SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 20
Download to read offline
Mobile Malware Heuristics: The
path from 'eh' to pretty good'.
Jimmy Shah, Mobile Malware Researcher, McAfee
Creditrs:
By Google (http://www.android.com/branding.html) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia
Commons
Photography by User: MrX [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons
By Mazenl77 (FindIcons) [CC-BY-3.0-2.5-2.0-1.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0-2.5-2.0-1.0)], via Wikimedia Commons
The Problem
● About a 1,000,000 apps
● Not all are good
○ How do you tell?
■ Manual Analysis
■ Automate it
The Problem, cont.
● How do you tell?
● Manual Analysis
○ Slow, doesn’t scale, ties up resources
● Automate it
○ use knowledge from researchers
○ scale up with more hw
○ catch the majority of copycats/script kiddies
Heuristics
What are Heuristics?
● heu·ris·tic [hyoo-ris-tik or, often, yoo-]
adjective
1. serving to indicate or point out; stimulating
interest as a means of furthering
investigation.
"heuristic." Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc. 5 Aug. 2013. <Dictionary.com http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/heuristic>.
What are Heuristics?
● Rules of thumb
○ It looks like a duck
○ It walks like a duck
■ It’s probably a duck
"heuristic." Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc. 5 Aug. 2013. <Dictionary.com http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/heuristic>.
What are Heuristics?
● Rules of thumb
○ It looks like a duck
■ it has a beak
○ It walks like a duck
■ It has webbed feet
By Pearson Scott Foresman [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb
28PSF%29.png/632px-Duck_1_%28PSF%29.png
Duck?
It’s a Duck!
What are Heuristics?
● Rules of thumb
○ It looks like a duck
■ it has a beak
○ It walks like a duck
■ It has webbed feet
By Pearson Scott Foresman [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/ca/Platypus_3_%28PSF%29.png/320px-Platypus_3_%28PSF%29.png
Duck?
Nope, it’s a
Platypus.
Heuristic scanner: DmpAxml.pl
git://git.assembla.com/dexdump.git
Heuristic scanner: DmpAxml.pl
~$ ./DmpAxml.pl
DmpAxml - AndroidManifest.xml File Dumper ver. 0.7
Copyright 2013 Jimmy Shah All rights reserved.
Usage: /home/js/dexdump/DmpAxml.pl [-adspih] filename
Options:
-a Dump all
-d Dump printable AndroidManifest.xml
-s Dump string table
-p Dump Permissions
-i Dump Intents
-r Dump Activities
-h Run heuristics
Ideas for Heuristics
Heuristic ideas: Permissions
● Bad apps ask for permissions they dont
need
○ True
○ They're more likely to request many permissions that
they do need/use
● Bad apps use a particular set of permissions
○ True
○ So do clean apps
● Insufficently unique.
○ Good chance to FP on clean apps
○ Too many FPs to use by itself
Heuristic ideas: Permissions, cont.
~$ ./DmpAxml.pl -h 517298409.apk
---------------------|
Suspcious Permissions|
---------------------|
android.permission.INTERNET
android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
android.permission.READ_CONTACTS
INTERNET Transmit and receive traffic via the Internet
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION GPS location vs. Wifi or cell tower
READ_CONTACTS Read Contact information
Android/PBL.A - A phone book leaking
malware
Heuristic ideas: Certificates
● Blacklisting malicious developers
○ Bad apks from the same malware author are signed
with the same certificate
■ True
■ Not all bad apks from the same author are signed
with the same certificate
■ Newer variants may use different certificates
○ Insufficiently unique.
■ Chance to FP
■ Higher chance for False Negative(missed
heuristic detection)
Heuristic ideas: Certificates, cont.
~$ ./DmpAxml.pl -h ./4D60F52138C44B903582C4EBB9661969.apk
----------------|
Possible Variant|
----------------|
Android/FakeInstaller Variant
Android/Fakeinstaller - A trojan that pretends to
be an installer for a legitimate app
Heuristic ideas: Activities
● Malware uses specific Activity names to
launch
○ legit apps with injected malicious code
○ trojans
○ spyware
● Not as useful for obfuscated apps
○ unidentifiable or changing activity names
● Complex malware can avoid notice by
injecting code into legitmate Activity
Heuristic ideas: Multiple Indicators
● Each Heuristic has its individual FP rate
○ Chances that actual malware is missed
○ Heuristic can not be too specific or it becomes a
unique signature for a particular malware
● Combining multiple indicators can reduce
this rate
○ Ex: Certificate blacklisting plus Permissions
○ Chance is low enough to indicate malware without
excluding too many variants
Heuristic ideas: Multiple Indic., cont.
~$ ./DmpAxml.pl -h ./d20cb0bb5d87bfc8394bda0d8964d663.apk
----------------|
Possible Variant|
----------------|
Android/FakeInstaller Variant
---------------------|
Suspcious Permissions|
---------------------|
android.permission.INTERNET
android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
android.permission.READ_CONTACTS
INTERNET Transmit and receive traffic via the Internet
SEND_SMS Send SMS messages
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Checks network connectivity
Android/Fakeinstaller - A trojan that
pretends to be an installer for a legitimate
app
Heuristic ideas: Multiple Indic., cont.
● 70 unknown samples
● Training set of about 200 known malware
● 10 samples, possible variants of known malware
○ Android/Fladstep
■ fake flash player
■ browser, loads malicious site
○ Android/VDLoader
■ backdoor trojan, steals user info
● 1 out of 7 detection rate(~14%)
○ 10 apps that warrant a closer look
Questions?

