1.
Threat
Perception
and
the
Guatemalan
Genocide
John
Gallant
10025373
POLS
838
Dr.
Oded
Haklai
December
7th
2016

2. Gallant
2
Table
of
Contents
Introduction
3
Literature
Review
Symbolic
Politics
4
Historical
Context
5
Analysis
Majority/Minority
Relations
in
Guatemala
7
Symbolic
Politics
and
Threat
Perception
8
Conclusion
15
Index
17
Notes
18
Bibliography
21

3. Gallant
3
The
historical
trend
of
Guatemalan
politics
is
one
best
characterized
by
state
terror
and
responses
to
it.
This
began
with
the
events
leading
up
to
the
36-­‐year
Guatemalan
civil
war,
eventually
erupting
later
into
genocide.
Created
with
the
purpose
of
a
proxy
war
between
central
powers
of
the
Cold
War,
this
civil
war
capitalized
on
legacies
of
racism
crystallized
by
capitalist
shift
in
the
Guatemalan
economy.
Chief
aggressors
in
this
conflict
began
as
leftist
forces
in
rural
Guatemala
against
the
military
controlled
state,
but
gradually
moved
into
a
conflict
along
racial
lines.
This
conflict
against
guerilla
leftists
in
the
countryside
was
a
direct
product
of
communist
fears
instilled
by
the
1954
American-­‐backed
coup
of
Jacobo
Arbenz’s
left-­‐wing
government.1
What
ensued
was
an
authoritarian
pattern
of
military
leadership,
defined
by
active
suppression
of
opposition
under
the
pretext
of
eliminating
communist
subversives.
However,
the
genocide
itself
did
not
formally
occur
until
the
coup
and
subsequent
assumption
of
leadership
by
Efrain
Rios
Montt
and
the
Guatemalan
Republican
Front
(GRF)
who
began
violent
counterinsurgency
operations
against
Mayans
in
countryside
in
fear
of
leftwing
challenges
to
the
Ladino
majority
and
state
legitimacy.2
It
is
important
to
establish
that
the
central
object
of
analysis
for
this
paper
is
the
Guatemalan
genocide,
rather
than
the
civil
war
itself.
Consequently,
the
following
discussion
will
attempt
to
answer
the
question
how
can
one
explain
the
extremity
of
violence
against
the
Mayans
during
the
Guatemalan
genocide?
This
paper
will
use
the
context
of
the
Guatemalan
civil
war
to
account
for
several
elements
present
in
the
genocide.
To
elaborate,
the
context
of
the
Guatemalan
civil
war
will
be
used
to
analyze
the
genocide
and
determine
how
threat
perception
of
the
Mayans
by
the
Ladino
majority
is
concerned
and
the
utility
this
has
for
elites
involved
in
Guatemala’s
authoritarian
patterns.
In
order
to
understand
the
rationale
behind
the

4. Gallant
4
Mayan
genocide
it
is
necessary
to
observe
the
historical
treatment
of
Mayans
in
Guatemala,
as
an
object
of
a
relationship
defined
through
control.
Consequently,
the
analysis
will
endeavor
to
apply
a
model
of
threat
perception
to
the
case
of
the
Guatemalan
genocide
and
argue
that
there
was
a
strategic
deployment
of
symbolic
politics
on
part
of
the
Guatemalan
elite,
leading
up
to
and
into
the
genocide
itself.
This
investigation
will
begin
first
with
a
literature
review
surrounding
the
Guatemalan
civil
war,
followed
by
a
contextualization
of
the
relationship
between
the
Ladino
majority
and
Mayan
minority,
and
lastly
an
analysis
of
the
genocide
through
a
theoretical
lens
in
a
specific
case
study
as
well
as
in
the
elite
context.
To
begin,
the
scholarship
regarding
the
Guatemalan
genocide
would
suggest
there
is
a
gap
in
literature
surrounding
the
application
of
a
threat
perception
model,
and
further
defining
state
behavior
as
terror
instead
of
repression.
Literature
Review
Symbolic
Politics
Stuart
Kaufman’s
Nationalist
Passions
and
Modern
Hatreds
provide
a
theoretical
basis
for
this
analysis
in
the
utility
of
threat
perception
models
for
studying
ethnic
conflict.34
Kaufman’s
work
argues
that
prejudice
is
a
long
term
product
of
stereotypes
and
attitudes
that
are
communicated
in
the
narratives
and
stories
told
defining
the
ethnic
group.5
Specifically
this
is
done
so
through
the
manipulation
of
symbolic
predispositions
(SYPs)
that
function
as
“durable
inclinations
people
have
to
feel
positively
or
negatively
about
an
object,
corresponding
to
an
emotion
and
can
be
specific
or
more
abstract”.6
Relevant
to
the
analysis
of
this
paper
however
Kaufman’s
work
argues
that
social
threat
to
a
majority
is
less
likely
to
encourage
violence
when
compared
to
a
physical
threat,
and
therefore
provides
the
basis
of

