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2016 Civil Affairs Symposium
Civil Affairs Issues Paper
“Leveraging Civil Affairs”
“The Issues and the Spaces for Leveraging
Civil Affairs and Future Civil-Military
Operations”
A White Paper
John C. Hope
COL, CA
August 2016

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Contents
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3
Executive Summary………………………………………………………………………………………….……………. 4
Acronyms……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 5
Terms of Reference…………………………………………………………………………………………….…………. 7
Introduction……………………………………………………….…………………………………………………………. 8
Part the First: “The (Near) Total Failure of Civilian-Military Cooperation in Iraq and
Afghanistan”………………………………………….………………………………………………………….…….…….. 9
Part the Second: “The (Obvious) Present and Emerging Spaces for Leveraging Civil
Affairs”…………………………………………………..……………………………………………………………………. 15
Part the Third: “A (Possible) Interim Solution: A Model Short of Goldwater-Nichols
for Civil-Military Cooperation”………………………………………………………………...…………………… 20
Part the Fourth: “The (Elusive) Holy Grail: A Goldwater-Nichols Interagency Reform
Act for Civil-Military Cooperation”……………………………….…………..……………………..……………. 28
The Conclusions………….……………………………………………………………..………………………….……. 32
The Epilog…..………………………………………………………………………….…………………………………… 33

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Abstract
“The Issues and the Spaces for Leveraging Civil Affairs and Future Civil Military
Operations,” for The Civil Affairs Association 2016 Civil Affairs Symposium, an independent
submission written and edited by COL John C. Hope, USAR, 36 pages.
U.S. Army Civil Affairs (CA) is ideally suited to synchronize with other military
capabilities. These include Military Information Support Operations and Information
Operations (MISO/IO), Foreign Area Officers (FAOs), the National Guard State Partnership
Program (SPP) Missions and NATO CIMIC in a European context. CA is the Joint Force of
choice to work with an array of civilian agencies and non-governmental, civil society, and
private sector actors whose capabilities best mitigate drivers of conflict and instability in
order to promote peace.
“Leveraging Civil Affairs” is an important concept, as Civil Affairs remains an
enduring national capability to consolidate political-military gains and to engage partners
and other actors to shape, influence and stabilize the human environment and to contribute
to conflict prevention. The “Long War,” the combination of the recent conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, is essentially over and a new environment of Phase 0 operations, “prevent
conflict” is the new reality for CA operations around the globe. Maneuver in a complex
civilian environment is the new line of effort. Leveraging Civil Affairs in any previous
conflict context is antiquated, as the Long War as proven. Maximizing Civil Affairs in
support of Phase 0 operations is the new task and the new challenge. Civil Affairs must
lead the way in a global environment that is transregional, multi-domain and multi-
functional.

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Executive Summary
How can Civil Affairs (CA) most important clientele – the Geographic Combatant
Commands (GCCs) and the Special Operations Command (SOC) – best leverage CA’s full
range of capabilities – Army and Marine, Active and Reserve, Special Operations and
General Purpose? How can they use the inherent and comparative advantages of this
diverse force to facilitate desired regional strategic, operational and tactical outcomes?
What capabilities do these command’s most need in CA and other engagement forces and
how can CA forces be best structured, utilized and maintained? What policy, legal,
institutional, organizational, program or funding issues encumber fully leveraging CA?
What are the solutions?
These are poignant and important questions. To answer them, we must first look
back at what has not worked in “The Long War,” the confluence of the Iraq and Afghanistan
conflicts. While there are tremendous amounts of “lessons learned,” or “lessons
encountered,” one thing is clear: the future is not about fighting the last war or trying to
apply lessons learned or encountered from that war to a new framework.
Phase 0 is the new reality; maneuver in a complex civilian environment is the new
challenge. The answers to all questions involving Civil Affairs and Civil Military Operations
(CMO) must be viewed in this way if we are to determine how CA in all forms can best
support the Geographic Combatant Commanders and the Special Operations Command.
Civil Affairs is not a stand-alone discipline – it functions by necessity and design in
an interagency environment. This environment is trans-regional, multi-domain and multi-
functional. To avoid going back and repeating the errors and omissions of the past, we first
look at the (near) total failure of CA and Civilian-Military Cooperation in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
To better function in the interagency environment, CA needs to consider new tactics,
techniques and procedures (TTPs) in Phase 0 operations. A possible interim solution, a
model short of a Goldwater-Nichols Act for Civil-Military Cooperation, is presented and
discussed. This will set the stage to answer the important questions posed.
Phase 0 operations is the new environment for all Civil Affairs actions and force
employment. In this environment, there are vast spaces for SOF and General Purpose CA
forces to work in a collaborative manner. Here are the new spaces to work with CIMIC
counterparts and interagency partners in hybrid warfare, in Countering Trans-National
Threats, and in rendering Nation Assistance, in addition to traditional CA roles in mission
and exercise support.
Ultimately, for CA to function most effectively in phases of conflict, a Goldwater-
Nichols Interagency Reform Act for Civil-Military Cooperation must be considered and
enacted if CA is to bring the full weight of its capabilities to bear for Combatant
Commanders and SOF forces and indeed, for the military as a whole.

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Acronyms
AC Active Component
AFRICOM Africa Command (See U.S. Africa Command, also USAFRICOM)
AOR Area of Responsibility
ASCC Army Service Component Command
BCT Brigade Combat Team
CA Civil Affairs
CCDR Combatant Commander
CENTCOM Central Command (See U.S. Central Command, also USCENTCOM)
CERP Commander’s Emergency Relief Program
CIM Civil Information Management
CMO Civil Military Operations
CMOC Civil Military Operations Center
COCOM Combatant Command
CONUS Continental United States
OCO Overseas Contingency Operations
OCONUS Outside (the) Continental United States
COP Common Operational Picture
DA Department of the Army
DOD Department of Defense
DOS Department of State
EU European Union
EUCOM European Command (See U.S. European Command, also USEUCOM)
FAO Foreign Affairs Officer (U.S.)
CTNT Countering Trans-National Threats
GCC Ground Combatant Command
IA Interagency (U.S.)
IED Improvised Explosive Device

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LOE Line(s) of Effort
MDMP Military Decision Making Process
NCR National Capitol Region – Washington, DC
NG National Guard
MISO Military Information Support Operations (formally Psychological Operations)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OE Operational Environment
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
RC Reserve Component
RFF Request for Forces
RIP/TOA Relief in Place / Transfer of Authority
RSOI Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, Integration
SIGAR Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SOC Special Operation Command (traditionally U.S. Army Special Operations
Command – USASOC)
SOF Special Operations Forces
SPP State Partnership Program (National Guard)
TCP Theater Campaign Plan
TFBSO Task Force for Business and Stability Operations
TMM Trans regional, Multi-Domain, Multi-Functional
TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
U.S. United States
USASOC U.S. Army Special Operations Command
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USG United States Government
USARC U.S. Army Reserve Command
WOG Whole of Government

