COT-RPMS Additional Indicators.pptx

7. Planned, managed, implemented
developmentally sequenced teaching
and learning processes to meet
curriculum requirements and varied
teaching context.

Identifying concepts in planning and
managing developmentally-sequenced
teaching and learning processes.
Following curriculum requirements and
anchoring these processes on various
teaching contexts.

Also, includes discussions on how to
specifically plan for a lesson – from the Daily
Lesson Log (DLL) template to knowing
appropriate management and implementation
procedures to effectively execute instructional
plans.
Careful planning and management preserves
quality teaching and learning processes in our
respective classrooms.

The Planning process is a framework for
designing lessons.
The planning begins with a focus on the
learning outcomes (competencies to be
mastered) and leads to a deep
understanding of the context.

CURRICULUM AREAS
•These are different learning/subject areas taught
and learned in the basic education curriculum.
DEVELOPMENTALLY SEQUENCED TEACHING
AND LEARNING PROCESSES.
•These refer to the order of activities that keeps
learners engaged in the content and purposely
scaffolds learners towards achieving the lesson’s
objectives by maximizing allotted class time.

INSTRUCTIONAL PLANNING
 This refers to the process of systematically
preparing, developing, evaluating and managing the
instructional process by using principles of teaching
and learning.
TEACHING/LEARNING CONTEXTS
These refer to teaching/learning situations and all
the circumstances in which learners learn from
instruction.

Teachers planning a sequence of lessons
starting with learning outcomes before
determining the curriculum, activities and
materials.
A sequence of lessons can refer to a
curriculum unit or a sequence of learning
experiences aimed at producing a
particular learning objective, goal, or
intentions.

STAGE #1:
Identify the desired results
What should students come away
understanding, knowing and being able
to do?

STAGE #2:
Determine acceptable evidence
What will be the evidence of the desired
results?

STAGE #3:
Plan learning experiences and
instructions
What learning activities will promote
students’ understanding, knowledge,
skills and interest?

FEATURES OF PRACTICE
5
1.The teacher connects outcomes from previous and
future learning, and transitions between activities are
smooth.
2.The teacher’s sequence of learning activities generally
keeps learners engaged and moving from one portion to
the next in a reasonable manner. Learners understand
the purpose of the lesson and what they are to do to
accomplish the purpose.

6
1.The teacher’s sequence of activities purposefully
scaffolds learners toward achieving the lesson’s
objectives.
2.The teacher’s sequence of learning activities keeps
learners engaged in the content and has a clear sense
of purpose throughout the class period but lacks in-
depth processing of the activities.

7
1. The teacher’s progression from the warmup to the
main activity is thoughtfully planned.
2. The review of basic concepts and the activities that
follow are effective in taking the application of this
knowledge to the next level of exploration.

INDICATOR NO. 8
Selected, developed, organized and
used appropriate teaching and
learning resources including ICT to
achieve learning goals.

The proper selection, development, organization
and utilization of teaching and learning resources,
including ICT, is necessary
It helps enhance and maximize learners’
participation
Providing them with teaching and learning
resources that can be seen or heard
 Provide concrete experiences about the
lessons..

Indicator #8:
The Teaching Learning Resources (TLRs)
should not only give vibrancy to the
classroom setting by adding color and
appeal to the learners but also help the
teachers address the learning goals.

LEARNING GOALS
These are broad statements of learning outcomes
which include Content and Performance Standards
TEACHING AND LEARNING RESOURCES
These refer to resources used in the teaching and
learning process such as teaching resources (e.g.,
curriculum guides, teacher’s manuals); learning
resources (e.g., learner’s materials, worksheets).
.

INCLUSION OF INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (ICT)
This refers to the integration of ICT in the
teaching and learning process. This also
includes digital resources downloaded from
the Learning Resource Management and
Development System (LRMDS) Portal,
YouTube and the like.

5
1. The teacher utilizes a variety of
instructional materials and resources that
are aligned with the instructional
purposes which usually support the
learning goals.

6
1.
The teacher utilizes a variety of instructional
materials and resources that are aligned with
the instructional purposes which always
support the learning goals.

7
1. The teacher skillfully manages diverse
instructional materials that encompass
other disciplines which consistently
support the learning goals.

INDICATOR NO. 9
Designed, selected,
organized used
diagnostic, formative
and summative
assessment strategies
consistent with
curriculum
requirements.

As teachers, we must be able to grasp assessment
as an integral part of the teaching and learning
process that allows us to track and measure
learner’s progress and adjust instruction
accordingly.
We will act as support group and will offer authentic
and instructive illustrations of practice anchored on
the Philippine Professional Standards for Teachers
(PPST) to help enhance current practice.

ASSESSMENT STRATEGIES
These refer to approaches or tactical procedures used to reach
a goal.
Likewise, these are strategies the teacher employs to gauge
student learning.
These are assessments used to identify each learner’s
strengths, weaknesses, knowledge and skills prior to instruction
(diagnostic); used to identify the parts of the lesson where
learners need improvement (formative); and used to identify
learner achievement (summative).

ASSESSMENT STRATEGIES
A. Diagnostic Assessments
Used to identify each learner’s strengths, weaknesses,
knowledge and skills prior to instruction
B. Formative Assessments
Used to identify the parts of the lesson where learners need
improvement
C. Summative Assessments
Used to identify learner achievement (summative).

These are embedded as an integral part of the
lesson and are aligned with the intended
instructional goals consistent with the content
standards.

5
1. The teacher uses a repertoire of
assessment strategies which are aligned with
the intended learning goals.
2. The teacher uses assessment procedures
that draw out evidence of whether learners
have learned the intended learning outcomes.

6
1. The teacher predominantly uses assessment
strategies which are embedded as an integral
part of the lesson and are aligned with the
intended instructional or consistent with the
content standards.
2. The teacher encourages the learners to assess
and monitor the quality of their work againts the
assessment criteria and performance standards.

7
1.The teacher uses assessment strategies which
engage learners in assessment criteria to self-
monitor and reflect on their own progress.
2.The teacher prompts learners to frequently
assess their own work and the work of their peers
using assessment criteria embedded in teacher- or
learners-generated rubrics, peer reviews, and/or
reflection logs.

- Catherine Pulsifer
•“At the end of the day we
are accountable to
ourselves, Our Success is
a result of what we do”

Thank You and
God bless us all…

•Present:
• PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
• CARPIO,
• CORONA,
• LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
• BERSAMIN, JJ.

M+W ZANDER PHILIPPINES, INC. and ROLF
WILTSCHEK,
Petitioners,
- versus -
TRINIDAD M. ENRIQUEZ,
Respondent

• The facts:
On June 4, 2001, respondent Enriquez was hired on
probationary basis as the Administration Manager and Executive
Assistant to the General Manager of petitioner M+W Zander
Philippines, Inc. (M+W Zander), a multi-national corporation
engaged in construction and facilities management. She was
confirmed as a permanent employee on December 4, 2001.

• As Administration Manager, respondents responsibilities include
taking charge of the management of administrative personnel
assigned to the head office, as well as the security of the company
staff and premises and the implementation of company rules.
• As Executive Assistant to the General Manager, respondent was in
charge of scheduling, monitoring and tracking all the General
Managers appointments and personal finances and serving as the
liaison among the General Manager, the Division Heads, the
Administrative Staff and external contacts.

• In January 2002, M+W Zander relieved its General Manager, Mr. Eric
Van Stiegeren, and in his place appointed Mr. Rolf Wiltschek
(Wiltschek). The appointment of Wiltschek as the Acting General
Manager was announced in a meeting held on January 31, 2002. On
the same day, a Letter of Appeal was signed by 29 employees of
M+W Zander, opposing the appointment of Wiltschek.
• Petitioners allege that after the announcement of Wiltschek as the
new General Manager, respondent actively solicited signatures for a
letter opposing the appointment of Wiltschek (Letter of Appeal).

• The petitioners claim that Enriquez used her influence and moral
ascendancy to coerce several employees into signing the letter of
appeal.
• They referred to Affidavits of Mark Joseph M. Amador (Amador), Randy R. Tecson (Tecson) and
Patrocinio R. Simpliciano, M+W Zanders Accounting Assistant, Network Administrator and
Contract Administrator, respectively, which state that respondent sought their signature for the
Letter of Appeal. Amador stated in his affidavit that on February 1, 2002 one Abelardo Tayag
asked him not to go to work and Enriquez only called him to confirm that he did not report for
work. In Tecsons affidavit, it was stated that on February 1, 2002, he received a call from
Enriquez in his mobile phone telling him not to report to work since other employees will not
report to work and that he should just file for a sick leave since they were doing the same. Tecson
said he was already on his way to the office and refused to follow Enriquez.

• Upon discovering respondent Enriquezs participation in drafting and in
circulating the Letter of Appeal, as well as in the alleged work stoppage that
occurred a day after the release of the Letter, M+W Zander sent a Notice to
respondent Enriquez, requiring her to explain within 48 hours from receipt of
the notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against her for willful
breach of trust and using her authority and/or influence as Administration
Manager of M+W Zander over her subordinates to stage a no work day on
February 1, 2002. It was indicated that willful breach of trust has a
corresponding penalty of dismissal. Meanwhile, respondent Enriquez was
placed under preventive suspension for 15 working days.

