CNV Paper Sanitized

1
THE IMPACT OF BRAZIL’S TRUTH COMMISSION ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
ABSTRACT
The national level security providers in Brazil – the armed forces and the
central intelligence agency- Agência Brasileira de Inteligência, ABIN – are limited in
scope and financing. In some new democracies, including Argentina and Portugal,
the explanation for the restrictions on security providers in the democratic regimes
can be explained in terms of a reaction to the excesses of the security providers
during the authoritarian regimes. In Brazil, although there was a long process of
“naming and blaming” of human rights abusers leading up to and including the
Comissão Nacional de Verdade –National Truth Commission’s -1,000 page report in
December 2014, this paper argues that the current impoverished situation of the
security providers is best explained by the incentives of the civilian politicians in
electoral politics.
According to a recent issue of the journal Latin American Perspectives “A
second wave of memory, truth and justice mobilizations has spread in Latin America
since the turn of the century.” 1 Now, therefore, may be a propitious time to review
the impact of the process leading up to and following from the Brazilian Truth
Commission (Comissão Nacional da Verdade, CNV) that issued its 1,000 page report
in December 2014. It is widely recognized that truth commissions are created for
several goals. According to Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, drawing upon a 2004 Report of
the Secretary General of the United Nations, two of these concern the institutions
that involve successor regimes to authoritarian governments. They are as follows:
“To make recommendations for redress and for reforms that are designed to
prevent future abuses; To promote democratic consolidation;” 2
1 “The Resurgence of Collective Memory, Truth, and Justice Mobilizations Part 3:
Culture, Politics and Social Mobilization” Latin American Perspectives Issue 211,
Volume 43 Number 6 November 2016. Available at
lap@latinamericanperspectives.ccsend.com accessed December 7, 2016.
2 Eric Wielbelhaus-Brahm, “What Does Brazil Have to Gain From a Truth
Commission After Two Decades of Democracy?” Unpublished paper for the
International Conference on the Right to Truth, University of São Paulo, October 19-
20, 2009. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1647361. Accessed December 1,
2016.

2
Our goal in this paper is to assess the impact of the CNV process on the
support of the civilian government, which assumed power in Brazil in 1985
following twenty-one years of military rule, for the armed forces, including the
successor to the intelligence service of the military regime, the National Information
Service (Serviço Nacional de Informações, SNI). In some new democracies, including
Argentina and Portugal, which Bruneau knows from personal experience, the legal
and financial situation of the armed forces and the intelligence agencies in the
contemporary civilian – led regime can best be explained as a reaction, or response,
to the human rights abuses of the armed forces in Argentina, and the intelligence
agency, the Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado, PIDE) in Portugal. 3 The main
question in this paper is if the process leading up to and including the CNV, which
brought to light and publicized the human right abuses during the military regime of
1964-85, is responsible for the legal and financial situation of the armed forces and
the successor to the SNI, the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Agência Brasileira de
Intêligencia, ABIN).
It is a fact that in Brazil very limited resources are provided to the armed
forces and to the ABIN. Below we compare Brazil’s defense budget to the BRICS, to
which Brazil belongs, and to the permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council, to which Brazil aspires to become a member.
Brazil, BRIC Nations and U.N. Security Council Nations: GDP and Defense Budgets,
2013. 4
Nation
GDP
(USD Billion)
Defense Budget
(USD Billion)
Percentage of
GDP Spent on
3 For the case of the armed forces in Argentina see the chapter on Argentina in
Thomas Bruneau and Cris Matei, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military
Relations (London: Routledge Publishers, 2013), 151-57. On the PIDE see César
Henrique Morgado Rodrigues, Serviços de Informações Portugueses: Estruturas,
Missões e Recursos PhD Dissertation, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, February 2015.
4 Jane’s Defense Budgets. Accessed March 13, 2014.

3
Defense
Brazil 2348 32 1.39%
China 9563 165 1.73%
France 2772 53 1.92%
India 2044 46 2.26%
Russian Federation 2209 68 3.12%
United Kingdom 2596 58 2.27%
United States 17024 582 3.42%
Or, looking specifically at ABIN, minimal funding is allocated. ABIN’s 2014 budget
was 528 million Reais, the equivalent of about $206 million. For a sense of scale, the
budget for Colégio Pedro II (a secondary school in Rio de Janeiro) was 469 million
Reais, the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte was 1,187 million Reais, and
the Ministry of Sport was 3,256 million Reais. 5 Further, according to the 1988
Constitution, Section XII of Article 5, ‘‘the secrecy of correspondence and of
telegraphic data and telephone communications is inviolable, except, in the latter
case, by court order, in the cases and in the manner prescribed by law for the
purposes of criminal investigation or criminal procedural finding of facts.’’ And, as
further defined in law No. 9296 of 24 July 1996, ABIN cannot do intercepts.
Therefore, ABIN has to rely on the Federal Police, for intercepts. This involvement
has been the source of the main scandals involving ABIN during the past decade.
These scandals associate ABIN in the public mind with the bad old days of the SNI.
Also in law, the ABIN is placed not under the presidency, but at least once removed,
. 5 See http://www.planejamento.gov.br/ministerio.asp?.index=8&ler=s1154.
Accessed 22 January 2015. The budget data on ABIN is on p. 15, Colégio
Pedro II is on p. 23, Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte is on p. 28,
and the Ministry of Sport is on p. 73.