5. Gallant
5
distinction
for
the
Guatemalan
state
as
an
agent
of
terror
instead
of
repression
during
the
civil
war.
This
however
comes
in
contrast
to
scholarship
regarding
rational
choice
explanations
for
ethnic
conflict,
something
that
will
be
used
for
this
paper.
In
particular
Russell
Hardin’s
One
for
All:
The
Logic
of
Group
Conflict
provides
an
account
for
group
conflict
informed
by
rational
choice
approaches
that
is
relevant
to
this
analysis.7
This
work
argues
among
other
approaches
in
favour
of
a
‘hard-­‐rationalist’
approach
defining
ethnic
war
as
a
rational
pursuit
of
personal
security,
not
consistently
yielding
material
benefits.8
Based
on
majority
fears
of
loss
of
control
to
Mayan
minorities
in
Guatemala,
this
understanding
of
rational
choice
yields
explanatory
capacity
to
the
actions
of
state
elites
during
the
civil
war
and
subsequent
genocide.
History
of
the
Guatemalan
Civil
War/Genocide
Barbara
Levenson’s
Adios
Niño
provides
a
historical
account
of
Guatemala
with
relation
to
the
behaviour
of
the
state
in
it’s
role
as
the
primary
generator
of
social
inequality
into
the
country’s
contemporary
society.9
Levenson
argues
that
the
conditions
of
state
inequality
are
rooted
in
strict
adherence
to
Weberian
notions
of
state
function
and
as
a
result
gave
way
to
increased
criminal
activity
in
Guatemala,
a
direct
product
of
the
civil
war
and
genocide.10
Levenson’s
analysis
provides
a
valuable
historical
overview
for
this
paper
in
the
critical
historical
overview
of
Guatemala.
Specifically
Adios
Niño
provides
a
broader
context
for
the
creation
and
function
of
civilian
defense
units
(PACs)
in
the
country,
an
important
element
in
the
analysis
this
paper
will
execute.11
From
an
anthropological
standpoint
however
there
is
a
need
to
properly
contextualize
race
relations
in
Guatemala
between
the
Ladino
majority
and
Mayan
minority.
The
Evolution
of
Racism
in
Guatemala:
Hegemony,
Science,
and
Anti-­‐hegemony
by
Richard
N.
Adams
is
an
anthropological
study
that
provides
valuable
insight
into
racism
in

6. Gallant
6
Guatemala
and
it’s
historical
variations.12
Adams’
work
addresses
continuities
and
variations
in
the
use
of
‘race’
and
‘racism’,
recognizing
a
slow
evolution
to
challenge
the
hegemonic
ideas
of
racism
in
Guatemala
towards
Mayans.13
This
analysis
is
relevant
to
the
paper
as
it
provides
the
sociological
basis
for
a
model
of
threat
perception
for
the
Guatemalan
genocide.
Given
anthropological
accounts
of
minority-­‐majority
relations
in
Guatemala,
this
would
serve
to
explain
to
a
degree
the
behaviour
of
the
state
in
response.
Carlos
Figueroa-­‐Ibarra’s
Genocide
and
State
Terrorism
in
Guatemala,
1954-­‐1996:
An
Interpretation
provides
a
compelling
analysis
of
state
violence
in
the
country.
Figueroa-­‐Ibarra
contends
that
the
state
undermined
it’s
own
legality
in
the
enactment
of
genocide,
specifically
in
the
decision
to
move
from
clandestine
state
terror
to
open
violence.14
This
analysis
is
of
relevance
to
this
paper
in
that
it
provides
support
for
the
application
of
threat
perception
models
to
describe
the
civil
war.
Given
the
overview
there
is
a
gap
regarding
application
of
threat
perception
models
to
the
Guatemalan
genocide.
Explanatory
capacity
has
been
given
to
historical
legacies
and
the
behavior
of
the
state
and
in
turn
accounts
have
been
broad
in
their
overview
and
explanation.
This
paper
will
attempt
to
bridge
the
theoretical
and
practical
gap
by
applying
a
model
of
threat
perception
to
the
case
of
Guatemala.
Analysis
Majority-­‐Minority
Relations
in
Guatemala
Regarding
the
composition
of
Guatemalan
society,
it
is
divided
principally
between
the
Ladino
majority
and
the
Mayan
minority.
Comprising
59.4%
of
Guatemalan
demographics,
Ladino
is
the
name
given
to
the
majority
population
characterized
by
Mestizo-­‐Amerindian
heritage.15
This
Mestizo
majority
is
of
mixed
birth
and
is
a
product
of
Spain’s
colonial
legacy
in

