John Doe V ESD, Meredyth Cole | John doe's petition for writ of mandamus | Episcopal School of Dallas

No. 17-_____
_____________________________________________________________
The Supreme Court of Texas
_____________________________________________________________
IN RE JOHN DOE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
NEXT FRIEND FOR JOHN DOE, JR., A MINOR
_____________________________________________________________
Original Proceeding
From the Fifth Court of Appeals - Dallas
Cause No. 05-17-00493-CV
_____________________________________________________________
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
_____________________________________________________________
Craig T. Enoch
Marla D. Broaddus
Shelby O’Brien
ENOCH KEVER PLLC
5918 W. Courtyard Dr. Suite 500
Austin, Texas 78730
512.615.1200
512.615.1198 fax
Lawrence J. Friedman
FRIEDMAN & FEIGER, L.L.P.
5301 Spring Valley Road,
Suite 200
Dallas, Texas 75254
972.788.1400
972.788.2667 fax
ATTORNEYS FOR RELATORS
EMERGENCY RELIEF REQUESTED
FILED
17-1005
12/7/2017 9:43 PM
tex-21163971
SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, CLERK

i
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Relators: John Doe (“Doe”), individually and as next friend
for John Doe, Jr., a minor (“Doe, Jr.”)
(collectively, “the Doe Family”)1
Relator’s Trial Counsel: Lawrence J. Friedman
Lance Pool (no longer with firm)
5301 Spring Valley Road, Suite 200
Dallas, Texas 75254
John Sokatch
DYKEMA COX SMITH
1717 Main Street, Suite 4200
Dallas, Texas 75201
Relator’s Appellate
Counsel:
Craig T. Enoch
Marla D. Broaddus
Shelby O’Brien
ENOCH KEVER PLLC
5918 W. Courtyard Dr., Suite 500
Austin, Texas 78730
Christopher D. Kratovil
Kristina M. Williams
DYKEMA COX SMITH
Dallas, Texas 75201
Respondent: Fifth Court of Appeals, Dallas, Texas
1
Because John Doe, Jr. was a minor at the time of the events giving rise to this matter, in this
mandamus proceeding and the proceedings below, Relators use the pseudonyms Doe and Doe Jr.

ii
Real Parties in Interest: The Episcopal School of Dallas, Inc. (“ESD”),
Meredyth Cole, Jeffrey Laba, and Donna Hull
Real Parties in Interest’s
Trial and Appellate
Counsel:
Ronald W. Johnson
J. William Conine
TOUCHSTONE, BERNAYS, JOHNSTON, BEALL,
SMITH & STOLLENWERCK, LLP
4040 Renaissance Tower
1201 Elm Street
Dallas, Texas 75270-2196
Karen S. Precella
Andrew W. Guthrie
HAYNES & BOONE, LLP
301 Commerce Street, Suite 2600
Fort Worth, Texas 76102-4140

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ............................................................ i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES......................................................................................v
MANDAMUS RECORD......................................................................................... vi
STATEMENT OF THE CASE............................................................................... vii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION......................................................................viii
ISSUES PRESENTED...............................................................................................x
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................3
A. ESD is a private school that claims to be religious institution
but has no affiliation with a particular church or church
doctrine..................................................................................................3
B. ESD made express promises to Doe about Doe Jr.’s education,
Doe paid tens of thousands in tuition dollars relying on these
promises, and ESD refused to honor the representations it
made. .....................................................................................................5
C. Doe filed suit to recover monetary damages caused by ESD and
the individual defendants. .....................................................................9
ARGUMENT...........................................................................................................11
I. The court of appeals abused its discretion by applying the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to bar claims against a private school
that concern secular education policies and do not implicate or require
resolution of religious doctrine......................................................................11
A. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is intended to protect
against state interference in a religious entity’s governance,
faith, and doctrine................................................................................11
B. This Court should clarify that the Doctrine does not shield a
private school, unaffiliated with a religious entity, from claims
that touch upon the school’s secular internal affairs...........................13

iv
C. Because the allegations and evidence show Doe’s claims
against ESD implicate ESD’s secular, educational internal
affairs, the court of appeals abused its discretion in applying the
Doctrine...............................................................................................16
II. Mandamus relief is available.........................................................................19
PRAYER..................................................................................................................20
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.......................................................................21
MANDAMUS CERTIFICATION...........................................................................21
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................22
APPENDIX..............................................................................................................23

v
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
C.L. Westbrook, Jr. v. Penley,
231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007) .......................................................................passim
Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Tex.,
422 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. 2013) ..............................................................................12
In re Prudential Ins. Co.,
148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) ..............................................................................19
In re St. Thomas,
495 S.W.3d 500 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, orig.
proceeding) ...................................................................................................14, 15
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) ........................................................................16, 18
Tilton v. Marshall,
925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996) ..................................................................12, 13, 16
In re Vida,
No. 04-14-00636-CV, 2015 WL 82717 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Jan. 7, 2015, orig. proceeding) ...............................................................13, 14, 15
STATUTES & CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 84.002....................................................................5
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 84.003....................................................................5
U.S. CONST. AMEND. I..............................................................................................11

vi
MANDAMUS RECORD
Relators have filed three volumes reflecting the Mandamus Record for this
matter.
• Two volumes contain the documents that the trial court did not order filed
under seal and are referred to in this Petition as “MR” for the first volume
and “2-MR” for the second volume.
• The volume with the documents that are being filed under seal per the trial
court’s protective order is referred to in this Petition as “SMR.”

vii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the
Case
Real Party in Interest Episcopal School of Dallas is a private
primary and secondary school that is unaffiliated with a church
and is governed by secular admissions, code of conduct, and
disciplinary policies. In direct violation of these policies and
express promises ESD made to Relator Doe—and after obtaining
great sums of Doe’s tuition dollars—ESD breached its promises
by requiring Doe’s son, John Doe Jr., to withdraw from the school.
ESD never refunded the thousands of dollars Doe paid. Thus, Doe,
individually and as next friend for his son, filed suit against ESD
and certain ESD employees for money damages. ESD filed a
counterclaim against Doe, alleging that Doe breached the
Enrollment and Tuition Agreement by suing ESD.
After litigating the case for well over a year, ESD and the
individual defendants employed by ESD filed a jurisdictional plea,
seeking dismissal of Doe’s claims based on the “ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine.” After considering Doe’s allegations and the
evidence presented, the trial court denied the plea.
ESD and the individual defendants filed a petition for writ of
mandamus. The Dallas Court of Appeals stayed the trial court
proceedings pending its decision.
Respondent Fifth Court of Appeals, Dallas, Texas
Respondent’s
Actions
Necessitating
Relief
The Dallas Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus
relief and ordered the trial court to dismiss the lawsuit. The court
of appeals concluded that: (1) ESD is a faith-based institution
“enjoying First Amendment Protection for the free exercise of
religion;” and (2) resolving Doe’s claims “would require a court to
pass judgment on the school’s internal affairs and governance—
matters exclusively within the province of an ecclesiastical
institution.” In re Episcopal Sch. of Dallas, Inc., No. 05-17-00493-
CV, 2017 WL 4533800, at *8-9 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 11,
2017, orig. proceeding) (Appendix A). As such, the court held that
“the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies, the trial court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, and it abused its discretion by denying
Relators’ plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss.”
Appendix A, at *9; see also Appendix B.

viii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this mandamus proceeding for two reasons.
First, the Court has jurisdiction to consider an error of law that is important to the
jurisprudence of the state. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.001(a)(6). This Court has
discussed the boundaries of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine (“Doctrine”) on a
handful of occasions. But this Court has never considered whether a private school
that claims to be a religious institution may rely on the Doctrine when the breach
and tort claims at issue concern the school’s secular promises and warranties about
the education of its students. The Dallas Court of Appeals applied the Doctrine to
the private school defendant here and the individual defendants employed by the
school, allowing them to evade liability for breach and fraud claims that implicate
the school’s secular education policies, not religious standards of conduct. This
Court’s guidance regarding the limits of the Doctrine in suits against private
schools, which often purport to wear “religious” hats but engage in relationships
and conduct of a purely secular nature, is important to the state’s jurisprudence.
Second, this Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against a
Texas court of appeals. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.002(a). The Dallas Court of
Appeals abused its discretion by misapplying this Court’s jurisprudence regarding
the standard applicable when determining a jurisdictional plea, ignoring the
plaintiff’s allegations and evidence, accepting the defendants’ allegations as

ix
conclusively proved, and holding that the Doctrine bars Doe’s claims. In doing so,
the Dallas court allowed a private school bound by no church or religious doctrine
to avoid its secular contractual promises and commit fraud. This Court should
exercise its original jurisdiction to address this error that, if not corrected, will lead
to confusion in the lower courts concerning the correct review standard for pleas to
the jurisdiction and will serve as precedent for the many private schools in our
state that may claim a religious affiliation to avoid responsibility for harmful
conduct not governed or dictated by religious doctrine.

x
ISSUES PRESENTED
I. Did the court of appeals abuse its discretion by applying the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to bar the contract and
tort claims in this lawsuit when:
• the claims concern a private school’s secular conduct and
policies and do not implicate or require resolution of
religious doctrine?
• the private school and individual defendants claiming
protection under the “ecclesiastical abstention doctrine”
are not affiliated with or governed by church doctrine?
(Full Argument Reserved For Brief On The Merits)
• the court of appeals misapplied this Court’s precedent
concerning the applicable review standard by ignoring
the plaintiffs’ pleadings, accepting the defendants’
allegations as true and proven, and refusing to
acknowledge that the evidence, at a minimum, creates a
fact issue surrounding the jurisdictional question? (Full
Argument Reserved For Brief on the Merits)
II. Is mandamus relief available to challenge the court of
appeals’ order and opinion requiring the trial court to
dismiss Doe’s suit under the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine?

