This document provides a summary of a delegation's fact-finding mission to Iraqi Kurdistan in July 1995 to investigate the ongoing conflict between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The delegation met with leaders from both parties as well as other political and civil groups. They found that ceasefires had repeatedly broken down and peace agreements failed to end the violence. Both sides accused the other of seeking a military solution while neighboring powers prolonged the conflict. The delegation witnessed the humanitarian impact of recent Turkish military incursions on local villages.

1. Rejection ofReason
A report based on a mission toIraqi Kurdistan
TheHuman Rights Alliance and the UKParliamentary Human Rights Group
August1995
'Ifpursuingdisadvantageafterthedisadvantage hasbecome obviousisirrational,therejection of
reason isthe primecharacteristic offolly'.
Barbara Tuchman,The March ofFolly

2. I Introduction
1.Thisreportis basedona missiontoIraqiKurdistan between July ISand21,1995.Theparticipants
were Dr Mahmoud Osman,elderstatesman and onetimecolleagueofGeneral Barzani;MrBakhtiar
Amin,independentKurdish personality based in Paris;Mrs Kathryn Cameron Porter,Presidentofthe
USHuman RightsAlliance,and Lord Avebury,chairmanofthe UKParliamentaryHuman Rights
Group.
2.T^edelegation wereextremelygratefultoallthose whofacilitated the mission:tothegovernmentof
Syria,forallowing ittocrosstheir borderintotheregion;tothe leadersofthe Kurdistan Democratic
Party,(KDP)Mr Masoud Barzaniand ofthePatriotic Union ofKurdistan,(PUK),MrJalal Talabani,
for beingsogenerous with theirtime;tothe leading figuresofboth parties,fortheirinsightsinto the
manyproblemsconfrontingthem;totheINCand the otherpolitical parties,fortheirown perspectives
on theconflictand theirassistance in crossingthe frontline between Salahaddin and Arbil,and to all
those whoentertained uswith theirtraditionalKurdish hospitality in the midstoftheirpreoccupations.
Withoutthe whole-heartedco-operation ofourKurdish friends,it would have been impossibleto
conducttwo meetings with the main partyleaders,and manyothers with theirsenior officials,with the
minorparties,and with independentpersonalities,in thespaceoflessthan a week,andthe welcome
wereceivedshowed thatalmostallconcerned are genuinely interested in peace.
3.Theobstacles in the way ofan agreementare neverthelessformidable,and to overcomethem will
require an actofpolitical will bythe party leaders,and thecommitmentbythe international
communitytofurtherinvolvementin the peace process.There isa levelofdistrustandsuspicion
between the warring factions,that makes it difficultto negotiate.A numberofceasefireshave been
broken;signed agreementshave been repudiated,and eachsideaccusestheotherofseekingamilitary
solution,whilstagreeingthatoutright victoryisunlikelybecauseoftheeven balanceofpopulation and
resources.The neighbouring powersall havean interestin prolonging the conflict,and their baleful
influence can beseen intheready availabilityofarmsand ammunition;theincursions bythe Turkish
armedforces;theattemptstocoercethe partiesintoalignments with Iran and Turkey;the presence of
foreign agents,and the widespread allegationsthateach powerhassomeindividualson itspayroll.
4.Thewest,on the otherhand,hasan equallystronginterestin the promotion oforderly government
in the Kurdish entity.A democraticrole modelin Kurdistan would beavital componentofany
strategytoreplace Saddam Hussain with ademocraticsystem in the wholeofIraq.Thestability of
Kurdistan,and its ultimate re-incorporation in afederalIraq,could bethe keyto solving theconflict
between theTurkish Kurdsand Ankara'sKemalistunitarystate.Itcouldalso helptoencourage
politicalsolutionstothe Kurdish problemsin Syria and Turkey.Apartfrom these practical
considerations,the westalso hasa powerful moralresponsibilitytowardsthe Kurdish people.President
Bush encouraged them torebelagainstSaddam Hussain during the DesertStorm operationto evict
Iraqiforcesfrom Kuwait,and thesafe havens policy,coupled with the demandsin Resolution 688that
Iraq immediatelyend therepression and allow immediate access by international humanitarian
organisationsto all those in need,are pledges bythe intemationalcommunity nottoabandon the Kurds
to chaos and oppression,whether home made orimported.
II Recent past history.
6.Afterthe defeatofSaddam Hussain by the allies in February 1991 in operation DesertStorm,with
theencouragementofPresidentGeorgeBush the Kurdsofnorthern Iraq andthe Shi'asofsouthern Iraq
rose in revoltagainst Baghdad.The Iraqiarmed forces wereable to regain control ofboth regions,
however,and hundredsofthousandsofKurdish refugeesfled into Turkey and to a lesser extent Iran.
On April5,1991,the UN Security Council passed resolution 688,which called on Iraq(interalia)to
end therepression oftheIraqi civilian population,and laterin the month the allies launched operation
Provide Comfort,which established a'safe haven'in the Kurdish region,and established a'no-fly'zone
for Iraqi aircraft north ofthe 36th parallel.

3. 7.In October 1991,the Iraqiforceswithdrew from mostofthe Kurdish region,butretained controlof
Kirkuk,which hasbeensystematically Arabisedsince.Saddam Hussainimposedan intemalblockade
ontheKurdish entity,which hasremained inforceeversince,gratuitouslyimposingseverehardship
on the people.
8.TheIraqi KurdistanFront,an umbrellaorganisation ofopposition partieswhich had beenformed
originallyto co-ordinatethe opposition toSaddam Hussain,hadcontinued tofunction afterDesert
Storm,andattemptedtonegotiateaKurdishautonomousregion.Thediscussions werevirtually
suspended in August 1991 and wereformally brokenoffin January 1992,whentheIKFannounced
thatelectionswould beheld foraKurdish Parliament.Theseelectionswereheld in May 1992and
resulted in a wafer-thin majorityofvotesforthe Kurdistan DemocraticParty(KDP)ofMasoud
Barzanioverthe PatrioticUnionofKurdistan(PUK)ofJalal Talabani.Thepartiesdecidedthateach
should have50seats,aspartofapower-sharingagreement.
9.Underthepower-sharingagreement,any Minister belongingtooneparty hadadeputyfrom the
other,andthisledto paralysis becausethedeputiesinvariablychallengedandattemptedtofhistiatethe
decisionsoftheirnominalsuperiors.The50-50policy wasextended toadministrativeas well as
Ministerialappointments,and ateveryleveleach partytried to block the decisionsoftheother.
10.InNovember 1992,theTurkisharmyinvaded IraqiKurdistan withaforceof15,000men,
advancingupto25km intotheterritory in anattempttodetermilitaryoperationsbytheKurdistan
Workers'Party(PKK),anarmedoppositiongroupinTurkey,from mountingoperationsintoTurkey
from basesacrossthefrontier.Ankara wanted theKDPandPUKthemselvesto takeeffective measures
todisarm thePKKandstoptheirincursionsintoTurkey.TheTurkshad moresuccesswiththeKDP,
whoselongfrontierwithTurkeyandgreatervulnerabilitybothtomilitaryandeconomicpressure by
theTurks made them morereceptivetotheTurkish demandsthanthePUK.This becamean additional
causeoftension between the parties.
11.Thetwo main parties,and theIslamic Movementin Iraqi Kurdistan(IMIK)each maintained
controlofitsown privatearmedforces,and theregion wasdividedintoterritories,withinf^arh of
whichtheadministrationofjusticeandthemaintenanceoflaw and order werelargely underthe
controlofthepartyandnotthecentralgovernment.Thistrend hasbeen accentuatedsince May 1994,
when theICDPstartedtocollectandretain largesumsofmoney bylevying'taxes'onthe movementof
goodsfrom TurkeytoIraqand vice versa.ThishasgiventheKDPtheabilitytopaysalariesto public
servantsand armed fighters('peshmergas')within theirown area,whilestarvingthecentral
governmentofrevenuesthatproperly belonged to it.
12.A seriesofarmed clashes betweenthe variousfactionswasinaugurated with atwo-week conflict
between thePUK and theIMIKin December 1993,whichcaused several hundred deathsand
widespread destructionofhouses,mosquesand publicbuildings.In May 1994,conflictserupted
involvingthePUK,KDPandIMIK,andfightingcontinuedspasmodicallyintoJuneandJuly.In July,
delegationsfrom thetwomain parties metinParisattheinvitation ofMme Mitterand underthesemi
officialauspicesoftheFrench government.TheTurksprotestedtoFrance,seeingtheParisAgreement
astantamountto a declaration ofan independentKurdish state,and they refused toallow the leadersof
the partiestotraveltoParisfortheformalsignature which had been planned toratifytheagreement.
13.On August 16,1994,thetwoleaders,MrJalalTalabaniand MrMasoud Barzani,entered into
solemn undertakingsbeforetheParliamentandinthe presenceofthree Parliamentarydelegatesfrom
the UK,oneofwhom wasalsoa memberofthe presentdelegation,nottoresorttoarmed forceand to
work togetherfortheruleoflaw and theconstruction ofcivilsociety.The"Public Statement"issued
by the Parliamentisgiven asAnnexItothisreport.Thefollowing week,however,there wererenewed
clashes,and the UKdelegates wamed the party leaders,in a letter printed asAnnex II,ofthe
consequencesoftheirfailureto make peaceand composetheir political differences.
14.On November21,1994,yetanotheragreement wasreached between the two leaders.This Alliance
Covenant,(see Annex III)as it wascalled,prohibited and criminalised the use ofarmed force between
the parties,and provided for political and legalreformsdesigned to preventfurtherconflict.In

