1. NSRDEC PAO # U16-332
“Hybrid Warfare Is Coming To a Theater Near You”
By Frank Kostka (NSRDEC) and Tim Hill (PM E2S2 / PdD CBI); 27 July 2016
Shockand awe was a good concept to punish ourenemies, but lacked the breadth of solutions needed
to stabilize Iraq. Underestimated were the cultural, societal and political seams that were ripe for
exploitationbybothNon-State and State Actors. Whether in Yugoslavia, Iraq or Libya, the unshackling
of historical constraints doesn't always lead to vibrant, western style, democracies. The 2016 Joint
Concept for Integrated
Campaigning (JCIC) Executive
Overview written by the Army
Capabilities Integration Center
recognizes this and suggests
that winning at warfare in a
Hybrid Environment is more
about shaping and less about
rapid dominance. Shock and
awe was an example of the
latter.
The genie is out of the bottle
and today's military leaders are
facing complex Hybrid Warfare
(HW) adversariesandwill be for
the foreseeable future. HW is
defined as combating a
consortium of adversaries
across multiple battle-spaces,
some still undefined. They will
be a mix of State and Non-State
Actors synergistically aligned,
who have shown a lack of any constraints when dealing with their captives. Religious and sectarian
genocide, human trafficking, and rape are common outcomes.
Chief of Staff Army GEN Mark Milley at the October 2015 AUSA stated that the Army Training and
Doctrine Command was targeting specialized training for units deploying to areas where HW was a
prevalent threat.
 The impact of Hybrid Warfarecould be catastrophic acrossthebattlefield
CurrentJointPub 5-0 JointOperationsPlanning doctrine focuses on two states, War and Peace and the
Warfighters' primary focus is on dominating the adversary. The 2016 JCIC is now considering this
approach through a HW lens.

2. “HybridWarfareIs ComingTo a Theater Near You” 27 July 2016
By Frank Kostka (NSRDEC) and Tim Hill (PME2S2 / PdD CBI) NSRDEC PAO # U16-332
2
Gen Milley's AUSA remarks prompted the Joint Standardization Board (JSB) for Tactical Shelters and
Expeditionary BasingSystems toinitiate aPhase I studyinNovember2015 to determineif expeditionary
basingactivitieswouldbe impacted bythisnew threat. The JSB, an element of the Joint Committee on
Tactical Shelters (JOCOTAS), recently assumed standardization responsibility for basing systems. It
works closely with the Services' Program of Record basing Product Managers, to include the Army's
Force Provider and Air Force's BEAR Base programs.
In the 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS) four pillars of HW were identified and clear definitions
provided. Clarity of meaning is critical to fully understand communications in this area. The CBEC
(Contingency Basing Executive Council ) is currently working through eleven years of expeditionary
basing strategy, doctrine and policy only to find terms and concepts used broadly have multiple
definitions. A Joint Strategic Working Group led by Army G4 began addressing this issue in 2015.
The HW studies investigated included a series of common themes and a recognition of multiple
emerging threats. Key characteristics are listed below.
 Uncertaintyand Confusion….Proverbial FogofWar
 UnanticipatedGame Changes
 State and Non State Players Actingin Synchrony
 Blurring between,Warand Peace and; Combatants and Non Combatants
 Exploitationof Societal Seams in OpenSocieties
In total the JSB study reviewedover400 documentsand identifiedtenthreatslisted in the above table.
All couldimpactbasingactivities. The firstfourincolumnone were fromthe 2005 NDSdiscussedabove.
Included are disruptive challenges that emanate
from adversaries who develop and use
breakthrough measures to negate current U.S.
advantages in key operational domains. The
Improvised Explosive Device or IED is a prime
example. IEDs were totally unexpected, cost an
estimated $150.00 to produce, consisted of an
artilleryshell, aremote control unit and detonator.
The IED made the HMMWV obsolete overnight. It