1
INTRODUCTION
This case presents an issue of first impression: Does the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine bar contract and tort claims brought against a private school
that alleges to be a religious institution when those claims involve the school’s
secular educational affairs that are not governed by religious doctrine? In the last
few years, the San Antonio and Houston courts of appeals have applied the
Doctrine to claims against Catholic private schools affiliated with the Diocese
because the claims implicated the schools’ “internal affairs” promulgated by
Catholic Church doctrine. In this case, the Dallas Court of Appeals erroneously
followed suit even though ESD is not affiliated with a church, does not ascribe to a
particular religious doctrine, and is governed by secular education policies. By
applying the Doctrine under these circumstances and allowing ESD to avoid
liability for its breach and fraud, the Dallas court has weakened the purpose of the
Doctrine, which is to uphold the Free Exercise Clause by preventing civil intrusion
into religious internal affairs.
Private schools play a significant role in the education and care of our state’s
children. They enter contracts with families, businesses, and vendors under which
the private schools accept thousands of dollars and agree to pay for services and
goods. These schools should not be permitted to exploit the Free Exercise Clause
as a means to evade liability when the claims against them arise from secular

2
conduct and do not implicate religious doctrine or require resolution of a religious
controversy in any way.
The Free Exercise Clause is intended to protect religious organizations from
state interference with matters of religious governance, faith, and doctrine. Until
the Dallas court’s opinion, the Clause has not been construed in a sweeping
manner to permit a private school claiming to be a religious institution to take
money from a public member, defraud and breach a contract with that person, and
hide behind the Doctrine under the guise of having the right to manage the school’s
“internal affairs”─affairs the evidence shows are not governed by religious tenet.
This is an affront not only to the Free Exercise Clause, but also this Court’s
precedent requiring courts to consider jurisdictional evidence when determining
the Doctrine’s applicability and to deny a jurisdictional plea when the evidence
raises a fact issue on the jurisdictional question.
If not corrected, the Dallas court’s opinion will serve as precedent for private
schools claiming to be a religious institution to avoid liability for abusive, tortious,
and breach of contract conduct when the school argues that the claims against it
concern “internal affairs,” regardless of whether those affairs implicate any

3
religious doctrine.2
This will detrimentally impact not only the growing number of
students and their families who rely on private schools for their children’s safety
and education, but also an array of other parties who contract with private schools
and reasonably expect that the schools live up to the bargains they make. This
Court should grant review to address the scope of the Doctrine when private
schools claim a First Amendment right to avoid civil claims against them.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. ESD is a private school that claims to be religious institution but has no
affiliation with a particular church or church doctrine.
ESD touts itself as being one of the top college preparatory schools in the
nation. SMR 783-85. Parents pay ESD private school tuition rates of at least
$25,000 per year in exchange for an education that, according to ESD’s mission
statement, prepares their children “for lives of intellectual discovery, integrity, and
purpose.” MR 125; SMR 358, 414, 513, 776.
Although ESD includes the word “Episcopal” in its name, ESD represents
itself to the federal government as a school, not an institution auxiliary to a church.
MR 244; SMR 778-79. ESD has derived an economic benefit from tax-exempt
public bonds available only to secular institutions. SMR 778-79, 799. Further, ESD
2
For example, in the recent past, an ESD teacher sexually assaulted a student. MR 129.
Relying on the Dallas court’s opinion, schools like ESD could contend in these situations that the
Doctrine bars claims concerning how the school investigated the incident, treated the student,
and treated the teacher, all because these matters concern the school’s “internal affairs.”

4
does not require its students to ascribe to a religion and does not recruit students
based on their religion affiliation. SMR 786, 794. In fact, over 85% of ESD’s
2016-2017 students are non-Episcopalian and include Catholic or Methodist
students as well as students not affiliated with any religion. SMR 786.
ESD is so far removed from a formal religious affiliation that ESD refers to
itself as “an independent school” not part of, owned, supervised or controlled by
the Episcopal Diocese of Dallas. MR 213-16, 255; SMR 346, 425, 795, 797. And,
although an Episcopal clergyman founded ESD over forty years ago, today neither
the Episcopal Church nor any clergy own, manage, or control the school or its
Board. MR 214-16, 220-25; see also SMR 782, 792, 795, 797. Only half the Board
members are Episcopalian, and ESD had a Jewish chair of the Board when Doe Jr.
was expelled. SMR 782, 804.
ESD admits the school does not know the religious affiliation of its teachers
and staff, and ESD does not give preference to Episcopalians when hiring. MR
220-23; SMR 796. ESD requires its students to take only one unit of religion
instruction out of twenty-four required for high school graduation. SMR 770. Of
the four elective religion courses ESD offers, not one centers on Episcopal doctrine
or Protestant Christianity more generally. SMR 771-72; see also MR 230.

5
B. ESD made express promises to Doe about Doe Jr.’s education, Doe paid
tens of thousands in tuition dollars relying on these promises, and ESD
refused to honor the representations it made.
Doe Jr. enrolled at ESD in 2008. MR 126; SMR 846. From that time
forward, Doe Jr. had consistently been an exceptional student—academically,
athletically, and behaviorally. MR 126.
In January of 2014, Doe paid the tuition for Doe Jr.’s expected enrollment at
ESD for Doe Jr.’s upcoming junior year. MR 127. In making that payment, Doe
relied on express representations ESD made in the Enrollment and Tuition
Agreement (“Enrollment Agreement”) and the Upper School Student and Parent
Handbook (“Student Handbook”), which the Enrollment Agreement incorporates.
MR 127; SMR 346-50, 354-67, 848-50. First, in the Enrollment Agreement, ESD
contracted for a limitation on its civil liability under Chapter 84 of the Texas Civil
Practice & Remedies Code with respect to “all matters related to” Doe Jr.’s
“affiliation with the School.” SMR 346; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§
84.002(7), 84.003. ESD thus overtly acknowledged to Doe that ESD could be
subject to a civil action for its agreement to provide Doe Jr. an education, albeit
subject to the Chapter 84 limitations.
Second, in the Student Handbook, ESD made promises concerning its
education policies, including the code of conduct and disciplinary policy, SMR
360-67, which ESD supplemented through a September 23, 2014 letter to Upper

6
School Families like the Doe Family. SMR 848-50. This letter includes a
“Response Chart and Consequence Matrix” concerning the school’s disciplinary
measures and explains that a “vast majority” of the outlined consequences are
“NOT new changes in policy. These are responses that the school has been issuing
for these offenses for many years.” SMR 850.
ESD’s education policies are not based on religious doctrine. SMR 360-67.
Rather, the code of conduct is premised on “Principles of Honor, Respect, and
Integrity,” not one of which reflects a particular religious tenet:
SMR 360. Further, ESD’s disciplinary policy is based on the following secular
statement:
The mission statement of [ESD] states that we strive to develop ‘the
educated conscience’ inside each student. To carry out our mission,
EDS must be a safe place, physically and emotionally, for the best
learning to occur. The development of self-discipline is a process.
Clear boundaries, expectations and repercussions support the
development of self-discipline. Our Code of Conduct provides a
reasonable, consistent, and fair disciplinary structure.

7
SMR 848 (emphasis added); see also SMR 358. As part of this “reasonable,
consistent, and fair disciplinary” policy, ESD expressly warrants:
• “ESD’s disciplinary system is not punitive in nature.” SMR 848
(emphasis added).
• ESD “take[s] to heart that, in most case, students should be given a
chance to redeem themselves. We are not a zero-tolerance school.”
SMR 848 (emphasis added).
• ESD “will not impose a consequence without verifiable evidence” and
will only “act when we have actual evidence, but gossip, rumors, and
second and third hand information are not sufficient.” SMR 849.
• “Suspension (1 Day)”─not expulsion─is the result for a student’s
“first alcohol, first drug offense.” SMR 850.
Doe considered these promises critical when deciding where Doe Jr. would
spend his high school years. MR 131-32; SMR 845-46. Indeed, Doe chose to enroll
Doe Jr. at ESD based on the school’s representations of “fair, even handed, and
sympathetic treatment and discipline of its students” and its promise that it is “not
a zero-tolerance school.” SMR 846. Doe considered these promises important
because he “did not want to risk having John Doe Jr.’s academic career derailed by
an alleged one-time youthful mistake.” SMR 846. The desire to keep Doe Jr. in a

8
compassionate and stable educational environment was especially significant after
Doe Jr.’s mother died in a tragic car accident. MR 135.
In the fall of 2014 of Doe Jr.’s junior year, ESD abruptly breached the
Enrollment Agreement as well as its express warranties and expelled John Doe.
MR 126-27. In doing so, ESD made allegations against Doe Jr. that Doe and Doe
Jr. vigorously deny and that contradicts the evidence.3
ESD admitted under oath
that it did not rely on and was not compelled by religious doctrine when, in
contravention of its promises, ESD expelled Doe Jr. MR 232-35. In fact, the
individual defendants and ESD’s counsel─not clergy or Episcopalian Church
doctrine─made the decision to terminate the Enrollment Agreement. MR 232-36;
SMR 831-32.
3
ESD refused to allow Doe Jr. to continue his education at ESD because Doe Jr. allegedly left
campus with another student and smoked marijuana. SMR 640-46. ESD did this even though it
knew Doe Jr. had passed a legitimate urine test and knew Doe Jr’s friend had admitted he “threw
[Doe Jr.] under the bus” and had lied to ESD about Doe Jr.’s involvement in the alleged incident.
SMR 645, 640. In any event, this was Doe Jr.’s first alleged drug offense and one that allegedly
occurred off campus, something ESD expressly promised would not result in the extreme
punishment of expulsion. SMR 848-50.
ESD’s conduct departed sharply not only from its express secular promises and warranties,
but also from ESD’s punishment of other students. Out of more than fifty drug or alcohol
incidents since 2008, Doe Jr. was the only student ESD expelled. SMR 647-769; see also, e.g.,
SMR 740 (“It is part of the school’s philosophy to give students a second chance when doing so
will not compromise the safety or integrity of the school community.”); SMR 740 (ESD refused
to discipline student even though student posted drug use on social media).
Further, information shows that the head of school and her subordinates singled out Doe Jr. as
a scapegoat to deflect from an embarrassing incident that occurred at the head of school’s home.
MR 130, 133-35; SMR 317-18. This incident involved alcohol and was initiated by the head of
school’s son, also a student at ESD, who committed multiple violations of the code of conduct
but was only required to write a letter of apology to the ESD Board. SMR 646; see also SMR
317-18.