4. December,however,the warstarted anew,amid bitterrecriminationsfrom both sides.Bynow the
Kurdish entity had been effectively divided intotwo mini-statesgoverned bythe hostile parties,
entrenched behind theirgrievancesand apparently incapableofcompromiseor manoeuvre.
15.In January 1995 MrDavid Littofthe USState Department,accompanied by other USand Turkish
officials,visited both party leadersand discussed peaceformulas withthem.Each party produced a
draftagreement,butMrLitt wasunableto arrangea meeting between the leaderstosee whetherthe
gap between the drafts could be bridged.He left,warningthe leadersthat iftheyresumed fighting,the
US would abandon its effortsto help them settle their differences.
16.Predictably,Mr Litt's initiative was no moresuccessful in the medium term than anyofthe
previousattempts.However,in April a3month ceasefire wasagreed,toend on July 15.Before it
cameto an end,the Iranians called the party leadersto Tehran,and tried to persuadethem to extend the
cease fire forone month.In the meanwhile,no progress had been madeon any ofthesubstantive
political questions,and there had been,allegedly,a verylarge numberofsmall violationsofthe cease
fire.
17.On July9,thesmouldering conflict burstoutinto afullscale war,in which hundreds ifnot
thousandsoftroopswere involved in each engagement,together with heavy artilleryand multiple
rocketlaunchers.It was atthis pointthatthe presentmission wasaboutto arrive.
II Activities ofthe mission.
18.The mission assembled in Damascusonthe evening ofJuly 12,1995,were entertained to dinner by
Mr Talib Shbib,formerIraqiForeign Minister,and metrepresentatives ofa number ofIraqiopposition
groupsand independentintellectuals.
19.On the following day,July 13,the mission held talks with Mr Ali Hassan,KDP;MrDana Ahmad
Mjeed,PUK;Dr Hamid,Iraqi CommunistParty;Mr Kadir Aziz,Leaderofthe Kurdistan Toilers'
Party,and Mr AbdulKhaliqZangana,Memberofthe Politburo(PB)ofthe Toilers'Party and
President,Human Rights Advocacy Association.The mission wastold thatsince May 1,1994,
mediation efforts had continued between the two major parties.On June 1, 1995,there had been an
agreementto extend the cease fire until July 15.MrTalabani had wanted the KDP to withdraw their
forcesfrom Shaqlawa,Salahaddin and Masif,andto hand overthe customs revenue they had collected
to an independent body.In return,thePUK forces would withdraw from Erbil.Theseven small parties
and theIraqi NationalCongress(INC)would administerthe whole area,underthe authority ofa new
cabinetto be agreed.However,the KDP insisted thatthePUK should withdraw from Erbilfu^t,since
in their view the occupation ofErbil had been a breach offaith.Noagreementwasreached on these
matters,and there wasaseriousoutbreak offighting on July9,following a long seriesofminor
violations ofthe cease-fire in previous weeks.
20.On Friday,July 14,the mission had a discussion with Mr Abdullah Ocalan,Chairman ofthe PKK.
The discussion centred mainly on the situation in south-eastern Turkey,but Mr Ocalan did comment
on the Turkish invasionsofnorthem Iraq,which hesaid were breachesofinternational law.Hesaid
that in the firstoperation,the Turks had lost210 men,tothe PKK's 12.He denied thatthePKK had
been mounting,or intendingto mount,armed assaults over the border.Why should thePKK do this,he
asked,when they already had theirforces 500km inside Turkey? ButthePKK does have a role within
Iraqi Kurdistan,he said,in trying to develop a third front,in opposition to the classic tribal war
between the KDP and the PUK.
21.On Saturday,July 14,the team flew to Qamishli wherethey were met by the PUK representative in
the town,who arranged cartransportto the rivercrossing,which is almostatthe point wherethe
frontiers ofTurkey,Iraq and Syria meet.The local KDP representative arranged the river crossing,and
provided transportto Duhok,thecapitalofthe govemorateofDuhok province.

5. 22.In Duhokthe mission waswelcomed bythe Governor,MrAbdulAzizTaieb,whospokeaboutthe
Turkish invasions.Hesaid thatin the firstonslaught,104 villages had been affected,with the lossof
21 people killed,and 120housesand a bridge destroyed.60 people were wounded and had been
registered with NGOs. Nineschoolshad been affected. Some villagersarestillafraid togo back;the
Turitish soldiers had used strong arm tactics with people. They did notcometothe centreoftown but
searched houseson the outskirts.Detailed records weresaid to have been keptofthedamagedoneand
these were promised to the mission,though none were delivered.
23.In thesecond invasion,9villages were destroyed,all7,500inhabitants fled,and 150cattle were
killed.A child waskilled and two women were wounded byshelling. Much agriculture wasruined,
because this was thetime ofharvest.The Turksaccused the governorofbeing a memberofPKK
because he gave an accurate assessmentofthe damages. Thechiefvictims were neitherthePKK nor
the Turks butthe localcivilian population
24.The Governorreferred to the incidentin which7shepherds were killed,five ofthem brothersand
two others who were their cousins. The men had been arrested bythe Turks with four women also
shepherds.The responsible officerforthearea,MrShukri Nerway wenttosee the Turkish Generaland
pleaded forthe release ofthe detainees.TheTurksreleasedthe women,butthe mutilated bodiesofthe
men werefoundthe nextday.The Governorsaid thatitwascertainthisatrocity wascommitted bythe
Turkish army.
25.Accordingto A1HayyatofJuly 13, Turkey declared thaton Tuesdayaftersue daysthe operation
in northern Iraq had ended andforeign ministryspokesman,OmarIqbal,had rejected allegationsthat
the Turkish army harmed Iraqicivilians. Threethousandtroops weresaid to beinvolved and AFP
reported thatTurkeyclaimed 167guerrillas had been killed forthe loss of20soldiersin foursectors.
The previousoperation had claimed thelivesof550PKKfighters.AccordingtothePKK,210Turkish
soldiers werekilledforthe lossof13PKK,while 13 Kurdish villages had been destroyed and
thousandsofvillagers had fled their homes.
26.Afterstaying overnightin Duhok,the delegation travelled to Salahaddin on July 16.On their
arrival,they were greeted byseniorKDPofficials including MrSami Abdurrahman.MrHoshiarZibari
and MrJawharNamiq.They also had meetings with MrShamsaddin Mufti,independentpersonality
and lawyer,and with ProfessorKamal Khoshnaw,memberofthe board ofKurdistan Watch.
27.The MinisterofJustice,MrKader Jabarytold the delegation thatthe Ministry ofJustice was
paralysed.AlthoughJudgesappointed bythe Ministry were still operating in Arbil,thePUK had also
appointed a militaryJudge,Mr Kadem Mohammed Jan,who had been chiefofsecurity in Arbil.He
wasdealing with any caseshespecified,taking them outofthe handsofthe normalcivil courts.
Similarly a militaryJudge,MrSalah Aziz,had been appointed in Suleimaniyeh.
28.Underthe law,MrJabary continued,any person sentenced to death could applyto the Regional
Govemorfor clemency,and since there are no RegionalGovernors,it wasto be expected that all
sentences would besuspended untilgovernorscould beappointed.Indeed,before^earmed conflict
began,no death sentences were in factcarried out,butnow,dozensofpeople were being executed in
thePUK area,some withoutJudicial process.
29.The former GovemorofArbil,Mr Khurshid Shera,told the delegation that it would be possible to
secure law and order in Arbil with a neutralforce offewerthan 2,000 men,who could be recruited
from the smaller partiesand theINC.Hethoughtthe costofsuch a force would be no more than
$50,000 a month.
30.In the evening,the delegation met Mr Masoud Barzani,who welcomed them asfollows:"1am
delighted you are here and appreciate the trouble you have gone to and yoursincerity in helping usto
overcome a difficultsituation. I wish you allsuccess in your efforts.The conflict has become more
complicated and I am notoptimistic. I had been hopefulthat we have laid the foundation fora solution
butthathasnow collapsed. On July9theotherside launched the largestand mostintense attack,
violating the cease-fire. Thesecretary general ofthePUK had said only two daysearlier thatthe next
stage would be "normalisation"in Duhok".