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Terms of Reference
CIMIC - The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO
Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as
international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies. (AJP-9)
Civil Affairs - Operations as actions planned, executed, and assessed by Civil Affairs
forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of
the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within
civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the
responsibility of civil government. (JP 3-57)
Civil Information Management - (Army) CIM is one of the five core tasks of Civil Affairs
(CA) forces. CA forces provide the military commander with expertise on the civil
component of the Operational Environment (OE). CIM is the process that develops the civil
component information critical to the commander’s CMO planning. CIM is continuous and
occurs across the range of military operations. The CIM process, when conducted correctly,
provides the commander with accurate, timely, and accurate information to develop
courses of action (COAs) that promote the growth, legitimacy, and ultimate transfer of
authority to the HN government. (ATP 3-57.50)
Civil Military Operations - Activities of a commander performed by designated Civil
Affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations
between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting
the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability
within a region or host nation. (JP 3-57)
Common Operational Picture - (Army) A single display of relevant information within a
commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s requirements and based on common
data and information shared by more than one command. Also called the COP. (ADRP 6-0)
Interagency - Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments,
including the Department of Defense. (JP 3-08)
Interagency Coordination - Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the
coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US
Government agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an objective.
(JP 3-0)
Joint Interagency Coordination Group – The JIACG is an interagency staff group that
establishes regular, timely and collaborative working relationships between civilian and
military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to
the CCDR and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant command, it
provides the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG
civilian agencies and departments. Each combatant command implements and tailors their
JIACG based on their unique requirements. (JP3-08)

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Military Decision Making Process - (Army) The MDMP is an iterative planning
methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and
produce an operation plan or order. The MDMP combines the conceptual and detailed
aspects of planning and integrates the activities of the commander, staff, subordinate
headquarters, and other partners throughout the planning process. The MDMP helps
leaders apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to
understand situations, develop options to solve problems, and reach decisions. The MDMP
results in an improved understanding of the situation and a plan or order that guides the
force through preparation and execution. (ADP 5-0)
Phase 0 Operations - Shape. Shape phase missions, task, and actions are those that are
designed to dissuade or deter adversaries and assure friends, as well as set conditions for
The contingency plan and are generally conducted through security cooperation activities.
Joint and multinational operations and various interagency activities occur routinely
during the shape phase. Shape activities are executed continuously with the intent to
enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation by shaping
perceptions and influencing adversaries’ and allies’ behavior; developing allied and
friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; improving
information exchange and intelligence sharing; providing US forces with peacetime and
contingency access; and mitigating conditions that could lead to a crisis. (JP 3-0)
Phase 1 Operations - Deter. The intent of this phase is to deter an adversary from
undesirable actions because of friendly capabilities and the will to use them. Deter is
generally weighted toward security activities that are characterized by preparatory actions
to protect friendly forces and indicate the intent to execute subsequent phases of the
planned operation. A number of flexible deterrent options (FDOs) could be implemented
during this phase. Once the crisis is defined, these actions may include mobilization,
tailoring of forces, and other pre-deployment activities; initial deployment into a theater;
employment of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; and
development of mission-tailored command and control (C2), intelligence, force protection,
and logistic requirements to support the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC’s) Contingency
Plans (CONOPS). CCDRs continue to engage multinational partners, thereby providing the
basis for further crisis response. Many actions in the deter phase build on activities from
the previous phase, and are conducted as part of security cooperation activities. They can
also be part of stand-alone operations. (JP 3-0)

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The (Near) Total Failure of Civilian-Military Cooperation in Iraq
and Afghanistan
The “Interagency” approach to civil-military cooperation is good in theory, but failed
spectacularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. Here’s why.
Part 1 of a 4 part series on Civil-Military Coordination and Operations.
COL John C. Hope
Amidst the never-ending barrage of discussions concerning American involvement
in the Middle East, I invite you to step back and look with me at recent military efforts in
Iraq and Afghanistan. What do we have to show for the expenditure of American blood and
treasure during what they now call “The Long War?” Military victories? New and
sustainable Middle Eastern democracies? An absence of religious and cultural conflict? We
have achieved none of the above. One thing is certain: outside of any purely military issues,
both Iraq and Afghanistan represent a total failure, or a near total failure, of civil-military
cooperation. We must get after the root causes of this failure in order to avoid the very
same mistakes in civil-military cooperation in the future.
Pundits and scholars have written and spoken volumes on what constitutes
successful civil-military operations. The commonly suggested solution is the “whole of
government” (WOG) approach: the interagency process and the use of soft power that
members of the interagency bring to the fight to compliment the hard power of the U.S.
military. The concept itself is sound; the past and current execution is not.
The core of the interagency is built on defense, diplomacy and development. The
defense component belongs to the military, diplomacy to the Department of State (DOS),
and development primarily to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The
component breakdown is straightforward enough, however, each component does not plan
and execute consistently with respect to the others’ goals, capabilities, or resources. One of
the main reasons for this failure of cooperation is that neither the Department of State nor
USAID have expeditionary capability. The Service components can deploy tailored forces

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anywhere in the world on short notice; DOS, USAID and the interagency cannot. Where the
Army can deploy Divisions and Corps, the two other main components are able to deploy
barely a handful of personnel—hardly an equal collaboration. Once deployed, DOS and
USAID cannot move within their area of responsibility (AOR) because they lack security
elements and must depend upon the military to provide security for them, opening a gap in
capability and execution. Acrimony from all components quickly follows.
The military to go anywhere and will do anything to accomplish the mission, but in
cases involving the conduct of civil-military operations (CMO), lacks the inherent expertise
to do so. DOS and USAID provide the needed expertise, but these agencies have a minimal
number of subject matter experts residing in the theater or the AOR, and their reach-back
capability from experts in Washington, D.C., is light years away from the constantly shifting
realities and conditions of the combat zone. DOS and USAID only provide a “Monday
Morning Quarterback” overview from the beltway, because they are not in the game, which
widens the gaps of interagency cooperation and collaboration.
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was a
reaction to the changing military environment that forced the branches of the military to
endorse and embrace joint operations. Considering the reality of the mission objectives the
interagency faces, it is high time to break the mold of the interagency and force upon them
the expeditionary capabilities they require to be co-equals in civil-military cooperation.
We desperately need a Goldwater-Nichols Act for civil-military cooperation in order to
solve these problems, or short of that, to develop a new model for interagency cooperation.
The military is a world-class planning organization. It uses a methodology that
covers the six phases of the “continuum of military operations,” from Phase 0, “Shape the
Environment,” through Phase 5, “Enable Civil Authority,”1 to plan its operations at the
strategic level. The Army is extremely proficient in executing Phase 0 through Phase 3,
“Dominate the Enemy.” This is the military’s core competency. However, it is far less
effective at executing Phase 4, “Stabilize the Environment,” and Phase 5, “Enable Civil
Authority”—especially in the environment of asymmetric warfare where there is no clear
beginning or end to combat operations and no clear forward lines. In Phases 4 and 5, the