9
C. Doe filed suit to recover monetary damages caused by ESD and the
individual defendants.
When ESD breached the Enrollment Agreement and committed fraud, ESD
did not refund the tuition Doe had already paid. MR 127, 136. Further, Doe Jr. was
forced to have a “black mark” on his academic record, enroll in a new school, and
finish his upper school years without his ESD friends, teachers, and activities that
ESD had promised would play a positive role in Doe Jr.’s education. MR 136.
Doe, on behalf of himself and his son, thus filed an Original Petition, alleging tort
and contract claims against ESD. MR 80; see also MR 123.
ESD did not respond with any challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction. MR
101. Instead, ESD filed a counter-claim, contending that Doe breached the
Enrollment Agreement by bringing the lawsuit. MR 104. Then, after well over a
year of discovery, ESD and the individual defendants filed a plea to the
jurisdiction. SMR 321-468. In this plea, Defendants’ contended that because ESD
“is a religious institution and because each of Plaintiffs’ claims seeks judicial
review of the ESD’s internal affairs and governance, this suit is barred by the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and must be dismissed.” SMR 330.
The trial court denied Defendants’ plea. Appendix E; MR 303. Defendants
subsequently filed their Petition for Writ of Mandamus and a Motion for Stay of
Trial Court Proceedings Pending Mandamus Review. 2-MR 912. The Dallas Court
of Appeals granted a stay and, without holding an oral argument, issued an opinion

10
conditionally granting the writ. See Appendix A. The appellate court concluded
that: (1) ESD is a faith-based institution “enjoying First Amendment Protection for
the free exercise of religion;” and (2) resolving Doe’s claims “would require a
court to pass judgment on the school’s internal affairs and governance—matters
exclusively within the province of an ecclesiastical institution.” Appendix A, at *8-
9. The court thus held that “the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies, the trial
court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, and it abused its discretion by denying
Relators’ plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss.” Appendix A, at *9.
After the opinion issued, ESD filed a motion to modify the relief the Dallas
court ordered. 2-MR 1299. Even though it had successfully argued that the
Doctrine applies, ESD asked the court to change its order to require the trial court
to dismiss only Doe’s claims and not ESD’s counterclaim that is based on the very
same contract from which ESD claims immunity from suit. 2-MR 1301. The court
of appeals denied ESD’s motion and Doe’s motion for rehearing. See Appendix C-
D; 2-MR 1364.

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ARGUMENT
I.
The court of appeals abused its discretion by applying the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to bar claims against a private
school that concern secular education policies and do not
implicate or require resolution of religious doctrine.
This case presents the Court with the opportunity to determine whether a
private school—particularly one unaffiliated with a church—can hide behind the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine when a plaintiff brings claims against the school
that concern the school’s secular affairs and do not require resolution of religious
doctrine. The Court should grant review and conclude the answer is no.
A. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is intended to protect against state
interference in a religious entity’s governance, faith, and doctrine.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof….” U.S. CONST. AMEND. I. Under this “Free Exercise Clause,” the
government (including the judicial branch) may not “encroach[] on the church’s
ability to manage its internal affairs.” C.L. Westbrook, Jr. v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d
389, 395 (Tex. 2007). As this Court has explained, government action may burden
the free exercise of religion in two different ways: “by interfering with an
individual’s observance or practice of a particular faith ... and by encroaching on

12
the church’s ability to manage its internal affairs.” Id. at 395 (federal citations
omitted).
In the last two decades, this Court has issued only a handful of decisions
about the intersection of civil courts and church autonomy. See Masterson v.
Diocese of Nw. Tex., 422 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. 2013); Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 395;
Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996). Each of these cases concerned
claims against churches and church ministers, not claims against private schools.
And, in these cases, the Court provided guidance concerning the boundaries of the
Doctrine when church matters are involved.
In Westbrook, for example, this Court explained that “[c]hurches have a
fundamental right to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of
church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.” Westbrook, 231
S.W.3d at 397 (emphasis added). But civil courts have a duty to apply “neutral
principles of law to non-ecclesiastical issues”—even when religious entities are
involved. Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 606 (emphasis added). Based on these First
Amendment principles, this Court concluded that the Doctrine precludes civil tort
claims based on a church’s discipline of its members who do not conform to the
church’s morals. Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 397. But the Doctrine does not prohibit
courts from considering a dispute regarding the division of church property,
Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 606-07, or a fraud claim against a church minister who

13
falsely promised he would engage in certain conduct for financial gain. Tilton, 925
S.W.2d at 679.
Accordingly, this Court’s precedent holds that the Free Exercise Clause
prohibits courts from resolving disputes implicating religious doctrine and the
church’s internal affairs premised on church doctrine. Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at
397-98; Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 677. This is because the state, through its courts,
cannot “substantially burden” the free exercise of religion. See Tilton, 925 S.W.2d
at 677. But this Court’s precedent also makes clear that the Free Exercise Clause
does not preclude courts from deciding claims against religious entities when the
dispute does not turn on matters of religious practice—and it does not prevent a
court from considering claims against a private school that does not make
educational decisions based on a particular religious doctrine. Otherwise, Texas
courts would abdicate their constitutional duty to decide civil disputes.
B. This Court should clarify that the Doctrine does not shield a private
school, unaffiliated with a religious entity, from claims that touch upon
the school’s secular internal affairs.
This Court has never extended the Doctrine to claims that happen to touch
on the secular educational affairs of a private school—and certainly not secular
claims against a private school like ESD whose religious ties are nominal at best.
As a consequence, the Dallas Court of Appeals in this case relied heavily on a
couple of lower court decisions. Appendix A, at *8-9 (discussing In re Vida, No.

14
04-14-00636-CV, 2015 WL 82717 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 7, 2015, orig.
proceeding) and In re St. Thomas, 495 S.W.3d 500 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding)).
• In In re Vida, a family sought declaratory relief against the
superintendent of a Catholic school related to the school’s decision to
not promote a Kindergartner to First Grade. 2015 WL 82717, *1. The
San Antonio Court of Appeals applied the Doctrine to bar the suit,
concluding that the school was affiliated with the Catholic Diocese
and that, because the claims implicated the “Diocese’s policy
manual,” they “impinge[d] upon the Diocese’s ability to manage its
internal affairs by adopting policies regarding admission requirements
for Catholic schools.” Id. at *2-3.
• In In re St. Thomas High School, the Houston (Fourteenth) Court of
Appeals evaluated whether the Doctrine barred a family’s claim for
injunctive relief against a Catholic school that had expelled a student
based on the parents’ false allegations against a teacher. 495 S.W.3d
500, 504. The court held that the Doctrine precluded the claims
because the school was a religious institution and “spiritual standards
and references to Catholic teaching permeate[d]” the allegations the
family made against the teacher. Id. at 512. Thus, the claims

15
impermissibly required the court to resolve “spiritual standards and
religious doctrine.” Id. at 513.
Notably, in both St. Thomas and Vida, the private schools were directly affiliated
with the Catholic Church. Further, in both cases, the families’ claims for injunctive
or declaratory relief either implicated policy the Diocese directly promulgated or a
teacher’s compliance with religious doctrine. These circumstances do not exist in
this case. First, ESD is a private school with secular education policies. Second, the
claims against ESD concern these secular education policies promising that a one-
time mistake would not ruin a student’s educational trajectory. Third, unlike the
families in St. Thomas and Vida, Doe is not seeking to force ESD to accept Doe Jr.
as a student; he is suing for damages for ESD’s breach and fraud.
A private school, even one loosely affiliated with religion, should not enjoy
full-scale immunity from civil claims simply because they touch on “internal
affairs.” To allow the Doctrine to apply in such a situation goes far beyond the
Doctrine’s purpose of preventing civil intrusion on religious internal affairs. And it
sets a dangerous precedent. The Dallas Court of Appeals’ opinion, if not corrected,
will provide support for any private school or organization claiming a religious
affiliation to hide behind the Doctrine when faced with claims based on conduct
that has nothing to do with religious doctrine or faith.

