1. Risk Watch Spring 2015 The Conference Board of Canada 13
I
t is widely recognized that the
effective use of technology, regard-
less of one’s industry sector, is
required in order to keep pace and
provide a competitive advantage in a
globalized economy. In fact, in many
cases, it can prove to be a game-changer
for an organization’s strategic direction.
To achieve its goals, organizations have
to work smarter and be more collab-
orative—both internally and with their
external stakeholders.
This article is part of a series that
focuses on various aspects of cyber
risk. In this first article, we explore
the need for a well-established cyber
risk framework that is integrated into
the organization’s enterprise-wide risk
management process; look at some key
questions organizations should be asking
to help frame these ever-evolving risks;
provide some statistics on the financial
impacts of cyber risk; and provide a
few “what-if” scenarios and their pos-
sible impacts and potential mitigation
strategies.
The spirit and intent of ERM is to instill
a culture of cross-functional collabora-
tion with the outcome of achieving the
organization’s objectives. This includes
working strategically and holistically on
cyber risks. For instance, organizations
should consider what could happen
when the corporate security group is not
kept in the loop and there is a missed
opportunity to avert a known threat. As
well, organizations should recognize the
outcomes if the information systems and
information technology groups didn’t
discuss hardware needs for new software
purchases. And, specifically, the organiz-
ation must consider what would happen
to its balance sheet if finance and insur-
ance were not involved in the discussion
to protect shareholder value.
A CYBER RISK FRAMEWORK
A cyber risk framework is a well-
communicated tool that is supported
by cross-functional teams that develop
strategic insight and responses to
managing these dynamic risks. An
established cyber risk framework
ensures that your company engages
and includes the right subject matter
experts in the process at the right time,
and is speaking the same language.
(See Exhibit 1 for an example of a
Cyber Risk Framework.) Elementally,
this framework embraces a response
where crisis management, investigation,
and contractual or financial risk transfer
are critical. For instance, according to a
McAfee report in 2014, Italy sustained
an $875-million economic impact of
cyber crimes (actual losses) but the
recovery and opportunity costs reached
$8.5 billion.1
QUESTIONS FOR FRAMING
CYBER RISK
The following are a few fundamental
questions about cyber risks that organ-
izations need to consider. Being able to
affirmatively answer any one of those
questions will help frame what your
organization currently has in place and
what work is left to undertake:
• Does your company have a written
cyber security risk management
strategy and governance framework?
How is it measured?
• What does cyber risk mean to your
organization? What is the true nature
of the risk (e.g., privacy, reliance on
technology/business continuity)?
• Is there a culture of awareness
among your employees?
• Which corporate cyber policies
does your organization have in place
and are they enforced? Examples
include “bring your own device”
(BYOD); employee e-mail agree-
ments; Internet use, and security
violation procedures.
1 McAfee, Intel Security, Net Losses, 18.
By Christine Maligec and Gregory Eskins
Cyber Risks: Imagining the Possible
and Plausible

2. Risk Watch Spring 2015 The Conference Board of Canada14
• What are your regulator’s expect­
ations for cyber risk standards
or controls (e.g., SOX,2 Health
Information Act (HIA), Personal
Information Protection Act (PIPA)?
• Which cyber security controls are
currently in place and how often
are they tested?
• If a material breach or other cyber
event were to occur, is there a
written/defined crisis management
protocol? Has it been tested?
• Has your company identified pos-
sible and plausible events where your
cyber infrastructure could be at risk?
2 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (often
shortened to SOX) is legislation passed by
the U.S. Congress to protect shareholders
and the general public from accounting
errors and fraudulent practices in the
enterprise, as well as improve the accuracy
of corporate disclosures.
THE VALUE OF STRUCTURED
“WHAT-IF” (SWIFT)
DISCUSSIONS AND
SCENARIO ANALYSIS
The ISO 31010:2009 risk assessment
techniques guide3 describes the SWIFT
assessment as “a system for prompting
a team to identify risk. Normally used
with a facilitated workshop. Normally
linked to a risk analysis and evaluation
technique.”4 That might be a lot of jar-
gon, but it is a conversation starter on
the possible and plausible risks. It is
more aligned with the risk identification
phase of the ISO 31000 ERM Process
Model. Additional tools—such as busi-
ness impact, or cash flow analysis
3 International Organization for Standardization
(ISO), 31010:2009 Principles and Guidelines.