4
under the Gabinete de Segurança Institucional, (GIS) Secretariat for Institutional
Security. And, recruitment is via a public concurso, or public exam, which results in
unspecific recruitment, and departures, as in most other public bureaucracies in
Brazil.
The democratic transition from a military regime to the current democratic
regime was heavily negotiated. And, several issues had to be resolved before the
transition could happen. Among the most important was the passing of an Amnesty
Law in 1979. This law ensured that no legal repercussions would occur once the
military handed over power to civilians. It “...granted “total and unrestricted
amnesty” to all individuals involved in politically motivated crimes during the
dictatorship, including torture, kidnapping, and homicide.” 6 At the time, this law was
a fundamental requirement in terms of the democratic transition of Brazil. Since
then however, there have been many arguments concerning its legality.
The military government transferred power to civilians in 1985, and in 1988,
a new Brazilian Constitution was passed. The 1988 Constitution had an impact on
many lawyers’ interpretation of the 1979 Amnesty Law. Tang states that these
lawyers believe that the principles of the “new constitution should have chronological
and hierarchical primacy over the amnesty law, so as to limit its scope and ultimately
void its effect for any crimes involving gross human rights violations.”7
The first review of the military regime’s human rights abuses was carried out
even before the democratic transition by the Catholic Archdiocese of São Paulo. The
project was called Brasil: Nunca Mais (Brazil: Never Again). As part of this effort, in
the late 70s and early 80s, lawyers investigated the alleged crimes being committed
by the Brazilian government at the time. Very significantly, the project was delayed
6 Paulo Coelho Filho. 2012. “Truth Commission in Brazil: Individualizing Amnesty,
Revealing the Truth.” The Yale Review of International Studies., 2 Available at:
http://yris.yira.org/essays/440. Accessed December 14, 2016
7 Yi Shin Tang. 2015. “International Justice through Domestic Courts: Challenges in
Brazil’s Judicial Review of the Amnesty Law.” The International Journal of
Transitional Justice 9 (2): 259–77., 4–5

5
until after the transfer of power to civilians in March 1985 so that the project would
not negatively affect the democratic transition. According to a publication of the
United States Institute of Peace, it did not have a legally – defined mandate, and its
recommendations were vague, but it concluded that “torture was an essential part of
the military justice system and that judicial authorities were aware that torture was
used to extract confessions.” 8
Due to pressure from domestic and international bodies, a law was passed in
1995 that created a Comissão Especial de Mortos e Desaparecidos Políticos (Special
Commission on Political Deaths and Disappearances (CEMDP). The CEMDP was
overseen by the Secretariat on Human Rights (created in 1997 to promote the
protection of human rights), the Amnesty Commission (created in 2001 to provide
financial redress to victims of political persecution) 9, and the Ministry of Justice.
The CEMDP is “composed of state officials representing different state departments or
ministries, on one hand, and civil society actors selected due to their recognized
knowledge of and commitment to human rights, on the other.” 10 The CEMDP was
approved by then President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and was overseen by
Brazil’s Ministry of Justice. The CEMDP was an important step in the long, drawn –
out, process that ultimately resulted in the National Truth Commission because the
government was in fact acknowledging that the military government had committed
human rights abuses. As a result of the CEMDP, families affected by the
government’s abuses were able to request death certificates and were given
compensation. The CEMDP was not without criticism, but nonetheless was a step in
the direction of reconciliation. The CEMDP’s 11 years of work culminated in a book
8 “Commission of Inquiry: Brazil.” 2016a. United States Institute of Peace. Available
at: http://www.usip.org/publications/commission-of-inquiry-brazil. Accessed
November 30, 2016
9 Glenda Mezarobba. 2016a. “Between Reparations, Half Truths and Impunity: The
Difficult Break with the Legacy of the Dictatorship in Brazil.” Available at
https://www.e-
science.unicamp.br/gpd/admin/publicacoes/documentos/publicacao_5409_Betwee
n%20Reparations,%20Half.pdf. Accessed December 14, 2016.
10 Global South Study Center (GSSC), University of Cologne, and Marcia Esparza.
2015. Legacies of State Violence and Transitional Justice in Latin America: A Janus-
Faced Paradigm? Lexington Books., 43

