Palestra ministrada por Dennys Zimmermann, Tauil e Chequer Advogados Associados à Mayer Brown LLP (RJ), no Seminário de Seguros de Responsabilidade Civil realizado dia 26 de agosto de 2014, em São Paulo.

2. Exploração de Petróleo e Gás - riscos, responsabilidades e seguros necessários.
Palestrante: Dennys Zimmermann - Tauil & Chequer Advogados associados a Mayer Brown LLP – RJ

3. O que é o pré-sal?
Reservas de mais de 90 bilhões de barris
Petróleo leve de alta qualidade
5 a 8 km abaixo do fundo do mar
Profundidade de mais de 2 km abaixo do nível do mar

4. Reservas Totais de mais 90 bilhões de
Área Total: 149,000 km2

5. Reservas de Óleo e Gás no Mundo
Brasil antes e depois da descoberta das reservas do pré-sal

6. Riscos do Pré-Sal É Macondo um incidente único?
Antes de Macondo: claims decorrentes de hurricanes no Golfo do México em 2005/2005 e 2008 (MWS e pipelines cover).
Estudo do Deepwater Horizon Study Group (DHSG) – Berkeley University examinou “wellbore instability rater for deepwater wells”: desde 1947 foram perfurados aprox. 50.000 poços, sendo que desde 1993 apenas 47 com mesma complexidade de Macondo.
O mesmo estudo demonstra que os rates de “well bore instability” são altos e o uso de BOP’s, mais constante.

7. Riscos do Pré-Sal - Redução da janela de Pore Pressure/Fracture Gradient; - Salt Drilling (formações de sal inibem a obtenção de resoluções sísmicas – a falta de dados sísmicos disponíveis complica o mapeamento de formações geológicas do pré-sal; além disto, a densidade do sal é baixa, facilitando movimentações durante a perfuração); - Depósitos asfálticos; - High Pressures/High Temperatures (HPHT) – downhole pressures de mais de 35.000 psi e temperatures acima de 450º F; - Dificuldades naturais no controle de poço – “…closer to Apollo 13 than the Exxon Valdez” (Thad Allen 2010: ‘National Incident Commander’s Report, MC252 Deepwater Horizon’, http://www.nrt.org/production/NRT/NRTWeb.nsf/AllAttachmentsByTitle/ SA- 1065NICReport/$File/Binder1.pdf?OpenElement, 1 October 2010) – impossibilidade de acesso por mergulhadores, disponibilidade limitada de sondas e equipamentos (BOP’s adequados à pressões superiores a 25.000 psi; dificuldade de detecção de kicks;

8. Riscos do Pré-Sal
Campo de Dos Cuadras (Santa Barbara, CA – Janeiro de 1969): 80.000 a 100.000 barris de óleo – Perdas seguradas não disponíveis
Campo Ixtoc (Bay of Campeche, Mexico – 1979): 3,3 milhões de barris de óleo – Perdas seguradas de USD22,000,000
Campo de Funiwa (Nigeria, 1980): aprox. 200.000 barris – Perdas seguradas de USD54,000,000;
Campo de Montara (Timor Sea): 28.800 barris de óleo – Perdas seguradas de USD425,000,000;
Campo do Frade (Rio de Janeiro, RJ – Novembro de 2011): menos de 3.000 barris de óleo;

9. Riscos do Pré-Sal Campo de Dos Cuadras (Santa Barbara, CA – Janeiro de 1969): 80.000 a 100.000 barris de óleo – Perdas seguradas não disponíveis Campo Ixtoc (Bay of Campeche, Mexico – 1979): 3,3 milhões de barris de óleo – Perdas seguradas de USD22,000,000 Campo de Funiwa (Nigeria, 1980): aprox. 200.000 barris – Perdas seguradas de USD54,000,000; Campo de Montara (Timor Sea): 28.800 barris de óleo – Perdas seguradas de USD425,000,000; Campo do Frade (Rio de Janeiro, RJ – Novembro de 2011): menos de 3.000 barris de óleo;

10. 4.9 milhões
de barris perdidos (62.000 barris por dia)
O custo total da
resposta pode montar a
aprox. USD 11.2bilhões
Fire burned for 36 hours
11 pessoas mortas
Afundamento da plataforma
Hidrocarbonetos despejados por 87 dias.