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military expects to relinquish the lead to other interagency partners, namely DOS and
USAID. But if these partners are not present – due to their lack of expeditionary capability,
resources, or for a myriad of other reasons – the transition cannot occur, and the onus,
“something that is one's duty or responsibility,” is on the military to plan for continued
leadership in these two final phases of conflict.
The Army specifically uses the Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) to outline and guide all
efforts, civil and military. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the Theater Campaign Plan often failed
to address the Lines of Operation (LOEs) that govern Phase 4, “Stabilize the Environment.”
In many cases, this resulted in the Army defaulting to its organizational structure for
execution instead of following a cohesive, overarching strategy to adapt to the challenges of
stabilizing the environment.
Therefore, the coin of the realm for civil-military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
was the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and the CMO focus was the area of operations
assigned to each BCT. The Army, and to some extent the Marines, provided the BCT
Commander (a Colonel in most cases) with Commander’s Emergency Response Funds,
known as CERP. The BCT Commander then used the CERP money for stabilization
operations within the BCT’s assigned area of operations. Unfortunately, both the Iraq and
Afghanistan theaters lacked concise top-down guidance as to the priorities of stabilization
efforts. Security was certainly the top priority, as no short, mid or long term goals can be
achieved in the absence of security. After security, priorities for CERP spending varied by
area of operation. Each BCT Commander addressed what they believed to be their most
pressing CMO concerns: civil administration, unemployment, emergency services,
education, infrastructure improvements, etc. These priorities were seldom coordinated
with adjacent BCT Commanders, and when the BCT departed the area of operations at the
end of their tour (12-18 months), the incoming BCT Commander generated a new set of
priorities that may or may not have differed from those of the previous Commander. In
very few cases were these priorities nested under the Theater Campaign Plan. The
interagency partners had little or no input to the process, and often were more concerned
with larger scale projects run out of the U.S. Embassy, such as infrastructure, power, and
State Owned Enterprises, and how to transition these to private or public-private

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operations. Despite some localized achievements, neither the macro nor the micro-level
stabilization operations conducted by BCT Commanders proved to be a success story of any
notable merit.
The military, specifically the Army, tried at least two hybrid approaches to civil-
military operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In the latter part of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, the concept of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) was pursued. “PRTs
were relatively small operational units comprised not just of diplomats, but military
officers, development policy experts (from the U.S. Agency for International Development,
the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Justice), and other specialists (in
fields such as rule of law, engineering, and oil industry operations) who worked closely
with Iraqi provincial leaders and the Iraqi communities that they served.”2 The concept
was to subordinate a civil-military team to BCT level or lower in each Province for
enhanced planning and execution, and to provide a semblance of continuity in the area of
operations after the Relief in Place and Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) from one BCT to
the next. PRTs enjoyed some successes in each of these areas. At the high-water mark in
Afghanistan, PRTs totaled 17 in number. Many of the PRT priorities were eventually
nested under the Theater Campaign Plan, but any success was short lived. PRTs did not
exist prior to the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, and do not exist in either country today.
The political decision to draw down and exit Iraq assured even minor successes were
“overcome by events.” In Afghanistan, the PRTs were disbanded at the beginning of the
drawdown, leaving no subordinate civil-military entities to support the remaining
interagency components in the country.
A second hybrid organization, the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations
(TFBSO), was created as a division under the Department of Defense (Policy). “The Task
Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO), a multi-year endeavor for the U.S.
Department of Defense, sought to use private-sector strategies to create sustainable
economies in Iraq and Afghanistan.”3 TFBSO was established in 2006 to stabilize the post-
invasion Iraqi economy, reduce unemployment, and attract foreign investors to the
country; in 2009, the program expanded operations to include Afghanistan. TFBSO used a

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unique model comprised of a small number of military personnel and a much larger
number of civilian subject matter experts living in “safe houses,” with the forces protected
by contracted security firms and managed by a civilian Director. The intent was to be more
effective by “hiding in plain sight,” and not drawing attention to its activities, thus enabling
its members to move freely in the combat zone to engage government officials, business
entities and entrepreneurs.
Numerous and obvious issues limited the success of TFBSO. It was incorrectly
placed under the Department of Defense (Policy) located in the Pentagon. The TFBSO
Director and the vast majority of its subject matter experts did not reside in Afghanistan;
instead they flew in for engagements from TFBSO headquarters in Crystal City, VA, limiting
their effectiveness and involvement in a rapidly changing environment. None of the TFBSO
lines of operations were nested under the Theater Campaign Plan, meaning that TFBSO had
little or no communication or oversight from the Department of Defense, the Department of
State or USAID. To judge the success of TFBSO, one has only to Google the name to discover
a complete lack of success stories for any initiative in which they were engaged. At the
close of operations in Afghanistan, TFBSO was under investigation by the Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) for possible fraud, waste and abuse.
For fourteen years I have stood on the fault line of civil-military cooperation. As we
emerge from this somber reflection, look again with me into the future. We see renewed
religious and cultural conflicts in Syria, Turkey, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen. We see the same
on a lesser scale in parts of Africa, from the Sinai through the Horn of Africa to Libya and in
locations as far West as the Maghreb. We see more of the same in the Pacific in the South
China Sea, as well as trends of disturbance in Eastern Europe, especially in Ukraine, the
Balkans and the Baltic region. We see a rise of hybrid threats and transnational threats
around the globe. We experience terrorism on a repetitive basis. We operate in complex
civilian environment that is ever changing.
We also see new opportunities and challenges that demand civil-military
communication, collaboration, cooperation and cohesion (the 4 C’s) in every potential

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trouble spot in the world. We have very few positive “lessons learned” for civil-military
operations to consult and carry forward from our last two wars and no resounding success
that puts a stake in the ground to emulate elsewhere. What we do have is a series of
expensive mistakes that must not be ignored. What is needed is a fresh look and a new
model for civil-military cooperation and civil-military operations in an uncertain
environment. They world continues to change and new challenges arise. Who will heed
the uncertain trumpet?

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The Present and Emerging Spaces for Leveraging Civil Affairs
How can Civil Affairs most important customers – Geographic Combatant Commands
and Special Operations Command – best leverage CA’s full range of capabilities?
Here’s how.
Part 2 of a 4 part series on Civil-Military Coordination and Operations.
COL John C. Hope
There are emerging challenges to U.S. National Security on both sides of the
Continental United States (CONUS). To the west, China is exerting itself seeking to become
an eastern hegemon by laying claim to the whole of the South China Sea. China’s actions
are shaking the established order and structure in the entire region. To the east, revanchist
Russia annexed Crimea while manipulating the crisis in eastern Ukraine, has deployed
forces to Syria, and is threatening western neighbors as it seeks to re-establish the sphere
of influence it lost upon the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Great Britain is exiting the
European Union with other EU countries perhaps destined to follow. The migration crisis
in Europe has its roots in the Middle East and in Africa, impacting migration patterns and
issues around the globe. Yet in spite of these challenges, there is an absence of U.S. military
Civil Affairs (CA) forces involved in actual combat operations. In this, it is a different world.
On February 6, 2015, a new National Security Strategy was issued by President
Barack Obama to provide "a vision and a strategy for advancing the nation’s interests,
universal values, and a rules-based international order through strong and sustainable
American leadership."4 A key requirement under a U.S. “whole of government approach” is
to build capacity to prevent conflict. “We will strengthen U.S. and international capacity to
prevent conflict among and within states… Within states, the nexus of weak governance
and widespread grievance allows extremism to take root, violent non-state actors to rise
up, and conflict to overtake state structures.”5 In the absence of armed conflict, Civil Affairs
(CA) and Civil Military Operations (CMO) require focused and unified efforts on Phase 0