7. Gallant
7
Latin
America,
therefore
explaining
their
presence
as
the
dominant
ethnic
group.
In
contrast,
the
Mayan
community
of
Guatemala
is
composed
of
several
indigenous
groups:
K’iche
9.1%
of
the
population,
8.4%
is
Kaqchikel,
7.9%
Mam,
6.3%
Q’eqcji,
and
lastly
8.6%
being
other
Mayan
categories.16
To
begin
to
explain
the
reason
for
the
extremity
of
violence
enacted
towards
the
Mayan
population
of
Guatemala
in
the
1980s
there
is
a
need
to
understand
the
racial
hierarchies
in
place
that
were
manipulated
in
the
Guatemalan
civil
war.
Specifically,
racism
in
Guatemala
towards
the
indigenous
population
was
informed
by
a
biological
context,
that
is
to
say
it
was
backed
by
a
created
scientific
discourse.
Borrowing
from
Euro-­‐American
colonial
understandings
of
race,
the
Maya
were
understood
to
be
unquestionably
depraved,
requiring
of
forced
labor
and
guidance
from
the
principally
white/Mestizo
Ladino
population.17
Anthropological
work
has
indicated
that
in
the
1960s
leading
up
to
the
civil
war
that
these
racist
structures
have
moved
into
a
more
non-­‐hegemonic
significance,
meaning
racist
modes
of
relation
have
moved
further
into
cultural
spheres
and
are
horizontally
disseminated
instead
of
solely
vertical.18
However,
in
doing
so
these
attitudes
have
given
way
to
fears
that
Mayan
accommodation
poses
a
threat
to
established
Ladino
power
and
thus
a
negotiation
is
required
to
maintain
a
democratic
model
where
the
Ladino
majority
remains
at
an
advantage.19
In
response
to
poor
representation
within
the
Guatemalan
state,
Mayan
social
movements
demanding
land
and
wage
reform
formed
in
the
1960s
while
facing
repression.20
This
repression
culminated
in
the
burning
down
of
the
Spanish
Embassy
on
January
1st
1980,
when
a
group
of
Mayan
civil
rights
leaders
were
trapped
inside,
laying
groundwork
for
the
URNG
to
mobilize
in
the
Mayan
countryside
leading
into
the
Guatemalan
civil
war.21
The
historical
trend

8. Gallant
8
in
the
relationship
between
Guatemala’s
Ladino
majority
and
Mayan
minority
indicates
an
established
basis
of
tension,
that
if
manipulated
can
evolve
into
a
perception
of
threat.
Symbolic
Politics
and
Threat
Perception
Threat
perception
here
is
best
indicated
by
counterinsurgency
campaign
initiated
by
General
Lucas
Garcia
and
later
Rios
Montt
against
perceived
communist
subversives
in
Guatemalan
countryside.
Referred
to
as
Operacion
Limpieza
(Cleanup)
–an
offshoot
of
the
broader
Operation
Sofia
counterinsurgency
campaign,
the
military’s
development
and
deployment
of
civil
defense
patrols
(PACs)
in
the
1980s
to
confront
guerilla
presence
of
the
Guatemalan
National
Revolutionary
Unit
(URNG)
in
the
countryside
is
influenced
by
a
rational
calculus
on
the
part
of
the
Guatemalan
military
and
state
through
manipulation
of
symbolic
politics.22
Comprised
of
civilians
armed
with
rifles
and
machetes,
these
troops
were
mobilized
to
support
already
established
public
presence
of
the
military
in
Guatemala
while
being
conscripted
into
the
atrocities
that
later
became
known
as
the
Mayan
genocide.
These
patrols
were
comprised
mainly
of
Ladino
men
in
addition
to
captured
Mayans
in
order
to
destabilize
guerilla
opposition
and
consolidate
military
power
in
the
Guatemalan
state.23
While
created
by
the
military
with
the
intention
of
protecting
the
rural
population
from
communist
guerillas,
these
patrols
became
the
main
actor
aside
from
the
military
in
over
200,000
deaths
with
83%
of
them
Mayan
and
17%
Ladino.24
Given
the
extreme
behavior
of
civil
defense
patrols
as
an
extension
of
the
Guatemalan
military
under
Lucas
Garcia
and
later
Rios
Montt,
some
analysis
can
be
offered
regarding
the
role
symbolic
politics
has
played.
In
particular,
the
pretext
of
suppressing
communist
guerillas
is