• Respondent Enriquez signed a statement, dated February 5, 2002,
denying that she used her authority and/or influence as
Administration Manager and Executive Assistant to the General
Manager to compel her co-employees to stage the illegal work
stoppage.
• She also denied that she performed any act to disrupt the vital
operations of the company.

• She said that when she arrived at work on February 2, 2002,
she was given a notice of suspension for 15 days and was
instructed to leave the premises without being given an
explanation. Her personal belongings were inspected and she
was escorted out of the premises like a criminal. Respondent
stated in her affidavit that her colleagues were given an order
that if she is seen in the premises of the company, the
administration should be informed immediately and that in no
case should respondent be allowed to enter the premises

• On February 14, 2002, an administrative investigation and an
administrative hearing were conducted by the petitioner. During
the administrative hearing, the respondent submitted several
signed statements from her subordinates, such as Cecilia
Benito, the receptionist; Michelle De Mesa, the Engineering
Administrative Assistant; Joy Esguerra, an Administrative
Assistant, and Christine Roma San Agustin; all saying that they
were never advised or prevailed upon by the respondent not to
report to work.

• Out of the eight subordinates who gave their statements during the
administrative investigation, it was only Stanley Mosende
(Mosende) who stated that he was influenced by respondent
Enriquez not to report for work.
• It appears, however, that Mosende was not absent from work
based on the signed attendance sheet, which showed that he
reported to the office at 5:00 p.m. and signed out at 7:00 p.m.

• The accounts of Mosende are incongruous with the statement of
Tecson, the Network Administrator. Tecson submitted a written
statement declaring that around 8:00 a.m. of February 1, 2002, he
received a text message from Mosende and from Wally Borja
asking him not to go to the office. He did not mention the
respondent. Later on, he contradicted his earlier statement when
he submitted another affidavit that was attached to the Petition for
Review of petitioner M+W Zander, this time stating that it was
respondent Enriquez who called him up in his mobile phone to tell
him not to report to work.

• On March 1, 2002, a Notice of Termination was received by
respondent informing her that her services as Administration
Manager and Executive Assistant to the General Manager of M+W
Zander are terminated effective the same day. The respondent
was found liable for willful breach of trust and confidence in using
[her] authority and/or influence as Administrative Manager of M+W
Zander Philippines over [her] subordinate to stage a no work day
last February 1, 2002, which in turn disrupted vital operations in
the Company.

• The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and found
that respondent was not illegally dismissed because she
committed serious misconduct which destroyed the trust and
confidence of the management in her.
• The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the
NLRC and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter, declaring
that the dismissal
of respondent was illegal.

• The petitioners were ordered to reinstate respondent to her former
position without loss of seniority rights and privileges. The Court of
Appeals deleted the award of exemplary damages and reduced
the award of moral damages to P25,000.00. The award of
attorneys fees was also affirmed.

• The sole ground for respondents termination by petitioners is
willful breach of trust and confidence in using [her] authority
and/or influence as Administrative Manager of ZANDER over
[her] subordinate to stage a no work day last February 1, 2002.
• Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code allows an employer to terminate
the services of an employee for loss of trust and
confidence. Certain guidelines must be observed for the
employer to terminate an employee for loss of trust and
confidence. We held in General Bank and Trust Company v.
Court of Appeals,

• [L]oss of confidence should not be simulated. It should not be
used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or
unjustified. Loss of confidence may not be arbitrarily asserted in
the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It must be
genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in
bad faith.
• The first requisite for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence is that the employee concerned must be one holding a
position of trust and confidence.

• In the case at bar, respondent was employed as the Administration Manager and the Executive Assistant to the
General Manager. The responsibilities of the Administration Manager include:
• - To take charge of the management of Administrative personnel assigned to the head office in so far as
administrative functions are concerned (Administrative Assistants assigned to the Division heads and other
managerial positions except HRD);
• - To take charge of the over-all security for the company staff, premises, and sensitive areas; to guard
against unauthorized entry in sensitive areas (as determined by the management committee);
• - To take charge of the implementation of company rules on housekeeping, cleanliness and security for
all occupants of the Head Office in coordination with the company Division Heads and HRD;
• - To monitor attendance of all administrative personnel and enforce applicable company rules pertaining
thereto;
• - To take charge of the maintenance, upkeep and inventory of all company property within the head
office;
• - To take charge of the timely provision of supplies and equipment covered by the proper requisition documents
within the head office;
• - To take charge of traffic, tracking, and distribution of all incoming and outgoing correspondence, packages
and facsimile messages;
• - To take care of all official travel arrangements and documentation by company personnel;
• - To ensure the proper allocation of company cars assigned to the Head Office; and
• - To coordinate schedule and documentation of regular staff meetings and one-on-one meetings as required by
EVS and the Division Heads.[35] (Emphasis supplied.)

• he duties of the Executive Assistant to the General Manager are as follows:
• - To take care of the scheduling, monitoring, and tracking of all the GMs
appointments;
• - To serve as liaison between the GM, the Division Heads, the
Administrative Staff and external contacts;
• - To take care of immigration concerns and corresponding documents for
the GM and the company expatriates;
• - To effectively handle, monitor, and document calls for the GM;
• - To handle personal financials (Banking/Bills) for the GM and
• - To perform any other tasks relative to the above functions which may be
assigned from time to time by the GM.

• Though respondents position is designated as the Administration Manager of M+W Zander, it
does not automatically mean that she occupies a position of trust and confidence. It is not the
job title but the actual work that the employee performs that determines whether he or she
occupies a position of trust and confidence. Respondents duties as the Administration
Manager include management of the administrative assistants who are assigned to the
division heads, in so far as their administrative functions are concerned. She also takes
charge of the implementation of company rules on housekeeping and cleanliness, oversees
the security of the premises and the sensitive areas of the company, monitors the inventory of
company property, and ensures the timely provision of supplies and equipment. The position
of an Administration Manager may thus be properly considered as a managerial position,
being a head of administrative assistants of other divisions, and because of the performance
of work directly related to management policies and company rules.

• The second requisite of terminating an employee for loss of trust
and confidence is that there must be an act that would justify the
loss of trust and confidence.
• To be a valid cause for dismissal, the loss of confidence must be
based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly
established facts.
• We find that it was not established that respondent used her
authority to influence her subordinates to stage a no work day;
and assuming that she performed this act as alleged by
petitioners, it does not satisfy the jurisprudential requirements for
valid termination due to loss of trust and confidence.

• Loss of trust and confidence stems from a breach of trust founded on a
dishonest, deceitful or fraudulent act. In the case at bar, respondent did not
commit any act which was dishonest or deceitful. She did not use her
authority as the Administration Manager to misappropriate company
property nor did she abuse the trust reposed in her by petitioners with
respect to her responsibility to implement company rules. The most that
can be attributed to respondent is that she influenced a single subordinate,
without exerting any force or making any threats, not to report to work. This
does not constitute dishonest or deceitful conduct which would justify the
conclusion of loss of trust and confidence.

• We are convinced that respondent's dismissal cannot justifiably be
sustained since the findings in this case and whatever
investigations may have been made by petitioners miserably fail to
establish culpability on respondents part. While dishonesty or
disloyalty of an employee is not to be condoned, neither should a
condemnation on that ground be tolerated on the basis of
suspicions spawned by speculative inferences.

• Petitioners anchored the termination of respondent on the
statement made by a single subordinate, Mosende, which was
made during the administrative investigation conducted by
petitioners. Mosende stated that respondent, as his superior, told
him not to report to work on February 1, 2002. It was only
Mosende who said that respondent forced him not to report to
work on February 1, 2002. During the administrative
investigation, the rest of respondents subordinates did not identify
respondent as the one who influenced them not to go to work on
February 1, 2002.

• We note that while 29 other employees signed the Letter of Appeal, and
several employees joined the alleged work stoppage, it was only
respondent who was singled out and dismissed. These protest activities
bear out the general sentiment of discontent within the company and
petitioners cannot pin the blame on respondent alone. Petitioners may not
terminate respondents employment on mere speculation and base her
dismissal on unclear and nebulous reasons, especially where a less
punitive penalty would suffice. The penalty must be commensurate with the
act, conduct or omission imputed to the employee and must be imposed in
connection with the disciplinary authority of the employer.

• We thus find the dismissal to be illegal. Consequently,
respondent is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges, and to full back wages, inclusive of
allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent,
computed from the time of the withholding of the employee's
compensation up to the time of actual reinstatement. If
reinstatement is not possible due to the strained relations
between the employer and the employee, separation pay should
instead be paid the employee equivalent to one month salary for
every year of service, computed from the time of engagement up
to the finality of this decision.

• We find that based on the facts of the case, there is sufficient basis to award
moral damages and attorneys fees to respondent. We have consistently ruled
that in illegal dismissal cases, moral damages are recoverable only where the
dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an
act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. Such an award cannot be justified solely upon the
premise that the employer fired his employee without just cause or due
process. Additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of
moral damages under the Civil Code, i.e., that the act of dismissal was
attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was
done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; and, of
course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, and similar
injury resulted therefrom.

• Lastly, we come to the issue of whether Wiltschek, as the General
Manager, should be personally liable together with M+W
Zander. We agree with petitioners that he should not be made
personally liable. The general manager of a corporation should not
be made personally answerable for the payment of an illegally
dismissed employee's monetary claims arising from the
dismissal unless he had acted maliciously or in bad faith in
terminating the services of the employee. The employer
corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its officers
who merely act as its agents.

