1. Imagining the Future Through Demographic Lens: Challenges
and Realities for China’s Aging Population
A thesis presented to the
Program in Political and Social Thought at the
University of Virginia
by
Claire Xiaozhi Wang
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts with honors.
30 March 2015
Advisor: ______________________________
Professor Yingyao Wang
3. 1
Thesis Abstract
In this thesis, I offer a comprehensive description of the population-aging
phenomenon in China, which will be one of China’s most significant new realities in the next
three to four decades. Taking a cross-disciplinary approach, I construct a narrative that
includes social, economic, policy, and personal perspectives of China’s population aging. I
incorporate a comprehensive approach by integrating a range of authoritative secondary
sources: up-to-date data, peer-reviewed academic research, and institutional reports that
present statistics and recommendations. The literature informs and builds on one another.
Because aging is such an intimate experience in one’s life course, I will contextualize
statistics and discuss real-life experiences to meaningfully convey implications.
In Chapter One, I describe China’s demographic outlook against the background of
global population aging. The One Child Policy, which is unique to China, played an
important role in shaping this outlook. The economic prospect of an older world is often
deemed pessimistic, but this may not be true if we can accept population aging as an
emerging societal norm.
In Chapter Two, I offer an overview of how the traditional value system of filial piety
and familial power structure underwent significant changes due to political and economic
programs after1949 and will continue to change. Older parents gradually lose their authority
over their children, and this trend will impact elderly care. This chapter provides a cultural
context of aging in China.
4. 2
Chapter Three investigates four main policy areas that will be most seriously
challenged by a rapidly aging population. The government needs to create a fair and
sustainable pension system, terminate the One Child Policy, gradually raise retirement age,
and increase investments in education to sustain economic growth and meet the occupational
demands of an older population.
In Chapter Four, I restore the elderly as the object of the aging process and explore
how the conception of old age is constructed. By reconsidering old age, I show the
possibilities of a positive and active attitude towards later life, which may lead to greater
personal attainment and wellbeing.
In the Conclusion, I acknowledge that making clear predictions about the future is
virtually impossible because of the complexity and interconnectedness of factors. I argue that
change and adaption will be constant themes while imaginative and forward-looking attitudes
are crucial to successfully transitioning into an older demographic structure. More cross-
disciplinary dialogues on the impact of aging need to be heard by the public. An older
population should be viewed as a new norm instead of as a “burden” or “problem.” Both the
state and individuals need to make fast decisions and adapt, preferably in a proactive, not
reactive, way.
5. 3
Introduction
In this thesis, I offer a comprehensive description of population aging in China, one
of China’s most significant new realities in the next three to four decades. I demonstrate that
change and adaption will be a constant theme while an imaginative, forward-looking attitude
is crucial to a successful transition into an older demographic structure.
Currently, there is a wealth of literature that deals with population aging and related
issues. Aging is an important stage in life course, a unique phenomenon in demography, an
important variable in economic development, and a major shaper of social life. Viewed from
different perspectives, old age is significant for research from a microscopic level to a macro
level. The social and economic implications of population aging are investigated in a wide
range of disciplines: economics, sociology, anthropology, policy analysis, etc. The complex
nature of aging demands research effort from investigation across fields.
The field of gerontology is defined as “the comprehensive study of aging and the
problems of the aged” in the Merriam-Webster dictionary.1
Gerontology is a
multidisciplinary study that incorporates biology, psychology and sociology (including
demography) and deals with multi-faceted aspects of aging. I am particularly interested in
social aging, which includes concerns and social issues associated with aging and the ways in
which these themes are influenced and at the same time influence the society in which people
live. In addition, because aging has important policy implications, many international
1
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gerontology
6. 4
organizations pay close attention to the topic. They gather data, present narratives, and draft
policy recommendations. The United Nations (UN) offer credible historical and projected
statistics on population indicators. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank
publish reports that assess policies and make recommendations. Economic researches play an
important role in evaluating the role of different factors and in informing policies. This rich
literature together offers a well-rounded picture of population aging and its consequences.
In reviewing the literature, however, I came across its limitations.
First of all, discussions often happen within disciplinary boundaries. They offer a
limited understanding of the issue. For example, research on the revision of China’s One
Child Policy is carried out mostly by demographers focusing on “demographic” questions
such as rebounding fertility rate and scale of population growth. Demographer Xiaotian Feng
says that there is little effort made to understand issues closely related to policy, including
impact on social and familial structure, the economy, education, employment, and social
security.2
Policy analysts are also bound by their disciplinary perspective and assumptions.
Second, the literature offers important statistics and narratives, but rarely are they
combined to tell a story. Demographic summaries offer a clear picture of China’s graying
population, of which a third will be older than 60 in 2050. But how does that necessarily
make people’s lives different from that of today? Answering this question requires one to
look into sociology and anthropology. Cause-and-effect relationships, which economic
studies often try to establish, can be limited in their usefulness because there are too many
confounding factors that influence the ourcome.
2
, “‘ ’ ,” , no. 5 (2014): 57–
62.
7. 5
Third, the implicit assumption of most literature, especially economic studies, is to
regard population aging as a “problem” and an older population a burden. Mass media
certainly has a role to play in negative association, which calls the transition a “demographic
time bomb.”3
Prevailing sentiments of fear and denial hinder us from seeing the matter more
objectively and discourage more creative means of looking at the issue.
***
In this thesis, I take a cross-disciplinary approach in constructing a narrative around
population aging in China. Describing population aging is a daunting challenge by itself.
Every change is followed by “enormous complexities.”4
I incorporate a comprehensive
perspective by integrating a range of authoritative secondary sources: up-to-date data, peer-
reviewed academic research, and institutional reports that present statistics and
recommendations. The literature informs and builds on one another. Because aging is such an
intimate experience in life course, I contextualize statistics and discuss real-life implications
people experience.
The socio-economic scene in China is changing very quickly so new data is crucial.
China’s pension coverage expanded by 20% of the entire population between 2009 and 2012
because of public pension system reform. The announcement that the older dual-track
employment-based pension system would start to unify to a single plan came out in January
2015. Such changes are happening constantly. Some are so new that they have not been
comprehensively studied by academic research because of the academic publishing cycle. In
3
“China, a Demographic Time Bomb,” OECD Data, accessed March 30, 2015,
http://data.oecd.org/chart/4fYe.
4
Wang Feng and Andrew Mason, 2007. “Population Aging in China: Challenges, Opportunities, and
Institutions,” Population in China at the Beginning of the 21st Century, edited by Zhongwei Zhao and Gei Guo,
Oxford University Press, 177-196.
8. 6
the thesis, I present the latest data and policy updates while anticipating more of those on the
way.
I hope this thesis will offer an opportunity to help the reader incorporate the
demographic scope into how he or she observes the world and makes decisions.
“Demography is destiny” is a line used in many books and articles discussing the role of
demography. However, few people other than demographers recognize this perspective. In
beginning of the preface of his book Population Aging: The Transformation of Societies,
Donald Rowland says that, “Population aging is one the main processes transforming
contemporary societies.”5
He calls the global change in population structure “a silent
revolution.”
Instead of solely looking at past results, I adopt a forward-looking and imaginative
attitude towards population aging. Because the challenge is one that has never occurred in
history, being open to new ideas and shifting assumptions we hold on to today will be a
crucial component of preparing for tomorrow.
In Chapter One, I describe China’s demographic outlook against the background of
global population aging. The One Child Policy, which is unique to China, played an
important role in shaping this outlook. The economic prospect of an older world is often
pessimistic, but this may not be true if we can accept population aging as an emerging norm
of human society. In Chapter Two, I offer an overview of how the traditional value system of
filial piety and living arrangement of the elderly underwent significant changes due to
political and economic programs after 1949 and will continue to change. Chapter Three
investigates four main policy areas that will be most seriously challenged by a rapidly aging
5
Donald T. Rowland, Population Aging: The Transformation of Societies (Springer Science &
Business Media, 2012).
9. 7
population, namely the pension system, the population policy, the retirement age, and
investments in education. In Chapter Four, I restore the elderly as the object of aging process
and explore their conception of old age. By reconsidering old age, I show the possibilities of
a positive and active attitude towards later life, which may lead to greater personal attainment
and wellbeing.
10. 8
Chapter One
China’s Shifting Demographic Prospect in a Global Context
In a recent Forbes article titled “What Will The World Look Like In 50 Years?” the
UK communications manager of Ashoka (a leading international non-profit organization that
promotes social entrepreneurship and social innovation) gives a list of ten exciting
predictions. The list includes familiar buzzwords in mass media and optimistic developments
of issues people care about today: technology, innovation, climate change, sustainability,
conquering HIV and AIDS, disappearance of poverty, and so on.6
It is easy to associate the
future with innovations and inventions. Clearly, in this discussion, and very likely in the
minds of most young people, demographic shift is not on the top of the list. However, a
change in population age structure worldwide is one of the most certain realities we must
face.
By 2050, world population will be significantly older than it is today, and China will
be a major contributor to this trend. This unfolding phenomenon is not receiving as much
attention from the public as it deserves. Not only should we have a clear understanding of the
demographic prospect of the world, we also need to investigate the potential impact of this
shift.
The Global Context of China's Population Aging
6
“What Will The World Look Like In 50 Years?,” Forbes, accessed March 28, 2015,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashoka/2013/04/12/what-will-the-world-look-like-in-50-years/.