9. Gallant
9
an
insufficient
explanation
for
the
Mayan
death
toll
of
the
Guatemalan
Civil
War
and
genocide,
suggesting
that
there
is
something
distinctly
irrational
at
least
in
part
explaining
this
action.
This
irrationality
motivating
the
violence
is
a
product
of
historical
grievances
fusing
with
perception
of
threat,
turning
the
perception
of
Mayans
in
the
country
into
a
symbolic
predisposition
(SYP).
A
pivotal
event
in
the
usage
of
symbolic
predispositions
(SYPs)
began
with
the
outset
of
the
Guatemalan
civil
war
with
American
funding
of
counterinsurgency
efforts
against
the
communist
insurgency
MR-­‐13
(Movimiento
Revolucionario
13
Noviembre)
that
had
previously
staged
failed
coups
against
the
Guatemalan
state
in
1960.
In
particular,
this
American
funding
and
sharing
of
troops
came
in
response
to
MR-­‐13
forging
relationships
with
pro-­‐Soviet
Partido
Guatemalteco
del
Trabajo
(PGT).25
While
these
revolutionary
movements
were
unsuccessful,
they
were
indicative
of
an
authoritarian
pattern
that
when
combined
with
pre-­‐existing
racisms
in
Guatemala
erupted
into
the
subsequent
Mayan
genocide.
In
simpler
terms,
the
fear
of
communism
became
conflated
with
the
fear
of
Maya
which
provided
a
strong
impetus
for
mobilization
of
the
Ladino
majority.
It
is
here
that
a
model
of
threat
perception
possesses
utility
for
the
Guatemalan
case,
specifically
the
role
SYPs
play.
Specifically,
the
pre-­‐existing
image
of
Mayans
in
Guatemala
as
inferior
to
Ladinos
functions
as
a
symbol
to
which
certain
emotions
are
associated.
In
this
case
these
emotions
associated
with
Mayans
well
into
the
1990s
were
ones
of
fear,
and
the
perception
that
accommodation
would
mean
unfathomable
concessions
on
the
part
of
Ladinos.
However,
in
order
for
SYPs
to
be
manipulated,
a
process
of
framing
of
the
Mayan
threat
was
also
necessary
by
the
Guatemalan
elite.
Framing
of
Mayans
by
the
Guatemalan
state
was
one
that
occurred
via
the
exploitation
of
pre-­‐existing
animosities
coupled
with
authoritarian

10. Gallant
10
traditions.
This
move
to
authoritarianism
has
been
through
the
introduction
of
increasingly
capitalist
economics
in
Guatemala,
resulting
largely
uneven
development.26
What
ensued
was
a
crystallization
of
class
divisions
across
the
country,
increasing
the
likelihood
of
political
violence
as
a
result.
Introduction
of
right-­‐wing
authoritarianism
in
Guatemala
took
pre-­‐existing
Mayan/Ladino
divisions
and
magnified
them
through
the
lens
of
capitalist
development.27
Indications
of
this
shift
towards
increased
capitalism
can
be
found
in
the
international
response
to
state
terror
in
Guatemala,
including
US
funding
for
the
national
intelligence
apparatus.28
Further
evidence
of
this
is
indicated
by
Israel’s
support
for
the
Guatemalan
state
beginning
in
1971
through
the
support
of
counter-­‐insurgency
advice,
as
well
as
the
supplying
of
arms
to
the
Guatemalan
military.29
Framing
of
the
relationship
between
Mayans
and
Ladinos
then
occurred
first
through
the
magnification
of
class
divisions
between
the
two,
and
then
through
international
support
for
this
established
frame.
The
historical
context
would
then
suggest
that
Maya
were
perceived
to
pose
a
social
threat
in
addition
to
an
economic
one,
given
the
civil
war
and
genocide
was
enacted
under
the
pretext
of
suppressing
communist
subversives.
This
SYP
combined
with
civilian
defense
patrols,
best
illustrates
the
perception
of
the
Mayan
threat
through
the
example
of
their
deployment
in
Southern
Quiché
by
the
Rios
Montt
presidency,
specifically
the
town
of
Joyabaj.30
This
town
was
subject
to
violence
from
the
Guerilla
Army
of
the
Poor
in
1981,
who
kidnapped
a
Ladino
mayor
and
killed
his
son
in
the
process.31
This
provoked
outrage
from
the
town’s
Ladino
population
and
provided
the
necessary
impetus
for
the
military
and
PACs
to
intervene.32
The
military
set
up
bases
in
Joyabaj
and
shortly
after
coordinated
the
use
of
civil
defense
patrols
to
conduct
massacres
in
the
countryside
surrounding
the
town,
targeting
indigenous
Mayan
communities.33
These
civil