More Related Content

Similar to Mobile malware heuristics the path from 'eh' to pretty good'

PyCon AU 2012 - Debugging Live Python Web Applications
PyCon AU 2012 - Debugging Live Python Web ApplicationsPyCon AU 2012 - Debugging Live Python Web Applications
PyCon AU 2012 - Debugging Live Python Web ApplicationsGraham Dumpleton
 
Pwning mobile apps without root or jailbreak
Pwning mobile apps without root or jailbreakPwning mobile apps without root or jailbreak
Pwning mobile apps without root or jailbreakAbraham Aranguren
 
BugBounty Roadmap with Mohammed Adam
BugBounty Roadmap with Mohammed AdamBugBounty Roadmap with Mohammed Adam
BugBounty Roadmap with Mohammed AdamMohammed Adam
 
GDD Japan 2009 - Designing OpenSocial Apps For Speed and Scale
GDD Japan 2009 - Designing OpenSocial Apps For Speed and ScaleGDD Japan 2009 - Designing OpenSocial Apps For Speed and Scale
GDD Japan 2009 - Designing OpenSocial Apps For Speed and ScalePatrick Chanezon
 
Join the phishing dots to detect suspicious mobile apps
Join the phishing dots to detect suspicious mobile appsJoin the phishing dots to detect suspicious mobile apps
Join the phishing dots to detect suspicious mobile appsLeonardo Amor
 
Security panel-western-mass-drupal-camp
Security panel-western-mass-drupal-campSecurity panel-western-mass-drupal-camp
Security panel-western-mass-drupal-campcwworks
 
TheWriteId > components
TheWriteId > componentsTheWriteId > components
TheWriteId > componentsTim De Coninck
 
Building Web Mobile App that don’t suck - FITC Web Unleashed - 2014-09-18
Building Web Mobile App that don’t suck - FITC Web Unleashed - 2014-09-18Building Web Mobile App that don’t suck - FITC Web Unleashed - 2014-09-18
Building Web Mobile App that don’t suck - FITC Web Unleashed - 2014-09-18Frédéric Harper
 
Honeypots, Deception, and Frankenstein
Honeypots, Deception, and FrankensteinHoneypots, Deception, and Frankenstein
Honeypots, Deception, and FrankensteinPhillip Maddux
 
