1. Grey Targeting at the Troop/Company Level:
Using the CoIST to Understand the Human
Terrain
By Karl K. Schoch and Kevin A. Pavnica
Journal Article | Jul 25 2013 - 1:26am
Grey Targeting at the Troop/Company Level: Using the CoIST to Understand the Human Terrain
1LT Karl K. Schoch and 1LT Kevin A. Pavnica
Abstract
Based on the authors’ experience during their deployment, the Company Intelligence Support Team
(CoIST) can provide great value to their organization by developing refined geographic targets (eight to
ten digit grids) that are important logistical, political and social nodes in insurgent networks (mosques,
schools, shops, etc), a process we call Grey Targeting. This focus allows it to complement personality
based targeting capabilities, and since this approach only depends on HUMINT it is a model that is
appropriate for Host Nation forces without SIGINT capabilities.
Learning Curve: Contextualizing Process Development
In June of 2012, 1st Squadron (Airborne), 91st Cavalry Regiment, part of the 173rd Airborne Brigade
Combat Team, deployed to one of the most challenging and kinetic environments in Afghanistan: Logar
Province. Disposed across the major districts of this area in combat outposts and forward operating bases
in company-plus-sized teams, and operating both alongside Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
partners and unilaterally, the Squadron as a whole found itself in an environment almost wholly different
from the one that had been projected prior to the deployment. Rather than training and enabling ANSF
partner units as they took an increasingly greater role in the fight for their country—Anvil Troop, 1-91
CAV found itself fighting a robust and dynamic insurgency that threatened legitimate Afghan government
influence in Logar.
Throughout this fight, which lasted from June 2012 to March of 2013, a number of newly established
systems in 1-91 CAV became critically important to the unit’s success. One of the most effective of these
was the distillation of the targeting process into a Troop/Company-level tool. The targeting process is not
new. However, the targeting procedure that was developed during this deployment provides unique insight
into how collation and analysis at low levels can greatly enhance situational awareness and operational
effectiveness.
To contextualize the development of this Troop targeting process, it is important to briefly examine the
Company Intelligence Support Team (CoIST) concept in the 173rd ABCT; particularly within A Troop, 1-
91 CAV. CoIST formation for A Troop and 1-91 CAV occurred in three phases: initial fielding, pre-
deployment development, and in-theater refinement. During initial fielding prior to deployment, the

2. CoIST took pre-platoon leadership lieutenants and line soldiers and turned them into organic
Troop/Company-level intelligence cells. Integration of these teams into the Troop/Company framework
was emphasized by command from the Brigade level on down. They were first tested significantly at the
173rd’s mission readiness exercise (MRE) in March 2012, at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center at
Hohenfels, Germany. Training for CoIST prior to the beginning of the exercise focused almost completely
on utilizing the cells to act as relays between operational elements and the Squadron’s S-2 shop to
outsource patrol briefing and debriefing tasks previously concentrated at Squadron level. During the
exercise itself, the CoIST’s role was limited to the utilization of the District Stability Framework concept
to enhance stability operations through analysis of conditions in the area of operations (AOs).[i] There
was little emphasis on intelligence and targeting in a kinetic environment. The major kinetic scenarios
posited were incongruous to the rest of the training scenario and conducted in pseudo-isolation from the
rest of the simulation. Benefits from the exercise were the opportunity to test and refine physical
configurations, develop product formats, and explore models for information flow laterally (to other
units), upward (to Squadron staff), and downward (to the line platoons in the Troops). Despite a well
thought out training program, significant Command support and robust resourcing, the training did not
fully prepare the CoISTs for the environment they faced during the deployment.
The interim between the mission readiness exercise and the teams’ departure for Afghanistan with the
Squadron advance party contained the second developmental phase for CoISTs. In A Troop, the major
highlight was the establishment of the team’s final configuration going into deployment. It consisted of
two lieutenants and one specialist (MOS 19D, with a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice). The civilian
educations coupled with training in the maneuver arms of the United States Army--rather than any formal
military intelligence training--provided the foundation for the development of functional processes for
analysis and targeting in Afghanistan at the Troop level.
Roles and responsibilities of the CoIST during the second phase congealed into three major areas. First,
the need to provide the Squadron leadership with an accurate and insightful running assessment of the
Troop battle space, and input into the larger Task Force Saber targeting process. Second, direct support
provided to platoons in the form of threat briefs, intelligence updates, and target development. Finally,
administrative support in processing, preserving, and forwarding evidence for exploitation, managing and
tracking biometric collection, and liaising with various enablers available to the Troop and the intelligence
apparatuses of other units.
