Miranda Rights failed to not only protect the accused but also inmates when they are interrogated for a crime unrelated to their current incarceration.

3. THESE RIGHTS ARE
KNOWN AS
“MIRANDA RIGHTS,” OR
“MIRANDA WARNINGS”.

4. WHAT CONDITIONS ARE NECESSARY FOR
THE MIRANDA RULE TO APPLY?
Miranda rule applies only when police
interrogate a suspect who is in custody
Custody requires:
1) A formal arrest, or 2) restraint of a suspect’s
freedom to a degree associated with a formal
arrest.
An interrogation occurs when the police:
1) Ask investigative questions; 2) engage in other
words and actions they know or should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the subject.

5. WHAT FACTORS DO COURTS CONSIDER IN DECIDING WHETHER A
SUSPECT, WHO HAS YET TO BE ARRESTED, IS IN CUSTODY FOR
WARNING PURPOSE?
Before police give a suspect their Miranda warnings, an actual arrest has to
take place. So many times, police will stop somebody on the street, or pull
them over and will ask incriminating questions. Because the person is not
“under arrest,” they are not considered to be in police custody. These types of
situations are known as “non-custodial”: a situation where Miranda rights are
not required because an actual arrest didn’t take place.
“The standard to determine whether someone is under custody is based on the
reasonable person rule: measuring the way a reasonable person would have
acted if he or she was in the same position as the suspect and how they would
have understood their freedom to terminate questioning and leave”
(Kalogerogiannis, 2016)

6. WHAT FACTORS DO COURTS CONSIDER IN DETERMING WHETHER AN
INTEROGATION WAS CUSTODIAL?
Courts have generally used a “totality of
circumstances” test to figure this out. They look at
“a number of factors and focus on the “physical
and psychological restraints on the person freedom
during the interview” (Rydholm, n.d). Courts
consider several factors in determining whether
an interrogation was custodial:
1. LENGTH OF THE INTERROGATION
2. ISOLATED SURROUNDINGS
3. THREATS
4. THREATING PRESENCE OF P.O’S
5. BLOCKING DOORWAYS
6. DISPLAYED WEAPONS
7. PHYSICAL TOUCHING OR RETRAINT
8. ITIMADATING TOUCHING OR
RESTRAINT
9. ORDERS NOT TO MOVE
Overall, Courts “try to determine how intimidating,
coercive, and compelling the environment was
(Rydholm, n.d)

7. IMPACT OF THE MIRANDA V. ARIZONA (1966)
CASE
THE MIRANDA DECISION IMPACTED SOCIETY IN THREE WAYS:
1. It educated the person about relevant constitutional rights. The decision help individuals
understand their rights so they can “make an intelligent, knowing, and voluntary decision on
whether to waive those rights” (Beechy, 2014). After understanding their rights, “individuals are
able to make an educated decision when questioned by police” (Beechy, 2014).
2. Law enforcement feared Miranda. Law enforcement officials “feared that suspects who confess
voluntary would get their confessions excluded from trial on the technicality that Miranda
warnings were not given” (Holland, 2015). And that, even after being warned, “suspects would
invoke their rights instead of confessing” (Holland, 2015). Law enforcement feared that “the loss
of confession evidence would hamper criminal investigations and even set dangerous criminals
free” (Holland, 2015)
3. Police officers’ strategies on speaking to suspects has changed. “Case law has influenced law
enforcement to change their ways to establish lawful tactics towards suspects” (Beechy, 2014).

