1. Initiative "one book in one snapshot"
Title of the book/paper: Brexit: Threats and Opportunities for Global Development
Author: Owen Barder (Center for Global Development)
Date of publication: 28 June 2016
Sectors/areas of interest: Brexit, UK, European Union, Global development aid
Summary
This short article, which was published five days after the Brits decided to leave the EU,
speculates in a very well-balanced manner the threats and opportunities of ‘Brexit’
regarding global development aid and least developed countries (LDCs).
Speculation entails a vast amount of uncertainty, so the article contains a lot of ‘ifs’ and
the use of the conditional tense. It was written 6 months ago and Article 50 of the Lisbon
Treaty is yet to be triggered for the formal process of ‘Brexit’ to take place. Nonetheless,
Prime Minster Theresa May did deliver a speech with 12 priorities on Tuesday 17 January
2017, where she accepted the UK would pay to participate in some “specific European
programmes” but would not be contributing vast sums to the EU budget. She did not
mention the words ‘development’ nor ‘aid’ though, so uncertainty is still the flavour of the
month. We did learn however that the UK would be leaving the Single Market.
‘Brexit’ will affect economic growth, trade, remittances and aid which could have a
negative impact on LDCs; especially British Commonwealth countries such as the ones
covered by DEVCO Directorate H: Bangladesh, the Maldives, Pakistan, Sri Lanka (South and
South East Asia), the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa,
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu (Pacific). Moreover, aid is also given to the
Pitcairn Islands (a British Overseas Territory in the Pacific) by the Department for
International Development (DFID) as well as the EU. With a population of around 40, the
Pitcairn Islanders could seriously be affected by ‘Brexit’.
The UK meets the international 0.7% benchmark of gross national income (GNI) to be
spent on development aid. This amounts to roughly £ 12 billion per year. Only the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden and Denmark of the EU reach this 0.7% benchmark.
This means that the other EU Member States (MS) which give aid are not playing (or
paying) by the rules. Given the UK’s large contribution, LDCs could seriously be affected
therefore once the UK leaves the EU. An extreme scenario posited by Owen Barder is that
in order to save money, DFID may have to shut down as a consequence of ‘Brexit’ and that

2. the £ 12 billion is instead spent within Britain. On the other hand, ‘Brexit’ could mean that
the UK is less restricted in spending its 0.7% of GNI on aid on the poorest countries and
shifts its aid to ‘more effective’ multilateral institutions such the World Bank instead of the
European Commission, which could lead to the UK taking the lead in global international
development policy.
Once the UK leaves the Single Market, LDCs could also lose their duty-free, quota-free
access to the UK which they currently enjoy under the Everything But Arms (EBA)
agreement and the European Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Alternatively, Barder
hypothesises that the UK could duplicate the EBA and EPAs and offer preferential market
access to LDCs which could be a potential positive outcome of ‘Brexit’. Another positive
outcome for LDCs could be that they sell their products in rich country markets without
facing tariffs.
Since the set-up of the British Department for Exiting the European Union requires more
civil servants to focus on negotiations with Brussels, the UK will have fewer resources and
less influence on an international platform for global leadership. The author suggests
European aid could instead be spent on European neighbouring countries instead of LDCs.
However, this would be a lengthy process and seems unlikely in my opinion especially as
one of the EU’s objectives is to combat poverty worldwide and not just in its backyard.
Another consequence for the UK is that it would no longer would be able to have a strong
voice to increase transparency, reduce international tax avoidance and corruption. The
UK’s role of acting as a moral compass and a European leader of development could
therefore be replaced by another EU MS. Furthermore, post-Brexit, the UK would be
removed from the European Coordination meetings which agree a common position for
key global fora such as the World Bank. As a consequence, both the UK and European
voices would be weaker on a global scale according to Barder.
One of the tasks of the ‘Brexit’ government is to take into consideration the three
devolved nations’ strategies on their preferred outcomes of ‘Brexit’. The majority of Scots
and Northern Irish voted to remain, while Wales (and England) voted to leave which
makes ‘Brexit’ an even tougher challenge as the government will need to negotiate
externally with Brussels, as well as internally with Belfast, Cardiff and Edinburgh. This
would have a knock-on effect with regards to aid. This article suggests that once ‘Brexit’
happens, Scotland could push for a referendum to leave the UK. Scotland recently held
one in 2014 where 45% of the population wanted to leave so this is certainly a possibility.
If an election goes ahead and Scotland leaves, the article suggests its aid strategy could
then resemble that of Scandinavian countries (World ranking of GNI % towards
development aid: Sweden 1st
, Norway 2nd
and Denmark 4th
). In other words, Scotland
could offer a more generous and coherent aid policy. This argument is far-fetched in my
view and I do not foresee Scotland being in the same financially well-off situation as its
Scandinavian neighbours for the time being.

3. In conclusion, Europe will need to wait until Article 50 is triggered (date still to be
confirmed) in order to get a clearer picture of Britain’s (positive or negative) impact on
development aid, so watch this space!
Takeaway messages for DG DEVCO
Despite the age of this article, we are still in a world of uncertainty regarding ‘Brexit’’s
effects so it difficult to take away any message for anyone, let alone DG DEVCO. Currently
the EU has not developed a common position on ‘Brexit’ due to the date of the triggering
of Article 50 not being confirmed. But once Article 50 is triggered, DG DEVCO would get a
much clearer sense of the UK’s objectives on spending aid abroad and therefore of the
opportunities and risks.
In my opinion, DG DEVCO could already start a dialogue with DFID (should it stay open) to
establish what money is going to be spent on Britain’s Commonwealth countries which DG
DEVCO covers in Asia, Africa, the Pacific and OCTs.
The ‘Brexit’ government has a huge task ahead, a fraction of which is to deal with its
development aid policy. Furthermore, Theresa May will need to negotiate with 27 MS and
three devolved nations. DG DEVCO and other development programmes could severely be
affected by this in a few years’ time so a DG DEVCO contingency plan is critical at this point
in my view. Perhaps a position needs to be opened in DG DEVCO to deal with post-Brexit
development aid relations for the four geographical directorates (for which four British
trainees could be hired).
Date: 22 January 2017
Name of Trainee: Guy Janaway (Directorate H)