Honeypots, Deception, and Frankenstein
Honeypots, Deception, and FrankensteinHoneypots, Deception, and Frankenstein
Honeypots, Deception, and FrankensteinPhillip Maddux
 
29 Advanced Google Tag Manager Tips Every Marketer Should Know
29 Advanced Google Tag Manager Tips Every Marketer Should Know29 Advanced Google Tag Manager Tips Every Marketer Should Know
29 Advanced Google Tag Manager Tips Every Marketer Should KnowMike Arnesen
 
FRIDA 101 Android
FRIDA 101 AndroidFRIDA 101 Android
FRIDA 101 AndroidTony Thomas
 
Open Source in Higher Education 2007
Open Source in Higher Education 2007Open Source in Higher Education 2007
Open Source in Higher Education 2007ssorden
 
Return Of The Browser Wars Ajax World West2007
Return Of The Browser Wars Ajax World West2007Return Of The Browser Wars Ajax World West2007
Return Of The Browser Wars Ajax World West2007John Eckman
 
Open Design: Business + Money @ FabLab Cali
Open Design: Business + Money @ FabLab CaliOpen Design: Business + Money @ FabLab Cali
Open Design: Business + Money @ FabLab CaliMassimo Menichinelli
 
I can be apple and so can you
I can be apple and so can youI can be apple and so can you
I can be apple and so can youShakacon
 
Symantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
Symantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CKSymantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
Symantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CKSymantec
 
Server-side template injection- Slides
Server-side template injection- Slides Server-side template injection- Slides
Server-side template injection- Slides Amit Dubey
 
Frida Android run time hooking - Bhargav Gajera & Vitthal Shinde
Frida  Android run time hooking - Bhargav Gajera & Vitthal ShindeFrida  Android run time hooking - Bhargav Gajera & Vitthal Shinde
Frida Android run time hooking - Bhargav Gajera & Vitthal ShindeNSConclave
 

Similar to Mobile malware heuristics the path from 'eh' to pretty good' (20)

PyCon AU 2012 - Debugging Live Python Web Applications
PyCon AU 2012 - Debugging Live Python Web ApplicationsPyCon AU 2012 - Debugging Live Python Web Applications
PyCon AU 2012 - Debugging Live Python Web Applications
 
Malware Analysis
Malware AnalysisMalware Analysis
Malware Analysis
 
Pwning mobile apps without root or jailbreak
Pwning mobile apps without root or jailbreakPwning mobile apps without root or jailbreak
Pwning mobile apps without root or jailbreak
 
BugBounty Roadmap with Mohammed Adam
BugBounty Roadmap with Mohammed AdamBugBounty Roadmap with Mohammed Adam
BugBounty Roadmap with Mohammed Adam
 
GDD Japan 2009 - Designing OpenSocial Apps For Speed and Scale
GDD Japan 2009 - Designing OpenSocial Apps For Speed and ScaleGDD Japan 2009 - Designing OpenSocial Apps For Speed and Scale
GDD Japan 2009 - Designing OpenSocial Apps For Speed and Scale
 
Join the phishing dots to detect suspicious mobile apps
Join the phishing dots to detect suspicious mobile appsJoin the phishing dots to detect suspicious mobile apps
Join the phishing dots to detect suspicious mobile apps
 
Security panel-western-mass-drupal-camp
Security panel-western-mass-drupal-campSecurity panel-western-mass-drupal-camp
Security panel-western-mass-drupal-camp
 
TheWriteId > components
TheWriteId > componentsTheWriteId > components
TheWriteId > components
 
Building Web Mobile App that don’t suck - FITC Web Unleashed - 2014-09-18
Building Web Mobile App that don’t suck - FITC Web Unleashed - 2014-09-18Building Web Mobile App that don’t suck - FITC Web Unleashed - 2014-09-18
Building Web Mobile App that don’t suck - FITC Web Unleashed - 2014-09-18
 