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Operations, “Shape” and Phase 1 Operations, “Deter.” The emerging Line of Effort (LOE)
may be “maneuver in complex civilian environment.” The new environment is
transnational, multi-domain and multi-functional. All CA/CMO efforts must support
decisive action for the commander. If we do not see this newly emerged environment, we
will not see the emerging spaces requiring the leveraging of the full range of CA expertise.
What are the present and emerging spaces that Civil Affairs forces can leverage to
best serve their most important clientele, the Geographic Combatant Commands and
Special Operations Command? I offer several areas for CA/CMO integration in Phase O and
Phase 1 Operations. Critical to understanding the emerging spaces is an understanding of
“Maneuver in a Complex Civilian Environment” and what COCOMs and SOC need from CA
to Shape and Deter, starting with tactical CA capabilities and operational planning support.
Civil Information Management (CIM). The most glaring and critical unmet need is
for Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) CA forces to provide their
customers with Civil Information Management that will feed a centralized Civil-Military
(Civ-Mil) Common Operational Picture (COP). Commander’s Critical Information
Requirements are articulated to the J2 (Intelligence), the J3 (Operations) and the J5 (Plans).
Currently, CA forces cannot provide coherent data to these sections to build a Civ-Mil COP
for a COCOM or for SOC. Currently, the AC and the RC use a number of different CIM
software databases. There is no uniformity for or amongst CIM users. The solution is for
all CA forces to understand and use the chosen databases of their COCOM clientele.
Specifically, RC CA forces need to be trained and effective in the customer’s choice for CIM
databases in order to contribute to the Civ-Mil COP. They must also be proficient to use
CIM effectively and immediately upon arrival.
CA forces must understand that stand-alone CIM data is both worthless and
meaningless. CA forces must be able to synthesize available data and convert it into a Civ-
Mil COP, so that commanders at all levels can see and understand the information and
make strategic, operational and tactical decisions based upon it. “CIM must feed the basic
building block of analysis, not data. All CIM information must be compiled into a format of

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“so what,” where leaders can be educated on the “who, what, when, where, and why”
requirements needing to be leveraged.”6 A functional Civ-Mil COP allows for the improved
integration of CA planners who can then present options to commanders through the
military decision making process (MDMP). CIM is CA’s most critically needed battlefield
operating system, but it is a long way from being standardized and effective to its primary
customers, specifically in the shaping and deterring environments.
SOF CA and Conventional Force CA Integration. U.S. Civil Affairs forces are
facing a near term crisis with the drawdown of the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade, the only Active
Component, Conventional Force (CF) CA unit in the Army inventory. “The 85th Brigade
provides support to Forces Command (FORSCOM) by deploying Civil Affairs units in
support of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), and provides a persistent Civil Affairs
engagement capability to the Geographical Combatant Commanders (GCCs), Army Service
Component Commanders (ASCCs) and United States Ambassadors in support of their
theater engagement plans.”7 Since the 85th Brigade’s activation on September 16, 2011, it
has worked closely and collaboratively with the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, the Special
Operations Forces CA Brigade, in all areas of civil military operations. What is missing in
the interaction is the intimate collaboration with RC CA forces. Relationship and functional
issues must be immediately addressed for continuity and enhancement of CA operations.
The onus is one the Civil Affairs community in each COCOM to address this issue. AC
CA forces and SOF CA forces must look into the near future and plan for the transfer of
existing AC CA missions to RC CA forces. This effort must include coordination with the
COCOM and the ASCC J2, J3 and J5 entities to determine existing and emerging
requirements. Conventional AC forces must determine the extent to which they can
continue to support requirements in the face of their pending drawn down and their
appropriate commands must then submit a Request for Forces (RFF) for RC CA capabilities
through FORSCOM to bridge identified gaps and to ensure RC CA support for emerging
requirements in the newly evolving complex civilian environment.

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As always, funding for RC CA support will be an issue. In the short term, Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) funds may be available on a limited basis. Other non-
traditional funding sources, such as the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), may be
available. For the long term, COCOM, ASCC and SOF planners and budgeters should build
future requirements for RC CA using 10 U.S.C. 12304B funding. As stated in the law: “When
the Secretary of a military department determines that it is necessary to augment the active
forces for a preplanned mission in support of a combatant command, the Secretary may,
subject to subsection (b), order any unit of the Selected Reserve (as defined in section
10143(a) of this title), without the consent of the members, to active duty for not more
than 365 consecutive days.”8 There are two additional stipulations written into the law
that state: “Units may be ordered to active duty under this section only if (A) the manpower
and associated costs of such active duty are specifically included and identified in the
defense budget materials for the fiscal year or years in which such units are anticipated to
be ordered to active duty; and (B) the budget information on such costs includes a
description of the mission for which such units are anticipated to be ordered to active duty
and the anticipated length of time of the order of such units to active duty on an
involuntary basis.”9 There is a two-year lead-time to budget and access 12304B funding.
Regardless of budget issues, RC CA forces can immediately begin to forge
relationships with their AC SOF brethren. This requires near term command guidance
from the U. S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and the U. S. Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)(USACAPOC(A)), as well as communication
and coordination with COCOMs and ASCCs. Under USACAPOC(A), the four Civil Affairs
Commands (CACOMs) must take the lead in operational and tactical planning required to
know and understand existing and emerging CA/CMO requirements, forge longer-term
relationships with SOF and CF CA, and affect the transition of AC CA capabilities to RC CA
forces. There is no time to lose without assuming significant risk for future civil military
operations in support of COCOMs and the Special Operations Command.
Countering Hybrid and Transnational Threats. The collaboration and fusion of
Active Component CA, Special Operations Forces CA and Reserve Component CA creates a

19. 19
united force to bear against the most lucrative Phase 0 and Phase 1 opportunities:
countering hybrid threats and countering transnational threats (CTNT). Hybrid threats are
NATO centric. “New strategic challenges by Russia and, to a degree, Daesh over the past
year have NATO scrambling to respond. Both forces are revisionist, one seeking to alter the
status quo of the European security order, the other to undo the Middle Eastern state
structure established after WWI. These dual-pronged threats to NATO’s eastern and
southern flanks are forcing the Alliance to adopt new strategic postures in response.”10
For the U.S. military “transnational threats are commonly referred to as organized
crime, terrorism and cyber security. U.S. Department of Defense defines transnational
organized crime as those self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate
transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or
commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities
through a pattern of corruption and/or violence, or while protecting their illegal activities
through a transnational organizational structure and the exploitation of transnational
commerce or communication mechanisms.”11 Countering transnational threats is not
EUCOM centric, and the U.S. government has stood up a number of new departments and
agencies with counterterrorism capabilities, including the Department of Homeland
Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National
Counterterrorism Center. Countering hybrid threats and countering transnational threats
will become likely become more ubiquitous across all COCOMs in the near future, because
of the need to enable each other in addressing asymmetrical threats throughout the world.
Countering hybrid threats and transnational threats are core Phase 0 and Phase 1
problems sets likely to be addressed on a comprehensive scale by combined CA forces in
the future. CA is not required or likely capable of taking the lead on any singular CTNT
program. However, CA forces possess wide ranges of skills and expertise that can be
applied in an enabling mode to other U.S. agencies. In the absence of conflict, the entire
spectrum of Phase 0 and Phase 1 activities belong to the Whole of Government, where CA
can contribute its expertise to leadership provided by interagency subject matter experts.