3. “HybridWarfareIs ComingTo a Theater Near You” 27 July 2016
By Frank Kostka (NSRDEC) and Tim Hill (PME2S2 / PdD CBI) NSRDEC PAO # U16-332
3
was one of the biggest killers on the battlefield causing more than 3000 deaths and approximately
30,000 injuries to U.S. and coalition Warfighters. It drove a multimillion dollar mitigation effort and
resulted in a $50 billion vehicle replacement program. It should be noted that the IED threat became
more deadlyasa resultof the use of explosivelyformedpenetrators(EFP). According to the Wall Street
Journal EFPs were provided by Iran.
 Data Sources
The JSB study data base includes open source HW studies,
technical papers, reports and articles. The latter come from print
journalists, wire services, military publications, Janes and other
defense sources and electronic media. The information is
reviewed and logged into a matrix that bins the data into nine
categories listed in the chart to the right. This will allow future
sortingto quantifyintensity,identifyemerging trends, investigate
leading indicators and discover subtleties. Phase II will include a
review of the current data base to validate if the HW element
binning is consistent and captures visible insights.
A summation of work to date was presented to the J4 and the
Contingency Basing Executive Council staff, Tactical Edge Virtual
Energy Community of Practice (CoP) and the NSRDEC Soldier & Squad Performance and Optimization
Initiative Program Office. There was agreement within the group that HW would impact future
expeditionarybasingefforts. TRADOCrequirementsdocumentsidentify HW as a threat to both shelters
and basing activities in general terms. A HW front end analysis was presented at the JOCOTAS 2016
springmeetingandaugmentedbykeycurrentandhistorical documents on the topic. The goal of Phase
II of the effort is to quantify basing threats using a modified Future Soldier Initiative (FSI) model.
Duringthe nextphase of the JSBstudy on HW and
expeditionary basing an update to the 2010
NSRDEC FSI Troop to Task model linked to basing
will be executed. The FSI expeditionary basing
study investigated current approaches by user
troopswithrecentfieldexperienceto establisha
platoonsize base camp. The base leadership uses
every resource to start defining what the Camp
time line for completion will look like with the
goal to get more Soldiers conducting missions
outside the wire. An excerpt from the Executive
Summary of the 4th
Brigade,25th
InfantryDivision,
Fort Richardson, Alaska exercise, follows.
The Future SoldierInitiative conducted a scenario

4. “HybridWarfareIs ComingTo a Theater Near You” 27 July 2016
By Frank Kostka (NSRDEC) and Tim Hill (PME2S2 / PdD CBI) NSRDEC PAO # U16-332
4
basedCapabilities exercise to demonstrate the challenges of building a Small Combat Unit (SCU) base
camp. Aninfantryplatoon sergeantandplatoonleaderwere the participantsinthe exercise. They were
provided a Concept of Operation that provided the Task Organization, on hand equipment, enemy
threat and environmental conditions that shape the build of the camp. The Soldiers were provided a
four hour block of time to develop work packages that represent of the Base Camp Build phases. The
workpackagesreflectthe prioritizationof how theywouldbuildthe base’scombatoutpost withcurrent
capabilities, manning and current standards for resupply requests. Troop to Task for both Base Camp
BuildandCombatOperationsconductedoutsidethe Base campwere determinedlinkedtothe priorities
of workestablishedbythe participatingleaders.The goal of the exercise wastohighlightthe challenges
of both conducting the build and combat operations simultaneously. "
A subset of the Troop to
Task Matrix divided the
mission areas into sub-
elements allowing all
personnel to be executing
traceable activities twenty-
four hours per day. The
Soldiers are assigned to
each sub-element with
specific detailed daily work
assignments.
The FSI has now
transformedinto the NSRDECSoldierandSquadPerformance OptimizationInitiative. JSBstaff met with
the Program Integration Lead on May 9, 2016 to discuss the HW project and gather input. There was
agreement that HW was a broad-based threat applicable to expeditionary basing and that updating a
variant of the Troop to Task model was a viable approach. During Phase II, this will require that each
Troop to Task categoryand sub-element be validated for the HW environment. A further assessment
will be made to crosslink Troop to Task sub-element to threats.
The ultimate goal of basing is to
the have as many Soldiers
"Outside the Wire (OTW) as
feasible. The Soldier allocation
chart on the right documentsthat
at the onset of base camp
establishmentapproximately20%
are OTW. When the base is
completed that number moves
closer to 50%. There is a steady
state requirement of 25% of the
staff being assigned to Force
Protection duties, that are 24/7
responsibilities. The 90 day base
camp build cycle is not uncommon.