11. Gallant
11
patrols
were
often
made
up
of
local
Ladino
members
who
had
close
family
and
military
ties
that
existed
long
before
the
civil
war.34
The
mode
of
violence
enacted
upon
rural
communities
like
Joyabaj
has
been
described
as
a
form
of
‘collective
torture’
in
that
it
is
dictated
by
a
policy
of
‘scorched
earth’
in
which
the
PACs
and
military
actively
seek
to
eliminate
methods
of
reproducing
and
maintaining
life
through
their
massacres.35
However,
after
the
initial
massacres
in
the
early
1980s
the
violence
in
Joyabaj
and
the
surrounding
hamlets
became
less
discriminatory,
with
massacres
of
both
Ladino
and
Mayan
communities
at
the
hands
of
the
military
and
PACs.36
This
would
indicate
that
the
pretext
of
exterminating
communist
subversives
in
Southern
Quiché
for
the
military
waned
in
favor
of
more
ad
hoc
interests
of
the
commanders
therein;
often
issues
with
family
ties
and
rivalries.37
Towards
the
end
of
the
Guatemalan
civil
war
in
1986
these
groups
became
less
centralized
and
more
regional
in
violence,
with
selective
killings
against
local
challenges
to
PACs.38
The
events
in
Joyabaj
and
the
surrounding
area
provide
a
strong
case
for
the
role
of
symbolic
predispositions
(SYPs)
in
the
Guatemalan
genocide,
with
relation
to
how
Maya
are
perceived
as
a
threat
by
Ladinos.
The
presence
of
an
immediate
physical
threat
in
Joyabaj
inferred
by
the
murder
of
a
Ladino
citizen
provided
sufficient
impetus
by
the
Ladino
population
of
the
town
to
support
the
military/PACs
and
encourage
their
involvement
through
subsequent
massacres.
This
can
be
compared
to
broader
instances
of
threat
perception
in
Guatemala
insofar
as
Mayans
became
conflated
with
communist
guerillas
over
the
course
of
the
civil
war
thus
American
imperialism
would
suggest
the
perceptions
of
Mayans
as
a
threat
would
be
more
of
an
economic
nature.

12. Gallant
12
However,
this
case
presents
a
conundrum
in
terms
of
explaining
how
SYPs
are
involved
in
the
eventual
breakdown
of
relations
for
the
PACs
and
the
Guatemalan
military
in
Southern
Quiché.
In
particular,
what
has
happened
to
symbolic
predispositions
relating
to
Mayans
in
Joyabaj
that
the
objective
of
racial
extermination
was
shed
in
favor
or
pursuing
more
personal
interests?
Using
a
threat
perception
model
with
this
case,
it
appears
that
the
sustainability
of
SYPs
can
be
called
into
question
when
the
ability
to
enforce
it
becomes
diminished.
It
appears
that
absence
of
consistent
and
regular
reinforcement
of
SYPs
for
the
civil
defense
patrols
and
Guatemalan
military
in
the
case
of
Joyabaj
resulted
in
the
gradual
shift
in
focus
away
from
racially-­‐motivated
violence
and
movement
towards
more
rational
interests.
This
is
to
say
that
the
more
splintered
this
aspect
of
the
genocide
became,
the
harder
is
was
to
maintain
the
initial
motivation.
Indeed,
this
continued
well
into
the
resolution
of
the
Guatemalan
civil
war
as
civil
defense
patrols
continued
to
enact
more
localized
forms
of
violence
that
served
community
interests
instead.39
To
wit,
it
seems
that
on
a
low
enough
level
symbolic
politics
has
a
tendency
to
give
way
to
more
a
more
rational
calculus
of
interests
as
the
sustainability
of
symbolic
predispositions
becomes
weaker.
While
the
antithesis
of
symbolic
politics,
theories
of
rationality
are
also
applicable
to
the
Guatemalan
genocide
insofar
as
the
actions
of
elites
are
concerned
in
the
initiation
of
these
atrocities.40
While
symbolic
politics
and
symbolic
predispositions
explain
the
actions
of
Guatemalans
during
the
genocide,
the
actions
of
the
elite
leading
up
to
and
during
the
genocide
suggest
more
of
a
calculation.
Specifically,
the
circumstances
surrounding
the
behavior
of
the
Guatemalan
state
and
later
Rios
Montt’s
GRF
indicate
a
more
deliberate
approach
to
perceiving
Mayans
as
a
threat
and
how
this
can
be
used
for
political
gain.
In
particular,
the
decision
to