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called Direito à memória e à verdade (Right to memory and to truth), which was
published in 2007. 11 This book was the first official statement published by the
Brazilian state that directly accused the military of “torture, rape, dismemberment,
decapitation, concealing bodies and murder of opponents to the regime who were
already imprisoned and, therefore, unable to react.” 12
In 2007, the Secretary for Human Rights, Paulo Vannuchi, created a program
called Memorias Reveladas. This program spawned educational programs,
monuments, museum spaces, and an official report on all human rights violations.
Memorias reveladas, along with Direito à memória e à verdade, focused primarily on
the victims of torture and death. According to Schneider, “These latest 'politics of
memory' have climaxed in the current debate on the Truth Commission.” 13
In 2009, Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos (the National Human Rights
Plan (PNDH) was created by President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva –Lula. The PNDH
proposed the creation of a human rights commission to investigate crimes from the
military era and a review of the 1979 Amnesty Law. It was immediately met with
opposition from the Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim as well as the commanders of
the army, navy, and air force. Jobim and the three commanders threatened to resign
if the Lula administration went through with this plan. Jobim claimed that the plan
was too one-sided, in that it only focused on the crimes of the military, and not the
armed resistance to the military regime. 14
11 “Direito à Memória E à Verdade.” 2016. Available at:
https://www.marxists.org/portugues/tematica/livros/diversos/memoria.pdf. Accessed
December 19, 2016.
12 Glenda Mezarobba. 2016b. “Between Reparations, Half Truths and Impunity: The
Difficult Break with the Legacy of the Dictatorship in Brazil.” Available at:
http://nupsi.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Glenda_Mezarobba_-
_Between_Reparations_Half-Truths_and_Impunity.pdf. Accessed December 19, 2016.
13 Nina Schneider. 2011. “Breaking the ‘Silence’ of the Military Regime: New Politics
of Memory in Brazil.” Bulletin of Latin American Research 30 (2). Blackwell
Publishing Ltd: , 206
14 For a thorough analysis of the armed forces and the Truth Commission see Eliézer
Rizzo de Oliveira, Além da Anistia, Aquém da Verdade (Curitiba: Editora Paismas,
2015).

7
Accordingly, the PNDH was modified and the proposal for the National Truth
Commission was edited to appease Minister Jobim and the three military
commanders. While this new version of the National Truth Commission placated the
military’s concerns, human rights organizations spoke out against the commission,
which they deemed toothless. Human rights activists had hoped for punitive
measures to be carried out against those accused of criminal acts by the
commission. According to Tang, because of the influence of Brazil’s military leaders
and the Brazilian Supreme Court’s upholding of 1979 Amnesty Law, these hopes
were not fulfilled. Again according to Tang, the Supreme Court’s decision in April of
2010 has had a large impact on the progress of human rights activists fighting for
retribution against the past military leaders. 15
In April 2010, the Brazilian Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
1979 Amnesty Law, thus preventing any punitive damages being carried out against
the individuals in the military government during the period of 1964-1985. The case
had been moved by the Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil (Brazilian Bar Association
(OAB), which claimed that the 1979 Amnesty Law was in direct conflict with the
1988 Constitution. The OAB requested a constitutional review of pre-constitutional
norms claiming that the 1988 Constitution had chronological and hierarchical
primacy over the 1979 Amnesty Law. The Supreme Court rejected the OAB’s case
stating that unlike other Latin American amnesty laws, Brazil’s was a political
agreement generally supported by Brazilian society, and not imposed by former
dictators who were trying to avoid prosecution. Though this was the reasoning that
the Supreme court provided, there was also reportedly political pressure to reject
the case directed at the court from various sectors of Brazilian government. 16
Transitional Justice 9 (2): 259–77., 4–5
Transitional Justice:, 4–5

8
To further complicate this legal debate, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights ruled in December 2010 that the 1979 Amnesty Law was illegal.17 In their
ruling, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights reviewed the compatibility of the
1979 Amnesty Law with the American Convention on Human Rights, which Brazil
ratified. Predicated on international law and jurisprudence, the Inter-American
Court concluded that “the provisions of the Amnesty Law that prevent the
investigation and punishment of serious human rights violations are incompatible
with the American Convention and lack legal effect, and as such, cannot continue to
represent an obstacle for the investigation of the facts.” 18
After the various concessions and edits, the PNDH was passed by Congress in
October 2011, and then President Dilma Rousseff signed it immediately.19 The
commission was made up of 7 commissioners and 14 staffers reviewing information
and evidence regarding human rights abuses that occurred between 1946 and 1988.
20 On December 10, 2014, the CNV released its 1,000 - page report on human rights
violations committed by security forces during the military regime. Of major
importance, the CNV identified 434 individuals who had been killed or disappeared,
33 remains of individuals, and over 337 perpetrators by name. 21
The main question in this paper is, however, did the process leading up to
and including the CNV result in, as in some other new democracies, the current
http://yris.yira.org/essays/440. Accessed December 14, 2016
http://yris.yira.org/essays/440. Accessed December 14, 2016. It should be noted
that the Inter – American Court has not given up on the issue.
http://yris.yira.org/essays/440. Accessed December 14, 2016.
20 “Peace and Conflict Monitor, Addressing Past Violence: The New Brazilian Truth
Commission.” 2016. Available at:
http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=887. Accessed December
14, 2016.
http://yris.yira.org/essays/440. Accessed December 14, 2016.