11. 9
Population aging is a phenomenon where the proportion of the population above a
certain age increases. This is a novel feature of modern society. The majority of human
history is characterized by a high birth rate and a high mortality rate. In the twentieth century,
especially in its second half, the two most prominent demographic trends were: 1) a
significant drop in the fertility rate and 2) a drop in the mortality rate. The lowering mortality
rate occurred sooner than the drop in the fertility rate, which led to a global population
explosion in the twentieth century. According to data from the World Health Organization,
the average life expectancy at birth for the global population in 2012 was 70 years, as
opposed to below 50 in 1950s; the world’s average total fertility rate (TFR) has dropped by
about half, from 5.0 children per woman in 1950-1955 to 2.5 children per woman in 2010-
2015.7
These two trends will continue in the twenty-first century, with fertility decline more
prominent than the lowering mortality rate. World population has transitioned from high
death rates and high birthrates to low death rates and low birthrates, reflected in Fig. 1. This
will result in population aging on a global scale. The “UN Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, World Population Prospects:8
The 2012 Revision” succinctly points out low
fertility rate and longer life expectancy will contribute to world population aging.
7
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2013). World
Population Ageing 2013. ST/ESA/SER.A/348.
8
World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision (United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, 2012), http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm.
12. 10
Fig. 19
Replacement level fertility occurs when total fertility rate is 2.1, meaning a woman
bears an average of 2.1 children in her reproductive years (age 15-49). At this level, there
will be enough babies born to sustain the current population level. Forty-eight percent of the
world’s people live in countries where total fertility rates were below replacement level for
2005 to 2010.10
The current TFR is 1.5 births per woman in Europe and 1.4 births per
woman in Japan. On the other hand, by 2045-2050, life expectancy is projected to reach 83
years in more developed regions and 75 years in the less developed regions.11
With low
fertility and longer life expectancy, population growth will give way to population decline,
and population aging will be rapid.
9
Attitudes about Aging: A Global Perspective (Pew Research Center).
10
Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason, “Is Low Fertility Really a Problem? Population Aging,
Dependency, and Consumption,” Science 346, no. 6206 (October 10, 2014): 229–34.
11
World Population Ageing Report 2013 (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, Population Division, 2013), ST/ESA/SER.A/348.
13. 11
Economically more developed countries, primarily those in Europe, have been the
first to experience this trend of population aging. Although the developing world as a whole
will still have more children than older persons in 2050, China faces faster demographic
change along with other East Asian states like South Korea and Japan where fertility has
been below replacement level for decades.
Population projection by the United Nations forecasts that by 2050, for the first time
in human history, there will be more elderly people above 60 years old than children below
age 15 in the world. In 2013, the proportions of older persons (persons aged 60 years and
over) already exceeded that of children (persons under age 15) in developed countries (23%
versus 16%); by 2050, this will become 32% versus 16%, with older persons twice as many
as young people. Most countries, including the United States, are projected to see the share of
their population aged 65 years and above surpass the share below 15 by mid twenty-first
century. Never in history has human society operated with more old people than young
people, but it will be a new reality in near future.
14. 12
Fig. 2.12
In 2050, the demographic makeup of the world will be significantly different from
that today. The number of people 65 and above is projected to triple by 2050, from 531
million in 2010 to 1.5 billion in 2050. Approximately 1 in 6 people are expected to be 65 or
older by 2050. In 2050, 36% of world population growth will come from the elderly section,
as shown in Fig. 2. Only a handful of countries are going to experience rapid population
12
Attitudes about Aging: A Global Perspective (Pew Research Center, January 2014).
15. 13
growth and a larger workforce favoring economic development.13
In short, the age structure
of the global population is “changing from one in which younger people predominated to a
society in which people in later life constitute a substantial proportion of the total
population.”14
This outlook is unfamiliar and unprecedented. Lee and Mason point out that in 2013,
governments in 102 countries reported that population aging was a “major concern,” and
consequently 54 countries enacted policies intended to raise fertility.15
However, this is not
the first time the world community identified a major demographic challenge. Starting in the
1950s to 1960s, the unprecedented lengthening of human life led to the fastest rate of
population growth in history and therefore led to the formation of multiple global
organizations aimed at population control. The challenge of aging is reminiscent of this
earlier population control movement, only in the opposite direction.16
Graying China in the World
China’s population aging fits into the global trend of aging, and also displays its own
unique characteristics. In the past 50 years, the demographic structure of China underwent
significant changes. Like in most parts of the world, demographic change in China is the
result of a combination of longevity and lower mortality and fertility. The characteristics of
China’s aging process can be described in the following three ways:
13
Attitudes about Aging: A Global Perspective (Pew Research Center, January 2014).
14
Jason Powell, “Ageing and China: Towards Theory, Policy and Practice,” International Journal of
Social and Humanistic Sciences, 2015, http://chesterrep.openrepository.com/cdr/handle/10034/344456.
15
Lee and Mason, “Is Low Fertility Really a Problem? Population Aging, Dependency, and
Consumption.”
16
Wang Feng, Yong Cai, and Baochang Gu, “Population, Policy, and Politics: How Will History
Judge China’s One-Child Policy?,” Population and Development Review 38 (February 1, 2013): 115–29,
doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2013.00555.x.
16. 14
1) Rapid: from 2000 to 2010, in a mere decade, China’s elder population (above 65)
increased from 87.9 million to 110 million, a 25% hike.
The UN categories a population as aging if 7 percent of it is over 65, while a super-
aged country has over 20 percent of its citizens above that threshold. By definition, China is
already an aged country and will become super-aged soon. Currently, China has 110 million
people over age 65, a total of 8.3% of its entire population. By 2050, 23.9% of China’s
population will be above 65, totaling 330 million people, three times the size of that today.
The time it takes for the share of elderly (above 65) population to grow from 7% to
14% measures the pace of aging in that society.17
Western developed countries typically
took 40-100 years to reach population aging. For example, it took France 115 years and
Sweden 85 years, and it will take the United States of America 69 years. However, in China,
this aging process was completed in the past 25 years, similar to what happened in Japan.18
2) Massive: China’s extent of aging in 2050 will be that of today’s Japan in terms of
percentage of people above 65, but in terms of size, China will be facing a totally different
reality. According to the UN projection, in 2050, the size of China’s population above age 65
will be larger than that in North America (United States and Canada), Europe (west and east,
plus Russia), and Japan combined.19
Because 22% of world’s population above 65 will live
in China, caring for a massive elderly population will be a major challenge.
This also means that China will have a significant number of the “oldest old.”
Twenty-three million people aged 80 years or above were living in China in 2013, making
17
UN, World Population Ageing 2013
18
UN, World Population Ageing 2013
19
UN, World Population Ageing 2013
17. 15
China the country with the largest population of persons in that age group. In 2050, the
number will be 90 million, more than twice of 37 million in India, second in the ranking.20
3) “Old Before Rich”: China’s demographic transition occurs alongside its economic
transition. China will be the only major developing country to enter population aging before
it becomes a moderately developed country. “Old before rich” is a phrase often used in
discussing the economic side of population aging. The Economist estimates that China’s
unfunded pension liability is roughly 150% of GDP.21
Aging research expert Robert England
points out that the rural-urban migration is a crucial scope of this transition.22
A
recommendation by the Asian Development Bank suggests that “[t]he fact that the PRC is
aging at a low level of income magnifies the challenge.”23
***
By 2050, China will experience significant changes to its population structure.
Median age will increase from 35 to 46 from 2010 to 2050 while more than half the
population in Japan, South Korea, and Germany are going to be 50 years or older. India will
overtake China so that China will no longer be the most populous country by 2050. China’s
population will start to decline between 2030 and 2050 based on different predictions.24
The pace of aging in China in the next 50 years will not be constant. Based on the
UN’s projection, according to Fig. 3, each year the percentage increase of population size
above age 65 will be more than 10 from now until around 2040 and more than 20 around
20
UN, World Population Ageing 2013
21
“China’s Achilles Heel,” The Economist, April 21, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21553056.
22
Robert Stowe England, Aging China: The Demographic Challenge to China’s Economic Prospects
(Westport, Conn.!: Washington, D.C: Praeger, 2005).
23
Challenges and Opportunities of Population Aging in the People’s Republic of China (Asian
Developemt Bank, 2014), http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/42695/challenges-opportunities-
population-aging-prc.pdf.
24
World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision (UN)
18. 16
2020 and 2030. After 2045, the rate of increase will significantly lower although the base
number will have been larger. Nevertheless, the pace of aging will be rapid between now and
2040, and the challenge will be most acute between 2020 and 2040.
Fig. 3 Source: UN Projection, using medium variant25
A worldwide survey by the Pew Research Center investigates attitudes towards aging
in different countries.26
Seven in ten Chinese respondents describe aging as a major problem
in their country. Three East Asian countries, Japan, South Korea, and China express the
greatest concerns, followed by European countries such as Germany and Spain.27
25
World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision (UN)
26
Attitudes about Aging: A Global Perspective (Pew Research Center, January 2014).
27
Attitudes about Aging: A Global Perspective (Pew Research Center).
19. 17
Respondents living in countries that are most affected by aging show the greatest awareness
about the issue.
“China is on the brink of a rapid transformation to an aging society that will
significantly alter its social structure and shift its relationship with the rest of the world,” says
Robert England.28
Similar conclusions on China’s demographic challenges are present in
almost every work that studies the country’s population. The demographic transformation
China faces in the next few decade will be no less defining than its significant and rapid
ascend onto the world stage in the past half-century.
