1. The characteristics needed for the Japanese Diet to help curb corruption
John David Garrett
This paper has been written using the Japanese Diet as an example in trying to highlight
what characteristics of a developed democratic national assembly might be best cultivated in the
hopes of combating corruption. From the sources examined in this literature review of Japan's case,
the most important characteristics could be labeled as 'transparency, civic participation, dynamic
oversight, and enforcement/prosecution.' The four areas operate more or less in the order listed but
overlap or are interdependent upon one another as well. While Japan, an apparently developed
democracy, has scored relatively well on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index
over the last decade, its problems in these four areas have significantly lowered its potential score
and left it at a somewhat low rank in comparison to its contemporaries (Transparancy International,
2015).
Therefore, this paper will discuss the importance of the transparency, civic participation,
dynamic oversight, and enforcement/prosecution in turn, and suggest ways in which they may be
better assessed and improved upon within the Japanese context. The final assessment is that if these
issues can be adequately addressed, one institution – an anti-corruption commission – would be the
defining feature to unite and perpetuate the elimination of the widespread corruption that exists at
the highest levels of the Japanese political landscape.
Transparency
As the literature from the course on anticorruption explained, a lack of transparency prevents
one from being able to actually, literally, see corruption taking place. Indeed, one of the key
problems associated with controlling corruption is that fact that it is inherently secret. Therefore,
establishing a critical mass of independent counterbalances and checks on the government,
parliament, and entities such as corporations is needed in order to allow for an acceptable level of
transparency that will in turn deter government officials or those who are in a position to influence
government officials from engaging in corrupt acts. Transparency seems to be the first order of

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business in anti-corruption efforts and should be perpetuated by allowing for and then being
strengthened by civic participation and dynamic oversight.
With regards to Freedom of Information (FOI) laws, Japan has ridden the popular movement
to enact such legislation amongst the developed countries – at least as a diplomatic gesture to show
its legitimacy. In 2001 it enacted the Law Concerning Access to Information Held by
Administrative Organs, extended to public service corporations the same year, but has been
criticized as being circumvented in many cases by organizations being slow to respond to Freedom
of Information requests or simply missing the documents requested (Banisar, 2006).
To further confound the promise of FOI, it seems that there is actually little requirement for
parliamentary committees to produce an official report with regards to their findings (House of
Councillors, 2015; House of Representatives, 2015; Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2015a & 2015b).
Additionally, whatever documents are made and distributed amongst committee members, access to
this information seems to be restricted and beyond the reach of public transparency measures – even
in spite of the Freedom of Information legislation (Bazzell, 1998). Discussions with a professor of
Japanese constitutional law made apparent that despite such efforts as the 2001 legislation,
parliamentary committees are under no obligation to produce any documents regarding their
findings to the public (S. Yokodaido, personal communication, February 2, 2016).
Civic Participation
Over the past decade the number of popular referendums in Japan has significantly increased
(Numata, 2006). Though, the political establishment has not reacted in a manner that would give
referenda the political weight to hold those in power accountable. While civic response and
involvement does seem to be on the rise, it does not seem to be able to effectively take hold of
government by itself. It needs the support of those parliamentarians who are committed to
combating corruption. In 2001, Junichiro Koizumi rode of a wave of populism to political victory.
Whether or not Junichiro Koizumi's policies themselves were truly in the interest of the people