11. •BP: 65% interest - per occurrence limit on physical damage and business interruption is $700 million and is not expected to cover environmental cleanup costs or third party liability.
•Anadarko Petroleum: 25% interest - publicly stated they have $162.5M in available COW and Liability limits.
•Mitsui Oil Exploration: 10% interest - Mitsui is believed to have $175 million of coverage available.
•Transocean: The Deepwater Horizon estava segurada por$560 million + $950 million em third party liability insurance.
•• Cameron: The manufacturer of the blowout preventer reportedly has a $500 million liability insurance policy.
•• Halliburton: Service provider to Deepwater Horizon has liability insurance in excess of $1 billion.

12. •Riscos para o Owner/Operator e para o Contractor/Subcontractor por personal/bodily injury aos seus empregados e property damage aos seus bens;
•Riscos de liability em relação a terceiros por: (i) Personal/bodily injury, property damage, consequential losses, pollution; (ii) Riscos de poluição por contaminação proveniente dos equipamentos/assets ou do reservatório;
•Riscos de perdas consequenciais.
- Quem é responsável por que e quanto?
•Depende da lei aplicável e dos termos do contrato (Indemnity e Insurance provisions)

13. Alocação de Riscos em Contratos Standard do setor
•Danos ao próprio pessoal e aos próprios bens – knock for knock / mutual hold harmless (MHH) basis
•Riscos de liability em relação a terceiros em consequência da conduta do Operator ou do Contractor - fault/negligence basis
•Perdas consequenciais são mutuamente excluídas
•Poluição – knock for knock basis, com cada parte assumindo o risco de poluição emanando da sua própria propriedade e o Owner/Operator assumindo responsabilidade pela poluição do poço

14. Alocação de Riscos em Contratos Standard do setor
LOGIC General Conditions of Contract for Well Services :
“The Company shall save, indemnify, defend and hold harmless the Contractor from and against any claim of whatsoever nature arising from pollution and/or contamination including without limitation such pollution or contamination emanating from the reservoir and/or from any equipment or property of the Company or Contractor arising from or related to the contract” (cl.19.3);
“All exclusions and indemnities … given under this clause … shall apply irrespective of cause and notwithstanding the negligence or breach of duty (whether statutory or otherwise) of the indemnified party or any other entity or party and shall apply irrespective of any claim in tort, under contract or otherwise in law.” (cl.19.11)

15. Vantagens da alocação de riscos com base no k4k:
•Previsibilidade;
•Command/control: Cada parte mais bem posicionada para gerenciar o risco de dano ao seu pessoal e à sua propriedade ;
•Reduz os custos de seguro;
•Incentiva a troca de informação;
•Permite que as disputas sejam resolvidas e as indenizações pagas de maneira rápida;
•Reduz a “cultura da culpa”.

16. BP x Transocean Indemnity Clauses
24.2 COMPANY RESPONSIBILITY
COMPANY [BP] SHALL ASSUME FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AND SHALL PROTECT, RELEASE, DEFEND, INDEMNIFY, AND HOLD CONTRACTOR [Transocean] HARMLESS FROM AND AGAINST ANY LOSS, DAMAGE, EXPENSE, CLAIM, FINE, PENALTY, DEMAND, OR LIABILITY FOR POLLUTION OR CONTAMINATION, INCLUDING CONTROL AND REMOVAL THEREOF, ARISING OUT OF OR CONNECTED WITH OPERATIONS UNDER THIS CONTRACT HEREUNDER AND NOT ASSUMED BY CONTRACTOR IN ARTICLE 24.1 ABOVE, WITHOUT REGARD FOR NEGLIGENCE OF ANY PARTY OR PARTIES AND SPECIFICALLY WITHOUT REGARD FOR WHETHER THE POLLUTION OR CONTAMINATION IS CAUSED IN WHOLE OR IN PART BY THE NEGLIGENCE OR FAULT OF CONTRACTOR.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1451505/000145150510000069/exhibit10_1.pdf