16
C. Because the allegations and evidence show Doe’s claims against ESD
implicate ESD’s secular, educational internal affairs, the court of
appeals abused its discretion in applying the Doctrine.
Doe’s suit is, at its core, a suit seeking monetary relief for ESD’s false
promises to Doe, who paid thousands of dollars to the school, concerning its
secular education, code of conduct, and disciplinary policies. These false promises
are substantially similar to the false statements in Tilton v. Marshall, which this
Court concluded, despite Tilton’s undisputed religious operation, that the Doctrine
did not protect. 925 S.W.2d at 677-79. Yet the Dallas court allowed ESD and the
individual defendants to use the Doctrine as a shield, directly contravening the
purpose of the Free Exercise Clause.
How did this happen? The Dallas court failed to give due credit to Doe’s
allegations and the evidence the trial court considered. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks &
Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226-28 (Tex. 2004) (review of jurisdictional
plea requires court to “construe the pleadings liberally in the plaintiff’s favor”).
These allegations and the evidence show that ESD is not a faith-based institution
entitled to the Doctrine’s protection and that, even if it is, the Doctrine does not
apply because the claims do not require the “resolution of a religious controversy.”
Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 399.
• The school represents to the IRS that it is a school and not a faith-
based institution and has obtained bond financing available only to
secular institutions. SMR 778-79, 799.

17
• The school is not part of the Episcopal Diocese and receives no funds
from the Diocese, and no church owns, operates, or controls the
school. MR 213-16; SMR 792, 795, 797.
• ESD’s board members are not clergy; teachers and staff need not be
Episcopalian; and the vast majority of the school’s students (85
percent) are not Episcopalian. SMR 786, 804.
• ESD expressly promised to work with families on disciplinary issues,
warranted that its disciplinary process is not zero tolerance, and
represented that ESD will not impose “a consequence without
verifiable evidence” and that ESD’s “disciplinary process is not
punitive in nature,” and that evidence of disciplinary issues must be
“verifiable” and “actual.” SMR 848-49.
• ESD induced Doe to enter into an Enrollment Agreement and pay
tuition based upon those representations, and ESD accepted that
payment. MR 127; SMR 346-50.
• ESD admitted this was the first time Doe Jr. was alleged to be in
trouble. SMR 406. And ESD’s notes show Doe Jr. passed a legitimate
controlled substances test, SMR 644, and that the student who tried to
blame Doe Jr. had lied. SMR 645.
• ESD records show many disciplinary actions in which students
engaged in far more serious misconduct involving drugs and alcohol
received far less severe punishments than Doe Jr. SMR 647-769.
• ESD admitted that its non-Episcopalian staff and its counsel, not
clergy or a church, was involved in the decision to expel Doe Jr. MR
232-36; SMR 831-32.
• ESD’s education policies, including its code of conduct and
disciplinary policies, are not based on religious doctrine. SMR 360-
67, 848-49.
• ESD had motivation to breach its contract, commit fraud, and treat
Doe Jr. differently than how the school promised, as this was a means

18
to deflect from an embarrassing event that happened earlier in the year
involving the head of school and her son. MR 130, 133-35; SMR 318.
If, as Doe alleges and the evidence shows, Doe Jr. was expelled for secular
disciplinary reasons and in violation of secular promises and representations, then
evaluation of ESD’s conduct does not implicate religious tenets or standards of
conduct. But the Dallas court swept these allegations and evidence aside and, on
top of this, erroneously concluded that the jurisdictional allegations of ESD, the
defendant, are “undisputed” and “conclusively establish[ed].” Appendix A, at *4,
8. Equally troublesome, the Dallas court concluded the Doctrine applies to the
school’s “internal affairs” without regard to whether they implicate religious
doctrine.
Because Doe’s allegations and the evidence at a minimum raise a fact issue
on the jurisdictional question, the trial court was well within its discretion to deny
the jurisdictional plea. And the Dallas court abused its discretion by second
guessing this decision contrary to this Court’s precedent. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at
228; see also Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 395 (“A plea should not be granted if a
fact issue is presented as to the court’s jurisdiction ... .”).

19
II.
Mandamus relief is available.
Mandamus is available when the court of appeals abuses its discretion and
the relator has no adequate appellate remedy. See In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148
S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004). “The operative word, ‘adequate’, has no
comprehensive definition; it is simply a proxy for the careful balance of
jurisprudential considerations that determine when appellate courts will use
original mandamus proceedings to review the actions of lower courts... . An
appellate remedy is ‘adequate’ when any benefits to mandamus review are
outweighed by the detriments.” Id. at 136.
Here, the benefits of mandamus review far outweigh the detriments. If the
Court refuses to grant mandamus review, the trial court will be required to vacate
its order denying ESD’s plea and dismiss the lawsuit. Although Doe could then
bring a direct appeal to the Dallas Court of Appeals, that court has already written
about this issue. Requiring Doe to bring an appeal to the Dallas court as a mere
formality to seeking appellate review in this Court would constitute an enormous
waste of resources for both the Dallas court and litigants. Further, the narrow issue
of the Doctrine’s application is squarely before this Court given the proceedings
below. This Court thus has full authority to exercise its mandamus jurisdiction
here.

20
PRAYER
Relators pray that the Court grant this petition and order the Dallas court of
appeals to vacate its order and opinion requiring the dismissal of Doe’s claims
against the Defendants. Relator further prays that the Court grant any other relief to
which Doe and Doe Jr. may be entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Craig T. Enoch
Craig T. Enoch
State Bar No. 00000026
cenoch@enochkever.com
Marla D. Broaddus
mbroaddus@enochkever.com
Shelby O’Brien
State Bar No. 24027203)
sobrien@enochkever.com
ENOCH KEVER PLLC
5918 W. Courtyard Drive, Suite 500
Austin, Texas 78730
512.615.1200 / 512.615.1198 (fax)
Lawrence J. Friedman
lfriedman@fflawoffice.com
5301 Spring Valley Road, Suite 200
Dallas, Texas 75254
972.788.1400 / 972.788.2667 (fax)
ATTORNEYS FOR RELATORS

21
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Relator certifies that this Petition for Writ of Mandamus (when excluding
the caption, identify of parties and counsel, table of contents, index of authorities,
statement of the case, statement of issues presented, statement of jurisdiction,
signature, certificate of compliance, certificate of service, and appendix) contains
4,499 words.
/s/ Marla Broaddus
Marla Broaddus
MANDAMUS CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(j), I certify that I have
reviewed this petition and that every factual statement in the petition is supported
by competent evidence included in the appendix or record. Pursuant to Rule
52.3(k)(1)(A), I certify that every document contained in the appendix is a true and
correct copy.
/s/ Marla Broaddus
Marla Broaddus

22
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served via
electronic service on the following counsel of record on December 7, 2017.
Ronald W. Johnson
J. William Conine
TOUCHSTONE, BERNAYS, JOHNSTON,
BEALL, SMITH & STOLLENWERCK, LLP
4040 Renaissance Tower
1201 Elm Street
Dallas, Texas 75270-2196
ronjohnson@tbjbs.com
will.conine@tbjbs.com
Karen S. Precella
Andrew W. Guthrie
HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP
301 Commerce Street, Suite 2600
Fort Worth, Texas 76102-4140
karen.precella@haynesboone.com
andrew.guthrie@haynesboone.com
Christopher D. Kratovil
Kristina M. Williams
DYKEMA COX SMITH
Dallas, Texas 75201
ckratovil@dykema.com
kwilliams@dykema.com
/s/ Marla D. Broaddus
Marla D. Broaddus

23
No. 17-_____
_____________________________________________________________
The Supreme Court of Texas
_____________________________________________________________
IN RE JOHN DOE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
NEXT FRIEND FOR JOHN DOE, JR., A MINOR
_____________________________________________________________
Original Proceeding
From the Fifth Court of Appeal - Dallas
Cause No. 05-17-00493-CV
_____________________________________________________________
APPENDIX
_____________________________________________________________
A. In re Episcopal Sch. of Dallas, Inc., No. 05-17-00493-CV, 2017
WL 4533800 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 11, 2017, orig.
proceeding)
B. Dallas Court of Appeals’ Order Conditionally Granting
Mandamus Relief (Oct. 11, 2017)
C. Dallas Court of Appeals’ Order Denying Motion for Rehearing
and Motion to Modify (Nov. 15, 2017)
D. Dallas Court of Appeals’ Order Granting Motion to Extend
Trial Court’s Deadline to Issue Written Orders (Nov. 17, 2017)
E. Trial Court’s Order on Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction and
Motion to Dismiss (Apr. 25, 2017)

In re Episcopal School of Dallas, Inc., --- S.W.3d ---- (2017)
© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
2017 WL 4533800
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT
LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.
Court of Appeals of Texas,
Dallas.
IN RE The EPISCOPAL SCHOOL OF DALLAS, INC., Meredyth Cole, Jeffrey Laba, and Donna Hull, Relators
No. 05-17-00493-CV
|
Opinion Filed October 11, 2017
Synopsis
Background: Parents of student, who was asked to withdraw from private, college preparatory school in lieu of
being expelled after he allegedly left school without permission and smoked marijuana, brought action against school
complaining about its disciplinary actions and application of its policies and procedures. The 68th Judicial District Court,
Dallas County, No. DC-15-04152, denied school's plea to jurisdiction and motion to dismiss based on ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine. School filed petition for writ of mandamus.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Whitehill, J., held that:
[1] as an issue of first impression, school was faith-based institution entitled to protection for free exercise of religion;
[2] ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applied to parents' claims; and
[3] doctrine of laches did not preclude mandamus relief.
Relief conditionally granted.
West Headnotes (26)
[1] Courts Acts and proceedings without jurisdiction
A trial court lacks discretion and must dismiss the case as a ministerial act when it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction.
Cases that cite this headnote
[2] Mandamus Entertaining and proceeding with cause
Mandamus is proper when a trial court acts without subject matter jurisdiction.
Appendix A to John Doe's Petition for Writ of Mandamus
Page 1 of 15