CATEGORIES:
1. PROBATIONARY
2. REGULAR OR PERMANENT
3. CONTRACTUAL
4. CASUAL

• 1. PROBATIONARY period refers to the length of time from he date
of actual hiring until the employee is given a regular appointment or
permanent status.
• Under the Labor Code , the probationary period is six – months,
which is the period needed to determine the employees fitness for
the job.
• It is not wise to extend the probationary employment if the
evaluation of the particular faculty is poor and he/she has not shown
any promise during the few months he/she is on the job.
• If the employment contract provides that the agreement is to take
effect for the period of one year from the date with the right to
renewal for another period of one year.

2. REGULAR OR PERMANENT STATUS
• Refers to one who has passed the stipulated period of probation
as a full – time member, has been recommended for permanency
board, and with whom the president of the university has signed a
permanent contract.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 850
• Considers the nature of job that determines regularity and not the
employment contract.
• It provides that if the job is usually necessary or desirable to the
main business of the employer, then the employee is regular.
• Employment for a definite period which exceeds one year shall be
considered regular for the duration of the definite period.

3. CONTRACTUAL EMPLOYMENT
*A contractual employee is one hired on an individual employment
contract basis to perform work on a specific project or projects.
*The duration of such employment is indicated in the employment
contract.
*The relations of the parties shall be regulated by the provisions of the
NEW Civil Code on Contract for a Piece of Work; the party who goes into
such a contract is normally considered as an independent contractor.
* Here, the contractor binds himself to execute a piece of work for the
employer, in consideration of a certain piece of work or compensation,
who may either employ only his labor or skills or also furnish the material.

• 3.The independent contractor is responsible only for the result of his
work and is not under the supervision of the employer.
• On the other hand, professors and or instructors are not
independent contractors, because the university controls the work of
the members of the faculty.
• A university prescribes the course or subjects that professors teach,
and when and where to teach them; the professors work is
characterized by regularity and continuity for a fixed duration; the
professors are compensated for their services by wages and
salaries, rather than by profits.

• They cannot substitutes to their work without the consent
of the university, and they can laid off their work is found
unsatisfactory.
• All these indicate that university has control over the
professors’ work.
• Professors, therefore in this case, are EMPLOYEES not
independent contractors.

4. CASUAL EMPLOYMENT
PRESEDENTIAL DECREE NO. 850 in defining the
concept of CASUAL EMPLOYMENT gives emphasis to the nature
of the job by stating that if the job is usually necessary or desirable
to the main business of the employer, then employment is
REGULAR; if not then the employment is CASUAL.
By another definition, a CASUAL worker is one hired only for
a few days months at a time to perform a unit work or to fill a gap in
the absence of another employee or a worker who is hired
occasionally or intermittently, especially during peak production
periods.

• CASUAL WORKERS may or may not possess special
trade skills or qualifications; they are not on the
permanent payrolls of the same employer.
• The jobs usually filled by casual workers are clerical,
janitorial, or manual.

YOLANDA M. MERCADO,
CHARITO S. DE LEON, DIANA R. LACHICA, MARGARITO M.
ALBA, JR., and FELIX A. TONOG,
Petitioners
- versus -
AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE-PARANAQUE CITY, INC. ,
Respondent.

AMACC is an educational institution engaged in computer-based
education in the country. One of AMACCs biggest schools in the country is its
branch at Paranaque City. The petitioners were faculty members who started
teaching at AMACC on May 25, 1998. The petitioner Mercado was engaged
as a Professor 3, while petitioner Tonog was engaged as an Assistant
Professor 2. On the other hand, petitioners De Leon, Lachica and Alba, Jr.,
were all engaged as Instructor 1.[5] The petitioners executed individual
Teachers Contracts for each of the trimesters that they were engaged to teach,
with the following common stipulation:[6]
1. POSITION. The TEACHER has agreed to accept a non-tenured
appointment to work in the College of xxx effective xxx to xxx or for
the duration of the last term that the TEACHER is given a teaching
load based on the assignment duly approved by the DEAN.

• For the school year 2000-2001, AMACC implemented new faculty
screening guidelines, set forth in its Guidelines on the Implementation of
AMACC Faculty Plantilla.[7] Under the new screening guidelines,
teachers were to be hired or maintained based on extensive teaching
experience, capability, potential, high academic qualifications and
research background. The performance standards under the new
screening guidelines were also used to determine the present faculty
members entitlement to salary increases. The petitioners failed to
obtain a passing rating based on the performance standards;
hence AMACC did not give them any salary increase.[8]
• Because of AMACCs action on the salary increases, the petitioners filed
a complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC on July 25, 2000, for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime and overload
compensation, 13th month pay, and for discriminatory practices.[9]

• On September 7, 2000, the petitioners individually received a
memorandum from AMACC, through Human Resources
Supervisor Mary Grace Beronia, informing them that with the
expiration of their contract to teach, their contract would no longer
be renewed.[10] The memorandum[11] entitled Notice of Non-
Renewal of Contract
• The petitioners amended their labor arbitration complaint to include
the charge of illegal dismissal against AMACC. In their Position
Paper, the petitioners claimed that their dismissal was illegal
because it was made in retaliation for their complaint for monetary
benefits and discriminatory practices against AMACC. The
petitioners also contended that AMACC failed to give them
adequate notice; hence, their dismissal was ineffectual.[12]

• AMACC contended in response that the petitioners worked under a
contracted term under a non-tenured appointment and were still
within the three-year probationary period for teachers. Their
contracts were not renewed for the following term because they
failed to pass the Performance Appraisal System for Teachers
(PAST) while others failed to comply with the other requirements
for regularization, promotion, or increase in salary. This move,
according to AMACC, was justified since the school has to
maintain its high academic standards.

THE LABOR ARBITER RULING
• On March 15, 2002, Labor Arbiter (LA) Florentino R. Darlucio declared in his
decision[14] that the petitioners had been illegally dismissed, and ordered AMACC to
reinstate them to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and to pay them
full backwages, attorneys fees and 13th month pay. The LA ruled that Article 281 of
the Labor Code on probationary employment applied to the case; that AMACC
allowed the petitioners to teach for the first semester of school year 2000-200; that
AMACC did not specify who among the petitioners failed to pass the PAST and who
among them did not comply with the other requirements of regularization, promotions
or increase in salary; and that the petitioners dismissal could not be sustained on the
basis of AMACCs vague and general allegations without substantial factual basis.[15]
• Significantly, the LA found no discrimination in the adjustments for the salary rate of
the faculty members based on the performance and other qualification which is an
exercise of management prerogative.[16] On this basis, the LA paid no heed to the
claims for salary increases.

The NLRC Ruling
• On appeal, the NLRC in a Resolution dated July 18, 2005[17] denied AMACCs appeal for lack of
merit and affirmed in toto the LAs ruling. The NLRC, however, observed that the applicable law is
Section 92 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (which mandates a probationary
period of nine consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for academic personnel in the tertiary
level where collegiate courses are offered on a trimester basis), not Article 281 of the Labor Code
(which prescribes a probationary period of six months) as the LA ruled. Despite this observation,
the NLRC affirmed the LAs finding of illegal dismissal since the petitioners were terminated on the
basis of standards that were only introduced near the end of their probationary period.
• The NLRC ruled that the new screening guidelines for the school year 2000-20001 cannot be
imposed on the petitioners and their employment contracts since the new guidelines were not
imposed when the petitioners were first employed in 1998. According to the NLRC, the imposition
of the new guidelines violates Section 6(d) of Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the
Labor Code, which provides that in all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall
make known to the employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at
the time of his engagement. Citing our ruling in Orient Express Placement Philippines v.
NLRC,[18] the NLRC stressed that the rudiments of due process demand that employees should
be informed beforehand of the conditions of their employment as well as the basis for their
advancement.

The CA Ruling
• In a decision issued on November 29, 2007,[19] the CA granted AMACCs petition
for certiorari and dismissed the petitioners complaint for illegal dismissal.
• The CA ruled that under the Manual for Regulations for Private Schools, a teaching personnel in
a private educational institution (1) must be a full time teacher; (2) must have rendered three
consecutive years of service; and (3) such service must be satisfactory before he or she can
acquire permanent status.
• The CA noted that the petitioners had not completed three (3) consecutive years of service
(i.e. six regular semesters or nine consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service) and were still
within their probationary period; their teaching stints only covered a period of two (2) years and
three (3) months when AMACC decided not to renew their contracts on September 7, 2000.
• The CA effectively found reasonable basis for AMACC not to renew the petitioners contracts. To
the CA, the petitioners were not actually dismissed; their respective contracts merely expired and
were no longer renewed by AMACC because they failed to satisfy the schools standards for the
school year 2000-2001 that measured their fitness and aptitude to teach as regular faculty
members. The CA emphasized that in the absence of any evidence of bad faith on AMACCs part,
the court would not disturb or nullify its discretion to set standards and to select for regularization
only the teachers who qualify, based on reasonable and non-discriminatory guidelines.

