1. Graham Scott
International Law Research Paper
Last spring, Crimea underwent a whirlwind of events, culminating in a formal
Russian annexation of the territory. Multiple areas of international law apply to Russia’s
annexation of Crimea. Russia and the West have both cited international law in support
of their claims to the legality of the annexation. The appeals to international law Russia
and the West have made will be presented and evaluated. In conclusion, this paper will
determine whether the annexation of Crimea was legal or illegal and why.
First, it is important to briefly review the events leading to Russia’s annexation of
Crimea. Russian extremists seized Crimea’s parliament buildings in late February.
Meanwhile, Russian military forces mobilized near Crimean borders, including the
Russian naval base in Sevastopol (The New York Times 2014). In an emergency session,
the Crimean Parliament voted Sergei Aksyonov as the new Crimean Prime Minister, yet
reports leaked out that lawmakers voted under threats and intimidation. Several days
later, Parliament voted in favor of holding a referendum to determine whether Crimea
would remain part of Ukraine or join Russia. The vote was once again closed from
independent journalists (Reuters 2014). In early March, ousted Ukrainian President
Viktor Yanukovych allegedly asked for Russian forces to stabilize and maintain security
in Crimea, which resulted in Russian occupation of Crimea (Bloomberg Business 2014).
On March 16th, the referendum was held, and Crimeans overwhelmingly voted to join the
Russian Federation. However, the legitimacy of the referendum has been widely
questioned (Peters 2014). Finally, Russia formally annexed Crimea with the signing of

2. the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian
Federation.
Russia made several interpretations of international law to support their claim of a
legal annexation of Crimea. Specifically, Russia sought to establish legality under the
balance of two principles in international law, the principles of territorial integrity and
self-determination. William Burke-White states, “With respect to the first principle, the
prohibition on the use of force to acquire territory, Putin adopted strategic denial,” (2014,
4). The International Court of Justice established an important precedent in Nicaragua v.
United States of America, stating that only assistance through effective control of military
operations would bestow legal responsibility upon the assisting state (Burke-White
2014). With this precedent, Russia only needed to avoid proof of an effective control of
the military resistance in Crimea leading to the annexation (Burke-White 2014).
Regarding the principle of self-determination, Russia sought to depict Crimea as, “a
distinct people who have been subject to systematic oppression, and who have chosen
their future status legitimately, through a democratic process,” (Burke-White 2014, 6). A
proposal by the Ukrainian government to revise the language policy was seen as
oppression of minorities residing in Crimea. Finally, the Crimean referendum provided a
democratic process for the people to use to determine their future (Burke-White 2014).
How well do Russia’s arguments hold under observation? Russia denied having
effective control over the pro-Russian forces in Crimea in an attempt to avoid
responsibility for the violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Vladimir Putin has since
admitted that the unidentified troops operating in Crimea were in fact Russian forces
under his command (The World Post 2014). This line of explanation would then seem

3. dead, but Russia has interpreted the right of self-defense to include, “the protection of its
nationals abroad,” in order to legitimate its military presence in Crimea (Burke-White
2014, 5). This brings more questions to the surface. Does the right of self-defense under
international law include the protection of nationals abroad? Were Russian nationals
attacked in a way that would legitimate military retaliation? The answer to the first
question has been widely debated in the field of international law. Thomson argues that
the right of self-defense extends to the protection of nationals on the fulfillment of three
criteria, “an imminent threat of injury to nationals, a failure or inability on the part of the
sovereign to protect them, and measures of protection are strictly confined to the object
of protecting them from injury through the use of force,” (2012, 628-629). Although the
extent to which self-defense extends to nationals abroad is disputed, scholars agree that
this form of self-defense would need to abide by the same requirements of proportionality
and approval by the United Nations Security Council (Shaw 2014). In regard to the
second question, there is doubt that Russian nationals ever faced any form of severe
attack. McGee states, “There is little or no evidence that the government or the people of
the Ukraine have beaten or tortured them (ethnic Russians) or threatened their lives,”
(2014, 3). Not only were Russians free from oppression, but Russia’s occupation of
Crimea was also not a proportionate response to any minor attacks that may have
occurred.
Russia’s second argument hinged on Crimea’s exercise of self-determination
through a democratic process. We must question Russia’s citation of the referendum in
Crimea as a democratic process. Burke-White states, “When a population exercises this
right through a referendum, the process must be well organized, free of corruption and

4. preceded by a period of thoughtful deliberation,” (2014, 7). In contrast, the Crimean
referendum was rapidly pushed through without debate. The ballot also presented a false
dichotomy between joining Russia or reverting to the 1992 constitutional union with
Ukraine. (Burke-White 2014). In conclusion, Russia’s arguments are largely invalid
under closer examination.
What arguments have the West used to deny the legality of Russia’s annexation of
Crimea? First, critics claimed that Russia violated the territorial integrity and sovereignty
of Ukraine in the annexation of Crimea. NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen illustrated the second point stating, “The annexation of Crimea through a so
called referendum held at gun point is illegal and illegitimate,” (Brookings Institute
2014). Finally, Ukraine has objected over Crimea’s unilateral separation as a violation of
the Ukrainian Constitution.
In regard to the first argument, Russia did take ownership of the troops in Crimea
leading up to the referendum. However, troop deployment was defended as a response to
a letter supposedly received from overthrown Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych
(Bloomberg Business 2014). The question then becomes whether Yanukovych was still
the legitimate head of government in Ukraine at the time of his letter to Putin.
Yanukovych was not impeached by a constitutional majority in the Ukrainian Parliament,
falling nine votes short of the 337 needed (Diplomatic Courier 2014). The interim
government also failed to establish control over Ukraine, with strong, pro-Russian
sentiment in eastern Ukraine. The international response was disputed; with the interim
government being deemed legitimate by the U.S. and the E.U., while Russia believed
Yanukovych remained the legitimate head of government. If Yanukovych did in fact