17. BP x Transocean Indemnity Clauses
•Cost of Control of Blowout (kill well)– BP fully responsible per default indemnity clause 25:
WHETHER SUCH NEGLIGENCE BE SOLE, JOINT OR CONCURRENT, ACTIVE, PASSIVE OR GROSS OR ANY OTHER THEORY OF LEGAL LIABILITY AND WITHOUT REGARD TO WHETHER THE CLAIM AGAINST THE INDEMNITEE IS THE RESULT OF AN INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT WITH A THIRD PARTY.
•Tal disposição não se aplica à cláusula 24.1 (Transocean indeniza por poluição “originating on or above the surface of the land or water” se causada por “negligence or fault” de BP).

18. Capacidade
•Current Value de alguns dos maiores Projetos/Assets para E&P Offshore é estimado como superior a USD 5 bilhões, considerando:
-O valor de hull e infra-estrutura;
-Risers e sistemas de mooring;
-Sub-sea systems.
-FPSOs também podem conter em torno de 2 milhões de barris de óleo.
-Incremento da responsabilidade dos Owners/Operadores/Contractors

19. Cobertura de Controle de Poço – OEE – EED 8/86
Section A. Controle de Poço
A cobertura tem início com um “well becoming out of control as defined under the policy”. A apólice normalmente define um poço fora de controle como sendo aquele cujos fluidos emanados acima da superfície do solo ou do water bottom não possam ser imediatamente obstados por meio de certas ações definidas na apólice, como, por exemplo, o uso de blowout preventers ou a circulação do excesso de pressão para fora do poço. O mesmo ocorrerá quando a autoridade regulatória dispuser que o poço está for a de controle.

20. Cobertura de Controle de Poço – OEE – EED 8/86
Section A. Controle de Poço
A cobertura tem início com um “well becoming out of control as defined under the policy”. A apólice normalmente define um poço fora de controle como sendo aquele cujos fluidos emanados acima da superfície do solo ou do water bottom não possam ser imediatamente obstados por meio de certas ações definidas na apólice, como, por exemplo, o uso de blowout preventers ou a circulação do excesso de pressão para fora do poço. O mesmo ocorrerá quando a autoridade regulatória dispuser que o poço está for a de controle.

21. Cobertura de Controle de Poço – OEE – EED 8/86
1. “Well out of control”:
– Unintended flow from the well of drilling fluid, oil, gas or water above the surface of the ground or water bottom, which cannot be stopped by equipment, increase of drilling fluid or safely diverted.
2. “Well brought under control” :
– Flow is stopped or can be safely stopped;
– Drilling resumed;
– Well returned to same status before occurrence;
– Flow diverted.

22. Cobertura de Controle de Poço – OEE – EED 8/86
Section B. Redrilling
Quando um poço é controlado ele precisa ser reperfurado ou recuperado até a sua condição anterior ao blowout. A Seguradora será responsável pelos custos incorridos no redrilling até a profundidade onde o poço sofreu o sinistro, mas a sua responsabilidade estará limitada com base em um percentual aplicável ao custo original de drilling (mais uma quantia prefixada representando a atualização monetária).

23. Cobertura de Controle de Poço – OEE – EED 8/86
•Triggering event: occurrence covered under Section A;
•Expenses “reasonably incurred” and with “most prudent and economical methods” employed;
•Depth limitations to point of loss or geologic zone(s) if production well;
•No coverage if flow can be safely diverted into production through relief well or otherwise;
– Standard AFE limitations of 130% of original well to depth at time of loss, plus 10% compounded per annum for production wells up to 250% of original (elimination by endorsement);
– Time limitations: redrilling commenced within 540 days of date of accident or expiration of policy, whichever later.