• The CA disagreed with the NLRCs ruling that the new guidelines for the school
year 2000-20001 could not be imposed on the petitioners and their
employment contracts. The appellate court opined that AMACC has the
inherent right to upgrade the quality of computer education it offers to the
public; part of this pursuit is the implementation of continuing evaluation and
screening of its faculty members for academic excellence. The CA noted that
the nature of education AMACC offers demands that the school constantly
adopt progressive performance standards for its faculty to ensure that they
keep pace with the rapid developments in the field of information technology.
• Finally, the CA found that the petitioners were hired on a non-tenured basis
and for a fixed and predetermined term based on the Teaching Contract
exemplified by the contract between the petitioner Lachica and AMACC. The
CA ruled that the non-renewal of the petitioners teaching contracts is
sanctioned by the doctrine laid down in Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora[20] where
the Court recognized the validity of contracts providing for fixed-period
employment.

• The petitioners submit that the CA should not have disturbed the findings of the LA and
the NLRC that they were illegally dismissed; instead, the CA should have accorded
great respect, if not finality, to the findings of these specialized bodies as these findings
were supported by evidence on record. Citing our ruling in Soriano v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[22] the petitioners contend that in certiorari proceedings under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the CA does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of
evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusions. They
submit that the CA erred when it substituted its judgment for that of the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC who were the triers of facts who had the opportunity to review the
evidence extensively.
• On the merits, the petitioners argue that the applicable law on probationary
employment, as explained by the LA, is Article 281 of the Labor Code which mandates
a period of six (6) months as the maximum duration of the probationary period unless
there is a stipulation to the contrary; that the CA should not have disturbed the LAs
conclusion that the AMACC failed to support its allegation that they did not qualify
under the new guidelines adopted for the school year 2000-2001; and that they were
illegally dismissed; their employment was terminated based on standards that were not
made known to them at the time of their engagement. On the whole, the petitioners
argue that the LA and the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion that the CA
can validly cite.

THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT
• In their Comment,[23] AMACC notes that the petitioners raised no substantial
argument in support of their petition and that the CA correctly found that the
petitioners were hired on a non-tenured basis and for a fixed or predetermined
term. AMACC stresses that the CA was correct in concluding that no actual
dismissal transpired; it simply did not renew the petitioners respective
employment contracts because of their poor performance and failure to satisfy
the schools standards.
• AMACC also asserts that the petitioners knew very well that the applicable
standards would be revised and updated from time to time given the nature of
the teaching profession. The petitioners also knew at the time of their
engagement that they must comply with the schools regularization policies as
stated in the Faculty Manual. Specifically, they must obtain a passing rating
on the Performance Appraisal for Teachers (PAST) the primary instrument
to measure the performance of faculty members.
• Since the petitioners were not actually dismissed, AMACC submits that the CA
correctly ruled that they are not entitled to reinstatement, full back wages and
attorneys fees.

• The CAs Review of Factual Findings under Rule 65
• We agree with the petitioners that, as a rule in certiorari proceedings under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the CA does not assess and weigh each piece of
evidence introduced in the case. The CA only examines the factual findings of
the NLRC to determine whether or not the conclusions are supported by
substantial evidence whose absence points to grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• Based on the review of the records and of the CA decision shows that the CA
erred in recognizing that grave abuse of discretion attended the NLRCs
conclusion that the petitioners were illegally dismissed. Consistent with this
conclusion, the evidence on record show that AMACC failed to discharge its
burden of proving by substantial evidence the just cause for the non-renewal of
the petitioners contracts.

Following this approach, our task is to determine whether the CA correctly found that
the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the petitioners were
illegally dismissed.
Legal Environment in the Employment of Teachers
a. Rule on Employment on Probationary Status
• A reality we have to face in the consideration of employment on probationary status of
teaching personnel is that they are not governed purely by the Labor Code. The Labor Code
is supplemented with respect to the period of probation by special rules found in the Manual
of Regulations for Private Schools.[27] On the matter of probationary period, Section 92 of
these regulations provides:
• Section 92. Probationary Period. Subject in all instances to compliance with the
Department and school requirements, the probationary period for academic personnel
shall not be more than three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory service for those in the
elementary and secondary levels, six (6) consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory
service for those in the tertiary level, and nine (9) consecutive trimesters of satisfactory
service for those in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered on a
trimester basis.

• The CA pointed this out in its decision (as the NLRC also did), and we confirm
the correctness of this conclusion. Other than on the period, the following
quoted portion of Article 281 of the Labor Code still fully applies:
• x x x The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary
basis may be terminated for a just cause when he fails to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the
employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who
is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular
employee. [Emphasis supplied]

b. FIXED-PERIOD EMPLOYMENT
• The use of employment for fixed periods during the teachers probationary period is likewise an
accepted practice in the teaching profession. We mentioned this in passing in Magis Young
Achievers Learning Center v. Adelaida P. Manalo,[28] albeit a case that involved elementary, not
tertiary, education, and hence spoke of a school year rather than a semester or a trimester. We
noted in this case:
• The common practice is for the employer and the teacher to enter into a contract,
effective for one school year. At the end of the school year, the employer has the option not to
renew the contract, particularly considering the teachers performance. If the contract is not
renewed, the employment relationship terminates. If the contract is renewed, usually for another
school year, the probationary employment continues. Again, at the end of that period, the parties
may opt to renew or not to renew the contract. If renewed, this second renewal of the contract for
another school year would then be the last year since it would be the third school year of
probationary employment. At the end of this third year, the employer may now decide
whether to extend a permanent appointment to the employee, primarily on the basis of
the employee having met the reasonable standards of competence and efficiency set by
the employer. For the entire duration of this three-year period, the teacher remains under
probation. Upon the expiration of his contract of employment, being simply on probation,
he cannot automatically claim security of tenure and compel the employer to renew his
employment contract. It is when the yearly contract is renewed for the third time that Section
93 of the Manual becomes operative, and the teacher then is entitled to regular or permanent
employment status.

• It is important that the contract of probationary employment specify
the period or term of its effectivity. The failure to stipulate its precise
duration could lead to the inference that the contract is binding for
the full three-year probationary period.
• We have long settled the validity of a fixed-term contract in the
case Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora[29] that AMACC
cited.Significantly, Brent happened in a school setting. Care should
be taken, however, in reading Brent in the context of this case
as Brentdid not involve any probationary employment issue; it dealt
purely and simply with the validity of a fixed-term employment under
the terms of the Labor Code, then newly issued and which does not
expressly contain a provision on fixed-term employment.

ACADEMIC AND MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE
• Last but not the least factor in the academic world, is that a school enjoys academic freedom a
guarantee that enjoys protection from the Constitution no less. Section 5(2) Article XIV of the
Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom.[30]
• The institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide and
adopt its aims and objectives, and to determine how these objections can best be attained, free
from outside coercion or interference, save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for
some restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed in the term academic freedom encompass
the freedom of the school or college to determine for itself: (1) who may teach; (2) who may be
taught; (3) how lessons shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study.[31]
• AMACCs right to academic freedom is particularly important in the present case, because of the
new screening guidelines for AMACC faculty put in place for the school year 2000-2001. We
agree with the CA that AMACC has the inherent right to establish high standards of competency
and efficiency for its faculty members in order to achieve and maintain academic
excellence. The schools prerogative to provide standards for its teachers and to determine
whether or not these standards have been met is in accordance with academic freedom that
gives the educational institution the right to choose who should teach.[32] In Pea v. National
Labor Relations Commission,

• The same academic freedom grants the school the autonomy to decide
for itself the terms and conditions for hiring its teacher, subject of course
to the overarching limitations under the Labor Code. Academic freedom,
too, is not the only legal basis for AMACCs issuance of screening
guidelines. The authority to hire is likewise covered and protected by its
management prerogative the right of an employer to regulate all aspects
of employment, such as hiring, the freedom to prescribe work
assignments, working methods, process to be followed, regulation
regarding transfer of employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and
discipline, and dismissal and recall of workers.[34]
• Thus, AMACC has every right to determine for itself that it shall use fixed-
term employment contracts as its medium for hiring its teachers. It also
acted within the terms of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
when it recognized the petitioners to be merely on probationary status up
to a maximum of nine trimesters.

The Conflict: Probationary Status
and Fixed-term Employment
• The existence of the term-to-term contracts covering the petitioners employment
is not disputed, nor is it disputed that they were on probationary status not
permanent or regular status from the time they were employed on May 25, 1998
and until the expiration of their Teaching Contracts on September 7, 2000. As the
CA correctly found, their teaching stints only covered a period of at least seven (7)
consecutive trimesters or two (2) years and three (3) months of service. This
case, however, brings to the fore the essential question of which, between
the two factors affecting employment, should prevail given AMACCs
position that the teachers contracts expired and it had the right not to renew
them. In other words, should the teachers probationary status be disregarded
simply because the contracts were fixed-term?
• The provision on employment on probationary status under the Labor Code[35] is a
primary example of the fine balancing of interests between labor and
management that the Code has institutionalized pursuant to the underlying intent
of the Constitution.[36]

• On the one hand, employment on probationary status affords management the chance to
fully scrutinize the true worth of hired personnel before the full force of the security of
tenure guarantee of the Constitution comes into play.[37] Based on the standards set at
the start of the probationary period, management is given the widest opportunity during
the probationary period to reject hirees who fail to meet its own adopted but reasonable
standards.[38] These standards, together with the just[39] and authorized causes[40] for
termination of employment the Labor Code expressly provides, are the grounds available
to terminate the employment of a teacher on probationary status.
• For example, the school may impose reasonably stricter attendance or report compliance
records on teachers on probation, and reject a probationary teacher for failing in this
regard, although the same attendance or compliance record may not be required for a
teacher already on permanent status. At the same time, the same just and authorizes
causes for dismissal under the Labor Code apply to probationary teachers, so that they
may be the first to be laid-off if the school does not have enough students for a given
semester or trimester. Termination of employment on this basis is an authorized cause
under the Labor Code.[41]