8. MIRANDA RIGHTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY AND HOW
IT HAS FAILED TO PROTECT THE “ACCUSED”
MIRANDA RIGHTS HAS FAILED IN 3 WAYS:
1. The decision has rested on a false premise that all suspects understand their Miranda
rights
2. The police have developed tactics to find their way around the Miranda warning
3. Supreme court cases after Miranda v. Arizona undermined the Miranda decision

9. FALSE PREMISE
Miranda has failed because the decision rested on the false premise that suspects would
understand their Miranda warnings.
Due to the popularity of the case “the public, police, and sometimes courts wrongly believe that
suspects in custody understand their rights” (Roger 2011)
Under Miranda as it now stands, there is no absolute cut off in terms of age, intellectual, or
psychological functioning that automatically renders a person incompetent to waive his or her
rights” (Frumkin, 2000)
An individual’s maturity, cognitive capabilities, or level of mental illness affects what he or she
understands or appreciates” (Frumkin, 2000)

10. FALSE PREMISE
TWO IMPORTANT FACTORS FOR A “KNOWING WAIVER”:
1. The defendant ability to know or understand what each of the four Miranda rights means
2. The manner in which the rights were given” (Frumkin 2000).
For example, “did the police read the defendant the Miranda warning? If, so were they read
quickly or slowly? Or did the defendant read the rights aloud or silently? Was the defendant
handed a waiver-of-rights form and told to “sign here” without having been read his or her
rights? Did the defendant read the rights and then sign the form or just sign it without reading
them?” (Frumkin, 2000)

11. FALSE PREMISE
Miranda warnings were established so suspects would understand their rights, and for police to be able to
establish that any confessions obtained after providing the warnings were “knowingly”, “intelligently”, and
“voluntarily” made and therefore, admissible in court.
However, a defendant may make a knowing waiver but not an intelligent one”. “A defendant who
understands the right to be represented by a lawyer but erroneously believe that an attorney only defends
innocent people cannot intelligently waive this right (Frumkin, 2000).
Nor can a defendant who understands the right to remain silent but believes that invoking that right will
be used against him or her in court can make an intelligent wavier” (Frumkin, 2000).
Defendants may not comprehend but may be too embarrassed to admit they do not understand (Frumkin,
2000).
In short, just because defendants state that they understand Miranda rights does not mean that a
knowing or intelligent waiver has occurred” (Frumkin, 2000).

12. FALSE PREMISE
FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGIST THOMAS GRISSO’S RESEARCH STUDY FOUND THAT:
 Juveniles age 14 and younger are substantially less likely than adults and older juveniles to understand “Miranda”
and make competent and intelligent judgements concerning their wavier of rights.
Juveniles age 15 and 16 with IQ scores of less than 80 appear to demonstrate incompetency to waive their rights both
in absolute terms and in relation to adult groups.
 Twenty-three percent of all adults do not understand at least one Miranda right.
The research also revealed that a surprising percentage of adults and juveniles showed a deficiency in being able to
make an intelligent use of the right to remain silent: about 43 percent adult offenders, over 70 percent of adult non-
offenders, and 55 percent of juveniles believed that this right is revocable by the judge in court.
21 percent of adult offenders, 35 percent of adult non-offenders, and almost 62 percent of juveniles also believed that
asserting this right would result in a penalty imposed by the court (Frumkin, 2000).

13. IN ADDITION, MANY JUVENILES ALSO BELIEVED THAT:
 The statement, “anything you say can be used against you in a court of law”, refers to profane
language or criticism by the judge.
One-third of juveniles, compared to one-eighth, had a 0-point understanding of why an
attorney would want the truth from a client.
Three-fifths believed that defense attorneys were obligated to report any evidence of guilt to
the court
One-fifth, that the attorney decided guilt or punishment
And one-fifth, that the attorney needs to know if the child was guilty in order to determine
whether he or she deserves a vigorous defense (Frumkin, 2000).

