2. Editor’s letter
Now that two issues of AD ABSURDUM have come into
existence, you may expect that there will be a third and
that it may feature an animal on the front. BUT
BEWARE: Just because you’ve only ever seen average-
sized white swans doesn’t mean that there isn’t a black
swan out there, large enough to support a portly,
Scottish philosopher.
We hope there will indeed be a summer outing for Ad
Absurdum, but we mustn’t become complacent; the
sun may not always rise, so please enjoy this issue in
case it’s our last.
Thank you to all contributors who have shared their
reasoning for others to enjoy. We encourage debate so
please get in touch if you wish to respond to any of the
articles, especially if you are willing to enter the lion’s
cage and defend the student’s right to be satisfied…
Contact us at:
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Editor-in-Chief
Vanessa Lucas
The Editorial Team
Thomas Galley, Vanessa Lucas, Elizabeth Watkins, James Wilson
Designed by
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Cover Design
Elizabeth Watkins
Illustrations
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Contents
1 Moral Dilemmas
Michael Lyons questions whether consequentialism or
deontology can provide the answer.
3 The Student Experience
Engaged students or passive consumers? James
Ladyman outlines why ‘satisfying’ students might not be
the prime objective of a philosophy professor.
4 Arthur Prior and the Logic of Time
Alex Malpass gives us the philosophical biography of
an influential and undervalued logician.
6 In conversation with: Dagmar
Wilhelm
7
I’m Sorry
A conceptual analysis of apologising.
8
An Atheist’s Guide to Reality
Thomas Galley and Barney Scott talk us through
radical scientism and nice-nihilism, as debated by
author Alex Rosenberg and Samir Okasha
10 The Pre-Socratics
Jay Stone extends our philosophical timelines
11 Philosophy Graduates: Where are they
now?
An anonymous civil-servant tells us about life in the
Fast-Stream and philosophy in government.
12 Poem & The Unfinished Novel
13 News & Events
14 Puzzles
16 BUPS Conference
3. AdAbsurdum | Spring 2012
1
HE problem of moral dilemmas is a
commonplace objection to non-
consequentialist ethical theories.
According to Mill (1863), there is no
alternative strategy to consequentialism
with which dilemmas can be handled.
Moral conflicts in fact are most frequently
directed to deontological ethics, as
according to which there are certain
actions that should not be conducted. If a
deontologist found himself/herself in a
moral dilemma, it appears to be
impossible to maintain the claim that one
moral duty/obligation ought to be
violated in favour of another. To accept
this strategy for dealing with moral
d i l e m m a s wo u l d b e f at a l t o a
deontological ethic.
In my view, Mill’s claim could only be
plausible when justified with the following
argument (I shall refer to this as Mill’s
Argument):
P1. Moral intuitions determine whether
it is right to conduct an action or
not. These intuitions are either
deontological or consequentialist.
P2. In any situation where morality
pertains (i.e. where one can act in
a c c o rd a n c e t o o n e ’s m o r a l
principles), there is always a morally
right course of action to take.
P3.
In circumstances ф, one has to either
conduct action α or conduct action
β, and both action α and action β are
morally wrong according to one’s
moral intuitions.
P4. A judgment can always be made
over which action will produce the
better consequences. Therefore,
consequentialist intuition is always
applicable to moral decision-making.
P5. If one’s moral intuitions are
deontological, both action α and
action β violate one’s moral
obligations/duties, thus both actions
are forbidden.
P6. Therefore, deontological intuition
cannot determine whether to
conduct action α or action β.
C. If deontological intuition cannot
determine which action to conduct,
then the only way to determine
which action is the right one to
conduct is by using consequentialist
intuition.
In this essay, I shall be arguing that
moral dilemmas are actually an issue for
both deontology and consequentialism. I
shall produce a dilemma as an example
for which neither consequentialism, nor
indeed deontology (at least immediately),
provide a strategy, in order to deny P4. I
will then argue that the only way in which
to overcome moral dilemmas is to deny
their genuine existence. The dilemma
shall thus also act as a counterexample to
P5. I shall also provide the Kantian
account of moral dilemmas, and argue
that it can give guidance when Mill’s
Utilitarianism cannot.
I. ‘Sophie’s Choice’
One of the most notorious cases of
such a dilemma comes from William
Styron's novel Sophie's Choice. The dilemma
is as follows: Sophie is forced to choose to
save one of her two children (a boy and a
girl), but that choice condemns the other
child to death. If Sophie chooses neither,
then both of her children will be killed.
Because of this condition, Sophie has a
morally compelling reason to choose one
of her children. But the reasons for
choosing one child seem to be the same as
for the other.
The duties that Sophie has to both the
children are entirely identical, and
therefore a duty to one child certainly
can’t overrule the duty to the other.
Equally, according to deontological
intuition, Sophie has the obligation to
make a choice, on account of these duties
to her children. As she has a duty to save
her children if she can, letting both
children be killed as opposed to saving
one child is forbidden by deontology.
So deontology leaves Sophie in a
double bind. However, consequential
intuition allows her to make a decision. At
the very last moment of opportunity,
Sophie chooses to save her son, with the
justification that because he is older and
stronger than her daughter, he would be
more likely to survive the concentration
camp than her daughter. This case seems
to support Mill’s argument. However, with
a small adjustment to the case,
consequential intuition becomes as unable
to provide advice as deontological
intuition.
The only reason why consequentialism
manages to advise Sophie over which
child to choose is because of the
difference between the two children.
Therefore, let us say that for the sake of
argument, that instead of the two children
being an older boy and a younger girl,
they are in fact identical twin brothers.
These twin brothers are not only
completely the same in terms of physical
form, but also have exactly the same
personality, to the point that they might as
well be considered as clones. Moreover,
they even have exactly equal value to
Sophie, to the point where they are, for all
intents and purposes, interchangeable.
Under this new imagining of ‘Sophie’s
Choice’, the consequences of choosing
one child will be exactly the same as
c h o o s i n g t h e o t h e r . U n d e r
consequentialist intuition, Sophie is still
obliged to make a choice, because
choosing one will avoid the consequence
of death for the chosen one, whilst not
choosing will make both children suffer
the consequence of death. Therefore,
consequentialist intuition is just as
unhelpful as deontological intuition.
This clearly demonstrates the falsity
of P4, leaving Mill no room to use moral
d i l e m m a s a s a n a r g u m e n t f o r
consequentialism. Moreover, if
deontology can provide a solution to
moral dilemmas, then moral dilemmas
can’t even be used as an objection to it. I
shall now investigate how this might be
achieved.
T
MORAL DILEMMAS
Can moral dilemmas only be settled by appeals to consequences rather than duties?
4. 2
AdAbsurdum | Spring 2012
II. How Should Moral
Dilemmas Be Solved?
It seems that the moral conflicts that
are worthy of the term ‘dilemma’ are
those like Sophie’s conflict, which leave
the individual in a double bind. They can
be defined with an adjustment to P2 of
Mill’s argument. One could say the moral
dilemmas are:
1.
When in circumstances ф, one is
morally obliged to either conduct
action α or conduct action β, and
both action α and inaction β are
morally wrong according to one’s
moral intuitions.
Or
2.
When in circumstances ф, one is
morally obliged to conduct action α
and to conduct action β, but cannot
conduct both action α and β.
Therefore, one must either choose to
conduct action α or conduct action
β.
These two parts of the definition are
essentially saying the same thing.
However, the first accounts for a negative
moral dilemma (being morally obliged to
choose between doing two actions which
are morally wrong), and the second
accounts for a positive moral dilemma
(being obliged to choose between two
moral obligations).
The reason these dilemmas are
generated is because of a combination of
the ‘ought implies can’ principle and the
agglomeration principle of morality. In
the case of circumstances ф, one cannot
conduct both actions, despite being
obligated to do so. It appears that one has
to admit that although one is obligated to
conduct action α, and obligated to
conduct action β, one is not obligated to
conduct both actions. Moreover,
according to the agglomeration principle,
the obligation to conduct action α implies
the obligation not to conduct action β,
and the obligation to conduct action β
implies the obligation not to conduct
action α. Without doubt, moral dilemmas
are a serious problem; they give reason to
put fundamental principles of morality
into doubt. If one is to accept moral
dilemmas as presented here, then either
the ‘ought implies can’ principle or the
agglomeration principle has to be
rejected.