6. 31.Hecontinued:"We welcome a!!international mediation efforts bythe US- UK,etc.and we madea
clearcommitmenttothesolution. Unfortunately,the otherside haveblown up allthe hopes we had.
Ifthey had been committed to a peacefulsettlement,the lastthree monthsoftruce would have been a
golden opportunity.Now we have nochoice butto defend ourselves,and you will concede thatwe
have the rightofself-defence. Because ofthe lack oftrustand confidence,1 can imagine no
guaranteesthat would ensurethe maintenanceofany cease-fire. Thatlastcease-fire gave people hope.
When MrDeutsch washere,he presented us withsome proposalsfor a leaderto leaderto meeting
outside Kurdistan. Wesaid we had to makethe rightstartby holding preparatoiy talksatthe politburo
level. We gave acommitmentthatthe cease-fire would
be maintained untilthe startofthe talks and in the absence ofthe cease-fire it is doubtful that talks
would serve any purpose".
32.MrsPorterand Lord Avebury then spoke,emphasising thatneitherside could gain an outright
military victory and thatsooneror later,the parties would havetocometotheconference table.They
urged thatthe sufferingsofthe civilian population,and thefurther diversion ofresources awayfrom
developmentinto the armed conflict,should betaken into consideration,and they pointed outthatthe
KDP would beseen asthe main obstacle to peace ifthePUK accepted the US invitation,andthe KDP
declined.
33.Dr Osman then said:"We have discussed thisconflictbefore and Irecognise the problemsare not
easyto overcome,arising asthey do outofthe SO-50arrangements. Iknow that Mr.Barzanidoesn t
like conflictfrom myexperience atthe 1991 negotiationswith Saddam. So what we are after is a
permanentpoliticalsettlementand wethinkthecease-fire didn'twodcbecausethere wasno political
movement Butitcould be argued thatthe violation ofthe cease-fire hasstrengthened the KDP both
militarilyand politically. Peace is easierto make when you arethestronger party. Thisconflict
involvesthe whole ofthe people and we have aresponsibility tothem;we need to makesacriflcesfor
them. Anysteps you take will produce a responsefrom the otherside,becausethisattack wasthen-
lastthrow. Iremember when Arbil wasoccupied by the
PUK,I toldthem this was a wrong decision,and Itoldthem it wasa mistake to assume that it would
force the KDPto makeconcessions. Now I think the militarysetbacksthePUK are reported to have
suffered will makethem moretoleranttowardsasettlement. Whether you like itor not,people are not
interested in apportioning blame;they are holding everyone responsible. We know how you dislike
war,so we hope you willre-emphasise the hopefor a peaceful settlement,particularly with US
guarantees. Ithink itis necessary to involveathird party in view ofthe failure ofprevious bilateral
agreements. 1 haveseen the KDP peace proposaland Ifind it positive. I am aware ofthe talks with
Bob Deutsch and they are also positive. I hopethisconflict will notdeflect you from the opportunity
which now presents itself,and which may neverrecur. Thefourofuscame with some ideaswhich we
have formulated and wewill presentthem after meetingtheotherside. Let us poolall ourresourcesto
make peace and tosee the US participate in the resolution ofthiscrisiswith theirguarantees. Forthe
past40 years,we havestruggled fora land ofourown and to intemationalise ourcause.Now there is
some hopebutwith the manoeuvringofregional powersthere is also greatdanger".
34.Mr Barzanireplied: "Honestly,when wesee friends like you making these requests wefeel
extremely embarrassed. Weappreciate yourefforts. We have our own constituencies,our own public
opinion and they refuse to acceptthatthe otherside should be able to decide whether we have war or
peace. The seriousnessofthisfighting is such thatthe aggressor should be identified,particularly as
they have undermined a very importantopportunity. For us it is difficult to overlook. Terrorism such
asthe car bomb atZakho and anotherattemptwith 700kilos ofexplosives in Duhok.(Rahman:And
the deliberate shelling ofcivilians in Kastnazan)Despite all this I agree with you thatevery war hasto
end atthe conference table. But we draw the line at being asked to reward the aggressor".[Note by
the delegation:thecar bomb explosion atZakho,which killed 80 people in the marketplaceon
February 27,1995,wasattributed to aPUK agent,as wasan attempted bombing in Duhok.However,
thePUK strongly denied responsibility and called for an independentinvestigation ofthe crime.The
Turkish authorities refused to permit any expertsto enterthe territory via Turkey,and this may be an
indication that Ankara was notkeen forthe truth to be uncovered].

7. 35.Thefollowing morning,July 17,thedelegation metseniorofficialsofthe KDP,andsome
independents.Those attending were asfollows:
HoshyarZebari,Foreign Relations,Politburo member
Sami Abdurrahman,Politburo Member,Ex-Ministerin Iraq
Muhsin Dizaye,Politburo Member,Ex-Ministerin Iraq
Jawhar Namiq,SpeakerofParliament,KDPPolitburo Member
RojNuri Shaweys,Deputy Prime Minister,KDP Politburo Member
KadirJabari,MinisterofJustice ofKurdish Parliament,KDP Central Committee
Sheren Amedi,KDP Central Committee,President,Kurdistan Womens Union
Faiek Alddin Kakayi,KDP Central Committee Member
Shamsaddin Mufti,lawyerandindependent,uncle ofAdnan,oneofthe originalfoundersofKDP in
1940s
Hussein Sinjari,cousin ofSami,poet,academiclecturerin London,visiting,Ex-Vice Memberof
Kurdish Parliament,formerPUK
Abdullah Agreen,KDP Central Committee
Khurshid Shera,Ex-GovemorofArbil
Azad Barwari,KDP Politburo Member
36.MrSamiAbdurrahman began bysayingthat Mr.Barzanihad leftdoorsopen butthesituation
should notbeoversimplified. Theceasefire had been declared on April7and extended by Mr
Barzanifi-om July8.Allthe fighting has been going onin formerly KDP held areas,aclearindication
ofwho wasthe aggressor. The violation ofthecease-fire waspreceded byafieryand aggressive
speech by MrTalabanion July5,when hespoke aboutthe occupation ofDuhok. The otherside had
destroyed theregionalgovernmentand Parliament. MrTalabanihadappointed amilitaiygovernorin
Arbil. In thisstage,he intended to clearthe restofArbil province andthe KDPfeltthatnoexternal
power wouldstop him. Nordid they wantthe Kiudish problem to be regionalised ortogive
neighbouringpowerstheexcuseforintervening."Theiragendaistocompletetheirinterruptedcoup
d'dtat",MrAbdurrahman continued. "They would notagreetosettle differences by meansof
elections. Ouragenda istostopthe fighting,evacuate Arbil,reconvene Parliamentand establish a
broadly based regional governmenttocollecttherevenuesand enforcesecurity. Thetwodifferent
agendas are clearly setout in the respective peace plans. The issue forus is whether Arbilcan become
once again theseatofregionalgovernment. And Aatisthe key".
37.Mr HoshiarZibarithen observed thatthe mission had to getthetwosidestogether and to deal with
thetwo contentiousissuesofArbiland therevenues. TheKDPregarded theoccupation ofArbilas
illegalandtheysaid the revenues belonged tothe governmentwhen itisformed by mutualagreement
ofthetwo political parties.ThePUK felt,hesaid,thatifthey leave Arbil it would causethem internal
problems. ButtheKDPcould notacceptthePUK prime minister."When we initiated the limited
cease-fu-e",headded,"theyaccepted it,butit wasnosubstitutefora political settlementIfyouexpect
immediateresults,you will be disappointed. Butthe intention ofthe USto playa moreactive roleis
important. Thesixty-seven NGOsworking in Kurdistan willalltell you who brokethecease-fire. The
need is now forconfidence building measures. But we believe MrTalabani hasabandoned the ideaof
a peacefulsettlement. Weon ourside are ready to respond tothe USpeace initiative".
38.Following theabove meeting,the delegation crossed thefrontline to Arbil,and were metthere by
the Prime Minister,MrKosratRassoul.Almostimmediately aftertheirarrival,atabout 11.00,they
heard explosions,and weretold thatthe city wasbeingshelled bythe KDPand the Iraqis. Laterthey
were informed ofthe names ofthe persons killed and injured at Hai Ulama,as follows:
Killed:
Hiwa AzizMohammad,age 16
Zarian HawezHamad,age 26,both unmarried
Injured:
Haikim Hussein Muhamad,age 17
JamalRasoul Salih,age23
Miryam Sabir,age43
Ahmad Rasoul Salih,age 18,married
Abdulla Rasoul Salih,age IS
Sartip Hussein Ahmad,married,age28

8. The 16 year old waskilled in a house facing immediately onto the street where theshell landed.The
delegation inspectedthe house,which wasseverely damaged,and they were told thatthe other victim,
MrHamad,26,was blown aparton thestreet,where he had been selling watennelonsfrom acart.The
delegation metMrStafford Cleary,head ofUNDCI,whosaid that histask wasto record the attackson
civiliansand to reportthem to the United Nations via Baghdad,but notto makeanyassessmentof
responsibility.Although it wassuggested later bythe KDPthatthePUK had shelled Arbilthemselves,
they had no doubt,from thetestimonythey received,thatthe KDP were responsible.
[Notfor publication:On Thursday,July20,1995,Mr.Allen Jensen,UNDCI,acting commanding
officer ofUNDCI(telephone24208)said. There is no doubtthatKDP wasshellingthe area in the
south ofArbil. And Mr.Nabeel Moswai,deputy representativeoftheINCsaw theshells passing over
the lastKDPcheck point before Arbil from Salahaddin and had actually been warned bythesecurity
guard tostop there becausetheshelling wasaboutto begin.]
39.The Deputy head ofUNDCI,Mr Alan Jensen,told the delegation thataccordingto the NGO
Emergency,based in Salahaddin,400people had been killed and more than 1,000 wounded since the
fighting erupted on July9.Hesaid that allthe heavy weapons used by both sides were Russian,
includingsome 120 mm artillery with arange of18km.Allthis materiel had tocomethrough Turkey
orIran,exceptfora very limited quantity which may have been captured from theIraqiforces.The
mandate ofUNDCI was limited,and any change had to be negotiated with Baghdad,because
technicallythis wasstill Iraqi territory.
40.In the afternoon ofJuly 17,the delegation travelled to Suleimaniyeh,accompanied by the Minister
ofJustice,MrMohammed Tofiq.
41.On the morning ofJuly 18,the delegation had theirfirstmeeting with MrJaialTalabani,atQala
Chualan.He began byexplaining thathe hadreceived delegationsfrom both Iraq and Iran the previous
evening,and this wasthe reason why the meeting had had to bedeferred ovemigftt."Turkey is
supporting Mr Barzaniand encouraging himto continue this conflict. Afterthe Parisagreement
HoshiarZibaritookthe textto Ankara and Turkey protested to France. MrBarzani obeyed a Turkish
order notto go to Paris and sign the agreement.Hethreatened that he would usethe Islamic movement
and negotiate with Baghdad".
42."The Turksattempted to show thatKurdsare incapable ofgoverning themselves",MrTalabani
continued."The main purpose ofMr.Barzanisstrategy istokeep his grip on the$180K plus 10-12
million dinarsa day which he getsfrom the bordertaxes. The dollars are going into US banksforthe
benefitofthe families ofMr.Barzaniand Nechervan. Ibrahim Khalil collectsthe moneyforthem".
(Note;anothersourcetold the delegation thatthe money had been transferred to German and Swiss
banksabout5-6 weeksearlier,probably forgreatersecurity. Thesource feltthatthe CIA knew about
this).
43."The Iraniansasked usto evict alltheIranian Kurdish parties",MrTalabanisaid."We had to agree
that we would notallow them to use ourterritory either asa military base orfor broadcasting back to
Iranian Kurdistan. The MKO(Mujahideen Khalq Organisation,one ofthe parties in the National
CouncilofResistance ofIran(NCRl))have nothad basesin Iraqi Kurdistan since 1991. The Iranians
asked the KDPto publish a declaration attheend ofMarch thaton the requestofTeheran they agreed
to acease fire. Both Mr Barzaniand IsentdelegationstoTeheran at the invitation ofthe Iranian
government.Butthe KDP delegation refused to sit down and talk with the PUK. The KDPsaid that
Mr Barzani had agreed to extend the cease-fire buton July9,hesentatelegram to his commandersof
which I can give you acopy,saying thatthe cease-fire wasatan end. That wasalso announced on the
KDP radio. Overthe two months prior to theending ofthe cease-fire,there were 120 violations by the
KDPforces. They believe that with their money and with the supportofboth Turkey and Iraq,they
could achieve a military victory".
44."The last US proposal",continued MrTalabani"wasthaton July24,delegatesfrom each side go to
Lisbon,then on August 1,the leaders meetthere. Weareready to attend both meetings. Ifthe US
could persuade Turkeyto pressure Mr Barzani,there could be an agreement. We would like it to be
monitored bythesmaller parties,theINC and others. On July 2,theseven minor parties,including
Islamics and Communists,gave us proposalsand we agreed to them,so itcan be done".