20. 20
CA and CIMIC Integration. The U.S. military employs CA forces. Most of the
European nations under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) construct employ
CIMIC forces. Limitless opportunities abound for CA to forge deeper relationships with
NATO CIMIC partners. With Great Britain exiting the European Union, and with other
countries likely to exit, NATO is the only organization capable of holding the whole of
Europe together. CA and CIMIC are capable of coordinating and integrating joint efforts for
CMO in Phase 0 and Phase 1. NATO is currently launching initiatives under “countering
hybrid threats” focusing on migration issues, including Stability and Reconstruction,
Population Protection, Protecting Women and Children in Conflict and Cultural Property
Protection. USACAPOC(A) would be well served to provide a liaison at the NATO CIMIC
Center of Excellence (CCOE) to enhance cooperation and coordination for all CA/CIMIC
interactions.
Many other of the world’s nations employ some form of “CA-like” forces that does
not fall under a branch or a discipline as per the U.S. and NATO. Regardless of the naming
convention, there is space for U.S. CA to engage with these forces as with NATO.
The Interagency. The Whole of Government (WOG) environment offers a plethora
of opportunities for CA forces to support the interagency, specifically in Countering
Transnational Threats. CA forces offer the perfect partnering capability for interagency
integration across a wide spectrum. “Within the context of DOD involvement, interagency
coordination is the coordination that occurs between elements of DOD and engaged USG
agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. Interagency coordination forges the
vital link between the U.S. military and the other instruments of national power.”12 CA
forces are routinely involved in COCOM missions and exercises providing both tactical
forces and planning support. We need only to examine the interagency spaces to find new
opportunities to engage with USG partners in Phase 0 and Phase 1 operations.
Combatant Commands offer significant opportunities for CA involvement outside of
kinetic operations. For example, the Interagency Partnering Directorate (J9) at USEUCOM
has 12 interagency partners, all of whom touch countering transnational threats in some

21. 21
way. EUCOM has current initiatives in the areas of Academic Outreach, Women, Peace and
Security, Humanitarian Mine Awareness, and Public Private Partnerships, with a primary
focus on Eastern European nations. Other opportunities abound, with the most obvious
linkages to development and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HA/DR)
through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA). USACAPOC(A) would also be well served to have a permanent
liaison at USAID to develop opportunities to expand CA opportunities for interagency
interactions.
National Guard State Partnership Program Integration. The State Partnership
Program (SPP) is a Department of Defense security cooperation program run by the
National Guard Bureau (NGB). “The SPP relates to several areas of potential interest to
Congress, including improving the capabilities of partner nations to protect their citizens;
strengthening relationships with partners to facilitate cooperation, access, and
interoperability; improving cultural awareness and skills among U.S. military personnel;
and fostering the integration of reserve and active component forces into a “total force.”13
The SPP is yet another space in which CA forces can seek collaboration. For example, many
SPP engineering and building projects are executed in host partner countries, along with
the training of host nation military personnel. Both of these venues offer CA forces the
ability to collaborate with the SPP and provide CA support to the National Guard that does
not have organic CA assets, and lack the ability to perform civil reconnaissance and civil
engagement in support of National Guard priorities in their host nations.
Mission and Exercise Support. In Phase 0 and Phase 1 Operations, mission and
exercise support is the bread and butter of RC visibility, competency and support to the
COCOM’s readiness. Traditionally, RC CA has played a major role by its participation, but
there exists more space for effective execution. Specifically, RC CA must prepare to take the
lead from AC CA for CMO planning and exercise integration at all Combat Training Centers
(CTCs), in addition to its traditional mission and exercise participation and support.

22. 22
In the rapidly changing global environment, RC CA needs to improve on mission and
exercise preparation, show up ready to “plug and play” and be an effective enabler to the
CCDR and the SOC Commander. To achieve this goal, RC participants must be involved in
the exercise academics and Master Scenario Events List (MSEL) conferences. In addition,
RC CA representation is critical at initial, mid and final planning conferences. Attendance at
these events must be built into RC Annual Training (AT) plans, and more importantly, they
need to be budgeted in advance. Attending a MSEL or planning conference uses the same
AT days as do participation in the exercise itself. Several large exercises require more than
the 14 days of AT allocated per Soldier per year. Thus, other types of funding such as
Active Duty for Training (ADT) must also be budgeted, utilized and managed.
In order to be the most effective enablers upon arrival, RC CA leaders and personnel
must also do their pre-deployment homework. Such homework must include
familiarization with their COCOMs Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) and Theater Campaign
Order (TCO), as well as familiarization with the Country Cooperation Plans (CCPs) for those
ally and partner nations involved a given exercise. CACOM Civil Affairs Planning Teams
(CAPTs) and Civil Liaison Teams (CLTs) should be executing their AT at their COCOMs,
remain current on events shaping plans and engagements, and transfer this knowledge to
their home units. CA forces must widen their aperture to contribute their skills and expand
their knowledge of their COCOM and SOC partner priorities through enhanced internal
communication and by maintaining constant situational awareness in the area of operation.
Geographic Combatant Commands provide the requirements that give CA its
legitimacy and purpose. The COCOMs also provide unparalleled training venues for
conventional CA Active and Reserve forces and SOF CA forces. The changing environment
calls for new initiatives with CIMIC and CA-like forces from other partner nations. AC SOF
and RC Conventional CA must rapidly align their planning and execution to best serve their
major clients. Countering hybrid and transnational threats presents new and complex
problem sets for all CA forces to address, both as a single discipline and under the WOG
approach, nested within the interagency environment. Integration with the National Guard
State Partnership Program offers additional space for SOF and CF Civil Affairs to interact

23. 23
and collaborate on behalf of COCOMs and SOC. All elements of CA will continue to be
involved in missions and exercises, to include Combat Training Center rotations, but with
the inactivation of the 85th CA Brigade, the demand on RC CA will increase. RC CA forces
must bring their best game when supporting missions and exercises and conducting CA
planning, and must resolve issues with Civil Information Management in order to be
prepared for new and spontaneous problem sets. Lastly, they must be prepared to support
decisive actions at all levels of CMO for their Combatant Commands.
These are the present and emerging spaces for Civil Affairs to better and best
support their respective Combatant Commands and Special Operations Command. Vision
and bold leadership from all levels of leadership will better enhance the use and success of
CA forces in a complex civilian environment.

24. 24
A (Possible) Interim Solution: A Model Short of Goldwater-
Nichols for Civil-Military Cooperation
The “Interagency” approach to civil-military cooperation requires a bridging
strategy to a future Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act model. Here’s one.
Part 3 of a 4 part series on Civil-Military Coordination and Operations.
COL John C. Hope
As written in Part 1, pundits and scholars have written and spoken volumes on what
constitutes successful civil-military cooperation. The commonly suggested solution is the
“whole of government” approach: the interagency process and the use of soft power that
members of the interagency bring to the fight to compliment the hard power of the U.S.
military. The Whole of Government (WOG) concept itself is sound; the execution in the last
two major conflicts was not. And, there is no rigorous debate as to the way forward for
civil-military cooperation. There is no resonating anger and angst over the failures of civil-
military cooperation that cost American taxpayers hundreds of millions of wasted dollars
in the two conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan, in return for no sustainability or stability. Two
things are now clear: we can’t go back to the old models and, given the uncertain
environment in the world today, we desperately need to find a new one.
It is a fact is that the military and the Interagency (IA) generally do not plan and
execute with respect to the others’ goals, capabilities, or resources, but the good news is
that we have improved. One of the main reasons for the failures of civil-military
cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan is that the interagency does not have an expeditionary
capability or the personnel or resources to match what the military brings to a conflict
area. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) model was an ad hoc solution to a
plethora of CMO challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in spite of small, localized
successes, proved to be unsustainable and ineffective as a CMO construct. PRTs exist
nowhere in world today in any phase of military operations, nor is the model even
discussed for future utilization in Phase 0 or in potential conflicts.