China’s One Child Policy and Fertility
The One Child Policy has had a profound impact on China’s aging population. It is
one of China’s most well-known, large-scale and controversial social engineering projects.
For 36 years, a “temporary” policy transformed the lives of many generations and many
more to come. Started as an interim policy in 1979 but lasting until today, the policy requires
all couples to have only one child, with some exceptions for ethnic minorities and rural
residents.
This policy was conceived in the second half of the twentieth century when global
population growth rate was the highest ever in human history. Rapid growth worldwide led
governments to attempt measures to slow it down. By the mid-1960s, many international
organizations, including the UN, identified population growth as a hindrance to economic
28
England, Aging China: The Demographic Challenge to China’s Economic Prospects, iv
20. 18
growth and a potential risk to stability in the world’s less developed areas, calling for
population control.29
China’s government adhered to this prevailing thought. In 1971, a Chinese State
Council document made reducing the population growth rate to 1 percent in cities and 1.5
percent in rural areas by 1975 part of China’s fourth Five-Year Plan. The Birth Planning
Commission was established in 1974 to initiate birth control measures.
In the beginning of post-Mao era, the new leadership saw economic development as a
source of their political legitimacy and considered population growth as hindering this
agenda. In June 1978, the policy measure of “encouraging couples to have one child, at most
two” was formally stated in a CCP Central Committee document as a means of achieving the
desired reduction in population growth.30
The policy was followed by concrete measures
adopted in over ten provinces in the same year, including rewards for parents who gave birth
to one child and punishing the noncompliant. In 1980, the goal was to restrict 95 percent of
urban couples and 90 percent of rural couples to having only one child and to cap total
population at 1.2 billion.
The National Family Planning Commission was formed in 1981 to execute the policy.
In 1982, birth control became a “basic state policy” (jiben guoce), one of the seven most
fundamental guiding strategies of the state. As early as 1979, some policymakers have
anticipated negative consequences of the policy such as rapid population aging and
destruction to kinship structure. In 1984, the policy was adjusted to allow couples in rural
areas with one daughter to birth another child. A violation of the policy could have serious
29
Wang, Cai, and Gu, “Population, Policy, and Politics: How Will History Judge China’s One-Child
Policy?”
30
Wang, Cai, and Gu, “Population, Policy, and Politics: How Will History Judge China’s One-Child
Policy?”
21. 19
consequences. Since the policy was established, if a couple defies population regulation, they
must pay a fine for the “social resources” that go into raising that child. In addition, parents
could lose their jobs, especially if they work for the government or public institutions. They
may also fail to register the child in the residential registration system, rendering that child
illegal and illegible for enrolling in schools. The policy is most strictly enforced in urban
centers; in rural areas, getting away with having more children is slightly easier.
***
China’s fertility rate experienced dramatic decline from 1949 to today, but the One
Child Policy may have played a smaller role in this change than expected. In 1949, a woman
gave birth to 6.4 children on average; the TFR dropped to well below 2 after 2000.
Demographers differ on the actual current TFR in China. For the year 2010, the data ranges
from 1.63 (UN) to, 1.4-1.5 (Wang), based on the 2010 Population Census.31
This is lower
than the average in developed countries (1.7) and in Europe (1.6). Wang states that given the
TFR of 1.4-1.5, China’s population for each generation will be a quarter smaller than that in
the previous generation.32
Researchers question the necessity of the One Child Policy as an extreme means of
population control. Popular political rhetoric in China argues that the policy was responsible
for preventing “400 million births.”33
Researchers challenge this statement and how the
number 400 million is arrived at. One study estimates China’s fertility if there were no one-
31
Wang Feng, “China’s ‘One-Child’ Rule Should Be Scrapped,” The New York Times, November 19,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/20/opinion/chinas-one-child-rule-should-be-scrapped.html.
32
,“ 15 —— —
”, accessed March 30, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/zh-cn/research/interviews/2013/03/20-china-family-
planning-wang.
33
“ 40 4 ,” Xinhua News Agency, n.d.,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/11/c_118096000.htm.
22. 20
child policy.34
By 1979, China’s TFR had already dropped to about 2.7 (see Fig. 4). Using
the Bayesian model, the same used for the latest UN population projections, the study shows
that the decline would have continued after 1980 without population control. The Bayesian
model projects China’s future fertility scenarios based on: 1) the fertility trend in China
before launching the one-child policy and 2) fertility trends in all other countries. By 2010,
fertility would have fallen to its currently observed level of around 1.5 children per woman.
The rise in fertility rate in 1980s was a response to unpredictable policy prospects. Similarly,
Murray suggests that improved living standards via modernization would have led to the
same outcome voluntarily as more urban dwellers chose to reduce their family sizes.35
Fig 4. Total Fertility Rate in China. Source: UN data36
34
Wang, Cai, and Gu, “Population, Policy, and Politics: How Will History Judge China’s One-Child
Policy?”
35
Geoffrey Murray, “China’s Population Control Policy: A Socio-Economic Reassessment”
(Liverpool John Moores University, 2004).
36
World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision (UN)
23. 21
The unintended consequences of the One Child Policy are arguably more significant
than its effects in slowing population growth. The huge number of families with only one
child poses a challenge to the care of aging parents. Economist and demography expert Feng
Wang estimates that for the 110 million women born between 1961 and 1970, in 2005 when
most of this cohort has completed childbearing, over 40% have only one child.37
The
proportion is highest in big cities like Beijing and Shanghai and lowest in remote rural areas.
Among the urban families surveyed, the share of one-child families is 86% and in 10
provincial areas this exceeds 90%. Wang concludes that, “Among urban Chinese families of
the 1960s birth cohort, who will begin to reach age 60 in less than a decade from now, a
virtually universal one-child family world is already a reality.” In an article published in the
New York Times, Wang gives an alarming number: one in three families in China — some
150 million households — now have only one child.38
In addition, the risk of losing one
child — the only child — is monumental. Official statistics estimate that more than one
million families have lost their only child.39
This estimate may be conservative given the
government’s reluctance in dealing with the issue.
In 2013, China announced that the one child policy would be loosened. Now couples
are allowed to have two children if just one parent is an only child. This revision was much
anticipated, but the effects of three-and-a-half decades of strict restriction cannot be reversed.
Reality of an Aged World: Economic and Beyond
37
Wang, Cai, and Gu, “Population, Policy, and Politics: How Will History Judge China’s One-Child
Policy?”
38
Wang, “China’s ‘One-Child’ Rule Should Be Scrapped,” The New York Times, November 19, 2013.
39
2010 ( , 2010).
24. 22
Economists have long warned governments and people about the challenges of the
aging world. Although the elderly typically consume more and channel their savings into the
economy, they demand higher governmental spending on pension and health care.
Economists’ forecasts are almost always pessimistic because fundamentally there will be
fewer people in the workforce supporting a growing number of dependent elderlies. As the
population ages, the economy will experience slower growth, a shrinking workforce, and a
higher dependency ratio.
One example of such pessimistic forecast is offered by Feng Wang, who predicts
“irreversible population aging, labor shortage, and economic slowdown and stagnation.”40
In
his book Population and Development: The Demographic Transition, Tim Dyson argues that
demographic change and economic development are closely interrelated, and the main
direction of causality is from demographic change to economic development, not the other
way round.41
I shall explain five crucial economic impacts, particularly for China. Japan, the
most aged country in the world today, offers some possible suggestions for what China’s
tomorrow will look like.
Firstly, the benefits of China’s demographic dividend will run out. As crude birth
rate and mortality rate both decline, which is what happened in China from 1989 to 2004, a
“demographic window” is created. This generates a low dependency ratio, a large share of
working-age population, ample labor supply, and, therefore, growth potential for a country.
This growth potential is also called the demographic dividend. According to the World Bank,
China’s per capita GDP growth rate was an astonishing 8.69% on average per annum during
40
Wang, Cai, and Gu, “Population, Policy, and Politics: How Will History Judge China’s One-Child
Policy?”
41
Tim Dyson, Population and Development: The Demographic Transition (London; New York; New
York: Zed Books, 2010).
25. 23
1978–2008.42
China’s economic growth in the past has had a close relationship with this
demographic dividend.
Secondly, a closing demographic window will lead to slower growth. Zhang Wei and
Rui Hao estimate that between 1989 and 2004, a substantial decline in the dependency ratio
has accounted for about one-sixth of the provincial growth rate of GDP per capita.43
They
also find that growth, reflected in higher income, has pronounced feedback effects on
demographic behaviors such as lower birth rates, postponed marriage and longer life
expectancy. Japan enjoyed the benefits of the demographic dividend from around 1950 to
1990. After 1990, Japan’s economy growth started to slow down, and the society entered a
period of “demographic onus.”44
He concludes that before reaching a turning point in
dependency rate, China’s demographic dividend will last for about another 20 years. But
ultimately, growth will slow down when the demographic dividend is exhausted, and the
economy can no longer rely on the large number of workers as a comparative advantage.
Thirdly, China’s population aging will create more elderly dependents for a
diminishing working-age population. Old-age dependency ratio is defined as the number of
people aged 65 and older per 100 people of working age (ages 15 to 64). China’s old-age
dependency ratio will more than triple from 11 in 2010 to 39 in 2050.45
Comparatively,
China’s old-age dependency ratio is lower than some countries: 72 in Japan and more than 60
in Spain, South Korea, Germany, and Italy. Worldwide, old age dependency will grow faster
42
World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” October 16, 2013, http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators.