The only way to maintain both
principles is to assert that moral dilemmas
are impossible. Earl Conee (1989:
137-140) explained a portrayal of
morality that allowed for such an
assertion. This portrayal was that a wholly
moral life was one that “consists in the
person’s closest possible approach to a
(morally) perfect life” (Ibid. p.137). In
other words, to be completely moral is to
fulfill every moral obligation physically
possible to do so. Conee refers to the
physically possible moral obligations as
absolute moral obligations (Ibid. p. 136).
According to him, with respect to moral
dilemmas, confounding moral obligations
no longer lead to a contradiction, as one is
only one moral obligation could be
absolute. To exemplify, with the case of
Sophie’s choice, Sophie is only under the
absolute moral obligation to choose one
of her children to save, because one is as
many as she can possibly save. Though it
is a moral obligation for her to save her
other child, it is not an absolute moral
obligation, as it is not physically possible
to save the other. Conee would argue that
Sophie’s choice isn’t in fact a moral
dilemma, because she is not making the
choice to sacrifice one of her children.
From a deontological point of view, she is
instead simply fulfiling her duties as her
mother to the extent that is physically
possible, so who exactly she chooses
doesn’t matter from a moral perspective.
Equally, from a consequentialist point of
view, she is simply producing the best
consequences she possible can, given her
circumstances. So in the second imagining
of Sophie’s choice, like with the
deontological point of view, it doesn’t
matter from a moral perspective which
twin brother she chooses.
III. The Kantian Alternative
Whilst it is clear that in the re-
imagined version of ‘Sophie’s choice’,
Mill’s utilitarianism could give no
guidance to Sophie as for what course of
action to take, Kant might argue that a
particular course of action is required in
both the new and original scenario. Both
Mill (1863: 36-37) and Kant (1964: 23)
argued that an ethical theory should be
set out in such a way that prevents
genuine moral dilemmas ever coming
about, and both claimed that each of
their theories managed this respectively.
As such, for Kant to be able to give moral
guidance when Mill can’t is that much
more of a victory for deontological
intuitions over consequentialism,
especially when Mill claimed that his
theory avoided dilemmas exclusively.
In my view, Kant probably would have
argued that the right choice for Sophie
would be to not make a choice in the first
place. Because Kant’s requirements for
action are only dealt out in terms of
duties, the difference between imperfect
and perfect duties makes a much more
significant difference to the matter of
moral conflict. Kant would have said that
Sophie’s duty of care towards her children
would be, although resolute, imperfect
nonetheless. It would not for instance be
considered a violation of moral law if
Sophie’s children had simply been taken
away from her and killed, simply because
she failed to protect them. Nevertheless,
the duty to not kill a rational being is a
perfect one, and thus electing one of her
children to die would make Sophie
complicit in the act of killing, which I
would imagine Kant wouldn’t allow, even
if it meant the death of both children. He
would clearly manage to give Sophie a
clear understanding of what in his eyes
she should do, however difficult it would
be for her to act according to it.
IV. Conclusion
In this essay, I have shown that Mill’s
argument can be objected to on two
different grounds: firstly, on the notion
that appeals to consequences are sufficient
for settling moral conflicts, and secondly
on the notion that deontological intuitions
do not manage as well as consequentialist
ones. In light of this, Mill’s claim merits its
rejection. I have also shown that what was
lacking in appealing to consequences can
be made up with Conee’s argument that
whatever principles are behind our moral
obligations, in order to be completely
moral, an individual need only fulfil as
many moral obligations as physically
possible. I then finally demonstrated in a
given scenario how Kant apparently
succeeded in avoiding moral dilemmas
whilst Mill did not. Thus not only was
Mill wrong to think that the concept of
moral dilemmas put his version of
consequentialism in any favour, but the
case might actually be the reverse. This
essay has demonstrated how deontological
intuitions can in fact provide guidance
when consequentialism cannot.
Regardless of whether the advice itself is
in appealing, there are cases where
deontological intuitions can still provide
advice when consequentialism cannot.
Michael Lyons. 3rd-Year Philosophy UG,
University of Bristol.
5. AdAbsurdum | Spring 2012
3
N days gone by one went to university
to ‘read’ a subject. In the terms of the
current idiolect academics are expected to
‘deliver the student experience’. What if
anything does this shift in language
signify? Perhaps on average students do
not read as much as in the past; I do
suspect that fewer whole books are read at
the expense of articles and anthologies
and introductory material. More
important though is the shift from the
active to the passive, from studying to
having an experience delivered to you. It
is something of a cliché that our culture
has become increasingly focused on short-
term and superficial experience at the
expense of long-term deep engagement.
Compare Brian Cox on the solar system
to Carl Sagan on the cosmos – with the
former you get a much slicker and more
visually engaging experience than with
the latter, but you also get a lot less
content. It is worrying that there is a lot of
pressure for higher education to follow the
same trend.
There is now an emphasis on
appraising quality in higher education
with questionnaires that largely concern
students’ perception of their own
satisfaction. The National Student Survey
is increasingly treated as a measure of
how good university departments are at
educating students. This is despite the fact
that those taking the survey have
absolutely no basis for comparison in
making their judgments, nor have they
had any time to find out whether their
education has served them well in their
lives. In respect of the former, students
may reward their departments for having
efficient administrations and giving them
lots of support and making them feel
good about themselves, even where those
departments are teaching at a relatively
low level outside of the context of high-
powered research in philosophy; well
taught students are also likely to be more
critical of their education and so to score
their departments lower than those whose
reflective capacities are less developed. In
respect of the latter, it is only in later life
with the benefit of experience and wide
exposure to others who have graduated
from other programmes and universities
that one is in a position to appraise one’s
own education. In any case, whether or
not a degree programme is appropriately
rigorous and has enough logic or Kant or
whatever ought not to be for students to
decide anymore than it is for my son to
decide whether he has enough chips in his
diet. Furthermore, the survey places
students in the position of consumers of a
product. Psychological research has
demonstrated the importance of framing
effects in influencing how people answer
questions. Perhaps if students were asked
extensive questions about their own
contribution to their education they would
give very different responses to subsequent
questions about their teachers and classes.
For example, in my experience, sometimes
students find seminars unproductive
because they have not done the
preparatory work necessary to get much
out of them.
The emphasis on the student
experience makes studying at University
sound like watching a movie or visiting a
theme park. Hence, many worry that
‘edutainment’ is replacing ‘education’.
Every year I read UCAS personal
statements in which the candidates
declare themselves to be dedicated to
philosophy and the development of their
minds, and every year I witness students
without a pen and paper sitting back
waiting for the lecturer to make the
subject interesting. Attending a lecture or
seminar without having prepared is not
very rewarding, but the solution is for the
individual to take responsibility for their
own learning not for them to ask for the
subject to be made exciting for them.
Academic study is not supposed to be
immediately accessible and enjoying it
requires commitment and concerted and
sustained effort. If your lecturer has nicely
presented Powerpoint slides with pictures
of all the philosophers talked about and
simple synopses of all the main arguments
you may have a better experience than
listening to someone talk in bewildering
detail about the intricacies of the subject,
but the intellectual content of the latter
may be greater and it may be much more
satisfying to those students who arrive at
the lecture already well read in the
subject. I had a lecturer who used to begin
a course by saying ‘I make no concessions
to the idle’. It is not clear that satisfying
the idle is compatible with doing right by
the industrious. In any case, it is not clear
that we want to make students satisfied.
Studying philosophy is about engaging
with among the most profound and deep
thoughts human beings have had. I
usually find doing philosophy disquieting,
perplexing and frustrating not satisfying.
Satisfaction is what I feel after doing the
washing up or eating my tea, it is not the
right term for the result of thinking about
metaphysics, the nature and extent of
human knowledge, or how to live a good
life.