25. 25
In the last two wars the Army deployed quickly in vast numbers to Iraq and
Afghanistan, as the military’s primary land power component. Lacking personnel,
resources and deployment capabilities, the interagency partners eventually arrived later in
the conflict, when Army and Marine personnel were already engaged in the length and
breadth of civil-military operations. After an initial period of uncertainty, the situation
begged several questions: Now who does what? Where do we go from here? Who is in
charge? In time, the Provincial Reconstruction Team was conceptualized and
operationalized. This led to results both unremarkable and unsustainable. The PRT
concept faded to black without major changes or a future, leaving the model unsound and
unusable for future conflicts. The Task Force for Business and Stability Operations faded to
black as well. And there is an absence of new ideas, or even suggestions, as to what can or
should replace the PRTs at any point in the future.
George Santayana stated: “Those who do not remember the past, are condemned to
repeat it.” We need to remember the past, because civil military cooperation in the past
didn’t work. What we can remember is that the majority of civil-military cooperation is
conducted between the interagency (IA) and the U.S. Army. Since it appears we cannot
bring the interagency mountain to the Army, perhaps we can bring the Army to the
interagency mountain via a reverse engineering methodology. The building blocks of a
new model already exist; it remains for us to put them all together.
We could start with the first building block; our model is the Interagency Partnering
Directorate (ECJ9) at U.S. European Command (EUCOM). The brainchild of Admiral James
Stavridis, EUCOM Commander from 2009 – 2013, “the J9 embodies a “whole of society”
approach, bringing in a wide range of perspectives by integrating agencies outside of the
Defense Department to better execute EUCOM operations. The staff reaches out to entities
within and outside of the U.S. Government, including academia, think tanks, non-
governmental organizations, private businesses and international organizations. These
organizations offer EUCOM valuable viewpoints and capabilities so it can work together to
strengthen regional security and stability.

26. 26
The Interagency Partnering Directorate focuses on building and strengthening
sustainable partnerships with interested organizations to ensure regional security and
stability. Several U.S. government agency partners provide onsite representatives, to
include:
• Department of State
• Department of Treasury
• Department of Energy
• Department of Justice
• Drug Enforcement Administration
• Customs and Border Protection
• U.S. Agency for International Development
• Immigration and Customs Enforcement
• Department of Justice
• Federal Bureau of Investigation
Additionally, EUCOM staff officers regularly engage interagency partners in the national
capital region. Interagency partners are integral members of the EUCOM team,
representing their agencies while working with U.S. military planners and staff to ensure
close coordination in activities in EUCOM’s theater.”14 The IA is vital to conducting
operations in a complex civilian environment. The IA is also vital to supporting and
sustaining Phase 0 operations that are transregional, multi-domain and multi-functional.
The next set of building blocks are the personnel and facilities of the U.S.
government interagency partners in Washington, DC and their interagency personnel
deployed forward as standing members in the ECJ9. These seasoned and veteran
personnel in DC could become the trainers for Army personnel for their agency; their
facilities will become the initial training sites. The senior interagency
officer/representative in a given Combatant Command (COCOM), in this case EUCOM, will
become the “team leaders” for their agency chain of command. For example, during steady
state operations, or in the event of a pending crisis, the Foreign Service Officer (FSO) for the

27. 27
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in the EUCOM J9, follows the guidance
contained in the Theater Campaign Plan (TCP), and conducts a mission analysis to
determine the scope of the problem set with both military and agency leadership. The FSO
then determines how many additional military support personnel USAID would need to
effectively conduct operations in theater. Other senior interagency representatives will do
the same. Upon reaching consensus, the various agencies will present the Army with a
“Request for Forces” (RFF), in the same way that the COCOM leadership will provide a RFF
for military forces to U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM). Sequential and parallel planning is
then possible for both the military and interagency, in lieu of the interagency planning
separately and lagging behind in the process, waiting for the military to develop the
situation and provide guidance.
The last building block belongs to the U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs (CA) Branch.
Eight-five percent of conventional Civil Affairs forces reside in the U.S. Army Reserve.15
These CA forces number approximately 10,000 officers, non-commissioned officer and
enlisted personnel,16 the vast majority having multiple deployments to the Balkans, Iraq,
Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa over the past 10-15 years. The vast majority of these CA
personnel also have previous experience with the interagency, either through direct
collaboration in an embassy, in a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), through
participation on a Provincial Reconstruction Team, or through participation in numerous
annual training exercises conducted around the world. Civil Affairs is a high demand and
highly used discipline within the U.S. Army. It possesses the veteran and trained personnel
who have the ability to “surge” and become the subordinate staff personnel for the
interagency partners in a COCOM, who cannot readily meet the demand from their own
organizations due to time/space requirements.
In concept, following the mission analysis and the request for forces, RC CA
personnel will be mobilized and deployed to the various interagency locations in the
National Capitol Region (NCR), or to their most appropriate training venues in the United
States. For steady state operations, they could undergo 14-29 days of integration training
with the parent organization utilizing Annual Training (AT) funding. This training is key in

28. 28
order to learn the culture, and to learn the “ways and means” for the planning and
execution of their agency-specific responsibilities at the COCOM. In event of a crisis, a
thirty day training period could be conducted as CA post-mobilization training. This
training period will allow for the COCOM to prepare for the reception, staging, onward
movement and integration (RSOI)17 of the Civil Affairs surge personnel. It will also allow
for communication and coordination with agency trainers and their forward deployed
leadership, to determine what additional training will be required forward to augment and
sustain training already received in the continental United States (CONUS). Lastly, this
CONUS training period will allow the Department of the Army (DA) to establish the
authorities and funding required to deploy and sustain the CA surge personnel prior to
final deployment and integration.
Upon arrival in theater, these trained CA forces fall under the civilian chain of
command of each agency and augment their efforts until each IA entity can supplement
their teams with agency surge personnel.
Also previously stated, the military will go anywhere and do anything to accomplish
the mission. In the case of Interagency Partnership, the military lacks the inherent
expertise to do so. The interagency provides the needed expertise, but these agencies have
a minimal number of subject matter experts residing in the theater, and have limited reach-
back from experts in Washington, D.C. However, these agency personnel are available to
train the surge force of Civil Affairs Soldiers that can quickly augment the resident agency
personnel already deployed at the COCOM. Until a Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act can be applied, this interim model can be utilized to better
support and embrace interagency operations, specifically in military operations Phase 0
and Phase 1.
The threats in any COCOM are transregional, multi-domain and multi-functional.
The military does not understand them as well as the IA does, but it is rapidly beginning to
understand maneuver in a complex civilian environment. This proposed model will assist
the military in learning from other USG subject matter experts and provide for greater

29. 29
integration in the current environment. The goal is to win the peace; the military needs to
be part of the interagency process to win it. I propose this is a good model to start with.