14. FALSE PREMISE
Some offenders are street-wise and legally sophisticated, but far more have a limited and often erroneous
understanding of Miranda warnings and underlying Constitutional safeguards (Rogers, 2011).
In a analysis on nationwide statistics of 9.2 million arrest in 2009, conducted by psychology professor
Richard Roger, PH.D., he estimated that 976,000 arrests or 10% of the cases, were compromised by
problems with Miranda warnings (Rogers, 2011).
 The estimate includes 360,000 arrests of adults with mental health disorders; 305,000 arrests of adults
without mental disorders; and 311,000 juvenile arrests (Rogers, 2011).
There are “more than 800 different versions of Miranda Warnings used by police agencies across the
United States, and these warnings vary in reading level from second grade to post level college” (Rogers,
2011).
Defendants often assume that they know their rights so they don't listen and the warnings aren't
explained well by police officers” (Rogers, 2011).
As a result, suspects wrongly believe their silence can be used against them in a court of law (Rogers,
2011).

15. FALSE PREMISE
A close-ended survey about Miranda warnings of 119 undergraduate students and
149 pretrial defendants at jails in Texas and Oklahoma found that (Rogers, 2011) :
36% of the undergrads and 31% of the defendants wrongly believed that
their silence can be used against them as incriminating evidence.
 They also believed that police can continue to interrogate you after you
have requested an attorney and while waiting for the attorney to arrive.

16. CIRCUMVENTING MIRANDA
Developments in Supreme Court case law since Miranda have allowed police officers a significant end
run around awarding suspects the Miranda protection”.
 Law enforcement has developed countless ways of circumventing Miranda warnings, such as questioning
suspects before they are taken into custody, or presenting the warning in a way that inherently
undermines them.
Officer’s pressure, trick and intimidate suspects to speak, and elicit false confession even in situations
where a person may not be in a physical environment like formal arrest (Maoz, 2012).
A common tactic used in response to a suspect who is unwilling to talk; officers remind suspects of his or
her “right to remain silent” in order to convince him or her to open to the investigator. By informing a
suspect of his or her rights, the concession would make the interrogator appear more sympathetic and
increase the suspects willingness to speak. Then the interrogator follows the concession with an
explanation that a suspect who refuses to talk assumedly has something to hide (Maoz, 2012)

17. 1966 VERDICT ALTERED TO
UNDERMINE MIRANDA DECISION?
In the years following Miranda v.
Arizona, many changes were made to
the 1966 verdict. The trials following
Miranda served to reduce the impact of
the decision on law enforcement while
still upholding the central ruling of the
decision. However, these changes
undermined the Miranda decision
rather than help clarify it :

18. HARRIS V.
NEW YORK
(1971)
“In regard to statements made prior to defendants being read their Miranda
rights, the court held that, “these statements may be used at trial to prove
inconsistency and therefore admissible for impeachment” (Beechy, 2014).
Simply put, “when a defendant makes statements prior to being read his
Miranda rights, those statements can be used to challenge the truthfulness of
the defendant’s testimony at trial” (401 U.S. 222 (1971) Harris v. New York. No.
206). The verdict provided an incentive for police to ignore Miranda and benefit
from illegally obtained confessions.

19. NEW YORK V. QUARLES (1984)
Is known as the “public-safety exception to Miranda rights”.
The court held that “if a suspect makes a spontaneous
statement prior to being mirandized, it is still valid in trial. The
purpose of this exception is to protect public safety; the evidence
is valid if the officer is questioning the suspect in order to
ensure that the public is not in danger” (401 U.S. 222 (1971)
Harris v. New York. No. 206).

20. UNITED STATES V.
PATANE (2004)
In United States v. Patane (2004) the
court held that “physical evidence
obtained from un-Mirandized
statements, if those statements were not
forced by police, were constitutionally
admissible”. In other words, “when a
suspect makes a statement prior to
being Mirandized, physical evidence that
was obtained from this statement is still
valid at trial” (542 U.S. 630 (2004)
UNITED STATES v. PATANE no. 02-
1183. Supreme court of united states).