Prof. James Ladyman. Head of Subject and
Profesor of Philosophy, University of Bristol.
the Student
Experience
As the National Student Survey urges final years across the country to appraise the
delivery of their degrees, James Ladyman questions the value of student satisfaction.
I
6. 4
AdAbsurdum | Spring 2012
RTHUR Prior was a 20th century
philosopher and logician, who
became famous for pioneering temporal
logic (or, as he called, it “tense logic”).
Prior was born in Masterton, New
Zealand in 1914. Unfortunately, his
mother died of septicaemia only two
weeks after giving birth. This resulted in
Prior being brought up by his Methodist
grandparents, and for a long time the
influence of religion played a very
important role on Prior’s thought. While
an undergraduate at the University of
Otago, Prior became influenced by three
main figures:
1) He discovered the radical neo-
orthodox Calvinist theologian Karl Barth
(1886-1968), who taught a complex
version of the Doctrine of Predestination.
God knows what will happen in the
future, argue Calvinists, and so there is a
selection of people walking around today
who are destined to go to heaven (the
‘elect’), and then the rest of us. This
doctrine, with its heavy emphasis on
temporal concerns, fascinated the early
Prior.
2) He was also influenced by the
Presbyterian minister, Rev. Alexander
Miller (1908-1960), who taught a
combination of pacifism and socialism. In
the spirit of both Christianity and
socialism, Miller called for Christians to
willingly give away any income they
received above the national average – an
economic proposal that was at the same
time radical, moral and strangely rational.
The concern for the welfare of the
community was a value Prior ardently
adhered to throughout his life, long after
the spirit of Christianity had left him.
3) The last, and in the long run most
important, influence on the early Prior
was the relatively unknown philosopher
John Findlay (1903-1987), who was
professor of philosophy at Otago. This
influence lasted the longest because he
introduced Prior to logic. Other than
teaching Prior logical techniques, Findlay
ignited Prior’s imagination with an article
entitled “Time: A Treatment of Some
Puzzles” [1941]. In this, Findlay wrote:
“[O]ur conventions with regard to
tenses are so well worked out that we have
practically the materials in them for a
formal calculus”.
Having noted the possibility of a
formal calculus of tenses, and sketching
out a few rudimentary principles therein,
he left the task for others to continue. It
was this task that Prior pursued tirelessly
for the rest of his life.
Having secured a position at
Christchurch, New Zealand, Prior
continued work on the logic of time, while
also lecturing on ethics and Keynes’
theory of probability. He was an unusual
figure in Christchurch, as a student of his,
Jim Wilson, recorded:
“He was usually late for his own
lectures (or anyone else's for that matter).
But he almost always turned up
eventually… He would pull cycle clips off
his trousers and plonk an ancient
shopping bag on the desk in front of him.
Out of this bag would come… a cabbage,
a bunch of carrots, a loaf of bread, a
bottle of milk… until, always at the
bottom, he would find the book he was
looking for…, then he would look up at
us, apologise for being late and ask: ‘Now
where were we last time?’ Someone in the
front row would consult her or his notes –
Arthur couldn't, as he never had any –
and would say ‘You were just dealing with
such and such’. ‘Ah yes, thank you’ Arthur
would respond, and forthwith launch into
an extempore exposition which followed
on perfectly from the previous session and
was beautifully structured and clear even
though he was just thinking along with
us.” (Copeland [2007]).
Soon Gilbert Ryle, who approved of
Prior’s “complete lack of mugwumpery”,
invited Prior to Oxford to give the John
Locke Lectures in 1955. Prior accepted,
and swapped the stuffy atmosphere of
Christchurch (where he was the only
philosophy professor) for a year as a
visiting scholar in one of the most vibrant
philosophy departments in the world. In
the Lectures, which went on to become
his first book about temporal logic ‘Time
and Modality [1958], Prior displayed how
he had developed temporal logic from the
rudimentary remarks of Findlay into
something approaching a full logical
system. Prior gained a wide audience that
regularly included Peter Geach, Elizabeth
Anscombe and E J Lemmon.
Prior had adapted the latest logical
techniques from the hugely influential
Polish logician Jan Łukasiewicz
(1878-1956), with whom he had been in
correspondence for a number of years.
The basic idea was to modify or extend
the basic propositional calculus in some
way in order to express important aspects
related to time; either to change it, like the
development of non-Euclidian geometry,
or to extend it, like the development of
the predicate calculus. PC deals with basic
propositional elements, p, q, r etc, and
certain strictly defined combinations of
these (‘not…’, ‘…and…’, ‘…or…’, ‘if…,
then…’ etc.), which get given one of two
truth values (true or false). Łukasiewicz’s
was moved by Aristotle’s famous ‘Sea
Battle’ argument (de Interpretione), in
A
With a passion for human freedom, this conveniently named logician almost ‘single-
handedly developed a new type of logic’, inspired Kripke and even managed to avoid
philosophical ‘mugwumpery’.
Arthur Prior
and the Logic of Time
7. AdAbsurdum | Spring 2012
5
which it is argued that certain
propositions, i.e. predictions of contingent
future events (‘future contingents’), can
neither be true nor false. Łukasiewicz
tried adapting the propositional calculus
so that propositions have one of three
t r u t h v a l u e s ( t r u e, f a l s e, a n d
indeterminate). The idea was that the
propositions which took on the third value
(indeterminate) were the future contingent
propositions (like ‘there will be a sea
battle’ etc). This meant redesigning the
basics of the calculus, right down to the
elementary permissible combinations of
propositions according to ‘not…’, ‘…
and…’, ‘…or…’ etc.
Prior went another route, and extended
the propositional calculus instead. He
added two new elements: the future-tense
operator, ‘It will be that…’, and the past-
tense operator, ‘It was that…’, using the
symbols F and P respectively. This made it
natural to understand simple atomic
proposition letters (with no tense-operator
prefixing them) as expressing present
tensed propositions (like ‘it is raining’). So,
if p = ‘It is raining’, then the English
sentence “It will rain” would be
symbolised as “Fp” and was understood
as expressing the following proposition ‘(It
will be that (It is raining))’.
S o, t o c o m p a r e t h e t w o ; i n
Łukasiewicz’s system, some of the atomic
proposition letters were given the
‘indeterminate’ truth value, and taken to
stand for future-tensed propositions; in
Prior’s system, the logical form of the
tenses was made explicit, so that the
present tensed and future/past tensed
propositions could be clearly distinguished
and manipulated. This enabled Prior to
express more nuanced formulae, as his
system had greater expressive power.
Early on, Prior recognised and formulated
the idea that the following should count as
a type of tautology specific to the logic of
tenses:
a) p → FPp
This says that if it is true now that (say)
‘it is raining’, then ‘it will be that (it was
that (it is raining))’ is also true; the
principle can be stated thus:
a*) If it is, then it will be that it was.
The year 1955-56 spent giving the John
Jock Lectures in Oxford was the happiest
of Prior’s life. Soon after returning to the
stuffy atmosphere of Christchurch, Prior
managed to secure a job in Manchester,
and he was off – this time for good. His
post at Manchester gave him a base from
which he could maintain close research
relationships with his Oxford friends.
During this period at Manchester, Prior
continued to develop his logic of time in
new directions. In addition to the ‘tense-
logic’, Prior also developed a ‘calculus of
dates’ along the following lines:
A proposition letter, like p, only gets
given a truth value when it is paired up
with a date, or a time, symbolised with a t.
So instead of having basic propositions,
like p which are true or false depending
on when they are expressed, one has more
complex propositions, like ‘(p, t)’ which
express the propositions like ‘p is true at
time t’, and which do not depend on
when they are expressed for their truth
value. So if p = ‘England is at war with
Germany’ and t = some time in 1916,
then ‘(p, t)’ is true. If t = some time in
1920, then ‘(p, t)’ is false. The times, it is
natural enough to suppose, are ordered by
a binary relation, i.e. the ‘...is later than...’
relation; so Rtt’ expresses ‘(t’ is later than
t)’.