9
situation in which the armed forces and ABIN are relatively weak and minimally
funded? Or, using the same terms as Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm above, regarding the
institutions that involve successor regimes to authoritarian governments: “To make
recommendations for redress and for reforms that are designed to prevent future
abuses; To promote democratic consolidation;”
Our argument is that it did not. Rather, the explanation for the weakness of
the national security and defense sector is to be found in the nature of electoral
politics in Brazil. We will review four main points, all relating to electoral politics,
which lead us to find the analysis of Wendy Hunter in Eroding Military Influence in
Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers, more convincing than those who consider the
institutional power arrangements largely static. As she states “Rational politicians
following the incentives unleashed by electoral competition will indeed be tempted
to undermine the expanded level of military prerogatives that resulted from long-
term military rule and that survived the transition.” 22 She published this book in
1997, and since that time the politicians have not only whittled down the
prerogatives, but appropriated to themselves the great many opportunities for
personal gain offered by control of the state apparatus in Brazil. Some background
in the politics of the Constituent Assembly is necessary to understand this process of
appropriation.
Politics as Usual
On May 28, 2016, the incoming Brazilian Minister of Defense, Raul Jungmann,
gave an interview with the Estado de São Paulo newspaper. In the long interview he
barely touched upon military or defense issues, merely lauding the military’s
neutrality in the chaotic political situation. However, he did highlight an important
aspect of Brazilian politics. He noted that while the Constitution of 1988
strengthened accountability institutions, politics had not changed. In his terms,
22 Wendy Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 141.

10
politics is a hostage to itself. 23
These observations by a seasoned politician, who had twice served as both
federal minister and federal deputy, permit us to better understand the situation of
the security institutions and the impact of the CNV.
Scholars who study the process whereby the Constitution of 1988 was
formulated and the resulting document are extremely critical. Thomas Bruneau
argues that the Constitution did not represent an “elite settlement” ensuring
democratic consolidation, as was the case in Spain, for example. 24 Law professor,
Keith S. Rosenn, states the following: “The process by which Brazil’s 1988
Constitution was adopted practically assured that the end product would be a
hodgepodge of inconsistent and convoluted provisions.” 25 Despite the 245 articles
and 70 transitional provisions, the framers were unable to resolve such
fundamental question as whether Brazil would be a monarchy or republic, and if the
latter, a presidential or parliamentary regime. These fundamental decisions were
left for a referendum in 1993 the results of which favored a presidential republic.
The framers of the constitution, which were the 559 members of the sitting
Brazilian Congress, maintained intact both the institutional defects of the political
system and the extensive prerogatives of the armed forces that governed Brazil
between 1964 and 1985. Whereas the institutional defects of the political system
continue until the present, since the system is, as Jungmann puts it, hostage to itself,
the prerogatives of the armed forces have been diminished, as the powers of the
politicians themselves, and the opportunities for rent seeking, have increased.
23 Estado de São Paulo May 28, 2016. .
24 Thomas Bruneau, “Brazil’s political transition,” in John Higley and Richard
Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 257-281.
25 Keith S. Rosenn, “Conflict Resolution and Constitutionalism: The Making of the
Brazilian Constitution of 1988,” in Laurel E. Miller, editor, with Louis Aucoin
Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), 458.

11
The Constitution of 1988 changed nothing regarding the political institutions
that put those 559 politicians into the position of writing the constitution, and have
made only most minimal changes in the intervening 28 years. As Rosenn states “The
constituent assembly also did nothing to reform the malfunctioning of the political
party system, which is one of the world’s worst.” 26 They did not establish a
minimum number of votes for a party to be recognized, resulting in the current
situation with 35 political parties at the national level with 19 having deputies in the
lower house, the Câmara. They did not change the open – list system of proportional
representation in which each state is a single, and at – large multi – member district.
They did not change the gross misrepresentation whereby all states, and the federal
district, have three senators or the provision stipulating that all states, regardless of
population, would have a minimum of eight and a maximum of seventy deputies.
There was supposed to be a wholesale revision of the Constitution in 1993
that would require only an absolute majority of the deputies. That revision never
happened. Instead, there have been piecemeal revisions. In reviewing the various
initiatives to revise the constitution between 1988 and today, they amount to very
little.
FIRST, DIMINISHING MILITARY PREROGATIVES
Both Rosenn and Bruneau detail the extensive prerogatives of the armed
forces that resulted from the negotiated transition from military to civilian rule and
the reliance of President Sarney on the armed forces during his five year tenure
(1985 – 90) as the first civilian president in twenty-one years. The most extensive
work on this topic, however, is found in Alfred Stepan’s Rethinking Military Politics:
Brazil and the Southern Cone where he argues, by describing 11 prerogatives, that
Brazil had little progressed between military and civilian rule. Stepan ranked
military prerogatives as HIGH in Brazil; indeed, higher than the other countries he
analyzed, which included Argentina, Spain, and Uruguay. 27
26 Rosenn, “Conflict Resolution …”, 458.
27 Stepan 1988:122