21. BERGHUIS V. THOMPKINS (2010)
Finally, in 2010, the U.S. Supreme court issued a series of decisions that
significantly affected the circumstances under which Miranda rights apply. In
Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010), the court held that, “a suspect must invoke his
or her Miranda right to remain silent; a suspect automatically waives this
right when he or she makes a "knowingly and voluntarily" statement to the
police. The statement is considered to be proof that the suspect does not want
to remain silent (130 S.Ct. 2250 (2010) Mary BERGHUIS, warden, petitioner,
v. Van Chester THOMPKINS. No. 08-1470. Supreme court of united states).

22. silence—even prolonged
silence—is not enough to
invoke your right to
remain silent. You must
speak and unambiguously
announce that you are not
going to speak to the
officers.

23. HOWES V. FIELDS, 565 U.S. 499 (2012): REDEFINING
MIRANDA IN PRISON
Does federal law automatically require Miranda warnings before
questioning jail or prison inmates about issues unrelated to the cases
for which they were incarcerated? (Oyez, n.d.)

24. HOWES V. FIELDS, 565 U.S. 499
(2012): FACTS OF THE CASE
The case involved Randall Lee Fields who was found guilty of two counts of third-degree criminal
sexual conduct by a jury for the sexual sexual abuse of a thirteen-year-old child (Oyez, n.d.).
Fields was serving a 45-day sentence for disorderly conduct when Lenawee county, Michigan
deputies questioned him about allegations of sex with a minor (Oyez, n.d.)
Fields was escorted from his jail cell by a corrections officer—who didn’t inform him where he was
being taken nor for what purpose— to a locked conference room, where he was questioned for
approximately five to seven hours.
Although Fields was not given Miranda warnings or advised that he did not have to speak, he was
repeatedly told by deputies that he was “free to leave” and could return to his cell (Desai, 2012).
Fields did not ask for an attorney or ask to go back his cell; however, he demanded several times
that he didn’t want to speak with the deputies anymore

25. HOWES V. FIELDS, 565 U.S. 499 (2012): FACTS OF THE CASE
Before returning to his cell, Fields confessed to a sexual relationship with a minor.
Fields filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals calming that his statements were inadmissible because
he had not been given his Miranda warnings before questioning (Oyez, n.d)
The trial court denied Fields motion to suppress his confession and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, “holding
that because Fields was free to leave the conference room and return to his cell and was questioned on a matter
unrelated to his incarceration, there was no obligation to provide him warnings under Miranda” (Oyez, n.d).
Fields then filed a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming that his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination was violated, and the U.S. District Court agreed. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed (Oyez, n.d)
The Sixth Circuit held that the interview was a custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda, “reasoning that
Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) clearly established, that isolation from the general prison population,
combined with questioning about conduct occurring outside the prison, makes any such interrogation custodial per se”
(Cornell Law, n.d.)

26. HOWES V. FIELDS, 565 U.S. 499 (2012): CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit decision which ruled an “interrogation custodial whenever an
inmate is removed from the general prison population and questioned about events unrelated to his or her
incarceration” (Desai, 2012).
Writing for the courts 6 to 3 majority opinion, Justice Samuel Alito Jr. Stated that “it’s precedents did not
support such categorical rule, and that the three elements of that rule (1) imprisonment, (2) questioning in
private, and (3) questioning about events in the outside world are not enough to create a custodial situation
for Miranda purposes (Desai, 2012).
The court also held that Mr. Fields should not be considered “in custody” for Miranda purposes because
“inmates who are already confined, are not shocked and coercible as a newly arrest might be (New York
Times, 2012). But, most importantly, “Fields was not threatened or physically restrained and was told at the
outset of the interrogation, and reminded thereafter, that he was free to leave the conference room and
return to his cell whenever he wanted” (New York Times, 2012).
Therefore, because the facts in this case was consistent with an environment in which a reasonable person
would have felt free to end the questioning and leave, the court held that the interrogation was not custodial

27. OPEN ISSUES AFTER HOWES V. FIELDS:
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG
“Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, which Justice
Stephen Beyer and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined”
(Oyez, n.d.). Justice Ginsburg agreed on the fact that
“what constituted custody was not clearly established in
fields favor” (Oyez, n.d.).
However, he disagreed with the court’s decision that
“Fields was not in custody because Fields was subjected
to “incommunicado interrogation” in a police-dominated
atmosphere, he was placed against his will, in an
inherently stressful situation and his freedom of action
[was] curtailed in any significant way” (Oyez, 2012; New
York Times; 2012).