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seems besides the point when considering his populist call to arms was against clientelism the long-
ruling political party to which he belonged – the LDP. He was elected and has been considered one
of the most successful Japanese Prime Ministers in postwar history, if not the most successful, in
effectively carrying out his policies – all because he tapped into citizens' desires to make
government more accountable (Żakowski, 2013).
Koizumi created his opposition to the LDP from within the LDP itself, and so it seems that
parliamentarians will most likely need to do the same in creating effective schemes in either
motivating or assisting civic participation in effectively organizing to then further empower those
parliamentarians to help carry out the reforms needed in combating corruption. Per the literature of
the course, parliamentarians will need to do all that they can to make issues public – tapping into
their sources via the media. They'll also need to push for and do what they can to organize anti-
corruption education for the public at large. Though it seems an arduous task, it can be done as the
Koizumi example has shown.
Empowered citizens who have taken to create their own non-governmental organizations in
support of an initiative from parliamentarians to curb corruption can add much needed support in
lobbying/pressuring the government for further legislation that increases the effectiveness of
government oversight in combating corruption. It is that first step in putting existing Freedom of
Information norms that the government agreed to in name (for legitimacy) to the test, and moving to
force that government to actually live up to those norms.
Dynamic Oversight
A combined, significant effect of civic participation in the affairs of government,
parliamentary oversight committees, and pressure from international conventions, can foster a
critical mass of oversight that is dynamic enough to be hard for those intending to engage in
corruption to circumvent. While the basic legislative oversight mechanisms of parliamentary
committees seems to be the standard check of government corruption – whistleblowing, support of

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NGOs, and adherence to international anti-corruption regimes such as the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention seem to be additionally necessary in order for parliamentary committees to be subject to
oversight themselves (Duross, Hough, & Goda, 2014; Okano, 2014). Such pressure would, it
seems, make it difficult for parliamentarians to simply discount requests for information with
regards to their own oversight roles. Though, what Japan does not have, but would be effective in
ensuring the critical mass of oversight needed, would be an independent and well-funded anti-
corruption commission to listen to all the watchdogs of government and act as an authority that
could help enforce anti-corruption legislation and hep prosecute those who commit corruption.
As for the Japanese Diet, it is bicameral, divided into the House of Representatives and the
House of Councillors, both with standing committees related to ministries and special committees
related to extraordinary issues. The Emperor of Japan gives his approval to the legislation the Diet
creates, and the cabinet directs the acts of the Emperor and is responsible for those acts of
legislation. Executive power is made up of a cabinet of ministers chosen and headed by the Prime
Minister, and is the government that acts within a mandate granted by the Diet. In all cases, a
relevant parliamentary committee can call the government to account.
With regards to anti-corruption, both houses have committees that have the authority to
question the government and help initiate prosecution of those guilty of corruption. At present there
is the standing Committee on Discipline and the Deliberative Council on Political Ethics within the
House of Councillors, and the Committee on Discipline within the House of Representatives.
Though, again, there seems to be a situation in Japan in which the cabinet and ministries hold such
power that they are beyond the reach of these committees (Hein, 2010; Neary, 2004). This seems to
stem from party loyalty within Japanese domestic politics that prevent politicians from effectively
operating in a bipartisan manner within parliamentary committees so that they can align themselves
to tackle the issue at stake that those committees have been charged to handle (Cox, 2000;
Fujimura, 2012).

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While the Japanese political system has drifted from a one-party system (dominated by the
LDP) towards a two-party system (with the addition of the DPJ), there is now a higher number of
independent politicians within the Diet than has previously been the case (e.g., Neary, 2004; Owens,
2003; Żakowski, 2013). Therefore, per the party proportionality requirements of parliamentary
committees in the Diet, there is a greater likelihood for opposition parties to have voice and initiate
inquiries/investigations. This could lead to what Żakowski (2013) termed as a 'third pole' in the
political landscape. This third pole could, then, dislodge the status quo that might oppose an anti-
corruption commission and make such an agency a reality. Aided by a more empowered citizenry
and international obligations to adhere to anti-corruption norms, an independent anti-corruption
commission could be very strong authority for those fighting corruption to depend on.
Enforcement/Prosecution
Incentives towards political corruption are different with regards to who you are and what
you want. There is a difference between politicians who 'loot' and those who 'cheat' (Nyblade &
Reed, 2008). Looting is corruption as simple material gain – for example, a bribe taken by a
politician. Cheating, on the other hand, has to do with the politician possibly giving a bribe to win
an election. Additionally, in the case of cheating, it isn't the contest between parties that creates
cheating, but the contest between members of the same party – intraparty politics. Vote buying
happens in Japan when politicians are in a close race competing amongst those who are in the same
party competing for a spot more-or-less already allocated to the party. So, the idea that political
competition will curb corruption should be qualified.
As incentives to corrupt are qualified, so too are the powers to prosecute those who commit
corruption. Johnson (2000) wrote an article in reference to Japanese politicians entitled “Why the
Wicked Sleep.” It presented a fairly grim picture of corruption that existed from around 1954 until
1994 – many scandals, but few convictions. He surmised that this rested on a particular law that
was put into effect that year with regards to Japan's top prosecutor. The law, which permitted the