4 International Organization for Standardization,
ISO 31000: Risk Management, 23.
and stress tests—would be required to
further evaluate the cyber risk and add
probability and quantum, both pre- and
post-mitigation, to understand the organ-
ization’s risk appetite.
Scenario analysis, however, has a
greater time horizon and proves more
useful where historical data on prob-
ability might not be available. Scenario
analysis aids in developing a “series
of scenarios … each one focusing on
a plausible change in parameters.”5
The advantage is not so much on risk
assessment, but being able to review
your risk assessments when monitoring
changes to your organization’s environ-
ment. For these reasons, we will explore
5 Ibid, 41.
Exhibit 1
Cyber Risk Framework
Source: Marsh Risk Consulting. (Reproduction is not permitted without the express written consent of Marsh.)
Cyber Security
Assessment
1
• STEP 1: Penetration testing
and threat intelligence
• STEP 2: Assessment of
security framework/
prevention and
emergency response
Cyber Risk
Quantification
2
• STEP 1: Risk tolerance
estimation
• STEP 2: Risk scenario
identification and
quantification
• STEP 3: Cyber risk
modelling
• STEP 4: Claim preparation
(in case of loss)
Risk Transfer Analysis
3
• STEP 1: Contractual risk
transfer with third-party
practices optimization
• STEP 2: Insurance gap
analysis and optimization
• STEP 3: Estimation of cyber
insurance cost
Actions Prioritization
and Planning
4
• STEP 1: Prioritization of
recommendations
• STEP 2: Total cost of risk
optimization

3. Risk Watch Spring 2015 The Conference Board of Canada 15
three possible scenarios, as shown
below. Still, organizations should
imagine the possible and plausible
when it comes to their own cyber risks
relative to their business.
SCENARIO 1: INTERRUPTION
BY RANSOMWARE
The mid-level manager of an architec-
ture and engineering firm received an
e-mail with an attachment. The e-mail
appeared to be from a client’s dot com
address, but the manager did not rec-
ognize the sender. Thinking nothing
of it, he opened the e-mail attachment,
which then took over his computer
and eventually the company’s network.
The manager and his colleagues sat
helplessly in front of their computers as
an image appeared and informed them
that the company was the victim of ran-
somware. They also were told that they
had 48 hours to pay $250,000 or their
systems and all data would be destroyed.
After paying the ransom, the IT depart-
ment analyzed the system to find that
not only had a number of files been
damaged, but blueprints for a client’s
proprietary process were copied and
had ended up on the Internet.
Possible and Plausible Impacts/Losses
• Damage to server and critical files
• Payment of ransom funds
• Intellectual property loss
MITIGATION STRATEGIES
Damage to Server/Critical Files
A well-designed, financial risk transfer
program for cyber-related occurrences
can assist in a number of ways.
“Damage” usually conjures up an image
of something being physically broken.
However, in the context of cyber risk,
damage is typically made to the intan-
gible data—a peril most have never
experienced. Most people have little
to no frame of reference and lack the
experience to manage an active response
or investigation. Despite the competence
of a firm’s internal IT department, the
cost of hiring an independent foren-
sics team to investigate and preserve
evidence (indeed, a crime has been com-
mitted) is extremely worthwhile from
a couple of perspectives. Engaging a
forensic team will provide an objective
picture of what has transpired. And,
given the team’s specialization, they
may be more effective with respect to
the confirmation of threat and loss con-
tainment, as well as recovery efforts.
Second, other parties—e.g., regulators—
generally prefer to see an independent
analysis (also beneficial in the event the
organization is later sued by its clients).
Ransom Funds
The actual ransom payment may or may
not be deemed a material amount. That
said, the financial loss can certainly be
insured. Beyond the actual payment,
management—and, by extension, the
organization—may be incapable of con-
ducting business while its digital assets
are encrypted. What is the impact on the
revenue stream? Perhaps revenue is only
deferred? But, nonetheless, companies
incur additional expenses to continue
operations during this time. More likely,
there will be a combination of revenue
loss and extra expense involved dur-
ing the period of restoration. Both the
actual loss of revenue and the extra
expense incurred to continue operations
are insurable.