12
Today, 26 years later, if we look at his eleven prerogatives we find a very
different situation, one in which most of the military prerogatives are LOW. We see
in all cases a tremendous emphasis on legal instruments – the 1988 Constitution
and subsequent laws, as Brazilians seek to overcome the arbitrary and, at the most
generous, formally legal workings of the military regime. And, the civilian control
mechanisms, which vitiate the prerogatives, extend throughout the public
bureaucracy in Brazil. The following section briefly examines the eleven military
prerogatives.
“Selected Prerogatives of Military as Institution in a Democratic Regime, Brazil from
1946 to 2014”
Prerogative Stepan
1946-
1964
(Civilian
rule)
Stepan
1969-
1972
(Intense
Repressio
n)
Stepan
1974-
1979
(Controlle
d
Opening)
Stepan
1985-87
(Democrat
ic
Transition
)
Authors
2016
(Democratic
Consolidatio
n)
1 Constitutional
ly sanctioned
independent
role of the
military in
political
system
High High High High Low
2 Military
relationship
to the chief
executive
Moderat
e
High Moderate Moderate Low

13
3 Coordination
of defense
sector
High High High High Moderate
4 Active-duty
military
participation
in the Cabinet
High High High High Low
5 Role of
military vis a
vis legislature
Moderat
e
High High High Low
6 Role of senior
career civil
servants or
civilian
political
appointees
High High High High Moderate
7 Role in
intelligence
Moderat
e
High High High Moderate
8 Role in police Moderat
e
High High Moderate Moderate
9 Role in
military
promotions
Moderat
e
High Moderate High Moderate
Prerogative #1: Constitutionally sanctioned independent role of the military in
political system. Today the rating is LOW. Many of the changes in military
prerogatives result from the founding of a civilian-led Ministry of Defense by
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1999. Today the armed services no longer
enjoy cabinet rank. The military is under the MOD. The MOD was created by
Complementary Law 97 of June 9, 1999. The fact that it was a Complementary law is

14
very important since this type of law requires that both the Senate and the Chamber
of Deputies pass the law by absolute majorities which is 50 percent plus one vote
(which meant 257 out of 513 in the Chamber, 42 out of 81 in the Senate), and then
signed by the President. More recently, the MOD’s powers were expanded and
further specified in Complementary Law 136 of August 25, 2010.
Prerogative #2: Military relationship to the chief executive. This too is LOW
today. Since 1985 all of the presidents of Brazil are civilians. Since 1989 the
president, as well as state governors, are elected by the population every four years.
Prerogative #3: Coordination of defense sector. The military maintains
MODERATE prerogatives in this area, due to the paucity of civilian expertise in the
MOD. Insofar as the coordination of the defense sector is defined by the central
documents on national defense, it is the civilians who take the lead. This
responsibility is made very clear in Complementary Law 136 of August 25, 2010,
and it should be noted that the END was the responsibility of two civilians: Minister
of Defense Nelson Jobim, and the Minister of Strategic Affairs, Roberto Mangabeira
Unger. According to a long-time military observer of Brazil, “[T]he National Strategic
Defense Plan [END] is the most significant expression of civilian control of the
military in Brazil” 28
Prerogative #4: Active duty military participation in the Cabinet. This rating
is LOW. Today, of the 27 members of the cabinet, none are military. The Minister of
Defense is a civilian. Only one of the fourteen officials in the expanded cabinet, the
head of the Secretariat for Institutional Security, GSI, is a member of the military.
Prerogative #5: Role of Legislature. Today the role of the Brazilian Congress
in all areas of governance, including the armed forces, is high, which means the
military prerogatives are LOW. All of the key legislation, which implies the
commitment in allocating funds, must pass both houses of the congress. Then too,
the Congress calls special investigatory committees to review any and all issues.
28 Linwood Ham, Brazil’s National Defense Strategy-A Deepening of Civilian Control,
Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College Senior Service College Fellowship Project.
2009:26.