43
Zheng Wei and Rui Hao, “Demographic Structure and Economic Growth: Evidence from China,”
Journal of Comparative Economics 38, no. 4 (December 2010): 472–91, doi:10.1016/j.jce.2010.08.002.
44
, “ ,” , no. 03 (2012): 49–57.
45
UN, World Population Ageing 2013
26. 24
than the drop in child dependency. The working generation and governments will face
greater difficulties supporting the growing number of dependents.
Fig. 5.46
Fourthly, aging may have contributed to income inequality in China. Economist
Zhong Hai studies the evolution of income inequality in rural China from 1997 to 2006, and
tries to identify its relationship with population aging.47
He argues that a significant portion
of the sharp increase of income inequality at the beginning of the 2010s can be attributed to
demographic change. Using regression-based inequality decomposition, he explains that the
inequality is a result of lower share of working-age member in a family due to enforcement
46
Attitudes about Aging: A Global Perspective (Pew Research Center).
47
Hai Zhong, “The Impact of Population Aging on Income Inequality in Developing Countries:
Evidence from Rural China,” China Economic Review 22, no. 1 (March 2011): 98–107,
doi:10.1016/j.chieco.2010.09.003.
27. 25
of the One Child Policy. He warns that with the lack of an effective redistributive tax transfer
system such as pension, the problem will only exacerbate in the future.
Lastly, a shrinking workforce is another major concern. China’s working-age
population fell by 2.44 million to 919.54 million in 2013, marking the second consecutive
year of decline, reported National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in 2014. Between 2010 and
2050 China's workforce will shrink as a share of the population by 11 percentage points,
from 72% to 61%.48
A policy recommendation for China by the Asian Development Bank
states that, “Aging results in labor force shortages, which in turn increase average salaries
undermining the economy's competitiveness. Rapid population aging, if unaddressed, might
hamper the industrial transformation process needed to attain higher income status.”49
But
the experience of aging countries is less straightforward than this prediction may have us
believe. In truth, the economic consequences suggested by different parties paint a
complicated picture.
In the case of Japan, its working population reached its peak in 2005 and has been
declining ever since. The share of older people in the workforce has also been steadily
increasing. Japan has the greatest share of elderly in its workforce. In 2001, Japan has 4.92
million people above age 65 who were participating in the workforce, which means one is
either working or actively looking for work, and account for 21.8% of people in that age
range.50
In addition, this was accompanied by high unemployment rate among the young and
economic stagnation that resulted in fewer job opportunities. The aged workforce has a
harder time adjusting to changing needs of the market economy and is unfit for heavy
48
Challenges and Opportunities of Population Aging in the People’s Republic of China (Asian
Developemt Bank, 2014)
49
Challenges and Opportunities of Population Aging in the People’s Republic of China (Asian
Developemt Bank, 2014)
50
1. , “ ,” , no. 04 (2003): 127–39.
28. 26
physical labor in fishery, etc. However, real income increased steadily from 1999 to 2014
(except for 2007-2009 as a result of the global economic recession) despite the shirking and
aging workforce.51
Such real-world examples reveal that economic models that emphasize isolating
single cause-and-effect relationships may be of limited use in predicting the macroeconomic
future of aging societies. This is because the way factors interact with each other produce
unpredictable results. It is extremely difficult to capture the entire economic impact of aging.
It is therefore inadequate to talk about demographic transition in terms of numbers and
economic theories. On the one hand, population is an important factor in shaping
development; on the other hand, population is not a natural occurrence and is shaped by
society and development. Dyson points out that a thorough understanding of demographic
transition is necessary if we want to make sense of what has happened in the world during
the last 200 years.52
This will certainly be applicable to the future, too. If we want to
understand what tomorrow’s world might look like, we must acknowledge the complexity of
the relationship between economic, social and political factors.
The outlook of aging societies should not simply be a number’s game. China’s One
Child Policy, aiming to cap population growth rate at a certain number, was the result of an
over-simplified understanding of population. “Because no one has lived in a society with
more old people that very young people, there is much to learn and understand about how
such a society will work differently from societies of the past and present,” suggests Robert
England.53
Thus, we must imagine a more complex future.
***
51
http://ycharts.com/indicators/japan_real_net_income_from_the_rest_of_the_world
52
Dyson, Population and Development: The Demographic Transition
53
England, Aging China: The Demographic Challenge to China’s Economic Prospects, iv
29. 27
Although the challenge of population aging has not received enough attention, some
people were ahead of others in seeing tomorrow’s world through this demographic lens with
a very pessimistic tint. In Gray Dawn: How the Coming Age Wave Will Transform America
— and the World, Peter G. Peterson writes,
There's an iceberg dead ahead. It's called global aging, and it threatens to bankrupt the
great powers. As the populations of the world's leading economies age and shrink, we
will face unprecedented political, economic, and moral challenges. But we are
woefully unprepared. Now is the time to ring the alarm bell.54
His words imply that the ship of humanity will sink when it hits the “iceberg.” Gray Dawn
came out sixteen years ago in 1999. In this book, Peterson foresaw the multifold
consequences of aging, calling it “a truly global challenge.”
To him, governments must make tough decisions for the benefit of future generations.
His recommendations can only be achieved “by amending existing social contracts, by
violating cultural expectations, or by offending entrenched ideologies.”55
Peterson’s career
path in banking and politics ranged from high positions in investment banking to Secretary of
Commerce in the United States. His wealth and influence enabled him not only to advocate
his thoughts but also pressure Washington to “prepare” for the future by cutting back what he
calls “entitlement” program such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid.56
“Global aging could trigger a crisis that engulfs the world economy,” proclaims
Peterson. However, if we substitute “aging” by “population explosion,” the argument will
sound very familiar. In fact, not long ago, overpopulation received grave concern. Malthusian
54
Peter G. Peterson, “Gray Dawn: The Global Aging Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, February 1999,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/54620/peter-g-peterson/gray-dawn-the-global-aging-crisis.
55
Peterson, “Gray Dawn: The Global Aging Crisis.”
56
Michael Hiltzik, “Unmasking the Most Influential Billionaire in U.S. Politics,” Los Angeles Times,
October 2, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/02/business/la-fi-hiltzik-20121003.
30. 28
thought was at helm and worries about food shortage and income decline were the prevailing
rhetoric. Today, we can see that the result of population growth is not entirely negative.
Says Becker, “Rapid growth in world population during past 250 years has been
accompanied by unprecedented high per capita incomes all over the world. Whatever the
Malthusian negative effects of greater population, they have been dominated by factors that
raised per capita incomes, including the benefits of increasing returns and other advantages
from having a larger population.”57
Similarly, it is overly pessimistic to predict population
aging as a damning phenomenon. Predictions of the future are often extrapolations of what is
happening at the moment. The “threat” of population explosion was built on the premise that
world population would outpace productivity improvements, and the threat of aging actually
comes from a lack of imagination for a different future.
It will be a crucial step to regard an older population as a new emerging norm of
human society. The sooner we accept and internalize this reality, the more ready we are to
prepare for it. By nature, this is neither good nor bad, just as population explosion was a
phase in development that created both challenges and progress. Policy experts Hu and Peng
point out that the challenge of population aging derives mainly from the failure of the
existing socio-economic system to cope with the aging process.58
In the following chapter, I
will examine main parts of China’s socio-economic system that will be most influenced by
aging.
57
“Low Birth Rates: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies-Becker,” The Becker-Posner Blog,
accessed March 30, 2015, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2013/08/low-birth-rates-causes-consequences-
and-remedies-becker.html.
58
Zhan Hu and Xizhe Peng, “China’s Population Aging from the Perspective of Public Policy,”
Social Sciences in China, no. 04 (2011): 106–24.
31. 29
Chapter Two
Transformations in Moral Values and Elderly Care
Aging is a social process. In China, this process has long been centered on the family.
In this chapter, I want to put population aging in the Chinese context. The traditional Chinese
society, deeply rooted in Confucian moral values, holds a value system of “filial piety” that
prescribes how people are expected to treat the elderly, especially caring for their parents.
This moral system became challenged when the Chinese society started to modernize.
First, I will explain filial piety and the traditional patrilineal family. Under the
Communist government, political campaigns to weaken traditions and the later the
introduction of market economy created a fundamental change in this social and moral
system, as I will discuss using Yunxiang Yan’s ethnographic work in a Chinese village.
Cultural shifts occur concurrently with demographic trends I discussed in Chapter One, and
the two combined produce new patterns and complicated discourses between new and old
lifestyles. Next, I will offer a brief summery of statistics showing new elderly support
patterns. In the last section, I will discuss one consequence of rapid change: suicide among
the Chinese elderly. This is both a rising problem and a ground for comparison between the
Western and Chinese, which needs to be viewed through distinct cultural lenses.
32. 30
Filial Piety in the Traditional Society
The peoples of East Asia have a notable tradition of elder respect rooted in the
Confucian teachings of filial piety. In traditional Chinese education, filial piety is central to
the moral values prescribed to pupils and practiced in daily life. Filial piety is a complex and
extensive ideal that needs to be traced to its origins in order to discuss its evolution and
relevance today. The general view is that elder respect is being courteous and obedient to
elderly persons.
Classical Confucian literature contains passages about filial piety that have influenced
how Chinese people treat the elderly. These writings include a combination of moral
doctrines and specific instructions for practices.
The following Confucian classics laid down a number of rules and prescripts that
adults were to follow in order to fulfill their filial duties to parents, ancestors, and other
elderly people: The Book of Rites (Li Chi, Confucian teachings on rites or propriety),59
Teachings of Filial Piety (Hsiao Ching, guidelines for the practice of filial piety),60
Analects
of Confucius (Lun Yu, sayings and deeds of Confucius and his disciples on a scope of
subjects including education and moral cultivation),61
and Works of Mencius (Meng Tzu, a
collection of opinions and conversations of Mencius, a principal disciple of Confucius). For
example, the following quote
Of all human conducts, none is greater than filial piety. In filial piety nothing is greater than
to respect one’s parents.62
( )
59
Book of Rites (Li Chi) [Collection of Confucian Teachings of Rites] (1993). (O.S. Kwon, Tran.).
Seoul, Korea: Hongshin Moonwha-Sa.
60
Teachings of filial piety [Hsiao Ching]. (1989). Sacred books of the east [J. Legge, Tran.] (Vol. 3).
London: Oxford. (Original work published 1879–1885)
61
Analects of Confucius (Lun Yu). (1960). (J. Legge, Tran., 2nd ed.). Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press.
62
Teachings of filial piety, Ch. 10
33. 31
reflects the importance of filial piety in the Confucian moral system. This quote is still very
well known and frequently used in dialogue and writings today.
A research by Sung and Dunkle examines these central Confucian texts and discovers
16 traditional forms of elder respect.63
They cover all aspects of social life: providing care
and services; asking for consent and advice; serving foods; complying with elder’s wishes;
bestowing gifts on elders; celebrating birthdays in honor of elders; using proper language to
convey a sense of respect; giving precedential treatment to elders; holding courteous manners
to convey respect; greeting elders with respect; furnishing elders with honorable seats;
respecting privacy of elders; worshiping ancestors; holding funeral rites for deceased elderly
kin; respecting elders of the larger society. By reviewing empirical researches conducted in
different Asian communities, Sung and Dunkle find consistency in a set of similar, if not
identical, forms of elder respect practiced in modern East Asia. These modern forms contain
most of the traditional forms, albeit their expressions have undergone some changes.
Throughout the history of China, the state and the cultural elite regarded filial piety as
a fundamental ethical and social norm. Imperial laws were designed accordingly to protect
the powers and privileges of the senior generation, particularly the senior members in the
family. Parents could ask local government to punish an unfilial son, "And if a parent or
grandparent should commit suicide in a fit of anger at a son's behavior, the latter would be
decapitated for causing the death. " Therefor, filial piety is not only believed but also
institutionalized, and a breach of the social norm entails severe consequences. A modern
continuation of the Chinese state’s mandating of filial action is a law named “Protection of
63
Kyu-Taik Sung and Ruth Dunkle, “Roots of Elder Respect: Ideals and Practices in East Asia,”
Journal of Aging, Humanities & the Arts 3, no. 1 (March 2009): 6–24, doi:10.1080/19325610802652069.
34. 32
the Rights and Interests of Elderly People.” This law stipulates children to cater to material
and mental support of their parents.
According to Sung & Dunkle, there are two types of elder respect within the
traditional forms. First, there is respect involving some action or work, such as caring,
housekeeping, and serving choice foods and drinks, providing gifts, and so forth. Secondly,
there are symbolic displays of respect—those falling into linguistic, presentational,
acquiescent, spatial, precedential, and celebrative forms. Both types constitute elder respect
according to the precepts in the classics. A filial child is expected to exhibit both instrumental
support and respectful bonding with his or her parents.
Filial piety essentially directs the young to recognize the care and aid received from
elderly relatives, and therefore to respect and care for them in return. In the beginning of his
book Chinese Family and Society, sociologist Olga Lang says that the statement “the Chinese
are family centered” is “in essence” true.64
Her book surveys various aspects of the Chinese
family in the early twentieth century. The emphasis on Confucian values creates a patriarchal
family, a family and kinship system centered on the old father.65
There is a reciprocal
relationship between strengthening the family and kinship group and strengthening the state,
because Confucius regards the family as “the root of the state.” Traditionally, the family is
the primary unit of care for old people, and parents live with one child, usually a married son,
and his family by marriage.
64
Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, (New Haven,: Yale university press;, 1946), 55.
65
Lang, Chinese Family and Society, 55.
35. 33
Cultural Transformations from 1949 to 2015
A general trend in the past hundred and thirty years or so has produced more change
in elderly support in China than the rest of its history combined. Generally speaking, the
central trend is the fall of family care and support. The reasons behind this major shift in
lifestyle for a significant proportion of the world’s population are, of course, complex. The
traditional Confucian value system that controls public and private life before the nineteenth
century has undergone continuous change after China resumed interaction with Western
powers in the first half of nineteenth century. This value system came under further shock
during the Communist revolution and the politically tumultuous years that followed, which
introduced ideals such as collectivization.
After the economic reform in 1970s and 1980s, an open China moves itself to the
center of the world economic stage. This, accompanied with aggressive social engineering
policies, produced two trends of demographic change: low fertility and high mobility. The
results of these two important trends are still escalating and unfolding today. A continuous
cultural change and rapid demographic change lead to a complicated social reality and
challenges to take care of the country’s aging members.
The theme of cultural change has been significant in the study of the Chinese society
since the early twentieth century. This is because China has been undergoing major
transformations since the late Qing period when Western imperial powers and western ideas
made their ways to the self-secluded empire. The modernization of China, like that in the
West, causes significant changes in the economic and social systems. Olga Lang’s extensive
historical and field study is placed against the old empire’s modernization.66
Published in
1946, Lang’s book reflects Western academia’s attempts to comprehend the traditions of an
66
Lang, Chinese Family and Society.
36. 34
ancient civilization. This is the first study to use careful sociological and statistical methods
to observe and explain the vital forces of change that affect the Chinese institution of
family.67
After the Communist Revolution which ended with the People’ Republic of China
under a Communist government, the Chinese society faced a new set of challenges. To
examine the nuances of these changes, I am looking into anthropologist Yunxiang Yan’s
enlightening ethnography, Private Life under Socialism: Love, Intimacy, and Family Change
in a Chinese Village, 1949-1999.68
In the book, Yan details the transformations in the village
of Xiajia, located in Heilongjiang Province in northeast China, during China’s collective and
reform eras. His account of changes pivots on the transformation of the Chinese family, and
in this case, that of rural peasant farmers who made up about than 90% of China’s population
in 1949 (this number dropped to about three quarters in late twentieth century at the end of
Yan’s study). The reason for using an anthropological study is that it findings are grounded
in observation of everyday activities of a group of people. This intimate observation provides
a concrete context for aging by taking it out of abstract theories. Such details of everyday life
is crucial in enabling me to imagine the lives of older people from the past and, more
importantly, in the future.
Yan abandons the “corporate model” that is commonly used in studying Chinese
family and private life. This model sees the family primarily as an economic entity composed
of rational, self-interested members. Influential researches by this method include those by
Myron Cohen and Margery Wolf. Instead, Yan puts an emphasis on the individual and moves
67
Tung-Tsu Chu, “Review of Chinese Family and Society by Olga Lang,” American Anthropologist,
New Series, 49, no. 3 (July 1, 1947): 476–77.
68
Yunxiang Yan, Private Life under Socialism!: Love, Intimacy, and Family Change in a Chinese
Village, 1949-1999 / (Stanford, Calif.!: Stanford University Press, 2003).
37. 35
the perspective from the public (such as political economy) to the private domain of life. This
approach is especially valuable when we want to examine aging and elderly support.
Although material support is essential, the expectation and satisfaction of senior life are
heavily affected by emotions, subjective values, and personal life experiences.
***
Before 1949, family life is organized around patriliny and kinship solidarity. During
the post-1949 period, especially after the high tide of radical collectivization that aimed at
destroying traditional patterns of social organization, the power of the patrilineage in Xiajia
diminished considerably. The party-state launched ideological attacks on the notion of filial
piety through various political campaigns, such as the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural
Revolution, and the "Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize Confucius" campaign in the early 1970.
In the sphere of pirate life, beginning in the 1950s, a family revolution started to steer
family value and family organization away from the Confucian ideal. Three major changes
took place: the Marriage Law of 1950 said that women were equal to men; the land reform
by the early 1950s declared that all land was held in common; and the socialist state built
more houses with the same structure for more families, providing more privacy which was
close to nonexistent before. Members within families became more equal, and the generation
of young people who grew up in this new setting had more autonomy and independence than
their earlier counterparts ever had.
The actions by the state had profound influences. Under the chapter titled “Elderly
support and the Crisis of Filial Piety,” Yan outlines a trend at Xiajia village that is mirrored
in hundreds of thousands of villages around China. The decline of the notion of filial piety is
a major cause of diminishing support for the elderly he observed. When Yan asked older
38. 36
villagers to describe the current problems related to elderly support, they all claimed that
their own parents had enjoyed a higher status and were treated well during the collective era.
The party-state has never tried to attack the traditional practice of elderly support in
rural areas. Sons remained the expected caretaker of the elderly parents under the practice of
“raising a son for old age” ( ) because daughters do not inherit property from
parents, although the situation was different in cities. To promote loyalty to the state,
political propaganda downplayed the notion of filial piety without offering an alternative
solution. The Marriage Law made elderly-support a legal duty, but there was little room for
enforcement by local government or court in cases of parent abuse.69
Usually in a court case
related to dispute over elderly support, economic sanction was the only resolution, which
takes away the emotional and ethical component of parent-children relationship.
Political campaigns attacked other social components that were crucial to the family
and its value system. The collapse of parental superiority in religious and kinship domains
leads to what Yan calls the "demystification of parenthood." The authority of old people in
public life was challenged when young people became much more active. Public opinion was
silenced due to a greater sense of privacy. Ancestor worship greatly diminished in 1949.
Ritual, rich in moral messages, is a traditional symbol that reinforces the status of parents and
emphasizes parents’ emotional and material inputs in raising their children. Without the
backup of a traditional kinship system and religious beliefs and rituals, the notion that parents
grant their children the highest favors began to weaken.
The demystified parents find themselves in a vulnerable position because without
intergenerational reciprocity, children started to reject filial piety. Before 2009, there was no
69
Yan, Private Life under Socialism, 184
39. 37
pension scheme for rural residents; therefore old-age support came solely from personal
savings and the family. The basis for intergenerational relations, especially between older
parents and their married sons, became more rational and self-interested, especially after
privatization of production and adoption of the market economy in the 1970s. Filial piety
started to lose its structural context. Fewer and fewer parents could expect formal obedience
and ritual respect from their married children like what the stories in Twenty-four stories of
filial piety depict. Arguments with parents became normalized, and abuse of old parents
started to become more common. One can also interpret this as transformation in expressions
of filial piety to be shifting from subservient to egalitarian and from the complex to the
simple, but undeniably the social fabric of an ancient form of society begins to unravel.
Yan’s findings are corroborated by numerous studies, research, news reports, and
anecdotal incidents.
Abuse and mistreatment of the elderly reflects this erosion of filial piety. In Chinese
academia, there is a considerable amount of literature on elder abuse, partly motivated by
increasing exposure to this growing social problem. Dong conducted research at an urban
medical center on elder abuse and neglect. Out of a total of 412 participants who completed
the survey, 145 (35%) participants screened positive for elder abuse and neglect.70
The mean
age of the victims was 69 years and 59% were male. Caregiver neglect was the most
common form of abuse, followed by financial exploitation, psychological abuse, physical
abuse, sexual abuse, and abandonment. Thirty-six percent of the victims suffered multiple
forms of abuse and neglect.
70
Xinqi Dong et al., “Loneliness in Older Chinese Adults: A Risk Factor for Elder Mistreatment:
loneliness and elder mistreatment in urban china,” Journal of the American Geriatrics Society 55, no. 11
(November 2007): 1831–35, doi:10.1111/j.1532-5415.2007.01429.x.
40. 38
Verbal and physical abuse by their family caregivers is common among the
population of older Chinese with dementia, according to a study in Hong Kong.71
While this
reflects the general trend of diminishing respect, it can also be argued that demented parents
can no longer engage in meaningful interaction with their caregivers, therefore filial
obedience and respect declines. A study in Nanjing established loneliness as a risk factor
associated with elder mistreatment in this urban, community-dwelling Chinese population.72
According to Yan’s theory, this appears to be a spurious relation because both loneliness and
mistreatment are results of decreased intergenerational exchange.
Some studies based on more recent data focus on modernization of the economy and
urbanization. While Yan’s primary focus was on rural China, other researchers explored
trends in cities. Cheung and Kwan analyze the relationships between the levels of
modernization in six Chinese cities and variations in expressions of filial piety and cash
payments to parents.73
Modernization in this research is measured by average gross domestic
product per capita, the average wage, and the percentage of the workforce that are employed
in the service sector. They found that filial piety and cash payments were lower when the
participant was in a city with higher level of modernization, and that the reduction can be
mitigated by higher level of education.
It is worth noting that some studies are factoring in mental health issues, such as
depression, as risk factors or results of old age abuse. While low diagnosis rate is limiting the
validity of data source and usefulness of such results, it is a probable guess that dwindling
71
J. Woo et al., “Ageing in China: Health and Social Consequences and Responses,” International
Journal of Epidemiology 31, no. 4 (August 1, 2002): 772–75, doi:10.1093/ije/31.4.772.
72
Dong et al., “Loneliness in Older Chinese Adults: A Risk Factor for Elder Mistreatment.”
73
Chau-Kiu Cheung and Alex Yui-Huen Kwan, “The Erosion of Filial Piety by Modernisation in
Chinese Cities,” Ageing & Society 29, no. 02 (February 2009): 179–98, doi:10.1017/S0144686X08007836.
41. 39
filial piety may lead to depression, although specifying the difference in cultural context of
mental illness between the West and China should be taken into account.74
Living Arrangement: Revolution and Evolution
The fall of family care takes places while new lifestyles emerge. This new lifestyle
seems to emphasize autonomy and intergenerational independence. Wang and Xia show that
based on data from a 1992 survey, China’s elderly people enjoy a relatively high degree of
independence in terms of economic self-sufficiency, everyday self-care, and spiritual life.75
Income sources for the elderly include employment income, property income, subsidy
income, and transferred income from members of the family.
i. Sources of support
By the early 1990s, a national survey on elderly care patterns shows that contrary to
the general belief that adult children assume care for aging parents, most elderly parents
provided their own care or were cared or by their spouses: 77 percent among the urban
elderly and 63 percent among their rural counterparts.76
Hong Zhou surveys the factors in
the fall of family elder care in rural China in the post-Mao era. Official data from the Chinese
government claim that in urban areas, 78 percent of elderly receive pensions in 2007. Pension
and personal saving can help parents to live independently from their children. In Chapter
74
Li Wu et al., “Prevalence and Associated Factors of Elder Mistreatment in a Rural Community in
People’s Republic of China: A Cross-Sectional Study,” PLoS ONE 7, no. 3 (March 2012): 1–8,
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033857.
75
Wang Mei and Xia Chuanling, “The Current State of the Burden of Family Support for the Elderly
in China,” Chinese Sociology & Anthropology 34, no. 1 (Fall 2001): 49.
76
Wang and Xia, “The Current State of the Burden of Family Support for the Elderly in China,”
42. 40
Three, I will show that the state is taking a bigger and bigger role in elderly support while
family care decline.
ii. Living arrangements and caregiving
Yan also touches on two monumental demographical changes that contribute to the
change in family care. One is the low fertility, which I have discussed in Chapter One. The
other trend is rural-urban migration. After the late 1980s, temporary jobs in the cities became
another important source of cash income. For those who were too young to receive contract
land in 1983, such jobs were also a major means of survival. In 1991 there were 106 Xiajia
laborers working regularly outside the village for longer than three months per year; this
figure increased to 167 in 1994. The trend continued throughout the second half of the 1990s;
an increasing number of unmarried young women also joined the force of temporary migrant
laborers. Today, China’s “floating population” of rural migrants stands in excess of 220
million. This further differentiates the aging experience in rural and in urban China.
The large-scale continuous movement of rural residents leads to the separation of
family/generational separation and fragmentation of kinship network. One change is that the
daughters appropriate an increasingly important role in being responsible for their parents’
support. Working in factories allows young women to acquire economic income and a higher
social status. They are able to replace sons in the patrilineal family in terms of caring for
parents. Older parents traditionally lived with one marries son, while daughters who marry
“into” their husbands families are like irretrievable “water thrown out” (
). Now, daughters embody more filial piety than sons and emerge as caretakers of her
43. 41
biological parents.77
Similarly, Liu finds that while daughters took over some responsibilities
that were traditionally expected from their brothers and sisters-in-law in caring for old
parents, the persistence of gendered practices and traditions in rural villages allowed sons
more symbolic status and material benefits.78
When older parents realize their investment in
raising sons do not get them desirable returns, controlling income and marriage of daughters
is a new way of rebuilding filial piety.
Studies have shown that until 1980s living arrangements of elderly predominantly
follow the traditional pattern: living in stem family with married son or daughter. This form
remains the most popular arrangement until the early 21st
Century. However, the most recent
census shows notable changes.
A study based on data from the 6
th
National Population Census in 2010 shows a
significant increase in the percentage of empty nesters compared to in 2000. The total
number of people above age 60 who live alone or with only his or her spouse comprise
38.3% of the elderly population, a 4 percentage point increase from 2000. In cities, this
proportion is as high as 42.7%. This percentage is higher than the average in developing
nations, demanding a bigger role by the state. Living with children is still the main
arrangement in China: 37.1% of elderly live in three-generation households. However, the
elderly under this category are more likely to be rural, female, with deceased spouse, and
unhealthy, indicating that they need more help from family members.
An even newer but growing trend is for older parents to relocate to where the child
(very often a single child) is living. Young adults move to seek better personal economic
77
Yihong Jin, “Mobile Patriarchy: Changes in the Mobile Rural Family,” Social Sciences in China,
no. 01 (2011): 26–43.
78
Jieyu Liu, “Ageing, Migration and Familial Support in Rural China,” Geoforum 51 (January 2014):
305–12, doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2013.04.013.
44. 42
prospect. They often get married and settle down and start their own nuclear families in a city
other than where their parents live. Increasingly, parents may rejoin children to take care of
grandchildren, to seek care, or to help with economic activities for children. Leaving where
one has been living for a long time and moving to a different place late in one’s life is a
creation of rearrangements in social-economic order.79
This trend is a response to the
combined challenges of mobility, single-child family, and adherence to family-oriented
traditional values.