Prior was able to discern a precise
relationship between the ‘tense-logic’ and
the ‘calculus of dates’, and even prove
certain facts about this relationship. One
such fact was that if the ordering relation
on the times in the ‘calculus of dates’ was
transitive, then the following would be
true in the ‘tense logic’: FFp → Fp (if it
will be that p, then it will be that it will be
that p). This accomplishment much
impressed the young Saul Kripke, who
was inspired by it to do the work that led
to his famous completeness proof for the
modal logic S5. This famous and
breakthrough work utilised similar models
to Prior’s which, while not involving
reference to times, involved reference to
possible worlds. Thus, Kripke’s ‘possible
worlds’ and ‘accessibility relation’ are just
Prior’s ‘times’ and ‘earlier/later-than
relation’ in a new guise.
For a decade between 1955 and 1965,
Prior is the only person to have a
published paper on tense logic. In 1965,
Prior was invited to be the visiting Flint
Professor of philosophy at the University
of California and found himself
surrounded by interested and capable
young researchers, such as Dana Scott
and Nino Cocchiarella. In ’65 work was
published by Robert Bull and Peter Geach
in England, by Georg von Wright in
Finland; by Charles Hamblin in Australia;
and by Scott and Cocchiarella in
California. Prior was now at the head of a
growing research group. During this
fertile time, Prior produced his most
sophisticated work, which went on to
become his second major work on
temporal logic, his book Past, Present and
Future, widely regarded as a masterpiece
of philosophical logic. Prior blended
together his new and cutting edge logical
techniques with antiquarian knowledge of
obscure figures from the history of
philosophy, theology and logic, such as
Diodorus Cronus, Jonathan Edwards and
William of Ockham. In this work we find
traditional discussions of freedom,
ontology and metaphysics interlaced with
technical discussions of the relationship
between the topological properties of time
and the logic of tenses.
There are many original contributions
to logic alongside the logic of tenses found
within this work, such as the creation of
hybrid logic, which have gone on to have
important impacts in areas such as
computer programming. One innovation
that I would like to mention in particular
was the discussion of logics that combined
both modal and temporal operators, in
which one can properly express
propositions like ‘it is possible that (it will
be that (p))’. These were modelled using a
suggestion from Kripke made in 1959 that
the future might be represented, not as a
simple linear series of times, but as a set of
ever branching futures. This idea
fascinated Prior, as it seemed to combine
his passion for temporal logic with his
youthful Calvinist-inspired passion in
predestination and human freedom. Prior
used these models, along with his so-called
‘Piercean’ semantics, to make a tense-logic
in which “even God does not know what a
free agent will do, until he does it”. The
influence of Findlay had triumphed over
the influence of his early religious
teachers, as he used his tense logic to
express with all the clarity and precision
he could humanly muster (by single-
handedly designing the logical vocabulary
capable of expressing it formally) the idea
that the human agent is free.
Prior died on the 6th of October 1969,
aged only 55. During his relatively short
career as a philosophical logician, he
contributed a new type of logic (almost
single-handedly) and helped in the
development of formal philosophy during
a t i m e w h e n t h i s w a s d e e p l y
unfashionable.
Alex Malpass. Teaching Fellow at the University
of Bristol.
8. 6
AdAbsurdum | Spring 2012
in conversation with…
Dagmar Wilhelm
Why were you attracted to Bristol
philosophy department?
Because it is a department that does work
on intuitions – well, Finn does work on
intuitions. They have got Chris Bertram
in political philosophy, and maybe I
should mention Seiriol as well.
Where were you before you came to
Bristol?
Before I came here I worked at Keele
University. I was a student at Aberdeen,
then Glasgow, then Aberdeen again. I was
tutoring in Glasgow, St Andrews and
Edinburgh.
How would you sum up Bristol
Philosophy Department in three
words?
Lively, encouraging, and smart.
How did you first get into
philosophy?
By accident. I was studying in Scotland
and I had to choose another subject
alongside my chosen degree in
Psychology. I chose to study philosophy
and I liked it better. It was more
challenging.
Did your experiences in psychology
lead you to pursue the philosophy
of mind, or to your current interest
in intuitions?
Yes but I think it went a much longer way.
I had an interest in the philosophy of
mind but it is not so strong anymore. It
makes me see psychology in a very
different way; it makes me more
distrustful of the experimental method.
Are their philosophers who have
heavily influenced your work?
It’s difficult to say… there have been some
political philosophers who have influenced
me. But when I was studying psychology,
every philosopher stood out, I was taken
in by whomever.
One of your primary research
areas is Recognition Theory, within
political philosophy. What attracted
you to this area?
It brought together several of my
interests. Recognition Theory is an
ambitious theory, a moral theory and it
also makes certain assumptions about the
nature of self. It believes that justice
should not just be a matter of economic
distribution and it advocates giving people
their due recognition - that this is an
important part of their development of
autonomy and that is something valuable.
I think there is something to that. It’s not
an unproblematic theory. There are a lot
of assumptions, which seem intuitively
plausible but that just don’t hold. You
have to accept that a proper development
is desirable - more than desirable.
What do you mean by ‘a proper
development’?
Well, even if you get misrecognised you
develop some kind of character, some
kind of self. But you don’t have the right
kind of self-image and that you are not to
accept.
Recognition theory takes a lot of
influence from the Frankfurt
School. Do you have any affinities
philosophically with any
individuals within that school?
Yes, Axel Honneth, a British third-
generation theorist.
What are the strengths of the
theory?
Well, there seems to be something missing
if we must think of social justice only in
terms of economic resources.
And what would you say are some
of the weaknesses?
So Honneth, Taylor, Fraser - several of
the recognition theorists - tell a very
plausible story of why others are involved
in our conception of ourselves and how
that might influence the confidence with
which we go out into the world. But I
guess it is not obvious that this should
have any normative force. I think that is
the biggest problem. Also, Honneth -
who I like - doesn’t ignore but sidelines
issues of economic distribution, which I
think he should care about.
You are from Germany originally,
what brought you to the UK?
Do you want the honest answer?
It’s up to you!
It’s nothing particularly philosophical, I
wanted to emigrate to Australia. The
Australian embassy told me to study in an
English speaking country. I wanted to
study something that was not psychology
but I would have had points deducted on
my emigration application. And I just
chose Aberdeen because I liked the name.
Do you think there are significant
differences between the UK and
German education systems?
I think the UK system is a better system,
because I think it is fairer and it is open.
But I might be prejudiced and I don’t
know the German system at all, and I
think that it’s changing as well.
Were you tempted to return to work
in Germany, perhaps at the home of
The Frankfurt School, The Institute
for Social Research?
They actually now have a bigger centre
and it’s much more international. In fact,
they now have a centre in New York. I am
interested in what they do, so I am
interested in their conferences but I don’t
necessarily want to go back to Germany.
Are there any places you would
particularly like to visit, either in
the UK or elsewhere?
I actually think that Bristol is a great
place, I feel very happy here. I also think
AD ABSURDUM interviews the most recent addition to Bristol's Philosophy
Department, Dagmar Wilhelm, on her travels within UK academia, Recognition Theory,
and the plight of Australian street children.
9. AdAbsurdum | Spring 2012
7
E tend to have the idea that when
we do bad things, and we know it,
we say sorry. This principle is hammered
home from infancy and commendably so;
think of TV’s ‘Supernanny’ naughty-
stepping toddlers into admitting to their
mischief and forcing them to apologise to
the afflicted parent/sibling/whatever. In
saying sorry for their misdemeanour, the
child is acknowledging their responsibility
for their behaviour and making it clear
that they understand that they should not
have carried out whatever perversion they
are guilty of.
If I were to say sorry to my (non-
infant) brother for having punched his
face, I would seem to be claiming two
things about myself: firstly, that I had
indeed intentionally punched my brother
on his face, and secondly, that I can now
see that this was something I should not
have done. If either of these claims were
not true, then my brother could rightly
claim that my ‘sorry’ was hollow: I would
not be apologetic at all. With this in mind,
we can characterise some necessary
conditions that must be true of an agent
when they say sorry for an action, if it is
not to be a hollow or inauthentic apology:
They must believe that they have
intentionally performed an action;
They must have an attitude of regret
towards that action because of the actual
or potential harm that has been dealt by
that action to the person to whom they
are apologising.