13. Gallant
13
alternate
between
open
state
terror
and
clandestine
violence
illustrates
an
approach
by
the
Guatemalan
state
that
is
informed
by
maintaining
legitimacy.
Following
the
CIA-­‐backed
1954
coup
the
USA
praised
Guatemala
as
a
model
of
development,
funding
their
agricultural
and
manufacturing
sector
as
well
as
the
security
apparatus.41
This
government
under
Julio
Cesar
Mendez
Montenegro
became
characterized
by
a
more
clandestine
violence,
in
which
activists
and
civil
rights
leaders
were
murdered
or
imprisoned.42
Indeed,
this
behavior
often
involved
death
squads
and
violence
that
carried
more
of
a
psychological
significance
for
Guatemalans
than
a
tangible
physical
one.
For
the
Montenegro
presidency
then
violent
action
occurred
only
insofar
as
it
did
not
call
into
question
the
legitimacy
of
the
state
in
a
more
official
sense.43
However,
this
1954
coup
marked
a
change
into
a
more
authoritarian
cycle
of
leadership
in
which
the
Guatemalan
state
was
subject
to
several
coups,
eventually
installing
General
Efrain
Rios
Montt
and
the
GRF
in
the
1980s.
From
here
onward
into
the
Guatemalan
genocide,
state
violence
moved
from
clandestine
beginnings
into
overt
state
terror.
This
state
violence
was
comprised
of
Rios
Montt’s
counterinsurgency
campaign
Operation
Sofia
and
other
sub-­‐
operations
characterized
by
massacres
like
the
aforementioned
ones
in
rural
Quiché.44
The
shift
towards
state
terror
however
suggests
that
legitimacy
has
become
more
difficult
to
maintain
for
the
Guatemalan
state,
and
thus
different
measures
need
to
be
adapted.
In
terms
of
threat
perception
then
it
would
appear
that
Rios
Montt’s
presidency
has
taken
a
rational
choice
approach
to
maintaining
legitimacy
and
confronting
challenges
to
the
state.
On
the
surface
this
economic
rational
choice
approach
is
indicated
by
the
prioritization
of
eliminating
communist
subversives
in
Guatemala
in
that
they
pose
a
threat
to
the
national
economy
and
capitalist
ideals.
However,
this
would
indicate
another
aspect
to
the
rational
calculus
of
the

14. Gallant
14
Guatemalan
state
in
the
decision
to
‘play
ball’
with
American
interests
looking
to
preserve
a
Cold
War
foothold
against
communism.
On
the
level
of
political
parties
then
the
decision
to
move
towards
open
state
violence
by
the
GRF
was
one
underpinned
at
first
by
the
extermination
of
communist
subversives,
and
secondly
by
the
manipulation
of
pre-­‐existing
prejudices
against
the
Mayan
community.
Given
the
racial
dimension
to
the
counterinsurgency
operations,
the
GRF’s
decision
to
launch
Operation
Sofia
was
one
informed
by
maintaining
legitimacy
through
manipulation
of
ethnic
prejudices
in
Guatemala.
In
theoretical
terms,
the
Guatemalan
genocide
was
informed
by
a
strategic
deployment
of
SYPs
in
order
to
maintain
legitimacy
through
avoiding
falling
victim
to
the
authoritarian
pattern
of
coup
d’états
that
defined
politics
until
then.
Given
the
analysis,
the
symbolic
predispositions
present
up
into
the
Guatemalan
civil
war
and
genocide
were
ones
informed
by
attempts
by
the
state
to
maintain
legitimacy.
However,
it
would
be
dismissive
to
not
acknowledge
possible
modifications
or
objections
to
the
argument
this
paper
has
presented.
To
elaborate,
an
analysis
of
manipulating
ethnic
hatreds
runs
the
risk
of
being
informed
by
oversimplification
of
actors
and
elements
involved.
Some
argue
that
the
Guatemalan
genocide
was
not
in
fact
a
genocide
but
rather
a
politicide.45
This
is
because
there
was
a
period
during
the
Guatemalan
civil
war
in
which
Mayans
ceased
to
be
the
single
target
of
state
terror,
and
Ladinos
were
incorporated
into
the
program
of
violence.
A
similar
criticism
can
be
levelled
at
the
fact
that
PACs
both
in
Southern
Quiché
and
beyond
were
comprised
of
groups
beyond
simply
Ladinos,
but
rather
Mayans
who
were
conscripted
to
participate
in
their
own
atrocities
as
well.46
In
response
then
we
can
return
to
the
utility
of
the
threat
perception
model
and
how
SYPs
are
concerned.
This
fact
that
the