15
Prerogative #6: Role of senior career civil servants or civilian political
appointees. This prerogative is MODERATE. The civilian bureaucracy in Brazil is
unequivocally strong. However, as there is no civilian career, nor the required
concurso, in the MOD---and with the paucity of civilians with expertise---the military
fills a vacuum and thereby assumes larger roles in the MOD itself.
Prerogative #7: Role in intelligence. This prerogative is also MODERATE. The
Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (ABIN), the Brazilian Intelligence Agency, is led by
a civilian who is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. However,
ABIN reports to the Minister Chief of the GSI, who is a general officer in Brazilian
Army. Then too, the Brazilian Military Intelligence system is largely intact.
Prerogative #8: Role in police. This prerogative is LOW. The control of the
Polícia Militar (PM), or Military Police, is a state responsibility, under the
democratically elected civilian governors of the states. The Polícia Federal (PF), or
Federal Police, is under the Ministry of Justice. The domestic roles of the armed
forces in Brazil are defined in the Constitution of 1988, in Article 142, and in
subsequent laws. The conditions are very precisely defined in Complementary Law
97 of June 9, 1999. Specifically, a state governor, who is responsible for security in
the state, can request of the President of the Republic that the armed forces be used
to support the police.
Prerogative #9: Role in military promotions. The rating is MODERATE. In
complementary law no. 136 of August 25 2010, the authority to indicate general
officers for promotion and assignment was transferred from the service
commanders to the Minister of Defense, who recommends the promotions to the
president for nomination.
Prerogative #10: Role in state enterprises. This is LOW. Fundamentally, the
state enterprise sector has been significantly decreased in size and importance. 29
Further, for that remaining with the state, rather than providing jobs to senior
officers, politicians put their own people into the senior positions as rewards or to
29 Albert Fishlow, Starting Over: Brazil Since 1985 (Washington, DC: Brookings,
2011), 50-61.

16
seal political bargains. This situation has resulted in extensive problems of graft and
corruption.
Prerogative #11: Role in legal system. The rating here is LOW. Although the
military still have their own legal system, their writ does not extend beyond, to
civilian areas, except in that which specifically concerns crimes against the military
organization. Also, this separate system is currently being scrutinized, with the
head of the Federal Supreme Tribunal (the highest civilian court) criticizing the
military system.30 Further, due to the powers of the Ministério Público, Public
Ministry the powers of all government entities, including the armed forces, are
under scrutiny.
In sum, Brazil is clearly a consolidated democracy. According to the
Bertelsmann Transformation Index for 2016, which unlike most other indices of the
quality of democracy, includes items on civil – military relations, Brazil is a
“Democracy in Consolidation” that is the highest rating of the Index of the five that
they offer. 31 And, as an electoral democracy it made, and still makes, perfectly good
political sense to diminish the prerogatives of the military from their twenty-one
years of rule, and for the politicians to appropriate them. 32
SECOND, ABOLISHING THE SNI
In line with an electoral platform promise President Collor abolished the
Serviço Nacional de Informações, (SNI) in 1990. The SNI had such a bad reputation,
which was caused not only due to its prominent role in human rights abuses during
the military regime, but which also continued after the transition to a civilian
president in 1985, that there was no popular support, including in the armed forces,
to counter its abolition. Maybe as important as an indication of the low relevance of
30We are beholden to Angela Moreira Domingues da Silva for her invaluable
information on this topic. Her doctoral dissertation, listed in the references, is on the
topic of military justice.
31 https://www.bti-project.org/en/index/status-index/ Accessed December 15,
2016.
32 According to Wiebelhaus-Brahm the democratic consolidation is not due to the
electoral dynamics but to a change of heart in the military. Wiebelhaus-Brahm,
“What does…” 17. We do not find that argument convincing.

17
intelligence, it was not until 1995 that the Presidency, under Fernando Henrique
Cardoso, and politicians of the Left in the Congress got around to creating its
successor, the ABIN, and, as noted above, with severe restrictions on its role and a
very limited budget. 33 Most importantly since the founding of ABIN in 1995, in
terms of electoral politics is that the constitutional amendment, that has been
bandied about for at least ten years, which would include reference to intelligence in
the constitution, and resolve many of the issues which guaranteed the fecklessness
of ABIN, has never come up for a vote in the Congress, and has thus never been
passed.
THIRD, BRAZIL HAS NO ENEMIES.
A common refrain and widely held perception is that Brazil has no enemies.
Brazil is considered a “geopolitically satisfied” country with no major border
disputes with its neighbors. The “geopolitical frustrated” countries in South
America, which include Argentina (Falklands/Malvinas), Bolivia (exit to the sea, or
salida al mar), and Venezuela (territorial claims to the Essequibo River), are not
“frustrated” in relation to Brazil. Brazil occupies a unique position in the world: it
shares borders with many nations, but has no major geopolitical issues with any of
them.
Furthermore, Brazil’s rivalry with Argentina has largely dissipated. The
rivalry peaked in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as the military regimes in both
countries viewed each other’s missile and nuclear programs with deep suspicion.
Competition also extended to riverine resources, as Brazil’s bid for hydroelectric
power along the Paraná River was met with protests by the Argentine government.
Brazil’s defense posture at the time was driven in large measure by the rivalry with
Argentina. In the final years of the military regimes and especially under civilian
presidents, Brazil and Argentina began to cooperate in trade and even in the nuclear
33 On ABIN see, for example, Thomas Bruneau, “Intelligence Reform in Brazil: A long,
Drawn-Out Process,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence
28:3 (2015), 502-519, and the bibliography he cites.