24. Cobertura de Controle de Poço – OEE – EED 8/86
Section C. Seepage and Pollution, Clean-Up and Contamination
a) all sums which the Assured shall by law or under the terms of any oil and/or gas and/or thermal energy lease and/or license be liable to pay for the cost of remedial measures and/or as damages for bodily injury (fatal or non-fatal) and/or loss of, damage to or loss of use of property caused directly by seepage, pollution or contamination arising from wells insured herein;
b) the cost of, or of any attempt at, removing, nullifying or cleaning up seeping, polluting or contaminating substances emanating from wells insured herein, including the cost of containing and/or diverting the substances and/or preventing the substances reaching the shore;
c) costs and expenses incurred in the defence of any claim or claims resulting from actual or alleged seepage, pollution or contamination arising from wells insured herein, including Defence Costs and costs and expenses of litigation awarded to any claimant against the Assured, provided, however, that the inclusion of the above costs (and expenses) shall in no way extend the Combined Single Limit of Liability of Underwriters over all Sections of this Policy.

25. Cobertura de Controle de Poço – OEE – EED 8/86
Section C. Seepage and Pollution, Clean-Up and Contamination
a) all sums which the Assured shall by law or under the terms of any oil and/or gas and/or thermal energy lease and/or license be liable to pay for the cost of remedial measures and/or as damages for bodily injury (fatal or non-fatal) and/or loss of, damage to or loss of use of property caused directly by seepage, pollution or contamination arising from wells insured herein;
b) the cost of, or of any attempt at, removing, nullifying or cleaning up seeping, polluting or contaminating substances emanating from wells insured herein, including the cost of containing and/or diverting the substances and/or preventing the substances reaching the shore;
c) costs and expenses incurred in the defence of any claim or claims resulting from actual or alleged seepage, pollution or contamination arising from wells insured herein, including Defence Costs and costs and expenses of litigation awarded to any claimant against the Assured, provided, however, that the inclusion of the above costs (and expenses) shall in no way extend the Combined Single Limit of Liability of Underwriters over all Sections of this Policy.

26. Cobertura de Controle de Poço – OEE – EED 8/86
-BOP WARRANTY:
“It is warranted that where the Assured is the operator (...) on any insured well being drilled, deepened, serviced, worked over, completed and/or reconditioned, a blowout preventer(s) of standard make will, when in accordance with all regulations, requirements and normal and customary practices in the industry, be set on surface casing or on the wellhead and installed and tested in accordance with usual practice.”
“When the assured is a non-operator on any insured well, he will endeavour to see that the operator complies with the warranties”.

27. Cobertura de Controle de Poço – OEE – EED 8/86
DUE DILIGENCE CLAUSE
“It is a condition of this insurance that the Assured shall exercise due care and diligence in the conduct of all operations covered hereunder, utilizing all safety practices and equipment generally considered prudent for such operations, and in the event any hazardous condition develops with respect to an insured well, the Assured shall at their sole expense make all reasonable efforts to prevent the occurrence of a loss insured hereunder. “

28. CONTROLE DE POÇO Questões potencialmente controvertidas:
- O POÇO NÃO ESTÁ FORA DE CONTROLE SEGUNDO A DEFINIÇÃO CONTRATUAL;
-O POÇO FOI TRAZIDO SOB CONTROLE ANTES DO ALEGADO PELO SEGURADO, OU PODERIA TER SIDO TRAZIDO SOB CONTROLE ANTES;
-É NECESSÁRIO HAVER UM BLOWOUT?
-FOI ADOTADO O MÉTODO MAIS PRUDENTE E ECONÔMICO NA REPERFURAÇÃO?
- AS ATIVIDADES CONSTITUEM “DECOMMISSIONING”?
-NÃO HÁ DEFINIÇÃO DE “PROPERTY DAMAGE”; ISTO PODE AFETAR A COBERTURA PREVISTA NA SEÇÃO C?
-A EFETIVAÇÃO DA COBERTURA PARA CLEAN-UP DEPENDE DA RESPONSABILIZAÇÃO LEGAL DO SEGURADO?
-DUE DILIGENCE CLAUSE

29. CONTROLE DE POÇO
Objeto do seguro: "To cover expenses entailed by the assured in regaining control of oil or gas well(s) being drilled (…) which get out of control as a direct result of the drilling of wells insured hereunder until completion of (or) abandonment (…).”
Blowout: “(…) a condition in which a well builds up a sufficient gas pressure at the bottom of the hole and causes a rather sudden, forceful eruption or explosion which cleans out the well and causes it to go out of control.”