The notion of regret towards an
action can be simply cashed out in terms
of a desire to have not performed that
action.
Now, I also use ‘sorry’ in other
circumstances. Take for instance, “You
were involved in a minor car accident?
Oh, I’m sorry to hear that”, or when said
at a funeral, “I am sorry for your loss”.
Assuming that I am not regretting having
intentionally listened to someone tell me
of their vehicular misfortune, and that I’m
not a murderer who attends his victims’
funerals, what’s going on? The obvious
and accurate answer is that on occasion
people use ‘sorry’ in a rather different
way: to express sympathy, to demonstrate
that they find some situation lamentable.
This is true even when that situation is not
one to which the sympathiser is remotely
related. This use of the word is neatly
captured in the phrase “a sorry state of
affairs” because it makes clear that the
‘sorry-ness’ applies to a broader situation
independent of the agent, rather than
picking out a relation between an agent
and their act. The two conditions of the
‘apologetic sorry’ in the first paragraph
clearly do not apply to the ‘sympathetic
sorry’ as it is used at funerals and the like.
So what? One word, two uses? It
matters because saying sorry has become
a prominent feature of public life and too
often these two discrete meanings are
fudged. When politicians blunder, we hear
things like, “I am sorry for any offence
caused.” Does this mean that you’re
apologising for what you have done
because you offended people? Do you
regret your behaviour and intend to avoid
it in future? If that’s what you’re saying
then say that. Admit you’ve done
something you regret, apologise and move
on, fine. But by phrasing it in the passive
(offence caused) rather than active
(causing offence) the speaker is distancing
themselves from the action and it becomes
unclear that there is a genuine ‘apologetic
sorry’ at work. Anyone can sympathise
with, or lament, the existence of “any
offence caused”, but only the agent can
apologise for causing offence. Now there’s
nothing wrong with sharing sympathies
with people in unfortunate straits, but it
does not amount to an apology. And if
offended parties are calling for an apology,
“I’m sorry for any offence caused” should
not placate them.
Luke Jones. MA Philosophy, University of
Bristol.
that Glasgow is a great place, they are my
favourite places. Otherwise, I would like to
go to Tehran in Iran.
Why Tehran?
Because I like Iranian culture. Also – and
this is complicated given the situation at
the moment – because they have great
philosophers.
What do you like to do in your spare
time?
I used to do theatre in my space time –
when I had spare time – and I think I have
to somehow get involved in the theatre in
Bristol. I like to translate philosophical
texts into plays. I did a bit of Plato and I
would like to do a philosophical cabaret.
And I would do Beauvoir.
As a child, what did you imagine
that you would be as an adult?
I wanted to work with street children in
Australia. I liked Popper and I liked
Nietzsche. I always had an interest in
philosophy but I didn’t think I would do it
as a job. I don’t think you sit there and
think, ‘I really want to be a philosopher’!
Why did you want to work with
street children in Australia?
I don’t know… I was so small when I
formed this idea. I had the impression that
there were not so many people living on
the streets there that it was hopeless to do
something to improve the situation, if that
makes sense.
I’m Sorry
W
Apology or sympathy? A conceptual analysis of saying ‘Sorry’
10. 8
AdAbsurdum | Spring 2012
A N A T H E I S T ’ S
Does physics tell us everything there is to know? Two Physics & Philosophy students
outline the debate between controversial author Alex Rosenberg and Bristol
University’s Samir Okasha.
N the fateful night of 23rd of
February, Alex Rosenberg, author of
“An Atheist’s Guide To Reality”, took a
seat in Foyles Bookshop in Bristol to
defend his controversial thesis that
scientific knowledge is the only knowledge
we can have about reality. Bristol
University’s Samir Okasha was there to
reign in this radical scientism.
Here, Barney Scott and Thomas
Galley summarise and further the debate.
N many ways the methodology of
(good) philosophy, or indeed any other
critical discipline, should be a constant
questioning and stripping away of
intuition and ungrounded assumption in
pursuit of some set of fundamental
features. Whether the target of enquiry is
the essential nature of human psychology,
a set of binding normative principles or
even some abstract notion of the ‘essence’
of reality, such processes are both
increasingly enabled by and also reflective
of natural scientific methodology. I argue
that Alex Rosenberg’s reductionist
arguments are suggestive of (if not yet a
substantial realisation of) the only
plausible position to hold regarding reality
and subsequently morality which does not
succumb to naive intuition; a position
leading to what is lightly referred to as
‘nice nihilism’.
At the most basic level, Rosenberg
argues that everything real can be reduced
(certainly theoretically) to the level of
physics; that is in essence to the level of
fundamental particles (fermions and
bosons) and laws. By extension, anything
irreducible to physics cannot have reality.
This presents a clear threat to some very
deeply held intuitions, particularly
concerning morality (which by this model
is content-less), free-will (which again
turns out to be illusory) and God (needless
to say an early casualty).
More on the above later, but first a
crucial clarification I believe is necessary
regarding what this type of reductionism
does not need to threaten; namely the
autonomy of the various scientific and
social-scientific disciplines. An
appreciation of exactly what is meant by
Rosenberg’s use of ‘reduction’ is essential
to following his theories. Where it may be
understandable that, say, a psychologist
would feel aggrieved in being told that her
work was merely applied physics, it is a
naive interpretation which reads into
Rosenberg’s theories any contempt for
other disciplines. What I feel can often be
missed is that there was no proposal of a
‘bottom-up’ revaluing of scientific process;
no suggestion was made that physics in
any way supersedes or invalidates other
disciplines, nor that a particle physicist
should ever be able to construct and
predict all complex (biological, political
etc.) structures in the world from fermions
and bosons. The reductive thesis being
expressed was in fact a more subtle one:
that a posteriori, that is, given the
knowledge of the world we have now
obtained through our various scientific
and social scientific disciplines, there is
nothing observed that we could not
conceivably reduce to fundamental
physics. Anything outside of our laws
regarding the physical world is
explanatorily superfluous. Perhaps the
clearest example cited by Rosenberg in
the debate was that of genetics: Mendel’s
initial framework for heredity preceded
any molecular biological understanding of
genetics by nearly one hundred years, and
this itself preceded an understanding of
the underlying chemistry. What should be
clear in this example is that reduction
does not imply constructability; to argue
that it is theoretically possible to argue a
posteriori back to some fundamental
physics is not to say that all investigation
should or even could proceed from first
principles, but simply that there are no
basic building blocks which exist outside
of what can in principle be known
through the study of physics.
Samir Okasha argued that the above
example is a particularly convenient one
for the reductionist, citing ideas of
‘emergence’ of complex systems in
various cases such as ecology and
consciousness. However, this appears to
me to be a threat only to the ‘bottom-up’
model previously dismissed. One may not
be able to abstract systematic interaction
on such scales from the behaviour of
particles, but it is possible to explain these
interactions, once observed, in terms of
the previously observed behaviour of their
constituent parts.
We return now briefly to the
controversial application of reductionism
to morality. The reductive thesis
pertaining to evolutionary theory commits
us to accepting one of the following:
Either:
‘Natural selection produced the
moral core in us because it’s the right
one.’
Or:
‘We think it’s the right one because
natural selection produced it in us.’
According to Rosenberg, the first
option is a non-starter since we have
absolutely no reason to expect natural
selection (which clearly has generated
many morally ‘wrong’ beliefs as well as
morally ‘right’ ones) to have access to
some abstract universal ‘right’ amongst an
infinity of possibilities. Thus we are
committed to accepting the latter; that we
are loosely bound to a generally accepted
normative view only by virtue of its
contingent benefit to our survival. The
only reason to accept a universal moral
reality is on the grounds of some posited,
and I would argue ad hoc, metaphysics
which lies beyond the observable,
reducible world.
Metaphysical loneliness may be hard to
swallow, but any honest normative theory
must be able to accept itself as contingent
on the facts of human psychology, not
absolute. Failure to divest ourselves of
such dogmas, I would argue, is giving in to
teleology and plumbs the depths of anti-
naturalist methodology.