30. 30
The (Elusive) Holy Grail: A Goldwater-Nichols Interagency
Reform Act for Civil-Military Cooperation
The “Interagency” desperately needs a reform act from Congress to codify “whole of
government” interactions similar to Joint Military Operations. We are still waiting.
Part 4 of a 4 part series on Civil-Military Coordination and Operations.
COL John C. Hope
The military and the interagency generally do not plan and execute with respect to
the others’ goals, capabilities, or resources. One of the main reasons for the failures of civil-
military cooperation and civil-military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is that the
interagency does not have an expeditionary capability, nor the personnel or resourcesto
match what the military brings to conflict area. Over and over, the solution identified and
“offered up” is the “whole of government” approach: the interagency process and the use of
soft power that members of the Interagency bring to the fight to compliment the hard
power of the U.S. military. Two conclusions can be reached as a result of “the Long War;”
the military and the Interagency are not enemies, and they work much more effectively
when they work as a team. What prevents the teaming? Funding, authorities, manpower,
priorities, rice bowls, politics, and a lack of strategic vision, to name but a few. It will take
an act of Congress to rectify this situation before the next conflict, if we have the time.
It took an act of Congress to address “Joint Issues” in the military. “The Goldwater–
Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was an attempt to fix problems
caused by inter-service rivalry, which had emerged during and after the Vietnam War,
contributed to the catastrophic failure of the Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980, and
were still evident in the invasion of Grenada in 1983.”18 Military collaboration was not
“joint” in anything but name and the “established” system led to counterproductive inter-
service rivalry. “Peacetime activities (such as procurement and creation of doctrine, etc.)
were tailored for each service in isolation. Just as seriously, wartime activities of each
service were planned, executed, and evaluated independently. These practices resulted in
division of effort and an inability to profit from economies of scale, and inhibited the

31. 31
development of modern warfare doctrine.”19 This previous environment looks and feels
like the interagency environment during “the long war” and it is, with minor exceptions, the
same environment we have today. More concerning is the fact that now major hostilities
are concluded, there is a noticeable trend of interagency partners returning to their core
competencies, perhaps under the assumption that asymmetric warfare is a thing of the
past. It should be remembered that after Vietnam, the U.S. Army adopted the same
mindset, and created the concept of the air-land battle to face the major threat from the
U.S.S.R and the Eastern Block forces, convinced it would never fight an insurgency again.
They were wrong.
As successful as the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act was to bring “jointness”
to the military, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter recently stated: “This year, as Goldwater-
Nichols turns 30, we can see that the world has changed… Instead of the Cold War and one
clear threat, we face a security environment that’s dramatically different for the last
quarter-century. It’s time that we consider practical updates to this critical organizational
framework, while still preserving its spirit and intent.”20 The world continues to change. In
the near future DOD will interact with Capitol Hill to attempt to fine-tune several aspects of
the current Goldwater-Nichols Act.
In contrast, a basic reorganization act for the interagency is not even a topic of
debate, and has no champion like Secretary Carter, even after the failures of interagency
cooperation over the last fifteen years.
“Whole of government efforts are essential in irregular conflicts. The military must
improve its efforts to reach across departmental divides. Unfortunately, emphasis on
working whole-of-governments issues is fading across the U.S. Government, except in the
field of joint concept and doctrine support.”21 Since the Long War, the military has taken
positive steps in outreach and collaboration with the interagency partners. In Iraq and
Afghanistan, “the U.S. was often unable to knit its vast interagency capabilities together for
best effect. The implementation of national decisions by various agencies and departments
was a continuing problem for senior officials. The inability to integrate, direct, prioritize,

32. 32
and apply capabilities in the optimal manner diminished success as much as any faulty
strategy or campaign plans. The converse is true: our greatest successes were those
pockets of interagency collaboration stimulated by innovative leaders.”22
A Goldwater-Nichols Reform Act for the interagency is desperately needed. Having
one will prevent the “whole-of-government” and civil-military cooperation from fading
back into oblivion. It will serve as a forcing function to keep intact the progress that was
made, even if that progress was nominal during the Long War. It will keep interagency
communication, cooperation and collaboration in the forefront of senior leader’s minds for
planning and execution in Phase 0 and in preparation for the next asymmetric conflict. It
would seem logical that as Secretary Carter works with Congress to fine-tune the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, that a similar initiative would be undertaken to create a similar
reform act for the interagency, and let both initiatives precede side-by-side until the former
is completed and the latter is created.
Our entire focus should be on Phase 0 operations and anticipating the next
war/conflict we will have to fight. As suggested by “Lessons Encountered,” we need to
learn and remember the past, lest we repeat it. Now is the time for the military and the
interagency to coalesce and drive towards a better model for future success. However, the
interagency lacks a champion for driving a Goldwater-Nichols Interagency Reform Act.
More importantly, the interagency lacks a political champion to verbalize the problems of
the USG “jointness.” Only Congressional action and Congressional leadership can provide
the catalyst and urgency required to make an Interagency Reform Act a reality.
We are now in a period of time that lacks actual war, Syria and Iraq
notwithstanding. In this interim period, there is no greater need than to have the military
and the interagency working together to conduct operations in a complex civilian
environment. The goal, as stated by the EUCOM Commander, GEN Curtis Scaparroti, is to
win every competition short of conflict. The goal is to win the peace. We need to examine
the current and emerging spaces for Civil-Military cooperation, and forge new relationships
between Civil Affairs and the interagency for Phase 0 operations, to include joint training in

33. 33
interoperability at all levels. And we need an “Interagency Reform Act” to bring true
jointness to the interagency. There is much to be done to win the peace.
Have we learned nothing from the Long War? The civil war in Syria continues
unabated and the second and third order effects of that conflict – the refugee crisis, the
movement and actions of violent extremists operating in Europe, Russia’s entrance into the
conflict and their threats to peace and stability in Ukraine, the Baltics and around the
periphery of Europe – should cause concerns to the European Union, NATO, and the U.S.
There is unrest and upheaval in the whole of North Africa, in the Maghreb, and in the Horn
of Africa. There is a civil war in Yemen; there is turbulence in Lebanon and Iraq. Iran’s
conduct is always a factor as they strive to establish homogeny in the central Middle East.
There are hybrid and transnational threats world-wide, but specifically in the Middle East,
in the Balkans, in Eastern Europe, in North Africa, and even at our own U.S. southern
borders. There are issues with North Korea; there are issues in the greater western Pacific
with China. All of these situations – and potential crisis spots – beg, and even demand, an
interagency solution. And instead of addressing these problem sets head on, we, the
collective we, seem to moving the other direction and looking past the war we just fought,
erroneously thinking it will never happen again. And we will be wrong.
If the peace cannot be won, there will be another war or another conflict that will
require an interagency solution and that solution must be better than what we experience
in the Long War. The potential conflicts areas are clearly present. Civil-Military
cooperation must be addressed and it must be maximized. What we need is action from
the military and the interagency. And we need visionary action from Congress to assure
civil-military cooperation as well as joint military cooperation. If not now, when?

34. 34
The Conclusions
The Issues and the Spaces for Leveraging Civil Affairs and Future Civil Military
Operations
Civil-Military cooperation was a near total failure during Iraq and Afghanistan
conflicts, the so-called Long War. With no other options other than to act, the U.S. Military
filled the vacuum created by the lack of interagency partners during the early years of both
conflicts. Lacking the essential knowledge and skills of their interagency partners, the
military did a commendable job, but not a competent job. Lacking an expeditionary
capability, the interagency was slow to surge and slow to arrive. Ultimately, civil-military
planning improved and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams added a degree of competent
execution to civil military operations. And then they were gone.
Lessons learned, and lessons encountered were many, but all lessons applied to
civil-military cooperation in a time of war. Few if any lessons can be applied to the Phase 0
operations the military and the interagency are now engaged in. It is time to stop looking
back as what was, and time to look forward to what is. In the new Phase 0/Phase 1
environment, the problem sets are different. Vast amounts of space exists, along with
many opportunities, for new and improved civil-military cooperation. Where CIMIC and
CIMIC forces exist, there are many areas for planning, interaction and integration.
Countering hybrid threats and countering transnational threats require interagency and
Civil Affairs and interagency synergies. Civil Information Management must be developed
as a specific core competency for all CA units; integration with and support of SOF CA must
be addressed and executed in the very near future. Lastly, executing missions and
exercises in support of Combatant Commands will pay tremendous dividends if CIM
expertise and SOF, Interagency and State Partnership Program integration is achieved.
Since it is inconceivable that CA and the IA will ever return to the PRT construct, we
must look for new ways and new methods to optimize interagency training and integration
in Phase 0, which will set the groundwork for deeper collaboration and cooperation in
Phase 1 and in Phases beyond if they evolve. We can do better in civil-military cooperation

