Stormbreak-Special-Report-web-final_0.pdf

Stormbreak: Fighting Through
Russian Defences in Ukraine’s
2023 Offensive
Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds
Special Report
www.rusi.org
Special Report

192 years of independent thinking on defence and security
The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) is the world’s oldest and the UK’s leading defence and security think
tank. Its mission is to inform, influence and enhance public debate on a safer and more stable world. RUSI is
a research-led institute, producing independent, practical and innovative analysis to address today’s complex
challenges.
Since its foundation in 1831, RUSI has relied on its members to support its activities. Together with revenue
from research, publications and conferences, RUSI has sustained its political independence for 192 years.
Royal United Services Institute
for Defence and Security Studies
Whitehall
London SW1A 2ET
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 7747 2600
www.rusi.org
RUSI is a registered charity (No. 210639)
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s), and do not reflect the views of RUSI or any
other institution.
Published in 2023 by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies.
© RUSI, 2023
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non-Commercial – No-Derivatives 4.0
International Licence. For more information, see <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>.
RUSI Special Report, September 2023.
Cover image: A destroyed Russian military vehicle is pictured in Novodarivka village, Ukraine.
Courtesy of Raj Valley / Alamy

ii
Contents
Executive Summary 1
Introduction 3
I. Taking Novodarivka and Rivnopil 5
II. Russian Lessons and Adaptation 15
III. Ukrainian Challenges and Requirements 20
Conclusion 24

1
Executive Summary
Irrespective of the progress made during Ukraine’s counteroffensive, subsequent
offensives will be necessary to achieve the liberation of Ukrainian territory. It
is therefore important to assess the tactics employed and training provided
during the Ukrainian offensive to inform force generation over the coming
months. This report scrutinises tactical actions to identify challenges that need
solving.
The prerequisite condition for any offensive action is fires dominance. This has
been achieved through blinding the counterbattery capability of Russian guns
and the availability of precise and long-range artillery systems. Ensuring the
sustainability of this advantage by properly resourcing ammunition production
and spares for a consolidated artillery park is critical.
Ukraine is suffering from heavy rates of equipment loss, but the design of
armoured fighting vehicles supplied by its international partners is preventing
this from converting into a high number of killed personnel. It is vital that
Ukrainian protected mobility fleets can be recovered, repaired and sustained.
This also demands a focus on industrial capacity and fleet consolidation.
Attempts at rapid breakthrough have resulted in an unsustainable rate of
equipment loss. Deliberately planned tactical actions have seen Ukrainian forces
take Russian positions with small numbers of casualties. However, this approach
is slow, with approximately 700–1,200 metres of progress every five days, allowing
Russian forces to reset. One key limitation on the ability to exploit or maintain
momentum is mine reconnaissance in depth. The exploration of technological
tools for conducting standoff mine reconnaissance would be of considerable
benefit to Ukrainian units.
Another limiting factor in Ukrainian tactical operations is staff capacity at
battalion and brigade level. Training of staff would significantly assist Ukrainian
forces. This will only be helpful, however, if training is built around the tools
and structure that Ukraine employs, rather than teaching NATO methods that
are designed for differently configured forces. There is also a critical requirement
to refine collective training provided to Ukrainian units outside Ukraine so that
Ukrainian units can train in a manner closer to how they fight. This requires
regulatory adjustment to allow for the combination of tools that are highly
restricted on many European training areas.
Russian forces have continued to adapt their methods. Some of these adaptations
are context specific, such as the increased density of minefields, from a doctrinal

2
Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive
assumption of 120 metres to a practical aim to make them 500 metres deep.
Other adaptations are systemic and will likely have a sustained impact on Russian
doctrine and capability development. The foremost of these is the dispersal of
electronic warfare systems rather than their concentration on major platforms,
a shift to application-based command and control tools that are agnostic of
bearer, and a transition to a dependence on more precise fires owing to the
recognised inability to achieve the previously doctrinally mandated weight of
imprecise fire given the threat to the logistics sustaining Russian guns. It is vital
that Ukraine’s partners assist the country’s preparations for winter fighting,
and subsequent campaign seasons now, if initiative is to be retained into 2024.