28. OPEN ISSUES AFTER HOWES V. FIELDS: “CUSTODY” IN CUSTODY:
REDEFINING MIRANDA RIGHTS IN PRISON
Separating inmates from the general population satisfies the coercive pressure and restraint on movement
requirements necessary to trigger Miranda protections (Dominguez , 2011, p.1306)
Both of the elements required in Miranda in determining custody— (1) restraint on the suspect freedom of movement
(2) and the presence of coercive pressures—existed during the seven-hour investigation of Mr. Fields” (Dominquez, 2011,
p. 1311).
“Incarceration” alone “satisfies the restraint on freedom of movement necessary for Miranda to apply, because, even in
lowest level security prisons, inmates cannot leave without permission” (Dominquez, 2011, p. 1311).
Inmates may also believe that their cooperation with an interrogation may directly and immediately adversely affect
them”. “In fact, an inmates’ cooperation may be considered when determining parole.” (Dominguez, 2011, p.1312).
Inmates are uniquely vulnerable to the actions of correction officers, who corporate with police officers and other
interrogators, therefore, the coercive atmosphere is more serve regardless of who is doing the interrogating”
(Dominguez, 2011, p. 1313).

29. OPEN ISSUES AFTER HOWES V. FIELDS: “CUSTODY” IN CUSTODY:
REDEFINING MIRANDA RIGHTS IN PRISON
“A correction officer escorted Fields out of his prison cell to a conference room in an isolated area without explanation”:
“the interrogator was either in control and did not inform the corrections officer of the situation, or that the correction
officer and the interrogator was working together against the suspect” (Dominquez, 2011, p. 1313)
When interviewing incarcerated suspects, police officers: (1) have more “freedom” than they have when the interview
suspects outside the prison, (2) can interview incarcerated suspects whenever they want without having reasonable
suspicion to stop them or probable cause to formally arrest or hold them, (3) and they do not have to finish
interrogations in a “timely” matter, deliberately advoiding protections triggered by formal proceedings (Dominquez,
2011, p.1313)
Telling an inmate he is free to leave does not negate the coercive nature of interrogation, and is not a sufficient
substitute for Miranda warnings (Dominquez, 2011, p. 1313)
The fact that the interrogators told Fields that he was free to leave, only “lends support to the claim that Miranda
applies, and that prophylactic measures are necessary to safeguard the rights of prisoners” (Dominquez, 2011, p.1314)

30. OPEN ISSUES AFTER HOWES V. FIELDS: KENNETH C.
PICKERING, WORCESTER, MA, CO-CHAIR OF THE
SECTION’S CRIMINAL LITIGATION
COMMITTEE
Kenneth C. Pickering, Worcester, MA, co-chair of the section’s
criminal litigation committee—who also opposed the supreme court
ruling in Howes v. Fields. Pickering—argument raised the
question, “at what point does a prisoner become accustomed to his
surroundings whereby questioning him with armed deputies in
another room becomes natural and not alarming to him, like being
questioned by police in a precinct would for someone who is out in
the community?” (Desai, 2012).
“The coercive effect of this police-dominated, incommunicado
interrogation does not dissipate simply because an inmate is
familiar with his surroundings”(Dominquez, 2011, p. 1312).
Pickering agrees that the absence of a bright-line rule, makes it
difficult for courts to assess when an interrogation is custodial
under a variety of circumstance (Desai, 2012).