• Labor, for its part, is given the protection during the probationary period of knowing the
company standards the new hires have to meet during the probationary period, and to be
judged on the basis of these standards, aside from the usual standards applicable to
employees after they achieve permanent status. Under the terms of the Labor Code, these
standards should be made known to the teachers on probationary status at the start of their
probationary period, or at the very least under the circumstances of the present case, at the
start of the semester or the trimester during which the probationary standards are to be
applied.
• Of critical importance in invoking a failure to meet the probationary standards, is that the
school should show as a matter of due process how these standards have been
applied. This is effectively the second notice in a dismissal situation that the law requires as a
due process guarantee supporting the security of tenure provision,[42] and is in furtherance,
too, of the basic rule in employee dismissal that the employer carries the burden of justifying a
dismissal.[43] These rules ensure compliance with the limited security of tenure guarantee the
law extends to probationary employees.[44]
• When fixed-term employment is brought into play under the above probationary period rules,
the situation as in the present case may at first blush look muddled as fixed-term employment
is in itself a valid employment mode under Philippine law and jurisprudence.[4

• The fixed-term character of employment essentially refers to the period agreed upon
between the employer and the employee; employment exists only for the duration of the
term and ends on its own when the term expires. In a sense, employment on
probationary status also refers to a period because of the technical
meaning probation carries in Philippine labor law a maximum period of six months, or in
the academe, a period of three years for those engaged in teaching jobs. Their similarity
ends there, however, because of the overriding meaning that being on
probation connotes, i.e., a process of testing and observing the character or abilities of
a person who is new to a role or job.[4
• Understood in the above sense, the essentially protective character of probationary
status for management can readily be appreciated. But this same protective character
gives rise to the countervailing but equally protective rule that the probationary period
can only last for a specific maximum period and under reasonable, well-laid and
properly communicated standards. Otherwise stated, within the period of the probation,
any employer move based on the probationary standards and affecting the continuity of
the employment must strictly conform to the probationary rules.

• Under the given facts where the school year is divided into trimesters, the school
apparently utilizes its fixed-term contracts as a convenient arrangement dictated by
the trimestral system and not because the workplace parties really intended to limit
the period of their relationship to any fixed term and to finish this relationship at the
end of that term. If we pierce the veil, so to speak, of the parties so-called fixed-term
employment contracts, what undeniably comes out at the core is a fixed-term contract
conveniently used by the school to define and regulate its relations with its
teachers during their probationary period.
• Given the clear constitutional and statutory intents, we cannot but conclude that in a
situation where the probationary status overlaps with a fixed-term contract not
specifically used for the fixed term it offers, Article 281 should assume primacy and
the fixed-period character of the contract must give way. This conclusion is
immeasurably strengthened by the petitioners and the AMACCs hardly concealed
expectation that the employment on probation could lead to permanent status, and
that the contracts are renewable unless the petitioners fail to pass the schools
standards.

• To highlight what we mean by a fixed-term contract specifically used for the fixed
term it offers, a replacement teacher, for example, may be contracted for a period of
one year to temporarily take the place of a permanent teacher on a one-year study
leave.The expiration of the replacement teachers contracted term, under the
circumstances, leads to no probationary status implications as she was never
employed on probationary basis; her employment is for a specific purpose with
particular focus on the term and with every intent to end her teaching relationship
with the school upon expiration of this term.
• If the school were to apply the probationary standards (as in fact it says it did in the
present case), these standards must not only be reasonable but must have also
been communicated to the teachers at the start of the probationary period, or at the
very least, at the start of the period when they were to be applied. These terms, in
addition to those expressly provided by the Labor Code, would serve as the just
cause for the termination of the probationary contract. As explained above, the
details of this finding of just cause must be communicated to the affected teachers as
a matter of due process.

• AMACC, by its submissions, admits that it did not renew the petitioners contracts
because they failed to pass the Performance Appraisal System for Teachers (PAST) and
other requirements for regularization that the school undertakes to maintain its high
academic standards.[47] The evidence is unclear on the exact terms of the standards,
although the school also admits that these were standards under the Guidelines on the
Implementation of AMACC Faculty Plantilla put in place at the start of school year 2000-
2001.
• While we can grant that the standards were duly communicated to the petitioners and
could be applied beginning the 1sttrimester of the school year 2000-2001, glaring and
very basic gaps in the schools evidence still exist. The exact terms of the standards were
never introduced as evidence; neither does the evidence show how these standards
were applied to the petitioners.[48] Without these pieces of evidence (effectively, the
finding of just cause for the non-renewal of the petitioners contracts), we have nothing to
consider and pass upon as valid or invalid for each of the petitioners. Inevitably, the non-
renewal (or effectively, the termination of employment of employees on probationary
status) lacks the supporting finding of just cause that the law requires and, hence, is
illegal

• In this light, the CA decision should be reversed. Thus, the LAs decision,
affirmed as to the results by the NLRC, should stand as the decision to be
enforced, appropriately re-computed to consider the period of appeal and
review of the case up to our level.
• Given the period that has lapsed and the inevitable change of circumstances
that must have taken place in the interim in the academic world and at AMACC,
which changes inevitably affect current school operations, we hold that - in lieu
of reinstatement - the petitioners should be paid separation pay computed on a
trimestral basis from the time of separation from service up to the end of the
complete trimester preceding the finality of this Decision.[49] The separation pay
shall be in addition to the other awards, properly recomputed, that the LA
originally decreed.

• WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the
petition, and, consequently, REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 2007 and its Resolution
dated June 20, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96599. The Labor Arbiters
decision of March 15, 2002, subsequently affirmed as to the results
by the National Labor Relations Commission, stands and should be
enforced with appropriate re-computation to take into account the
date of the finality of this Decision.
• In lieu of reinstatement, AMA Computer College-Paraaque City,
Inc. is hereby DIRECTED to pay separation pay computed on a
trimestral basis from the time of separation from service up to the
end of the complete trimester preceding the finality of this
Decision. For greater certainty, the petitioners are entitled to:

• (a) backwages and 13th month pay computed from September 7,
2000 (the date AMA Computer College-Paraaque City, Inc. illegally
dismissed the petitioners) up to the finality of this Decision;
• (b) monthly honoraria (if applicable) computed from September 7,
2000 (the time of separation from service) up to the finality of this
Decision; and
• (c) separation pay on a trimestral basis from September 7, 2000 (the
time of separation from service) up to the end of the complete
trimester preceding the finality of this Decision.
• The labor arbiter is hereby ORDERED to make another re-
computation according to the above directives.

Mr. Bridget E. Abalorio
Ph.D – Educational Management Student

Tenure
Tenure is the right to continue in
employment until the latter is
terminated for a valid and lawful
cause.

Tenure
Art. XIII, sec. 3 of the Philippine
Constitution declares that the State shall
afford full protection to labor, security of
tenure, humane conditions of work and a
living wage, and participation in policy
and decision-making process.

Tenure
Labor Code (Art. 279) prohibits
employers from terminating the services
of an employee without just cause; it
also provides for reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and back wages
in case of termination without just
cause.

Tenure
The 2010 Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools also provides that no
teacher shall be suspended or separated
from the service during the pendency of
his/her contract or appointment except
for cause and after due process.

Tenure
The 2010 Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools Section 64 also provides
that stability and security of employment
shall be assured all private school
personnel shall be provided with a
contract or appointment in accordance
with their employment status in school.

Tenure
Art. 281, Labor Code, Book Six, Title I
provides that the services of an employee
who has been engaged on a probationary
basis may be terminated only for a just
cause or when he/she fails to qualify as a
regular employee in accordance with
reasonable standards made known to the
employee at the time of his/her
engagement.

Tenure
Administrative personnel may gain tenure
status only as classroom teachers, but
he/she has no tenure security as an
administrator.

Tenure
In the case of La Salette of Santiago, Inc. vs. NLRC and Clarita
Javier, (G.R. No. 82918, March 11, 1991)
Clarita Javier, private respondent, was first employed by the La Salette
School System as principal of the La Salette of Jones High School. She
was principal for three years.
Then for another period of three years, from 1969 to 1972, she was
Teacher and Subject Area Coordinator of a sister school, the La Salette of
Santiago, Inc.
Afterwards, and for some seven years, from 1972 to 1979, she was
a full-time college instructor of still another sister school, the La Salette
College. For two years of that period, from 1977 to 1978, she was the
Head of the College's Education and Liberal Arts Department.
In the same period, she was sent by La Salette College to the De
La Salle University in Manila on a study leave.
Clarita Javier returned to La Salette College in 1979 and continued as
Head of its Education and Liberal Arts Department.

Tenure
In 1980 she accepted an offer to go back to La Salette of
Santiago, Inc. as Assistant Principal. She however made known
that she said "did not intend to sever . . . (her) professional and
business relations with La Salette College . . . (expressing the
hope that her stay in the High School Department) will deepen .
. . (her) insight into the field of education and therefore be of
service to the La Salette College." It was no doubt pursuant to
that reservation, which the School System accepted, that while
serving as such assistant Principal, she retained her teaching
assignment as part-time instructor at La Salette College.

