.203669 0.81 0.424 -1.4825 3.433939
w1 Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Total .601296174 31 .019396651 Root MSE = .14005
Adj R-squared = -0.0112
Residual .588407949 30 .019613598 R-squared = 0.0214
Model .012888225 1 .012888225 Prob > F = 0.4240
F( 1, 30) = 0.66
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 32
. reg w1 rg
-.2-.1
0
.1.2.3
e(w1|X)
-.05 0 .05
e( rg | X )
coef = .97571938, se = 1.2036688, t = .81
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32. Other Criticisms and Debates
• The net saving rate is not constant but affected by g, then W/Y
will not increase much (Krussell and Smith, 2014)
• Piketty assumes r and s stable, and only g falls, but r, s, and g
may be interrelated as shown by the simple regressions for the
period after the WW II
• No empirical evidence for r > g to raise wealth inequality
• The huge breakdown of W/Y in the first world war is hard to
understand, not examined fully in the book, and low W/Y in the
20th century may reflect high capital productivity (Dumenil and
Levy, 2015)
• The role of politics is important, such as labor unions for changes
in inequality, recently endorsed by Piketty, so power relationship
should be studied more extensively (Lee, 2016; Piketty, 2017)
33. Regression of s on g
- Using 10-yr average data for 1871 to
2010, for 4 countries
- Insignificant relationship for OLS and
panel fixed effects model
- Using 10-yr average data for 1951 to
2010, for 7 countries
- Significant with the coefficient about 0.5
- Same results for OLS and panel fixed
effects
-.1
-.05
0
.05
.1
e(s|X)
-.05 0 .05
e( g | X )
coef = -.03713273, se = .27189245, t = -.14
-.05
0
.05
.1
e(s|X)
-.04 -.02 0 .02 .04 .06
e( g | X )
coef = .96086479, se = .28125694, t = 3.42
34. Regression of r on g
- Using 10-yr average data for 1871 to 2010,
for 4 countries
- Significant with the coefficient is about 0.5,
so if g decreases, r falls but r-g getting
higher (meaning very big sigma at steady
state with CES production function)
- Using 10-yr average data for 1951 to 2010,
for 7 countries
- Significant with the coefficient is about
0.8,
- so if g decreases, r falls but r-g getting
higher (meaning very big sigma at steady
state with CES production function)
-.04-.02
0
.02.04.06
e(r|X)
-.04 -.02 0 .02 .04 .06
e( g | X )
coef = .81073209, se = .14738993, t = 5.5
-.05
0
.05
.1
e(r|X)
-.05 0 .05
e( g | X )
coef = .48873402, se = .16133461, t = 3.03
35. r > g and Wealth Inequality
• The effect of r-g on
top 1% wealth
concentration, for the
US, France and the UK,
over the 1870s to
2000s
• No significant
relationship between
two variables
• Similar to Acemoglu
and Robinson (2015)
for income inequality
36.
37. Future Prospects of Research
• A great study to present historical data but limitation in terms
of theory and model, so further research is called on
• Development of study on wealth inequality and concentration
in many countries, using several methods (Saez and Zucman,
2014 vs. Kopczuk)
• Empirical debates on measurement of elasticity of substitution
including net income going on (Ronglie, Lawrence etc.)
• Modelling the economy into the productive and rent sector,
showing the rent rising with more power of capital (Stiglitz,
2015; Naidu etc.)
• Radical changes toward political economy approach, away
from marginal productivity theory and production function
approach? (Moseley, 2015)
38. Capital in Korea in the Twenty-First Century
• An increase in the capital-income ratio (β) after 1980 and the
capitals’ share (α) after 1997 (Lee and Yoon, 2017)
• A very high capital-income ratio, and a higher ratio of
government wealth in comparison with other developed
countries
• r>g also emerging after 1997, leading to higher wealth inequality
• The capital income share rising after the 1997 financial crisis
(dividing mixed income into the same capital/labor income ratio)
together with rising income inequality in general
• Meaning that productivity growth is higher than real wage
growth
• A vicious circle of rising inequality and stagnant economic
growth, so a change was called on
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43. A Recent Debate on Productivity-Pay Gap
and the Wage Share in Korea
• Recently, Park (2019) criticizes the rising productivity-pay
gap and the decline of the wage share, using same price
deflators
• However, using CPI is better for real wage calculation
because it is for standard of living of workers, a difference
in the base year should be considered too
• Terms-of-trade effect due to different deflators is the same
in the US, and we should consider median wage
considering rising wage inequality
• The wage data don’t cover all workers, so looking at
macroeconomic data, productivity-pay gap really existed,
and the wage share fell after 1997
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50. Implications for Korea
• Causes of the rising capital income ratio in Korea
• The elasticity of substitution, the nature of technological
change, globalization, real estate factor, and power
relationship
• Effects of the falling wage share and rising inequality on
economic growth in Korea
• Stagnant economic growth due to falling aggregate
demand, serious political conflicts, and lower human
capital investment and innovation etc.
• The need for income-led growth or inclusive growth in
Korea, with more effective policy measures