Honeypots, Deception, and Frankenstein
Honeypots, Deception, and FrankensteinHoneypots, Deception, and Frankenstein
Honeypots, Deception, and Frankenstein
 
Honeypots, Deception, and Frankenstein
Honeypots, Deception, and FrankensteinHoneypots, Deception, and Frankenstein
Honeypots, Deception, and Frankenstein
 
29 Advanced Google Tag Manager Tips Every Marketer Should Know
29 Advanced Google Tag Manager Tips Every Marketer Should Know29 Advanced Google Tag Manager Tips Every Marketer Should Know
29 Advanced Google Tag Manager Tips Every Marketer Should Know
 
FRIDA 101 Android
FRIDA 101 AndroidFRIDA 101 Android
FRIDA 101 Android
 
Open Source in Higher Education 2007
Open Source in Higher Education 2007Open Source in Higher Education 2007
Open Source in Higher Education 2007
 
Return Of The Browser Wars Ajax World West2007
Return Of The Browser Wars Ajax World West2007Return Of The Browser Wars Ajax World West2007
Return Of The Browser Wars Ajax World West2007
 
Open Design: Business + Money @ FabLab Cali
Open Design: Business + Money @ FabLab CaliOpen Design: Business + Money @ FabLab Cali
Open Design: Business + Money @ FabLab Cali
 
I can be apple and so can you
I can be apple and so can youI can be apple and so can you
I can be apple and so can you
 
Symantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
Symantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CKSymantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
Symantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
 
Server-side template injection- Slides
Server-side template injection- Slides Server-side template injection- Slides
Server-side template injection- Slides
 
Frida Android run time hooking - Bhargav Gajera & Vitthal Shinde
Frida  Android run time hooking - Bhargav Gajera & Vitthal ShindeFrida  Android run time hooking - Bhargav Gajera & Vitthal Shinde
Frida Android run time hooking - Bhargav Gajera & Vitthal Shinde
 

More from Jimmy Shah

Brick all the internet of things!(with notes)
Brick all the internet of things!(with notes)Brick all the internet of things!(with notes)
Brick all the internet of things!(with notes)Jimmy Shah
 
There's no S(ecurity) in IoT: This is why we can't sleep
There's no S(ecurity) in IoT: This is why we can't sleepThere's no S(ecurity) in IoT: This is why we can't sleep
There's no S(ecurity) in IoT: This is why we can't sleepJimmy Shah
 
BYOD is now BYOT (Bring Your Own Threat) – Current Trends in Mobile APT
BYOD is now BYOT (Bring Your Own Threat) – Current Trends in Mobile APTBYOD is now BYOT (Bring Your Own Threat) – Current Trends in Mobile APT
BYOD is now BYOT (Bring Your Own Threat) – Current Trends in Mobile APTJimmy Shah
 
Solar Powered Parking Meters - An IoT thought experiment
Solar Powered Parking Meters - An IoT thought experimentSolar Powered Parking Meters - An IoT thought experiment
Solar Powered Parking Meters - An IoT thought experimentJimmy Shah
 
Mobile malware analysis with the a.r.e. vm
Mobile malware analysis with the a.r.e. vmMobile malware analysis with the a.r.e. vm
Mobile malware analysis with the a.r.e. vmJimmy Shah
 
Viruses on mobile platforms why we don't/don't we have viruses on android_
Viruses on mobile platforms  why we don't/don't we have viruses on android_Viruses on mobile platforms  why we don't/don't we have viruses on android_
Viruses on mobile platforms why we don't/don't we have viruses on android_Jimmy Shah
 
Isn't it all just SMS-sending trojans?: Real Advances in Android Malware
Isn't it all just SMS-sending trojans?: Real Advances in Android MalwareIsn't it all just SMS-sending trojans?: Real Advances in Android Malware
Isn't it all just SMS-sending trojans?: Real Advances in Android MalwareJimmy Shah
 