9. 45."AboutDecember 19last year,there wasagreementon a new cabinet",hesaid."And itshould
havebeenratified bytheParliamenton December23. Butafterthe fighting,theKDPrepudiatedthe
agreement Wesaid,letthe Iraqi Kurdistan Frontmeet;lettheCommitteeoftheParliamentmeet;let
the 17parties meet. ButMrBarzaniwould notagree because he had madeadeal with Iraq and
Turkey. He has no desiretosolveanyoftheproblems. Andthatis whythe Parisagreement,the
Parliamentagreement,etc.have not worked".
46.Thetotalamountofmoney collected on theTurkish borderin the 14 monthsfrom May 1, 1994to
the end ofJune 1995 was$25 million plus 3,000 million Dinars",MrTalabani claimed."Atthe
momentthe rate ofcollection issomeSlSOk a day.When the committee ofParliamenttried to claim
the money in December,they weretold thatNachevan had withdrawn it Bob Deutsch said thatifthe
parties were notable to reach an agreement,the US would review its policy fortheregion. Butwhat
heshould havesaid isthatthey would review their policy forthe party which prevents agreement".
47."Wearereadytotalk and negotiate",said Mr Talabani."Weare for peace and directnegotiations.
WeacceptBob Deutsch's proposals. We cannotsolvethisconflictalone and wecannotacceptthat
Iran,Iraq and Turkeyshould have any roleto play. Butwhatcan wedo ifweare readyto talk and the
otherside will not? You have to persuade them tostep forward for peace. Yet,Iam afraid there is a
conspiracy between Ankara,Baghdad and theKDP to obstructthe peace process. Whatarethe
consequencesofall these proposals? He hassaid thathe will usethree cards. Thefirstisthatthe
world commimity will lose interest butifthere is a meeting,it will be possible to cleareveiything and
verify the situation. Ifone isinsisting on fighting and theotherdoesn'twanttofight,itis clear where
theresponsibility lies. Lastyear,weevacuated Shaqlawaand they occupied it.They destroyed my
house and library asthe Kurdish Communistparty confirms.Openlythey co-operate with the Turkish
oppressorsofthe Kurdsin thatcountry.Nevertheless,we mustlook fora solution. First,serious US
pressure mustbe exerted to makethem cometo the conferencetable. Second,a real position fi'om
those concerned. The facts ofthe mattershould be setoutbythe intemationalcommunity. The civil
servants in our areas have notbeen paid,though Mr Barzani hasreceived hissalary from central
revenues. They started personal attacks,and when we replied,they wanted the propaganda warto
stop".
48.Following the first round ofmeetings with Mr Barzani and MrTalabani,the delegation produced a
setofconfidence building measuresand action proposals,based on whatwasconsidered possible,and
designed,notto produce an instantsolution,buttoserve asan agendafortheforthcoming meetings
convened by the US State Department.The texts ofthese documentsare given as Annex IV and Annex
V.
49.On the morning ofJuly 19,the delegation travelled from Sulaimaniyeh to Arbil,where they met
leadersofthe Kurdistan DemocraticParty ofIran(KDPI):Mr Abdullah Hasanzadeh,Secretary-
General,Mr Salam Azizi,PB member,Mr Abdurrahman Kajayee,cadre ofthe Secretariat,and Mr
Mohammed Hasanpour,cadre ofthe Secretariat. Mr Hasanzadeh began by saying that in Iran,the
situation ofthe government wasgood,butthatofthe people was bad."This is because Western
governments look aftertheir own interests,and afterthe UStook the good decision to place an
embargo on Iran,the Europeansstarted to fillthe gap. For instance,two m months ago.President
Clinton vetoes a deal with Conoco and last week TOTALtook their place.[Thisconcernsthe
developmentofthe Sirri A and Sirri E oil and gasfields.]European countriessay they are readyto
normalise relations with Iran ifTeheran promises notto kill Rushdie on their territory,butthe Fatwa of
Khomeini cannot be reversed. The Europeansare lookingforan excuseto co-operate with Iran".
50.In answerto a question,Mr Hasanzadeh said thatthe Kurdish question in Iran is notseparatefrom
otherquestions in the country.He continued:"Thesilence ofthe world on Iran's crime andthe
competition from other countries givesIran freedom to supportterrorism,notonly at home butalso
abroad.And as you know,Iran still aspires to be a nuclear power. They have a large list ofterrorist
programsforthe funire.The KDPI hassome information aboutthe nuclear program but we wantto
complete our knowledge and will then give itto countries abroad. Thisterrorist program is not
directly only toward our organisation but also othersand especially those who are involved in activities
in Kurdistan. This is a plan ofa house in Arbil rented in the name ofthe Supreme Council ofIraqi

10. Revolution,which is used asacoverfor clandestine activities. It collects information about US
organisationssuch asOFDA, World Food Program,WOL,SNI,and European organisationslike
Oxfam and especiallythe French organisation such asFrancesLibert^,M^dteins Du Monde,Amedical
International"
51. "A month ago",MrHasanzadeh said,"the Iranianssenttwo brotherstoexplode
two bombsatthe officesoftheKDPI Revolutionary Branch atDora Raba butthey were
caughtin the act.One ofthe bombers was hanged by the Party,a man named Shearko.The othertwo
conspirators,his brotherand his wife,are still detained by the party in their private prison.I don'tknow
whetherthey have yetbeen sentenced.The
authorities here didn t wantto makeafussabout it,and in alotofcases where terrorists are caughtand
handed over to officials nothing happens.Aboutsix monthsago we handed over an agent who was
filming ourheadquartersand a week laterthey released him.Headmitted he wastakingthese pictures
forIran.In anotherincident,an agenttook pictures ofthe headquartersin KoisinjatandtheIranians
used them to build a modeland thus to rehearse an air attack which was made in November 1993.One
woman,MsHowsatOsman,age39,was killed and 3other people were wounded".
52."Familiesin Iranian Kurdistan known to have relatives on thisside are being threatened that ifthey
don t persuadetherelativesto return,they themselves will be expelled",Mr Hasanzadeh continued.
"People known to have relatives in the Peshmerga are madeto payextra taxes".He mentioned thecase
ofMr FiruzMariwani,from Mariwan,who burned himselfto death about6weeksago when he was
refused entryto the university,despite having passed the entrance exams with flying colours,on the
sole groundsthathis brother was inthe Peshmerga.
53.From 1991 to 1993,claimed Mr Hasanzadeh,125 terroristacts had been planned oractually
perpetrated by the Iranians in Iraqi Kurdistan."The governmentofIraqi Kurdistan has its heart with us
buttheir heads with the Iranians",he said. "Suspects are arrested and are then letgo".
54."Lastsummer,we were told thatthose crossing into Iraqi Kurdistan frequently had ^imily members
held untilthe others agreed to inform duringtheirstay in Kurdistan. Theysend relatives ofpeople
from Iran to take backtheirsons who are hereas Peshmergasoractivists. Ifthey do not,they are
punished. They takefamily members,expelthem to Kurdistan and will notallow them to return
without their sons,husbands.Onthe border,mines are laid,and thousandsofpeople have been
expelled withoutcompensation to create acordon sanitaire".
55.Asked how the internal fighting in Iraqi Kurdistan had affected Iranian Kurds,Mr Hasanzadeh
replied:"The fighting isthreatening Iranian Kurdsand indeed all people in Kurdistan. It hassome
directinfluence on us,because while the supportersofthe KDPIare inside Iran,the leadership is here
in Iraqi Kurdistan and all the activities,military,political,information,are carried outfrom thisside.
One effectofthe conflict is thatboth parties are trying to preventus from communicating with our
members inside Iran,or carrying outour activities. Attacks have been carried outon us by both
parties. A radio station,which survived for 15 years,in spite ofbeing attacked repeatedly by the
Iranians,wasclosed down by the PUK.We had a headquarters in Harir.Thiscamp atBasrama was
attacked by an armed KDPforce under Wasta Fattah using heavy artillery. Mr Fattah was promoted to
the rank ofBrigadier. The closing ofthe radio station and the Basrama attack were examplesofthe
competition between the partiesto please Iran. 80families wereexpelled from Basramacamp by KDP
to Arbil,and about38families still have no place to stay and are in effect homeless without water,
electricity and basic necessities. The UNHCR do nothelp these people,they are depending on the
charity oflocal residents in Baharka".
56.According to MrHasanzadeh,the Kurdsin Iran number about 10 million, 16-17%ofthe
population butoccupying only7%ofthe land area. Iranian Kurds were deprived ofall administrative,
legal and human rights.Nearly all publicemployeesat higher levels in Iranian Kurdistan are non-
Kurds. In afew smalltownsand villages,there are Kurdish collaborators,afew mayorsfor instance.
There has been a genocidal war against Kurds in Iran forthe past 16 years. "We are askingfor basic
rights in Iranian Kurdistan,we asked for autonomy within the framework ofIran. Overthe last 16
years,more than 40thousand,mostly unarmed women and children,have been killed by shelling,
bombing and armed attacks. Thousands offamilies were expelled into other areasofIran. And
10