Barney Scott. 3rd-Year Physics & Philosophy
UG.
I
O
11. AdAbsurdum | Spring 2012
9
GUIDE TO REALITY
AMIR’S initial response to Alex
Rosenberg’s scientism was to note the
counter-intuitive consequences that such a
position entails, notably with regards to
morality and free will. The view
propounded by Rosenberg, if accepted,
forces one to deem the holocaust to be
morally on-par with a charitable action.
Such a stance being contrary to the
common sense incites us to question
Rosenberg’s position (though it by no
means provides a refutation of scientism).
Samir’s next line of attack was to
question Rosenberg’s assertion that
science will explain everything that can be
explained and continue to ignore
questions such as free will and morality.
Historical enquiry shows that 17th and
18th-century scientists had a radically
different view of science than our
contemporary one and could not have
envisaged the possibilities of quantum
mechanics or general relativity. In a
similar manner we should not claim today
to have a final understanding of science
which is still rapidly changing, we must
remain within a framework of current
scientific knowledge. The notion that
science will explain everything is a
statement of faith, for we cannot assert
with any certainty the direction science
will take in the future. Rosenberg’s reply
was that the seemingly orthodox view that
science evolves by paradigm shifts is in
fact the unorthodox position and only
became prevalent post 1962: science does
in fact evolve continuously, hence
induction can be used to say that science
will continue to be reduced to physics and
that morality and such will not come
under scientific scrutiny in the future.
Such a view coupled with strict scientific
realism commits us to denying the
existence of free will, intentionality and
morality. The disagreement hinged on
how we perceive the evolution of science:
whether it is continuous or experiences
paradigm shifts.
Another strong contention of Alex
Rosenberg’s was that all sciences are
reducible in physics, if not in practice (the
different sciences evolve separately) then
at least in principle. Samir acknowledged
that this is obvious in the case of biology
being reduced to molecular biology and
ultimately physics but it is hard to see why
this should be the case for a social science
like economics. Economics deals with
objects that are physically constituted but
have been discovered independently. One
should proceed from experience to
principle: and there are too many
scientific areas which we cannot reduce to
physics which should prevents us from
inducing that all science can (even as a
matter of principle) be reduced to physics.
The strong claim that all sciences are
reducible to physics relies on too few cases
(the natural sciences) to be able to
extrapolate a general rule which would
govern many other areas such as the
social sciences and ecology. Even in
biology the principle of natural selection
infuses a language of purpose into science
(absent in physics): it makes sense to ask
questions such as ‘Why does this butterfly
have this particular wing colour?’ and
search for the evolutionary advantage the
trait would confer as opposed to just
exploring the biochemistry behind such
colours.
An example of non-scientific
knowledge given is 1st person experience,
feelings of fear for instance. These
experiences give us knowledge
unobtainable by scientific inquiry,
knowledge about what something feels
like. One cannot know what fear or the
feeling of fear is until one has experienced
it.
The debate moved on to Rosenberg’s
nice nihilism, which states that although
there is no such thing as morality
(nihilism), we have evolved to be social,
cooperative even altruistic. In order for
such peculiar and physically uninspiring
creatures as ourselves to move out of the
African savannahs to our current position
of dominance we have had to become
nice. This take on evolutionary
psychology is by no means a consensus
view. Many accounts portray humans as
opportunistic and xenophobic creatures,
our ‘niceness’ being limited to certain
circumstances (a short glance at human
history disconfirms the idea that we are
nice).
Samir’s contribution was not an
outright attack on Rosenberg’s position; it
was an attempt to bring nuance to some
of his more absolutist and counter-
intuitive claims by bringing into question
the less evidence-based parts of an
otherwise scientific position.
Thomas Galley. 2nd-Year Physics &
Philosophy UG.
--
Julian Baggini is running a series of
talks at Foyles for the microphilosophy
podcast series in partnership with the
Festival of Ideas. A full recording of the
debate will soon be available on:
http://itunes.apple.com/gb/podcast/
microphilosophy/id438876628
S
12. 10
AdAbsurdum | Spring 2012
HOSE we now refer to as the
presocratic philosophers were
thinkers of the fifth and sixth century BC
and are the first we know of to engage in
attempts to explain the nature of the
world around them and of being. While
many of them would not necessarily have
identified themselves as philosophers or
even had a complete concept of what
philosophy was; the pursuit of wisdom
certainly was their goal and more to the
point, the fruits of these pursuits as well as
their methods form the foundations of all
western philosophy thereafter. If the old
saying ‘know your roots’ holds any water
at all then you philosophers ought to read
on because these are yours; thinkers who
claimed such things as everything comes
from water, men burst full-grown from the
guts of fish, or that motion, multiplicity
and change are impossible. I will begin
with some clarification regarding the
presocratics and what the term refers to,
then move on to the ‘narrative’ that forms
the core of the presocratic period.
The term presocratic clearly means
before Socrates, however when we refer to
presocratic philosophy, we are not simply
referring to the entirety of thought that
precedes him chronologically; that would
constitute a gargantuan category for
which providing a short overview would
be near impossible. Rather it refers to
those preceding Socrates philosophically,
both literally, insofar as Socrates (as
portrayed by Plato at least) and his
successors are plainly reacting to the
presocratics, and in terms of the questions
they are grappling with. As already
mentioned, the presocratics' primary
occupation appears to have been with the
nature of things and being, while Socrates
and many after him were more concerned
with questions about virtue and how to
live a good life.
Unfortunately, owing to the gap of
roughly two and a half thousand years
between the presocratic period and the
present day, primary sources for these
thinkers range from thin on the ground to
non-existent. While we do have some
fragments of texts from some of these
philosophers, the vast majority of our
sources are testimonial; we are reliant
upon the writings of Plato, Aristotle and
others for knowledge of them. This
renders us unable to accurately
differentiate between the ideas and
arguments of the presocratics themselves
and those attributed to them in such
writings, however this is all we have and as
such we must make do.
Let us now turn to the core narrative
of presocratic thought; that of first
principles. It begins with the Milesians
who sought to provide an empirical and
naturalistic alternative to the gods-
dependant accounts of the world found in
the works of Homer and the like. First
among them is Thales, the first
philosopher. Thales was a very practical
man, contrary to the image of the
'armchair philosopher' that seems so
common nowadays; he had a number of
scientific achievements to his name
including the prediction of a solar eclipse.
Philosophically, he is known for claiming
that water was the first principle of nature
from which the other elements, and
consequently everything else, were
formed. Others followed suit but did not
agree with his choice of first principle. For
example, Anaximenes posited air in place
of water, while Anaximander instead
claimed that none of the four elements
were the first principle, but rather they
arose out of this raw, indeterminate stuff
that he called the apeiron.
After the Milesians came the Eleatics,
the first was Parmenides who offered a
different approach; he was not concerned
with empirical methods but came to his
conclusions regarding the nature of being
entirely a priori. He disagreed with the
Milesians outright, for Parmenides it was
ridiculous to think that one element could
change into the others, in fact change in
itself was a ridiculous notion
to him – he claimed that change,
movement and multiplicity were mere
illusions. Parmenides argued his case well
– he began from the base premise that
everything that is, is while everything that
is not, is not. From this, he reasoned that
what is had to be a singular thing with no
variation, since everything that is is in the
same way. His arguments continue in this
manner until he comes to the conclusion
that all that really is in the world is one
perfect and eternal sphere that never
moves or changes in anyway. Parmenides
had a number of supporters, one such
man being Zeno, who famously used
paradoxes to further demonstrate the
logical impossibility of motion and
multiplicity.
It's quite plain to us that motion does
exist, so too was it to Democritus, one of
several thinkers to respond seriously to
Parmenides. He sought to take into
account Parmenides' insights on eternal
and indestructible being, as well as his
rational method, while explaining
multiplicity, motion and change. He
reasoned that as there is plainly motion,
there must not be one, but infinitely many
tiny indivisible atoms that make up the
world around us. These atoms are able to
move as a result of the void: literal non-
being or empty space that must exist in
order for atoms to move around in. It is
important to note that these are not the
same as modern atoms as they are not
reducible to smaller parts, rather they are
the absolute base material of the world.