Superficially, the CoIST’s inexperience with Intelligence operations would appear to be a setback, and
was indeed initially an obstacle to be overcome. However, the lack of formalized training actually helped
to provide a degree of fluidity and creativity to the CoIST’s approach to intelligence after an initial
learning period. This blank slate enabled the CoIST to tailor intelligence and targeting processes to fit the
situation on the ground, rather than attempting to implement familiar solutions that did not necessarily suit
the situation. This agility was perhaps the CoIST’s most important asset during the third, and most
important, phase of its evolution, deployment.
The deployment was the most critical part of the CoIST’s growth into an effective institution. Arriving at
FOB Shank in June of 2012, A Troop immediately found itself often operating unilaterally against
insurgents conducting IDF, DF and IED attacks and had to adapt quickly. This period, and the challenges
it presented, saw the development of a Troop targeting process that stemmed from the CoIST’s need not
only to support Troop operations, but also to provide situational awareness to the Squadron.
In addition to the challenges presented by the enemy, local ANSF force alignment left the Troop without
an Afghan partner to partner with and greatly limited the kinetic options available to it. This required the
development of indirect methods to affect insurgents, which framed all of the cell’s work during the

3. deployment and led to a series of principles that an effective CoIST should follow.
The first of these principles is that a CoIST needs to digest unprocessed and unabridged information from
numerous intelligence sources and organize this information into usable formats. To gain an accurate
picture of the state of the Troop’s AO, there was no substitute for meticulously and tediously pouring over
interrogation reports, signals intelligence logs, human intelligence reports and other products. Often, in
products aimed at Squadron and Brigade level audiences, information critical to the fight in A Troop’s
sector was omitted as unimportant. That is not to say that this should not have occurred, only that the
access to raw information, rather than simply relaying reports found in an INTSUM, allowed CoISTs to
create products filtered only through the lens of the Troop fight. This complemented and enhanced the
intelligence available to the Troop commander, as well as filled critical gaps in Squadron situational
awareness.
The second principle was the importance of rigorously and constantly organizing information. Perhaps the
largest developmental boost for A Troop CoIST came from visits to the intelligence shop of a Special
Operations unit on FOB Shank. Through these, extremely valuable insight was gained into a data
infrastructure that had found ways to minimize information attrition while still remaining simple and
accessible. This showed the CoIST that to be effective, it was necessary to create a database construct
(Maptracks) that allowed both graphic and narrative information to be communicated cleanly.
Constant communication became the final principle of effective CoIST operations. This is demonstrated
in the Troop’s targeting process, which is effectively viewed through the lens of the F3EAD (Find, Fix,
Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate) method —traditionally used in personality targeting -- to illustrate
how Troop level targeting manifests itself (See the figure below).
Grey Targeting: The Troop/Company Level Targeting Process
Overview
The F3EAD model must be adjusted slightly from what is put forth doctrinally in FM 3-60 to adapt it for
the resources available to the CoIST. The modification stem from the fact that targeting at the CoIST
level should not be primarily personality-based,[ii] as the SIGINT resources required to conduct effective
personality-centric targeting are not available at the Company or Troop level. Additionally, there are
other units that are specifically designed to conduct this type of targeting, and do it very well. The
framework put forth in this article instead focuses on targeting insurgent networks on a geographical point

4. basis. The moniker “Grey Targeting” derives from the fact that the concept combines black, or lethal,
targeting and white, or non-lethal, targeting. Grey Targeting is necessary for an organization that does not
necessarily possess the capability and mission set to allow it to operate exclusively as either a black or
white targeting force. This is precisely the situation in which A Troop, 1-91 CAV found itself, and the
utilization of “Grey Targeting” created a flexible model for affecting the battle space.
In addition to moving away from the personality based targeting paradigm, utilizing F3EAD at the CoIST
level also requires understanding that dissemination is inherent in every stage of the targeting process.