18
and missile arenas, creating an almost textbook example of cooperation. Today,
together in UNASUR, Argentina and Brazil enjoy harmonious relations.
This uniquely privileged position is vividly captured in a blunt statement in
the interview with then-Brazilian Minister of Defense José Viegas Filho in March of
2002. In response to the question, “Is Brazil immune to terrorism?” he stated, “No
one can say that they are immune to terrorism. But if you were to draw up a list of
countries that are vulnerable to this problem, Brazil would certainly be in one of the
lowest rankings. Brazil has no enemies. There is not one country in the world that
hates us or is prejudiced against us”. 34
Current corroboration for this view can be found in the END of 2008, which
states in the Introduction: “Brazil is a peaceful country, by tradition and conviction.
It lives in peace with its neighbors”. 35 And, in the same Defense Strategy, under
“Guidelines:” “Presently, Brazil does not have any enemies”36. If Brazil has no
enemies, then why would citizens vote for politicians who say they are going to use
tax – generated funds for national security and defense when there are so many
other unmet demands in the socio-economic areas?
There is a widely held consensus among the elite and the general population
about the country’s peaceful vocation. As Luis Bitencourt and Alcides Costa Vaz state
in the Executive Summary of their report on Brazilian Strategic Culture, “Peace is
thus the strategic and cultural norm; it involves active engagement by the State via
alliances, diplomacy, economic developments, and trade partnerships. The Brazilian
National Defense Strategy underscores and builds perceptions of security upon
peace and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. It is remarkable that the first word in
the Brazilian National Defense Strategy of 2008 is ‘peace’. This key document states
that ‘peace is the main goal of this strategy.’ In general, Brazilians believe that they
34 Correio Brasiliense 2003 Available at http://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/>
Accessed 9 July 2013.
35 Ministério da Defesa, Estratégia Nacional de Defesa, Brasília: Governo Federal,
2008), 8
36 Ibid, 16.

19
are a peaceful people, and that peace is an ingrained cultural value.”37. The view of
peace as a vocation is supported by the public’s general perception as validated in
numerous public opinion surveys. 38
The three points noted above regarding electoral politics and their impact on
the security sector including the armed forces and the intelligence services –
diminishing prerogatives, abolishing SNI, and responding to popular perceptions
regarding Brazil’s unique situation in lacking enemies – are probably enough to
explain the legal and financial situation of the security sector. Furthermore, in
reviewing the literature on the military and intelligence agencies, and on the
process leading up to the CNV, as well as queries with informed observers in Brazil,
we could find no link whatsoever between human rights abuses and the severely
restricted legal and financial situation in the security sector.
If even further proof were needed we can cite the allocation of resources to
the military personnel and their high prestige in Brazil today.
“Brazil, BRIC Nations, and U.N. Security Council Nations: Percentage of Defense
Budgets Spent on Military Personnel 39
Nation
Percentage of
Defense Budget
Spent on
Personnel
Brazil 71%
37 Luis Bitencourt and Alcides Costa Vaz Brazilian Strategic Culture, Miami: Florida
International University Applied Research Center, 2009, 4.
38 See for example Brazilians Upbeat About Their Country, Despite Its Problems, in:
Pew Research, Global Attitudes Project, online:
<http://www.pewglobal.org/2010/09/22/brazilians-upbeat-about-their-country-despite-its-
problems/> Accessed 9 July 2013.
39 Jane’s Defense Budgets. Accessed March 13, 2014.