[3] Pleading Plea to the Jurisdiction
Lack of jurisdiction may be raised by a plea to the jurisdiction when religious-liberty grounds form the basis
of the jurisdictional challenge.
[4] Appeal and Error Cases Triable in Appellate Court
The Court of Appeals reviews de novo a plea to the jurisdiction questioning the trial court's subject matter
jurisdiction.
[5] Appeal and Error Proceedings preliminary to trial
In reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction questioning the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, the Court of
Appeals focuses first on the plaintiff's petition to determine whether the pled facts affirmatively demonstrate
that subject matter jurisdiction exists.
[6] Appeal and Error Pleading
The Court of Appeals construes the pleadings liberally in the plaintiff's favor when reviewing a plea to the
jurisdiction questioning the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction.
[7] Pleading Scope of inquiry and matters considered in general
If a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, the trial court may consider evidence
beyond the pleadings and must do so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised.
[8] Pleading Questions of law and fact
The court must grant a plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law if there is an incurable jurisdictional defect.
[9] Constitutional Law Ecclesiastical matters
The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine arises from the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and applies to
the states through the 14th Amendment. U.S. Const. Amends. 1, 14.
[10] Constitutional Law Freedom of Religion and Conscience
Courts give great deference to the First Amendment's freedom of religion guarantee. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.
Page 2 of 15

[11] Constitutional Law Internal affairs, governance, or administration;autonomy or polity
Among its prohibitions, the Free Exercise Clause precludes government action that burdens the free exercise
of religion by encroaching on the church's ability to manage its internal affairs. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.
[12] Religious Societies Judicial supervision in general
The “ecclesiastical abstention doctrine” prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that
would require an analysis of theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the
conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required.
[13] Constitutional Law Ecclesiastical matters
Although wrongs may exist in the ecclesiastical setting, and although the administration of the church may
be inadequate to provide a remedy, the preservation of the free exercise of religion is deemed so important a
principle that it overshadows the inequities that may result from its application; thus, courts accept as final and
binding an ecclesiastical institution's decisions on such matters. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.
The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not foreclose civil court subject matter jurisdiction over all disputes
involving religious entities; because churches, their congregations, and their hierarchies exist and function
within the civil community, they are amenable to rules governing civil, contract, and property rights in
appropriate circumstances.
To determine whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies, courts must analyze whether a particular
dispute is ecclesiastical in nature or simply a civil dispute in which church officials happen to be involved.
[16] Constitutional Law Private Education
Education Establishment and status in general
Private, college preparatory school was faith-based institution entitled to First Amendment protection for free
exercise of religion, even though school was not owned or operated by church; school's bylaws required that at
least one-half of its directors were communicants of Episcopal Church, students and faculty were required to
attend and participate in daily chapel and students were required to complete mandatory religious curriculum
requirements, school was member of National Association of Episcopal Schools and its head of school was
Association board member, school's website emphasized that it was faith-based institution, and school's mission
Page 3 of 15

and purpose were religious, as it endeavored to imbue its students and staff with Christian principles and values
even if they did not already subscribe to them. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.
[17] Constitutional Law Private Education
Being a faith-based school instead of being a church does not deny the school First Amendment freedom of
religion protection. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.
[18] Education Punishment;suspension or expulsion
Religious Societies Contracts and indebtedness
Religious Societies Torts
Ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applied to claims by parents of student, who was asked to withdraw from
private, college preparatory school in lieu of being expelled after he allegedly left school without permission and
smoked marijuana, against school complaining about its disciplinary actions and application of its policies and
procedures; dispute derived solely from calculus of school's internal policies and management of its internal
affairs, as breach of fiduciary duty, Deceptive Trade Practices Act, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, tortious
interference, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims were based on the application of internal policies, procedures, and guidelines set forth in the
code of conduct and school handbooks. Tex. Bus. & C. Code § 17.41 et seq.
[19] Appeal and Error Origin, nature, and scope of remedies in general
Mandamus Nature and scope of remedy in general
Mandamus Discretion as to grant of writ
Unlike a direct appeal, which is a matter of right, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, intended to be
available in only limited circumstances at the court's discretion.
[20] Mandamus Nature of questions involved
Mandamus review is reserved for trial court errors where the very act of proceeding to trial, regardless of the
outcome, would defeat the substantive right involved.
[21] Mandamus Nature and scope of remedy in general
To obtain mandamus relief, a relator must show either (i) the underlying order is void or a clear abuse of
discretion and, (ii) no adequate appellate remedy.
[22] Mandamus Laches
Page 4 of 15

Doctrine of laches did not preclude mandamus relief for private, college preparatory school following trial
court's denial of its plea to jurisdiction in action by parents of school, who was asked to withdraw from school
in lieu of being expelled after he allegedly left school without permission and smoked marijuana, complaining
about its disciplinary actions and application of its policies and procedures, despite claim that school waited
19 months before raising ecclesiastical abstention doctrine; school explained that it was waiting to complete
sufficient discovery to present comprehensive plea to jurisdiction, parents did not identify any good faith and
detrimental change in position resulting from delay in their suit, and relevant time period for laches was not
measured from time that doctrine was raised but with reference to mandamus petition's filing, which was two
weeks after plea was denied.
[23] Equity Nature and elements in general
“Laches” is an equitable remedy that prevents asserting a claim due to the lapse of time.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[24] Mandamus Laches
For laches to bar a mandamus action, a real party in interest ordinarily must show (i) the opposing party's
unreasonable delay in asserting its rights and (ii) the real party in interest's good faith and detrimental change
in position because of the delay.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[25] Equity Application of doctrine in general
Whether a party's delay in asserting its rights results in laches depends on the circumstances.
[26] Courts Time of making objection
A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time.
Original Proceeding from the 68th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. DC-15-04152
Before Justices Bridges, Fillmore, and Whitehill
OPINION
Opinion by Justice Whitehill
*1 This original proceeding involves an issue of first impression for this Court: whether the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine applies to faith-based schools not owned or operated by a church. 1
If that doctrine applies here as a general
Page 5 of 15

matter, a second question is whether the plaintiffs' claims implicate the school's ability to manage its internal affairs such
that the doctrine defeats the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over those claims.
The Episcopal School of Dallas (the school) seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to vacate an order
denying its plea to the jurisdiction. In two issues, the school maintains that (i) it is a faith-based school and therefore
the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims arising
from the school's decision to request a student's withdrawal for disciplinary reasons and (ii) there is no adequate remedy
by appeal.
Because the undisputed facts establish that (i) the school is a faith-based institution to which First Amendment
protections apply, (ii) this dispute turns solely on the school's ability to manage its internal affairs, including its
admissions decisions, and (iii) mandamus is appropriate when a court acts without subject matter jurisdiction, we sustain
both issues and conditionally grant the requested relief.
I. Background
The school is a private, college preparatory school founded in 1974 by an Episcopal clergyman and a group of local
Episcopalian leaders. It is a tax-exempt, non-profit corporation school.
Plaintiff John Doe, Jr. (Doe) was a student at the school. Plaintiff John Doe is Doe's father. They are collectively the
Does.
Dishonesty, refusal to consent to a search, and drug use and possession violate school policy. Furthermore, the school's
handbook provides that refusal to allow an interior vehicle search “will be cause for suspension, termination of campus
driving and parking privileges, and potential reconsideration of student's enrollment at [the school].”
The handbook also provides for punishing certain infractions, including dishonesty and drug possession. Moreover,
parents and students acknowledge in writing that the school may impose disciplinary consequences, including
termination of enrollment, for conduct the school deems unsatisfactory.
Additionally, the school's enrollment and tuition agreement provides that:
*2 The enrollment of Student is entirely at ESD's discretion and the school reserves the right to
dismiss Student or to discontinue further enrollment at any time for conduct ... whether on or off
school property, which it deems ... unsatisfactory.
The agreement further provides that the school “may terminate Student's enrollment for any reason,” and “students may
be disciplined including but not limited to suspension and expulsion.”
The school sent upper school parents, including John Doe, a letter stating among other things “that in most cases, students
should be given a chance to redeem themselves” and that “we are not a zero tolerance school.” (Emphasis added).
Doe was a student during the 2014-2015 school year. One day, he violated school policy by leaving campus for lunch
without permission. A neighbor reported to the school that two students (one of whom was later proved to be Doe) were
parked in front of her house smoking marijuana, and she called the police.
Doe initially denied leaving campus, but a security camera showed otherwise.
Page 6 of 15