There are two primary reasons for this, the first of which is derived from focusing on geographic rather
than personality targeting. When utilizing F3EAD for targeting personalities, there is a fairly established
path through which operations and intelligence flow, but no such path exists for a company level unit
targeting on a geographic basis. It is nearly impossible to predict when a certain piece of information will
be valuable on a patrol. This means that a CoIST must work constantly to provide patrols with an
understanding of a broad range of issues such as the personalities, locations and connections that are
important in an AO. Continuous dissemination allows patrols to realize when they come across an
important location, person or piece of intelligence during their daily patrols.
The second reason why dissemination is inherent in every stage of the CoIST’s F3EAD targeting process
is due to the fact that the intelligence the CoIST gathers helps to drive the Squadron-level targeting
process. In addition to continually feeding information to the Troop Commander, the CoIST must also
provide information to leadership at the Squadron level to improve their situational awareness. This is
especially important for asset employment, as there are many stake holders in the targeting process at the
Squadron level that bring unique capabilities to the fight, especially on the non-lethal side. In order to
effectively target issues in a school, mosque or government official, these enablers must be informed of
how these institutions or individuals contribute to instability. Without dissemination to Squadron, the
CoIST will not only have failed in its responsibility to inform decision makers but also might adversely
affect their unit’s ability to access vital non-organic assets.
Find
The find portion of targeting for the CoIST requires sorting through a tremendous mass of information to
produce target locations for patrols. While too much data is better than the alternative, it still causes
problems. To sort it, priorities from the Commander are vitally important. These will often come in terms
of an insurgent effect (IDF, IEDs, weapons facilitation, etc.) he/she wants to target. From these priorities,
a system of data triage can be established.
Once priorities are set, the first step a CoIST must take is to determine which INS networks are behind the
targeted effect. Determining this information allows a CoIST to hone in on reporting from specific areas
or cells and helps to ensure that time and resources are spent effectively. The starting point for this step is
often Squadron and Brigade INTSUMs, as they provide important macro-level information on the enemy.
HUMINT information can then be used to develop knowledge on the cells behind the targeted effect. The
most valuable reports for the CoIST in this respect are Human Collection Team reports and Tactical
Interrogation Reports. Reading these reports allows the CoIST to begin to develop an understanding of
the major and minor players in each cell, as well as determining locations that are important to these
individuals (bed down locations, where they work, what mosque they go to, etc.). It is important to begin
entering these individuals into link diagrams and these locations into maptracks,[iii] as these tools allow
the CoIST to visualize nodes in the networks. At this point in the targeting process, putting marks on the
wall is more important than absolute accuracy. The CoIST will not necessarily know what is important
and what is extraneous, so it is essential to keep as much information in play as possible, provided the

5. information does not become impossible to process. A certain amount of overload at this phase, however,
is acceptable and in many ways a sign of being on the right track.
On the SIGINT side, the CoIST’s most effective resource for developing the INS network is information
tying people and geography together. By looking at locations where targeted individuals have been,
important locations in an individual’s networks and patterns of life become apparent, which should
become patrol targets. This information can become especially useful when it is layered over Maptracks,
as the CoIST may find that these SI tracks correspond with locations on the maptracks; thus providing
some additional context for why and to whom a specific cluster is important (e.g. a mosque, village elder’s
house, etc).
At this point, the locations developed through the creation of map and SI tracks must be disseminated to
Platoons. They need to know the grid they are going to, why it is important, and any Information
Requirements (IRs) for that location (who is the mullah at this mosque, what is his phone number, etc.).
Additionally, there are many occasions when the CoIST receives named locations of general areas (i.e. a
neighborhood) that are related to enemy activity. The patrol can then refine these down to ten-digit grids
based on information obtained from locals. This information needs to be captured in debriefs, then added
to the maptracks and link diagrams to allow for further analysis and dissemination.
Fix
The Fix phase of the CoIST targeting process focuses on refining the information gathered during the find
phase. In that initial phase, the CoIST produces a great deal of raw data that has only been slightly
refined. In the Fix phase then, it becomes important to sort through that information to find indicators for
which locations are actually important nodes in the insurgent network.[iv] . These nodes could take the
form of mosques, schools, neighborhoods, villages or even individual personalities that are important
figures in one of these locations.