11. thousandsofothersbecamerefugeesin IraqiKurdistan. Theylive ina very harshsituation. Apart
from 26,000wholivein acamp in Altash,an ArabicpartofIraq,whogetsome helpfrom
organisations,thereare about 1,000familiesin Iraqi Kurdistan whoare in a very bad situation and
need help desperately.Thosepeople weregetting300dinarsa month butarenow being given nothing.
Halfofthem would prefertogo backtoIran,they prefertodiethere ratherthan Iraq".
57."Wetiy as much as wecan abroad to bringthe attention ofWestern governmentsto our Kurds,but
they don'tlisten to us",said MrHasanzadeh."Dr Ghassemlou[a previousGeneralSecretaryofthe
KDPl,assassinated by Iranian secretagentsin Vienna on July 13,1989]used tosay wedon t attract
the attention ofthe outside world because weare notterrorists,wedo notkidnap,kill orterrorise.
From the begirming,we did notaccept violence butlookfora peaceful way ofsolving our problems
with the Iranian government Theytook advantage ofusand assassinated DrGhassemlou and Dr
Abdallah Ghaderiatthe conferencetable when they had been broughtto negotiate andsign a peace
agreement. Iranian history is full ofthese kinds oftreachery".
58.Asked aboutcontacts between the Kurdish and Azeri minorities in Iran,MrHasanzadeh said they
were in touch with the Organisation ofRevolutionary Democracy in Azerbaijan,butthis wasasmall
body with veryfew members.
59.The delegation then metthe Presidentofthe University,DrB K Maulood,and two ofhis
colleagues.They told the delegation that both partiesfullyaccepted thatthe university should be
allowedto conductitsoperations withoutinterference;thatallstaffshould remain attheir posts,and
that no party political meetingsshould be allowed underthe auspicesofthe university.Some38staff
members had left because ofthe situation,butsome had been replaced,and the Presidenthadjust
returnedfrom atourofthe Turkish universities,where he had been successfulin persuadingsome
academicsto cometo Arbilon visiting professorships.He would be visiting UK universities in the first
two weeksofOctober,and hoped to attractfurthershort-term recruits,particularly in engineering and
medicine.The university had about 11,000students.Noforeignjournals had been received since 1988,
and the facilities were grossly inadequate.The President mentioned computing,where the university
had no modem facilities whatsoever.
60.At 16.00on July 19,the delegation metrepresentativesoftheseven independent parties,as
follows:
Kurdistan CommunistParty-Iraq(Mulla Hasan)
Kurdistan Social DemocraticParty(Khorshid Hormaziar)
Assyrian Democratic(ShmaelBenyamen)
Islamic Movementin Kurdistan(Salim Osman)
Kurdistan Toilers Party(Bahman Hussain)
Kurdistan Islamic Union(Abdulrahman Sidiq)
The representativessaid they had worn outthree pairs ofshoesgoing back and forth between the
partiesin mediation attempts.They referred to the currentattack on thetown ofRawanduzbythe
KDP,which had resulted in the death and wounding ofmany civilians,and the destruction ofover 100
dwellings.The whole population ofthe town,some 15,000to 20,000 people,had fled to the
mountains.Addressing DrOsman,they told him thatsince his previous visit,they had tried hard to
make peace butachieved little."To be honest",thespokesman said,"their response was not uptothe
level ofour mediation and attimes wefelt our efforts were notappreciated.In the recentcease-fire
there wasthe particular need to getthe harvestin,and the end ofyearexamsin the university.But
there wasno political progressand wecame totheconclusion thatunlessthe leaders met,nothing
could be achieved. We were askingfora permanent peace,becausethat was whatthe people wanted,
yetin each lull they rearmed and prepared forrenewalofthe war.There wereserioushuman rights
violations,and each side discriminated accordingto party affiliation.The propaganda became worse
and was accompanied by intemperate language".
61."On July 8",thespokesman continued,"we asked foraresponse to our latest memorandum.The
PUK agreed to our proposals,butthe KDP referred it to their Politburo. On July 9,thePUK attacked,
using the excuse thatthe KDP were gathering their forcesand the fact is that both sides were doing the
same. Wesuspended all our mediation activities between parties because we had not achieved
anything since the Parliamentmeeting wherethey kissed each other as ifnothing happened. Things
II

12. started to godown hill afterthatmeeting with cease-fire violationsand eachsideaccusingtheother.
Tostop allthese incidentson thefrontline wesuggested ourPeshmergasbe placedthereasobservers.
ThePUKagreed unconditionally,butthe KDPrefused,sayingthatthedead bodycountwould
establish clearly who wasatfault. Itseemedto usthatneitherside isreadytostopthe fighting,nordo
theyappreciateourmediation. Wehad noforcetocompelthem,andsome preferred todepend onthe
Iraniansorthe Turks,who possessthe powerofstates".
62.Thesamespokesman continued:"TheTurkstried to mediate becausethey wereafraid thatthe
PKK would step into the vacuum.Butatthesametimethey weretrying to persuadethe partiesto sit
down together and negotiate with Saddam. Wethinkthatthe regional powerstook advantageofthe
circumstancesto increasetheir power in Kurdistan and establish intelligence bases in Kurdistan. Both
ofthem wantto getrid oftheiropponents based here. The Iraqigovemmentalsotook whattheysaw
asan opportunity,by offeringto negotiate with us,butonly on the basisofthe unacceptableschemeof
1991. They are notreadyto giveanything new orto havesomeconsideration forthe Kurds. Justthe
opposite,afterstartingthefightingin December,they tightened theembargo,creatingshortagesoffuel
and food. Duringthisround offighting,food and everythingelse has become much moreexpensive.
Commercial movementand economic life is almostparalysed and there is a risk ofanotherfamine.
Security is very bad in thecitiesand the villages. Many people have been killed,robberiesand looting
have increased,and human rights violationsare rife. This hasseverely affected the morale ofthe
people and we feelthatinternational pressure mustbe exerted on these partiessince theyare deafto
logic. On both sidesthere are people who benefitfi-om theconflict,and even iftheydo agree to a
cease fire,itisalwaysfragileandtemporary".
63.A second representative oftheseven parties told us:"Wecould withstand lack of
electricity,waterand otherresources. Our people have accepted theseterrible conditions,butthey
cannotputup with the political manoeuvring. Inthese sensitive circumstances,we wantyou to
persuade yourgovernments notdesert us,becauseifthey do,we will be atthe mercy ofthe four
regional powers. Do notequate the Kurdish nation with thePUKand KDP. We are a peaceful nation,
andthe policiesofthese two partiesdo notexpress atall ourspirit. Ifanything bad takes place,the
PUK and KDP are at fault,and the Western governmentsare also atfaultfor not pressuringthem to
stop".[In answerto a question]"Yes,there have been demonstrationsagainstthefighting,butthere is
no licenceforthose activities,and they may bestopped with bullets".
64.A third representative said thatbecauseofthelow levelofeconomicactivity,many peoplejoined
the militias asa means ofsupporting themselvesand their families.Onestep towardsasolution wasto
increase thesupportgiven to employmentgeneration projects,to persuade men to leave the militias
and start working productively.
65.Late in the afternoon ofWednesday July 19,the delegation crossed the front line again to
Salahaddin.Since Mr Barzani wasoutoftown,they took the opportunity ofvisiting Shaqlawa and
talking to several people in theshopsthere. Allsaid thatthe fighting had had a disastrous effecton
their business. While en routeto Shaqlawa,they were passed in the opposite direction by aconvoy of
14 identical new Toyota Land Cruisers.The delegation could notavoid reflecting thatthe leaders did
not have toshare the hardshipsand suffering endured bythe ordinary people.
66.At00.45 on the morning ofJuly20,Mr Barzani saw the delegation for thesecond time.They
presented him with the confidence-building measuresand political ideas(see Annexes111 and IV)
which they had drafted afterthe initial round ofmeetings,and expressed the hope that as much as
possible ofthese ideascould be agreed between the leaders,so thattheycould provide aframework for
the discussions proposed bythe US State Department.MrBarzani observed that ifthe KDP did goto a
meeting,they would like tosee afiamework designed in advance.He was very insistent on the need to
identify thePUK asthe aggressors who brokethe cease fu-e on July9,and hesaid that Arbil wasthe
keyto a peaceful solution ofthe conflict. Healso mentioned the$14 million which hesaid was in the
banksat Arbil when the city wasoccupied by thePUK,thethousands ofpersonalcars appropriated by
the PUK,and the looting ofproperty belonging to Ministers.Hesaid thatthe US State Department
should identify the aggressor and apportion blame for other wrongs done.
12