Doe then admitted leaving but denied smoking marijuana. Doe's companion, however, admitted smoking marijuana
and said that Doe participated.
Doe also refused a search of his vehicle.
Although Doe passed an initial urine drug test, the school later learned that he used another student's specimen for the
test. Doe failed a second drug test.
The school subsequently asked Doe to withdraw from school in lieu of being expelled. Doe withdrew.
Based on these and additional related facts, the Does sued the school, head of school Meredith Cole, head of upper school
Donna Hull, and the assistant head of upper school Jeffrey Laba (collectively, Relators). The lawsuit complains about
Relators' disciplinary actions and the application of the school's policies and procedures. The suit alleges these claims
against some or all Relators: (i) breach of fiduciary duty, (ii) aiding and abetting fiduciary breaches, (iii) breach of express
warranties under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, (iv) negligent misrepresentation, (v) fraud, (vi) negligent
hiring and supervision, (vii) negligence and gross negligence, (viii) tortious interference with a contract, (ix) breach of
contract, (x) promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, money had and received/assumpsit, (xi) intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and (xii) respondeat superior and vicarious liability. The Does also requested a declaratory judgment
concerning the parties' rights and obligations under the school's enrollment agreement and student handbook, and a
declaration concerning damages. The school counterclaimed for breach of the tuition and enrollment agreement. 2
Five months before the dispositive motion deadline and after considerable discovery was done, Relators filed a plea to
the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss asserting that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine deprives the court of subject
matter jurisdiction. After additional jurisdiction-based discovery and a hearing continuance, the court heard and denied
the motion and plea. The court also denied a motion to stay the proceedings pending mandamus review.
*3 Relators' mandamus petition followed and is at issue here. We stayed the trial court proceedings pending our
mandamus determination.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
[1] [2] Mandamus is warranted when the relator demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion and there is no adequate
appellate remedy. E.g., In re St. Thomas High School, 495 S.W.3d 500, 506 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, orig.
proceeding). A trial court lacks discretion and must dismiss the case as a ministerial act when it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. Mandamus is thus proper when a trial court acts without subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
[3] “Lack of jurisdiction may be raised by a plea to the jurisdiction when religious-liberty grounds form the basis of the
jurisdictional challenge.” Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2007).
[4] [5] [6] [7] [8] We review de novo a plea to the jurisdiction questioning the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction.
See Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). In doing so, we focus first on the
plaintiff's petition to determine whether the pled facts affirmatively demonstrate that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Id.
at 226. We construe the pleadings liberally in the plaintiff's favor. Id. If a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of
jurisdictional facts, the trial court may consider evidence beyond the pleadings and must do so when necessary to resolve
the jurisdictional issues raised. Id. at 227; Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000). The court must
grant the plea as a matter of law if there is an incurable jurisdictional defect. See St. Thomas, 495 S.W.3d at 506.
Page 7 of 15

B. The Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine
[9] [10] [11] The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine arises from the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and applies
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV; St. Thomas, 495 S.W.3d at 507.
Courts “give great deference to the First Amendment's freedom of religion guarantee.” In re Godwin, 293 S.W.3d 742,
745 (Tex. App.—San Antonino 2009, orig. proceeding). Among its prohibitions, the Free Exercise Clause precludes
government action that burdens the free exercise of religion “by encroaching on the church's ability to manage its internal
affairs.” Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 395.
[12] This doctrine thus “prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that would require an analysis
of theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church
to the standard of morals required.” Patton v. Jones, 212 S.W.3d 541, 547–48 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied).
[13] “Although wrongs may exist in the ecclesiastical setting, and although the administration of the church may be
inadequate to provide a remedy, the preservation of the free exercise of religion is deemed so important a principle that
it overshadows the inequities that may result from its application.” Williams v. Gleason, 26 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd); accord, In re Godwin, 293 S.W.3d at 750. Thus, courts accept as final and binding
an ecclesiastical institution's decisions on such matters. See Patton, 212 S.W.3d at 547.
*4 [14] [15] In that regard, the doctrine does not foreclose civil court subject matter jurisdiction over all disputes
involving religious entities. Because churches, their congregations, and their hierarchies exist and function within the
civil community, they are amenable to rules governing civil, contract, and property rights in appropriate circumstances.
St. Thomas, 495 S.W.3d at 507. To determine whether the doctrine applies, courts must analyze whether a particular
dispute is ecclesiastical in nature or simply a civil dispute in which church officials happen to be involved. Id.
As an initial matter, the Does urge that the doctrine does not apply here because the school is not a church, owned by
a church, or run by a church, and does not have religion as its “primary purpose.” In short, the Does contend, without
supporting authorities, that the doctrine applies only to churches or church owned entities. But our sister courts routinely
apply the doctrine to dismiss suits against religious schools or officials with authority over religious schools. See St.
Thomas, 495 S.W.3d at 509 (citing cases). We agree with their reasoning. Thus, our first question is whether the record
conclusively establishes that the doctrine applies to this school.
C. Is the school a faith-based institution?
1. Facts Showing that the School Is Faith-Based
[16] The record establishes these facts bearing on whether the school is a faith-based institution entitled to First
Amendment protection:
One, the school's articles of incorporation state that its “primary purpose is to operate a non-profit, college preparatory
middle and upper school, committed to the Christian gospel as interpreted by the Protestant Episcopal Church of the
United States of America.”
Two, its bylaws require that at “least one-half of all directors serving at any time shall be communicants of the Episcopal
Church in the United States of America.”
Three, the school's stated mission is to create a “Christian community that places the honor and worship of God at the
center of its common life” and embraces “diversity and inclusion” and the school's founding belief that “[a]ll children are
made in the image of a loving God.” The mission statement further refers to “faith as [an] essential element of student
development.” The school's founding tenets are daily worship, community, ethical decision making, and service, and it
Page 8 of 15

emphasizes a “faith-centered environment” that promotes “[n]urturing a spiritual relationship with God through the use
of the Book of Common Prayer.”
Four, students and faculty are required to attend and participate in daily chapel, and students must complete mandatory
religious curriculum requirements. The religious curriculum includes courses studying (i) major world religions, (ii)
Jewish and Christian texts, (iii) ethical reasoning, and (iv) religious experiences.
Five, the Dallas Episcopal Diocese assigns ordained Episcopal priests to conduct chapel and Eucharist services at the
school. A student's absence from chapel is considered an unexcused absence subject to disciplinary action.
Six, the Senior Chaplain is “responsible for pastoral care and chapel services” at the school and “oversees all spiritual
components within the [SCHOOL'S] program.” The Senior Chaplain also sits on the school's Daily Worship and
Religious Life Board Committee and uses the Book of Common Prayer to design and implement daily worship at the
school.
Seven, both the Senior Chaplain and the lower school Chaplain conduct daily worship and monthly or weekly Eucharist
services. The Dallas Episcopal Diocese Bishop also periodically conducts Eucharist services.
*5 Eight, beginning in 1995, the lower school operated on church grounds pursuant to an occupancy agreement between
the school and St. Michael and All Angels Episcopal Church, with the church premises being used “for the purpose of
operating an Independent Episcopalian co-educational school ... through Grade 6 substantially in accordance with [the
school's] Mission Statement.”
Nine, that occupancy agreement states that “[a]ll spiritual instruction at the School will be in conformity with the
doctrine, discipline and worship of the Episcopal Church of the United States of America. In the event of a dispute
regarding spiritual instruction, the matter shall be settled by appeal to the Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Dallas
and his determination shall be final in the matter.”
Ten, the school is a member of the National Association of Episcopal Schools (NAES) and its head of school is a NAES
board member. NAES confirms that “[a]s embodiments of the Christian faith, Episcopal schools ... serve God in Christ
in all persons, regardless of origin, background, ability, or religion” and “strive for justice and peace among all people
and to respect the dignity of every human being.”
Eleven, the school's website further emphasizes that the school is a faith-based institution.
Twelve, the school's symbol and motto are faith-based, and both the student and faculty handbooks confirm the school's
faith-centered mission and founding tenets.
Thirteen, as a condition of enrollment, students and their parents agree to abide by the code of conduct, the student
handbook, and other “principles and standards” of the school community. Indeed, all members of the school's
community commit to the code of conduct, which recognizes “everyone is created in the image of God” and requires
the school community members to “conduct themselves with honor, respect, and integrity in a manner consistent with
the ideals of [THE SCHOOL'S]'s Mission Statement.” This code of conduct appears in the student handbook and
incorporates, among other things, an academic honor pledge, sportsmanship expectations, and state laws related to
illegal drugs and underage drinking.
2. The Does' Proffered Facts
[17] The Does, however, rely on the following to argue that the school is not a faith-based institution or a church:
Page 9 of 15

• The school represents to the IRS that it is a school, not a church; 3
• The majority of the school's students are not Episcopalian;
• The school is not part of the Dallas Episcopal Diocese and receives no money from the Diocese;
• The Episcopal church does not own, operate, or control the school;
• None of the school's board members are Episcopal clergy, and only half are Episcopalian;
• The teachers and staff need not be Episcopalian;
• The school's two chaplains are the only two school employees who are Episcopal clergy;
• The school does not give admission preference or discounts to Episcopalian students, actively recruits students of all
faiths, and makes no effort to track the religious affiliation of its faculty and staff;
• The school does not prepare students for the seminary;
• The school has obtained bond financing “holding itself out to local government entities as a secular scholastic
institution;” 4
• No member of the Episcopal clergy was consulted or involved in the school's decision regarding Doe, Jr.;
• Chapel services often include secular topics;
• Over 85% of the schools' students in 2016–17 self-identified as non-Episcopalians;
*6 • When its action regarding Doe, Jr. was taken, the school's board chair was Jewish, and the board consulted non-
clergy, outside lawyers regarding that decision; and
• Only one unit of religious instruction (out of a total of twenty-four units) is required, and none of the offered religion
courses focus exclusively on the Episcopal denomination.
These facts are similar to St. Thomas's facts in the sense that they show the school is in fact a school and not a church
as such. But these facts similarly do not negate the fact that the school endeavors to imbue its students and staff with
Christian principles and values even if those persons do not already subscribe to them. See St. Thomas, 495 S.W.3d at
508-09.
The record thus leaves only one reasonable conclusion: the school's purpose and mission are religious. And that the
school may not be an affiliate of or have a formal legal relationship with a specific church does not undermine the factual
conclusion that it is a faith-based institution. Id.
3. St. Thomas and In re Vida
The Does argue that RELATORS's reliance on St. Thomas, 495 S.W.3d at 502 and In re Vida, No. 04-14-00636-CV,
2015 WL 82717, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 7, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) for the premise that the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine warrants dismissal here is misplaced. We disagree.
a. In re Vida
Page 10 of 15