Looking for these nodes allows the CoIST to develop a conceptual understanding of how the network
operates, and to develop patterns of life on the network. As an example, there may be a great deal of SI
tracks at a particular mosque. Therefore, the CoIST can reasonably assume that insurgents attend that
mosque, and so that mosque, and it’s mullah by extension, are a node in the INS network. Mullahs, just
like teachers at schools or madrassas, are useful because they are tied to that location, and by virtue of this
lack of mobility become a reasonable personality target due to the high likelihood that they are regularly
at that location. Additionally, people around the location and the local populace will be able to guide
collectors to the mullah due to the relatively innocuous nature of asking to speak to a local leader.[v]
It is extremely important to disseminate this information about the larger composition of the INS network
to Troop and Squadron leadership, especially in Squadron targeting meetings. Institutional issues like
recruitment at a school are extremely hard for a Platoon Leader to deal with on their daily patrols, but
higher echelons have the resources necessary to effectively combat these problems (IO platforms, access
to government officials, etc.). Feeding this information to decision makers is important not only for
gaining assets, but also because it provides give them a full understanding of the insurgency in the AO. If
decision makers are not aware of the truly important insurgent nodes in their AO, they may devote
resources to other, less important, areas.
Finish
The Finish phase of the CoIST targeting process is where creativity becomes extremely important. There
are an almost infinite number of options available during this phase, but this article will merely focus on a
few options, and the scenarios in which they might be appropriate.

6. The most direct finish option is patrolling to locations where SI tracks or Maptracks have indicated that
insurgents are located. These patrols, if provided with sufficient detail on the locations and personalities
that they are looking for, could result in detainees being taken or caches being found. If the patrols do not
result in caches or detentions, they are still serving an important purpose in spiking the signature of
personality targets for direct action forces.
Locations that appear to be entrenched in an insurgent group’s patterns of life, such as a mosque, school,
or businesses, are excellent locations for focused biometrics, the collection of which, in an Afghan
context, helps to feed local criminal prosecution efforts. The times when insurgents will be at these
locations are fairly predictable, as prayer happens at certain times every day, school starts and ends at the
same time every day and bazaars have business hours. It is likely beyond the CoIST’s capabilities to
know exactly when and where someone will be, but focusing on locations like these at high traffic times
can greatly increase the effectiveness of biometric collection.
Additionally, the information developed by the CoIST can be an important tool for driving non-lethal
targeting. As the socioeconomic latticework of the insurgency becomes apparent, it is important that
people acting in the non-lethal sphere know which mosques, bazaars, schools and village elders support
the insurgency. Instead of painting with a broad brush and setting vague targeting goals—i.e. “the
educational system” or “the mosques and madrassas”—the CoIST can provide specific names and
locations to target, and exactly how these nodes facilitate insurgent operations. This type of information
helps ensure that non-lethal targeting resources are properly appropriated, and that assets are not
squandered on vaguely targeted projects. By firing a principal or not providing government resources to a
mullah whose school or madrassa is utilized for recruiting, a highly cost-effective blow can be struck
against the insurgency.
Exploit
The exploit phase of the CoIST targeting process is primarily concerned with collecting and collating the
data that Troop operations produce. This requires performing a great deal of administrative functions, and
in and of itself will not provide any great insights into or effects against the insurgency. This work,
however, is vitally important, as it produces the information necessary to drive future operations.
Perhaps the most important CoIST function in this phase is ensuring that any evidence collected or
detainees taken by the Troop/Company is done properly. Ensuring that platoons have the training to
properly conduct tactical site exploitation, collect evidence and DNA samples, and fill out arrest warrants
AO will drive prosecutions in the judicial system and also expand targeting to other parts of the network.
Providing ammunition for a prosecutor’s case will make it more likely that suspected insurgents are
prosecuted and taken off the street.[vi]
Another important function for the CoIST that is covered in all of the current literature on the position is
debriefing patrols. Patrols are an extremely valuable source of intelligence, and are the only collection
asset organic to a Troop. If the information that they are gathering is not being collected and integrated
into a unit’s knowledge management systems, this information will not be passed up to higher level
leadership. These debriefs should include information on the basic gist of what happened on the patrol,
any population engagement that occurred, IRs that were answered, important locations visited and pictures
which help to highlight important information.
Another important administrative function that the CoIST cell needs to perform is processing biometric
enrollments. If proper attention is paid to ensuring that DNA samples are connected to individuals
enrolled in biometric systems, it will help to ensure that biometric evidence resulting from hostile acts is
connected to information in databases. This, in turn, facilitates the discovery of insurgent personalities,

7. who become targets for Host Nation forces.