13. 67.Thedelegation saidthey werenotin Kurdistan to actasjudgesin deciding who wasresponsiblefor
breaking thecease-fire,orforanyotherviolationsofthemanyagreements madein the past between
the parties.Ifthey wanted an exerciseofthatkind,it wasuptothe partiestoagreeon theappointment
ofa qualified person to hearevidence,makeastatementoffindings,and quantify damagesifthat was
whatwasrequired.Thiswasa matter whichtheysuggested mightbe puton the agendaforthe State
Department meeting,butthe delegation feltcertain thatthe State Departmentitselfwould not wish to
getinvolved insuch an inquiry.MrBarzaniconcluded the meeting at03.00 by undertaking to consider
the delegation's proposalsand letthem have a reply in the morning.
68.The following morning,July 21,the delegation metthe KDP Politburo and received the textofMr
Barzani'sreply to their proposals.In general,he had accepted the ideasasa basis fordiscussion,but
feltthatpriorityshould be given toseveral ofthem.He had reiterated his view thatthe party which had
violated the cease-fireshould be identified,and he said thattheKDPhad responded positively tothe
US State Departmentpeace initiative.The full textofMrBarzani'sresponse is given as Annex V.
69.The delegation then setoffagain forSuleimaniyeh,stopping in Arbil on the wayforlunch with the
Prime Minister.Amongtheguests were Mr Muhamad Haji Mahmoud Secretary-General ofKurdistan
Social DemocraticPartyand otherseniorofficialsoftheParty.Theyalso mettheINCDeputy
Representative in Arbil,Mr Nabil Al-Moussawi.
70.Arriving in Suleimaniyeh,the delegation proceeded to the headquartersofMrTalabani atQala
Cholun,wherethey presented him with their proposals.Afterstudyingthe documents,MrTalabani
said thathe accepted the proposals unconditionally,and hesubsequently confirmed this in writing.An
English translation ofhis memorandum is given as Annex VI.MrTalabani also said thathe would be
prepared to acceptsomeform ofcommission to investigate responsibility for breaking the cease-fire.
He pointed outthatnumerous breachesofthe cease-fire had occurred priorto July9,forexample at
Penjwin,Arbiletc,and expressed reservationsaboutthe value ofsimply extending the cease-fire,
without making any progress onthe political differences between theparties.He wanted permanent
renunciation ofviolence,buthefeltthatthere wasa momentum towardsfurther attemptsata military
solution,which wasbeingencouraged by the regional powersfortheirown ends,and fuelled bythe
supply ofmilitary hardwareto the KDPfrom Turkey.Hehad discussedthis with theTurksand they
had notdenied it.He particularly drew attention to the useofheavy weaponsagainstthetown of
Rawanduz,which had resulted in manycivilian casualties butnochangein the military situation. Mr
Talabanisaid thathe wasreadyto accepttheinvitation from the USState Departmentto attend talks,
both atPolitburo and leader-to-leader level,and thathe wasdetermined to exhaustevery possibility of
reaching a politicalsolution.
4.Analysis
71.The prospectsforalasting peace and astable political settlementin Iraqi Kurdistan are notgood,
and willremain doubtfulaslong asthey depend on agreements between Masoud Barzani and Jalal
Talabani.Mr Barzani,son ofthe great hero ofthe Kurdish rebellion ofthe 1960sand 70s,Mulla
Mustapha Barzani,seeshimselfasthe legitimate heirto the tradition ofleadership based on family and
tribalconnections.Jalal Talabani,on the other hand,created the PUK outofreformistelements who
seceded from the KDP in 197S,when the Kurdish rebellion collapsed on the withdrawal ofsupport by
the USand the Shah'sIran.MrTalabani's wasa more ideologically motivated party,based on
modernisation and leR-orientated policies. It has to be noted,however,thatnotasingle one ofthe
leadersand intellectuals we metreferred to any ideological difference between thetwo main parties as
a barrier to peace.Thestruggle has become intensely personal,and it is nota reflection ofreal
differences ofopinion among the Kurdish people.
72.The harmful influence ofthe regional powers has been noted.The Kurdish region issurrounded by
Turkey,Iran,Iraq and Syria,all ofwhich have good reason to obstructand sabotage the Kurdish
democratic experiment.There is no countervailing influence from western powers,because the allies
have acted strictly in accordance with Article 2(7)ofthe United Nations Charter,which provides that:
13

14. "Nothing contained in the present Chartershall authorisethe United Nationsto intervene in matters
which areessentially within the domesticjurisdiction ofanystate orshallrequirethe Membersto
submitsuch matterstosettlement underthe presentCharter;butthisprincipleshallnotprejudicethe
application ofenforcement measures underChapter Vll".
This principle has prevented the westfrom doinganything which could imply alack ofrespectfor
Iraq'ssovereigntyoverthe regionsuch as,forinstance,compliance with therecommendation bythe
UN Special Rapporteuron Iraq,Mr Max van derStoel,thathuman rightsobserversbestationed in the
territory pending agreementon theiraccesstothe remainderofIraq.
73.The Charter has notdeterred Turkey from mountingthree invasionsofIraqi Kurdistan.The largest
ofthese,in March 1995,wasreported to have involved as many as70,000troops,and wascriticised in
western Europe,butendorsed by the US administration as alegitimate actofself-defence.Itseemsto
usdoubtful whether,in any circumstances,astate isentitled tosend largeforcesintothe territory ofa
neighbouring state withouttheauthority oftheSecurity Council,and the precedentestablished by
Turkey may have weakened thesafeguardsfor peace in general.Therightofself-defence,contained in
Article 51,oughtnotto beextendedto pre-emptivestrikesagainstarmed groupsoperatingfrom
anotherstate without permission.
74.There iscircumstantialevidence to show thatTurkey hasalso been supplying heavy weaponsand
ammunition to one ofthe partiesto the conflict.The delegation feltthatthese allegationsshould be
examined and reported on bythe UN Secretary-General,in exercise ofhis powers under Article99of
the Charter,which providesthat
'The Secretary-General may bringto the attention ofthe Security Councilany matter which in his
opinion maythreaten the maintenance ofinternational peace and security'.
75.The territory ofIraqi Kurdistan is divided intotwo quasi-state entities,administered by thePUK
and KDP respectively.The parliamentand governmentwhich were established afterKurdistan became
defacto independentin the autumn of1991 are no longerfunctional.The disastrous50-50power-
sharing arrangements,described above,havecollapsed,and both partiesappearto agreethatifthe
unityofKurdistan isto be preserved,a new provisionalgovernment will have to beformed,based on a
much widerdistribution ofportfolios,pendingthe holdingofnew elections.Itis also agreed thatthe
parties have to be demilitarised,and we were mildly encouraged bythe ready assentofboth sidesto
our proposal that heavy weaponsshould beimpounded,subjectto internationalsupervision.
76.The problem is,as it alwayshas been,thesequence ofmoves which haveto be madeto getfrom
two militarised party enclaves,to one unified entity with a monopoly ofarmed power.Mere
withdrawalofforces from territory occupied duringthesuccessivearmed clashes,withoutagenuine
agreementon the transfer oftheir controlto anew authority exercisingstate poweroverthe whole of
Kurdistan,would simply alterthe oddsslightly forthe nextround ofthe conflict
77.Any new administration would be unable to function,however,unless ithad control ofrevenues,
and particularly ofthe$180k a day beingcollected on the Turkish border.Asa preliminaryto any
wideragreement,thesesums,and otheramountscollected by eitherside,includingthe money from the
banksin Arbil,should be held in escrow bytrustees,pendingthe appointmentofa new provisional
government.The trusteescould be empowered to pay outany sumsattributabletothe costs of
collection,and the arrearsofsalaries due to employeesoftheformeradministration.
78.Unfortunately,the golden avalanche ofthe customsrevenuesaccruing to the KDP gives them a
strong incentive notto reach a political settlement,sincethat would mean notonly handing over all
future receipts to a new provisional government,but having to accountforthe alleged$25 million
already collected since May I, 1994.
79.The Iranians,who were offering theirservices as'mediators',were told plainly tostay outby
Washington,and this gives Tehran a particular reason for wanting to fhistrate the US-sponsored
meeting ofAugust9and the ensuing leader-to-leader meeting in September,in addition to the general
policy ofTehran to counter American influence whereverthey can.Iran also has more influence over
14

15. thePUK,which can be blackmailed by threatsto cutofTits only accessto the outside world viathe
Iranian border,than it would haveovera regionalauthority with achoiceofoutlets in theory,via
Turkey,Iraq and Syria as wellas Iran.Tehran can more easily controlthe Iranian Kurdish
organisations when they are confined within thePUK area,astheirsuccess in persuading MrTalabani
to close down the KDPI radio station demonstrates.
80.Turkey hasseveralreasonsfor not wanting to see asettlement.First,the continued fratricidal
conflictin Iraqi Kurdistan givescredenceto policy ofdenyingeven limited formsofself-government
to their own Kurdish minority.Second,Ankara has madea deal with the KDPto policethe border,
thusreducing,orsothey believe,the level ofcross-border military operations bythePKK.Third,
Ankaraand theKDPareengaged on sanctions-busting on agrand scale,engaging in a lucrativetrade
with Saddam Hussain which mightcome under unwelcomescrutiny ifthe Americansgetinvolved in
thesettlement.Fourth,Ankara wantsthesanctionsto be lifted altogether,and theysee hopeofadeal
between the KDPand Baghdad,creatingafavourable political environmentforopeningthe oil
pipeline which runsfrom Mosulthrough KDP territory into Turkey.
81.Iraq obviously does not wanttosee the creation ofastrong Kurdish entity,fi^ofinternal
preoccupations,and willingto actasa basefor politicaland military operationsagainstBaghdad by
any opposition coalition.
82.The west,on the other hand,mustaim to promoteademocraticadministration in IraqiKurdistan,
forexactlythe opposite reasons.Itshould be welcomed as partofastrategy- which has neverexisted-
to destabilise and ultimately overthrow the evil Saddam regime;it would haveenormous value asa
role modelforthe otherregional powers with Kurdish minorities,and it could actasan important
bufferagainstthespread ofIran'sextremistideology,which is very much outoftune with the Kurds'
traditionalreligioustolerance and pluralism.
83.The delegation were extremely concerned to leam that,afterashort lull in the fighting,on July29,
the KDP again shelled Arbil,hitting a numberofcivilian targetsincludingthe Children'sCare
Hospital,a mosqueand a number ofresidential properties.Thisagain looks like an attempttosabotage
the proposed meetings,and indicatesa lackofwillto engage in dialogue ratherthan violence.We
undertookthis mission in the hope thatourefforts,asfriendsofthe Kurdish peoplethroughoutmany
years,would be reciprocated bya new commitmenton the partoftheir leadersto refiain from
violence,particularly against non-combatants,and to sit down atthe conference table with a
determination to reach a permanent peace and political settlementoftheir differences. Weknow that
this is whatthe people wantand they expectno less.
15