Tenure
After serving as Assistant Principal of La Salette of
Santiago Inc. for one year, and for another period of three
years, from 1981 to 1984, Clarita Javier returned to the La
Salette College. this time as a full time instructor. However,
during the second semester of school year 1983-1984, Clarita
Javier taught at La Salette College only on part-time because
she was at the same time completing her doctorate degree.
In school year 1984-1985, she transferred back to La
Salette of Santiago, Inc. as its High School Principal. She
served as Principal in school year 1985-1986, too

Tenure
It appears that in accordance with the rules of the petitioner's School
System, the term of a principal of a high school department is two years.
Thus, after Clarita Javier had served as principal for a year, 1984-1985, she
was extended a written appointment for another year, 1985-1986, to
complete the two-year term. The appointment specified her term as
Principal to be from June 1, 1985 to May 31, 1986." During her two-year
stint as high School Principal, Clarita Javier continued as professor on a
part-time basis at the Graduate School and College Department of La
Salette College.
On June 9, 1986, some days after the expiration of her term and
before the opening of classes for school year 1986-1987, Clarita Javier
received a letter from Executive Secretary of the Board of Trustees of
the La Salette School System instructing her to report to La Salette College.
Sister Saturnina Pascual was named to replace her as a principal.

Tenure
On June 20, 1986, she received a letter from the
President of La Salette College, Fr. Romeo Gonzales, assuring
her that there would be neither diminution of compensation nor
loss of seniority in her transfer from the high school to
department of education of the college. Nonetheless Clarita
refused to accept the termination of her services as principal;
she refused to report her teaching assignments at the
education department, choosing instead to litigate for
vindication of her right to retain the position of principal of the
High School of La Salette of Santiago.

Tenure
In the case of La Salette of Santiago, Inc. vs.
NLRC and Clarita Javier, the Supreme Court (G.R.
No. 82918, March 11, 1991) ruled that a teacher
may also be appointed as a department head or
administrative officer of the school. The
acceptance by a teacher of an administrative
position offered to him/her or to which he/she
might have aspired does not operate as a
relinquishment of loss by him/her of his/her tenure
as a teacher during all the time that he/she
occupies the additional position of the school.

Tenure
Teachers appointed to serve as administrative
officials do not normally, and should not expect
to, acquire a second or additional tenure. The
acquisition of such an additional tenure is not
normal, is the exception rather than the rule,
and should therefore be clearly and specifically
provided by law or contract.

Evaluation and Promotion
It is good management practice to assess
employees periodically in order to give
them feedback and to give them a chance
to correct themselves as not to be
separated.

Promotions should be based on
clearly spelled out criteria stated in the
faculty manual with the procedures set
down.

Performance appraisal is one of the
most important tasks any administration
has & perhaps the most difficult to handle
adequately and constructively.

The important questions to ask in reference to
performance appraisal are:
1. Who shall conduct the performance
appraisal?
2. What kind of performance appraisal shall
be adopted?
3. How often shall performance appraisal be
made?

Performance appraisal can be done
informally, perhaps on a day-to-day basis,
where the department head of the teacher
involved spontaneously mentions his/her
good or weak points as observed.

Informal appraisal, has its buit-in
limitations. Everybody will agree that it is
not easy to judge or evaluate a
subordinate’s performance accurately
and to convey the result to him/her
constructively and without any taint of
bias or prejudice.

The systematic evaluation for faculty can
be done each semester or annually
depending on the particular purposes of
the appraisal program. For probationary
faculty, performance appraisal should be
done every semester in order to keep
track of the faculty’s strengths and
weaknesses.

One of the major incentives for
excellent employee performance is the
possibility of promotion to a higher rank
or level of work.

LIBRADA D. TAPISPISAN, G.R. No. 157950
Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; CIVIL QUISUMBING,
SERVICE COMMISSION; HON. YNARES-SANTIAGO,
RICARDO T. GLORIA, Secretary, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
Department of Education, Culture CARPIO,
and Sports (DECS); DR. NILO L. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
ROSAS, Regional Director, DECS- CORONA,
NCR; ATTY. RICARDO T. SIBUG, CARPIO MORALES,
Superintendent of Schools, Pasay CALLEJO, SR.,
City; MRS. ALICIA G. BENZON, AZCUNA,
Principal IV, Coordinating Principal, TINGA,
South District, Pasay City; MRS. CHICO-NAZARIO, and
MYRNA TEVES, Teacher, Gotamco GARCIA, JJ.**
Elementary School, Pasay City; and
MRS. AIDA RUMBAOA, Teacher,
Villanueva Elementary School, Promulgated:
Pasay City, Respondents.
June 8, 2005

Petitioner Tapispisan is a public school teacher and has
been occupying the position of Teacher III since September 1,
1992. She has been teaching for the last thirty (30) years and is
currently assigned at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School
in Pasay City.
On May 30, 1995, respondent Atty. Ricardo T. Sibug (Schools
Division Superintendent, Pasay City) issued Division Memorandum
No. 33 designating respondent Rumbaoa as OIC-Head Teacher of P.
Villanueva Elementary School and respondent Teves as OIC-
Principal of Don Carlos Elementary School, both schools are in
Pasay City. Feeling that she had been unduly by-passed, petitioner
Tapispisan filed with respondent Sibug a protest contesting such
designation. The latter, however, denied the protest. The petitioner
then brought the matter to respondent Dr. Nilo L. Rosas, Regional
Director of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
for National Capital Region (NCR) who, likewise, denied the protest.

On December 11, 1995, the petitioner filed with the DECS a
Complaint/Protest Against the Illegal and Indiscriminate Appointment
and Promotion of Aida Rumbaoa and Myrna Teves, docketed as
Adm. Case No. 96-001. Together with respondents Rumbaoa and
Teves, also named as respondents were Dr. Rosas, Atty. Sibug and
Mrs. Alicia G. Benzon (Principal IV, Coordinating Principal, South
District).
In her complaint/protest, petitioner Tapispisan alleged that the
designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves was made with
evident favoritism and in gross violation of Civil Service and DECS
rules and regulations on promotions. The petitioner claimed that she
was more qualified for promotion than respondents Rumbaoa and
Teves. She pointed out that in the 1994-1995 annual qualifying
examination conducted for both teachers and principals, she placed
No. 4 in the Division List of Promotables for Head Teachers while the
names of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves did not appear therein.
Nonetheless, they were the ones recommended and designated to
the subject positions.

The petitioner claimed that she completed her masters
degree long before respondents Rumbaoa and Teves
completed theirs and that she became Teacher III ahead of
them. However, in making their recommendation, respondents
Benzon and Sibug allegedly disregarded these objective factors
or criteria for promotion and instead resorted to personal or
relative factors, which are the weakest of the standards for
evaluation, to favor respondents Rumbaoa and Teves.
The petitioner thus prayed in her complaint/protest that
the promotions of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves be recalled
and that they be disallowed from occupying, in acting capacity,
the positions to which they were designated.

Even granting arguendo that a protest may be properly
lodged against a designation, petitioner Tapispisan’s protest against
the designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves on the ground
that she is more qualified must still fail. In her
4th Indorsement[22] dated August 10, 1995, respondent Benzon, as
Principal IV, Coordinating Principal of the South District, clarified that
respondent Teves was considered for designation as OIC-Principal
of Don Carlos Elementary School because of her orientation and
training. Aside from occupying the position of Master Teacher II,
respondent Teves carried with her three years of work experience
as officer-in-charge of the same school. Respondent Benzon,
likewise, justified the designation of respondent Rumbaoa as OIC-
Head Teacher of P. Villanueva Elementary School stating that she
was qualified there for having been duly appointed Head Teacher III
effective March 15, 1995. Further, she ranked No. 2 in the Division
List of Promotables for the school year 1993-1994.

Clearly, the designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves
was well within the prerogative of the said respondents DECS
officials. It behooves the Court to refrain from unduly interfering with
the exercise of such administrative prerogative. After all, it is well
settled that administrative decisions on matters within the jurisdiction
of administrative bodies are entitled to respect and can only be set
aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of
law.[25] None of these vices has been shown as having attended the
designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves.
In fine, the appellate court committed no reversible error when
it affirmed the resolutions of the CSC dismissing the protest filed by
petitioner Tapispisan and upholding the designation of respondent
Rumbaoa as OIC-Head Teacher of P. Villanueva Elementary School
and respondent Teves as OIC-Principal of Don Carlos Elementary
School.

The teachers and employees in general remain
in their jobs not only because of the salaries or wages
they are paid, but also because of the promise of
certain faculty or employee benefits.

Under the 2010 MRPS, school personnel can enjoy,
Rest day, Overtime Pay for Holiday and Rest day,
retirement benefits, study leave, and other benefits
provided for by law.

Included under employee benefits are those required
by law under the SSS/GSIS, Medicare/PhilHealth,
PAG-IBIG, and retirement (under PERAA or CEAP),
health-care benefits, the thirteenth-month pay
mandated by law, and any other benefits specific to
the institution.

Benefits specific to the institution may include
longevity benefits, annual bonuses, special
anniversary gifts or benefits, and educational benefits
for the children. Others are economic or financial,
recreational, social, professional services, vacation,
sick, service leaves, service awards, retirement, and
scholarships.