Analyze
The Analyze phase of the CoIST targeting process is very similar to the Find phase, in that the CoIST will
sort through the new information arising from their operations (HUMINT reports from sources their
patrols generated, TIRs from SOF raids, etc.). The major difference between these two phases, however, is
that the CoIST needs to look for reflections resulting from operations. This essentially means combing
through the Battalion and Brigade INTSUMs to look for any mention of the Troop’s patrols. It also
means looking for reports of ambushes and IEDs in given AOs and then comparing these for positive
correlation with previous patrol routes. Looking for these reports of kinetic activity is important for force
protection reasons. Additionally, planned insurgent ambushes or IED emplacements may indicate an
insurgent desire to deny coalition forces access to a location vital to their operations, or the presence of a
population center that provides insurgents with information about coalition force movement.
Reflections also allow the CoIST to develop some idea about the effectiveness of their patrols. Patrols
producing reflections are ones that drew the attention of insurgents. They caused the desirable effect of
disrupting insurgent operations and spiking network and individual signatures for future targeting.
Detailed information regarding this is critical for dissemination to Commanders. It allows them to develop
operations in a way that most effectively impacts the enemy.[vii]
Disseminate
This is the most important part of the targeting process, as it does very little good if gathered information
is not disseminated to patrols, commanders, and Squadron leadership. This step, however, is also
extremely difficult, especially in terms of disseminating information in a way that is easily understood and
builds upon itself. This disseminate phase of the targeting process is also important for continuity, as
much important information is lost as units enter and leave AOs. FM 3-24 emphasizes the primacy of this
transference in its discussion about the importance of databases[viii] and analytic continuity in CoIN
operations.[ix] While a CoIST may not have access to sophisticated database technology, there are still
ways to accomplish the dissemination/knowledge management process.
Perhaps the best way to disseminate information is to create Troop-level Maptracks. When creating these
Maptracks, it is important that they not only help to give specific, ten-digit grids to locations like INS
caches or bed down locations, but that they show how these locations are linked together. This product
has to demonstrate, standing on its own, an understanding of the AO, and show how a store in the bazaar
close to a mosque fits into the larger picture of the insurgency in the Troop’s AO. If one entry talks about
how a mosque has many SI hits around it and HUMINT reports of INS meetings within it, this gives a
reader a sense of the background information on that location, along with the layers of intelligence that
contributed into making that one place significant. Providing this context helps to illuminate the insurgent
network to the consumer. The individual person who lives in the house or owns that store might have been
detained, but the location will likely maintain its importance in the insurgent network due to other factors.
[x]
Maptracks must absolutely be Geo-rectified—i.e. put on a map—to make them useful, and the best way to
do this is to make a Google Earth .kmz file from your spreadsheet by using Datatracker. A maptrack entry
should ideally contain five categories: Name, Grid, Date Modified, Description and Associated
Reporting. It is fairly simple to understand why most of these columns are significant, but it is important
to explain further the on the Date Modified, Description and Associated Reporting columns. The Date
Modified allows readers to sift through different time periods to avoid overcrowding on the map, as some
information that is important in 2010 might not be as important in 2012. This issue of relevance feeds into

8. the importance of the Description column, and how to ensure that the items on the Maptracks are relevant
and help to pass along the knowledge that has been gained on the insurgent network. Maptracks are not
about tracking SIGACTs within the AO, as systems exist that do this very well. As such, only items
illuminating the INS network should be on these map tracks, and any description should be written to
provide the consumer of the product with an understanding for why that location is important.[xi]
Providing this context is important because it shows the analysis conducted to develop these locations as
places of interest, so that readers, whether they are superiors, incoming units or patrol leaders, have a
quick understanding of why that place is important. Placing the associated reporting (IIR number,
Capture tag, etc) is also important, as it allows people to gain access to historical reporting so that they can
confirm the analysis. There also needs to be a folder that contains this associated reporting in the map
tracks folder, as this makes it easy to access this information.
Link diagrams are also an important way of maintaining and disseminating information about insurgent
relationships, and can supplement the geographical information in the maptracks with more insight into
the personal relationships between insurgents. Fortunately, software already exists to create link
diagrams, and it can easily capture all necessary information about familial ties, physical descriptions, etc.
This link diagram can also tie in geographical locations as well, which is a valuable tool because there is
no better way to show a location’s importance in an INS network than to have a lot of links emanating
from a location to important insurgent figures.