In re Vida involved a lawsuit filed by the parents of a child who was not promoted to first grade in a Catholic school.
The parents' claims were based on the school's enforcement of the age requirements in the school's policy manual. They
claimed that the requirement was purely secular, raised no religious objections, and was unrelated to church governance.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals disagreed and held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine deprived the court of
jurisdiction. In re Vida, 2015 WL 82717, at *2.
*7 In so doing, the court noted that the analysis requires considering both the substance and nature of the claim and the
effect of a judicial resolution. Id. at *2–3. The court further held that “if a judicial resolution of the claim will interfere
with a church's management of its internal affairs or encroach upon the church's internal governance, the court may not
exercise jurisdiction over the claim”—even if the decision requires no analysis of religious doctrine. Id. Finally, the court
held that the doctrine applies equally to Catholic schools as well as churches. Id. at *3.
b. St. Thomas
St. Thomas concerned a lawsuit filed by the parents of a student expelled from a Catholic high school. The school filed
a plea to the jurisdiction invoking the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. The trial court denied the plea and entered a
temporary injunction allowing the student to attend for the remainder of the semester. St. Thomas, 495 S.W.3d at 504.
The Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals, however, held that the doctrine applied and granted the school's
request for mandamus relief. Id. at 514. In doing so, the court rejected the parents' characterization of the lawsuit as
a “purely commercial dispute regarding an agreement for [the school] to prepare [the student] for college” and noted
that the school's status as a Catholic high school did not place it outside the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. Id. at
513. To this end, the court stated, “No less than a Catholic church [the school] is a religious institution enjoying First
Amendment protection for the free exercise of religion.” Id. at 509.
The Does argue that St. Thomas is distinguishable because they are not seeking specific performance and Doe has already
graduated from high school. They further assert that unlike this case, St. Thomas involved a significant spiritual and
ecclesiastical component.
The Does' analysis, however, misses the point. While St. Thomas was partially based on the fact that the parents' letter to
the school that led to the student's expulsion included “spiritual standards and references to Catholic teaching,” that was
not the court's emphasis. Specifically, the court noted that the key inquiry is whether a judicial resolution will encroach
on the institution's governance and affairs, and concluded that, “[i]n addition to express references to spiritual standards
and Catholic teaching, this record demonstrates impermissible interference with [the school's] management of its internal
affairs and encroachment upon its internal governance.” Id. at 513.
Here, the policies that form the basis of the Does' complaints are based on spiritual references and the teachings of the
Episcopal church. In fact, the Does tacitly acknowledge this fact by complaining that the administrators failed “to serve
as examples of how students should direct their lives spiritually and morally.”
c. The Does' Additional Arguments
The Does next argue that the school's “primary focus is not religion” and seem to suggest that the school is not “Episcopal
enough” to be categorized as a faith-based institution because, unlike the school in St. Thomas, the school does not offer
a traditional Episcopal education with traditionally structured daily worship. The Does also underscore the school's
inclusive admission policy, the number of students and faculty who are not members of the Episcopal faith or are not
Page 11 of 15

Episcopal clergy, and the absence of a strictly Episcopal curriculum as also demonstrating that the school is not a faith-
based school.
But the school's non-discriminatory, inclusive philosophies do not mean it is not a religious institution; it is just an
inclusive one. And the Does cite no authority for the premise that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine requires a showing
that an institution's “primary purpose” is religion. More importantly, asking this Court to examine and compare the
contours of different religions or measure the internal application of Episcopal precepts to the school's policies or its
conduct here seeks to have us engage in the exact analysis the First Amendment precludes.
*8 In sum, it is undisputed that the school is not a church. But the record establishes that it is nonetheless a faith-based
institution “enjoying First Amendment protection for the free exercise of religion.” See St. Thomas, 495 S.W.3d at 509.
Thus, contrary to the Does' assertion, we cannot conclude that this case lacks an “ecclesiastical component.”
D. The Nature of the Does' Claims
[18] Next, we consider the substance and nature of the Does' claims, all of which concern Doe's disciplinary action.
The Does characterize the lawsuit as a “secular breach of contract and tort” action, and they allege that the school's
representations that it had a “forgiving and non-punitive disciplinary system and was not a ‘zero tolerance’ school” were
false. According to the Does, Doe was treated differently than other students with similar disciplinary infractions and,
contrary to the school's stated policies, was expelled based on a solitary instance of alleged bad behavior. The facts,
however, conclusively establish that this dispute derives solely from the calculus of the school's internal policies and
management of its internal affairs, all directed at the school's decision regarding whether Doe should be a member of
the school community. Thus, this dispute fits entirely within the parameters of a dispute for which the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine applies. See Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 395 (Tex. 2007).
Nonetheless, the Does describe their claims as “simply civil law claims in which church officials happen to be involved,”
similar to the claims in Shannon v. Memorial Drive Presbyterian Church, 476 S.W.3d 612, 619 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) and Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 677–79 (Tex. 1996). We are not persuaded because
Shannon and Tilton did not involve the internal governance and affairs of a faith-based institution.
For example, Shannon involved a former employee's tort and breach of contract suit against a church arising out of
a breach of a settlement agreement containing a non-disparagement clause. Shannon, 476 S.W.3d at 619. Because the
suit required only the court's interpretation of the contract and did not require the court's intervention in hiring, firing,
discipline, or administration of the church's clergy, or matters of morality or church doctrine, the court concluded that
the matter was a “civil law controversy in which Church officials happened to be involved.” Id. at 624–25.
Shannon is distinguishable from the instant case. That case did not require encroaching on a faith-based institution's
management of its internal affairs, but rather a secular contract breach. As the St. Thomas court observed, however, the
“secular contract” approach does not apply when the claimed breach of contract arises from an enrollment agreement
at a faith-based institution. See St. Thomas, 495 S.W.3d at 509.
Likewise, Tilton is factually distinguishable from the present case. In Tilton, several television viewers sued evangelist
Robert Tilton for fraud, conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress regarding “prayer cloths” he sold
and promised to bless. 925 S.W.2d at 675–76. The court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applied to some,
but not all of the claims. Id. at 679–80.
Specifically, the court held that claims concerning Tilton's representations that he would perform certain concrete acts
such as personally reading, touching, and praying over plaintiffs' prayer requests were not claims based on religious
doctrine or belief, but rather alleged promises to perform certain acts. Id. On the other hand, claims based on Tilton's
statements of religious doctrine were not subject to court review because such claims would require the fact-finder toAppendix A to John Doe's Petition for Writ of Mandamus
Page 12 of 15

resolve the truth or falsity of religious doctrine or beliefs, an inquiry that is constitutionally proscribed. Id. Thus, the
court conditionally granted the writ in part, directing the trial court to dismiss the plaintiffs' conspiracy and intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims. Id. at 682.
*9 This case, however, requires no such claim fracturing. The Does' claims all concern a faith-based organization's
internal affairs, governance, administration, membership, or disciplinary procedures and are protected religious
decisions. Thus, the Does' suit has no secular aspect for the courts to consider.
In particular, the Does' breach of fiduciary duty claims concern allegations of fabricated evidence to justify Doe's
expulsion, i.e., internal application of internal policies. Likewise, the DTPA, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, tortious
interference, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims are all based on the school's application of internal policies, procedures, and guidelines set forth in the code of
conduct and school handbooks. For example, the Does allege that the school committed fraud “by and through the
School's Student Handbook, with the School's Code of Conduct ... and the School's policies” by “maintain[ing] secret
or alternative policies and procedures related to discipline.” Similarly, the Does contend that the school was negligent
and grossly negligent in providing “the education services outlined in the school's policies and procedures.” Indeed, all
of their claims are based on the same common theme. And the Does do not explain how a court might resolve any of
these claims without referring to the school's internal policies and governance of its own affairs.
We acknowledge that the dispute does not expressly concern religious doctrine in all respects. But we also note that St.
Thomas and Vida did not do so either. St. Thomas involved the expulsion of a student based on the school handbook. Vida
concerned age requirements in the school's policy manual. And as the St. Thomas court observed, “exclusive focus on
the presence or absence of an express dispute concerning religious doctrine demonstrates an unduly narrow conception
of [the doctrine's] applicable protections.” St. Thomas, 495 S.W.3d at 509.
Finally, the Does refer to a county court jury verdict against the school to argue that the school ignores “infamous and
on-point local precedent” establishing that it cannot rely on the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. However, trial court
judgments are not “binding precedent.” See, e.g., Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964) (after a principle,
rule or proposition of law has been decided by the Supreme Court or the highest court in a state, the decision is accepted
as binding precedent); Dee v. Crosswater Yacht Club, LP, No. 03-10-00796-CV, 2012 WL 1810213, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Austin May 18, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (decisions of trial court not legally binding precedent for appellate court). This
argument, therefore, adds nothing to our analysis.
We have concluded that the school is a faith-based school. Having examined the substance and nature of the Does' claims,
we further conclude that resolving those claims would require a court to pass judgment on the school's internal affairs
and governance—matters exclusively within the province of an ecclesiastical institution. Accordingly, the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine applies, the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, and it abused its discretion by denying
Relators' plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss.
*10 Having concluded that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies, we next consider whether Relators are entitled
to mandamus relief.
E. Are Relators entitled to mandamus relief?
[19] [20] The supreme court rejects a categorical approach to determining when mandamus review is appropriate. See In
re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 469 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding). Unlike a direct appeal, which is a matter
of right, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, intended to be available in only limited circumstances at the court's
discretion. See In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 374 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding). Thus, mandamus review is reserved for
trial court errors where the very act of proceeding to trial, regardless of the outcome, would defeat the substantive right
involved. See In re Schmitz, 285 S.W.3d 451, 459 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding).Appendix A to John Doe's Petition for Writ of Mandamus
Page 13 of 15