Intellectual Property Loss
In general, the most critical asset of any
organization is its intellectual property
(IP). To the extent that IP is entrusted
to a third party, and there is a breach
of privacy of such third-party’s IP
(i.e., corporate confidential information),
a cyber policy can respond by defending
in the event of a lawsuit, and potentially
pay certain damages.
Having said the above, if it were an
organization’s own IP that was breached
(think cyber espionage), the loss of
value is essentially uninsurable at this
point in time.
SCENARIO 2: WEAK LINK IN THE
TECHNOLOGY CHAIN
A mid-sized, financial services company
moved the majority of its back office
operations to a cloud-based solution.
The prevailing strategic reasons were
cost savings on modernizing servers
and software; virtual access—any time,
any place; the most up-to-date software;
flexibility with IT use and bandwidth;
and carbon footprint reduction. The
intended outcome of this implementa-
tion was to translate into a competitive
advantage that could be passed on as
savings to the customer, and an increase
in shareholder value. The cloud provider
experienced a disruption, which took
the access to the financial company’s
software and to client files off-line for
almost a week. This was not a good
week for one client that lost several
deals and could not meet disclosure
requirements with regulators. As a result,
several clients did not renew their con-
tract or cancelled service.
Possible and Plausible Impacts/Losses
• First-party loss of business and
share value
• Third-party financial loss
• Shareholder litigation

4. Risk Watch Spring 2015 The Conference Board of Canada16
MITIGATION STRATEGIES
First-Party Loss
Many organizations think the biggest
expense resulting from a cyber threat
is to compensate individuals whose
privacy was breached. As such, many
think a financial risk transfer program
would not add any value to their mitiga-
tion planning. For a growing number
of organizations, however, business
continuity takes precedence on a scale
of likelihood and impact. Although
large-scale breaches get media atten-
tion—and can certainly have a large
financial impact on the organization—
the business interruption exposure and
costs are often overlooked.
Third-Party Financial Loss
While traditional financial risk transfer
programs may provide business inter-
ruption coverage (e.g., loss of profits/
income and/or extra expense), they
generally will not respond to a cyber
event, (i.e., an event that does not cause
physical damage). Enter cyber risk
insurance. It can be tailored to protect
against the financial loss, such as rev-
enue (more specifically, gross profits)
during an interruption of business oper-
ations; the additional expenses incurred
during the interruption; and even normal
operating costs.
The hidden wrinkle in this scenario is
that the disruption did not originate
within the financial services company
and, thus, its exposure is contingent
on another firm (its cloud technol-
ogy vendor). Given the proliferation
of cloud-based vendors—for a variety
of business functions—the potential
for a material interruption is magnified.
Shareholder Litigation
Contingent business interruption cover-
age is also something that can be
addressed via a robust cyber policy.
What cannot be insured via a cyber
policy is the loss of shareholder value.
SCENARIO 3: AN “APP” FOR THAT
A major retail chain created and
launched an “app”—which scanned
smart devices for GPS and browser
search information—to create cus-
tomized advertisements. After a very
successful marketing campaign,
hundreds of thousands of shoppers
downloaded the app, with many link-
ing their profile to other social media
and payment accounts. Vulnerability
in the code made the app a target for
a foreign, organized crime syndicate
known for stealing and selling credit
card information on the black market
to finance terrorism.
Possible and Plausible Impacts/Losses
• Crisis management and
communication assistance
MITIGATION STRATEGIES
Crisis Management and
Communication Assistance
Unlike many other insurance products,
which are purely a form of risk finan-
cing or transfer, cyber policies can pro-
vide additional resources in the form of
pre- and post-claims services. Pre-claim
services may include consultation with
a security vendor; vulnerability assess-
ments; crisis management simulation,
other risk management tools and tem-
plates; and/or tabletop exercises aimed
at prevention and mitigation. Post-claim
services typically include access to a
panel of vendors in the areas of foren-
sics, legal and public relations, notifi-
cation, and remediation (identity theft
services).
Many organizations have similar internal
functions, but perhaps not the level
of specialization of external firms.
Furthermore, pulling internal individuals
away from their core responsibilities will
surely negatively impact the business
and productivity.