These knowledge management systems also provide the raw material for slides and briefings in the
Squadron/Battalion targeting process and intelligence summaries. Looking at these tools while preparing
for these briefings makes it easier to translate knowledge of the AO into digestible pieces of information
that are suitable for briefings. When writing intelligence summaries, the Associated Reporting column is
extremely useful as a quick reference for IIR numbers that will bolster the credibility of any analysis.
Being able to quickly reference this information is something that is lacking in almost all intelligence
organizations, so it is important to take a stab at this knowledge management issue at the lowest level,
where the amount of information is more manageable than at higher levels.
The biggest reason for creating map tracks in both geo-rectified and spreadsheet form, however, is for
continuity. Units spend one full year developing their knowledge of an AO. Then, without an efficient
data management and presentation tool, they are tempted to provide their relief with a series of
PowerPoint presentations that speak in generalities, and thus is not terribly useful for Platoon Leaders and
Company Commanders looking for information to aid their planning during the vulnerable initial period
of deployment. Maptracks provide an easily transferrable warehouse of information to form a solid
foundation for incoming relief units to use in developing targets as they build on the accomplishments of
their predecessors.
Conclusions
There are a number of reasons why adopting the targeting process and techniques that this article has laid
out for Company and Troop-sized elements will benefit units (magnifying SOF effects, improved
Biometric targeting, increasing values of detainees taken, providing purpose and direction to soldiers,
etc.). The most important reason specific to the current conflict in Afghanistan is because it is a template
for a type of targeting that can be conducted by ANSF units at the Kandak level and below. The goal of
any COIN operation is to hand off security operations to capable Host Nation forces, and intelligence
operations are an important part of this handoff. Most of the intelligence tools mentioned in this Troop
level targeting process (HUMINT reports and TIR’s) are available to Host Nation Forces and do not
require huge investments in technological resources and expertise. All intelligence personnel are easily
capable of reading reports, annotating places that are associated with insurgent activity, and then noting

9. which places (high schools, shops, etc) appear to be nodes in the insurgent networks.
Analysis can then be passed along to—and ideally eventually produced by—Host Nation Intelligence
Agencies, who then can utilize this knowledge to target specific homes or shops within an area that have
known INS connections. Even if these do not result in detainees or dead hostile actors, it will still bolster
the perception of local security forces in the eyes of the civilian population. If the Army and Police are
seen targeting specific compounds associated with insurgent personalities in a given village on a daily
basis, people will be more likely to step forward and contribute information on the insurgents operating in
a locality, especially if this targeting reduces collateral damage. While expecting a Kandak to have the
capability to conduct time-sensitive, personality-based targeting might be unrealistic, developing their
targeting towards a geographic focus might be a more reasonable goal, leaving the personality-centric
targeting to the organizations in mentored local formations where a large crop of reliable HUMINT
sources can very closely approximate CF SIGINT capabilities.
This article represents an attempt to understand what a CoIST can and should do, in the hope that others in
the same position continue to build on our experiences. While the phase of Operation Enduring Freedom
in which CF drives operations is at a close, the lessons learned over the course of a nine-month
deployment to Logar Province, Afghanistan are valuable beyond the immediate circumstances faced.
Perhaps the most important contribution that this article may make is to provide a conceptual framework
for how the CoIST can and should be used. Training and the manuals examined prior to the deployment
focused on the technological resources that the CoIST has at their disposal and on providing soldiers
unfamiliar with intelligence an idea of its role on the battlefield.[xii] They do not adequately address the
end state brought by successful integration of these tools and information. By attempting to focus on
geographical targeting of insurgent networks, an attempt is made to provide the framework for what a
CoIST’s efforts should ultimately result in.
The role of US forces in the war in Afghanistan has transitioned into a limited advisory role—a role which
will likely be reprised in military involvements in other regions as part of a future that senior defense
leaders predict will be characterized by persistent conflict. It will be important to determine how to advise
other forces with capabilities far more technologically limited than our own, and intelligence will be an
important area for us to focus mentorship on. Additionally, developing targeting tools at the lowest levels
may ultimately increase the effectiveness of the forces that will be inserted into future conflicts. This
article posits a method that, despite a steep learning curve, can help to accomplish this by combining
established doctrine with the collation and analysis tools available to maneuver Troops and Companies
that spare the manpower to enthusiastically specialize in their use. “Grey Targeting,” it is hoped by the
authors, can be a valuable contribution to the ongoing discussion on Foreign Internal Defense and clarify
the role of a potentially effective institution, CoIST, in solving a problem set that likely will not be unique
to experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Notes
United States (2007). Counterinsurgency Field Manual: FM 3-24, Washinton, DC: Headquarters,
Dept. of the Army.