The Labor Code provides for health, safety and
social welfare benefits. Under these provisions, it
becomes a duty of every employer to furnish his/her
employee with free medical and dental services and
facilities.

MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS
LEARNING CENTER and
MRS. VIOLETA T. CARIO
Vs.
ADELAIDA P. MANALO
G.R. No. 178835
On April 4, 2003, respondent instituted against petitioner a
Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of 13th month pay,
with a prayer for reinstatement, award of full backwages and moral
and exemplary damages.

In her position paper,[4] respondent claimed that her
termination violated the provisions of her employment
contract, and that the alleged abolition of the position of
Principal was not among the grounds for termination by an
employer under Article 282[5] of the Labor Code.
She further asserted that petitioner infringed Article
283[6] of the Labor Code, as the required 30-day notice to
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and to
her as the employee, and the payment of her separation pay
were not complied with. She also claimed that she was
terminated from service for the alleged expiration of her
employment, but that her contract did not provide for a fixed
term or period. She likewise prayed for the payment of her
13th month pay under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 851.

On December 3, 2003, Labor Arbiter (LA) Renell Joseph R.
dela Cruz rendered a Decision[8] dismissing the complaint for illegal
dismissal, including the other claims of respondent, for lack of merit,
except that it ordered the payment of her 13th month pay in the
amount of P3,750.00.
On appeal, on October 28, 2005, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Third Division,[9] in its Decision[10] dated
October 28, 2005, reversed the Arbiters judgment. Petitioner was
ordered to reinstate respondent as a teacher, who shall be credited
with one-year service of probationary employment, and to pay her
the amounts ofP3,750.00 and P325,000.00 representing her
13th month pay and backwages, respectively. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied in the NLRCs Resolution[11] dated
January 31, 2006.

Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC,
petitioner went up to the CA via a petition for certiorari. The CA, in its
Decision dated January 31, 2007, affirmed the NLRC decision and
dismissed the petition. It likewise denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration in the Resolution dated June 29, 2007.
As above discussed, probationary employees enjoy security of
tenure during the term of their probationary employment such that
they may only be terminated for cause as provided for by law, or if at
the end of the probationary period, the employee failed to meet the
reasonable standards set by the employer at the time of the
employees engagement. Undeniably, respondent was hired as a
probationary teacher and, as such, it was incumbent upon petitioner
to show by competent evidence that she did not meet the standards
set by the school.

Finally, we rule on the propriety of the monetary
awards. Petitioner, as employer, is entitled to decide whether to
extend respondent a permanent status by renewing her contract
beyond the three-year period. Given the acrimony between the
parties which must have been generated by this controversy, it
can be said unequivocally that petitioner had opted not to extend
respondents employment beyond this period. Therefore, the
award of backwages as a consequence of the finding of illegal
dismissal in favor of respondent should be confined to the three-
year probationary period.

Computing her monthly salary of P15,000.00 for the
next two school years (P15,000.00 x 10 months x 2),
respondent already having received her full salaries for the
year 2002-2003, she is entitled to a total amount
of P300,000.00. Moreover, respondent is also entitled to
receive her 13th month pay correspondent to the said two
school years, computed as yearly salary, divided by 12 months
in a year, multiplied by 2, corresponding to the school years
2003-2004 and 2004-2005, or P150,000.00 / 12 months x 2
= P25,000.00. Thus, the NLRC was correct in awarding
respondent the amount of P325,000.00 as backwages,
inclusive of 13th month pay for the school years 2003-2004
and 2004-2005, and the amount of P3,750.00 as pro-rated
13th month pay.

A worker’s right to labor is recognized by the Constitution
as a property right. As such, an employee cannot be
deprived of his work without just cause or due process
(Esmalin vs. NLRC; Cocoland vs. NLRC).
DIOSELYN P. PATILUNA

Definition of Terms:
Separation/Termination- is cessation
of employment as a result
of resignation, layoff,
or discharge. Sison, 1981:342)
.
Retirement- withdrawal from work because of age.
Authorized Causes- lawful grounds for termination.
Just Causes- are based on acts attributable to the
employee’s own fault or negligence.

2 kinds of termination:
1. termination by employer
2. termination by employee
2 most commonly grounds for termination
by employer are:
a. Authorized Causes (Art. 283,284 LC)
b. Just Causes (Art. 282 LC)

DUE PROCESS & SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
due process of law (dictionary.law.com)
- a fundamental principle of fairness in all legal
matters, both civil and criminal, especially in the
courts.
Substantial evidence (http://www.lectlaw.com)
-means "more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."

Procedural Due
Process
• A written notice of dismissal to the
employee specifying the grounds at least
30 days before the date of termination.
• A copy of the notice shall also be
furnished the Regional Office of the
Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) where the employer is located.

Procedural Due
Process
• First notice: Notice to Explain (NTE) or order to show
cause.
- specifies the ground/s for termination,
- opportunity within which to explain his side.
• Hearing or formal investigation.
- is given opportunity to respond to the charge,
present his evidence or rebut the evidence
presented against him.
• Second notice: Notice of decision. A written notice of
termination served on the employee indicating that upon
due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have
been established to justify his termination. (See Art.
277[b] and Sec 2, Rule I, Book VI, IRR)
twin-notice
and hearing

Sanction if employer failed to observe
due process? (http://www.blr.dole.gov.ph/
• In cases of termination for just causes,
the employee is entitled to payment of
indemnity or nominal damages in a sum
of not more than 30,000 pesos (Agabon
vs. NLRC, 442 SCRA 573);
• in case of termination for authorized
causes, 50,000 pesos (Jaka Food
Processing vs. Darwin Pacot, 454
SCRA 119).

Rights afforded to an unjustly dismissed employee
http://www.blr.dole.gov.ph/
• a) reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights;
• b) separation pay of one month pay for
every year of service (Golden Ace
Builders, et. al vs. Jose Talde, May 5,
2010, GR No. 187200);
• c) full backwages, inclusive of allowances
and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent from the time compensation
was withheld up to the time of
reinstatement;
• d) damages if the dismissal was done in
bad faith (Aurora Land Project Corp. vs
NLRC, 266 SCRA 48)

Authorized Causes
(Art. 283,284 LC)
- an employee is terminated
based on lawful grounds

The law authorizes an employer
to terminate the employment of any
employee due to the installation of
labor saving devices.
The installation of labor-saving
devices contemplates the installation
of machinery to effect economy and
efficiency in the method of
production.
1. Installation of labor saving device=

FACTS:
Magnolia Dairy Products Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
114952, January 29, 1996.
Petitioner, a division of San Miguel
Corporation (SMC), entered into a contract
of service with Lippercon Services, a
corporation engaged in providing
manpower services to the public. On July
1987, Lippercon Services assigned private
respondent Jenny A. Calibo to petitioner's
Tetra Paster Division as a cleaning aid.

• In December 1987, she was terminated from
service due to petitioner's installation of
automated machines. July 11, 1989, private
respondent instituted a complaint for illegal
dismissal against petitioner. In answer thereto,
petitioner averred that it has no employer-
employee relationship with private respondent
and that the dismissal was prompted by the
installation of labor saving devices — an
authorized cause for dismissal under the
Labor Code, as amended.
•

-Calibo is an employee of SMC on a labor
only contract basis where SMC has the power to
discipline and suspend the respondent.
-SMC is not charged with illegal dismissal but
is be sanctioned for non-compliance with the
requirements of, or for failure to observe due
process in terminating from service its employee.
-petitioner is ordered to pay separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month pay for every year of serviceto pay the sum
of P5,000.00 as indemnification for its failure to serve
the required notice mandated by law.
Supreme Court’s Decision

2. Redundancy-
exists where the services of
an employee are in excess of
what is reasonably demanded
by the actual requirements of
the enterprise.

Are there other conditions before an employee
may be dismissed
on the ground
of redundancy?
a) Good faith in abolishing redundant
position; and
b) Fair and reasonable criteria in
selecting employees to be
dismissed, such as but not limited
to less preferred status
efficiency and seniority
c) A one-month prior notice is given to
the employee and DOLE Regional
Office as prescribed by law.

3. Retrenchment - to
prevent losses of a business
occasioned by lack of work
and considerable reduction
in the volume of business.
Proof of actual or imminent
financial losses that are substantive in
character must be proven by the
employer to justify retrenchment.
A pending case of Rebecca Anonueva
for illegal termination vs. Miriam College
(viability and long term sustainability) in
the NLRC. She worked for Miriam
College for 19 years. She did not await of
early retirement Package offered by the
school.

4. Closure or cessation
of operation-
The closure of a business
establishment is a ground for the
termination of the services of an
employee unless the closing is for
the purpose of circumventing
pertinent provisions of the Labor
Code.

5. Health- An employer may
terminate the services of an
employee who has been found to be
suffering from any disease and
whose continued employment is
prohibited by law or is prejudicial to
his health as well as the health of his
co-employees. (Art 284 LC)
The disease is of such nature and
at such a stage that it cannot be
cured within a period of six months
even with proper medical treatment.
(Sec. 8, Title I, Bk. VI, IRR)

Just Causes of
Termination
- are based on acts attributable to the
employee’s own fault or negligence.

1. Serious misconduct-
improper or wrong conduct, a
transgression of a definite rule of action,
a forbidden act or dereliction of duty
which is willful in character and implies
wrongful intent, and not mere error in
judgment.
- For misconduct or improper behavior to
be a just cause for dismissal, the same
must be related to the performance of
the employee’s duties and must show
that he has become unfit to continue
working for the employer.