35. 35
than we did in the Long War, but it will take initiative and fearless, creative minds to make
it so.
Lastly, we must continue to press and fight for a Congressional interagency
reorganization act similar to Goldwater Nichols Act for the joint military forces. Without
Congress leading the way and creating legislation requiring integration, civil-military
cooperation will continue to flounder and at best just ebb and flow outside of the main
currents of the whole of government environment. The cause, maintaining all interagency
efforts in Phase 0, justifies the goal. There is no better example of the need for greater civil-
military cooperation than can be found in current situation in Europe. The confluence of
the European Union, NATO and U.S. and Allied interagency and military capabilities face
the challenge of deterring of Russia, supporting the NATO Alliance and countering hybrid
and transnational threats, among a myriad of other challenges. Not winning the peace in
Europe and elsewhere, will invite a military catastrophe no one wants to consider, or face.

36. 36
The Epilog
The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S.
Army or the Department of Defense. While this is a true statement, it is also problematic.
I graduated from West Point in 1981. Serving in both the Active Component and the
Reserve Component, I have given a lifetime of service to the nation, as I swore an oath that I
would do. I am a graduate of the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps Command and
General Staff Colleges. I have two Master’s Degrees, one in Strategic Studies from the Army
War College, the other in Military History from Norwich University. I was the only
Reservist chosen to be a Fellow in Cohort II for the Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic
Studies Group, where I received an additional skill identifier (ASI) as an Army Strategist.
I am the Army. I am the Department of Defense. I swim in the military environment
as a fish swims in water; the two are inseparable. I am but one of thousands of military
officers that write and strive to be thought leaders, because we love what we do and we
want to make a difference. Every year thousands of exceptionally intelligent and
passionate officers wanting to make a difference write thought papers at our Command and
Staff and War Colleges. Every year hundreds of officers write articles for professional
military journals and publications trying to make a difference. Are our voices ever heard?
I am in the twilight of my service to this great country. All I have ever wanted to do
is serve selflessly and nobly in the Profession of Arms. I know I have made a difference as a
Soldier. This may be my last chance to serve as a thought leader and a strategist. I am
passionate about the subject of civil-military cooperation as are many others. The need for
change is so clearly apparent. Sir Basil Liddell Hart said, "The only thing harder than
getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out."23 So, there is only now,
and moving forward. These are new ideas, based in doctrine and experience. They are not
radical or revolutionary; they are common sense and practical. These ideas were solicited
so thought leaders might contribute to help shape and form the way ahead for Civil-
Military Operations and Civil-Military Cooperation. I hope my voice will be heard.

37. 37
1 See Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, “Joint Operational Planning.” (Washington, DC, Department
of Defense, August 2011).
2 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). (Washington, DC: Department of State Website).
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/iz/c21830.htm. Accessed October 15, 2015.
3 Zimmerman, S. Rebecca, Daniel Egel and Ilana Blum. Task Force for Business and Stability
Operations: Lessons from Afghanistan. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1243.html. Accessed March 1, 2016.
4 FactSheet: The 2015 National Security Strategy. The White House Office of the Press Secretary
(Washington, DC, February 06, 2015). https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/02/06/fact-sheet-2015-national-security-strategy. Accessed May 5, 2016.
5 Barrack H. Obama, National Security Strategy of the United States of America.
(Washington DC: The White House, February 2015). Page 10.
6 COL Rob Bertram, personal communication, June 24, 2016
7 See Lineage, 85th Civil Affairs Brigade, “Warrior Diplomats.”
http://www.hood.army.mil/85thCA/BrigadeHistory.html. Accessed May 23, 2016.
8 Per Title 10 U.S. Armed Forces, 10 United States Code, 12304B Funding. Government
Printing Office, Washington DC. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-
title10/pdf/USCODE-2011-title10-subtitleE-partII-chap1209-sec12304b.pdf. Page 2377.
Accessed June 15, 2016.
9 Ibid.
10 Draft General Report by Julio MIRANDA CALHA (Portugal), General Rapporteur - 051
DSC 15 E, “Hybrid Warfare: NATO's New Strategic Challenge? NATO Parliamentary
Assembly. http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=3778. Accessed June 17,
2016.
11 United States European Command Homepage, “Counter Transnational Threats.”
http://www.eucom.mil/mission/key-focus-areas/counter-transnational-threats. Accessed
June 20, 2016.
12 See Joint Publication 3-08, “Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.”
24 June 2011. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_08.pdf. Page XVI. Accessed
June 20, 2016.
13 Lawrence Kapp and Nina M. Serifino, “The National Guard State Partnership

38. 38
Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress,” (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, August 15, 2011), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41957.pdf. Page
1. Accessed July 15, 2016.
14 See United States European Command Website, J-9, Interagency Partnering.
http://www.eucom.mil/organization/command-structure/j9-interagency-partnering.
Accessed 3 April, 2016.
15 MG Daniel Ammerman, Commander, U.S. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
Command (Airborne), quoted during a presentation to the Civil Affairs Association 2016
Civil Affairs Roundtable, and Presentation of the 2015-16 Civil Affairs Issue Papers on “Civil
Affairs: A Force for Engagement and Conflict Resolution, April 4, 2016 at the National
Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC.
16 See Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne).
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/ca-psyop.htm. Accessed April 15,
2016.
17 FM 100-17-3. “Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration. No. 100-17-3
(Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 17 March 1999).
http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/amd-us-archive/fm100-17-3(99).pdf. Accessed April
15, 2016.
18 Richard W. Stewart, ed. (2005). "Chapter 12: Rebuilding the Army Vietnam to Desert
Storm". American Military History, Volume II. United States Army Center of Military
History. Accessed April 27, 2016.
19 Summarized from Cole, Ronald H. (2003). "Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: Joint Operational
Reform". Joint Force Quarterly. Accessed April 27, 2016.
20 Aaron Mehta and Joe Gould. “Carter Unveils Goldwater-Nichols Reform.” (Defense News,
April 5, 2016, 4:07 p.m. EDT). http://www.defensenews.com/story/breaking-
news/2016/04/05/carter-unveils-goldwater-nichols-reform/82657800/. Accessed April
28, 2016.
21 Richard D. Hooker and Joseph J. Collins, eds. “Lessons Encountered: Learning From The
Long War.” (Washington, DC. National University Press, September 2015). Page 9.
22 Ibid, Page 10.
23 Sir Basil Liddell Hart Quotes. AZ Quotes. http://www.azquotes.com/author/6335-
B_H_Liddell_Hart. Accessed June 30, 2016.

39. 39
John C. Hope is a Civil Affairs Colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve. He has served over 30 years
at the tactical, operational and strategic levels in the U.S. Army. He has commanded CA
forces at the Company, Battalion and Brigade levels and has four combat tours serving in
Civil Affairs in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The views expressed are his own and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense.