Kant is arguing that the moral worth of an action lies not in its consequences or expected effects, but solely in the principle or motivation from which the action arises. For Kant, an action has moral worth only if it is done from duty to the moral law itself, not because of any external incentives or rewards. The good will and duty to the moral law are the sole determinants of morality, according to Kant.

1. pmail: happiness and morality
Student: I feel inclined to discuss the "Happiness and Morality"
passage in the Cahn anthology, particularly the example of the two
professors. Cahn states at the outset that this is a realistic
example, but, surely, it is unrealistic to pose the question of "who is
wiser?" at the end, after having stated the outcomes of each
individual's life. Indeed, at the time of the decision, neither
prospective professor knew what the vicissitudes of fate would hold
for her, and as such, the question "which of the two was the
wiser?" should be rephrased as "given the knowledge each had at
the time of the decision, which of the two was the wiser?". This
again reflects the intuitive vs. critical distinction of moral
reasoning. In this case, the immoral individual emerged from the
immoral act happier and more successful, but as Singer states, it is
better to "adopt some broad ethical principles and ... not deviate
from them. (93M)" The immoral Katie, then, represents the
exception to the general case in everyday experience, and we
would generally do better to follow Joan's actions.

2. pmail: the prior existence view
Student: When reading about Singer's explanation of the 'total'
view and the 'prior existence' view, he discusses whether it would
one would be morally obliged to reproduce if they could increase
the number of pleasant lives being lead. The discussion on going to
the movies as equivalent to killing a child in the third world in
Singer's moral theory seems relevant. Wouldn't bringing another
being into the world take up money, food, resources that could be
used towards helping those that are struggling in an already
overpopulated world? Increasing pleasure can be done by
increasing pleasure of those alive or increasing people to lead
pleasant lives, but by increasing the number of people, we are
decreasing the pleasure of those that are alive. Of course, this is
all predicated on the assumption that people would have otherwise
sent more money to those in need. I'm not sure if I'm on the right
track at all, but wouldn't that help to resolve the incoherency of
the 'total' view?

3. pmail: the prior existence view
Student: I couldn't really understand why, under the prior
existence view, there is no sufficient reason to affirm that one
should not have a child whose life will be miserable. Is it actually
not possible to affirm simultaneously that there is no obligation to
have a child whose life will be pleasurable and also that we should
avoid having a child whose life will be miserable?
Remember that the `prior existence’ view is different from
straightforward maximizing. It measures rightness/wrongness by
reference to the utility of those who exist prior to one’s choice. So
it doesn’t judge right/wrong that one brings a child into the world
who will be happy/miserable. So you don’t do wrong to bring a
miserable child into existence, on that view.

4. pmail: vegetarianism and pets
Student: To my knowledge as a pet owner, and as a person who
pays a lot of attention to vegan/vegetarian issues, there is not a
satisfactory meatless feed product for these kinds of animals. So, if
a human feels that is not ethically sound to commit to animal
cruelty for sustenance, it would be contradictory to have animals
that they could not feed properly for the same reasons. If a vegan
did try to feed a dog a meatless diet, it would be an act of cruelty
because the dog would be malnourished and their health would
suffer. A vegan that allowed their dog to eat animal-based foods
would be practicing speciesism, which seems to go against the
vegan ethic.
Perhaps that is why Singer is not a pet owner.

5. pmail: infants and the right to life
Student: Singer argues that babies cannot have a right to their
own life because they do not have any future life interests and are
not yet "self-aware." I think drawing the line at this point is
arbitrary because something as complex as self-awareness is not
something that an infant gains over a short period of time. Self-
awareness develops gradually, and as an infant grows, self-
awareness becomes more and more developed. At what point do you
draw the line between the baby that has no self-awareness and
the one that does? Does a toddler who is fully aware of themself
have more of a right to life than the infant who has a limited,
undeveloped awareness of self?
There are two “arbitrariness” arguments here. The one that informs
your final question looks more severe.