Democritus, as a contemporary of
Socrates, marks the end of the presocratic
period. I have provided what I deem to be
the core of the thought of the time and as
should be plain, the core is not the whole,
as many philosophers are missing from
this account. Many of these thinkers were
similarly concerned with first principles
and the nature of being, while others were
not. Likewise, ideas not directly pertaining
to the narrative are missing; Heraclitus'
famous doctrine of flux for example, or
Anaximander's claim that the first
generation of humans burst full-grown
from the guts of fish. It would be an
impossible task to discuss the entirety of
presocratic thought in one text, let alone
one brief article. However I would hope
that this introduction has piqued your
interests sufficiently and implore you all to
further explore the presocratics, and in
doing so the roots of western philosophy.
Jay Stone. Philosophy UG, UWE.
the Pre-Socratics
Jay Stone introduces us to the forgotten forefathers of Western Philosophy.
T
13. AdAbsurdum | Spring 2012
11
Philosophy Graduates:
Where are they now?
After three years of intense pondering philosophy graduates must fend for themselves in the material
world. So where do they end up, and are they still satisfying their philosophical needs?
This faceless civil servant cannot be named, for he
is but a cog in the powerful machine of
government and has forsaken his claim to
individual identity. All we can say is that in
2010 he graduated with a 1st in Philosophy and
gained a place on the Civil Service Fast Stream.
--
So, the Civil Service, was it the
glamour that drew you in?
The geeky answer is I always wanted to
work in the public sector, mainly because
it wasn’t the private sector. I couldn’t
understand wanting to spend my time
making money for a group of individuals.
And of course... I always thought that
governments should be run by
philosophers (sarcastic tone to mask the
conviction of this true belief)
But you didn’t go into politics, are
you saying civil servants run the
government?
Civil servants run the machinery of
government.
What’s the key to running this
machinery effectively?
Well we’re taught to exercise our
discretion professionally at all times. If
you look at the Civil Service Code it’s all
about objectivity, honesty and discretion,
so never being influenced by opinions and
passions.
How did your philosophy degree
help to prepare you for the job?
Well for any given policy you need to
grasp the concepts quickly as appose to
having a deep knowledge base and I think
I was well trained in conceptual
understanding from philosophy. It’s also
similar to philosophy in the breadth of
fields covered; I could be reading a paper
on law, the environment, pensions, in the
same way that we covered philosophy of
maths and philosophy of ethics or
medicine.
But philosophers do like to have
deep understanding and become
experts rather than having
superficial knowledge of lots of
disciplines…
Well you could say that a civil servant is
an expert in managing other people’s
expertise. We have ‘deep understanding’
of the need for professional discretion. We
do get to be creative too though, for
instance when David Cameron says, ‘The
Big Society’ in a speech, it’s the civil
servants who have to come up with
policies to back it up.
What is an example of
philosophical theory used in
government?
The management of the armed forces
through doctrine. You have rules of
engagement which define what you are
allowed to do, i.e. you’re only allowed to
attack pre-emptively if you have
irrefutable evidence that they’re going to
strike you. Interestingly Britain’s doctrine
on the use of the armed forces is the most
widely read across the world.
Can new philosophical ideas
influence governance and policy?
I don’t think you get a lot of truly
revolutionary or new theories in
government; it’s all fiddling with the edges
and gradual shifts.
How many late nights at the office?
There is pressure but they have a very
healthy approach to development so there
isn’t that culture that you can’t complain
about having too much work to do, or that
you need to outshine everyone else.
What advice would you give to
anyone that’s applying for the civil
service?
One of the main things they do is to
judge you on your learning and
development capacity so you need to
become very good at self-critiquing, for
example on the assessment day you write
an evaluation of yourself and one of the
ways you score points is how closely your
assessment of yourself matches up to their
assessment of you.
Do lots of test interviews and try to stay
honest and transparent, trust is very
important in the public sector. On the
written stuff, focus on comprehension: for
the e-tray exercises you have to give the
best response based only on what you
know, always read the briefing notes and
don’t over-analyse using external factors.
You should see the recruitment process as
coming to an agreement that it’s the right
job for you, not just selling yourself to
them.
What did you do your extended
essays on?
The first one on Universal Grammar and
the second one on Moral relativism versus
Kant’s Categorical Imperative.
Any advice or silly mistakes you
made?
I didn’t read widely enough and it turned
out my theory had been disproved (my
supervisor didn’t point that out in the
draft). Remember, if you think you don’t
understand something, read a book about
it. If you think you do understand
something, read two books. And always
use interesting examples to spice up a
philosophy essay.
Did you lie on your UCAS
application?
No, but I lied on the civil service
application. I said I was the president of
yoga society.
Which philosophy or philosopher
has had the biggest impact on your
life?
Plato and the idea of Eudaimonia
(human flourishing/happiness), Socratic
virtue ethics.
Where do you hope to be in 5 years?
Number 10, as a special adviser.
Can you name 5 female
philosophers?
I don’t know any. Um… Michelle
Montague?
What one thing would have
improved your undergraduate
degree?
I was very happy with it all actually.
Occasionally they dumb it down a bit too
much in the first few lectures of a module,
but that’s my only complaint.
14. 12
AdAbsurdum | Spring 2012
O Being for Self,
O End of all Ends,
O Something, O Nothing
Where everything blends!
Identical Absolute,
Thee we acclaim,
Though empty of Content
Thy Vacuous Name.
True Sun of the Realm,
Where the Bodiless move,
Insensible Object
Of Sensuous Love,
Sole Pattern supernal,
First Form without Stuff,
Why wasn’t pure Being
Existence enough?
Ah! Why did you suffer
The ‘slim’ Demiurge
In endless Becoming
Your Being to merge.
Oh! Where was your Noΰϛ
Oh! What was the Good?
You resemble the Babes
Who were lost in the Wood.
Oh! Why did you take
All the trouble and bother
Involved in becoming
A Manifold Other?
Ah! Now you are Many,
You find it such Fun,
You’ll never go back
To the Form of the One.
Prologue
Like all good books, this has only one
chapter, so actually it isn’t unfinished. It is
very ambiguous and often misread, so I
have added this little prologue. Here we
see an assault from one of the 'Men of
Principle' (later ridiculed...in the
unwritten chapters) directed at ‘the
Burdeneer’. The Burdeneer is the
misconstrued protagonist of the oeuvre
and is often mocked by the men of
principle due to his lack of principles. In
place of principled he has opted to lighten
the load of people around him in an
inconsistent fashion based on the whims
of his mood.
I fear very little of this comes through;
perhaps a longer novel would have been
more appropriate.
Chapter One
O how noble you are, you mole-
sighted little hobble-on! Your hands are so
grubby from scrubbing your soul clean;
your eyes are so weary from looking too
hard into that divine light you are so very
fond of. Yes, yes you are the man to tear
us out of this mess - perhaps we could
cling to your urine-soaked rags and you
could drag us all to dignity! Better still,
put on an eye patch and then put on
another, with such adversity how could we
possibly make a wrong turn? No need for
a compass, you swashbuckling oaf, just
steer your ship onto those rocks over
there. I think there’s a ticket to heaven on
that particularly frightful shard. Yes, yes
that’s the one, the one being straddled by
a hungry bear, let it devour your sins and I
think we’ll all be a little happier! O if only
there were more like you, but alas, alas!
The world is littered with sordid little
principle-huggers like me, dirty, conniving
tykes who swan around with fresh faces,
sharp suits, and a list of judgements
tattooed to our hearts. If you look closely,
you will see that the combs in our hair
betray horned silhouettes, and look, look!
That standard of morality upon which I
lean, upon which I bless the good and
leave sinners to rot for their misdeeds
looks rather like a trident doesn’t it? The
shadows cannot be fooled; we are devils in
the world of the dark! Good heavens let
us take a leaf out of that book you haven’t
written, let us denounce our rights to
revile and to smile.
It does not matter who is shooting, or
why, all that matters is that we cast
ourselves in front of the bullets, because
we can! So go on, Mr. Magoo, carry your
cross, carry it to the moon, but be sure to
take the long road round or you’ll never
be a prince.