16. Annex I'PublicStatement'issued bythe Kurdish Parliamenton August 16,1994,and accepted
by theleadersofthe KDPand PUK in the presenceoftheParliamentand the UK delegation.
Wecondemn thefighting and we prohibitthe useofforce,violenceand terroras meansofsolving
problems,which should be dealt with by democratic debate.
Wecondemn all kinds ofviolationsofthe principles ofdemocracy,pluralism,freedom ofexpression,
freedom to withdraw labour,and freedom to demonstrate;wecondemn arrests and threats made for
politicalreasons;we condemn the occupation ofheadquartersor officesofparties,and wecall for the
abolition ofpartyjails andthe release ofall prisoners held by them.
Wecondemn interference with officials and governmentdepartments,offices and institutions in the
performance oftheir duties.
We demand thespeeding up ofthe normalisation process,with the return ofall headquartersofparties
to normal.
We callon all partiestoabide by the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights and other international
instruments.
Wedemandrespectforthe separation ofpowers between the legislature,the executive and the
judiciaiy,andthe cessation ofinterference bythe political parties.
Wedemand respectforthe principlesoflaw and order.
Wedemand protection of,and absenceofinterference with,the work ofthe legislative body,and the
protection and freedom from political pressuresofthejudiciaiy.
Wecallfora review ofthetwo-party system and the50-50 principle.
Wedemand the recognition ofthe Parliament building and its neighbourhood asan aims-freezone;the
provision ofsecurityto MPsand tothe Parliamentbuilding,and the removalofpolitical party
headquarters from thezone.
Wecallforthe return ofall civil servantsto their originalgovernment posts;the paymentofarrearsof
salaries,and the cancellation ofillegal or unauthorised orders.
Wedemand the abolition ofthe militias,and the implementation ofthe lawson weaponsand on
political parties.
Wecall forthe reform ofthe administrativesystem and security;the introduction oflegislation to
createa Central Financial Monitoring Authority and a Central EconomicPlanning Board,and the
review ofother laws.
We callfora Constitution for the region.
We call for areview ofthe law on elections,the preparation ofa new electoral register,and the holding
ofnew elections.
We decideto initiate a study ofnew methodsforimproving the welfare ofthe people and
reconstructing the infrastructure.
We declare thatthe pressshould be orientated towards spreading the principlesofdemocracy,human
rights and national unity,and thata National Media Authority should be established.
We call forrespectfor Parliamentatall timesand in all circumstances.
16

17. Annex III:AlliancePactbetween Patriotic Union ofKurdistan and Kurdistan DemocraticParty
Theexperience ofour people,and the latestsad events,has proved an importantfact,which should be
comprehended and learn from it,isthatthefighting between thePUK and the KDP isasuicide actfor
both parties and the annihilation ofthe Kurdistan liberation movementas wellasa waste ofour
people'sachievement.It discreditsthe reputation ofthetwo partiesand the Kurdish movement
regionally and intemationally.Theseeventsasserted again thatthe advancementofKurdistan
movement,existence ofthe RegionalgovernmentofKurdistan,the parliamentand the Kurdistan Front
is very much tied to the unityand co-operation between thePUK and the KDPand to the unityofall
the othersides in Kurdistan Frontand the participation ofallother political groupsinthe democratic
movementexisting in Kurdistan presently.It is visibly clearthat both the national interest makes it
necessary for both to find the bestnormaland working relationship.This isthe only way to ensure
both partiesto remain popularand operate forthe benefitofthe people.Because ofthese reasons
membersofthePUK and the KDP political bureaus,in the presence ofMessrs Masoud Barzani and
Jalal Talabani,met.After discussions and exchange ofviewsthey have unanimously decided on the
following:
Firstly:
Fighting between political parties and forces is forbidden,and iscriminalised especially between the
PUKandthe KDPand regarding itanationalcrime which mustnotbecommitted.A campaign must
be waged to influence membersand cadresofthetwo parties againstinternal fighting by informing
them and teachingthem thespiritofdemocracy and beliefin co-operation,politicaland peaceful
dialogue in solving their differencesand problems.Tocondemn use ofviolence,fighting,murderand
hatred to promotetheir viewsand positionsorto usetheseactsin solving their problems which arise
duringtheirjourney ofnationalstruggle and democracy which iscurrently underwayin Iraqi
Kurdistan.Toforbid and criminalise usingforeign powersagainsteach otherin internal conflicts orto
usethe country's wealth in thisregard.Emphasis mustbe madeon solving all problemsand differences
betweenthetwo parties,their organisationsand members by peaceful meansand mutualrespectfor
each others'views.Evenjustthethoughtofresortingto arms in these circumstances mustbe avoided
and regarded asrepressive.In the eventa local dispute or conflicterupted it mustbe broughtunder
controland stopping itfrom spreading.Thismustbe regarded asa duty by the leadership ofboth
parties in general and by Masoud Barzaniand Jalal Talabaniin particular.Toteach allthe membersof
necessity ofworking together and realisingthata victory ordefeatofone side is victory and defeatfor
the other.Itis imperativethatboth sides work forthe promotion ofthe principleofhuman rightsand
civilised behaviourtosolvetheir naturaland acceptable views.Both sidesshould work togetherto
honour parliament's law which forbade and criminalised internalfighting.
Secondly
To avoid the creation offriction and encounter between thetwo sidesthe followingshould be
considered:
1.Election
Speed up the implementation ofthe census by the governmentcommittee so that it isfmalised before
the end ofthe present parliamentary session.
To hold a free and fair election and to prepare for it by carrying outthe censusand normalise the
situation totally and to provide all facilities to ensure thatthe election is nottampered with.
Toendeavourto form a coalition government which includethetwo parties and other national groups
according to the outcome ofthe election.
Election machinery should be studied according to the agreement.
Agreementshould be reached regarding the establishmentofprofessional institutionssuch as
Engineering,Medical etc.
17

18. Agreement between allthe partiesshould be reached to avoid friction during election time ofthese
institutions and have theelection carried outin a democraticatmosphere and to abide by it.
2.Freedom ofpolitical parties,institutions and organisations should be available to all and no oneside
should monopolise these activities.Rivalry in attracting the publicshould be conducted in a civilised
way and by offeringthe publictheir views and services in a civil and faircompetition.
3.Thetwo partiesshould provide each otherhelp in orderto accomplish theirduties and tasks in every
aspect.
4.Party membersand Peshmergas are notallowed to switch from one party to another.
5.Participation in administration and the authoritieson an equal basis untilthe election is held.
Monopolisation in thegovernmentandsemi-governmentoffices isforbidden.The agreementon the
establishmentofgovernmentinstitution,as laid outin the Parisagreement,should bespeeded up to
begin their duties(Finance,Planning,....)
6.Thetwo parties willagreetounitetheir position in respectofthetribesand other past private
militiasaccordingtothe laws passed bythe parliamentequally on all ofthem.They will beforbidden
contacts with foreign persons perceived to beofsuspicious nature.They will notbe allowed to play
doublegamesand blackmailtowardsthe governmentorthetwo parties.(This item will remain secret
and ajointcommittee ofprofessionalsshould be prepared tostudythelike ofthe above people).
7.Jointposition towards:
Kurdistan political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan Region(IKR)according to the Paris Agreement.
Islamictendenciesin IKR on a democratic basisand according to thelawslaid down by the
Parliament.
8.Invigoration and enlargementofthe Kurdistan Frontafter amending its agenda and broadening its
sphereto enable ittotake its role.
9.Formation ofaJointco-ordination committee tosuperviseand guide the mediato serve the alliance
and co-operation,and to check provocation,offence,insultand everything which may damage the
relationship ofthe two parties.
10.Co-ordination in the field ofregionaland international relations and to unify policiestowardsthese
aspectsas ithas been outlined in the Paris agreement.
Thirdly
Formation ofajoint political command which includes Messrs Barzaniand Talabaniand the two
political bureaus which meetsregularly to implementall the agreementsand tosupervise the policies
agreed upon.To promote the spiritofbrotherhood and co-operation between the two parties and to
direct policies relatingto regionaland international concern.
Fourthly
To honour the Paris Agreement pendingthe signing ofit by Messrs Barzani and Talabani.
Fifth
Genuine effortto implementthe Paris Agreementtotally and until this is achieved the two sides agree:
Restricting the numberofPeshmergas notto reach more than 15,000each and to review this matterat
the begirming ofthe coming year.
18

19. AnamountofIS million Dinars will beallocated to both PUK and KDP monthlyto provide helpfor
their Peshmeiigas.This matterto bereviewed atthe beginning ofthe coming year.
All militiasto return totheir previousjobsand occupations in a gradual way.
Co-ordination between thecommandsofthe parties'Peshmergasand to be used asa defensiveforce
againsttheenemiesand to guard the bordersoftheIKR.Also to guidethe Peshmergasto haveaspirit
ofbrotherhood and collaboration to defend the country.
Retreating theforcesfrom the citiesand majorroadsand to place them in appropriate areasfor
defensive purposesonly.
OtherPeshmerga forces will be paid on the previous basis.
Sixth
Helpforthe familiesofthe martyrs.
Providing forthefamiliesofthe martyrs isregarded asamain objective agreed byallthe partiesand
othernationalforcesand it hasbeen agreed byallto reserve financial help tothesefiamilieson a
permanentand orderly basis asfollows:
Reservation ofasalary forthe martyrs'familiesaccording toa legalfnunework and forthe relevant
institution to pay each family a monthly salary of500 dinar untiltheircase isfinalised.
Forming acommittee consisting ofthe Mayor,hisdeputyand the representative ofboth the KDPand
thePUK to auditall the accounts locally.
Allthe martyrs'affairs mustbe finalised withinthree monthsofsigning ofthis agreement.
Each side to prepare a list ISO oftheirsenior martyrsand each ofthese families will be allocated a
salaryof2,500dinar monthly.
Seventh
Establishmentofthe Executivesand Legislators on a democratic and civilised basisand remotefrom
duality and nepotism.
Principle ofshared responsibility will be adopted in the case ofthe office oftheleader ofthe
parliamentand the prime ministerand equalauthority will beenjoyed bythe leader and hisdeputy
with the usual consideration for protocol.
Deputy minister will bea professional person.His authorities will be determined bythe minister.
Both parties agree thata fullco-operation should be adopted between the head ofthe parliamentand
the prime ministersothatall important decisionsare agreedjointly,(note thisitem willremain secret).
Eighth
Adoption ofa strategic plan to include political,economic,legal,developmentareas as well as
relationsofKurdistan with the centralgovemmentand the regional and international governments.
Stepsto be taken to improve the livelihood ofthe civilian population,rehabilitation ofagriculture and
restoration offactories and agricultural institutions.Enhanced efforts in the field ofinternational aid
and allocation ofpartofthese towardsdevelopment projects and exploitation ofpetroleum and other
mineralresourcesofthe country.
Ninth
19