Smartphone Ownage: The state of mobile botnets and rootkits
Smartphone Ownage: The state of mobile botnets and rootkitsSmartphone Ownage: The state of mobile botnets and rootkits
Smartphone Ownage: The state of mobile botnets and rootkitsJimmy Shah
 

More from Jimmy Shah (8)

Brick all the internet of things!(with notes)
Brick all the internet of things!(with notes)Brick all the internet of things!(with notes)
Brick all the internet of things!(with notes)
 
There's no S(ecurity) in IoT: This is why we can't sleep
There's no S(ecurity) in IoT: This is why we can't sleepThere's no S(ecurity) in IoT: This is why we can't sleep
There's no S(ecurity) in IoT: This is why we can't sleep
 
BYOD is now BYOT (Bring Your Own Threat) – Current Trends in Mobile APT
BYOD is now BYOT (Bring Your Own Threat) – Current Trends in Mobile APTBYOD is now BYOT (Bring Your Own Threat) – Current Trends in Mobile APT
BYOD is now BYOT (Bring Your Own Threat) – Current Trends in Mobile APT
 
Solar Powered Parking Meters - An IoT thought experiment
Solar Powered Parking Meters - An IoT thought experimentSolar Powered Parking Meters - An IoT thought experiment
Solar Powered Parking Meters - An IoT thought experiment
 
Mobile malware analysis with the a.r.e. vm
Mobile malware analysis with the a.r.e. vmMobile malware analysis with the a.r.e. vm
Mobile malware analysis with the a.r.e. vm
 
Viruses on mobile platforms why we don't/don't we have viruses on android_
Viruses on mobile platforms  why we don't/don't we have viruses on android_Viruses on mobile platforms  why we don't/don't we have viruses on android_
Viruses on mobile platforms why we don't/don't we have viruses on android_
 
Isn't it all just SMS-sending trojans?: Real Advances in Android Malware
Isn't it all just SMS-sending trojans?: Real Advances in Android MalwareIsn't it all just SMS-sending trojans?: Real Advances in Android Malware
Isn't it all just SMS-sending trojans?: Real Advances in Android Malware
 
Smartphone Ownage: The state of mobile botnets and rootkits
Smartphone Ownage: The state of mobile botnets and rootkitsSmartphone Ownage: The state of mobile botnets and rootkits
Smartphone Ownage: The state of mobile botnets and rootkits
 

Recently uploaded

Leading Mobile App Development Companies in India (2).pdf
Leading Mobile App Development Companies in India (2).pdfLeading Mobile App Development Companies in India (2).pdf
Leading Mobile App Development Companies in India (2).pdfCWS Technology
 
Powerful Love Spells in Arkansas, AR (310) 882-6330 Bring Back Lost Lover
Powerful Love Spells in Arkansas, AR (310) 882-6330 Bring Back Lost LoverPowerful Love Spells in Arkansas, AR (310) 882-6330 Bring Back Lost Lover
Powerful Love Spells in Arkansas, AR (310) 882-6330 Bring Back Lost LoverPsychicRuben LoveSpells
 
BDSM⚡Call Girls in Sector 71 Noida Escorts >༒8448380779 Escort Service
BDSM⚡Call Girls in Sector 71 Noida Escorts >༒8448380779 Escort ServiceBDSM⚡Call Girls in Sector 71 Noida Escorts >༒8448380779 Escort Service
BDSM⚡Call Girls in Sector 71 Noida Escorts >༒8448380779 Escort ServiceDelhi Call girls
 
9999266834 Call Girls In Noida Sector 52 (Delhi) Call Girl Service
9999266834 Call Girls In Noida Sector 52 (Delhi) Call Girl Service9999266834 Call Girls In Noida Sector 52 (Delhi) Call Girl Service
9999266834 Call Girls In Noida Sector 52 (Delhi) Call Girl Servicenishacall1
 