Essentially, the costs incurred to conduct
a forensic investigation, respond to a
regulatory investigation, hire counsel
and a public relations firm, and notify
and communicate with the affected
(and potentially affected) individuals
are insurable.
Scenario Conclusion
In summary, cyber risk requires a clear
strategy in order to manage and monitor
it effectively. This will lead to an accept-
able level of organizational resiliency
should any of these scenarios play out.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Exhibit 2 provides definitions for
various loss categories.

5. Risk Watch Spring 2015 The Conference Board of Canada 17
Christine joined Covenant Health—
Canada’s largest Catholic health care
organization with over 14,000 phys-
icians, employees, and volunteers serving
Alberta—as its Risk Management
Advisor in 2013. Her role is focused on
designing and implementing an ERM
framework, along with supporting educa-
tion. Prior to this role, Christine served
in risk management positions within the
entertainment, post-secondary, energy,
and construction industries. She also
sits on the Northern Alberta Risk &
Insurance Management Society Board.
As national practice leader, Greg
is charged with advising clients on
emerging cyber risk issues, developing
client-specific product solutions, manag-
ing and growing market relationships,
and assisting Marsh offices/colleagues
across all industry segments. Since
joining Marsh in 2006, Greg has been
part of the Financial Institutions &
Professional Services Industry Practice
and also leads Marsh’s Cyber Risk
Practice. Greg speaks regularly on
cyber issues, and is on the advisory
committee of the International Cyber
Risk Management Conference.
Christine Maligec,
CRM-E, CRIS
Risk Management Advisor
Covenant Health
Gregory L. Eskins,
MBA candidate, CRM, CAIB
Senior Vice President,
Cyber Practice Leader
Marsh Canada
Exhibit 2
Loss Category Definitions
Loss Category Description
A Intellectual property (IP) Loss of value of an IP asset, expressed in terms of
loss of revenue as a reduced market share, as well
as lost investment (R&D).
B Business interruption Loss of profits or extra expenses incurred due to
the unavailability of IT systems or data as a result
of cyber attacks or other non-malicious IT failures.
C Data and software loss The cost to reconstitute data or software that have
been deleted or corrupted.
D Cyber extortion The cost of expert handling of an extortion incident,
combined with the ransom payment.
E Cyber crime/cyber fraud The direct financial loss suffered by an organization
arising from the use of computers to commit fraud
or theft of money, securities, or other property.
F Breach of privacy event The cost to investigate and respond to a privacy
breach event, including IT forensics and notifying
affected individuals, as well as third-party liability
claims arising from the same incident, and fines
from regulators and industry associations.
G Network failure liabilities Third-party liabilities from certain security events
occurring within the organization’s IT network
or passing through it (without the organization’s
cooperation) in order to attack a third party.
H Impact on reputation Loss of revenues arising from an increase in cus-
tomer churn or reduced transaction volumes, which
can be directly attributed to the publication of a
defined security breach event.
I Physical asset damage First-party loss due to the destruction of physical
property resulting from cyber attacks.
J Death and bodily injury Third-party liability for death and bodily injuries
resulting from cyber attacks.
K Incident investigation
and response costs
Direct costs incurred to investigate and “close”
the incident and minimize post-incident losses.
This applies to all other categories/events.
Source: Marsh Cyber Risk Practice (Marsh Canada Limited). (Reproduction is not permitted without the
express written consent of Marsh.)

6. Risk Watch Spring 2015 The Conference Board of Canada18
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International Organization for
Standardization (ISO). Risk
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Techniques. Mississauga: Canadian
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––. Principles and Guidelines. 2009.
www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:31000:
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McAfee, Intel Security. The Economic
Impact of Cyber Crime and Cyber
Espionage. July 2013.
www.mcafee.com/ca/resources/reports/
rp-economic-impact-cybercrime.pdf.
––. Net Losses: Estimating the Global
Cost of Cybercrime—Economic Impact
of Cybercrime II. June 2014.
www.mcafee.com/ca/resources/reports/
rp-economic-impact-cybercrime2.pdf.
U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission’s Office of Compliance
Inspections and Examinations (OCIE).
National Exam Program Risk Alert:
OCIE Cybersecurity Initiative. April 15,
2014. www.sec.gov/ocie/announcement/
Cybersecurity+Risk+Alert++%2526+
Appendix+-+4.15.14.pdf.