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Minister of Justice to control the Prosecutor General in an investigation, was enacted in 1947 but
only first used in 1954. It was a rubicon crossed – a benchmark for corrupt behavior for Japanese
politicians since. In effect, it allowed the cabinet to control who could be investigated.
Though, when it comes to petty corruption, prosecutors have seemingly endless powers at
their disposal. The pendulum seems to swing to different extremes in the case of law enforcement
and prosecution in Japan. Johnson (2000) noted how prosecutors seemingly didn't need to provide
much evidence of a lower level crime if they were intent on prosecution – as he put it, “a highly
enabling legal environment” with regards to crime-control interests (p. 65). Higher level political
corruption, on the other hand, requires almost insurmountable obstacles in bringing a conviction.
At this level, Johnson noted that bribery was the looting of choice. Looters, as Nyblade & Reed
(2008) made clear, are floating so far above the law that they engage in activities that might be too
risky for mere 'cheaters.'
A bureaucrat at the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry related to me that the ethic's
regimes and laws that she has to follow seem almost full-proof in preventing her from gaining any
advantage from her position as a public employee – as she fits snugly in the middle rung of the
government career track (M. Yamamoto, personal communication, February 14, 2016). The
literature supports this, as there seem to be numerous laws and codes providing for the basis of
disciplinary action, beginning with the first code of conduct implemented in 1887 (Akio, 2010).
At the lower level of corruption the authorities have the power of enforcement and
prosecution, but at the higher levels of the power structure a different reality exists. One practice is
a conflict of interest that seems to exist among many developed countries – politicians or high level
bureaucrats being given lucrative work in private firms that they previously had some sort of
regulatory authority over. In Japan, these people are known as 'Amakudari' – meaning those who
have 'descended from heaven.' Laws have been enacted that officially prevent this, but old habits
seem to die hard and the practice continues to this day (Rahman, 2008).

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Though, it might just be the black swan of the international community which can help
change this prosecution picture. Since becoming a signatory of the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, Japan has come under increasing pressure to adhere to its norms from other OECD
members – a loss of sovereign control of even the highest level government officials (Duross, et al,
2014).
Discussion
As the material from the course pointed out, the devil lies in the detail. Though Japan has
legislated Freedom of Information laws, the fact seems to be that government officials can simply
refuse to comply with the law by claiming ignorance to any documentation. While numerous codes
of conduct and regulations that dish out discipline exist for lower level bureaucrats, politicians and
higher level bureaucrats seem to operate with impunity as long as they tow the party or
organizational line.
What seems to be needed, therefore, is a strong 'outside force' that could give politicians
leadership incentives to follow the stated objectives of the parliamentary committees in providing
real oversight at the highest levels of government administration. The most likely candidate for a
third party authority would be an independent and well-funded anti-corruption commission. Such a
commission, though, would be up against the entrenched interests of existing party clientelism.
The most plausible strategy for those parliamentarians up to the task would be to work from
inside their parties and work carefully to build civic support and involvement based on the existing
laws which, at least in name, promote transparency – making these laws actually enforceable. Add
to this the weakening of the old 'one-party' system to a two and even three polar political landscape
– along with pressure from the international community – and the reality of a new anti-corruption
commission that can bring cohesion and a self-perpetuating positive feedback loop against
corruption at the highest levels of government could materialize.

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