30. CONTROLE DE POÇO 1) Sutton Drilling Co., Inc., vs. Universal Insurance Co. (Fifth Cir. 1964): “(…) the well was out of control to the extent that extraordinary well operations had to be implemented and routine drilling could not continue (…)”. 2) Atlantic Richfield Co. vs. Underwriters at Lloyd's London (D.C. Tex. 1975): ”(…) from a practical point of view (…) a well was not under control until workers could (…) make the well as planned (…)”.

31. CONTROLE DE POÇO
DESCUMPRIMENTO DE WARRANTIES – “BLOWOUT PREVENTER OF STANDARD MAKE” – “WHEN THE ASSURED IS A NON-OPERATOR ON ANY INSURED WELL, HE WILL ENDEAVOUR TO SEE THAT THE OPERATOR COMPLIES WITH THE WARRANTIES”.
“It is warranted that where the Assured is the operator (...) on any insured well being drilled, deepened, serviced, worked over, completed and/or reconditioned, a blowout preventer(s) of standard make will, when in accordance with all regulations, requirements and normal and customary practices in the industry, be set on surface casing or on the wellhead and installed and tested in accordance with usual practice.”
“When the assured is a non-operator on any insured well, he will endeavour to see that the operator complies with the warranties”.

32. OFFSHORE POLLUTION - JL2003/006 – Exclusions (e tb em LSW244/245 ) For “Bodily Injury”, “Personal Injury”, “Property Damage” and/or “Advertising Injury” directly or indirectly caused by or arising out of seepage, pollution or contamination however caused whenever or wherever happening UNLESS (a) the seepage, pollution or contamination was caused by an “Occurrence”; and, (b) the “Occurrence” first commenced on an identified specific date during the period set out in Item 5 of the Declarations; and, (c) the “Occurrence” was first discovered by the “Insured” within fourteen (14) days of such first commencement; and, (d) written notification of the “Occurrence” was first received from the “Insured” by Underwriters within ninety (90) days of the “Insured’s” first discovery of the “Occurrence” ; and, (e) the “Occurrence” did not result from the “Insured’s” intentional violation of any statute, rule, ordinance or regulation.

33. OFFSHORE POLLUTION - JL2003/006 – Exclusions (e tb em LSW244/245 )
BUT NEVER for any actual or alleged liability:
(i) to evaluate, monitor, control, remove, nullify and/or clean-up seeping, polluting or contaminating substances to the extent such liability arises solely from any obligations imposed by or on behalf of a governmental authority; (ii) to abate or investigate any threat of seepage onto or pollution or contamination of the property of a “Third Party”; (iii) for seepage, pollution or contamination of property which is or was, at any time, owned, leased, rented or occupied by any “Insured”, or which is or was, at any time, in the care, custody or control of any “Insured” (including the soil, minerals water or any other substance on, in or under such owned, leased, rented, occupied or controlled property or property in such care, custody or control); (iv) in respect of any seepage, pollution or contamination which is directly caused by or arises out of the drilling of, production from, servicing of, operation of or participation in wells or holes;

34. WELCAR
• Liability Section – praticamente o mesmo!
• Substitui (iv) (from wells) por:
arising directly out of the transportation by the Assured of oil (other than fuel or other substances used in furtherance of the Assured's operations) or other similar substances by watercraft; or
arising directly or indirectly from seepage, pollution or contamination which is intended from the standpoint of the Assured or any other person or organisation acting for or on behalf of the Assured;

35. Atualidades – Indemnity Clauses:
ROYAL INSURANCE CO. OF AMERICA, v. SOUTHWEST MARINE (1999)
“We are persuaded, however, that a party to a maritime contract should not be permitted to shield itself contractually from liability for gross negligence. (…) We conclude that the exculpatory clauses do not shield Southwest from liability for gross negligence and, a fortiori, do not shield Southwest from liability for intentional misconduct. Royal may pursue its claims against Southwest for gross negligence and intentional misrepresentation.”