3
Introduction
R
ussian forces suffered major setbacks in autumn 2022 with the collapse
of the Western Group of Forces in Kharkiv and a compelled withdrawal
from Kherson. In response to these setbacks, General Sergei Surovikin,
then commanding Russian forces in Ukraine, adopted a new strategy. First,
Russia would use long-range precision strikes to wage an attritional campaign
against Ukraine’s electricity and reticulation infrastructure with the aim of
making Ukraine’s cities uninhabitable during the winter. Second, the Armed
Forces of the Russian Federation would build a series of defence lines across
the occupied territories in a bid to blunt further Ukrainian advances and protract
the conflict by exhausting Ukrainian troops. The extensive preparation for
defensive operations – compared with the aggressive war aims of the Kremlin
– contributed to Surovikin being removed in January, with General Valery
Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, launching an ill-prepared and
costly series of offensive thrusts in January 2023. Nevertheless, the defence lines
were completed, and Russia has been able to fall back on these defences after
the failure of its offensive actions. The Surovikin Line now poses a major barrier
to Ukrainian troops seeking to liberate the occupied territories.
During the preparation of Ukraine’s offensive, various concepts of operation
were examined. Much of the data supporting the tactics that Ukraine’s international
partners sought to train Ukrainian forces to adopt was based on operational
analysis from the 20th
century that did not contend with a range of technologies
employed in Ukraine. Understanding how effective these tactics have been,
therefore, is important for refining both the tactics of Ukraine’s international
partners, and improving the training provided to Ukrainian forces for subsequent
operations. This report seeks to explore a set of tactical actions fought by the
Ukrainian military in the opening phases of the counteroffensive and how both
Ukrainian and Russian sides have refined their approach in response.
The overall plan for the offensive is highly sensitive. Detailed accounts of aggregate
losses and other data are also sensitive because they would provide Russia with
information about the extent to which they have written down Ukrainian units.
Therefore, instead of trying to summarise progress throughout the offensive,
this report presents a case study of a series of tactical actions, fought over a
two-week period over the villages of Novodarivka and Rivnopil, straddling the
border between Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. The series of tactical actions
is chosen because it is representative of wider trends, and informative as to how
Russian forces manage different tactical challenges, and the various approaches
employed by Ukrainian troops. The overview is based on accounts of the operations

4
by participants, captured documents from Russian command posts, open-source
material including satellite imagery of the engagements, and a review of non-public
videos of the relevant tactical actions. This report was presented to the Armed
Forces of Ukraine (AFU) prior to publication to ensure that its release would not
compromise any ongoing operations or tactics. The report remains solely the
work of the authors named.

5
I. Taking Novodarivka and
Rivnopil
T
he line of contact between Ukrainian and Russian forces along the boundary
between Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts had been relatively static over
the months preceding Ukraine’s offensive. Russian offensive operations
in early 2023 had focused on Vulhedar, some 40–50 kilometres to the east, and
Bakhmut. Ukrainian troops remained dug into tree lines around a kilometre to
the north of Novodarivka, around the village of Novopil. A brigade of the Ukrainian
Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) had been holding the line for some time,
reinforced in May by a mechanised brigade and another line brigade in anticipation
of the offensive. The mechanised brigade would spearhead the breakthrough.
The Russians had a company in Novodarivka and another in Rivnopil, with a
third holding a series of fighting positions between the two settlements. Behind
this were additional reserves including armour. The approaches to the settlements
were heavily mined. To begin advancing south towards the Surovikin Line,
Ukrainian forces needed to break through these villages, and thereafter through
Priyutne, approximately 6 kilometres to the south.

6
Figure 1: Russian Brigade Map of Force Laydown and Assessed Ukrainian Positions as
of 10 April 2023
Source: Captured by Ukrainian forces during fighting in June 2023.

7
Figure 2: Recreated Map of Russian Positions at Novodarivka and Rivnopil
Source: Map captured by Ukrainian forces during fighting in June 2023; Maxar Technologies.
The Ukrainian offensive began in late May with a protracted period of preparatory
artillery fires. For the Rivnopil sector, batteries of M777 155-mm howitzers had
been assigned to support the effort, setting up their firing positions to the
northwest. Usually, Ukrainian howitzers would have to displace 2–15 minutes
from opening fire, depending on their distance from different threat systems.
This time it was clear that Ukrainian intelligence had accurately marked down
Russian firing positions, and with the greater range afforded by 155-mm guns,
the Ukrainian gunners quickly caused Russian artillery to be pulled back. Since
the targets in this phase were largely in the close, the Ukrainian artillery
established a steady rhythm of strikes with little need to displace. There was a
sense of elation among the crews and the infantry watching the fire. For months
each gun was strictly limited in the number of rounds available. Ukraine had
been trying to conserve its ammunition to stockpile for the offensive. Now there
was freedom to fire and when calls for resupply were made, additional rounds
were promptly delivered.
The Ukrainians also worked to degrade Russian tactical reserves using UAVs.
Reconnaissance by day would locate Russian positions, which would be attacked
at night using converted agricultural UAVs dropping RPGs. These tactics were

8
fairly binary in their viability. If Russian electronic warfare (EW) was active,
the UAVs could not get in and usually were not committed. If there was a relaxation
in electronic protection, the effects could be dramatic. In one incident, a company
of Russian tanks had taken up position in a woodblock behind the front. Five
UAVs, each carrying four RPGs, were dispatched, destroying or seriously damaging
seven of the tanks, although all of the UAVs were lost in the process.
The decision to attempt a breach of the initial Russian fighting positions was
taken on the evening of 3 June, with mechanised troops assigned the task. There
was a debate within the command group over the bogginess of the ground after
recent rainfall. Nevertheless, the decision was to proceed. The initial attack was
to aim to breach an area where the minefields were less dense, because of the
short distance between the lines, and to break into the village of Novodarivka.
The village had been almost entirely destroyed by Russian shelling when originally
taken and was now simply a set of fighting positions for a Russian infantry
company. Long and thin, running east to west, the village provided the Russians
with covered positions that overlooked most approaches to their company
positions to the east and west.
After identifying the points for the breach, the offensive started early in the
morning of 4 June. Two UR-77 Meteorit charges were fired across the narrowest
part of the minefield, blowing two 6-metre-wide channels from the treeline to
Agricultural UAV modified to drop munitions,
Ukraine, July 2023. Courtesy of Jack Watling