FULL ENJOY - 9999218229 Call Girls in {Mahipalpur}| Delhi NCR
FULL ENJOY - 9999218229 Call Girls in {Mahipalpur}| Delhi NCRFULL ENJOY - 9999218229 Call Girls in {Mahipalpur}| Delhi NCR
FULL ENJOY - 9999218229 Call Girls in {Mahipalpur}| Delhi NCRnishacall1
 

Recently uploaded (6)

Obat Penggugur Kandungan Di Apotik Kimia Farma (087776558899)
Obat Penggugur Kandungan Di Apotik Kimia Farma (087776558899)Obat Penggugur Kandungan Di Apotik Kimia Farma (087776558899)
Obat Penggugur Kandungan Di Apotik Kimia Farma (087776558899)
 
Leading Mobile App Development Companies in India (2).pdf
Leading Mobile App Development Companies in India (2).pdfLeading Mobile App Development Companies in India (2).pdf
Leading Mobile App Development Companies in India (2).pdf
 
Powerful Love Spells in Arkansas, AR (310) 882-6330 Bring Back Lost Lover
Powerful Love Spells in Arkansas, AR (310) 882-6330 Bring Back Lost LoverPowerful Love Spells in Arkansas, AR (310) 882-6330 Bring Back Lost Lover
Powerful Love Spells in Arkansas, AR (310) 882-6330 Bring Back Lost Lover
 
BDSM⚡Call Girls in Sector 71 Noida Escorts >༒8448380779 Escort Service
BDSM⚡Call Girls in Sector 71 Noida Escorts >༒8448380779 Escort ServiceBDSM⚡Call Girls in Sector 71 Noida Escorts >༒8448380779 Escort Service
BDSM⚡Call Girls in Sector 71 Noida Escorts >༒8448380779 Escort Service
 
9999266834 Call Girls In Noida Sector 52 (Delhi) Call Girl Service
9999266834 Call Girls In Noida Sector 52 (Delhi) Call Girl Service9999266834 Call Girls In Noida Sector 52 (Delhi) Call Girl Service
9999266834 Call Girls In Noida Sector 52 (Delhi) Call Girl Service
 
FULL ENJOY - 9999218229 Call Girls in {Mahipalpur}| Delhi NCR
FULL ENJOY - 9999218229 Call Girls in {Mahipalpur}| Delhi NCRFULL ENJOY - 9999218229 Call Girls in {Mahipalpur}| Delhi NCR
FULL ENJOY - 9999218229 Call Girls in {Mahipalpur}| Delhi NCR
 

Mobile malware heuristics the path from 'eh' to pretty good'