Because old parents move into their children’s apartments and enter a completely
unfamiliar environment, their authority in the household is further weakened. Filial piety in
this case no longer emphasizes children’s obedience to parents’ orders. In addition, this
mobility at old age creates challenges for remote access of social security and healthcare
coverage (because the system is based on residential location) and the provision of
educational or entertainment activities for the elderly.
iii. Nursing homes: a reluctant but inevitable choice
Because for older parents, having filial children is still crucial to their self-worth and
social status, many elderly people are unwilling to live in caregiving facilities. Based on a
national survey of 20,255 older adults, a study examines the extent of willingness among
older Chinese to live in eldercare institutions.80
It was found that in urban and rural areas,
only 20 and 17 per cent of older adults, respectively, were willing to do so. There is evidence
79
““ ”
http://www.21ccom.net/articles/china/gqmq/20150314122198.html
80
Rita Jing-Ann Chou, “Willingness to Live in Eldercare Institutions among Older Adults in Urban
and Rural China: A Nationwide Study,” Ageing & Society 30, no. 04 (May 2010): 583–608,
doi:10.1017/S0144686X09990596.
45. 43
that, as the society changes, more and more older Chinese are willing to live in eldercare
institutions (e.g. Guan, Zhan and Liu 2007; Zhan, Feng and Luo 2008).
In addition, a qualitative study explores the relationship between filial piety and
institutional elderly care. Based on interviews conducted with residents at six elderly-care
facilities in Nanjing (there are 177 registered social welfare facilities in Nanjing) and their
children, sending older parents to nursing homes is regarded less of an “unfilial” act than in
the past. Parents recognize, at least rationally, that the benefits of living in a care facility
include having company, medical service, and having their meals and chores taken care of.
Their children are not entirely without guilt when they decide to send their parents to nursing
homes, but they all make this hard choice because demands of their jobs simply do not allow
them to care for their parents full-time. Both parents and children experience varied levels of
emotional strain when it comes to reconciling with the needs for institutional care. The new
acts of filial children include frequent visits, giving allowances to parents, and fetching
parents back home for holidays.81
The other side of the story is that in some cases, senior parents who want to move into
a nursing home may face objection from their children. Old people who are more open-
minded may wish live with people about their age, but their children may forbid them to do
so because it is “shameful.” Living in a nursing home can imply that the resident’s children
are unfilial. This causes bad reputation for the children, who would rather live with their
parents (sometimes unwillingly) than risking being called a “bad child.”
This complicated reality confirms the shift of power dynamic at home from old to
young people and the changing practices for elderly care. Unlike traditional children who are
81
Xiaotian Feng and Zhen Jiang, “Live in Elder Care Homes and Filial Piety: A Survey on Elder Care
Homes in Nanjing,” Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition), no. 05 (2014): 45–
51+141.
46. 44
supposed to comply with their parents’ wishes, the younger generation today increasingly
acts out of self-interest. Both generations respond to the challenges of old age by exploring
new options like relocation or nursing homes. This reality also reflects the complicated
relationship between old ideals and new reality. Practicality, feasibility, and convenience
have all become considerations in the new family arrangement. Because there are more and
more empty nesters, old people willingly or unwillingly comply to new options. The change
in family value is not one way, as one may expect, from more “conservative” to more “open”
to new, foreign-born ways of old age assistance. There is an ongoing dialogue whose future
development is worth considering, because such thought trends will signal collective and
individual resource allocation in elderly support.
Suicide: When Changes Occur Faster than Adaptation
In Yan’s book, a 64 year-old man, Mr. Li, killed himself by drinking a bottle of
pesticide in 1990.82
Everyone knew why: he had been having conflicts with his daughter-in-
law and his younger son and had repeated threatened to kill himself. He moved in to live with
his younger son and in-law after they got married. Following customary practice, Li chose to
live with his younger son but “showed no intention of giving up his power”. His daughter in-
law, however, was an independent woman who refused to listen to the old man's orders,
contrary to the traditional filial practice of obedience that Li would have expected.
According to Yan, the rapid shift in inter-generational power relations in Mr. Li's
family suggests that the existing stereotype of the patriarchal extended family may no longer
hold true in Xiajia village. Other old villagers thought his in-law was not the only one to
blame because Mr. Li was very bad-tempered and his demands were often unreasonable.
82
Yan, Private Life under Socialism, 87
47. 45
They also thought Li should have moved out after the dispute because he had money and a
house. It is striking that some villagers believed economically secure parents should live in
separate households if disputes arose between them and their married sons. In 1980s, the
traditional belief was that it is disgraceful for parents to live alone in old age because they
must have been unable to raise filial children.
Suicide is an especially worrisome result of familial conflicts that arise as a result of
change in family power dynamics. Such incidents keep making to the news.
A new research conducted by the Centre for Suicide Research and Prevention at the
University of Hong Kong reported that China's suicide rate has dropped significantly to
among the lowest levels in the world. Annually, an average of 9.8 people out of every
100,000 committed suicide between 2009 and 2011, a 58 percent drop from 2002.83
However, against this general trend, suicide rate of the elderly, particularly in rural areas, was
going up.
Social scientists have noticed and started studying this phenomenon. Studies on
Chinese suicide have been around for only about thirty years and rely heavily on Western
methodology and perspective. Fei Wu, an anthropologist who focuses on suicide studies,
gives an interpretation of suicide in the Chinese context. His book Suicide and Justice, A
Chinese Perspective84
studies suicides in rural China with a focus on the role of the Chinese
family. Suicide in the West is primarily associated with mental disorder; however, in China,
it is estimated that that only about half of the suicides were results of mentally illness. It is
83
Chong-Wen Wang, Cecilia L. W. Chan, and Paul S. F. Yip, “Suicide Rates in China from 2002 to
2011: An Update,” Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology 49, no. 6 (June 2014): 929–41,
doi:10.1007/s00127-013-0789-5.
84
Fei Wu, “Suicide and Justice: A Chinese Perspective. Wu Fei. London and New York: Routledge,”
The China Quarterly 202 (June 2010): 455–56, doi:10.1017/S0305741010000457.
48. 46
therefore crucial to investigate the meaning of suicide and the social risk factors behind this
action.
Wu points out an important difference between the Chinese and Western “paradigms”
of interpreting suicide. In the Western value system that finds its root in Christian teachings,
the discourse of humanity is based on the relationship between man and God, and “self-
preservation” is an assumption in this discourse. Durkheim’s suicide studies are based on this
tradition. On the other hand, Chinese culture places the discourse of humanity in family. The
relationship between the family and its members is the basic attribute to man’s social
existence.
He frames one’s life course from birth to death that revolves around people, property,
and ritual with the term Guorizi.85
The entire course takes place in the family setting, and
grievances in family are results from a combination of emotions and justice. Suicide is
committed when a power balance is broken in power games within the family in the course
of Guorizi. His analysis is an important context to understand existing researches on rural
Chinese suicides that attribute the root cause to “family conflicts,” which account for around
40% of all suicides in various studies.86
The problem of suicide highlights the cultural context of social aging in China.
Expectations and needs of elder people in China and in the West can be very different. We
may perceive suicide as the extreme way to rid oneself out of the result of changing
understandings of a family. This change happened very fast between 1950s and today, which
can be within one’s lifetime, and therefore acute and hard to resolve. How people perceive
old age in their life course and their value in the familial/social context is an important
85
The literal translation is “spend the day,” while I will translate it into “continuing life day by day.”
86
, , and , “ ,” , no. 03 (2011): 84–96.
49. 47
question to bear in mind when discussing measures to meet the new demands of an aging
population.
50. 48
Chapter 3
Providing Economic Security: Forward-Looking Policies
Unlike in the past, there is evidence that today’s Chinese people expect the state to
step up in providing elderly care. The Pew Research study reveals the perceived distribution
of responsibility for economic well being of the elderly among the government, their family,
and the elderly themselves. In China, 47% participants say the government bears the greatest
responsibility; 9% point to individuals, 20% point to the families, and 22% indicate “all
equally.”87
On the opposite side, in the U.S. (46%), Germany (41%) and Britain (39%),
more than one-third of the public name the elderly themselves bears the greatest
responsibility. Relatively speaking, Chinese people have high expectations for the
government to provide financial support and services for economic wellbeing in old age.
The reality is, the Chinese government will be facing a huge challenge meeting the
expectations of its people. HelpAge International, an international NGO that advocates for
and raises awareness about rights of the elderly, is the first to assess the wellbeing of older
people and present the result with an index. The Global AgeWatch Index 2014 Report ranks
countries according to the social and economic wellbeing of its elderly population. This
year’s reports focuses on income security, which “older people consistently identify as their
top priority” according to the report. Among 96 major countries in the world, China ranks 48
overall, and 72 in income security.88
87
Attitudes about Aging: A Global Perspective (Pew Research Center).
88
Global AgeWatch Index 2014 Insight Report (HelpAge International, 2014).
51. 49
In March 2015, the annual sessions of China's parliament, the National People's
Congress (NPC), and its advisory body, the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC), collectively called “National Lianghui (two conferences),” convened
in Beijing. The Lianghui is where delegates from around the country propose and approve
policies, laws, the budget and significant personnel changes. This year, elderly care is one of
the hottest topics. The Chinese government is paying much needed attention to the issue, but
with the current pace of reform, the challenge of an older population will be hard to handle.