36. Atualidades: Drilling Contractors diretamente responsabilizados pelo pagamento de multas e penalidades, bem como por punitive damages; “Incentive-based” long term contracts, onde o Contractor assume o controle e direção das operações de perfuração e divide parte do upside do acréscimo de produção (sobretudo em campos maduros).

37. Atualidades:
Contingent OEE
This section is extended to afford coverage on a contingent basis and shall reimburse the Insured hereunder for any legal and/or contractual liability arising from the Insured’s gross negligence and/or wilfull-misconduct resulting from the operations of the Insured as a drilling contractor, but this insurance shall only cover costs, expenses and/or other sums for which the Insured is legally and/or contractually liable that would otherwise have been recoverable herein as a well owner if said well owner were the insured herein (subject to Energy, Exploration, and Development Insurance EED 8/86).

38. Atualidades: Contingent OEE Qual é a contingência? - Cobertura para o drilling contractor em relação a uma “legal and/or contractual liability”;
-Decorrente de “gross negligence and/or wilful misconduct”;
-Subject to terms of EED 8/86.
-Esta cobertura não atende ao drilling contractor.

39. Turnkey Well Endorsement
(for use with EED 8/86)
In consideration of an additional deposit premium of {Missing} it is hereby understood and agreed that this policy is extended to insure "TurnkeyWells". For the purposes of this insurance a TurnkeyWell shall be defined as a well to be drilled where the drilling contractor agrees to drill the well for the Assured to a contracted depth for a specific price and the contractor assumes all costs, responsibilities and liabilities while the well is being drilled to that depth.

40. RANGER INS., LTDA., TRANSOCEAN OFFSHORE DEEPWATER DRILLING, INC. ET AL. AND CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S LONDON, V. BP P.L.C. ET AL.
-Transocean mantinha seguros com cobertura de responsabilidade, primários e em excesso, no valor de USD750MM, durante o período em que a explosão na Deepwater Horizon ocorreu.
-Transocean era um contractor de BP, e a BP e suas entidades afiliadas foram nomeadas como “segurados adicionais” nas apólices de seguro.

41. -Novembro/2011: A cobertura de um “segurado adicional” é tão extensa quanto sejam os dispositivos constantes do contrato subjacente acerca da obrigação de o “segurado adicional” prover indenizações. Segundo o art. 24 do Drilling Contract, Transocean era responsável por indenizar BP com relação a poluição ou contaminação originada em ou sobre a superfície da água, enquanto BP era responsável por indenizar Transocean com relação a poluição ou contaminação originada abaixo da superfície, p.ex., em razão de um blowout. Para a Corte de origem, o contrato só exigia que a BP fosse nomeada uma “segurada adicional” em relação às obrigações assumidas pela Transocean – i.e., em ou sobre a superfície da água.

42. -Março/2013: A Corte de Apelação decidiu diferentemente: “Under Texas Law, to discern whether a commercial umbrella insurance policy (…) provides direct liability coverage for the third party, we look to the terms of the umbrella policy itself, instead of looking to the indemnity agreement in the underlying contract. We apply this analysis so long as the indemnity agreement and the insurance coverage provision are separate and independent. (…)
Because we find that the (…) policies (…) do not impose any relevant limitation upon the extent to which BP is an additional insured and because the additional insured (…)”

43. Cont.:
“(…) provision in the Drilling Contract is separate from and addicional to indemnity provisions therein, we find BP is entitled to coverage under each of Transocean’s policies as an additional isured as a matter of law”.
- Novembro/2013: O Quinto Circuito reviu sua decisão e remeteu o caso à Suprema Corte do Texas para apreciação, que a admitiu.

44. BP x Transocean contract: Insured Contract provision: “(…) shall mean any written or oral contract or agreement entered into by the ‘Insured’ and pertaining to business under which the ‘Insured’ assumes the tort liability of another party (…)”. Additional Insured provision: “[BP] shall be name as additional insured in each of [transocean’s] policies, except workers’ compensation, for liabilities assumed by [Transocean] under the terms of this Contract”.

45. “To be allowed to drill on the outer continental shelf is a privilege to be earned, not a private right to be exercised.” Deep Water Report to the President of the United States of North America. Obrigado