JEFFREY ANINAG
CASE • Record show that sometime in September 2010, at around 3:00
in the afternoon, Mr. Aninag requested AAA to help him on
something and directed her to the school's clinic. AAA heeded
Aninag's request and while the two (2) were inside said clinic,
Aninag sexually grabbing and kissing her, even to the extent of
showing his genitalia.
• Sometime in January 2011, when AAA was about to go inside the
stockroom to borrow some books, Aninag invited her inside and,
right there and then, touched her private parts and then seduced
her to perform sexual communication with him.
• Thus, February 16, 2011, AAA filed a letter-Complaint addressed
to the XXX National High School Division Superintendent. SDS
transmitted together with her sworn statement to the Women and
Child Protection Desk of the Valenzuela City Police. ln said
complaint, AAA accused Aninag of committing acts of
lasciviousnoss pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610 (Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act.)

• Subsequently, AAA was joined by some teachers in her school who filed their
respective complaint against Aninag before the School Principal. a scoundrel,
recidivist" and habitual offender, as he sexually harassed one AAA.
• Aninag on Aug. 11 filed his counteraffidavit denying vehemently and categorically
the accusations filed against him.
• Based on the said affidavits, the Regional Office conducted its preliminary
investigation and, after finding a prima facie case, issued a Formal Charge for
Grave Misconduct against
• After formal investigation, the DepEd National Capital Region issued its Resolution
dated April 2, 2013 finding Aninag guilty, as charged.
Pertinent portion of the said Decision thus reads as follows:

2. Gross Insubordination
Elements: (a) employee’s assailed conduct must be
willful or intentional; (b) willfulness characterized by
wrongful or perverse attitude; (c) the order violated
must be reasonable, lawful and made known to the
employee; and (d) the order must pertain to the
duties which the employee has been engaged to
discharge.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Rebecca T. Arquero against
public respondents Edilberto C. De Jesus (De Jesus), in his
capacity as Secretary of Education, Dr. Paraluman Giron (Dr.
Giron), Department of Education (DepEd) Director, Regional Office
IV-MIMAROPA, Dr. Eduardo Lopez (Lopez), Schools Division
Superintendent, Puerto Princesa City, and private respondent
Norma Brillantes. Petitioner assails the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[1] dated December 15, 2004 and Resolution[2] dated May

2. Gross Insubordination
(a) employee’s assailed conduct must be
willful or intentional;
(b) willfulness characterized by wrongful or
perverse attitude;
(c) the order violated must be reasonable,
lawful and made known to the
employee; and
(d) the order must pertain to the duties which
the employee has been engaged to
discharge.

The facts of the case are as follows:
G.R. No. 168053 September 21, 2011
REBECCA T. ARQUERO,
Petitioner,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Former Thirteenth Division); EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS, in hiscapacity as
Secretary of the Department of Education; DR. PARALUMAN GIRON,Director, Regional Office IV-
MIMAROPA, Department of Education; DR. EDUARDOLOPEZ, Schools Division Superintendent,
Puerto Princesa City; and NORMABRILLANTES,
Respondents.Facts:
On October 13, 1989, a law was enacted converting schools into national schools andintegrated Palawan
National School (PNS) in the City of Puerto Prinsesa, Province of PuertoPrinsesa as branches
thereof. Section 2 of the said law provides that the PNS shall offer general secondary, post-secondary
technical-vocational educational program and other relevant courses to carry out its objectives. The PNS
shall be considered the "mother unit"and the integrated schools should benefit from a centralized curriculum
planning to eliminateduplication of functions and efforts relative to human resource development for
theprovince. The law also provides that the Palawan Integrated National Schools (PINS) shallbe headed by a
Vocational School Superintendent (VSS) who shall be chosen and appointedby the Secretary of the
Department of Education.However, no VSS was appointed. Instead, the DECS Region IV Office designated
then PNSPrincipal Eugenio J. dela Cuesta in a concurrent capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of thePINS.
After the retirement of Dela Cuesta, petitioner took over as Secondary SchoolPrincipal of the PNS. The
DECS-Region IV Director IV Desideria Rex (Director Rex)designated petitioner as OIC of the PINS. A

On December 1, 1994, Director Rexs successor, Pedro B. Trinidad placed all
satellite schools of the PINS under the direct supervision of the Schools Division
Superintendent for Palawan effective January 1, 1995.[10] This directive was later
approved by the DepEd in September 1996. Petitioner was instructed to turn
over the administration and supervision of the PINS branches or units.[11] In another
memorandum, Schools Division Superintendent Portia Gesilva was designated as OIC
of the PINS. These events prompted different parties to institute various actions
restraining the enforcement of the DepEd orders.
On May 14, 2002, then DECS Undersecretary Jaime D. Jacob issued an
Order[14] addressed to Dr. Giron, OIC, DepEd Regional Office No. 4, stating that there
being no more legal impediment to the integration, he ordered that the secondary
schools integrated with the PNS be under the direct administrative management and
supervision of the schools division superintendents of the divisions of Palawan and
Puerto Princesa City, as the case may be, according to their geographical and political
boundaries.

On September 19, 2002, Dr. Giron withdrew the designation of petitioner as OIC of the PINS, enjoining
her from submitting to the Regional Office all appointments and personnel movement involving the PNS and the
satellite schools. On November 7, 2002, petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission assailing the
withdrawal of her designation as OIC of the PINS.[16]
On September 18, 2003, Dr. Giron filed a formal charge[19] against petitioner who continued to defy the
orders issued by the Regional Office relative to the exercise of her functions as OIC of the PINS despite the
designation of private respondent as such. The administrative complaint charged petitioner with grave
misconduct, gross insubordination and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Petitioner was also
preventively suspended for ninety (90) days.[20]
On October 2, 2003, petitioner filed the Petition for Quo Warranto (A legal proceeding during which an
individual's right to hold an office or governmental privilege is challenged) with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Injunctive Writ[21] before the RTC of Palawan[22] against public and private respondents.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3854. Petitioner argued that the designation of private respondent
deprived her of her right to exercise her function and perform her duties in violation of her right to security of
tenure. Considering that petitioner was appointed in a permanent capacity, she insisted that private respondents
designation as OIC of the PNS is null and void there being no vacancy to the position.
On October 6, 2003, the Executive Judge issued a 72-Hour TRO[24] enjoining and restraining private
respondent from assuming the position of OIC and performing the functions of the Office of the Principal of the
PNS; and restraining public respondents from giving due course or recognizing the assailed designation of
private respondent. The RTC later issued the writ of preliminary injunction.[25]

On June 14, 2004, the RTC rendered a Judgment by Default,[28] the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and by preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Declaring petitioner Rebecca T. Arquero as the lawful Principal and Head of the
Palawan Integrated National High School who is lawfully entitled to manage the operation and
finances of the school subject to existing laws;
2. Declaring the formal charge against petitioner, the preventive suspension, the
investigating committee, the proceedings therein and any orders, rulings, judgments and
decisions that would arise there from as null, void and of no effect;
3. Ordering respondent Norma Brillantes, or any person acting in her behalf, to
cease and desist from assuming and exercising the functions of the Office of the Principal of
Palawan Integrated National High School, and respondents Edilberto C. De Jesus,
Paraluman R. Giron and Eduardo V. Lopez, or any person acting in their behalf, from giving
due course or recognizing the same; and
4. Making the writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case permanent.

CA held that the PINS and its satellite schools remain under the complete administrative
jurisdiction of the DepEd and not transferred to the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA). It also explained that by providing for a distinct position of VSS with a higher qualification,
specifically chosen and appointed by the DepEd Secretary that is separate from the school head of the PNS
offering general secondary education program, RA 6765 intended that the functions of a VSS and School
Principal of PNS be discharged by two separate persons.[33] The CA added that if we follow the RTC
conclusion, petitioner would assume the responsibilities and exercise the functions of a division schools
superintendent without appointment and compliance with the qualifications required by law.[34] The appellate
court likewise held that petitioner failed to establish her clear legal right to the position of OIC of the PINS as
she was not appointed but merely designated to the position in addition to her functions as incumbent
school principal of the PNS.[35]
The next question to be resolved is whether petitioner has the right to the contested public office
and to oust private respondent from its enjoyment. We answer in the negative.
In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the
subject public office. In other words, the private person suing must show a clear right to the contested
position.[46] Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action
for quo warranto may be dismissed.[47] It is not even necessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who,
by virtue of his appointment, continues in the undisturbed possession of his office.[48]

• On the basis of the evidence presented solely by petitioner and without considering the arguments and
attachments made by respondents to rebut petitioners claims, we find that petitioner failed to prove that she
is entitled to the contested position.
• It is undisputed that petitioner was appointed as the principal of the PNS. In addition, she was designated as
the OIC of the PINS. Said designation was, however, withdrawn. Private respondent was, thereafter,
designated as the new OIC. This prompted petitioner to file the quo warranto petition before the court a quo.
• WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated December 15, 2004 and Resolution dated May 3, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 85899,
are AFFIRMED.
•

.gross negligence: connotes want of care in the
performance of one’s duties, or absence of
even slight care or diligence as to amount to a
reckless disregards of the safety of the person
or property.
• habitual neglect: implies repeated failure to
perform one’s duties over a period of time
Gross Habitual Neglect
of Duties

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