9
the north to the edge of Novodarivka. Under covering fire from artillery, the first
column advanced along the eastern breach. The column was led by a pair of
tanks, followed by MaxxPro MRAPs carrying the infantry. Unfortunately, the
MRAPs struggled in the boggy ground, especially in the wake of the tanks.
Several of the MRAPs bogged in, while the cleared lane was insufficiently wide
for other vehicles to pass. It was at this point, with the column fully committed
to the breach, that a pair of Russian tanks unmasked and began to engage the
column. The Ukrainian tanks fired back at a range of around 800 metres.
Nevertheless, the vehicles in the column were knocked out in succession. Infantry
disembarking either turned back, or pressed forwards along the cleared lane,
trying to find shelter. Some infantry sections made it to the edge of the village,
but the open ground behind them, now scoured by fire, was perilous to traverse,
risking this force’s isolation. Too small to take the village, the Ukrainian military
now had to press ahead or risk the destruction of the platoon that had made it
to Novodarivka. The threat to those suppressed in the minefield eased after
SPG-9 recoilless guns managed to engage the Russian tanks from the flank,
knocking them out. This allowed casualties to be extracted.
The commitment of the second company to the western breach was necessitated
both by the requirement to make progress against the objective and to reinforce
the troops in Novodarivka. The ground proved firmer along this lane. However,
when the column was fully committed to the breach, two more Russian tanks
emerged, moving at pace towards the column and firing. Via UAV feeds, the
command post watched the emergence of the enemy, and fires were brought
down to try and disrupt the action. Exposed, the breaching company attempted
to accelerate through the breach, but deviated from course. All vehicles in the
company were then immobilised by mine strike in succession. Russian fires
then began to range on the column. The dismounts once again bifurcated, some
reaching the outskirts of the village and others withdrawing.

10
Figure 3: Assault and Aftermath of the Breach of Novodarivka
Source: Planet Labs.
Figure 4: Assault and Aftermath of the Breach of Novodarivka
Source: Maxar Technologies, 6 June 2023.

11
The Russian defenders inside the village displaced to account for the positions
that had now been occupied, falling back to strongpoints in a farm to the east
of the village, and to several fighting positions along the central road. Recognising
the importance of expanding the ground held to disperse the force from Russian
fires, the Ukrainian commander deployed two assault groups to reinforce. One
group in platoon strength worked its way along the breach, using the immobilised
vehicles as cover, while fires suppressed the Russian positions. Another platoon
situated to the west noted that a fold of dead ground had become viable as the
repositioning of Russian forces in the village removed it from view, while dense
foliage prevented overhead observation by UAS. These troops advanced cautiously
to the western end of Novodarivka and began to assault Russian positions to
secure the crossroads that bifurcated the settlement. After some fierce fighting,
the Russian troops withdrew eastwards to prevent their positions from becoming
isolated. Fighting inside Novodarivka would continue for a further week with
Russian firing positions in the eastern farmstead holding out until isolated by
another Ukrainian action towards Rivnopil. Despite the Russians holding some
positions, these no longer overlooked the approaches to other Russian units,
opening up additional avenues of attack. The first new position to be assaulted
was the elevated ground to the west of Novodarivka. Previously, Russian positions
in the settlement had denied the approaches to the hill, but with these firing
posts removed, Ukrainian infantry were able to contest the position from which
Russian artillery spotters had previously directed fire against Ukrainian troops.
Figure 5: Advance on Novodarivka
Source: Maxar Technologies, Telegram, RUSI.

12
Figure 6: Advance on Novodarivka
Source: Maxar Technologies, Telegram, RUSI.
Before any further advances could be taken, it was necessary to deal with the
Russian company in front of the village of Rivnopil to the east. This position
controlled access to a series of woodblocks that ran semi-contiguously north to
south. Ukrainian commanders were concerned that if they attempted to press
ahead, Russian anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW) teams and other troops would
work their way around the flank and cause significant damage to critical
equipment. The position therefore needed to be taken. At the same time, however,
Ukrainian commanders were wary. They had lost two companies of equipment
to take Novodarivka. Such a loss rate was not sustainable if they were to eventually
breach the Surovikin Line. It was therefore essential that the assault on the
Rivnopil positions was accomplished without similar setbacks.
The attack on the Russian company position in front of Rivnopil would be led
by TDF troops. In order to carry out the operation, the attacking force was
augmented with two tanks from a neighbouring brigade and a battery of artillery.
The attack began with artillery preparation of the Russian lines. Thereafter, the
two tanks moved into positions where they had line of sight to the objective and
began to deliver fire. The tanks, moving in and out of cover, engaged the Russian
firing positions to draw the attention of and suppress the defenders. Shortly
thereafter, artillery strikes on the fighting positions were combined with the