15. Gallant
15
genocide
didn’t
function
with
a
consistently
targeted
minority
would
perhaps
mean
that
the
sustainability
of
SYPs
with
relation
to
the
majority
was
undermined.
The
crisis
of
sustaining
symbolic
predispositions
into
the
civil
war
then
can
be
attributed
to
the
leadership
in
question,
in
the
eventual
failure
to
continually
frame
SYPs
in
such
a
way
that
maintained
a
cohesion
of
effort
on
part
of
the
security
apparatus.47
What
ensued
was
a
breakdown
in
the
GRF
and
previous
leaderships’
framing
of
communist
subversives
eventually
as
Mayan
minorities;
replaced
with
more
regional
motivations
and
attempts
at
self-­‐preservation.
Being
aware
of
this
flaw
regarding
SYPs
in
explaining
the
Guatemalan
case,
other
theories
could
then
compensate
for
this
deficit
in
explanation
possibly.
Indeed,
different
aspects
of
Kaufman’s
theory
of
symbolic
politics
could
explain
the
deviation
from
consistent
targeting
of
Mayans
during
the
genocide
due
to
a
manipulation
of
the
myth-­‐symbol
complex.48
This
approach
could
explain
the
change
as
a
voluntary
abandonment
from
following
national
myths
regarding
Mayans
in
favor
of
more
rational
interests,
suggesting
that
the
dominant
narrative
used
by
leaders
in
Guatemala
possesses
some
inherent
weaknesses
in
its
enforcement.
Conclusion
This
paper
has
endeavored
to
strike
a
balance
in
the
relationship
between
two
opposing
theories
of
ethnic
conflict.
That
is
to
say
symbolic
politics
accounts
of
threat
perception
function
as
responses
to
rational
choice
approaches
in
that
they
explain
accounts
of
ethnic
violence
that
defy
rationality.
The
Guatemalan
civil
war
and
subsequent
genocide
present
an
example
of
a
complementary
relationship
between
the
two,
and
the
nuances
therein.
Guatemala
illustrates
how
the
manipulation
of
symbolic
predispositions
can
function
for
political
gain,
albeit
in
the
short
term.
Specifically,
the
use
of
SYPs
served
as
a
bulwark
against

16. Gallant
16
challenges
to
the
legitimacy
of
the
Guatemalan
state
and
the
Ladino
majority,
although
these
degraded
as
the
civil
war
continued
and
ultimately
devolved
into
more
regional
concerns.
Further
aspects
of
research
could
be
directed
to
this
change
and
how
it
relates
to
overall
quality
of
the
Guatemalan
state
in
turn.
Indeed,
how
this
primacy
of
localized
interests
relates
to
contemporary
notions
of
stability
in
Guatemalan
politics
and
how
this
could
shape
the
quality
of
democracy
for
Guatemalans
in
the
future.

17. Gallant
17
Index
Guatemalan
Republican
Front
GRF
Symbolic
Predispositions
SYPs
Civilian
Defense
Patrols
(Spanish
translation)
PACs
Guatemalan
Revolutionary
Unit
URNG
Movimiento
Revolucionario
13
Noviembre
MR-­‐13
Partido
Guatemalteco
del
Trabajo
PGT

18. Gallant
18
Notes
1
“MAR
Data
|
Assessment
for
Indigenous
Peoples
in
Guatemala."
The
Minorities
at
Risk
Project.
December
31,
2006.
Accessed
November
6,
2016.
http://www.mar.umd.edu/assessment.asp?groupId=9002.
2
Deborah,
Levenson-­‐Estrada.
Adiós
Niño:
The
Gangs
of
Guatemala
City
and
the
Politics
of
Death.
Durham:
Duke
University
Press,
2013.
3
Stuart
J.
Kaufman
Nationalist
Passions.
Ithaca:
Cornell
University
Press,
2015.
4
Stuart
J.
Kaufman
Modern
Hatreds:
The
Symbolic
Politics
of
Ethnic
War.
New
York:
Cornell
University
Press,
2001.
5
Ibid.
6
Stuart
J.
Kaufman
Nationalist
Passions.
Ithaca:
Cornell
University
Press,
2015.
7
Hardin,
Russell.
One
for
All:
The
Logic
of
Group
Conflict.
Princeton,
NJ:
Princeton
University
Press,
1995.
8
Ibid.
9
Deborah
Levenson-­‐Estrada.
Adiós
Niño:
The
Gangs
of
Guatemala
City
and
the
Politics
of
Death.
Durham:
Duke
University
Press,
2013.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Richard
N.
Adams.
"6.
The
Evolution
of
Racism
in
Guatemala:
Hegemony,
Science,
and
Antihegemony."
Histories
of
Anthropology
Annual
1,
no.
1
(2005):
132-­‐180.
Https://muse.jhu.edu/
(accessed
November
6,
2016).
13
Ibid.
14
Carlos
Figueroa
Ibarra.
"Genocide
and
State
Terrorism
in
Guatemala,
1954-­‐1996:
An
Interpretation."
Bulletin
of
Latin
American
Research
32,
no.
S1
(2013):
151-­‐73.
Accessed
November
06,
2016.
doi:10.1111/blar.12111.
15
Central
Intelligence
Agency.
"The
World
Factbook-­‐
Central
America
And
Caribbean:
Guatemala."
Central
Intelligence
Agency.
November
10,
2016.
Accessed
November
21,
2016.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-­‐world-­‐factbook/geos/gt.html.
16
Ibid.
17
Richard
N.
Adams.
"6.
The
Evolution
of
Racism
in
Guatemala:
Hegemony,
Science,
and
Antihegemony."
Histories
of
Anthropology
Annual
1,
no.
1
(2005):
132-­‐180.
Https://muse.jhu.edu/
(accessed
November
6,
2016).
18
Ibid.
19
Mario
Roberto,
Morales.
"Ladino
Es
El
Que
No
Quiere
Ser
Indio,
Y
Punto."
Siglo
Veintiuno,
no.
15
(June
23,
1997).
20
Richard
N.
Adams.
"6.
The
Evolution
of
Racism
in
Guatemala:
Hegemony,
Science,
and
Antihegemony."
Histories
of
Anthropology
Annual
1,
no.
1
(2005):
132-­‐180.
Https://muse.jhu.edu/
(accessed
November
6,
2016).
21
"Maya
-­‐
Minority
Rights
Group."
Minority
Rights
Group.
July
2008.
Accessed
November
06,
2016.
http://minorityrights.org/minorities/maya-­‐2/.