5. remain legitimately in power, Russia did not violate the sovereignty of Ukraine, but was
instead responding to a request for help by the legitimate Ukrainian government.
The West’s second argument concerning the legitimacy of the referendum is
easier to support. The aforementioned structure of the ballot left voters without many of
the possible options for the future of Crimea. The democratic nature of the referendum
and the levels of voter turnout have also been questioned. Human rights experts have
determined that, “only 15 to 30 percent of those eligible to vote did vote in favor of
joining Russia,” (Peters 2014, 256). There are four principle standards referendums must
meet under international law, “first, peacefulness; second, universal, equal, free and
secret suffrage; third, the framework conditions of freedom of media and neutrality of the
authorities; and finally an international referendum observation,” (Peters 2014, 273-274).
The Crimean referendum met none of these standards. For example, Crimea was not a
neutral territory free from occupation of Russian forces, nor were outside groups allowed
to observe the referendum take place (Peters 2014). Without a free and fair referendum,
Russia’s annexation of Crimea may have in fact been a violation of Ukraine’s territorial
integrity and sovereignty, supporting the first argument made by Ukraine and Western
supporters.
The final argument rested on the premise that the Crimean referendum violated
Ukrainian constitutional law. The Supreme Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
established the legality of the referendum based on Article 138.2 of the Constitution of
Ukraine, which gives Crimea the power to conduct local referendums (Peters 2014, 262).
The counter-argument cites Article 134 of the Ukrainian Constitution that, “defines
Crimea as an inseparable constituent part of Ukraine,” (Peters 2014, 263). Article 73 of

6. Ukraine’s constitution is also breached. Article 73, “requires any alteration to its territory
be approved by a referendum of the entire country,” (Chesterman 2014, 3). The Venice
Commission, the European Union’s advisory body on constitutional law matters,
therefore favored the supreme Ukrainian Constitution (Peters 2014). In conclusion, the
Crimean referendum did violate the Ukrainian Constitution. Whether this will void the
legality of Crimea’s secession under international law will be discussed in our final
judgment of the case.
Both sides of this international legal argument have been presented, each making
a thorough appeal to international law. The question then remains, was Russia’s
annexation of Crimea legal? Before moving on to the inspection of specific details, the
larger principle of self-determination must be examined. Crimea not only failed to have
Ukraine’s approval of the referendum, but Crimea in fact broke Ukrainian constitutional
law. Does Crimea have the right to make this unilateral act of secession from Ukraine?
This question has divided international law scholars. Anne Peters sees the
constitutionality of Crimea’s referendum as irrelevant from an international law
perspective (2014). In fact, unilateral declarations of independence have not been
prohibited by international law (Chesterman 2014). McGee takes a more direct approach,
stating, “unilateral secession is always valid,” (2014, 4). Others argue against the validity
and effectiveness of unilateral secession under international law. Chesterman counters
his previous argument, “The fact that a declaration of independence is not prohibited by
international law does not mean that any such declaration would be effective.” He
elaborates, “secession is treated as a factual matter that may or may not lead to
recognition by other countries on the basis of their political choices,” (Chesterman 2014,

7. 3). Only decolonization movements and territories breaking free from foreign military
occupation have been recognized as legitimate unilateral acts of secession (Chesterman
2014). Similar interpretations do not recognize the right of unilateral secession as
extending outside of the colonial framework (Shaw 2014). Shaw continues, “Self-
determination has also been used in conjunction with the principle of territorial
integrity… to prevent a rule permitting secession from independent states from arising,”
(2014, 187). The scope and power of the right of self-determination in international law
cannot be clearly determined at this point.
Assuming Crimea had the right to unilaterally secede from Ukraine, did Crimea
meet the international legal standards necessary for a legitimate secession? Three
procedural conditions must be met in order to constitute a legal secession (Peters 2014).
First, a democratic procedure is needed. We have determined the Crimean referendum
did not meet the democratic standards determined by international law. Second, all other
options to resolve political differences within the state must be exhausted. The Crimean
referendum occurred quickly after the installation of the new Ukrainian government,
raising doubts that alternatives to secession were explored. Finally, the referendum must
be held under peaceful conditions, which was not the case in Crimea (Peters 2014).
Without the fulfillment of these conditions, the principle of territorial integrity and
stability prevails (Peters 2014). Therefore, it is in the opinion of this paper that Russia’s
annexation of Crimea was illegal.
This paper has surveyed Russia’s annexation of Crimea through the lens of
international law. Russia has defended the legality of its occupation of Crimea, the
Crimean referendum, and the subsequent Russian annexation of Crimea. Yet after

8. careful examination of this case, the vast majority of the international community is
correct in denouncing Russia’s annexation of Crimea illegal under international law.
Russia’s case falls apart in judging the Crimean referendum. The process of the
referendum fell short of the democratic standards it needed to reach. As a result,
Ukraine’s right of territorial integrity and sovereignty are supreme to Crimea’s right to
self-determination.

9. References
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