13
delivery of smoke in front of the tanks. The tanks worked forwards, giving the
impression that smoke was being used to cover the advance of infantry.
While the tanks fixed the attention of the defence, a platoon multiple of Ukrainian
assault troops moved along the treeline to the east of the Russian fighting
positions. From there, it began to lay down suppressing fire and advance in
pairs. The action drew the attention of the defence, which now recognised a
clear tactical play, with a fixing action to its front, and a major assault about to
be launched against its flank. The Russian unit began to reposition to prepare
for this attack and attempted to win the firefight to the east. Reinforcing the
perception that it was about to be assaulted, the Ukrainian artillery then delivered
a heavy salvo against the positions, signposting an imminent assault.
The assault when it came did not materialise as the Russian defenders had
envisaged. Instead, a platoon of assault troops, having infiltrated forwards along
the western flank of the position then advanced rapidly, reaching the defensive
positions that had been thinned out in anticipation of the assault to the east.
Disorientated and fearing encirclement, the Russian troops began to withdraw
towards Rivnopil, abandoning their communications equipment, and leaving
five troops behind who were taken prisoner. Ukrainian forces had to exploit the
attack quickly, advancing beyond the company position, because its coordinates
were pre-registered with Russian artillery which delivered strikes on the trenches.
Nevertheless, the rapid collapse of this position forced a redistribution of forces
in Rivnopil itself, allowing another brigade to launch an attack on the village
and, over several days, drive the Russians to fall back to the tree lines beyond
the village. Eventually, Russian troops withdrew across a water obstacle behind
the village and blew several agricultural dams to flood the area, establishing a
string of ATGW firing posts in the tree lines beyond. The density of the ATGW
screen was significant, with approximately four launchers per treeline with 50
missiles. These ATGW teams allow advances to be made past them and then
conduct anti-tank ambushes from the flank before attempting to withdraw. They
therefore had to be cleared deliberately before any armour could be pushed
forwards. With only one obstacle-crossing vehicle available, the Ukrainian units
had to pause to consolidate their gains.

14
Figure 7: Positions In Front of Rivnopil
Source: Maxar Technologies, June 2023; Planet Labs.
The capture of Novodarivka and Rivnopil took two weeks, with the need to secure
flank positions being a prerequisite to further advances. Thus, the rate of advance
during this period was one tactical advance for three days of fighting, with each
advance moving the line of control approximately 700–1,200 metres forwards.
The difference in methods for the various advances produced starkly contrasting
results in terms of the level of expenditure for the gains made. Whereas the first
tactical advance against Novodarivka cost two companies worth of equipment,
losses throughout the attack on Rivnopil were light. Both Russian and Ukrainian
forces made adaptations to their methods after these initial exchanges. The
emphasis for Ukrainian troops moved to taking ground while conserving
equipment and personnel.

15
II. Russian Lessons and
Adaptation
T
he tactical actions around Novodarivka and Rivnopil were largely seen as
successes by Russian forces insofar as they inflicted sufficient equipment
losses in the early phases so as to degrade the reach of Ukrainian manoeuvre
units assuming a consistent rate of loss through the depth of Russia’s defensive
positions. At the same time Russian losses in artillery and tanks were high, with
the former being more concerning for the Russian command. Russian troop
losses, while acceptable for the 58th
Combined Arms Army as regards the level
of attrition inflicted, were nevertheless unsustainable in the context of a protracted
assault unless reinforcement was delivered. In short, Russia achieved tactical
success in preventing a breakthrough, and could achieve operational success if
it continued to inflict comparable equipment loss on the enemy. Attrition of
personnel, however, if it remained consistent into the autumn, posed a risk of
operational defeat, while loss of artillery systems threatened a reduction in
capacity to attrit Ukrainian troops. Given this dynamic, several adaptations were
made to Russian defensive operations.
The first adaptation was to increase the depth of minefields. Russian minefields
had been doctrinally set down as 120-metres deep prior to the offensive. Following
the early clashes, it was noted that this depth of mines was breachable by MICLIC
and UR-77 to a sufficient depth to enable infantry to get into Russian defensive
positions. The aim, therefore, has been to increase the depth of minefields to
up to 500 metres, well beyond any rapid breaching capability. This has had a
series of secondary implications. First, the Russian logistics systems were
organised to equip brigades with sufficient mines to comply with doctrinal
templates. The increased depth of the fields means that Russian forces have had
insufficient mines to consistently meet this lay down with a density of mines
consistent with doctrine. The result has been improvisation of explosive devices,
the diversification of the range of mines ceded, and the decreasing regularity
of minefields. Other common adaptations have included the laying of two anti-
tank mines together – one atop the other – compensating for reduced density
by ensuring that vehicles are immobilised by single mine-strikes, even when
vehicles are equipped with dozer blades. Prior to this it was not unusual for a
tank equipped with a dozer blade to survive three mine strikes before being
immobilised by the fourth. Although the consistency of the minefields is now