Joe Gallacher. 4th-Year Philosophy &
French, University of Bristol.
From Camus to Kierkegaard, fiction has played its part
in our philosophical development. We invite you to
shelter from the analytical rigours of logic and
metaphysics, and unleash your imagination with a short
piece of creative writing…
the Unfinished Novel
“The Burdeneer”
A portrait of the Absolute,
originally published in F.C.S
Schiller’s satirical periodical
‘Mind!’ in 1901.
Poem
“On”
15. AdAbsurdum | Spring 2012
13
Events
“Can We Think of Things in
Themselves?”
Bristol University’s Philosophy Society
would like to invite you to a talk on Kant
by John Callanan from King’s College
London, 21st March at 7:30pm (Location
TBC):
‘Kant says that we cannot know things in
themselves in either a 'negative' or a
'positive' sense, but that considering things
in themselves in the positive sense is worse
somehow. Professor Callanan will be
looking into what this worse way of
thinking of things in themselves
'positively' actually is.
Professor Callanan will suggest that
Kantholds that when we make a
judgment regarding things in themselves
in the positive sense, the words that we are
using do not even express any genuine
thoughts, whereas they do when we make
j u d g m en ts reg a rd i n g th i n g s i n
themselvesin the negative sense. Thus,
while we cannot know things in
themselves in either sense, we cannot even
think of things in themselves in the
positive sense.’
Free for members and £2 for non-
members.
The History of Logic
The ‘History of Logic’ lecture series
provides an introduction to the
development of logic and to some of
history’s most important logicians. These
lectures, organised by Alex Malpass, are
open to anyone with an interest at any
level. The ‘History of Logic’ series
features contributions from both the
Philosophy and Maths departments, and
features talks on Aristotle’s Syllogism,
Stoic Logic, Frege, Godel and more.
When: Thursdays, 1-2pm
Where: Arts, LT2
Timetable available at:
www.bris.ac.uk/philosophy/department/
events/historyoflogic
News
New Staff
The Department of Philosophy is
pleased to announce the appointment of
two new members of staff who will be
joining us next year.
Kentaro Fujimoto will be joining us from
the University of Oxford. Kentaro will
hold a joint post with the Maths
department, and will be replacing Hannes
Leitgeib. His research interests are in
mathematical logic and the philosophy of
mathematics.
Replacing Jimmy Doyle is Joanna Burch-
Brown. She has just completed her PhD
on the epistemological difficulties for
utilitarians of knowing the consequences
of your account. She has research
interests in normative philosophy.
The Department is also very pleased to
announce that Dagmar Wilhelm will be
staying on with us next year.
Competition
In an attempt to put the Hume-our back
into this intellectually strenuous subject,
we’d like to invite you to send in your best
philosophical puns.
The winner, as voted for by a
democratically elected panel, will win the
‘Wittygenstein Award’ and be presented
with a packet of biscuits of their choice.
Restrain yourselves to one word or
phrase please.
Contributions to:
bris.adabsurdum@gmail.com
16. 14
AdAbsurdum | Spring 2012
Einstein’s
Puzzle
INSTEIN is said to have devised this
puzzle sometime last century. He
claimed that 98% of the people in the
world cannot solve it. Can you?
--
There are five houses of different colours
next to each other on the same road. In
each house lives a man of a different
nationality. Each man drinks a certain
type of beverage, smokes a certain brand
of cigar, and keeps a certain kind of pet.
No two owners keep the same kind of pet,
smoke the same brand of cigar, or drink
the same drink.
1. The Englishman lives in a red house.
2. The Swede keeps dogs as pets.
3. The Dane drinks tea.
4. The green house is just on the left of
the white house.
5. The green house owner drinks
coffee.
6. The person who smokes Pall Mall
keeps birds.
7. The owner of the yellow house
smokes Dunhill.
8. The man living in the house right in
the middle drinks milk.
9. The Norwegian lives in the first
house.
10. The man who smokes Blend lives
next door to the one who keeps cats.
11. The man who keeps horses lives next
door to the man who smokes
Dunhill.
12. The owner who smokes Blue Master
drinks beer.
13. The German smokes Prince.
14. The Norwegian lives next to the blue
house.
15. The man who smokes Blend has a
neighbour who drinks water.
So who owns the fish?
Across
1. Wrote a book about a giant sea
monster (6)
5.
“Actions are right in proportion as they
tend to promote happiness; wrong as they
tend to produce the reverse of happiness.
By happiness is intended pleasure and the
absence of pain.” (4)
8.
Disputed the Greeks’ goal (See 12.),
arguing via the categorical
imperative that ontologically it
exists only in the imagination (4)
9. Visiting lecturer who very nearly
got hit by a poker (See 2.) (6)
12.
Scored the game-winning goal for
the Greeks in the Monty Python
Philosophers’ Football Match (8)
13.
He’s on the front cover! (4)
14. British Empiricist (5)
15. Duhem-___ thesis (5)
Down
2. When cogent argument fails,
threaten your opponent with a
poker (12)
3. Founder of the Athenian Academy
(5)
4. The Father of Empiricism (5)
6.
“The philosophers have only interpreted
the world, in various ways; the point is to
change it.” (4)
7.
“Blessedness is not the reward of virtue,
but virtue itself.” (7)
10. Founder of modern logic (5)
11.
Also disputed the Greeks’ goal (See
12.), arguing that the reality is
merely an a priori adjunct of non-
naturalistic ethics (5)
1. 2. 3.
4. 5.
6.
7. 8.
9.
10.
11. 12.
13.
14. 15.
Crossword:
Philosophers’ Names
E
17. AdAbsurdum | Spring 2012
15
VER a period of years, in the course
of maintenance, the planks of
Theseus’ ship are replaced one by one –
call this ship A. However, the old planks
are retained and themselves reconstituted
into a second ship – call this ship B. At the
end of this process there are two ships.
Which one is the original ship of
Theseus?
--
This is a famous puzzle about identity
and material constitution. It was discussed
by the great seventeenth century political
philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679).
If the old planks had been discarded
or just left in a pile, we should have had
only one ship. And despite its changing
constitution it would have retained its
identity: Theseus’ ship would have
remained continuously in existence. If a
mere change of a plank meant that the
ship had been replaced by another one,
very few things would last more than a
split second. For instance, we would not
retain our identity, since our molecular
constitution is constantly changing little by
little. Even a major change like the loss of
both legs need not destroy a person or
that person’s body.
But what if we have the reconstituted
ship, B, as well? Until it is largely
reconstituted we still have only one ship,
which does not suffer any break in its
continuity. If the reconstituted ship is
identical with the original, when did A,
the ship which had its planks replaced,
cease to be the original ship? Did the
original ship suddenly switch to becoming
the reconstituted one or was there a break
in continuity? These problems are not,
however, an insuperable difficulty for the
option that B is the same as the original
ship, A. For there need be no determinate
time at which the switch occurs, any more
than there is any determinate time, except
in law, at which a child becomes an adult.
Perhaps it doesn’t really matter
whether A or B that we identify with
Theseus’ original ship. However, this
quietist approach has its problems:
Suppose Theseus had insured his ship
before the planks were replaced. Which
ship is insured after the reconstitution: A
or B?
--
Reprinted from Paradoxes from a to z,
Michael Clark. (Routledge, 2002)
Paradox: The Ship of Theseus
O
AD ABSURDUM is published by a
small band of philosophy students at
the University of Bristol. We are
grateful for the many excellent
contributions we have received both
from our own department and from
UWE, and we hope to return to print
again in the Summer.
We would very much like for AD
ABSURDUM to have a permanent home
in Bristol. For this reason, we are
inviting both undergraduate and
postgraduate philosophers to consider
joining the editorial team. Ideally, we
will use the Summer Edition to
handover the management of the
magazine to a newly-formed team who
will continue to run the magazine next
year.
If you would like to contribute an
article to the Summer Edition, or are
interested in forming next year’s
editorial team, please get in touch.
Contact us at:
bris.adabsurdum@gmail.com