United States (2006). Company Intelligence Cell in Stability and Support Operations Tactics,
Techniques and Procedures: X-file 2-1.1, Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory (C 52), Marine Corps Combat Development Command.
United States (2010). Company Intelligence Support Team (CoIST) SmartCard: GTA 90-01-022,
Fort Meade, Maryland: Asymmetric Warfare Group.

10. End Notes
[i] For more information regarding the District Stability Framework, see Army Field Manual 3-07
Stability Operations.
[ii] F3EAD is presented in FM 3-60 is primarily designed for this approach.
[iii] This article will go into more detail about creating maptracks in the Disseminate phase of the
targeting process. In addition to developing their own maptracks, the CoIST should also look into
finding if there are any maptracks and link diagrams that have been developed by other units. SOF
elements and HCTs are especially useful for these resources, as they can provide a great deal of
information to the CoIST without having to read through reams of post-mission reports.
[iv] Examples of indicators are when there are multiple known bed down locations in the same area on
the maptracks or multiple people who work, study or pray at the same bazaar, school/madrassa or
mosque on the link diagram.
[v] It is also adviseable at this point to perform at least a minimal cost benefit assessment that
compares possible courses of action against possible outcomes viewed through the lens of established
objectives, political considerations, and larger mission parameters
[vi] Perhaps as importantly as taking insurgents out of the fight, facilitating the prosecutors to make an
excellent case can be important for exposing corruption in a judicial system. If judges are not able to
throw cases against suspected insurgents for legitimate, but politically convenient, reasons like
improper evidence collection or questionable witness statements, it will help to expose corrupt judges
and hopefully facilitate their eventual removal from positions of influence within the Host Nation
government.
[vii] Reflections are also important to disseminate to the Platoons. Knowing that patrols are having an
influence on the enemy is important for morale and allows platoons to tailor operations to enhance
desired effects.
[viii] FM 3-24, page 128.
[ix] FM 3-24, page 131.
[x] The lack of this focus on analysis is one of the shortcomings of the current Tactical Integrated
Ground Reporting System. This program geo-locates SIGACTs and intelligence reports, but not in a
way that synchronizes information presented due to the universal user ability to add to the database,
resulting in debilitating inconsistencies in quality and utility of contributions.
[xi] Good map tracks description: “This is a reported bed down location for Maulawi Abdullah, a
summer IED cell leader in Istanbul village. His brothers Kalam and Kam are mechanics at the tractor
shop in the district center (grid), and use that shop to recruit people to emplace IEDs. We did a number
of missions at that tractor shop, and were informed that Named OBJ X was active in that area during our
time and commenting on a detention that we took. This shop was also indicated in TIRs of OBJ Loose

11. Lips and OBJ Sinks Ships.” This gives a sense of the larger network, both in terms of people involved
in it and the locations that are important to it. A poor description would just say, “This is a reported bed
down location for Maulawi Abdullah.”
[xii] Marine Manual and CoIST Smart Card
About the Authors
Karl K. Schoch
1LT Karl K. Schoch: 1 LT Schoch is a platoon leader with the 1st Squadron, 91st
Cavalry, 173rd ABCT. He also served as a Company Intelligence Support Team
(CoIST) officer and Platoon Leader during the same deployment to Afghanistan.
He received his Bachelor’s degree from the United States Military Academy, where
he majored in International History.
Kevin A. Pavnica
1LT Kevin A. Pavnica: 1LT Pavnica is a platoon leader with the 1st Squadron, 91st
Cavalry, 173rd ABCT. He served as both a Company Intelligence Support Team
(CoIST) officer and Platoon Leader during a deployment to Logar Province,
Afghanistan from June 2012 to March 2013. He received his Bachelor’s degree
from Indiana University in Political Science and Middle Eastern Languages.
Available online at : http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/grey-targeting-at-the-troopcompany-
level-using-the-coist-to-understand-the-human-terrain
Links:
{1} http://smallwarsjournal.com/author/karl-k-schoch
{2} http://smallwarsjournal.com/author/kevin-a-pavnica
{3} http://smallwarsjournal.com/comment/reply/14299#comment-form
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