16
diminished, this has significantly complicated Ukrainian planning and minefield
reconnaissance.
Russian forces have also assessed that the practice of setting pre-registered fires
to engage their own positions once they are lost is inefficient and dangerous
when the enemy has an artillery advantage in terms of counterbattery detection,
range and accuracy. The problems with this method have included the exposure
of friendly guns, reduced effectiveness because of the Ukrainian tendency to
displace from the fighting positions as soon as possible, and a dependency on
communications. To solve these problems the Russians have resorted to preparing
their fighting positions for reserve demolition. This is often done with improvised
charges. The template is to detonate the first line once Ukrainian troops enter
the fighting positions, while Russian forces withdraw through the rear of the
trenches. The Russians assess this to be more responsive and assured than the
application of artillery fire, and to threaten the boldest and most capable assault
troops in Ukrainian formations, deterring attacks on firing posts.
If the increased complexity and extent of the minefields imposes constraints on
adversary tempo, and reserve demolition of fighting positions deters the rapid
clearing of positions, this fixing of the enemy requires that the Russians have a
means to inflict damage on advancing troops. Artillery remains the primary
method, but with fewer guns and a requirement to protect them, there is now
a greater emphasis placed on other means. One of the foremost methods adopted
by the AFRF is the emplacement of ATGW teams to the flanks of their positions,
prioritising better trained and motivated troops to conduct anti-tank ambushes.
Although there are limited personnel capable and willing to fight forward in
this way, there appears to be no shortage of Russian ATGWs, with Ukrainian
troops noting that these teams are well stocked with recently manufactured
munitions. These troops are also prioritised for directing fire from standoff
aviation.

17
The use of attack aviation has posed a consistent challenge for Ukrainian forces
throughout the counteroffensive. The foremost threat comes from Ka-52 Alligators
firing Vikhr and Ataka ATGMs. However, the Russians have also begun mounting
Ataka on Mi-35Ms, which also engage in area-effect strikes utilising salvos of
lofted S-8 rockets. Aviation strikes are launched from a depth of approximately
8–10 kilometres from the target. Ukrainian forces note that the presence of
attack aviation is often heralded by the lifting of GPS jamming among Russian
formations, reflecting the need for precise navigation in order to coordinate
strikes, given that both armies are using many of the same platforms. Russian
helicopter groups are also often flying with an EW-equipped helicopter for
defensive purposes, equipped with directional pods aimed at targeting radar.
The Russians are having to keep helicopters relatively close to the front, making
their forward arming and refuelling points and other infrastructure vulnerable.
Nevertheless, shortage of Ukrainian tactical air defence, the low altitude
maintained by these assets, and the limited period during which they are in the
hover to deliver effects all make countering attack aviation difficult.
The Russian military has also determined to tactically exploit opportunities
when Ukrainian forces have become bogged down by aggressive flanking with
armour to knock out Ukrainian systems. It is worth noting that Russia often
loses the tanks used for these counterattacks but they inflict disproportionate
damage because the mines constrain Ukrainian vehicles in their ability to
Self-propelled howitzers preparing to move,
Ukraine, July 2023. Courtesy of Jack Watling

18
manoeuvre or respond. This willingness to counterattack and a decision to
defend forwards highlight how training for Russian tank crews and other
specialisms has continued to function, generating new crews with some tactical
competence compared with the disruption in collective training that has hampered
Russian infantry.
There are also areas of adaptation that reflect a significant improvement in
practice and are not specific to the current context. One area of continued Russian
adaptation but also improvement is EW. Russian EW has been a major area of
investment and Russian EW operators tend to be technically competent.
Nevertheless, Russian EW platforms have largely comprised modernised versions
of Soviet equipment, which placed each type of effector on a single large platform,
with formations of platforms providing a range of EW effects. The vulnerability
of this approach has been recognised by the AFRF given the targeting of specific
emitters. This has, in the first instance, led to the much more subtle employment
of large platforms such as Zhitel R330-Zh. It has also driven a preference for the
mounting of antenna on light platforms, or the dismounting and distribution of
antenna that can be placed to cover tactical positions. The channelling of effects
through antenna can therefore be carried out by EW suites that are not tied to
the emitting signature. The loss of antenna when they are targeted is a cost that
the Russian military feels it can bear. This is a transition in progress and so is
not a uniform approach. Nevertheless, the preference to use systems such as
Pole-21 and to treat them as disposable systems in order to provide wide-area
protection from UAV strikes reflects a change in mindset, and how the Russian
EW branch is learning from the conflict.
Another interesting area of conceptual innovation – underway before Ukraine’s
offensive but accelerated by the dynamics at play today – is a transition of Russian
fires doctrine. Based on statistics gathered during the Second World War, Russian
artillery had established levels of fire that were assessed to deliver specified
effects against defined targets. For example, 720 rounds were assessed to be
necessary to achieve the suppression of a platoon fighting position. This is the
basis on which Russian fires operated in the opening phases of their invasion
of Ukraine. It is an approach that the Russians now assess to be non-viable. First,
the Russian forces lack the ammunition to sustain this volume of fire. Second,
the logistics enabling such a volume of fire is too vulnerable to detection and
long-range precision strike. Third, the loss of counterbattery radar and barrel
wear have meant that this mass approach to fire suppression is of diminishing
effectiveness.
The general conclusion that Russian fires doctrine is non-viable has caused a
doubling down on the concept of the Reconnaissance Fires Complex (RFC) with
effect being prioritised over volume. While manufacture of a range of Russian