[21] To obtain mandamus relief, a relator must show either (i) the underlying order is void or a clear abuse of discretion
and, (ii) no adequate appellate remedy. See In re Nationwide Insurance Co., 494 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Tex. 2016) (orig.
proceeding); see also St. Thomas, 495 S.W.3d at 514 (mandamus is generally proper if a trial court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the underlying proceeding, and relator need not establish lack of an adequate appellate remedy); In
re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (if a court issues an order beyond its jurisdiction, the
relator need not show there is no adequate remedy by appeal).
We have already concluded that the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, mandamus relief is
appropriate unless the Does established a bar that would defeat the doctrine's application in this case.
F. Does laches bar the requested relief?
[22] The Does argue that Relators' “unexplained nineteen month delay” in raising the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine
precludes the requested relief based on laches.
[23] [24] [25] Laches is an equitable remedy that prevents asserting a claim due to the lapse of time. See Bluebonnet
Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Grayridge Apt. Homes, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 904, 912 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
For laches to bar a mandamus action, a real party in interest ordinarily must show (i) the opposing party's unreasonable
delay in asserting its rights and (ii) the real party in interest's good faith and detrimental change in position because of
the delay. In re Laibe Corp., 307 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). Whether a party's delay
in asserting its rights results in laches depends on the circumstances. In re Oceanografia, S.A. de C.V., 494 S.W.3d 728,
730 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
It is not accurate to state that Realtors offered no explanation for the delay in the trial court. To the contrary, they
explained that they were waiting to complete sufficient discovery to present a comprehensive plea to the jurisdiction.
Relators also said that during that time, the St. Thomas case was decided, which they believed confirmed the strength of
its jurisdictional argument. Therefore, Realtors maintain there was no unreasonable delay.
Although the Does claim that they have “undoubtedly” been “severely prejudiced” by the delay, and they “expended
significant resources” responding to Realtors' summary judgment motion before the case was stayed, they do not identify
any good faith and detrimental change in position resulting from the delay in their lawsuit.
*11 In fact, the Does opposed Relators' requested stay of the trial court proceedings pending resolution of this issue, and
requested a continuance and further discovery before the plea to the jurisdiction was heard by the court. Consequently,
they are at least partially responsible for some of the resource expenditure about which they now complain.
[26] More importantly, however, the relevant time period is not measured from the time the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine was raised in the court below. 5
Instead, unreasonable delay is calculated with reference to the mandamus
petition's filing, not the issue that precipitated the request for a writ. See, e.g., In re Laibe Corp., 307 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex.
2010) (orig. proceeding) (measuring time between denial of reconsideration motion and mandamus filing and concluding
two months not unreasonable delay); In re Sthran, 327 S.W.3d 839, 846 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, orig. proceeding)
(measuring time between trial court's order and filing mandamus petition and concluding no unreasonable delay).
Here, Realtors filed the mandamus petition two weeks after the plea to the jurisdiction was denied. That does not
constitute unreasonable delay. Therefore, laches does not bar the requested relief.
Page 14 of 15

III. Conclusion
Mandamus relief is proper here. We lift our May 17, 2017 order staying all trial court proceedings, and conditionally
grant Relators' petition for writ of mandamus. We order the trial court to issue orders within fifteen days (i) vacating
its April 24, 2017 Order denying Relators' plea to the jurisdiction, and (ii) granting the Realtors' plea to the jurisdiction
and dismissing the case. A writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply.
All Citations
--- S.W.3d ----, 2017 WL 4533800
Footnotes
1 This Court has previously applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to churches. See Reese v. Gen. Assem. of Faith
Cumberland Presbyterian Church in Am., 425 S.W.3d 625, 627 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.); Jennison v. Prasifka, 391
S.W.3d 660, 661 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.); Fesseha v. Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Debre Meheret St. Michael's
Church, No. 05-10-00202-CV, 2011 WL 2685969, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 12, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); Retta v.
Mekonen, 338 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). But we have not considered whether the doctrine applies to
a faith-based school.
2 We treat the counterclaim as conditionally abandoned since the school asked us to order the trial court to dismiss the action.
3 The school checks the “school” box on its tax return form 990 instead of “church.” But as St. Thomas and other Texas cases
hold, being a faith-based school instead of being a church does not deny the school First Amendment freedom of religion
protection. See St. Thomas, 495 S.W.3d at 509.
4 According to the Does, the school obtained bond funding by representing to local governments that it is a secular school
and therefore should be quasi estopped to contend otherwise. But the Does' record cites do not support that factual premise.
Specifically, the Does refer to a series of request for admission responses concerning the school's finances. The school, however,
denied making any representations to governmental entities that the school was a secular institution. The school admitted
that in at least two instances it benefitted from obtaining tax exempt financing from the governmental entities, with the Does'
apparently intended inference being that the school could obtain such financing only if it represented that it was a secular
entity. But the Does cite no authority for that premise, and the school made no such admission. Furthermore, the school cites
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829, 120 S.Ct. 2530, 147 L.Ed.2d 660 (2000) for the premise that it is permissible for loans
to be made to religious schools under the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act. It also cites LeBoon v. Lancaster
Jewish Community Center Ass'n, 503 F.3d 217, 229 (3rd Cir. 2007) for the premise that religious organizations may engage
in secular activities without forfeiting protections.
5 Further, a lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. See Carroll v. Carroll, 304 S.W.3d 366, 367 (Tex. 2010).
End of Document © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Page 15 of 15

Order entered October 11, 2017
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-17-00493-CV
IN RE THE EPISCOPAL SCHOOL OF DALLAS, INC., MEREDYTH COLE, JEFFREY
LABA, AND DONNA HULL, Relators
On Appeal from the 68th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-15-04152
ORDER
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we LIFT our May 17, 2017 Order staying all
trial court proceedings and CONDITIONALLY GRANT relators’ petition for writ of
mandamus. We order the trial court to issue written orders within fifteen (15) days of this order
vacating its April 24, 2017 order denying the plea to the jurisdiction, granting relators’ plea to
the jurisdiction, and dismissing the case. Should the trial judge fail to comply with this order, the
writ will issue. We ORDER the trial judge to file with this Court, within thirty (30) days of the
date of this order, a certified copy of his order(s) issued in compliance with this order.
/s/ BILL WHITEHILL
JUSTICE
Appendix B to John Doe's Petition for Writ of Mandamus
Page 1 of 1

Order entered November 15, 2017
In The
Court of Appeals
No. 05-17-00493-CV
IN RE: THE EPISCOPAL SCHOOL OF DALLAS, INC., MEREDYTH COLE, JEFFREY
LABA, AND DONNA HULL
ORDER
Before us are the real parties in interest’s motion for rehearing and relator’s motion to
modify relief ordered (which we construe as a motion for rehearing in part).1
Having considered
them, both motions are DENIED.
/s/ BILL WHITEHILL
JUSTICE
1
Relator’s mandamus petition’s “Requested Relief” statement said, “Defendants/Relators seek mandamus relief
commanding that Respondent grant the Plea to the Jurisdiction and dismiss the underlying proceedings based on a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction to interfere with the First Amendment rights of the Episcopal School to be free of
such interference with its internal affairs and religious mission.”
Appendix C to John Doe's Petition for Writ of Mandamus
1 of 1

Order entered November 17, 2017
In The
Court of Appeals
No. 05-17-00493-CV
IN RE: THE EPISCOPAL SCHOOL OF DALLAS, INC., MEREDYTH COLE, JEFFREY
LABA, AND DONNA HULL
ORDER
Real Party in Interest’s Unopposed Motion to Extend the Trial Court’s Deadline to Issue
Written Orders Vacating it April 24, 2017 Order is GRANTED. The trial court’s deadline to
issue written orders vacating its April 24, 2017 order is extended to December 11, 2017 and the
deadline for filing certified copies of the new orders is extended to December 22, 2017.
/s/ BILL WHITEHILL
JUSTICE
Appendix D to John Doe's Petition for Writ of Mandamus

CAUSE NO. DC-15-04152
JOHN DOE, Individually, aud as next
friend of JOHN DOE, JR., a minor
Plaintiff,
v.
THE EPISCOPAL SCHOOL OF
DALLAS, INC., MEREDYTH COLE,
JEFFREY LABA, AND DONNA HULL,
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
68th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
PRQf@~E°i) ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION
AND MOTION TO DISMISS
CAME TO BE HEARD on the 24'h day of April, 2017, Defendants' Plea to the
Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss. After considering the pleadings, the evidence and the
arguments ofcounsel, the Court DENIES the motion.
Dated: 4.-;I J~'I 101 7
JUDGE MARTIN HOFFMAN
ORDER Page 1 ofl MR 303
Appendix E to John Doe's Petition for Writ of Mandamus

John Doe V ESD, Meredyth Cole | John doe's petition for writ of mandamus | Episcopal School of Dallas

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