5. “HybridWarfareIs ComingTo a Theater Near You” 27 July 2016
By Frank Kostka (NSRDEC) and Tim Hill (PME2S2 / PdD CBI) NSRDEC PAO # U16-332
5
A second stretch goal for phase II of the study is to identify if leading indicators for new Disruptive
Adaption threats could be identified from open source incident articles and reports. Based on a past
effortbyJOCOTAS to better understand the impact on expeditionary basing as a result the shift to the
PacificRimI believethisispossible.Asoutlined in the 2012 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership Priorities
for the 21st
Century, the Pacific Rim strategy made little note of Africa with the exception of the Arab
Springand Somalia. The resultsof ourresearcheffortbeguninJanuaryof 2013, and outlinedinthe Sept
2013 TDM Armor and Mobility made it clear that Africa would be a location of future conflict.
 The Impact of HW on future Base Camps
ATP 3-37.10 (“Base Camps,” April 2013) defines a base camp as “an evolving military facility that
supports the military operations of a deployed unit and provides the necessary support and services
for sustainedoperations.” Base Campsare essentialforbattlefieldcommanders to project power in all
HW scenarios.The risktoWarfightersutilizingbase campsare the time it takes for the base camp to be
constructed, the troop to task ratio during construction to carry out their mission, and the ability to
sustainthe base camp duringoperations. The blending of traditional conventional and irregular forces
require base camps to become sustainable and self-sufficient in the foreseeable future.
Base camps allowthe operational missiontodevelopfullyinthe mosteffective,efficient,and
sustainable mannerwhileenablingpowerprojection.Measurestoprotectthe force are maximized;
abilitiestoresupply,reconstitute andrefitthe force are enabled;andqualityof life isintegratedto
increase overall force effectiveness.These capabilitiesmustbe approachedbyrecognizingtheir
interdependence inordertoprovide the commanderthe following:
a. Reducedsupplylinesusceptibilityfromthreatforcesbyminimizinglogisticsrequirements(e.g.,
fewerfuel andwatershipmentsanduse of insituconstructionmaterialsandlabor) while
maintainingthe same level of operational capabilitiesandreadiness;
b. Increasedflexibilityinbase campoperationsthroughmodular,scalable,sustainable,and
adaptable designs.Thismayincludeconstructionof infrastructure consideredoversizedby
conventional wisdomtoallowforexpansionormore adaptability;
c. Decreasedconstructionanddeconstructionrequirements(time,material,equipment,
personnel,andcost) throughimproved,standardized,adaptabledesignsandusingexisting
facilitieswhere possible;
d. Improvedoperationalefficiencies(energy,water,andwaste management)requiringless
Soldier,civilian,orcontractor oversightandsupport.
A recentarticle inthe Wall StreetJournal titled“U.S.ShiftsAntiterrorCommandSystem “statedthatthe
U.S. Army Special Operations Command may assume a larger responsibility in the global fight against
major terrorist organizations. The action known as the Campaign Plan for countering Trans-regional
Terrorist Organizations is awaiting approval.

6. “HybridWarfareIs ComingTo a Theater Near You” 27 July 2016
By Frank Kostka (NSRDEC) and Tim Hill (PME2S2 / PdD CBI) NSRDEC PAO # U16-332
6
This may be a leading indicator for an increased need for
highlymobile small base campssuchas the Force Provider
Expeditionary Basing system developed by PM Force
Sustainment Systems, a Product Manager under PM
Expeditionary Energy and Sustainment Systems
Base camp requirementsforHW scenarios continue to be
a priority for battlefield commanders to project power.
Nonetheless, sustainable base camps can provide
flexibility, reduce overall mission costs, and decrease
predictabilityof US movements on the battlefield so that
enemyforces are deceivedabouttroopmovements,times
and location of convoys, and their ability to recognize unit capabilities, needs, and requirements.
 Phase II of the JSB Hybrid Warfare Study is Unfunded