19
munitions has become constrained, production of Krasnopol 152-mm laser-
guided shells has been prioritised, with newly manufactured shells being widely
available across the front. The use of UAVs to designate for Krasnopol has also
been increased. Lancet has also been used extensively, along with FPV UAVs, to
strike lead elements of Ukrainian units. Flown in complexes with ISR UAVs,
these effects provide precision. The Russian military is, of course, continuing
to rely heavily on MLRS, 120-mm mortars and other imprecise systems, while
corner-cutting in the production of its munitions is becoming apparent.
Nevertheless, the trend appears to be towards maximising accuracy and reducing
the number of rounds necessary to achieve the desired outcome rather than
resorting to saturation fire. This is a concerning trend, as over time it will likely
significantly improve Russian artillery. The growth in the complexity, diversity
and density of Russian UAVs is concerning. The gains in both effect of the warhead
and the economy of its design between Lancet-3 and Lancet-3M demonstrate
how the Russians are actively improving their fielded equipment. Modifications
to loitering munitions to achieve noise reduction on Shahed-136 and to harden
navigation are also notable. Here, it is clear that the AFRF are actively learning
from Ukrainian forces, and in doing so, reducing the extent of some Ukrainian
advantages.
Enabling the RFC depends on communications. Here too, the Russian military
is making important progress. At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Russian
forces depended heavily on bespoke military radios. In the scramble for equipment
late last year, a wide array of civilian systems was employed. Conceptually,
however, the Russians now appear to have moved on, increasingly relying on
military bearer networks but app-based services for encoding and accessing
data. The result is that a system such as Strelets can provide a 3G connection to
multiple devices operating applications that are intuitive for civilian users. This
separation of bearers and services is nascent and the security and robustness
of the systems being tested must be doubted. Nevertheless, the reduced training
burden of this approach and the improvements in fire direction already achieved
mean that the AFRF are likely to continue to push in this direction and increasingly
systematise their communications architecture around these methods.

20
III. Ukrainian Challenges
and Requirements
U
krainian adaptation to overcome these challenges is sensitive. Instead,
therefore, this report will outline several areas of persistent challenge
that Ukraine’s international partners could focus on to refine the support
they offer to the AFU. Given the trajectory of the offensive it is now clear that
major ground combat operations will continue in 2024 and so improving support
to Ukraine’s force generation process now is critical.
Insofar as Ukrainian forces have been able to make progress during the offensive
it has been dependent on fires superiority. Outranging the Russians, combined
with having better means for detecting enemy artillery and carrying out
counterbattery fires, is an essential Ukrainian advantage. This advantage is
limited in its duration by the serviceability of Ukrainian artillery pieces, the
availability of replacement barrels, and the continued supply of 155-mm
ammunition. With 17 artillery systems in operation, it is evident that replacement
barrels cannot be produced for all systems, because of the shortage of barrel
machines across NATO. It is therefore vital that Ukraine’s international partners
invest to ensure that there is a sustainable supply for a consolidated artillery
park, focusing on maintaining a more limited range of guns at greater scale. If
this is not achieved, it will undermine the preconditions for Ukraine to continue
to make progress next year. The protection of guns from Lancet-3M and other
loitering munitions is also becoming a critical priority and research into methods
of force protection should be accelerated.
The importance of sustaining combat platforms provided by Ukraine’s international
partners is also important for protected mobility. There is a diverse range of
vehicles that have been donated, from MRAPs to IFVs. Some are no longer in
production, while others are still in widespread service. Ukrainian troops note
that Western-provided platforms are vastly superior to their Soviet-legacy protected
mobility platforms for one fundamental reason: crew survivability. Whereas for
a Soviet mechanised section, its BMP was its primary weapons system, and so
Soviet planners treated as synonymous the loss of the BMP with the loss of the
section, Western armies treat mechanisation as an addition to basic infanteering.
Protected mobility is aimed at delivering infantry to their objective, which the
infantry then assault. This difference in mindset, combined with a different
approach to losses, means that there is a heavy emphasis in Western platforms
on the survivability of dismounts even if the vehicle is mission killed. By contrast