A relative later coming in providing social insurance, China needs to act fast to
prepare itself for welfare expenditures and a different economic and social reality. It also
needs to anticipate the needs of tomorrow and design policies that are forward-looking. In
this Chapter, I will analyze four major policy areas where reforms will be crucial for China to
remain economically competitive and capable of meeting the needs of an older population.
The Pension System
A reliable and sustainable social insurance system is a crucial source of for old-age
income protection. China has a relatively short history of pension schemes compared to
highly industrialized nations. “Pension reform” is a key phrase in almost all policy
recommendations. The pension system needs to broaden coverage, close the benefit gap
between different schemes, and receive more fiscal attention.
There are two major characteristics of China’s current pension system. First, the
system was constantly under revision since its conception in 1951 due to changes in political
and economic situations and therefore ends up being very fragmented today. A total of four
52. 50
main pension and benefit schemes co-exist, creating multitier benefit levels.89
Benefits are
differential based on occupation and residential area, mainly on whether or not one is
affiliated with the government. Second, there is a significant divide in benefits between rural
and urban residents, which renders low-income rural residents most vulnerable and
economically insecure when they lose agricultural income. To those who have just started
contributing to the pension fund, pension is inadequate in providing financial support.
The first nationwide employment benefit system in China was established in 1951
when State Council issued Regulations on Labor Insurance, which applied to all types of
work-units including state-owned enterprises (SOEs), government organizations, and public
institutions (such as universities) all over China. Benefits covered pensions, medical care,
workers’ injury and compensation, maternity benefits, and a number of temporary relief
programs. In 1955 a separate pension system was created for employees in government
organs and public institutions. In 1958 the two systems were combined into a single system,
and in 1978, as the transition to a market economy began, it was divided again into two
systems, one for employees in private enterprises called the Urban Enterprise Pension
System (UEPS) and a civil service pension system for those in government organs and public
institutions. These two systems comprise the bulk of pension provision in China.90
Both systems were urban-based and operated as pay-as-you-go until the private
section became funded. One major difference between the two schemes was that the pension
system for government organs and public institutions was financed with fiscal revenue while
89
Robert C. Pozen, Tackling the Chinese Pension System, Policy Referendum (The Paulson Institute,
2013), http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/media/105497/china_pensions_pozen_english_final.pdf.
90
China’s Pension System: A Vision, Directions in Development - Human Development (The World
Bank, 2013), http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/978-0-8213-9540-0.
53. 51
that for private enterprises after 1997 was financed by individual enterprises and personal
contribution. The former was significantly more generous that the latter.
Inside a noncontributory benefit system, employees of government organs and public
institutions were not required to make individual contributions during the years of
employment. Upon retirement, they are paid with different levels of benefits based on their
wage levels prior to retirement and the number of years of employment. Usually, a retiree
from a government organ can get 90% of the basic wage if he/she has worked for 30 years.
This program covers 40 million governmental employees in 2011.
On the other hand, for each individual account on the private track, the employee
contributes 8%, the employer 20%, and the rest is matched with fiscal budget. Fifteen years
of contribution is required before pension can be collected. The result of the divide is that the
public track is 2 to 3 times more than the private track. This program covers 280 million
urban workers in 2011.
The dual-track pension system was a remnant of the socialist welfare state. This
divide continued until this year as the major employment-based pension systems in China.
The multitier benefit scheme was a main source of unfairness and public grievances. In
January 2015, an important change to the pension system is beginning of “combining tracks,”
which is expected to happen between 2015 and 2017. This means that the generous civil
service pension scheme would come to an end.
After expanding pension coverage to the entire working population, in the 2000s the
government moved towards a more comprehensive social insurance plan covering all
residents. Public pension coverage expanded significantly after 2009. In 2009, the New Rural
Pension was implemented, and the Urban Resident Pension in 2011. These two
54. 52
contributionary plans aim to cover working and non-working population. By December
2012, urban and rural participants of any form of pension scheme reached 483 million; 131
million receive monthly pension payment.91
The challenges facing the pension system are huge. One major challenge is the
enormous deficit in the pension fund. During the reform to a market economy, the pay-as-
you-go systems were proven highly unsustainable. Farid and Cozzarin quote the World Bank
statistics, which estimates China’s implicit pension debt to be 49 to 69 percent of GDP in
1997.92
In 2012, the government announced that the pension fund has a 1.9 trillion yuan
(USD 306 billion) budget surplus, but Zhengyuan Cao, Chief Economist at Bank of China,
says that the surplus needs to be 18.300 trillion yuan (USD 2.9 trillion) in 2013 if the
government were to pay the pension it had designed to pay in the next 70 years.93
The other challenge is the inadequacy of financial support for rural residents.
Expansion in pension coverage is a significant step forward, but does not equal to income
security for elderly. The pension payment for rural residents accounts for a small proportion
in their sources of support, according to Fig. 6.
91
China Report of the Development on Aging Issue 2013 (Social Sciences Academic Press China,
2013).
92
Mohamed Farid and Brian P. Cozzarin, “China’s Pension Reform: Challenges and Opportunities.,”
Pensions: An International Journal 14, no. 3 (August 2009): 181–90.
93
“ 25% 2015
,”http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20120723/031312638266.shtml
55. 53
Fig. 6. Primary Sources of Support for China’s Elderly94
China’s Pension System, a World Bank publication that investigates the system,
opens with the following statement:
A widely held view among policy makers is that the current approach to pension provision is
insufficient to enable China’s economy and population to realize its development objectives
in the years ahead.95
The pension system as an important component of social welfare is under enormous
challenge when population ages, not just in China, but around the world. On one hand, it is
clear that a more generous pension is crucial for the survival of low-income rural residents.
for On the other hand, given the economic outlook of the future, the present system will not
sustain itself unless the government makes a significant trade-off and channel more resources
to pay for pension. There is no comprehensive solution to this challenge yet. Many observers
point out larger adjustments in public programs and retirement age will be required, but the
biggest question will be “How to?”96
It is worth paying attention to what demographers,
policy analysts, and economist suggest.
Population Policies
When Beijing loosened the one child policy in 2013, opponents were worried about a
swell of new births. A year into the new policy, however, no baby boom was anywhere to be
seen. By September 2014, only around 804,000 couples applied to have a second child,
announced the National Health and Family Planning Commission, dramatically short of the
94
China’s Pension System: A Vision, (World Bank).
95
China’s Pension System: A Vision, (World Bank),1.
96
Lee and Mason, “Is Low Fertility Really a Problem? Population Aging, Dependency, and
Consumption.”
56. 54
annual two million new births projected by health officials in November 201397
. As the
policy mostly affect urban Chinese who are cautious to have more babies because of the
heavy investment in childrearing and stressful work environments, demographers observe
that the policy revision will only bring about limited birth increase.
There has long been clear evidence that a “two children” policy would not trigger
significant population growth— in fact, it may achieve more desirable demographic results.
Since 1984, an experiment was conducted in Jicheng, Shanxi province to test the outcome of
allowing two children and educating mothers to plan the second birth further apart from the
first one. After 25 years, population of Jicheng only increased by 20.7% compared to 25.5%
nationwide.
Calculations of a universal two-children policy with spacing, as advocated by Liang
Zhongtang, have demonstrated that such an approach would not only have achieved China’s
population control goal, but would also have produced more favorable social and
demographic conditions.98
The 2013 policy revision shows the government’s intention to slowly move away
from the one child policy. Many researchers have recommended the termination of the
population control scheme (Jing, 2013; Song 2014; Nie 2014) and advocate for faster reform.
Nie calls it “a policy without a future; ” Feng Wang calls it “a senseless policy” in a New
York Times article.99
However, the massive birth control apparatus created to enforce the
97
Laurie Burkitt, “China’s Changed One-Child Policy Doesn’t Give Baby Boost,” Wall Street
Journal, November 7, 2014, sec. World, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-changed-one-child-policy-doesnt-
give-baby-boost-1415359577.
98
Feng Wang and Baochang Gu, An Experiment of Eight Million People (Beijing Shi: Social Science
Academic Press, 2009).
99
Wang, “China’s ‘One-Child’ Rule Should Be Scrapped,” The New York Times, November 19, 2013.
57. 55
policy has been a main resistance to reform. It is imperative for the government to move over
indecision and delay and work immediately to phase-out the one child policy.
If we look further ahead in to the future, will China implement policies to raise its
fertility rate from its current low? The World Bank reveals that among 48 countries with a
total fertility rate below 1.8 children per woman in 2009, over 70 percent considered their
fertility too low.100
Given that China’s fertility is hovering around 1.6 and will not likely
experience substantial growth, in a few decades, China may join the countries where the
problem is too few births, not too many. Russia carried out “Year of the Family” campaign in
2008 to encourage families to have more babies; France, Sweden, and Japan to Estonia,
Canada, and Singapore have spent decades trying to goose their fertility rates.
Jianxin Li, sociology professor at Peking University says in an article that, “if a big
country [like China] does not maintain the necessary fertility rate (such as a TFR of 2), it will
lose its vitality and vigor, and therefore lose competitiveness and creativity.”101
Many
demographers hold this view and emphasize the importance of raising fertility rate to
replacement level.
The assumption that “a sub replacement fertility rate needs to be brought back to
replacement level” is hasty, if possible at all. A recent research published on Science suggests
that low fertility itself may not be a serious economic challenge. Economists Ronald Lee and
Andrew Mason examine how low fertility and population aging will influence public
100
World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” October 16, 2013,
101
“ ”
www.sachina.edu.cn/Htmldata/article/2009/03/1846.html