6. pmail: intentionality
Student: My question is pertaining to intentionality and ethics. To
me, the intentions governing an act are just as critical as the act
itself, but it is hard to piece together what moral theorists like
Singer think of this. Hypothetically there could exist someone
whose actions are completely ethical when viewed from a
preference utilitarian view, but the reasoning behind those actions
is not that of a preference utilitarian. I guess put simply, do
ethicists think that means are as important as ends, ends are the
be all and end all, or means are more important?
DrC: Consequentialists downplay intentions; deontologists give them
great or exclusive weight. DV utilitarianism is a hybrid view that
give intentions some weight corresponding to the strength of the
preference for the intended action.

7. pmail: egoism
Student: Taking [Rachels’s] example about Smith [who stays behind
to help his friend], he suggests that this is a perfectly clear case
of unselfish behaviour, I would say, however, that it is a perfectly
clear case of reciprocal altruism. If Smith's friend had not already
gone out of his way to help him in one way or another, or if in the
future he did not act similarly in an equal situation, I can almost
guarantee that Smith would not be staying behind to help the
friend. I think many cases of so called "unselfish" behaviour are
due to other less obvious factors. I found Rachels' satisfaction
argument could fit just as easily in the egoist camp. In his
argument about self interest he uses the smoker who does not quit,
here I would suggest that though this person may not be acting in
their self interest in the long run, they are attempting to increase
their pleasure for the current time, which is what I would call
"self-interested".

8. pmail: critical and intuitive morality
Student: “Soundly chosen intuitive moral principles should be like a
good tennis coach's instructions to a player. The instructions are
given with an eye to what will pay off most of the time; they are a
guide to playing 'percentage tennis.’ Occasionally an individual might
go for a freak shot, and pull of a winner that has everyone
applauding;but if the coach is any good at all, deviations from the
instructions laid down will, more often than not, lose. So it is better
to put the thought of going for those freak shots out of one's
mind." I am uncertain whether Singer does or does not endorse
this view? It seems to me this thinking would lead to a very
pedestrian life that could also have the ability to bring down the
average potential of human beings in general.
DrC: It's his view, as I read the passage. But I see what you
mean. You might be interested in William James's famous article,
"the moral philosopher and the moral life", which develops a
position seemingly like the one you favour.

9. Historical properties
Singer: No objective assessment can support
the view that it is always worse to kill
members of our species who are not persons
than members of other species who are.
(117B)
DrC: Are there what might be called
historical properties of human beings that
favour them in the scenarios that Singer has
in mind? Roughly, the historical property
might be: being one of us. (Compare a soldier
who saves a badly wounded comrade rather
than a healthy by-stander.)

10. Replaceability
Singer: So perhaps the capacity to see
oneself as existing over time, and thus to
aspire to longer life (as well as to have
other non-momentary, future-directed
interests) is the characteristic that marks
out those beings who cannot be considered
replaceable. (125)
DrC: Consider “transporting” in which the
original is destroyed.

11. new preferences
Singer: ...but Hart is on weaker ground when
he suggests that this must mean that
existing preferences can be outweighed by
new preferences created to take their place.
(127)
DrC: Consider again teleporting. For good
measure, suppose that *multiple* copies are
“beamed down”.

12. the moral ledger model
Singer: Since everyone has some unsatisfied
desires, the conclusion to be drawn is that it
would have been better if none of us had
been born. Thus the moral ledger model of
creating and satisfying a preference will not
do. (129B)
DrC: Was this passage Benatar’s inspiration?

13. Stevenson’s heuristic
Stevenson: To say that science can always
settle arguments about value, we have seen,
is to make this assumption: Agreement in
attitude will always be consequent upon
complete agreement in belief, and science
can always bring about the latter. (75T)
DrC: Do you think his heuristic would resolve
the difference in attitude between Singer
and Gauthier, say?

14. the moral worth of an action
Kant: Thus the moral worth of an action does
not lie in the effect expected from it and so
too does not lie in any principle of action
that needs to borrow its motive from this
expected effect....nothing other than the
representatijon of the law in itself, which
can of course occur only in a rational being,
insofar as it and not the hoped-for effect is
the determining ground of the will, can
constitute the preeminent good we call
moral, which is already present in the person
himself who acts in accordance with this
representation.... (81)