20. Startofa concerted political and media efforttoshow thatfederalism which weadopted is against
separatism and itconsolidatesthe unity ofIraq and itssovereignty.Both sidesadhere to the unity of
Iraq and refute chauvinistic allegation thatfederalism is asteptowardsseparatism.
Tenth
Assoon asthetwo organisations are combined(Zaniari and Specialorganisation)and placed underthe
authority ofthe government,co-operation and co-ordination will be carried out between the heads of
thesetwo organisations.Thetwo organisations will notcarry outany activities againsteach other or
any other politicalforces.Thetwo organisations will concentrate theireffort againstthe enemyand
their agents and toexpose theirespionage and subversive activities. Allsubversive,assassination and
espionage activities are forbidden and criminalised.
Eleventh
Thetwosides will have ajoint position towardstheINCand the otheropposition forces outsidethe
country and towardsthe activities aimed atrescuing Iraq from the dictatorship and forthe
establishmentofan alternative parliamentary democraticregime.
Twelfth
Assurethe nationaland democratic rightsofthe Turkomansand Assyrians within the OCRconstitution
Dated November21,1994.
20

21. Annex IV:ACTIONS:
Cease-fire.
Respond positivelytothe invitation byUSState Departmenttothe politburo meeting ofJuly24and
leaders meeting ofAugust I.
Demilitarisation ofArbiland surroundingsexceptfora neutral mutuallyagreed police force.
Transfer offunds accumulated from customs and all otherrevenues to an escrow account held in the
name ofTrusteesto be agreed by the parties pending theformation ofa new Cabinet.
Paymentofarrears ofsalaries to public servants without discrimination.
Formation ofa new caretakercabinetto hold office pendingnew elections,the keyappointments to be
held by qualified independent personsagreed by both Partiesand approved by the Parliament.
21

22. Annex V:CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES:
Initiate mutual balanced reduction offorces.
Withdraw heavy weaponstodesignated areas. Eliminateuseofweaponsofmassdestruction against
civilian population.
Restore communications between respective party areas.
Appoint peacecommission to meeton the frontierto discussalleged infractions.
Establish committee ofthe Parliament which would include independentassessors to monitor human
rights violations and publish reportson abuses.
Create Women sCommission to investigate and reporton rape and other violationsofwomen srights.
Ceaseall intimidation and terrortactics,deportation offamiliesofprivate citizens,and fighting in
refugee camps,townsand villages.
Refr-ain from interruption ofessential servicessuch as waterand electricity.
Supportacademic institutionsand intellectualfreedomsatall universities,and provide adequate
resources fortheiroperation.
Allow free movementofgoodsand persoimelofNGOsand stopintimidation and harassmentoftheir
staff.
End internaltaxation orembargoeson goods movingfrom onezone ofKurdistan toanother.
Exercise fullrespectfortraditional funeral,mourning traditionsand procedures.
Release all prisonersofwar.
Cease personal media attacks.
Preventextrajudicialexecutions,kidnapping and torture and mutilation.
Observe Article 3ofGeneva Conventions which prohibitsarmed action againstciviliansand fullco
operation with the ICRC.
Examinethe Lebanon model,with a view to agreeingspecialextra-statutoiy powersto be exercised by
a provisional government,including legislative powersto be delegated bythe Parliament.
Annex VI:KDP response to the delegation's proposals
The measures are generally acceptableto us.However,in termsofpriorities wefeelthatsomeshould
take precedence.The mostimportantCBM in the currentconflictare:
Cease media attack and the promotion ofwarculture in the media.
Cease all intimidation and terrortactics,deportationsoffamiliesofprivate citizens,and fighting in
refugee camps,townsand villages.
Release ofwar prisoners and prisonersofconscience.
22

23. Withdrawalofheavy weaponsfrom civilian areasto designated areas.
A publicdeclaration bythe leadershipto preventextrajudicialexecutions,kidnapping,tortureand
mutilation.Toobserve Article3oftheGenevaConventions(which prohibitsarmed action against
civilians)and fullco-operation with theICRC.
To restoretelephonecommunications between respective party areas.
On Action proposals:
1.-The party that violated the cease-fireshould be identified,stop thefighting fustand withdraw its
forces from occupied areasto the positions of8July 1995
2.- We have responded positively to the USState Department peace initiative and recommended
preparatory talksatPolit-bureauslevel first. Weare awaitingaresponse from the USSD to outline the
framework and venuesofthe talks.Thecontagiousissuesofdemilitarisation ofArbil,the issue of
revenues,the restoration ofthe political process in the region as well asleader-to-leader meeting will
be decided in the preparatory talks.
23

24. Annex VI:CHRONOLOGY OFTHE MISSION
July 12,1995
Arrived in Damascuslate afternoon;dinner with Iraqiopposition groupsand independentintellectuals
given by MrTalib Shbib,formerIraqiForeign Minister
July 13
Meeting with Mr AH Hassan,KDP,MrDana Ahmad Mjeed,PUK,DrHamid,Iraqi CommunistParty,
Mr Kadir Aziz,leader,and MrAbdul Khaliq Zangana(President Human Rights Advocacy
Association),PB member,Kurdistan Toilers Party.
July 14
Meeting with Mr Abdullah Ocalan,Leaderofthe PKK.
July 15
Damascusto Qamishli08.00.MetbyPUK representative in Qamishli.The KDP facilitated the river
crossing.Meeting with GovernorofDuhok, AbdulazizTayieb,and several KDPseniorofiicials.
Stayed in Duhok.
July 16
Travelto Salahaddin.Meeting with KDPsenior officials including Sami Abdurrahman,Jawhar Namiq,
ex-Speaker etc. Meeting with MrShamsaddin Mufti,independent personality and lawyer.Meeting
with Professor KamalKhoshnaw,memberofthe board ofKurdistan Watch. Firstmeeting with Mr
Masoud Barzani
July 17
Meeting with KDPPolitburoin the moming.Travelto Arbil. Received by Prime Minister MrKosrat
Rassoul in Arbil. Visitto site ofshelling and hospital.Meeting with Mr Stafford Cleary,head ofthe
UNDCI.
July 18
Travelto Sulaimaniyeh.Meeting with KDPIat Koisinjaq:Abdullah Hasanzadeh,Secretary-General,
Hassan Sharafi,PB member,Salam Azizi,PB member Baba All,PB member.
First meeting with MrJalal Talabani in Qalacholun.Others present MrNajad Aziz,formerVice-
Chairman ofthe National Assembly and MrMuhamed Tawfiq,memberofPUK Central Committee.
Lunch with MrTalabani at which others presentwere Dr Kamal Fouad,PB member,MrOmarSeyyid
Ali,Central Committee member,MrNajad ex-vice chairman ofthe National Assembly.MrFattah
Kawiyan and Mr Hashin Kerimi,PB membersofthe KDPI Revolutionary Branch.
Dinner with membersofPUK Politburo members MrOmar Abdulla,Mr Kadir Haji Ali,Mr Muhamed
Tawfiq(who also accompanied the delegation from Erbilto Sulaimaniyeh and back),Mr Faraydoon
Abdul Kadir and Mr Omar Fattah.
July 19
Travelfrom Sulaimaniyeh to Arbil.Meeting with KDPI in Arbil:Salam Azizi,PB member.Qasim
Qaramani,representative in Arbil,Abdurrahaman Kajayee,cadre ofthe Secretariat,Mohammed
Hasanpour,cadre ofthe Secretariat.
24

25. Meeting with the Presidentofthe University ofSalahaddin,Dr Bahram Khadir Maulood and thetwo
Vice-PresidentsDrNazim and DrSherzad.Lunch with MrsHero Talabani.Meeting with senior
representativesoftheseven minor parties.
Crossfrontline to Salahaddin under escortofthe Toilers Party.
Meeting with KDPPolitburo.
Second meeting with MrBarzani00.43to03.00to discussdelegation's proposals.
July 20
Meeting with KDP Politburo atwhich they gavethe delegation the KDPsresponsetothe delegation's
proposals.
Travelto Arbil,wherethePrime Ministerentertained the delegation tolunch.Amongthe guests were
Mr Muhamad Haji Mahmoud Secretary-GeneralofKurdistan Social DemocraticParty and othersenior
officials ofthe Party.
Meeting with theINCDeputy Representative in Arbil,MrNabilAl-Moussawi.
Travelto Qala Cholan.Second meeting with MrTalabani,together with Mr Muammad Tawfiq,Dr
Khasraw,senior official ofPUK.Ended01.30
July21
LeftSulaimaniyeh 07.30,arrived Arbil 10.00.Met by Prime Minister.Crossed to Salahaddin forfinal
meeting with KDPPolitburo.Left Salahaddin 13.30.Meeting with representativesoftherefugees in
Atrush camps.Arrived Duhok 17.15,metGovernor.LeftDuhok 18,00,arrived border 19.00(18.00
Syrian time).Metby KDPrepresentativefrom Qamishli.Arrived Qamishli21.00 Syrian time.
July22
Qamishlito Damascus 10.00
25