  • 1. Mobile Malware Heuristics: The path from 'eh' to pretty good'. Jimmy Shah, Mobile Malware Researcher, McAfee Creditrs: By Google (http://www.android.com/branding.html) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons Photography by User: MrX [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons By Mazenl77 (FindIcons) [CC-BY-3.0-2.5-2.0-1.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0-2.5-2.0-1.0)], via Wikimedia Commons
  • 2. The Problem ● About a 1,000,000 apps ● Not all are good ○ How do you tell? ■ Manual Analysis ■ Automate it
  • 3. The Problem, cont. ● How do you tell? ● Manual Analysis ○ Slow, doesn’t scale, ties up resources ● Automate it ○ use knowledge from researchers ○ scale up with more hw ○ catch the majority of copycats/script kiddies
  • 5. What are Heuristics? ● heu·ris·tic [hyoo-ris-tik or, often, yoo-] adjective 1. serving to indicate or point out; stimulating interest as a means of furthering investigation. "heuristic." Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc. 5 Aug. 2013. <Dictionary.com http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/heuristic>.
  • 6. What are Heuristics? ● Rules of thumb ○ It looks like a duck ○ It walks like a duck ■ It’s probably a duck "heuristic." Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc. 5 Aug. 2013. <Dictionary.com http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/heuristic>.
  • 7. What are Heuristics? ● Rules of thumb ○ It looks like a duck ■ it has a beak ○ It walks like a duck ■ It has webbed feet By Pearson Scott Foresman [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb 28PSF%29.png/632px-Duck_1_%28PSF%29.png Duck? It’s a Duck!
  • 8. What are Heuristics? ● Rules of thumb ○ It looks like a duck ■ it has a beak ○ It walks like a duck ■ It has webbed feet By Pearson Scott Foresman [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/ca/Platypus_3_%28PSF%29.png/320px-Platypus_3_%28PSF%29.png Duck? Nope, it’s a Platypus.
  • 10. Heuristic scanner: DmpAxml.pl ~$ ./DmpAxml.pl DmpAxml - AndroidManifest.xml File Dumper ver. 0.7 Copyright 2013 Jimmy Shah All rights reserved. Usage: /home/js/dexdump/DmpAxml.pl [-adspih] filename Options: -a Dump all -d Dump printable AndroidManifest.xml -s Dump string table -p Dump Permissions -i Dump Intents -r Dump Activities -h Run heuristics
  • 12. Heuristic ideas: Permissions ● Bad apps ask for permissions they dont need ○ True ○ They're more likely to request many permissions that they do need/use ● Bad apps use a particular set of permissions ○ True ○ So do clean apps ● Insufficently unique. ○ Good chance to FP on clean apps ○ Too many FPs to use by itself
  • 13. Heuristic ideas: Permissions, cont. ~$ ./DmpAxml.pl -h 517298409.apk ---------------------| Suspcious Permissions| ---------------------| android.permission.INTERNET android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION android.permission.READ_CONTACTS INTERNET Transmit and receive traffic via the Internet ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION GPS location vs. Wifi or cell tower READ_CONTACTS Read Contact information Android/PBL.A - A phone book leaking malware
  • 14. Heuristic ideas: Certificates ● Blacklisting malicious developers ○ Bad apks from the same malware author are signed with the same certificate ■ True ■ Not all bad apks from the same author are signed with the same certificate ■ Newer variants may use different certificates ○ Insufficiently unique. ■ Chance to FP ■ Higher chance for False Negative(missed heuristic detection)
  • 15. Heuristic ideas: Certificates, cont. ~$ ./DmpAxml.pl -h ./4D60F52138C44B903582C4EBB9661969.apk ----------------| Possible Variant| ----------------| Android/FakeInstaller Variant Android/Fakeinstaller - A trojan that pretends to be an installer for a legitimate app
  • 16. Heuristic ideas: Activities ● Malware uses specific Activity names to launch ○ legit apps with injected malicious code ○ trojans ○ spyware ● Not as useful for obfuscated apps ○ unidentifiable or changing activity names ● Complex malware can avoid notice by injecting code into legitmate Activity
  • 17. Heuristic ideas: Multiple Indicators ● Each Heuristic has its individual FP rate ○ Chances that actual malware is missed ○ Heuristic can not be too specific or it becomes a unique signature for a particular malware ● Combining multiple indicators can reduce this rate ○ Ex: Certificate blacklisting plus Permissions ○ Chance is low enough to indicate malware without excluding too many variants
  • 18. Heuristic ideas: Multiple Indic., cont. ~$ ./DmpAxml.pl -h ./d20cb0bb5d87bfc8394bda0d8964d663.apk ----------------| Possible Variant| ----------------| Android/FakeInstaller Variant ---------------------| Suspcious Permissions| ---------------------| android.permission.INTERNET android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION android.permission.READ_CONTACTS INTERNET Transmit and receive traffic via the Internet SEND_SMS Send SMS messages ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Checks network connectivity Android/Fakeinstaller - A trojan that pretends to be an installer for a legitimate app
  • 19. Heuristic ideas: Multiple Indic., cont. ● 70 unknown samples ● Training set of about 200 known malware ● 10 samples, possible variants of known malware ○ Android/Fladstep ■ fake flash player ■ browser, loads malicious site ○ Android/VDLoader ■ backdoor trojan, steals user info ● 1 out of 7 detection rate(~14%) ○ 10 apps that warrant a closer look