21
with Soviet-legacy platforms, the compromise of the vehicle’s armour is also
usually catastrophic for those inside it. Life support systems are a secondary
consideration. Given that Russia has greater mass than Ukraine, the accumulation
of experience and longevity of troops is strategically vital for the AFU. But while
Western-supplied protected mobility may be doing a good job at enabling their
dismounts to survive – as demonstrated by the infantry still making it to
Novodarivka despite their vehicles falling victim to mines and enemy fires – there
is still a high loss rate of platforms. These platforms are often mobility killed
rather than destroyed. But rebuilding them demands a consistent provision of
spare parts. That is challenging for vehicles that are no longer in production.
Again, therefore, Ukraine’s international partners need to ensure that the industrial
support is available to make the Ukrainian military sustainable.
The depth of exploitation of the conditions created by fires superiority is
significantly limited by the capacity for minefield reconnaissance. At present,
Ukrainian operations are inherently limited in their tempo by the fact that as
Russian minelaying becomes less and less uniform and omnipresent, it is necessary
to thoroughly recce ahead of any major push lest equipment loss becomes
unacceptable. This cannot be carried out in depth and often relies on dismounted
engineers. It is therefore very difficult to plan operations beyond the defences
immediately in front of Ukrainian positions, meaning that breaches forwards
are difficult to exploit. A note of caution is that because of the deviation from
doctrine, minefields differ in their actual contours from what is shown on Russian
plans. Assistance, therefore, should focus on equipment and techniques for
detecting mines. One critical area that could assist is the use of algorithmic image
analysis that could be conducted using UAVs to map minefields more quickly.
Planning remains a significant challenge for Ukrainian units because of the
limited availability of trained staff officers. The rapid expansion of the AFU with
the mobilisation of civilians means that there are many more units than staffs.
A Ukrainian BTR moves position, July 2023.
Courtesy of Jack Watling

22
Although brigades have technical specialists able to run the communications
and support systems they need, and often have skilled commanders, planning
shops and experienced G3 staff are scarce. This limits the scale at which brigades
can combine arms, especially during offensive operations where planning times
are compressed. This was an area of support identified as a requirement as early
as June 2022 but Ukraine’s partners have not effectively provided it. It is vital that
any staff training that is offered is not premised on putting Ukrainian staff through
academic courses aimed at creating NATO staff officers. A relatively small number
of staff applying NATO processes will have to revert to the mean once they are
back in Ukraine and working with the bulk of a staff who has not received training
on the same procedures. Instead, training should be based on observation of
how Ukrainian brigade staffs operate and the tools they depend on and then
offering training on techniques that maximise the efficiency of how those staffs
function within this context. The training must be bespoke. Ideally, it would be
of a whole staff. It must also accurately represent the communications and ISR
tools employed by Ukrainian brigades.
Another area of critical priority is training junior leaders to conduct tactical battle
drills. Again, attrition and the expansion of the Ukrainian military mean that
junior leaders with deep expertise in offensive operations are not universally
available across Ukraine’s formations. This manifests in referring of combat
management to higher echelons, where there are more experienced officers.
This drives the continuation of combat management at higher echelon and limits
mission command. Additional pressure is placed on the brigade, limiting the
scale and complexity at which it can operate. This was demonstrated during the
attack on Rivnopil. Only 3% of Ukrainian artillery-fire missions are smoke
missions. As demonstrated during the assault on the company position north of
Rivnopil, smoke can be extremely useful in confusing the enemy ground force
and obscuring assault actions. But smoke also has the effect of obscuring the
view from UAVs which higher Ukrainian echelons and command posts use to
coordinate activity and conduct combat management. Commanders persistently
prioritise maintaining their own understanding of the battlefield over laying
down smoke and concealing their personnel’s movements. Given the criticality
of rapid application of artillery to support movement, this prioritisation is
understandable, but it also reflects limitations in the ability of the brigade to trust
tactical commanders to execute actions when not directed by high headquarters
with greater situational awareness. Given the saturation of the headquarters that
results, it is vital to train junior leaders, in combination with expanding staff
capacity.
Another area where training needs to be refined is in gearing the support provided
outside Ukraine with the AFU’s training structure inside Ukraine. At present,
individual training conducted outside of Ukraine builds upwards from individual