19. Gallant
19
22
Simone
Remijnse.
"Remembering
Civil
Patrols
in
Joyabaj,
Guatemala."
Bull
Latin
American
Research
Bulletin
of
Latin
American
Research
20,
no.
4
(2001):
454-­‐69.
Accessed
November
06,
2016.
doi:10.1111/1470-­‐9856.00025.
23
Jeremy
Ross,
and
Betsy
Konefal.
"Civil
Patrols,
Race,
and
Repression
in
Guatemala,
1982-­‐
1996."
Undergraduate
thesis,
College
of
William
and
Mary,
2016.
24
"Truth
Commission:
Guatemala."
United
States
Institute
of
Peace.
Accessed
November
06,
2016.
http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-­‐commission-­‐guatemala.
25
,
G.
De
la
Peña
"Rural
Mobilizations
in
Latin
America
since
C.
1920’."
In
The
Cambridge
History
of
Latin
America,
379-­‐482.
Cambridge
University
Press,
1995.
26
Carlos
Figueroa
Ibarra
“Genocide
and
State
Terorrism
in
Guatemala”
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Cheryl,
Rubenberg.
"Israel
and
Guatemala
|
Middle
East
Research
and
Information
Project."
Middle
East
Research
and
Information
Project.
Accessed
November
27,
2016.
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer140/israel-­‐guatemala.
30
Simone
Remijnse.
"Remembering
Civil
Patrols
in
Joyabaj,
Guatemala."
Bull
Latin
American
Research
Bulletin
of
Latin
American
Research
20,
no.
4
(2001):
454-­‐69.
Accessed
November
06,
2016.
doi:10.1111/1470-­‐9856.00025
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
35
Deborah
Levenson-­‐Estrada.
Adiós
Niño:
The
Gangs
of
Guatemala
City
and
the
Politics
of
Death.
Durham:
Duke
University
Press,
2013.
36
Simone
Remijnse.
"Remembering
Civil
Patrols
in
Joyabaj,
Guatemala."
Bull
Latin
American
Research
Bulletin
of
Latin
American
Research
20,
no.
4
(2001):
454-­‐69.
Accessed
November
06,
2016.
doi:10.1111/1470-­‐9856.00025
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
Stuart
J.
Kaufman
Modern
Hatreds:
The
Symbolic
Politics
of
Ethnic
War.
New
York:
Cornell
University
Press,
2001.
41
Deborah
Levenson-­‐Estrada.
Adiós
Niño:
The
Gangs
of
Guatemala
City
and
the
Politics
of
Death.
Durham:
Duke
University
Press,
2013.
42
Ibid.
43
Carlos
Figueroa
Ibarra.
"Genocide
and
State
Terrorism
in
Guatemala,
1954-­‐1996:
An
Interpretation."
Bulletin
of
Latin
American
Research
32,
no.
S1
(2013):
151-­‐73.
Accessed
November
06,
2016.
doi:10.1111/blar.12111.
44
Simone
Remijnse.
"Remembering
Civil
Patrols
in
Joyabaj,
Guatemala."
Bull
Latin
American
Research
Bulletin
of
Latin
American
Research
20,
no.
4
(2001):
454-­‐69.
Accessed
November
06,
2016.
doi:10.1111/1470-­‐9856.00025

20. Gallant
20
45
Carlos
Figueroa
Ibarra.
"Genocide
and
State
Terrorism
in
Guatemala,
1954-­‐1996:
An
Interpretation."
Bulletin
of
Latin
American
Research
32,
no.
S1
(2013):
151-­‐73.
Accessed
November
06,
2016.
doi:10.1111/blar.12111.
46
,
Deborah
Levenson-­‐Estrada.
Adiós
Niño:
The
Gangs
of
Guatemala
City
and
the
Politics
of
Death.
Durham:
Duke
University
Press,
2013.
47
Stuart
J.
Kaufman
Nationalist
Passions.
Ithaca:
Cornell
University
Press,
2015.
47
Stuart
J.
Kaufman,
Modern
Hatreds
2001

21. Gallant
21
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