20
China 55%
France 50%
India 50%
Russian Federation 57%
United Kingdom 34%
United States 26%
While the overall defense budget is low, the personnel receive a relatively high
percentage of it. And, one might expect that the support of the armed forces for
democracy (in terms of Wiebelhaus-Brahm above) would be popularly perceived as
low in view of the information brought to the public attention through the process
leading up to the CNV. This is clearly not the case. In the extremely rigorous
analysis of IPEA in its Sistema de Indicadores de Percepção Social of 29 January 2012,
in response to the question “In your opinion, do the Armed Forces of Brazil respect
democracy?” a total of 77.9% responded either “totally” or “reasonably”, and only
21% responded “little” or “not at all”. 40 In contrast, in response to a question on the
Amnesty Law of 1979, 43% had never heard of it, 32% responded they had heard of
it but didn’t know what it entailed, and only 24% said they had heard of it and knew
what it entailed. 41While the amnesty law, and its abolition, is a key issue for those
involved in the truth commission process, it clearly is not for the general public.
FOURTH, CNV OVERCOME BY EXPOSURE OF GRAFT AND CORRUPTION
According to Mariana Schreiber, the published results of the CNV in
December of 2014, were to have all sorts of important implications. 42 This was not
to be, and we have to go back to the Constitution of 1988 that was full of
40 IPEA, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômico Aplicada,”Sistema de Indicadores de
Percepção Social, Defesa Nacional 29 Jaunary 2012. p. 13. Available at
http://www.ipea.gov.br accessed 15 December 2016.
41 IPEA, p. 14.
42 Mariana Schreiber, “Comissão da Verdade: O que acontece após o relatório final?”
BBC December 9, 2014.

21
contradictions to understand why. The issue of parliamentary vs. presidential form
of government was never resolved, neither in the constituent assembly nor after. On
the one hand the constitution gave the congress a role in approving annual budgets
and allowed them to overrule presidential vetoes with absolute majorities rather
than a two-thirds vote. On the other hand, it gave the presidency the exclusive right
to initiate and execute annual budgets and to force 45 – day limits on the congress to
review bills defined as “urgent” by the president, the power to appoint a cabinet,
subject to Senate approval, and the power to issue executive decrees (medidas
provisórias) which had the force of law while congress had 30 days to review the
measure. Post – 1990 presidents utilized these measures, and others, to govern.
Even with these gimmicks, the need to assemble a coalition, since no
president since the first directly elected, President Collor, has belonged to a party
with a majority in either house of congress, all presidents would have to obtain the
support of other parties. Brazil has one of, if not the most fractured, party system of
any democracy. This form of government, commonly called coalitional
presidentialism (presidencialismo de coalizão), could, and did, evolve into the
massive use of corruption.
The first and most famous, but not the only, corruption scandal of President
Lula (2002 – 2010) was the mensalão “big monthly” (as in big monthly payments to
members of congress to support his government’s policies in the congress) scandal.
Alfred Montero has this to say on this topic. “The need to engage in vote – buying
emerged from the limited options the Lula administration had for composing the
same kind of legislative coalition that Cardoso enjoyed.” 43 Several top Workers’
Party (PT) officials were implicated in this vote – buying scheme. The scandal
ultimately led to the convictions of twenty-five people, including Lula’s former chief
of staff, José Dirceu de Oliveira e Silva, who has more recently been sentenced to 23
years in jail in the Lava Jato corruption scheme.
There are so many corruption scandals currently in play in the investigation
and sentencing phases, that only experts can keep straight the modalities of
43 Alfred P. Montero, Brazil: Reversal of Fortune (Cambridge, Mass: Polity Press,
2014), 43

22
Mensalão, Lava Jato, Petrolão, Zelotes, Operation Aequalis, and Operation Timóteo to
mention only the biggest and most current. In a settlement on December 21, 2016
for up to U.S. $4.5 billion with the U.S. Department of Justice, it was stated that the
investigation involving bribery by Odebrecht and its subsidiary, Braskem, involved
the largest bribery case on record in the U.S. 44 Very simply, the massive corruption
scandals overwhelmed in the public, and in the media, the results of the CNV.
Furthermore, the President who received the CNV report, and who had been
tortured during the military regime, was impeached in April 2016, ex-president Lula
has been now been accused twice of involvement in corruption schemes, and the
main political party behind the CNV, the PT, suffered very seriously in the municipal
elections in mid – 2016. While not all of the crimes involve politicians, most of them
do, and virtually all of them involve sources of funds, as in Petrobras, under the
control of the Brazilian State, and thus of necessity involve politicians.
CONCLUSION
The 1979 general amnesty, a central element of the entendimento
(understanding) of the democratic transition from the military to civilian regime,
has held despite scattered opposition within Brazil and from the Inter – American
Commission on Human Rights. Due to the dynamics of electoral politics, however,
the extensive military prerogatives of the early phase of the democratic transition
have all been virtually eliminated, and the key components of Brazil’s security
sector – the armed forces and the main intelligence service (ABIN) receive minimal
public and financial support. While we argue that electoral politics in Brazil
provides a more compelling explanation for the situation of the armed forces and
intelligence agencies than the discovery of the “truth” during a military regime,
authors on truth and reconciliation commissions note that countries establish these
commissions for several reasons. Therefore, some of the other goals, including,
according to Wiebelhaus-Brahm, establishing facts about past abuses, providing
44 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-21/odebrecht-braskem-agree-to-carwash-penalty-of-
3-5-billion Accessed January 3, 2017.

23
victims with a venue in which to tell their story, and to educate about a troubling
period in the nation’s history, may well apply in the case of Brazil.

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