23
skills. There is not enough time in the course to move on to collective training at
the company, while the safety cases on Western ranges require certification of
individual skills before more complex activities can be trained. This approach
to safety may make sense in peacetime for Western armies. For Ukraine, it simply
transfers risk from training to operations. The reality is that individual training
can be delivered by the AFU in Ukraine. What cannot easily be delivered is
collective training. This is because the AFU does collective training ‘in the unit’.
Soldiers who are certified in their individual skills by training centres are assigned
to units and it is up to the brigade commander to carry out training activities. If
a brigade is fighting a sector of the front, it must establish a training area behind
the frontline and rotate troops back to exercise. This limits the scale of training
to company-sized activities at maximum, with the level of training undertaken
entirely dependent on the intensity of operational activity at the front. This
approach to force generation means that most Ukrainian battalions are generating
approximately two platoons of troops which are considered fully capable of
leading assault actions. While the rest of the battalion provides reinforcement,
and the ability to hold ground, the size at which formations can conduct offensive
action is severely constrained.
Collective training outside Ukraine is hampered by the fact that because of the
safety culture in NATO, Ukrainian troops cannot train as they fight. Moreover,
many NATO tactics either require a level of training that is not feasible within
the timeframe available, or are not validated in the modern threat environment.
A good example here is that Ukrainian training emphasises the threat from
artillery even when teaching squad tactics. For Western armies that build skills
incrementally, artillery is introduced into training after basic infantry tactics are
mastered. More complex training involving artillery cannot be conducted until
troops are certified in their basic skills to be able to exercise safely. For Ukraine,
however, troops who are not prepared to deal with artillery are not prepared for
the fight. Another example is the shaping effect of UAVs. Most NATO training
areas are severely restricted in the types of UAVs that can be flown and how they
can be used. This is because of fears that UAVs will malfunction and fly into
controlled airspace, such as the area around civilian airports. The problem is
that for collective training above company, Ukrainian troops need to be prepared
for and practise tactics in an environment where there are up to 25 UAVs observing
their movements, while UAVs are also critical to their own combat management.
Thus, on partner training grounds where they could conduct collective training
that is hard to carry out in Ukraine, they are prevented by regulation from either
actually practising and refining their own command and control procedures, or
exercising tactics that realistically represent the threat. This gearing of training
to meet Ukraine’s needs is critical if future rounds of mobilised Ukrainian troops
are to be properly prepared to continue the liberation of their territory.

24
Conclusion
O
perational analysis of tactical actions during Ukraine’s summer offensive
reveals a range of important areas where Ukraine’s international partners
can refine their support. Improvements in international training and
other assistance will not have an impact on the current offensive. They will be
critical however for Ukraine next year in its next round of force generation.
Confidence that forces can be regenerated and that equipment can be repaired
and sustained is also important for the AFU in shaping its planning for the current
phases of operations. Delays in improvements to training or the industrial
investment in making Ukrainian capabilities sustainable will similarly not have
an immediate effect, but will impose a considerable cost on Ukraine next year.
Some of the challenges currently limiting Ukrainian operations are a direct
consequence of the failure to address identified requirements with sufficient
alacrity in 2022.
It is also important to recognise that Russian forces are fighting more competently
and with reasonable tenacity in the defence. Although they are losing ground,
Russian forces are largely conducting orderly withdrawals from positions and
are effectively slowing down and thereby managing Ukrainian advances while
imposing a considerable cost in equipment. Another important point is that
scarcity of systems that Russia had previously depended on to offer advantages
are causing significant adaptation in the Russian armed forces and some of the
solutions arrived at are likely to be continued and built on after the war. Most
consequential of these are the move to application-based command and control
services, agnostic of military bearers, and the shift in fires to emphasise effect
for rounds fired rather than volume of rounds delivered on the enemy.
The Ukrainian military has learned from initial setbacks during its summer
offensive. Even if a rapid breakthrough has proven difficult, the attrition being
afflicted on Russian forces will see a degradation in the defence over time, and
once a critical mass of losses is reached, that degradation may become non-linear.
Given that it is unlikely, however, that this offensive will deliver a decisive
liberation of ground, both Russia and Ukraine now face the question of how to
regenerate combat power for the next round of fighting, into 2024 and beyond.
For Russia, mobilising people is simple, but providing trainers and equipment
for them remains a bottleneck. The conditions under which mobilisation is
conducted are also constrained by Russian political considerations. Although it
would make most sense to mobilise personnel before they are needed, Moscow
consistently defers taking critical decisions until there is an immediate need.
For Ukraine, there is first the question of how to retain as much of its experienced

25
forces as possible, and second how to expand the scale at which its forces can
operate by working with its international partners to improve collective training.
Whether Ukraine’s partners can overcome their habitual sluggishness in doing
what they have identified as necessary will be critical in determining whether
Ukraine can maintain the initiative into the next fighting season in 2024.
Given the lead-times involved, one question that should dominate the thinking
of Ukraine’s international partners today is the dynamics of winter warfare.
Last year, Russia prepared its troops poorly for winter conditions and suffered
disproportionately as a result. Ukraine’s current offensive operations are likely
to continue into the autumn, but the question should be asked whether actions
can be taken now to maintain the pressure through the winter. It is highly likely
that Russia will hope that the winter will cause Ukraine to pause its offensive
efforts, while Moscow will likely return to the attempted destruction of energy
and reticulation infrastructure across Ukraine. It is now clear that the conflict
will protract. It is therefore important that Ukraine’s international partners
invest now to give Ukraine protracted advantages. Failure to make timely
adjustment to support will come at a heavy price in 2024.
Jack Watling is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI.
Nick Reynolds is Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI.

Stormbreak-Special-Report-web-final_0.pdf

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to Stormbreak-Special-Report-web-final_0.pdf

Similar to Stormbreak-Special-Report-web-final_0.pdf (18)

More from EdouardHusson

More from EdouardHusson (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

Stormbreak-Special-Report-web-final_0.pdf